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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, and pursuant to
the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to
the Senate thirteen detailed staff reports, set forth in this volume,
which supplement Book II.of the Committee's final report entitled
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. These staff reports
present, in substantially greater detail, the results of the Committee's
inquiry into various areas which were highlighted in the final report.
Once again I want to gratefully acknowledge the great effort, dedica-
tion, 'and talent of the Committee staff. The principal authors and edi-
tors of these reports are indicated in Appendix C of Book II of the
final report.
Finally, I want to express the deep appreciation of the Committee to
Senator Walter F. Mondale for his excellent supervision of the prepa-
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COINTELPRO: THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS
AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
COINTELPRO is the FBI acronym for a series of covert action
programs directed against domestic groups. In these programs, the
Bureau went beyond the collection of intelligence to secret action de-
signed to "disrupt" and "neutralize" target groups and individuals.
The techniques were adopted wholesale from wartime counterintelli-
gence, and ranged from the trivial (mailing reprints of Reader's
Digest articles to college administrators) to the degrading (sending
anonymous poison-pen letters intended to break up marriages) and thedangerous (encouraging gang warfare and falsely labeling membersof a violent group as polce in formers).
This report is based on a staff study of more than 20,000 pages ofBureau documents, depositions of many of the Bureau agents involved
in the programs, and interviews of several COINTELPRO targets.
The examples selected for discussion necessarily represent a small per-
centage of the more than 2,000 approved COINTELPRO actions.
Nevertheless, the cases demonstrate the consequences of a Government
agency's decision to take the law into its own hands for the "greater
good" of the country.
COINTELPRO began in 1956, in part because of frustration with
Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceedovertly against dissident groups; it ended in 1971 with the threat ofpublic exposure., In the intervening 15 years, the Bureau conducted
a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarel at preventing theexercise of First Amendment rights of speech an association, on thetheory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propa-gation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deterviolence.2
Many of the techniques used would be intolerable in a democraticsociety even if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity,
but COINTELPRO went far beyond that. The unexpressed majorpremise of the programs was that a law enforcement agency has theduty to do whatever is necessary to combat perceived threats to theexisting social and political order.
On March 8, 1971, the FBI resident ageiicy in Media, Pennslyrania, was brokeninto. Documents stolen in the break-in were widely circulated and published bythe press. Since some documents carried a "COINTELPRO" caption-a wordunknown outside the Bureau-Carl Stern, a reporter for NBC, commenced aFreedom of Information Act lawsuit to compel the Bureau to produce other docu-ments relating to the programs. The Bureau decided because of "securityreasons" to terminate them on April 27, 1971. (Memorandum from C. D. Brennanto W. C. Sullivan, 4/27/71; Letter from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 4/28/71.)
2The Bureau's direct attacks on speaking, teaching, writing, and meeting arediscussed at pp. 28-33, attempts to prevent the growth of groups are set forthat pp. 34-440.
A. "Counterintelligence Program": A Misnomer for Domestic Covert
Action
COINTELPRO is an acronym for "counterintelligence program."
Counterintelligence is defined as those actions by an intelligence
agency intended to protect its own security and to undermine hostile
intelligence operations. Under COINTELPRO certain techniques the
Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adopted for use
against perceived domestic threats to the established political and
social order. The formal programs which incorporated these tech-
niques were, therefore, also called "counterintelligence." 2a
"Covert action" is, however, a more accurate term for the Bureau's
programs directed against American citizens. "Covert action" is the
label applied to clandestine activities intended to influence political
choices and social values.3
B. Who Were the Targets?
1. The Five Targeted Groups
The Bureau's covert action programs were aimed at five perceived
threats to domestic tranquility: the "Communist Party, USA" pro-
gram (1956-71); the "Socialist Workers Party" program (1961-69);
the "White Hate Group" program (1964-71); the "Black Nationalist-
Hate Group" program (1967-71); and the "New Left" program
(1968-71).
2. Labels Without Meaning
The Bureau's titles for its programs should not be accepted un-
critically. They imply a precision of definition and of targeting which
did not exist.
Even the names of the later programs had no clear definition. The
Black Nationalist program, according to its supervisor, included "a
great number of organizations that you might not today characterize
as black nationalist but which were in fact primarily black." 3a In-
deed, the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference
was labeled as a Black Nationalist "Hate Group." 4 Nor could anyone
at the Bureau even define "New Left," except as "more or less an at-
titude." 5
Furthermore, the actual targets were chosen from a far broader
group than the names of the programs would imply. The CPUSA
program targeted not only Party members but also sponsors of the
. For a discussion of U.S. intelligence activities against hostle foreign in-
telligence operations, see Report on Counterintelligence.
'See Senate Select Committee Report, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Leaders" and Staff Report: "Covert Action in Chile."
' Black Nationalist Supervisor deposition, 10/17/75, p. 12.
'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67, p. 2.
'New Left Supervisor's deposition, 10/28/75, p. 8. The closest any Bureau docu-
ment comes to a definition is found in an investigative directive: "The term
'New Left' does not refer to a definite organization, but to a movement which
is providing ideologies or platforms alternate to those of existing communist
and other basic revolutionary organizations, the so-called 'Old Left.' The New
Left movement is a loosely-bound, free-wheeling, college-oriented movement
spearheaded by the Students for a Demorcatic Society and includes the more
extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and anti-draft protest organizations."
(Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/28/68; Hearings. Vol. 6,
Exhibit 61, p. 669.) Although this characterization is longer than that of the
New Left Supervisor, it does not appear to be substantively different.
National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities
Committee 6 and civil rights leaders allegedly under Communist in-
fluence or simply not "anti-Communist." 7 The Socialist Workers
Party program included non-SWP sponsors of antiwar demonstra-
tions which were cosponsored by the SWP or the Young Socialist Al-
liance, its youth group. The Black Nationalist program targeted a
range of organizations from the Panthers to SNCC to the peaceful
Southern Christian Leadership Conference,9 and included most black
student groups. 0 New Left targets ranged from the SDS n to the In-
teruniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,12 from all of
Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left") 13 to the New Mexico
Free University '1 and other "alternate" schools," and from under-
ground newspapers 16 to students protesting university censorship of
a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on
them."
C. What Were the Purposes of COINTELPRO?
The breadth of targeting and lack of substantive content in the
descriptive titles of the programs reflect the range of motivations for
COINTELPRO activity: protecting national security, preventing
violence, and maintaining the existing social and political order by
"disrupting" and "neutralizing" groups and individuals perceived
as threats.
1. Protecting National Security
The first COINTELPRO, against the CPUSA, was instituted to
counter what the Bureau believed to be a threat to the national security.
As the chief of the COINTELPRO unit explained it:
We were trying first to develop intelligence so we would know
what they were doiig [and] second, to contain the threat....
To stop the spread of communism, to stop the effectiveness
of the Communist Party as a vehicle of Soviet intelligence,
propaganda and agitation.17a
Had the Bureau stopped there, perhaps the term "counterintel-
ligence" would have been an accurate label for the program. The ex-
'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.
"One civil rights leader, the subject of at least three separate counterintel-
ligence actions under the CPUSA caption, was targeted because there was no
"direct evidence" that he was a communist, "neither is there any substantial
evidence that he is anti-communist." One of the actions utilized information
gained from a wiretap; the other two involved dissemination of personal life in-
formation. (Memorandum from J.A. Sizoo to W.C. Sullivan, 2/4/64; Memorandum
from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/12/64; Memoranda from
FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 3/26/64 and 4/10/64; Memorandum
to New York Field Offide from FBI Headquarters, 4/21/64; Memorandum from
FBI Headquaters to Baltimore Field Office, 10/6/65.)
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.
'FBI Headquarters memorandum, 8/25/67, p. 2.
1o Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Jackson Field Office, 2/8/71, pp.
1-2.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 10/31/68.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/26/66.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 6/18/68.
"-Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albuquerque Field Office, 3/14/69.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office. 7/23/69.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 11/14/69.
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
".COINTELPRO Unit Chief deposition, 10/16/75, p. 14.
pansion of the CPUSA program to non-Communists, however, and
the addition of subsequent programs, make it clear that other pur-
poses were also at work.
2. Preventing Violenwe
One of these purposes was the prevention of violence. Every Bureau
witness deposed stated that the purpose of the particular program or
programs with which he was associated was to deter violent acts by
the target groups, although the witnesses differed in their assessment
of how successful the programs were in achieving that goal. The pre-
ventive function was not, however, intended to be a product of specific
proposals directed at specific criminal acts. Rather, the programs were
aimed at groups which the Bureau believed to be violent or to have the
potential for violence.
The programs were to prevent violence by deterring membership
in the target groups, even if neither the particular member nor the
group was violent at the time. As the supervisor of the Black National-
ist COINTELPRO put it, "Obviously you are going to prevent vio-
lence or a greater amount of violence if you have smaller groups."
(Black Nationalist supervisor deposition, 10/17/75, p. 24.) The COIN
TELPRO unit chief agreed: "We also made an effort to deter or
counteract the propaganda . . . and to deter recruitment where we
could. This was done with the view that if we could curb the organiza-
tion, we could curb the action or the violence within the organiza-
tion." 17b In short, the programs were to prevent violence indirectly,
rather than directly, by preventing. possibly violent citizens from
joining or continuing to associate with possibly violent groups.'8
The prevention of violence is clearly not, in itself, an improper
purpose; preventing violence is the ultimate goal of most law enforce-
ment. Prosecution and sentencing are intended to deter future crimi-
nal behavior, not only of the subject but also of others who might
break the law. In that sense, law enforcement legitimately attempts
the indirect prevention of possible violence and, if the methods used
are proper, raises no constitutional issues. When the government goes
beyond traditional law enforcement methods, however, and attacks
group membership and advocacy, it treads on ground forbidden to it
by the Constitution. In Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that the government is not permitted to "forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where
such advocacy is directed toward inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action." In the ab-
sence of such clear and present danger, the government cannot act
against speech nor, presumably, against association.
3. Maintaining the Existing Social and Political Order
Protecting national security and preventing violence are the pur-
poses advanced by the Bureau for COINTELPRO. There is another
purpose for COINTELPRO which is not explicit but which offers
17 Unit Chief deposition, 10/16/75, p. 54.
1 "Possibly violent" did not necessarily mean likely to be violent. Concededly
non-violent groups were targeted because they might someday change; Martin
Luther King, Jr. was targeted because (among other things) he might "abandon
his supposed 'obedience' to 'white, liberal doctrines' (non-violence) and embrace
black nationalism." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68,
p. 3.)
the only explanation for those actions which had no conceivable ra-
tional relationship to either national security or violent activity.
The unexpressed major premise of much of COINTELPRO is that
the Bureau has a role in maintaining the existing social order, and
that its efforts should be aimed toward combating those who threaten
that order. 9
The "New Left" COINTELPRO presents the most striking exam-
ple of this attitude. As discussed earlier, the Bureau did not define the
term "New Left," and the range of targets went far beyond alleged'subversives" or "extremists." Thus, for example, two student par-
ticipants in a "free speech" demonstration were targeted because they
defended the use of the classic four-letter word. Significantly, they
were made COINTELPRO subjects even though the demonstration
"does not appear to be inspired by the New Left" because it "shows
obvious disregard for decency and established morality." 20 In another
case, reprints of a newspaper article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says
Withdrawal Not the Answer" were mailed to members of the Vietnam
Day Committee "to convince [them] of the correctness of the U.S. for-
eign policy in Vietnam." 21 Still another document inveighs against the
"liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left" which
were "taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the
Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized
law enforcement agencies." " Upholding decency and established
morality, defending the correctness of U.S. foreign policy, and attack-
ing those who thought the Chicago police used undue force have no
apparent connection with the expressed goals of protecting national
security and preventing violence. These documents, among others
examined, compel the conclusion that Federal law enforcement offi-
cers looked upon themselves as guardians of the status quo. The at-
titude should not be a surprise; the difficulty lies in the choice
of weapons.
D. What Techniques Were Used?
1. The Techniques of Wartime
Under the COINTELPRO programs, the arsenal of techniques
used against foreign espionage agents was transferred to domestic
enemies. As William C. Sullivan, former Assistant to the Director,
put it,
This is a rough, tough, dirty business, and dangerous. It was
dangerous at times. No holds were barred... . We have used
[these techniques] against Soviet agents. They have used
[them] against us. . .. [The same methods were] brought
home against any organization against which we were tar-
geted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough busi-
ness.2 3
Mr. Sullivan's description-rough, tough, and dirty-is accurate. In
the course of COINTELPRO's fifteen-year history, a number of in-
" This attitude toward change is apparent in many of those Bureau activities
investigated by the Committee. It played a large part in the Martin Luther King,
Jr. case, which is the subject of a separate report.
FBI Headquarters memorandum, 11/4/68.
n Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/1/65.
" Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/29/64, pp. 1-8.
, William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.
dividual actions may have violated specific criminal statutes; 24 a num-
ber of individual actions involved risk of serious bodily injury or
death to the targets (at least four assaults were reported as "re-
sults") ; 25 and a number of actions, while not illegal or dangerous, can
only be described as "abhorrent in a free society." 26 On the other hand,
many of the actions were more silly than repellent.
The Bureau approved 2,370 separate counterintelligence actions.
7
Their techniques ranged from anonymously mailing reprints of news-
paper and magazine articles (sometimes Bureau-authored or planted)
to group members or supporters to convince them of the error of their
ways, 28 to mailing anonymous letters to a member's spouse accusing
the target of infidelity; 29 from using informants to raise controver-
sial issues at meetings in order to cause dissent,3 0 to the "snitch jacket"
(falsely labeling a group member as an informant) 31 and encourag-
ing street warfare between violent groups; 32 from contacting mem-
bers of a "legitimate group to expose the alleged subversive back-
ground of a fellow member,"3 to contacting an employer to get a tar-
get fired; 34 from attempting to arrange for reporters to interview
targets with planted questions,"" to trying to stop targets from speak-
ing at all; 36 from notifying state and local authorities of a target's
criminal law violations,3 7 to using the IRS to audit a professor, not
just to collect any taxes owing, but to distract him from his political
activities.38
2 A memorandum prepared for the Justice Department Committee which
studied COINTELPRO in 1974 stated that COINTELPRO activities "may" have
violated the Civil Rights statute, the mail and wire fraud statutes, and the pro-
hibition against divulging information gained from wiretaps. (Memorandum
to H. E. Petersen, 4/25/74.) Internal Bureau documents show that Bureau
officials believed sending threats through the mail might violate federal extor-
tion statutes. (See, e.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field
Office, 2/19/71.) Such threats were mailed or telephoned on several occasions.
.Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/70.
20 Hearing of the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights
11/20/74, p. 11. The Petersen Committee, composed of Department of Justice
attorneys and Bureau agents, was formed in 1974 at the request of Attorney
General Saxbe to investigate COINTELPRO. Its conclusions are discussed on
pp. 73-76.
" 3,247 actions were proposed.
' E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
11/1/65.
* E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
11/26/68.
' E.g., Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/12/68.
n E.g., Memorandum from Newark Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/3/69.
The term "snitch jacket" is not part of Bureau jargon; it was used by those
familiar with the Bureau's activities directed against the Black Panther Party
in a staff interview.
* E.g., Memorandum from Columbia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/4/70.
* E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 8/2/68.
3 E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland and Boston Field
Offices, 5/5/64.
I E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office,
11/18/69.
" E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office,
4/6/70.
3 E.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office,
11/19/70.
Is E.g., Memorandum from Midwest City Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/1/68.
2. Techniques Carrying A Serious Risk of Physical, Emotional,
or Economic Damage.
The Bureau recognized that some techniques were more likely than
others to cause serious physical, emotional, or economic damage to the
targets. Any proposed use of those techniques was scrutinized care-
fully by headquarters supervisory personnel, in an attempt to balance
the "greater good" to be achieved by the proposal against the known
or risked harm to the target. If the "good" was sufficient, the proposal
was .approved.39 For instance, in discussing anonymous letters to
spouses, the agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO
stated:
[Before recommending approval] I would want to know
what you want to get out of this, who are these people. If it's
somebody, and say they did split up, what would accrue from
it as far as disrupting the New Left is concerned? Say they
broke up, what then....
[The question would be] is it worth it ? 39a
Similarly, with regard to the "snitch jacket" technique-falsely
labeling a group member as a police informant-the chief of the Racial
Intelligence Section stated:
You have to be able to make decisions and I am sure that
labeling somebody as an informant, that you'd want to make
certain that it served a good purpose before you did it and not
do it haphazardly. . . . It is a serious thing. . . . As far as
I am aware, in the black extremist area, by using that tech-
nique, no one was killed. I am sure of that.4 0
Moore was asked whether the fact that no one was killed was the
result of "luck or planning." He answered:
"Oh, it just happened that way, I am sure." e4
It is thus clear that, as Sullivan said, "No holds were barred," 42
although some holds were weighed more carefully than others.
When the willingness to use techniques which were concededly dan-
gerous or harmful to the targets is combined with the range of pur-
poses and criteria by which these targets were chosen, the result is
neither "within bounds" nor "justified" in a free society.43
Mechanically, the Bureau's programs were administered at headquarters.
but individual actions were proposed and usually carried out by the field. A
field proposal under the COINTELPRO caption would be routed to a special
agent supervising that particular program. During most of COINTELPRO's
history that supervisor was a member of the section at the Domestic Intelligence
Division with investigative responsibility for the subject of the proposal. The
supervisor's recommendation then went up through the Bureau hierarchy. Pro-
posals were rarely approved below the level of Assistant Director in charge of
the Division, and often were approved by one of the top three men in the Bureau.
'm New Left supervisor testimony, 10/28/75, pp. 72, 74.
'0 George C. Moore testimony, 11/3/75, p. 62.
nMoore, 11/3/75, p. 64.
"Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 97.
* James B. Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 73, 75.
E. Legal Restrictions Were Ignored
What happened to turn a law enforcement agency into a law viola-
tor? Why do those involved still believe their actions were not only
defensible, but right ? 44
The answers to these questions are found in a combination of factors:
the availability of information showing the targets' vulnerability
gathered through the unrestrained collection of domestic intelligence;
the belief both within and without the Bureau that it could handle
any problem; and frustration with the apparent inability of tradi-
tional law enforcement methods to solve the problems presented.
There is no doubt that Congress and the public looked to the Bureau
for protection against domestic and foreign threats. As the COINTEL
PRO unit chief stated:
At this time [the mid-1950s] there was a general philosophy
too, the general attitude of the public at this time was you did
not have to worry about Communism because the FBI would
take care of it. Leave it to the FBI.
I hardly know an agent who would ever go to a social affair
or something, if he were introduced as FBI, the comment
would be, "we feel very good because we know you are han-
dling the threat." We were handling the threat with what
directives and statutes were available. There did not seem to
be any strong interest of anybody to give us stronger or better
defined statutes.4 5
Not only was no one interested in giving the Bureau better statutes
(nor, for that matter, did the Bureau request them), but the Supreme
Court drastically narrowed the scope of the statutes available. The
Bureau personnel involved trace the institution of the first formal
counterintelligence program to the Supreme Court reversal of the
Smith Act convictions. The unit chief testified:
The Supreme Court rulings had rendered the Smith Act
technically unenforceable. . . . It made it ineffective to prose-
cute Communist Party members, made it impossible to prose-
cute Communist Party members at the time.46
This belief in the failure of law enforcement produced the subsequent
COINTELPROs as well. The unit chief continued:
" The unit chief stated: "The Bureau people did not think that they were doing
anything wrong and most of us to this day do not think we were doing anything
wrong." (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 102.) Moore felt the same way: "I thought I
did something very important during those days. I have no apologies to make
for anything we did, really." (Moore 11/3/75, p. 25.)
* Unit chief, 10/16/75, pp. 11, 12, 14.
Unit chief, 10/10/75, pp. 12-14, Deputy Associate Director Adams' testimony
on COINTELPRO noted that "interpretations as to the constitutionality of [the
Smith Act of 1940] leave us with a statute still on the books that proscribes cer-
tain actions, but yet the degree of proof necessary to operate under the few
remaining areas is such that there was no satisfactory way to proceed." (Adams
testimony, 11/19/75. Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 71.) In fact, the Smith Act decisions
did not come down until 1957. Perhaps the witnesses were referring to Commit-
nist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board. 351 U.S. 115 (1956), which
held that testimony by "tainted" Government witnesses required remanding the
case to the Board.
The other COINTELPRO programs were opened as the
threat arose in areas of extremism and subversion and there
were not adequate statutes to proceed against the organiza-
tion or to prevent their activities.4 7
Every Bureau witness deposed agreed that his particular
COINTELPRO was the result of tremendous pressure on the Bureau
to do something about a perceived threat, coupled with the inability of
law enforcement techniques to cope with the situation, either because
there were no pertinent federal statutes,4 8 or because local law enforce-
ment efforts were stymied by indifference or the refusal of those in
charge to call the police.
Outside pressure and law enforcement frustration do not, of course,
fully explain COINTELPRO. Perhaps, after all, the best explanation
was proffered by George C. Moore, the Racial Intelligence Section
chief :
The FBI's counterintelligence program came up because there
was a point-if you have anything in the FBI, you have an
action-oriented group of people who see something happen-
ing and want to do something to take its place.4 9
F. Command and Control
1. 1956-71
While that "action-oriented group of people" was proceeding with
fifteen years of COINTELPRO activities, where were those respon-
sible for the supervision and control of the Bureau? Part of the answer
lies in the definition of "covert action"-clandestigie activities. No one
outside the Bureau was supposed to know that COINTELPRO ex-
isted. Even within the Bureau, the programs were handled on a "need-
to-know" basis.
Nevertheless, the Bureau has supplied the Committee with docu-
ments which support its contention that various Attorneys General,
advisors to Presidents, members of the House Appropriations Sub-
committee, and, in 1.958, the Cabinet were at least put on notice of the
existence of the CPUSA and White Hate COINTELPROs. The
Bureau cannot support its claim that anyone outside the FBI was
informed of the existence of the Socialist Workers Party, Black
Nationalist, or New Left COINTELPROs, and even those letters or
" Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 15.
" One witness also pointed out that while the federal antiriot and antibomb-
ing statutes were not passed until 1968, inadequate statutes were not the only
problem. Statutes directed at specific criminal acts would only have served to
allow prosecution after the crime; they would not have prevented the act in the
first place. He also stated that he did not believe it would be possible to pass
a statute which would have given the Bureau the tools necessary to prevent
violence by disrupting the growth of violence-prone organizations-"because of
something called the United States Constitution." When asked whether that an-
swer implied that preventing the growth of an organization is unconstitutional,
he answered, "I think so." (Black Nationalist supervisor. 10/1/75, pp. 25-26.)
He was the only Bureau witness who had reservations about COINTELPRO's
constitutionality. Another witness gave a more typical response. When asked
whether anybody at any time during the course of the programs discussed their
constitutionality or legal authority, he replied. "No, we never gave it a thought."
(Moore, 11/3/75. p. 83.)
"Moore, 11/3/75, p. 79.
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briefings which referred (usually indirectly) to -the CPUSA and
White Hate COINTELPROs failed to mention the use of techniques
which risked physical, emotional, or economic damage to their targets.
In any event, there is no record that any of these officials asked to
know more, and none of them appears to have expressed disapproval
based on the information they were given.
As the history of the Domestic Intelligence Division shows, the
absence of disapproval has been interpreted by the Bureau as suffi-
cient authorization to continue -an activity (and occasionally, even
express disapproval has not sufficed to stop a practice). Perhaps,
however, the crux of the "command and control" problem lies in the
testimony by one former Attorney General that he was too busy to
know what the Bureau was doing, 0 and by another that, as a matter
of political reality, he could not have stopped it anyway.5'
2. Post-1971
Whether the Attorney General can control the Bureau is still an
open question. The Petersen Committee, which was formed within
the Justice Department to investigate COINTELPRO at Attorney
General Saxbe's request, worked only with Bureau-prepared
summaries of the COINTELPRO files. 52 Further, the fact that the
Department of Justice must work with the Bureau on a day-to-day
basis may influence the Department's judgment on Bureau activities."
G. Termination
If COINTELPRO had been a short-lived aberration, the thorny
problems of motivation, techniques, and control presented might be
safely relegated to history. However, COINTELPRO existed for
years on an "ad hoc" basis before the formal programs were instituted,
and more significantly, COINTELPRO-type activities may continue
today under the rubric of "investigation."
1. The Grey Area Between Counterintelligence and Investiga-
tion
The word "counterintelligence" had no fixed meaning even before
the programs were terminated. The Bureau witnesses agreed that there
is a large grey area between "counterintelligence" and "aggressive
investigation," and that headquarters supervisors sometimes had diffi-
culty in deciding which caption should go on certain proposals."
Aggressive investigation continues, and may be even more disrup-
tive than covert action. An anonymous letter (COINTELPRO) can
be ignored as the work of a crank; an overt approach by the Bureau
" Ramsey Clark testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 249.
"Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testimony. 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 217.
"These summaries were the point of departure for the Select Committee's
investigation but were deemed unsatisfactory for a complete inquiry.
" For instance, the Department is defending litigation commenced against
the Bureau by COINTELPRO victims who happen to have received their files
through Freedom of Information Act requests. More such litigation may arise
as more targets learn of Bureau actions taken against them.
' The New Left supervisor stated, "[The COINTELPRO caption was] as much
as it was anything else, and administrative device to channel the mail to the Bu-
reau . . . we get back to this old argument between the supervisors-not argu-
ment, but discussion, between the supervisors, it falls on yours, no, it doesn't, it's
yours." (New Left Supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 
4 9 .)
("investigation") is not so easily dismissed.55 The line between infor-
mation collection and harassment can be extremely thin.
2. Is COIATTELPRO Continuing?
COINTELPRO-type activities which are clearly not within the
"grey area" between COINTELPRO and investigation have continued
on at least three occasions. Although all COINTELPROs were offi-
cially terminated "for security reasons" on April 27, 1971, the docu-
inents discontinuing the program provided:
In exceptional circumstances where it is considered counter-
intelligence action is warranted, recommendations should be
submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to
which it pertains. These recommendations will be considered
on an individual basis.50
The Committee requested that the Bureau provide it with a list of
any "COINTELPRO-type" actions since April 28, 1971. The Bureau
first advised the Committee that a review failed to develop any infor-
mation indicating post-termination COINTELPRO activity. Subse-
quently, the Bureau located and furnished to the Committee two
instances of COINTELPRO-type operations.," The Committee has
discovered a third instance; four months after COINTELPRO was
terminated, information on an attorney's political background was
furnished to friendly newspaper sources tinder the so-called "Mass
Media Program," intended to discredit both the attorney and his
client.ss
The Committee has not been able to determine with any greater
precision the extent. to which COINTELPRO may be continuing. Any
proposals to initiate COINTELPRO-type action would be filed under
the individual case caption. The Bureau has over 500,000 case files,
and each one would have to be searched. In this context, it should be
" The Bureau can and does reveal its interest in the subjects of investigation
to employees, family members, and neighbors. The Black Nationalist super-
visor explained, "Generally speaking, we should not be giving out information
to somebody we are trying to get information from. As a practical matter some-
times we have to. The mere fact that you contact somebody about someone
gives them the indication that the FBI is interested in that person." (Black
Nationalist deposition, 10/17/75, p. 16). See also the statement of the Social
Workers Party, 10/2/75, which details more than 200 incidents involving its
members since COINTELPRO's termination. The SWP believes these to be as
disruptive as the formal SWP COINTELPRO.
" Memorandum from Charles D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 4/27/71,
Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 55-3.
17 In one instance, a field office was authorized to contact the editor of a South-
ern newspaper to suggest that he have reporters interview Klan members and.
write an article based on those interviews. The editor was also furnished informa-
tion on Klan use of the polygraph to "weed out FBI informants." According to
the Bureau, "subsequent publication of the Klan's activities resulted in a number
of Klan officials ceasing their activities." (Letter from FBI to the Senate Select
Committee 10/24/75.) The second case involved an anonymous letter and de-
rogatory newspaper clipping which were sent to a Black Panther Party office in
the Northeast to discredit a Panther leader's abilities. (Letter from FBI to the
Senate Select Committee, 9/24/75.)
5 It should be noted that Charles Colson spent seven months in jail for similar
activity involving the client.
noted that a Bureau search of all field office COINTELPRO files
revealed the existence of five operations in addition to those known to
the Petersen committee. 9 A search of all investigative files might be
similarly productive.
3. The Future of COINTELPRO
Attitudes within and without the Bureau demonstrate a continued
belief by some that covert action against American citizens is permis-
sible if the need for it is strong enough. When the Petersen Committee
report on COINTELPRO was released, Director Kelley responded,
"For the FBI to have done less under the circumstances would have
been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people."
He also restated his "feeling that the FBI's counterintelligence pro-
grams had an impact on the crises of the time and, therefore, that they
helped to bring about a favorable change in this country." 60 In his
testimony before the Select Committee, Director Kelley continued to
defend COINTELPRO, albeit with some reservations:
What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is that
the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they
felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Congress, and the people of the United States....
Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Coun-
terintelligence Programs, and there were some substantial
ones, should not obscure the underlying purpose of those
programs.
We must recognize that situations have occurred in the.past
and will arise in the future where the Government may well
be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's
case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency,
and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an immi-
nent threat to human life or property.62
Nor is the Director alone in his belief that faced with sufficient
threat, covert disruption is justified. The Department of Justice pro-
mulgated tentative guidelines for the Bureau which would have per-
mitted the Attorney General to authorize "preventive action" where
69 Letter from Attorney General Edward H. Levi to the Senate Select Commit-
mittee, 5/23/75. These included: (1) 37 actions authorized between 1960 and
1971 "aimed at militant groups which sought Puerto Rican independence;" (2)
"Operation Hoodwink," from October 1966 to July 1968, "aimed 'at putting orga-
nized crime elements in competition with the Communist Party USA;" (3) a
1961 program targeted against "a foreign-dominated group;" (4) two actions
taken between January 1969 and March 1971 against "a foreign nationality group
in the United States;" and (5) seven actions between 1961 and 1968 against
members, leaders, and factions of "a foreign communist party."
The FBI's operations against "a foreign communist party" indicate that the
Bureau, as well as the CIA, has engaged in covert action abroad.
* Clarence M. Kelley testimony, House Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee hearings, 11/20/74, pp. 44-45. This statement appears to be an
explicit recognition that one purpose of COINTELPRO was to influence political
events.
" Clarence M. Kelley testimony, 12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 283, 284.
Affirmative legal steps to meet an imminent threat to life or property are, of
course, quite proper. The difficulty with the Director's statement, juxtaposed
as it was with a discussion of COINTELPRO, is that the threats COINTELPRO
purported to meet were not imminent, the techniques used were sometimes
illegal, and the purposes went far beyond the prevention of death or destruction.
there is a substantial possibility that violence will occur and "prose-
cution is impracticable." Although those guidelines have now been
dropped, the principle has not been rejected.
II. THE FIVE DOMESTIC PROGRAMS
A. Origin8
The origins of COINTELPRO are rooted in the Bureau's jurisdic-
tion to investigate hostile foreign intelligence activities on American
soil. Counterintelligence, of course, goes beyond investigation; it is
affirmative action taken to neutralize hostile agents.
The Bureau believed its wartime counterattacks on foreign agents
to be effective-and what works against one enemy will work against
another. In the atmosphere of the Cold War, the American Communist
Party was viewed as a deadly threat to national security.
In 1956, the Bureau decided that a formal counterintelligence pro-
gram, coordinated from headquarters, would be an effective weapon inthe fight against Communism. The first COINTELPRO was there-
fore initiated.63
The CPUSA COINTELPRO accounted for more than half of all
approved proposals. 64 The Bureau personnel involved believed thatthe success of the program-one action was described as "the most
effective single blow ever dealt the organized communist move-
ment" 6 5-made counterintelligence techniques the weapons of choice
whenever the Bureau assessed a new and, in its view, equally serious
threat to the country.
As noted earlier, law enforcement frustration also played a part
in the origins of each COINTELPRO. In each case, Bureau wit-
nesses testified that the lack of adequate statutes, uncooperative orineffective local police, or restrictive court rulings had made it impos-
sible to use traditional law enforcement methods against the tar-geted groups.
Additionally, a certain amount of empire building may have been
at work. Under William C. Sullivan, the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion greatly expanded its jurisdiction. Klan matters were transferred
in 1964 to the Intelligence Division from the General Investigative
Division; black nationalist groups were added in 1967; and, just as
the Old Left appeared to be dying out,66 the New Left was gradually
added to the work of the Division's Internal Security Section in the
late 1960s.
Finally, it is significant that the five domestic COINTELPROs
were started against the five groups which were the subject of inten-
sified investigative programs. Of course, the fact that such intensive
investigative programs were started at all reflects the Bureau's proc-
ess of threat assessment,: the greater the threat, the more need to
a AMemorandum from Alan Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 8/28/56, Hearings,
vol. 6, exhibit 12.
* 1,388 of a total of 2,370.
6 Excerpt from materials prepared for the FBI Director's briefing of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee, FY 1966, p. 2.
* According to Sullivan. membership in the Communist Party declined steadily
through the '60s. When the CPUSA membership dropped below a certain figure,
Director Hoover ordered that the membership figures be classified. Sullivan
believes that this was done to protect the Bureau's appropriations. (Sullivan,
11/1/75, pp. 33-34.)
know about it (intelligence) and the more impetus to counter it
(covert action). More important, however, the mere existence of
the additional information gained through the investigative pro-
grams inevitably demonstrated those particular organizational or
personal weaknesses which were vulnerable to disruption. COIN
TELPRO demonstrates the dangers inherent in the overbroad col-
lection of domestic intelligence; when information is available, it can
be-and was-improperly used.
B. The Programs
Before examining each program in detail, some general observa-
tions may be useful. Each of the five domestic COINTELPROs had
certain traits in common. As noted above, each program used tech-
niques learned from the Bureau's wartime efforts against hostile
foreign agents. Each sprang from frustration with the perceived
inability of law enforcement to deal with what the Bureau believed
to be a serious threat to the country. Each program depended on an
intensive intelligence effort to provide the information used to dis-
rupt the target groups.
The programs also differ to some extent. The White Hate program,
for example, was very precisely targeted; each of the other programs
spread to a number of groups which do not appear to fall within any
clear parameters." In fact, with each subsequent COINTELPRO,
the targeting became more diffuse.
The White Hate COINTELPRO also used comparatively few
techniques which carried a risk of serious physical, emotional, or eco-
nomic damage to the targets, while the Black Nationalist COIN
TELPRO used such techniques extensively. The New Left COIN
TELPRO, on the other hand, had the highest proportion of proposals
aimed at preventing the exercise of free speech. Like the progression
in targeting, the use of dangerous, degrading, or blatantly uncon-
stitutional techniques also appears to have become less restrained with
each subsequent program.
1. OPUSA.-The first official COINTELPRO program, against
the Communist Party, USA, was started in August 1956 with Direc-
tor Hoover's approval. Although the formal program was instituted
in 1956, COINTELPRO-type activities had gone on for years. The
memorandum recommending the program refers to prior actions,
constituting "harassment," which were generated by the field during
the course of the Bureau's investigation of the Communist Party."
These prior actions were instituted on an ad hoc basis as the oppor-
tunity arose. As Sullivan testified, "[Before 1956] we were engaged in
COINTELPRO tactics, divide, confuse, weaken in diverse ways, an
organization. . . . [Before 1956] it was more sporadic. It depended
on a given office. . . ." "
In 1956, a series of field conferences was held to discuss the develop-
ment of new security informants. The Smith Act trials and related
proceedings had exposed over 100 informants, leaving the Bureau's
I For instance, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference was targeted
as a "Black Nationalist-Hate Group." (Memorandum from FBI headquarters
to all SAC's, 3/4/68, p. 4.)
* Memorandum from Alan Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 8/28/56, Hearings,
Vol. 6. exhibit 12.
* Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 42-43.
intelligence apparatus in some disarray. During the field conferences,a formal counterintelligence program was recommended, partly be-
cause of the gaps in the informant ranks. 0
Since the Bureau had evidence that until the late 1940s the CPUSA
had been "blatantly" involved in Soviet espionage, and believed that
the Soviets were continuing to use the Party for "political and intel-
ligence purposes," 71 there was no clear line of demarcation in the
Bureau's switch from foreign to domestic counterintelligence. The
initial areas of concentration were the use of informants to capitalize
on the conflicts within the Party over Nikita Khrushchev's denuncia-
tion of Stalin; to prevent the CP's efforts to take over (via a merger)
a broad-hased socialist group; to encourage the Socialist Workers
Party in its attacks on the CP; and to use the IRS to investigate under-
ground CP umenibers who either failed to file, or filed under false
names.
As the program proceeded, other targets and techniques were de-
veloped, but until 1960 the CPUSA targets were Party members, and
the techniques were primarily aimed at the Party organization (fac-
tionalism, public exposure, etc.)
2. The 1960 Expansion.-In March 1960, CPUSA COINTELPRO
field offices received a directive to intensify counterintelligence
efforts to prevent Communist infiltration ("COMINFIL") of mass
organizations, ranging from the NAACP 72 to a local scout troop.73
The usual technique would be to tell a leader of the organization about
the alleged Communist in its midst, the target, of course, being the
alleged Communist rather than the organization. In an increasing
number of cases, however, both the alleged Communist and the organi-
zation were targeted, usually by planting a news article about Com-
munists active in the organization. For example, a newsman was given
information about Communist participation in a SANE march, with
the express purpose being to discredit SANE as well as the partici-
pants, and another newspaper was alerted to plans of Bettina Apth-
eker to join a United Farm Workers picket line."4 The 1960 "COMIN
FIL" memorandum marks the beginning of the slide from targeting
CP members to those allegedly under CP "influence" (such civil rights
leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr.) to "fellow travelers" (those tak-
ing positions supported by the Communists, such as school integration,increased minority hiring, and opposition to HUAC.) 7
3. Socialist Workers Party.-The Socialist Workers Party
("SWP") COINTELPRO program was initiated on October 12, 196f,
by the headquarters supervisor handling the SWP desk (but with
Hoover's concurrence) apparently on a theory of even-handed treat-
"As noted earlier, Bureau personnel also trace the decision to adopt counter-
intelligence methods to the Supreme Court decisions overturning the Smith Actconvictions. As the unit chief put it, "The Supreme Court rulings had rendered
the 'Smith Act technically unenforceable. . . . It made it ineffective to prosecuteCommunist Party members, made it impossible to prosecute Communist Partymembers at the time." (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 14).
"Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 10.
Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/24/60.
PP Memorandum from Milwaukee Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/13/60,pp. 1-2.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/13/68."Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 29.
ment: if the Bureau has a program against the CP, it was only fair to
have one against the Trotskyites. (The COINTELPRO unit chief, in
response to a question about why the Bureau targeted the SWP in
view of the fact that the SWP's hostility to the Communist Party had
been useful in disrupting the CPSUA, answered, "I do not think that
the Bureau discriminates against subversive organizations.") 76
The program was not given high priority-only 45 actions were ap-
proved-and was discontinued in 1969, two years before the other four
programs ended. (The SWP program was then subsumed in the New
Left COINTELPRO.) Nevertheless, it marks an important departure
from the CPUSA CO1NTELPRO: although the SWP had contacts
with foreign Trotskyite groups, there was no evidence that the SWP
was involved in espionage. These were, in C. D. Brennan's phrase,
"home grown tomatoes." " The Bureau has conceded that the SWP has
never been engaged in organizational violence, nor has it taken any
criminal steps towaid overthrowing the country."'
Nor does the Bureau claim the SWP was engaged in revolutionary
acts. The Party was targeted for its rhetoric; significantly, the orig-
inating letter points to the SWPs "open" espousal of its line "through
running candidates for public office" and its direction and/or support
of "such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in
the South." Further, the American people had to be alerted to the
fact that "the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the
revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin, and Engles as interpreted
by Leon Trotsky." 7
Like the CPUSA COINTELPRO, non-Party members were also
targeted, particularly when the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance
(the SWP's youth group) started to co-sponsor antiwar marches.
0
4. White Hate.-The Klan COINTELPRO began on July 30,
1964, with the transfer of the "responsibility for development of in-
formants and gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate
groups" from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic
Intelligence Division. The memorandum recommending the reorgani-
zation also suggested that "counterintelligence and disruption tactics
be given further study by DID and appropriate recommendations
made." "
" Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 40.
"Charles D. Brennan testimony, Senate Select Committee on Campaign Ac-
tivities, 6/13/73, p. 10.
Robert Shackleford testimony, 2/6/76, pp. 88-89.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters.
For example, anonymous letters were sent to the parents of two nonmember
students participating in a hunger strike against the war at a midwest college,
because the fast was sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance. The letters
warned that the students' participation "could lead to injury to [their] health
and damage [their] academic standing," and alerted them to their sons' "involve-
ment in left wing activities." It was hoped that the parents would "protest to the
college that the fast is being allowed" and that the Young Socialist Alliance was
permitted on campus. (Memorandum from FBI headquarters to Cleveland Field
Office, 11/29/68.)
81 Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Charles Tolsen, 7/30/64, p. 5. Opinion within
the Division had been sharply divided on the merits of this transfer. Some saw
it as an attempt to bring the Intelligence Division's expertise in penetrating
secret organizations to bear on a problem-Klan involvement in the murder of
civil rights workers-creating tremendous pressures on the Bureau to solve.
Traditional law enforcement methods were insufficient because of a lack of
Accordingly, on September 2, 1964, a directive was sent to seventeen
field offices instituting a COINTELPRO against Klan-type and hate
organizations "to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activi-
ties of the various Klans and hate organizations, their leadership, and
adherents." 82 Seventeen Klan organizations and nine "hate" organiza.-
tions (e.g., American Nazi Party, National States Rights Party, etc.)
were listed as targets. The field offices were also instructed specifically
to consider "Action Groups"-"the relatively few individuals in each
organization who use strong arm tactics and violent actions to achieve
their ends." " However, counterintelligence proposals were not to be
limited to these few, but were to include any influential member if
the opportunity arose. As the unit chief stated:
The emphasis was on determining the identity and exposing
and neutralizing the violence prone activities of "Action
Groups," but also it was important to expose the unlawful
activities of other Klan organizations. We also made an effort
to deter or counteract the propaganda and to deter violence
and to deter recruitment where we could. This was done with
the view that if we could curb the organization, we could curb
the action or the violence within the organization."'
The White Hate COINTELPRO appears to have been limited, with
few exceptions,"@ to the original named targets. No "legitimate" right
wing organizations were drawn into the program, in contrast with the
earlier spread of the CPUSA and SWP programs to non members.
This precision has been attributed by the Bureau to the superior intel-
ligence on "hate" groups received by excellent informant penetration.
Bureau witnesses believe the Klan program to have been highly
effective. The unit chief stated:
I think the Bureau got the job done.. .. I think that one
reason we were able to get the job done was that we were
able to use counterintelligence techniques. It is possible that
-we eventually could have done the job without counterintelli-
gence'techniques. I am not sure we could have done it as well
or as quickly.8 '
This view was shared by George C. Moore, Section Chief of the
Racial Intelligence Section, which had responsibility for the White
Hate and Black Nationalist COINTELPROs:
I think from what I have seen and what I have read, as far
as the counterintelligence program on the Klan is concerned,
that it was effective. I think it was one of the most effective
Federal statutes and the noncooperation of local law enforcement. Others thought
that the Klan's activities were essentially a law enforcement problem, and that
the transfer would dilute the Division's major internal security responsibility.
Those who opposed the transfer lost, and trace many of the Division's subsequent
difficulties to this "substantial enlargement" of the Division's responsibilities.
("Unit chief, 10/16/75, pp. 45-47.)
" Memorandum from FRI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 9/2/64, p. 1.
FBI Headquarters memorandum, 9/2/64, p. 3.
* Unit Chief, 10/14/75, p. 54.
'A few actions were approved against the "Minutemen," when it became
known that members were stockpiling weapons.
" Unit Chief, 10/16/75, p. 48.
programs I have ever seen the Bureau handle-as far as any
group is concerned.8 '
5. Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.8 8-In marked contrast to prior
COINTELPROs, which grew out of years of intensive intelligence
investigation, the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO and the racial
intelligence investigative section were set up at about the same time
in 1967.
Prior to that time, the Division's investigation of "Negro matters"
was limited to instances of alleged Communist infiltration of civil
rights groups and to monitoring civil rights protest activity. However,
the long, hot summer of 1967 led to intense pressure on the Bureau
to do something to contain the problem, and once again, the Bureau
heeded the call.
The originating letter was sent out to twenty-three field offices on
August 25, 1967, describing the program's purpose as
. . . to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise
neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type
organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen.
membership, and supporters, and to counter their pro-
pensity for violence and civil disorder. . . . Efforts of the
various groups to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or
youthful adherents must be frustrated."9
Initial group targets for "intensified attention" were the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinat-
ing Committee, Revolutionary Action Movement, Deacons for Defense
and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam.
Individuals named targets were Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown,
Elijah Muhammed, and Maxwell Stanford. The targets were chosen
by conferring with Headquarters personnel supervising the racial
cases; the list was not intended to exclude other groups known to the
field.
According to the Black Nationalist supervisor, individuals and or-
ganizations were targeted because of their propensity for violence or
their "radical or revolutionary rhetoric [and] actions":
Revolutionary would be [defined as] advocacy of the over-
throw of the Government. . . . Radical [is] a loose term that
might cover, for example, the separatist view of the Nation of
Islam, the influence of a group called U.S. Incorporated. ...
Generally, they wanted a separate black nation.... They [the
NOI] advocated formation of a separate black nation on the
territory of five Southern states."o
8 7Moore, 11/3/75, p. 31.
m8Note that this characterization had no substantive meaning within the
Bureau. See p. 4.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAO's, 8/25/67.
" Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, pp. 66--67. The supervisor stated that
individual NOI members were involved with sporadic violence against police, but
the organization was not itself involved in violence. (Black National super-
visor. 10/17/75. p. 67.) Moore agreed that the NOI was not involved in organi-
zational violence, adding that the Nation of Islam had been unjustly blamed for
violence in the ghetto riots of 1967 and 1968: "We had a good informant coverage
of the Nation of Islam. . . . We were able to take a very positive stand and tell
the Department of Justice and tell everybody else who accused the Nation of
The letter went on to direct field offices to exploit conflicts within and
between groups; to use news media contacts to disrupt, ridicule, or dis-
credit groups; to preclude "violence-prone" or "rabble rouser" lead-
ers of these groups from spreading their philosophy publicly; and to
gather information on the "unsavory backgrounds"-immorality, sub-
versive activity, and criminal activity-of group members."'
According to George C. Moore, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference was included because
... at that time it was still under investigation because of the
communist infiltration. As far as I know, there were not any
violent propensities, except that I note . .. in the cover memo
[expanding the program] or somewhere, that they mentioned
that if Martin Luther King decided to go a certain way, he
could cause some trouble.... I cannot explain it satisfacto-
rily . . . this is something the section inherited.92
On March 4, 1968, the program was expanded from twenty-three
to forty-one field offices."' The letter expanding the program lists five
long-range goals for the program:
(1) to prevent the "coalition of militant black nationalist
groups," which might be the first step toward a real "Mau
Mau" in America;
(2) to prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could "unify,
and electrify," the movement, naming specifically Martin
Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammed;
(3) to prevent violence on the part of black nationalist
groups, by pinpointing "potential troublemakers" and neu-
tralizing them "before they exercise their potential for
violence;"
(4) to prevent groups and leaders from gaining "respect-
ability" by discrediting them to the "responsible" Negro com-
munity, to the white community (both the responsible com-
munity and the "liberals"-the distinction is the Bureau's),
and to Negro radicals; and
Islam. .. [that they] were not involved in any of the riots or disturbances. Elijah
Muhammed kept them under control, and he did not have them on the streets at
all during any of the riots." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 36.)
When asked why, therefore, the NOT was included as a target, Mr. Moore
answered: "Because of the potential, they did represent a potential . . . they
were a paramilitary type. They had drills, the Fruit of Islam, they had the
capability because they were a force to be reckoned with, with the snap of his
finger Elijah Muhammed could bring them into any situation. So that there was
a very definite potential, very definite potential." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 37.)
" The unit chief, who wrote the letter on instructions from his superiors, con-
cedes that the letter directed field offices to gather personal life information on
targets, not for "scandalous reasons," but "to deter violence or neutralize the ac-
tivities of violence-prone groups." (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 66.)
Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 37, 39, 40.
Primary targets listed in this second letter are the Southern Christian Lead-
ership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Revolution-
ary Action Movement, Nation of Islam, Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown,
Martin Luther King. Maxwell Stanford, and Elijah Muhammed. CORE was
dropped for reasons no witness was able to reconstruct. The agent who prepared
the second letter disagreed with the inclusion of the SOLO, but lost. (Black
Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 14.)
(5) to prevent the long range growth of these organiza-
tions, especially among youth, by developing specific tactics
to "prevent these groups from recruiting young people." 94
6. The Panther Directives.-The Black Panther Party ("BPP")
was not included in the first two lists of primary targets (August
1967 and March 1968) because it had not attained national importance.
By November 1968, apparently the BPP had become sufficiently active
to be considered a primary target. A letter to certain field offices with
BPP activity dated November 25, 1968, ordered recipient offices to
submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures
aimed at crippling the BPP." Proposals were to be received every two
weeks. Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing upon the
differences between the BPP and US, Inc. (Ron Karenga's group),
which had reached such proportions that "it is taking on the aura
of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals." 9
On January 30, 1969, this program against the BPP was expanded
to additional offices, noting that the BPP was attempting to create
a better image. In line with this effort, Bobby Seale was conducting
a "purge" 9 6 of the party, including expelling police informants.
Recipient offices were instructed to take advantage of the opportunity
to further plant the seeds of suspicion concerning disloyalty among
ranking officials.97
Bureau witnesses are not certain whether the Black Nationalist
program was effective. Mr. Moore stated:
I know that the ... overall results of the Klan [COINTEL
PRO] was much more effective from what I have been told
than the Black Extremism [COINTELPRO] because of the
number of informants in the Klan who could take action
which 'would be more effective. In the Black Extremism
Group . . . we got a late start because we did not have ex-
tremist activity [until] '67 and '68. Then we had to play
catch-up.... It is not easy to measure effectiveness.... There
were policemen killed in those days. There were bombs
thrown. There were establishments burned with molotov
cocktails.... We can measure that damage. You cannot meas-
ure over on the other side, what lives were saved because
somebody did not leave the organization or suspicion was
sown on his leadership and this organization gradually de-
clined and [there was] suspicion within it, or this organiza-
tion did not join with [that] organization as a result of a
black power conference which was aimed towards consolida-
tion efforts. All we know, either through their own ineptitude,
maybe it emerged through counterintelligence, maybe, I think
we like to think that that helped to do it, that there was not
this development. . . . What part did counterintelligence
[play?] We hope that it did play a part. Maybe we just gave
it a nudge." 98
" Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68, pp. 3-4.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 11/25/68.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's. 1/30/69.
* This technique, the "snitch jacket," was used in all COINTELPRO pro-
grams.
a' Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 34, 50-52.
7. New Left.-The Internal Security Section had undergone a
slow transition from concentrating on the "Old Left"-the CPUSA
and SWP-to focusing primarily on the 'activities of the "New
Left"-a term which had no precise definition within the Bureau.99
Some agents defined "New Left" functionally, by connection with
protests. Others defined it by philosophy, particularly antiwar
philosophy.
On October 28, 1968, the fifth and final COINTELPRO was started
against this undefined group. The program was triggered in part by
the Columbia campus disturbance. Once again, law enforcement meth-
ods had broken down, largely (in the Bureau's opinion) because col-
lege administrators refused to call the police on campus to deal with
student demonstrations. The atmosphere at the time was described
by the Headquarters agent who supervised the New Left
COINTELPRO:
During that particular time, there was considerable public,
Administration-I mean governmental Administration-
[and] news media interest in the protest movement to the ex-
tent that some groups, I don't recall any specifics, but some
groups were calling for something to be done to blunt or re-
duce the protest movements that were disrupting campuses.
I can't classify it as exactly an hysteria, but there was con-
siderable interest [and concern]. That was the framework
that we were working with... . It would be my impression
that as a result of this hysteria, some governmental leaders
were looking to the Bureau.o
And, once again, the combination of perceived threat, public outcry,
and law enforcement frustration produced a COINTELPRO.
According to the initiating letter, the counterintelligence program's
purpose was to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activi-
ties of the various New Left organizations, their leadership, and ad-
herents, with particular attention to Key Activists, "the moving forces
behind the New Left." The final paragraph contains an exhortation to
a "forward look, enthusiasm, and interest" because of the Bureau's
concern that "the anarchist activities of a few can paralyze institutions
of learning, induction centers, cripple traffic, and tie the arms of law
enforcement officials all to the detriment of our society." The internal
memorandum recommending the program further sets forth the Bu-
reau's concerns:
Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence
caused to a large extent -by various individuals generally con-
nected with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolu-
tion in America and call for the defeat of the United States
in Vietnam. They continually and falsely allege police bru-
* As the New Left supervisor put it, "I cannot recall any document that was
written defining New Left as such. It is my impression that the characteriza-
tion of New Left groups rather than being defined at any specific time by docu-
ment, it more or less grew.... Agreeing it was a very amorphous term, he added:
"It has never been strictly defined, as far as I know.... It is more or less an
attitude. I would think." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, pp. 7-8.)
New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, pp. 21--22.
tality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful actsto further
their so-called causes.
The document continues:
The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurri-
lously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt
to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the
college campuses.' 0
Based on those factors, the Bureau decided to institute a new
COINTELPRO.
8. New Left Directives.-The Bureau's concern with "tying the
hands of law enforcement officers," and with the perceived wea.mess
of college administrators in refusing to call police onto the campus,
led to a May 23, 1968, directive to all participating field offices to
gather information on three categories of New Left activities:
(1) false allegations of police brutality, to "counter the
wide-spread charges of police brutality that invariably arise
following student-police encounters";
(2) immorality, depicting the "scurrilous and depraved
nature of many of the characters, activities, habits, and living
conditions representative of New Left adherents"; and
(3) action by college administrators, "to show the value of
college administrators and school officials taking a firm stand,"
and pointing out "whether and to what extent faculty mem-
bers rendered aid and encouragement."
The letter continues, "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must
be vigorously and enthusiastically explored. It cannot be expected
that information of this type will be easily obtained, and an imagina-
tive approach by your personnel is imperative to its success." 103
The order to furnish information on "immorality" was not carried
out with sufficient enthusiasm. On October 9, 1968, headquarters sent
another letter to all offices, taking them to task for their failure to
"remain alert for and to seek specific data depicting the depraved
nature and moral looseness of the New Left" and to "use this material
in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them." 04
Recipient offices were again instructed to be "particularly alert for this
type of data" 105 and told:
. Memorandum from Charles D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.
'
0 Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 5/23/68.
Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SACs, 10/9/68.
This time the field offices got the message. One example of information
furnished under the "Immorality" caption comes from the Boston field office;
"[Informant] who has provided reliable information in the past concerning
the activities of the New Left in the Metropolitan Boston area, has advised that
numerous meetings concerning anti-Vietnam and/or draft activity are conducted
by members sitting around the table or a living room completely in the nude.
These same individuals, both male and female, live and sleep together regularly
and it is not unusual to have these people take up residence with a different
partner after a six or seven month period.
"According to the informant, the living conditions and habits of some of the
New Left adherents are appalling in that certain individuals have been known
to wear the same clothes for an estimated period of weeks and in some instances
As the current school year commences, it can be expected that
the New Left with its anti-war and anti-draft entourage will
make every effort to confront college authorities, stifle mili-
tary recruiting, and frustrate the Selective Service System.
Each office will be expected, therefore, to afford this program
continuous effective attention in order that no opportunity
will be missed to destroy this insidious movement. 0
As to the police brutality and "college administrator" categories,
the Bureau's belief that getting tough with students and demonstrators
would solve the problem, and that any injuries which resulted were
deserved, is reflected in the Bureau's reaction to allegations of police
brutality following the Chicago Democratic Convention.
On August 28, 1968, a letter was sent to the Chicago field office
instructing it to "obtain all possible evidence that would disprove
these charges" [that the Chicago police used undue force] and to "con-
sider measures by which cooperative news media may be used to coun-
teract these allegations." The administrative "note" (for the file)
states:
Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the
forces on the left are taking advantage of the situation in
Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to
attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies....
We should be mindful of this situation and develop all pos-
sible evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false
allegations.107
In the same vein, on September 9, 1968, an instruction was sent to
all offices which had sent informants to the Chicago convention dem-
onstrations, ordering them to debrief the informants for information
"indicating incidents were staged to show police reacted with undue
force and any information that authorities were baited by militants
into using force." 108 The offices were also to obtain evidence of possible
violations of anti-riot laws.109
The originating New Left letter had asked all recipient offices to
respond with suggestions for counterintelligence action. Those re-
for months. Personal hygiene and eating habits are equally neglected by thesepeople, the informant said.
"The informant has noted that those individuals who most recently joinedthe movement are in most instances the worst offenders as far as moral andpersonal habits are concerned. However, if these individuals remain in themovement for any length of time. their appearance and personal habits appearto improve somewhat." (Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Head-quarters, 6/13/68.)
a Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/9/68.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 8/28/68.
o Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's. 9/9/68.
Note that there was no attempt to determine whether the allegations weretrue. Ramsey Clark, Attorney General at the time, testified that he did not knowthat either directive had been issued and that "they are highly improper." Healso noted that the Bureau's close working relationship with state and local policeforces had made it necessary to "preempt the FBI" in cases involving the investi-gation of police misconduct; "we found it necessary to use the Civil Rights Divi-sion, and that is basically what we did." (Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings Vol. 6. pp.254-255.)
sponses were analyzed and a letter sent to all offices on July 6, 1968,
setting forth twelve suggestions for counterintelligence action which
could be utilized by all offices. Briefly the techniques are:
(1) preparing leaflets designed to discredit student demonstrators,
using photographs of New Left leadership at the respective universi-
ties. "Naturally, the most obnoxious pictures should be used";
(2) instigating "personal conflicts or animosities" between New Left
leaders;
(3) creating the impression that leaders are "informants for the
Bureau or other law enforcement agencies";
(4) sending articles from student newspapers or the "underground
press" which show the depravity of the New Left to university offi-
cials, donors, legislators, and parents. "Articles showing advocation
of the use of narcotics and free sex are ideal";
(5) having members arrested on marijuana charges;
(6) sending anonymous letters about a student's activities to par-
ents, neighbors, and the parents' employers. "This could have the effect
of forcing the parents to take action";
(7) sending anonymous letters or leaflets describing the "activities
and associations" of New Left faculty members and graduate assist-
ants to university officials, legislators, Boards of Regents, and the press.
"These letters should be signed 'A Concerned Alumni,' or 'A Con-
cerned Taxpayer'";
(8) using "cooperative press contacts" to emphasize that the "dis-
ruptive elements" constitute a "minority" of the students. "The press
should demand an immediate referendum on the issue in question";
(9) exploiting the "hostility" among the SDS and other New Left
groups toward the SWP, YSA., and Progressive Labor Party;
(10) using "friendly news media" and law enforcement officials to
disrupt New Left coffeehouses near military bases which are attempt-
ing to "influence members of the Armed Forces",
(11) using cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters to "ridi-
cule" the New Left; and
(12) using "misinformation" to "confuse and disrupt" New Left
activities, such as by notifying members that events have been can-
celled.o1 0
As noted earlier, the lack of any Bureau definition of "New Left"
resulted in targeting almost every anti-war group,"' and spread to
students demonstrating against anything. One notable example is a
proposal targeting a student who carried an "obscene" sign in a demon-
stration protesting administration censorship of the school newspaper,
no Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 7/6/68.
m The New Left supervisor confirmed what the documents reveal: "legitimate"
(nonviolent) antiwar groups were targeted because they were "lending aid and
comfort" to more disruptive groups. According to the New Left supervisor:
"This [nonviolent groups protesting against the war] was the type of thing
that the New Left, the violent portion, would seize upon. They could use the
legitimacy of an accepted college group or outside group to further their inter-
ests." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 39)
Nonviolent groups were thus disrupted so there would be less opportunity for
a violent group to make use of them and their respectability. Professors active in
"New Left matters," whether involved in violence or just in general protest, were
targeted for "using [their] good offices to lend aid and comfort to the entire
protest movement or to help disrupt the school through [their] programs." (New
Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 69.)
and another student who sent a letter to that paper defending the
demonstration.112 In another article regarding "free love" on a univer-
sity campus was anonymously mailed to college administrators and
state officials since free love allows "an atmosphere to build up on
campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left." 113
None of the Bureau witnesses deposed believes the New Left COIN
TELPRO was generally effective, in part because of the imprecise
targeting.
III. THE GOALS OF COINTELPRO: PREVENTING OR DISRUPTING THE EXERCISE
OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The origins of COINTELPRO demonstrate that the Bureau adopt-
ed extralegal methods to counter perceived threats to national security
and public order because the ordinary legal processes were believed to
be insufficient to do the job. In essence, the Bureau took the law into
its own hands, conducting a sophisticated vigilante operation against
domestic enemies.
The risks inherent in setting aside the laws, even though the pur-
pose seems compelling at the time, were described by Tom Charles
Huston in his testimony before the Committee: 114
The risk was that you would get people who would be sus-
ceptible to political considerations as opposed to national
security considerations, or would construe political con-
siderations to be national security considerations, to move
from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and
from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper
sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just keep going
down the line. 115
The description is apt. Certainly, COINTELPRO took in a stag-
gering range of targets. As noted earlier, the choice of individuals
and organizations to be neutralized and disrupted ranged from the
violent elements of the Black Panther Party to Martin Luther King,
Jr., who the Bureau concedes was an advocate of nonviolence; from
the Communist Party to the Ku Klux Klan; and from the advocates
of violent revolution such as the Weathermen, to the supporters of
peaceful social change, including the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign
Policy.
The breadth of targeting springs partly from a lack of definition
for the categories involved, and partly from the Bureau's belief that
dissident speech and association should be prevented because they were
incipient steps toward the possible ultimate commission of an act
which might be criminal. Thus, the Bureau's self-imposed role as pro-
tector of the existing political and social order blurred the line be-
u Memorandum from FBI Headquarters, Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
"3 -Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 8/27/68.
"' Huston was the Presidential assistant who coordinated the 1970 recom-
mendations by an interagency committee for expanded domestic intelligence,
including concededly illegal activity. The so-called "Huston Plan" is the sub-
ject of a separate report.
"'Tom Charles Huston testimony, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.
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tween targeting criminal activity and constitutionally protected acts
and advocacy.
The clearest example of actions directly aimed at the exercise of con-
stitutional rights are those targeting speakers, teachers, writers or
publications, and meetings or peaceful demonstrations."' Approxi-
mately 18 percent of all approved COINTELPRO proposals fell into
these categories."'
The cases include attempts (sometimes successful) to get university
and high school teachers fired; to prevent targets from speaking on
campus; to stop chapters of target groups from being formed; to
prevent the distribution of books, newspapers, or periodicals; to dis-
rupt news conferences; to disrupt peaceful demonstrations, including
the SCLC's Washington Spring Project and Poor People's Campaign,
and most of the large antiwar marches; and to deny facilities for meet-
ings or conferences.
A. Efforts to Prevent Speaking
An illustrative example of attacks on speaking concerns the plans of
a dissident stockholders' group to protest a large corporation's war
production at the annual stockholders meeting." The field office was
authorized to furnish information about the group's plans (obtained
from paid informants in the group) to a confidential source in the
company's management. The Bureau's purpose was not only to "cir-
cumvent efforts to disrupt the corporate meeting," but also to prevent
any attempt to "obtain publicity or embarrass" corporate officials.""
In another case, 20 anonymous telephone calls were made to the edi-
torial desks of three newspapers in a Midwestern city, advising them
that a lecture to be given on a university campus was actually being
sponsored by a Communist-front organization. The university had
recently lifted its ban on Communist speakers on campus and was ex-
periencing some political difficulty over this decision. The express pur-
pose of the phone calls was to prevent a Communist-sponsored speaker
from appearing on campus and, for a time, it appeared to have worked.
One of the newspapers contacted the director of the university's con-
ference center. He in turn discussed the meeting with the president of
" The usual constitutional inquiry is whether the government is "chilling"
First Amendment rights by indirectly discouraging a protected activity while
pursuing an otherwise legitimate purpose. In the case of COINTELPRO, the
Bureau was not attempting indirectly to chill free speech or association; it was
squarely attacking their exercise.
n" The percentage is derived from a cross-indexed tabulation of the Petersen
Committee summaries. Interestingly, these categories account for 39 percent of
the approved "New Left" proposals, which reflects both the close connection be-
tween antiwar activities and the campuses, and the "aid and comfort" theory of
targeting, in which teachers were targeted for advocating an end to the war
through nonviolent means.
" The group was composed largely of university teachers and clergymen who
had bought shares in order to attend the meeting. (Memorandum from Minne-
apolis Field Office to FBI headquarters, 4/1/70.)
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 4/23/70;
memorandum from Minneapolis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/1/70.
'2 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/26/60;
Memoranda from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/27/60, 10/28/60,
10/31/60; Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to Alan H. Belmont, 10/26/60.
the university who decided to cancel the meeting.' The sponsoring
organization, supported by the ACLU, took the case to court, and won
a ruling that the university could not bar the speaker. (Bureau head-
quarters then ordered the field office to furnish information on the
judge.) Although the lecture went ahead as scheduled, headquarters
commended the field office for the affirmative results of its suggestion:
the sponsoring organization had been forced to incur additional ex-
pense and'attorneys' fees, and had received newspaper exposure of its
"true communist character."
B. Efforts to Prevent Teaching
Teachers were targeted because the Bureau believed that they were
in a unique position to "plant the seeds of communism [or whatever
ideology was under attack] in the minds of unsuspecting youth." Fur-
ther, as noted earlier, it was believed that a teacher's position gave
respectability to whatever cause he supported. In one case, a high
school teacher was targeted for inviting two poets to attend a class
-at his school. The poets were noted for their efforts in the draft re-
sistance movement. This invitation led to an investigation by the local
police, which in turn provoked sharp criticism from the ACLU. The
field office was authorized to send anonymous letters to two local
newspapers, to the city Board of Education, and to the high school
administration, suggesting that the ACLU should not criticize the
police for probing into high school activities, "but should rather have
focused attention on [the teacher] who has been a convicted draft
dodger." The letter continued, " [the teacher] is the assault on aca-
demic freedom and not the local police." The purpose of the letter,
according to Bureau documents, was "to highlight [the teacher's]
antidraft activities at the local high school" and to "discourage any
efforts" he may make there. The letter was also intended to "shov
support for the local police against obvious attempts by the New
Left to agitate in the high schools." 122 No results were reported.
In another case, 1 2 a university professor who was "an active par-
ticipant in New Left demonstrations" had publicly surrendered his
draft card and had been arrested twice (but not convicted) in antiwar
demonstrations. The Bureau decided that the professor should be"removed from his position" at the university. The field office was au-
thorized to contact a "confidential source" at a foundation which
contributed substantial funds to the university, and "discreetly suggest
that the [foundation] may desire to call to the attention of the Univer-
sity administration questions concerning the advisability of [the pro-
fessor's] continuing his position there." The foundation official was
told by the university that the professor's contract would not be re-
newed, but in fact the professor did continue to teach. The following
' It is interesting to note that after the anonymous calls to the newspapers
giving information on the "communist nature" of the sponsor, the conference
center director called the local FBI office to ask for information on the speaker.
He was informed that Bureau records are confidential and that the Bureau could
not make any comment.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 6/19/69.123 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 5/1/70.
academic year, therefore, the field office was authorized to furnish
additional information to the foundation official on the professor's
arrest and conviction (with a suspended sentence) in another demon-
stration. No results were reported.
In a third instance, the Bureau attempted to "discredit and neutral-
ize" a university professor and the Inter-University Committee for
Debate on Foreign Policy, in which he was active. The field office was
authorized to send a fictitious-name letter to influential state political
figures, the mass media, university administrators, and the Board of
Regents, accusing the professor and "his protestin cohorts" of "giving
aid and comfort to the enemy," and wondering 'if the strategy is to
bleed the United States white by prolonging the war in Vietnam and
pave the way for a takeover by Russia." No results were reported.12 4
C. Efforts to Prevent Writing and Publishing
The Bureau's purpose in targeting attempts to speak was explicitly
to prevent the "propagation" of a target's philosophy and to deter "re-
cruitment" of new members. Publications and writers appear to have
been targeted for the same reasons. In one example'12 two university
instructors were targeted solely because they were influential in the
publication of and contributed financial support to a student "under-
ground" newspaper whose editorial policy was described as "left-of-
center, anti-establishment, and opposed [to] the University adminis-
tration." The Bureau believed that if the two instructors were forced
to withdraw their support of the newspaper, it would "fold and cease
publication. . . . This would eliminate what voice the New Left has in
the area." Accordingly, the field office was authorized to send an
anonymous letter to a university official furnishing information con-
cerning the instructors' association with the newspaper, with a warn-
ing that if the university did not persuade the instructors to cease their
support, the letter's author would be forced to expose their activities
publicly. The field office reported that as a result of this technique,
both teachers were placed on probation by the university president,
which would prevent them from getting any raises.
Newspapers were a common target. The Black Panther Party paper
was the subject of a number of actions, both because of its contents and
because it was a source of income for the Party.126 Other examples in-
clude contacting the landlord of premises rented by two "New Left"
newspapers in an attempt to get them evicted; 127 an anonymous letter
to a state legislator protesting the distribution on campus of an under-
ground newspaper "representative of the type of mentality that is fol-
"* Memoranudm from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/11/66;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/26/66.
1" Memorandum from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70; memo-
randum from FBI Headquarters to Mobile Field Office, 12/31/70; memorandum
from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/3/71.
' In one example, a letter signed "A Black Parent" was sent to the mayor, the
Superintendent of Schools, the Commander of the American Legion, and two
newspapers in a northeastern city protesting a high school's subscription to the
BPP newspaper. The letter was also intended to focus attention on the teacher
who entered the subscription "so as to deter him from implementing black ex-
tremist literature and philosophy into the Black History curriculum" of the school
system. (Memorandum from Buffalo Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/5/70.)
x" Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to SAC, Los Angeles Field Office, 9/23/68.
lowing the New Left theory of immorality on certain college cam-
puses ; 18 a letter signed "Disgusted Taxpayer and Patron" to ad-
vertisers in a student newspaper intended to "increase pressure on the
student newspaper to discontinue the type of journalism that had been
employed" (an article had quoted a demonstrator's "vulgar lan-
guage") ; 129 and proposals (which, according to the Bureau's re-
sponse to a staff inquiry, were never carried out) to physically disrupt
printing plants.1o
D. Effort8 to Prevent Meeting
The Bureau also attempted to prevent target groups from meeting.
Frequently used techniques include contacting the owner of meeting
facilities in order to have him refuse to rent to the group; 11 trying to
have a group's charter revoked; 132 using the press to disrupt a "closed"
meeting by arriving unannounced; 131 and attempting to persuade
sponsors to withdraw funds."'4 The most striking examples of attacks
on meeting, however, involve the use of "disinformation." 135
In one "disinformation" case, the Chicago Field Office duplicated
blank forms prepared by the National Mobilization Committee to End
the War in Vietnam ("NMC") soliciting housing for demonstators
coming to Chicago for the Democratic National Convention. Chicago
filled out 217 of these forms with fictitious names and addresses and
sent them to the NMC, which provided them to demonstrators who
made "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses." The NMC
then decided to discard all replies received on the housing forms rather
than have out-of-town demonstrators try to locate nonexistent ad-
dresses.'" (The same program was carried out when the Washington
Mobilization Committee distributed housing forms for demonstrators
coming to Washington for the 1969 Presidential inaugural cere-
monies.) 137
In another case, during the demonstrations accompanying inaugura-
tion ceremonies, the Washington Field Office discovered that NMC
marshals were using walkie-talkies to coordinate their movements and
1aMemorandum from Newark Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/23/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 6/4/69.
mMemorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/28/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 3/27/69.
3" For example, one proposal requested that the FBI Lab prepare a quart of
solution "capable of duplicating a scent of the most foul smelling feces avail-
able," along with a dispenser capable of squirting a narrow stream for a distance
of approximately three feet. The proposed targets were the physical plant of a
New Left publisher and BPP publications prior to their distribution. Head-
quarters instructed the field office to furnish more information about the purpose
for the material's use and the manner and security with which it would be used.
The idea was then apparently dropped. (Memorandum from Detroit Field Office
to FBI Headquarters, 10/13/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit
Field Office, 10/23/70.)
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 9/23/68.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 5/13/69.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office, 6/17/68.
2" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 12/30/68.
"" One of the 12 standard techniques referred to in the New Left memorandum
discussed at pp. 25-26, disinformation bridges the line between "counter-
intelligence" and sabotage.
" Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/9/68;
memorandum from Charles Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 8/15/68.
." Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/21/69.
activities. WFO used the same citizen band to supply the marshals with
misinformation and, pretending to be an NMC unit, countermanded
NMC orders. 138
In a third case 139 a midwest field office disrupted arrangements for
state university students to attend the 1969 inaugural demonstrations
by making a series of anonymous telephone calls to the transporta-
tion company. The calls were designed to confuse both the transporta-
tion company and the SDS leaders as to the cost of transportation and
the time and place for leaving and returning. This office also placed
confusing leaflets around the campus to show different times and
places for demonstration-planning meetings, as well as conflicting
times and dates for traveling to Washington.
In a fourth instance, the "East Village Other" planned to bomb
the Pentagon with flowers during the 1967 NMC rally in Washington.
The New York office answered the ad for a pilot, and kept up the
pretense right to the point at which the publisher showed up at the air-
port with 200 pounds of flowers, with no one to fly the plane. Thus, the
Bureau was able to prevent this "agitational-propaganda activity as
relates to dropping flowers over Washington." 140
The cases discussed above are just a few examples of the Bureau's
direct attack on speaking, teaching, writing and meeting. Other in-
stances include targeting the New Mexico Free University for teach-
ing, among other things, "confrontation politics" and "draft counsel-
ing training." 141 In another case, an editorial cartoonist for a north-
east newspaper was asked to prepare a cartoon which would "ridicule
and discredit" a group of antiwar activists who traveled to North
Vietnam to inspect conditions there; the cartoon was intended to
"depict [the individuals] as traitors to their country for traveling to
North Vietnam and making utterances against the foreign policy of
the United States." 142 A professor was targeted for being the faculty
advisor to a college group which circulated "The Student As Nigger"
138 Egil Krogh has staited to the Committee staff that he was in charge of coordi-
nating D.C. law enforcement efforts during demonstrations, and gained the
cooperation of NMC marshals to ensure an orderly demonstration. This law
enforcement/NMC coordination was effected through the same walkie-talkie
system the Bureau was disrupting. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to
Washington Field Office, 1/10/69; staff summary of Egil Krogh interview,
5/23/75.)
__ Memorandum from Cincinnati Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/20/68;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 12/29/68.
1o Memoranda from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/15/67,
9/26/67, and 10/17/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field
Office, 9/29/67. By letter of January 14, 1976, the Bureau submitted specific in-
stances of "action, other than arrest and prosecution, to prevent any stage of [a]
crime or violent acts from being initiated" which had been taken. The examples
were intended to aid in developing "preventive action" guidelines.
One of the examples was the prevention of the publisher's plan to drop flowers
over the Pentagon: "A plan was thus thwarted which could well have resulted in
tragedy had another pilot accepted such a dangerous flying mission and violated
Federal or local regulations in flying low over the Pentagon which is also in the
heavy traffic pattern of the Washington National Airport." The letter does not
explain why it was necessary to act covertly in this case. If flying over the Penta-
gon violates Federal regulations, the Bureau could have arrested those involved
when they arrived at the airport. No informant was involved; the newspaper
had advertised openly for a pilot.
.u. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albuquerque Field Office, 3/19/69.
n' Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/22/66.
on campus. 43 A professor conducting a study on the effect and social
costs of McCarthyism was targeted because he sought information
and help from the American Institute of Marxist Studies."' Contacts
were made with three separate law schools in an attempt to keep a
teaching candidate from being hired, or once hired, from getting his
contract renewed.1"
The attacks on speaking, teaching, writing, and meeting have been
examined in some detail because they present, in their purist form,
the consequences of acting outside the legal process. Perhaps the Bu-
reau was correct in its assumption that words lead to deeds, and that
larger group membership produces a greater risk of violence. Never-
theless, the law draws the line between criminal acts and constitution-
ally protected activity, and that line must be kept.", As Justice
Brandeis declared in a different context fifty years ago:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people, by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law: it invites every man
to become a law unto himself. To declare that in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of the private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against the pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. U.S., 277
U.S. 439,485 (1927)
IV. COINTELPRO TECHNIQUES
The techniques used in COINTELPRO were-and are-used
against hostile foreign intelligence agents. Sullivan's testimony that
the "rough, tough, dirty business" 1' of foreign counterintelligence
was brought home against domestic enemies was corroborated by
George Moore, whose Racial Intelligence Section supervised the White
Hate and Black Nationalist 'COINTELPROs:
You can trace [the origins] up and back to foreign intelli-
gence, particularly penetration of the group by the individual
informant. Before you can engage in counterintelligence you
must have intelligence.. .. If you have good intelligence and
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to El Paso Field Office, 12/6/68.
'" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 3/19/65.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland and Boston Field Offices,
5/5/64.
.. Mr. Huston learned that lesson as well:
"We went from this kind of sincere intention, honest intention, to develop a
series of justifications and rationalizations based upon this . . . distorted view
of inherent executive power and from that, whether it was direct . . . or was
indirect or inevitable, as I tend to think it is, you went down the road to where
you ended up, with these people going into the Watergate.
"And so that has convinced me that you have just got to draw the line at the
top of the totem pole, and that we would then have to take the risk-it is not
a risk-free choice, but it is one that, I am afraid, in my judgment, that we do
not have any alternative but to take." (Huston, 9/23/75, p. 45.)
u' Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 97 98.
know what it's going to do, you can seed distrust, sow mis-
information. The same technique is used in the foreign field.
The same technique is used, misinformation, disruption, is
used in the domestic groups, although in the domestic groups
you are dealing in '67 and '68 with many, many more across
the country . . . than you had ever dealt with as far as your
foreign groups.s
4 8
The arsenal of techniques used in the Bureau's secret war against
domestic enemies ranged from the trivial to the life-endangering.
Slightly more than a quarter of all approved actions were intended to
promote factionalization within groups and between groups; a roughly
equal number of actions involved the creation and dissemination of
propaganda.149 Other techniques involved the use of federal, state, and
local agencies in selective law enforcement, and other use (and abuse)
of government processes; disseminating derogatory information to
family, friends, and associates; contacting employers; exposing "com-
munist infiltration" or support of target groups; and using organiza-
tions which were hostile to target groups to disrupt meetings or other-
wise attack the targets.
A. Propaganda
The Bureau's COINTELPRO propaganda efforts stem from the
same basic premise as the attacks on speaking, teaching, writing and
meeting: propaganda works. Certain ideas are dangerous, and if their
expression cannot be prevented, they should be countered with Bureau-
approved views. Three basic techniques were used: (1) mailing re-
prints of newspaper and magazine articles to group members or po-
tential supporters intended to convince them of the error of their
ways; (2) writing articles for or furnishing information to "friendly"
media sources to "expose" target groups; 150 and (3) writing, printing,
and disseminating pamphlets and fliers without identifying the Bu-
reau as the source.
1. Reprint Mailings
The documents contain case after case of articles and newspaper
clippings being mailed (anonymously, of course) to group members.
The Jewish members of the Communist Party appear to have been
inundated with clippings dealing with Soviet mistreatment of Jews.
Similarly, Jewish supporters of the Black Panther Party received
articles from the BPP newspaper containing anti-Semitic state-
ments. College administrators received reprints of a Reader's Digest
article " and a Barron's article on campus disturbances intended to
persuade them to "get tough." 152
Perhaps only one example need be examined in detail, and that only
because it clearly sets forth the purpose of propaganda reprint mail-
ings. Fifty copies of an article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says With-
1o Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 32-33.
"'The percentages used in this section are derived from a staff tabulation of
the Petersen Committee summaries. The numbers are approximate because it was
occasionally difficult to determine from the summary what the purpose of the
technique was.
'The resulting articles could then be used in the reprint mailing program.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 9/12/68.
drawal Not the Answer," described as "an excellent article in support
of United States foreign policy in Vietnam," were mailed to certain
unnamed professors and members of the Vietnam Day Committee"who have no other subversive organizational affiliations." The pur-
pose of the mailing was "to convince [the recipients] of the correct-
ness of the U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam." '5
Reprint mailings would seem to fall under Attorney General Levi'scharacterization of much of COINTELPRO as "foolishness." 154
They violate no one's civil rights, but should the Bureau be in theanonymous propaganda business?
2. "Friendly" Media
Much of the Bureau's propaganda efforts involved giving informa-
tion or articles to "friendly" media sources who could be relied uponnot to reveal the Bureau's interests.'5' The Crime Records Division ofthe Bureau was responsible for public relations, including all head-
quarters contacts with the media. In the course of its work (most ofwhich had nothing to do with COINTELPRO) the Division assem-bled a list of "friendly" news media sources-those who wrote pro-Bureau stories.156 Field offices also had "confidential sources" (unpaidBureau informants) in the media, and were able to ensure theircooperation.
The Bureau's use of the news media took two different forms: plac-ing unfavorable articles and documentaries about targeted groups,and leaking derogatory information intended to discredit individ-uals."'
A typical example of media propaganda is the headquarters letterauthorizing the Boston Field Office to furnish "derogatory information
about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source [nameexcised]": 158
'3 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/1/65."'Levi 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 318.
"Name checks" were apparently run on all reporters proposed for use in theprogram, to make sure they. were reliable. In one case, a check of Bureau filesshowed that a television reporter proposed as the recipient of information onthe SDS had the same name as someone who had served in the Abraham LincolnBrigade. The field office was asked to determine whether the "individuals" were"identical." The field office obtained the reporter's credit records, voting registra-tion, and local police records, and determined that his credit rating was satis-factory, that he had no arrest record, that he "stated a preference for one of thetwo major political parties"-and that he was not, in fact, the man who foughtin the Spanish Civil War. Accordingly, the information was furnished. (Memo-randum from Pittsburgh Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/26/68; memoran-dum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 1/23/69.)' The Bureau also noted, for its files, those who criticized its work. or itsDirector, and the Division maintained a "not-to-contact" list which included thenames of some reporters and authors. One proposal to leak information to theBoston Globe was turned down because both the newspaper and one of itsreporters "have made unfounded criticisms of the FBI in the past." The BostonField Office was advised to resubmit the suggestion using another newspaper.(Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 2/8/68.).. Leaking derogatory information is discussed at p. 50.The Committee's agreement with the Bureau governing document productionprovided that the Bureau could excise the names of "confidential sources" whenthe documents were delivered to the Committee. Although the staff was permittedto see the excised names at Bureau headquarters, it was also agreed that thenames not be used.
Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are
good. Emphasize to him that the NOI predilection for vio-
lence, 5 9 preaching of race hatred, and hypocrisy, should be
exposed. Material furnished [name] should be either public
source or known to enough people as to protect your sources.
Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is completely pro-
tected by [name].160
In another case, information on the Junta of Militant Organizations
("JOMO", a Black Nationalist target) was furnished to a source at a
Tampa television station.' 6' Ironically, the station manager, who had
no knowledge of the Bureau's involvement, invited the Special Agent
in Charge, his assistant, and other agents to a preview of the half-hour
film which resulted. The SAC complimented the station manager on
his product, and suggested that it be made available to civic groups.
162
A Miami television station made four separate documentaries (on
the Klan, Black Nationalist groups, and the New Left) with materials
secretly supplied by the Bureau. One of the documentaries, which had
played to an estimated audience of 200,000, was the subject of an
internal memorandum "to advise of highly successful results of coun-
terintelligence exposing the black extremist Nation of Islam."
[Excised] was elated at the response. The station received
more favorable telephone calls from viewers than the switch-
board could handle. Community leaders have commented
favorably on the program, three civic organizations have
asked to show the film to their members as a public service,
and the Broward County Sheriff's Office plans to show the
film to its officers and in connection with its community serv-
ice program.
This expose showed that NOI leaders are of questionable
character and live in luxury through a large amount of money
taken as contributions from their members. The extreme
nature of NOI teachings was underscored. Miami sources ad-
vised the expose has caused considerable concern to local
NOI leaders who have attempted to rebut the program at
each open meeting of the NOI since the program was pre-
sented. Local NOI leaders plan a rebuttal in the NOI news-
paper. Attendance by visitors at weekly NOI meetings has
dropped 50%. This shows the value of carefully planned
counterintelligence action.
63
The Bureau also planted derogatory articles about the Poor People's
Campaign, the Institute for Policy Studies, the Southern Students
Organizing Committee, the National Mobilization Committee, and a
host of other organizations it believed needed to be seen in their "true
light."
' Note that Bureau witnesses testified that the NOI was not, in fact, involved
in organization violence. See pp. 20-21.
'oMemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 2/27/68.
'
t Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/5/68.
.. Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/7/69.
"Memorandum from G. C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/21/69.
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3. Bureau-Authored Pamphlets and Fliers.
The Bureau occasionally drafted, printed, and distributed its own
propaganda. These pieces were usually intended to ridicule their tar-gets, rather than offer "straight" propaganda on the issue. Four of
these fliers are reproduced in the following pages.
Digit. It's timz to pull the chain, brcthers and sisters. If
the peace rnov:=nt in A.mrika i; to aurvivo, the craz L.fluence
of the Socialict Workers Party and its b'.stard you.h':-rup
- Young Socialist Allince - unt be flushed frcm ew .cbeonce and for all. Stagnant zerce like Preddie Halzttad and
Harry Ring, both memcrs of the SW? Nat'1 ComittCC, :..ust
be dumped. Lez's (aCs rid of tnt Carol Lip-ns, Guj
Horowitzn rad the Joua.a Msinnik alon: .ith other SWP shite!
DDA!!D A" END '10 S ? BALLING! drite New MKnc todny at .
Suite 900, 1039 VerAint Ave., N.'d., :azhin:;ton, D.C.
NOTE: Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/14/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office,
1/20/70.
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T:r GTGAKT're "i'ICK TKAG CO;TEST' IS 11M
aJ504 Febulous Prizs 
iNothing To Buy!
YOU can win!
-urry I Hurry I
CAFh jLES Simnly pick the faggot from the following photos. Print
y our choice on the entry blank at the bottom of this
pare and1 POP it Into the ma il. YOU COULD ESILY WIN!
DAve Dollinger Che Guervera* Miark Rudd Herbert Marcuse
.CHEC- THESE COLCSSAL PRIZES!
GRA1D PRIZE...... .... Seven f..11. days in Hanoi - Expenses paid)
*.SECC!ND PRIZE................ Furteen full days in Hanoil
M THIRD PRIZE............... A weekend with josie Duke in d genuine
fire-damaged Columbia.University
dormitory
* FOURTH PRIZE............ Two weekends with tubby little Josiol
* ADDITIONAL FRIES..... .0 olls of red toilet tissue, each
sheet L oaring the picture of Chairman Mo
in living colorl
e-:-o ::: :::-:+:.:-.:-:-o -: :- :-:+:H--H:+:+:::::-:11A IL TODAY:":-:1 : I
FAC CO!TEST,
Pczt Office Box 220, Old Chelsea Station,
KW* Yor., liew York (10011)
The REAL Fag pictured above is..........................................
Hama........................Address................ *......zip.......
(*Katc: Cho, unfortunate1y, was disconnected from the 
world last year.)
NOTE: Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/7/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/14/69.
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J*LA1u FLAsu FrAsH FLASH FLASH FLASH
DESPERATE DAVE DAINGLES DINGUS
Murderously Mangles MCBE
3.
Washinpton. D. C. Jan. 20 - Speaking in his usual hg pitched
voice, Dave Dellinger, National Chairman of the National
Mobilization Committee (MOBE), today claimed that the anti-
inaugural demonstrations called by his crganization had been
responsible in getting the Paris peace talks going again.
Dellinger made this startling disclosure before an audience
of newsman in the dingy Hawthorne School which housed many
of his followers. A cluster of the latter stcod behind their
Guru sniffling and fingering wilted flowers. Dellinger,
lcoking pale.- more fairy-liko than ever - tried to control
the squcaks in his voice to no avail. "How many demonstrators
did MODE bring to the inaugural?", he was asked.
"At least 10,000, " he answered.
"Bullshit", was heard in several sections of the room.
Dellinger shuffled his notes. a Let's make that 5,000."
"Bullshit".
"Would y:u'believe 3,000?" Oilence. Dave 1 rolled hIs eves
at the ceiling. "I'm not going to play at numbers, " he chirped.
"Wat matters is that I'EMOE accomplished so much. We did get the
peace talks going. We did break some windows in the National
Geographic Society building. Despite police brutality, our
brave people managed to throw cans and sticks at the President."
His voice went higher - sounding like glass bells in a soft
summer breeze. "We shook the establishment, gentlemen."
Associated Press stood up. "We understand MCBE is broke. That
you lost control of the thing. That SDS and many other
organizations in the peace movement refused to back you. That
you have no idea how MOBE funds were spent."
Dellinger put a finger in his mouth and sucked it
reflectively. Some minutes passed before he spoke. "MOBE
is solvent, boys, As of this murning, we have 1.9I5 in the
treasury. The price of peace is high." He tried to look grim.
"SDS, of course, Is just a bunch of dirty colloge kids with grass
for brains. We didn't want then cr need them." He formed his
lips into a cute bow. "I must go now. We're hitching.a ride
back to New York today unless we can raise bus fare."
He shoved four finpers into his mouth and was led slowly
from the room humming "We Shall Overcomo."
NOTE: Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/21/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office,
1/24/69.
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U.S., Inc. which were "taking on the aura of gang warfare with
attendant threats of murder and reprisals," 166 is just one example.
A separate report on disruptive efforts aimed at the Panthers will
examine in detail the Bureau's attempts to foment violence. These
efforts included anonymously distributing cartoons which pictured the
U.S. organization gloating over the corpses of two murdered Panthers,
and suggested that other BPP members would be next,16 7 and sending
a New Jersey Panther leader the following letter which purported to
be from an SDS member: 168
"To Former Comrade [name]
"As one of 'those little bourgeois, snooty nose'-'little
schoolboys'-'little sissies' Dave Hilliard spoke of in the
'Guardian' of 8/16/69, I would like to say that you and the
rest of you black racists can go to hell. I stood shoulder to
shoulder with Carl Nichols last year in Military Park in
Newark and got my a-whipped by a Newark pig all for the
cause of the wineheads like you and the rest of the black
pussycats that call themselves Panthers. Big deal; you have to
have a three hour educational session just to teach those ...
(you all know what that means don't you! It's the first word
your handkerchief head mamma teaches you) how to spell it.
"Who the hell set you and the Panthers up as the vanguard
of the revolutionary and disciplinary group. You can tell all
those wineheads you associate with that you'll kick no one's' ... a-,' because you'd have to take a three year course in
spelling to know what an a- is and three more years to be
taught where it's located.
"Julius Lester called the BPP the vanguard (that's leader)
organization so international whore Cleaver calls him racist,
now when full allegiance is not given to the Panthers, again
racist. What the hell do you want? Are you getting this?
Are you lost? If you're not digging then you're really hope-
less.
"Oh yes! We are not concerned about Hilliard's threats.
"Brains will win over brawn. The way the Panthers have
retaliated against US is another indication. The score: US-6:
Panthers-0.
"Why, I read an article in the Panther paper where a
California Panther sat in his car and watched his friend get
shot by Karenga's group and what did he do? He run back
and write a full page story about how tough the Panthers are
and what they're going to do. Ha Ha-B- S--.
"Goodbye [name] baby-and watch out. Karenga's com-
ing.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 11/25/68.
Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/20/69;
memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 3/27/69; memo-
randum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 4/4/69.
' Memorandum from Newark Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 8/25/69.According to the proposal, the letter would not be typed by the field office steno-
graphic pool because of the language. The field office also used asterisks in its
communication with headquarters which "refer to that colloquial phrase . . .
which implies an unnatural physical relationship with a material parent." Pre-
sumably the phrase was used in the letter when it was sent to the Panthers.
" 'Right On' as they say."
An anonymous letter was also sent to the leader of the Blackstone
Rangers, a Chicago gang "to whom violent type activity, shooting,
and the like, are second nature," advising him that "the brothers that
run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's sup-
posed to be a hit out for you." The letter was intended to "intensify the
degree of animosity between the two groups" and cause "retaliatory
action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its
leadership." 169
EDITOR:
What's with this bull- SDS outfit? I'll tell you what
they has finally showed there true color White. They are
just like the commies and all the other white radical groups
that suck up to the blacks and use us. We voted at our meeting
in Oakland for community control over the pigs but SDS says
no. Well we can do with out them mothers. We can do it by
ourselfs.
OFF THE PIGS POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Soul Brother Jake
In another case, the Bureau tried to promote violence, not between
violent groups, but between a possibly violent person and another
target. The field office was given permission to arrange a meeting
between an SCLC officer and the leader of a small group described as
"anti-Vietnam black nationalist [veterans'] organization." The leader
of the veterans' group was known to be upset because he was not
receiving funds from the SOLC. He was also known to be on leave
from a mental hospital, and the Bureau had been advised that he
would be recommitted if he were arrested on any charge. It was be-
lieved that "if the confrontation occurs at SCLC headquarters," the
veterans' group leader "will lose his temper, start a fight," and the
"police will be called in." The purpose was to "neutralize" the leader
by causing his commitment to a mental hospital, and to gain "un-
favorable publicity for the SCLC." 170
At least four assaults-two of them on women-were reported as
"results" of Bureau actions. The San Diego field office claimed credit
for three of them. In one case, US members "broke into" a BPP
meeting and "roughed up" a woman member."'
In the second instance, a critical newspaper article in the Black
Panther paper was sent to the US leader. The field office noted that
"the possibility exists that some sort of retaliatory actions will be
taken against the BPP." 172 The prediction proved correct; the field
office reported that as a result of this mailing, members of US assaulted
a Panther newspaper vendor.17 3 The third assault occurred after the
1" Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/12/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Ohicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
no Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/25/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Philadelphia Field Office,
12/9/68.
"'lemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/10/69,
p. lf
' Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
... Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
San Diego Police Department, acting on a tip from the Bureau that"sex orgies" were taking place at Panther headquarters, raided the
premises. (The police department conducted a "research project," dis-
covered two outstanding traffic warrants for a BPP member, and used
the warrants to gain entry.) The field office reported that as a "direct
result" of the raid, the woman who allowed the officers into the BPP
headquarters had been "severely beaten up" by other members.174
In the fourth case, the New Haven field office reported that an in-
formant had joined in a "heated conversation" between several group
members and sided with one of the parties "in order to increase the
tension." The argument ended with members hitting each other. The
informant "departed the premises at this point, since he felt that he
had been successful, causing a flammable situation to erupt into a
fight." 17
2. Anonyrous Mailings
The Bureau's use of anonymous mailings to promote factionalism
range from the relatively bland mailing of reprints or fliers criticizing
a group's leaders for living ostentatiously or being ineffective speakers,
to reporting a chapter's infractions to the group's headquarters in-
tended to cause censure or disciplinary action.
Critical letters were also sent to one group purporting to be from
another, or from a member of the group registering a protest over a
proposed alliance.
For instance, the Bureau was particularly concerned with the al-
liance between the SDS and the Black Panther Party. A typical ex-
ample of anonymous mailing intended to separate these groups is a
letter sent to the Black Panther newspaper: 176
In a similar vein, is a letter mailed to Black Panther and New Left
leaders.177
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
Since when do us Blacks have to swallow the dictates of the
honky SDS? Doing this only hinders the Party progress in
gaining Black control over Black people. We've been
over by the white facists pigs and the Man's control over our
destiny. We're sick and tired of being severly brutalized,
denied our rights and treated like animals by the white pigs.
We say to hell with the SDS and its honky intellectual ap-
proaches which only perpetuate control of Black people by
the honkies.
The Black Panther Party theory for community control is
the only answer to our problems and that is to be followed
and enforced by all means necessary to insure control by
Blacks over all police departments regardless of whether they
are run by honkies or uncle toms.
The damn SDS is a paper organization with a severe case
of diarhea of the mouth which has done nothing but feed us
' Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/69.1 Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/18/70.
Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/27/69;memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/5/69.
Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/10/70; memo-randum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 3/3/70.
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lip service. Those few idiots calling themselves weathermen
run around like kids on halloween. A good example is their
"militant" activities at the Northland Shopping Center a
couple of weeks ago. They call themselves revolutionaries but
take a look at who they are. Most of them come from well
heeled families even by honky standards. They think they're
helping us Blacks but their futile, misguided and above all
white efforts only muddy the revolutionary waters.
The time has come for an absolute break with any non-
Black group and especially those - SDS and a return to
our pursuit of a pure black revolution by Blacks for Blacks.
Power!
Off the Pigs! !!!
These examples are not, of course, exclusive, but they do give the flavor
of the anonymous mailings effort.
3. Intefviews
Interviewing group members or supporters was an overt "inves-
tigative" technique sometimes used for the covert purpose of disrup-
tion. For example, one field office noted that "other [BPP] weak-
nesses that have been capitalized on include interviews of members
wherein jealousy among the members has been stimulated and at the
same time has caused a number of persons to fall under suspicion and
be purged from the Party." 178
In another case, fourteen field offices were instructed to conduct
simultaneous interviews of individuals known to have been contacted
by members of the Revolutionary Union. The purpose of the coordi-
nated interviews was "to make possible affiliates of the RU believe that
the organization is infiltrated by informants on a high level.179
In a third instance, a "black nationalist" target attempted to or-
ganize a youth group in Mississippi. The field office used informants
to determine "the identities of leaders of this group and in interview-
ing these leaders, expressed to them [the target's] background and
his true intentions regarding organizing Negro youth groups." Agents
also interviewed the target's landlords and "advised them of certain
aspects of [his] past activities and his reputation in the Jackson vi-
cinity as being 'a Negro extremist." Three of the landlords asked the
target to move. 0 The same field office reported that it had interviewed
members of the Tougaloo College Political Action Committee, an
"SNCC affiliated" student group. The members were interviewed
while they were home on summer vacation. "Sources report that these
interviews had a very upsetting effect on the PAC organization and
they felt they have been betrayed by someone 'at Tougaloo College.
Many of the members have limited their participation in PAC affairs
since their interview by Agents during the summer of 1968." 181
4. Using Informants To Raise Controversial Issues
The Bureau's use of informants generally is the subject of a sepa-
rate report. It is worth noting here, however, that the use of inform-
1s Memorandum from Indianapolis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/23/69.
2" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/28/70.
' Memorandum from Jackson Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/27/68.
i d.j
ants to take advantage of ideological splits in an organization dates
back to the first COINTELPRO. The originating CUPSA document
refers to the use of informants to capitalize on the discussion within
the Party following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin.82
Informants were also used to widen rifts in other organizations.
For instance, an informant was instructed to imply that the head of
one faction of the SDS was using group funds for his drug habit,
and that a second leader embezzled funds at another school. The field
office reported that "as a result of actions taken by this informant,
there have been fist fights and acts of name calling at several of the
recent SDS meetings." In addition, members of one faction "have
made early morning telephone calls" to other SDS members and "have
threatened them and attempted to discourage them from attending
SDS meetings." 183
In another case, an informant was used to "raise the question"
among his associates that an unmarried, 30-year old group leader"may be either a bisexual or a homosexual." The field office believed
that the question would "rapidly become a rumor" and "could have
serious results concerning the ability and effectiveness of [the target's]
leadership." i8
-5. Fictitious Organizations
There are basically three kinds of "notional" or fictitious organiza-
tions. All three were used in COINTELPRO attempts to factionalize.
The first kind of "notional" was the organization whose members
were all Bureau informants. Because of the Committee's agreement
with the Bureau not to reveal the identities of informants, the only
example which can be discussed publicly is a proposal which, although
approved, was never implemented. That proposal involved setting up
a chapter of the W.E.B. DuBois Club in a Southern city which would
be composed entirely of Bureau informants and fictitious persons.
The initial purpose of the chapter was to cause the CPUSA expense by
sending organizers into the area, cause the Party to fund Bureau
coverage of out-of-town CP meetings by paying the informants'
expenses, and receive literature and instructions. Later, the chapter
was to begin to engage in deviation from the Party line so that it
would be expelled from the main organization "and then they could
claim to 'be the victim of a Stalinist type purge." It was anticipated
that the entire operation would take no more than 18 months.',"
The second kind of "notional" was the fictitious organization with
some unsuspecting (non-informant) members. For example, Bureau
informants set up a Klan organization intended to attract member-
ship away from the United Klans of America. The Bureau paid the
informant's personal expenses in setting up the new organization,
which had, at its height, 250 members.'
The third type of "notional" was the wholly fictitious organization,
with no actual members, which was used as a pseudonym for mailing
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 9/6/56.
' Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/12/68,
p. 2.
m Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/2/70.
" Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/9/64.
"Meniorahdum from C. D. Brennan to W. C, Sullivan, 8/28/67.
letters or -pamphlets. For instance, the Bureau sent out newsletters
from something called "The Committee for Expansion of Socialist
Thought in America," which attacked the CPUSA from the "Marxist
right" for at least two years.17
6. Labeling Target8 A8 Informant8
The "snitch jacket" technique-neutralizing a target by labeling
him a "snitch" or informant, so that he would no longer be trusted-
was used in all COINTELPROs. The methods utilized ranged from
having an authentic informant start a-rumor about the target mem-
ber,s88 to anonymous letters or phone calls,189 to faked informants'
reports. 190
When the technique was used against a member of a nonviolent
group, the result was often alienation from the group. For example, a
San Diego man was targeted because he was active in draft counseling
at the city's Message Information Center. He had, coincidentally,
been present at the arrest of a Selective Service violator, and had been
at a "crash pad" just prior to the arrest of a second violator. The
Bureau used a real informant to suggest at a Center meeting that it
was "strange" that the two men had been arrested by federal agents
shortly after the target became aware of their locations. The field
office reported that the target had been "completely ostracized by
members of the Message Information Center and all of the other
individuals throughout the- area . . . associated with this and/or
related groups." 191
In another case, a local police officer was used to "jacket" the head
of the Student Mobilization Committee at the University of South
Carolina. The police officer picked up two members of the Committee
on the pretext of interviewing them concerning narcotics. By pre-
arranged signal, he had his radio operator call him with the message,
"[name of target] just called. Wants you to contact her. Said you have
her number." 192 No results were reported.
The "snitch jacket" is a particularly nasty technique even when
used in peacef ul groups. It gains an added dimension of danger when
it is used-as, indeed, it was-in groups known to have murdered
informers.19 3
For instance, a Black Panther leader was arrested by the local police
with four other members of the BPP. The others were released, but
the leader remained in custody. Headquarters authorized the field office
to circulate the rumor that the leader "is the last to be released" because
"he is cooperating with and has made a deal with the Los Angeles
Police Department to furnish them information concerning the BPP."
' Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 1/5/65.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 2/14/69.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Jackson Field Office. 11/15/68.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquaters to New York Field Office, 2/9/60.
Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/17/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 3/6/69;
memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters 4/30/69.
" Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/31/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 2/14/69.
'" One Bureau document stated that the Black Panther Party "has murdered
two members it suspected of being police informants." (Memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 2/18/71.)
The target of the first proposal then received an anonymous phone
call stating that his own arrest was caused by a rival leader.194
In another case, the Bureau learned that the chairman of the New
York BPP chapter was under suspicion as an informant because
of the arrest of another member for weapons possession. In order
to "cast further suspicion on him" the Bureau sent anonymous letters
to BPP headquarters in the state, the wife of the arrested member,
and a local member of CORE, saying "Danger-Beware-Black Broth-
ers, [name of target] is the fink who told the pigs that [arrested
members] were carrying guns." The letter also gave the target's
address.19*
In a third instance, the Bureau learned through electronic surveil-
lance of the BPP the whereabouts of a fugitive. After his arrest, the
Bureau sent a letter in a "purposely somewhat illiterate type scrawl"
to the fugitive's half-brother:
Brother:
Jimmie was sold out by Sister [name-the BPP leader who
made the phone call picked up by the tap] for some pig money
to pay her rent. When she don't get it that way she takes
Panther money. How come her kid sells the paper in his school
and no one bothers him. How comes Tyler got busted up by
the pigs and her kid didn't. How comes the FBI pig fascists
knew where to bust Lonnie and Minnie way out where they
were.
-Think baby.'
In another example, the chairman of the Kansas City BPP chapter
went to Washington in an attempt to testify before a Senate subcom-
mittee about information he allegedly possessed about the transfer of
firearms from the Kansas City Police Department to a retired Army
General. The attempt did not succeed; the committee chairman ad-
journed the hearing and then asked the BPP member to present his
information to an aide. The Bureau then authorized an anonymous
phone call to BPP headquarters "to the effect that [the target] was
paid by the committee to testify, that he has cooperated fully with
this committee, and that he intends to return at a later date to furnish
additional testimony which will include complete details of the BPP
operation in Kansas City." 19
In the fifth case, the Bureau had so successfully disrupted the San
Diego BPP that it no longer existed. One of the former members, how-
ever, was "'politicking' for the position of local leader if the group
is ever reorganized." Headquarters authorized the San Diego field
office to send anonymous notes to "selected individuals within the black
community of San Diego" to "initiate the rumor that [the target],
"" Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/11/69;
memorandum to San Diego Field Office from FBI Headquarters, 2/19/69." Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 3/10/69.
'" Memorandum to FBI Headquarters from SAC, Newark, 7/3/69; memo-
randum to Newark Field Office from FBI Headquarters, 7/14/69.
'9 Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/16/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/3/69.
who has aspirations of becoming the local Black Panther Party Cap-
tain, is a police informant." 198
In a sixth case, a letter alleging that a Washington, D.C., BPP
leader was a police informant was sent "as part of our continuing
effort to foment internal dissension within ranks of Black Panther
Party :" 199
Brother:
I recently read in the Black Panther newspaper about that
low dog Gaines down in Texas who betrayed his people to the
pigs and it reminded me of a recent incident that I should tell
you about. Around the first part of Feb. I was locked up at
the local pigpen when the pigs brought in this dude who told
me he was a Panther. This dude who said his name was [de-
leted] said he was vamped on by six pigs and was brutalized
by them. This dude talked real bad and said he had killed
pigs and was going to get more when he got out, so I thought
he probably was one of you. The morning after [name] was
brought in a couple of other dudes in suits came to see him
and called him out of the cell and he was gone a couple of
hours. Later on these dudes came back again to see him.
[Name] told me the dudes were his lawyers but they smelled
like pig to me. It seems to me that you might want to look
into this because I know you don't want anymore low-life
dogs helping the pigs brutalize the people. You don't know
me and I'm not a Panther but I want to help with the cause
when I can.
A lumpen brother
In a seventh case, the "most influential BPP activist in North Caro-
lina" had been photographed outside a house where a "shoot out" with
local police had taken place. The photograph, which appeared in the
local newspaper, showed the target talking to a policeman. The pho-
tograph and an accompanying article were sent to BPP headquarters
in Oakland, California, with a handwritten note, supposedly from a
female BPP member known to be "disenchanted" with the target, say-
ing, "I think this is two pigs oinking." 200
Although Bureau witnesses stated that they did not authorize a
"snitch jacket" when they had information that the group was at that
time actually killing suspected informants,2 01 they admitted that the
risk was there whenever the technique was used.
1"Memorandum to FBI Headquarters from San Diego Field Office, 3/6/70;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 3/6/70.1"Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/23/71;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.
2*0 Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters 3/23/71;
memorandum FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.
2m In fact, some proposals were turned down for that reason. See, e.g., letter
from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 2/18/71, in which a proposal
that an imprisoned BPP member be labeled a "pig Informer" was rejected be-
cause it was possible it would result in the target's death. But note that just one
month later, two similar proposals were approved. Letter from FBI Head-
quarters to Washington Field Office, 3/19/71, and letter from FBI Headquarters
to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.
It would be fair to say there was an element of risk there
which we tried to examine on a case by case basis.202
Moore added, "I am not aware of any time we ever labeled anybody
as an informant, that anything [violent] ever happened as a result,
and that is something that could be measured." When asked whether
that was luck or lack of planning, he responded, "Oh, it just happened
that way, I am sure." 203
C. Using Hostile Third Parties Against Target Groups
The Bureau's factionalism efforts were intended to separate indi-
viduals or groups which might otherwise be allies. Another set of ac-
tions is a variant of that technique; organizations already opposed to
the target groups were used to attack them.
The American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, for ex-
ample, printed and distributed under their own names Bureau-
authored pamphlets condemning. the SDS and the DuBois Clubs.
In another case, a confidential source who headed an anti-Commu-
nist organization in Cleveland, and who published a. "self-described
conservative weekly newspaper," the Cleveland Times, was anony-
mously mailed information on the Unitarian Society of Cleveland's
sponsorship of efforts to abolish the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The source had "embarrassed" the Unitarian minister with
questions about the alleged Communist connections of other cosponsors
"at public meetings." 204
It was anticipated that the source would publish a critical article in
her newspaper, which "may very well have the result of alerting the
more responsible people in the community" to the nature of the move-
ment and "stifle it before it gets started." 205
The source newspaper did publish an article entitled "Locals to Aid
Red Line," which named the Minister, among others, as a local sponsor
of what it termed a "Communist dominated plot" to abolish the House
Committee.206
One group, described as a "militant anticommunist right wing orga-
nization, more of an activist group than is the more well known John
Birch Society," was used on at least four separate occasions. The Bu-
reau developed a long-range program to use the organization in "coun-
terintelligence activity" by establishing a fictitious person named
"Lester Johnson" who sent letters, made phone calls, offered financial
support, and suggested action:
In view of the activist nature of this organization, and their
lack of experience and knowledge concerning the interior
workings of the [local] CP, [the field office proposes] that
efforts be made to take over their activities and use them in
such a manner as would be best calculated by this office to
2 Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 39.
2 Moore, 11/3/15, p. 64.
"' The minister has given the Select Committee an affidavit which states that
there was an organized attempt by the Bureau's source to disrupt the Church's
meetings, including "fist fights." Affidavit of Rev. Dennis G. Kuby, 10/19/75.
2 Memorandum from Cleveland Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/28/64;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.
2 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.
completely disrupt and neutralize the [local] CP, all without
[the organization] becoming aware of the Bureau's interest
in its operation.2
0 7
"Lester Johnson" used the organization to distribute fliers and let-
ters opposing the candidacy of a lawyer running for a judgeship 208
and to disrupt a dinner at which an alleged Communist was to speak.
2 0 9
"Johnson" also congratulated the organization on disrupting an anti-
draft meeting at a Methodist Church, furnishing further information
about a speaker at the meeting, 2 10 and suggested that members picket
the home of a local "communist functionary." 211
Another case is slightly different from the usual "hostile third
party" actions, in that both organizations were Bureau targets. "Op-
eration Hoodwink" was intended to be a long-range program to dis-
rupt both La Cosa Nostra (which was not otherwise a COINTELPRO
target) and the Communist Party by "having them expend their en-
ergies attacking each other." The initial project was to prepare and
send a leaflet, which purported to be from a Communist Party leader
to a member of a New York "family" attacking working conditions at
a business owned by the family member.2 12
D. Disseminating Derogatory Information to Family, Friends, and
Associates
Although this technique was used in relatively few cases it accounts
for some of the most distressing of all COINTELPRO actions. Per-
sonal life information, some of which was gathered expressly to be
used in the programs, was then disseminated, either directly to the
target's family through an anonymous letter or telephone call, or in-
directly, by giving the information to the media.
2' Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/18/66, p. 2.
2 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/67.
The lawyer was targeted, along with his law firm, because the firm "has a long
history of providing services for individual communists and communist organi-
zations," and because he belonged to the National Lawyers Guild.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 1/16/67.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 1/10/67.
2m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 11/3/66.
2 Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 10/4/66;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 10/5/66.
A similar proposal attempted "to cause dissension between Negro numbers
operators and the Italian hoodlum element" in Detroit. The Bureau had informa-
tion that black "numbers men" were contributing money to the local "black
power movement." An anonymous letter containing a black hand and the words
"watch out" was sent a minister who was "the best known black militant in
Detroit." The letter was intended to achieve two objectives. First, the minister
was expected to assume that "the Italian hoodlum element was responsible
for this letter, report this to the Negro numbers operators, and thereby cause
them to further resent the Italian hoodlum element." Second, it is also possible
that [the minister] may become extremely frightened upon receipt of this letter
and sever his contact with the Negro numbers men in Detroit and might even
restrict his black nationalist activity or leave Detroit. (Memorandum from the
Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/68; Memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 6/28/68.)
Several letters were sent to spouses; three examples follow.2 1 3 The
names have been deleted for privacy reasons.
The first letter was sent to the wife of a Grand Dragon of the
United Klans of America ("Mrs. A"). It was to be "typed on plain
paper in an amateurish fashion. .214
"My Dear Mrs. (A),
"I write this letter to you only after a long period of pray-
ing to God. I must cleanse my soul of these thoughts. I
certainly do not want to create problems inside a family but
I owe a duty to the klans and its principles as well as to my
own menfolk who have cast their divine lot with the klans.
"Your husband came to [deleted] about a year ago and
my menfolk blindly followed his leadership, believing him to
be the savior of this country. They never believed the "stories
that he stole money from the klans in [deleted] or that he is
now making over $25,000 a year. They never believed the
stories that your house in [deleted] has a new refrigerator,
washer, dryer and yet one year ago, was threadbare. They
refuse to believe that your husband now owns three cars and
a truck, including the new white car. But I believe all these
things and I can forgive them for a man wants to do for his
family in the best way he can.
"I don't have any of these things and I don't grudge you
any of them neither. But your husband has been committing
the greatest of the sins of our Lord for many years. He has
taken the flesh of another unto himself.
"Yes, Mrs. A, he has been committing adultery. My men-
folk say they don't believe this but I think they do. I feel like
crying. I saw her with my own eyes. They call her Ruby. Her
last name is something like [deleted] and she lives in the 700
block of [deleted] Street in [deleted.] I know this. I saw her
strut around at a rally with her lustfilled eyes and smart aleck
figure.
"I cannot stand for this. I will not let my husband and two
brothers stand side by side with your husband and this woman
in the glorious robes of the klan. I am typing this because I
am going to send copys to Mr. Shelton and some of the klans
leaders that I have faith in. I will not stop until your husband
is driven from [deleted] and back into the flesh-pots from
wherein he came.
" Letters were also sent to parents informing them that their children were
in communes, or with a roommate of the opposite sex; information on an actress'
pregnancy by a Black Panther was sent to a gossip columnist; and information
about a partner's affair with another partner's wife was sent to the members of
a law firm as well as the injured spouses.
Personal life information was not the only kind of derogatory information
disseminated; information on the "subversive background" of a target (or family
member) was also used, as were arrest records.
m Memorandum from Richmond Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/26/66.
"I am a loyal klanswoman and a good churchgoer. I feel
this problem affects the future of our great country. I hope
I do not cause you harm by this and if you believe in the
Good Book as I do, you may soon receive your husband back
into the fold. I pray for you and your beautiful little chil-
dren and only wish I could tell you who I am. I will soon,
but I am afraid my own men would be harmed if I do."
"A God-fearing klanswoman"
The second letter was sent to the husband ("Mr. B") of a woman
who had the distinction of being both a New Left and Black Nation-
alist target; she was a leader in the local branch of the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom, "which group is active
in draft resistance, antiwar rallies and New Left activities," and an
officer in ACTION, a biracial group which broke off from the local
chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality and which "engaged
in numerous acts of civil disruption and disobedience." 
2 1 5
Two informants reported that Mr. B had been making suspicious
inquiries about his wife's relationship with the Black males in
ACTION. The local field office proposed an anonymous letter to the
husband which would confirm his suspicions, although the inform-
ants did not know whether the allegations of misconduct were true.
It was hoped that the "resulting marital tempest" would "result in
ACTION losing their [officer] and the WILPF losing a valuable
leader, thus striking a major blow against both organizations." 
216
Accordingly, the following letter 2 16 a written in black ink, was sent
to the husband:
" Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.
* Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.
Note that there is no allegation that ACTION was engaged in violence. When
the target was interviewed by the staff, she was asked whether ACTION ever took
part in violent activities. She replied that someone once spat in a communion cup
during a church sit-in and that members sometimes used four letter words, which
was considered violent in her city. The staff member then asked about more con-
ventionally violent acts, such as throwing bricks or burning buildings. Her
response was a shocked, "Oh, no! I'm a pacifist-I wouldn't be involved in an
organization like that." (Staff interview of a COINTELPRO target.)
"' Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.
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A letter from the field office to headquarters four months later
reported as a "tangible result" of the letter that the target and her
husband had recently separated, following a series of marital
arguments:
This matrimonial stress and strain should cause her to func-
tion much less effectively in ACTION. While the letter sent
by the [field office] was probably not the sole cause of this
separation, it certainly contributed very strongly.2 17
The third letter was sent to the wife of a leader of the Black Libera-
tors ("Mrs. C"). She was living in their home town with their two
daughters while he worked in the city. Bureau documents describe
Mrs. C. as a "faithful, loving wife, who is apparently convinced that
her husband is performing a vital service to the Black world....
She is to all indications an intelligent, respectable young mother, who
is active in the AME Methodist Church." 218
The letter was "prepared from a penmanship, spelling style to imi-
tate that of the average Black Liberator member. It contains several
accusations which should cause [X's] wife great concern." It was
expressly intended to produce "ill feeling and possibly a lasting dis-
trust" between X and his wife; it was hoped that the "concern over
what to do about it" would "detract from his time spent in the plots
and plans of his organization." 219
The letter was addressed to "Sister C":
' Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/17/70.
2 18 Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69, p. 1.














The Petersen Committee said that some COINTELPRO actions
were "abhorrent in a free society." This technique surely falls within
that condemnation. 22 0
m House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, Hearings, 11/20/74, p. 11.
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E. Contacts with Employers
The Bureau often tried to get targets fired, with some success.
22 1 If
the target was a teacher, the intent was usually to deprive him of a
forum and to remove what the Bureau believed to be the added pres-
tige given a political cause by educators. In other employer contacts,
the purpose was either to eliminatea source of funds for the individual
or (if -the target was a donor) the group, or to have the employer apply
pressure on the target to stop his activities.
For example, an Episcopal minister furnished "financial and other"
assistance to the Black Panther Party in his city. The Bureau sent an
anonymous letter to his bishop so that the church would exert pressure
on the minister to "refrain from -assistance to the Black Panther
Party." 222 Similarly, a priest who allowed the Black Panther Party
to use his church for its 'breakfast program was targeted; his bishop
received both an anonymous letter and three anonymous phone calls.
The priest was transferred shortly thereafter. 22 3
In another case, a black county employee was targeted because he had
attended a fund raiser for the Mississippi Summer Project and, on
another occasion, a presentation of a Negro History Week pro ram.
Both functions had been supported by "clandestine CP members. ' The
employee, according to the documents, had no record of subversive ac-
tivities; "he and his wife appear to be genuinely interested in the wel-
fare of Negroes and other minority groups and are being taken in by
the communists." The Bureau chose a curiously indirect way to in-
form the target of his friends' Party membership; a local law enforce-
ment official was used to contact the County Administrator in the
expectation that the employee would be "called in and questioned
about his left-wing associates." 224
The Bureau made several attempts to stop outside sources from
funding target operations.2 2 5 For example, the Bureau learned that
SNCC was trying to obtain funds from the Episcopal Church for a
"liberation school." Two carefully spaced letters were sent to the
Church which falsely alleged that SNCC was engaged in a "fraudulent
scheme" involving the anticipated funds. The letters purported to be
from local businessmen approached by SNCC to place fictitious orders
for school supplies and divide the money when the Church paid the
bills. 2 26 Similar letters were sent to the Interreligious Foundation for
Community Organizing, from which SNOC had requested a grant for
its "Agrarian Reform Plan." This time, the letters alleged kickback
approaches in the sale of farm equipment and real estate.
2 27
Other targets include 'an employee of the Urban League, who was
fired because the Bureau contacted a confidential source in a foundation
which funded the League; 228 a lawyer known for his representation
2 There were 84 contacts with employers or 3 percent of the total.
'
22 Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 9/11/69.
0 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/29/64.
2 The FBI also used a "confidential source" in a foundation to gain funding
for a "moderate" civil rights organization. (Memorandum from G. C. Moore to
W. C. Sullivan, 10/23/68.)
"oMemorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/18/70.
2' Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/19/70.
" 8Memoranda from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 3/3/69 and
4/3/69.
of "subversives," whose nonmovement client received an anonymous
letter advising it not to employ a "well-known Communist Party
apologist"; 229 and a television commentator who was transferred after
his station and superiors received an anonymous protest letter. The
commentator, who had a weekly religious program, had expressed
admiration for a black nationalist leader and criticized the United
States' defense policy.230
F. Use and Abuse of Government Processes
This category, which comprises 9 percent of 'all approved proposals
includes selective law enforcement (using Federal, state, or local
authorities to arrest, audit, raid, inspect, deport, etc.); interference
with judicial proceedings, including targeting lawyers who represent
subversives"; interference with candidates or political appointees;
and using politicians and investigating committees, sometimes with-
out their knowledge, to take action against targets.
1. Selective Law Enforcement
Bureau documents often state that notifying law enforcement agen-
cies of violations committed by COINTELPRO targets is not counter-
intelligence, but part of normal Bureau responsibility. Other docu-
ments, however, make it clear that "counterintelligence" was precisely
the purpose. "Be alert to have them arrested," reads a New Left
COINTELPRO directive to all participating field offices.2 31 Further,
there is clearly a difference between notifying other agencies of
information that the Bureau happened across in an investigation-in
plain view, so to speak-and instructing field offices to find evidence
of violations-any violations-to "get" a target. As George Moore
stated:
Ordinarily, we would not be interested in health violations
because it is not my jurisdiction, we would not waste our time.
But under this program, we would tell our informants per-
haps to be alert to any health violations or other licensing
requirements or things of that nature, whether there were
violations and we would see that they were reported.28 2
State and local agencies were frequently informed of alleged statu-
tory violations which would come within their jurisdiction.233 As
noted above, this was not always normal Bureau procedure.
A typical example of the attempted use of local authorities to disrupt
targeted activities is the Bureau's attempt to have a Democratic Party
fund raiser raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commis-
229 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 7/2/64.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 3/28/69.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/9/68.2 Moore, 11/3/75, p. 47.
' Federal agencies were also used. For instance, a foreign-born professor
active in the New Left was deported by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service at the Bureau's instigation. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to
San Diego Field Office, 9/6/68.) The Bureau's use of the IRS in COINTELPRO
is included in a separate report. Among other actions, the Bureau obtained
an activist professor's tax returns and then used a source in a regional IRS
office to arrange an audit. The audit was intended to be timed to interfere with
the professor's meetings to plan protest demonstrations in the 1968 Democratic
conventidn:
Sion.
2 3 4 The function was to be held at a private house: the admission
charge included "refreshments." It was anticipated that alcoholic
beverages would be served. A confidential source in the ABC Com-
mission agreed to send an agent to the fund raiser to determine if
liquor was being served and then to conduct a raid.2 3 5 (In fact, the
raid was cancelled for reasons beyond the Bureau's control. A prior
raid on the local fire department's fund raiser had given rise to con-
siderable criticism and the District Attorney issued an advisory opin-
ion that such affairs did not violate state law. The confidential source
advised the field office that the ABC would not, after all, raid the
Democrats because of "political ramifications.") 236
In the second case, the target was a "key figure" Communist. He
had a history of homosexuality and was known to frequent a local
hotel. The Bureau requested that the local police have him arrested
for homosexuality; it was then intended to publicize. the arrest to
"embarrass the Party." Interestingly, the Bureau withdrew its request
when the target stopped working actively for the Party because it
would no longer cause the intended disruption.2 3 7 This would appear
to rebut the Bureau's contention that turning over evidence of viola-
tions to local authorities was not really COINTELPRO at all, but
just part of its job.
2. Interference With Judicial Proce88
The Bureau's attempts to interfere with judicial processes affecting
targets are particularly disturbing because they violate a fundamental
principle of our system of government. Justice is supposed to be blind.
Nevertheless, when a target appeared before a judge, a Jury, or a
probation board, he sometimes carried an unknown burden; the Bureau
had gotten there first.
Three examples should be sufficient. A university student who was
a leader of the Afro American Action Committee had been arrested
in a demonstration at the university. The Bureau sent an anonymous
letter to the county prosecutor intended to discredit her by exposing
her "subversive connections"; her adoptive father was described as
a Communist Party member. The Bureau believed that the letter
might aid the prosecutor in his case against the student. Another
anonymous letter containing the same information was mailed to a
local radio announcer who had an "open mike" program critical of
a4 The fund raiser was targeted because of two of the candidates who would
be present. One, a state assemblyman running for reelection, was active in the
Vietnam Day Committee; the other, the Democratic candidate for Congress, had
been a sponsor of the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on
Un-American Activities and had led demonstrations opposing the manufacture
of napalm bombs. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco
Field Office, 10/21/66.)
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
11/14/66.
2 Ibid.
m Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/23/60;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 3/11/60; memo-
randum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/10/60; memoran-
dum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 11/17/60.
local "leftist" activity. The letter was intended to further publicize
the "connection" between the student and the Communist Party.239
In the second example, a Klan leader who had been convicted on
a weapons charge was out on bail pending appeal. He spoke at a Klan
rally, and the Bureau arranged to have newsmen present. The result-
ng stories and photographs were then delivered to the appellate
judges considering his case.240
The third instance involved a real estate speculator's bequest of
over a million dollars to the three representatives of the Communist
Party who were expected to turn it over to the Party. The Bureau
interviewed the probate judge sitting on the case, who was "very co-
operative" and promised to look the case over carefully. The judge
asked the Bureau to determine whether the widow would be willing
to "take any action designed to keep the Communist Party from
getting the money." The Bureau's efforts to gain the widow's help in
contesting the will proved unsuccessful.241
3. Candidates and Political Appointee8
The Bureau apparently did not trust the American people to make
the proper choices in the voting booth. Candidates who, in the Bu-
reau's opinion, should not be elected were therefore targeted. The
case of the Democratic fundraiser discussed earlier was just one
example.
Socialist Workers Party candidates were routinely selected for
counterintelligence, although they had never come close to winning an
election. In one case, a SWP candidate for state office inadvertently
protected herself from action by announcing at a news conference
that she had no objections to premarital sex; a field office thereupon
withdrew its previously approved proposal to publicize her common
law marriage.241
Other candidates were also targeted. A Midwest lawyer whose firm
represented "subversives" (defendants in the Smith Act trials) ran
for City Council. The lawyer had been active in the civil rights move-
ment in the South, and the John Birch Society in his city had recently
mailed a book called "It's Very Simple-The True Story of Civil
Rights" to various ministers, priests, and rabbis. The Bureau received
a copy of the mailing list from a source in the Birch Society and sent
an anonymous follow-up letter to the book's recipients noting the
pages on which the candidate had been mentioned and calling their
attention to the "Communist background" of this "charlatan." 242 The
2 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 7/22/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 4/9/69.
Charles Colson spent seven months in jail for violating the civil rights of a de-
fendant in a criminal case through the deliberate creation of prejudicial pre-
trial publicity.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 6/23/66; memo-
randum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/30/66.
241 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/5/67. The
Bureau also obtained legal advice from a probate attorney on how the will could
be attacked; contacted other relatives of the deceased; leaked information about
the will to a city newspaper; and solicited the efforts of the IRS and state tax-
ing authorities to deplete the estate as much as possible.
41 Memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/13/70.so Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/15/65;
memorandui froin FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 9/22/65.
69-984 0 - 76 - 5
Bureau also sent a fictitious-name letter to a television station on
which the candidate was to appear, enclosing a series of informative
questions it believed should be asked.
24 3 The candidate was defeated.
He subsequently ran (successfully, as it happened) for a judgeship.
Political appointees were also targeted. One target was a member of
the board of the NAACP and the Democratic State Central Commit-
tee. His brother, according to the documents, was a communist, and
the target had participated in some Party youth group activities
fifteen years earlier. The target's appointment as secretary of a city
transportation board elicited an anonymous letter to the Mayor, with
carbons to two newspapers, protesting the use of "us taxpayers' money"
in the appointment of a "known Communist" to a highly paid job;
more anonymous letters to various politicians, the American Legion,
and the county prosecutor in the same vein; and a pseudonymous letter
to the members of the transportation board, stating that the Mayor
had "saddled them with a Commie secretary because he thinks it will
get him a few Negro votes. 24 4
4. Investigating Committees
State and Federal legislative investigating committees were occa-
sionally used to attack a target, since the committees' interests usually
marched with the Bureau's.
Perhaps the most elaborate use of an investigating committee was
the framing of a complicated "snitch jacket." In October 1959, a legis-
lative committee held hearings in Philadelphia, "ostensibly" to show
a resurgence of CP activity in the area.
2 4 5 The Bureau's target was
subpoenaed to appear before the committee but was not actually called
to testify. The field office proposed that local CP leaders be contacted to
raise the question of "how it was possible for [the target] to escape
testifying" before the committee; this "might place suspicion on him
as being cooperative" with the investigators and "raise sufficient doubt
in the minds of the leaders regarding [the target] to force him out of
the CP or at least to isolate and neutralize him." Strangely enough, the
target was not a bona fide CP member; he was an undercover in-
filtrator for a private anti-Communist group who had been a source of
trouble for the FBI because he kept getting in their way.
A more typical example of the use of a legislative committee is a
series of anonymous letters sent to the chairman of a state investigating
committee that was designated to look into New Left activities on the
state's college campuses. The target was an activist professor, and the
letters detailed his "subversive background."
G. Exposing "Communist Infiltration" of Groups
This technique was used in approximately 4 percent of all approved
proposals. The most common method involved anonymously notify-
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/1/65.
.." Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/24/66;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 11/3/66.
m According to the documents, "operating under the direction of New York
headquarters," a document was placed in the record by the Committee which
according to the "presiding officer," indicated that the CP planned to hold its
national convention in Philadelphia. The field office added, "This office is not
aware of any such plan of the CP." Memorandum from, Philadelphia Field Office
to FBI Headquarters, 11/3/59; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Phila-
delphia Field Office, 11/12/59.
ing the group (civil rights organization, PTA, Boy Scouts, etc.) that
one or more of its members was a "Communist," 2- so that it could
take whatever action it deemed appropriate. Occasionally, however,
the group itself was the COINTELPRO target. In those cases, the
information went to the media, and the intent was to link the group
to the Communist Party.
For example, one target was a Western professor who was the im-
mediate past president of a local peace center, "a coalition of anti-
Vietnam and antidraft groups." He had resigned to become chairman
of the state's McCarthy campaign organization, but it was anticipated
that he would return to the peace center after the election. Accord-
ing to the documents, the professor's wife had been a Communist
Party member in the early 1950s. This information was furnished to a
newspaper editor who had written an editorial branding the SDS
and various black power groups as "professional revolutionists."
The information was intended to "expose these people at this time
when they are receiving considerable publicity to not only educate
the public to their character, but disrupt the members" of the peace
organization.47
In another case, the Bureau learned through electronic surveillance
of a civil rights leader's plans to attend a reception at the Soviet Mis-
sion to the United Nations. (The reception was to honor a Soviet
author.) The civil rights leader was active in a school boycott which
had been previously targeted; the Bureau arranged to have news
photographers at the scene to photograph him entering the Soviet
Other instances include furnishing information to the media on
the participation of the Communist Party Presidential candidate in
a United Farm Workers' picket line: 249 "confidentially" telling estab-
lished sources of 'three Northern California newspapers that the San
Francisco County CP Committee had stated that the Bay area civil
rights groups would "begin working" on the area's large newspapers
"in an effort to secure greater employment of Negroes;" 250 and fur-
nishing information on Socialist Workers Party participation in the
Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to "dis-
credit" the antiwar group by tying it "into the subversive
movement." 251
."Note that the "Communist" label was loosely applied, and might mean onlythat an informant reported that a target had attended meetings of a "front"
group some years earlier. As noted earlier, none of the "COINTELPRO" labelswere precise.
2" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Phoenix Field Office, 6/11/68.
Memorandum from William C. Sullivan, 2/4/64; memorandum from FBIHeadquarters to New York Field Office, 2/12/64.
2mThe target was not intended to be the United Farm Workers, but a localcollege professor expected to participate in the picket line. The Bureau had un-successfully directed "considerable efforts to prevent hiring" the professor. Ap-parently, the Bureau did not consider the impact of this technique on the UnitedFarm Workers' efforts. Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBIHeadquarters 9/12/68; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San FranciscoField Office, 9/13/68.
m Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/16/64.2nMemorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/10/67;memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 3/14/67.
V. COMMAND AND CONTROL: THE PROBLEM OF OVERSIGHT
A. Within the Bureau
1. Internal Administration
The Bureau attempted to exercise stringent internal controls over
COINTELPRO. All counterintelligence proposals had to be approved
by headquarters. Every originating COINTELPRO document con-
tains a strong warning to the field that "no counterintelligence action
may 'be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization."
The field would send a proposal under the COINTELPRO caption
to the Seat of Govermnent-the Bureau term for headquarters-
where it would be routed to the Section Chief of the section handling
the particular COINTELPRO program.
2 52
The recommendation would then be attached to the proposal, be-
ginning the process of administrative review. The lowest level on
which a proposal could be approved was the Assistant Director, Do-
mestic Intelligence Division, to whom the Section Chief reported via
the Branch Chief. More often, the proposal would go through the
Assistant to the Director and often to the Director himself.
2. Coordination
The Counterintelligence programs were coordinated with the rest
of the section's work primarily through informal contacts, but also
through section meetings and the Section Chief's knowledge of the
work of his entire section.
Further, although the initial COINTELPRO was an effort to cen-
tralize what had been an ad hoc series of field actions, the programs
continued to be essentially field-oriented with little target selection by
headquarters. However, the Section Chief would attempt to make sure
targets were being effectively chosen by occasionally sending out di-
rectives to field offices to intensify the investigation of a particular
individual or group and to consider the subject for counterintelligence
action.253
3. Results
Participating field offices were required to send in status letters
(usually every ninety days) reporting any tangible results. They were
instructed to resolve any doubts as to whether a counterintelligence
action caused the observed result in their favor. Nevertheless, results
were reported in only 527 cases, or 22 percent, of the approved actions.
When a "good" result was reported, the field office or agent involved




2 The CPUSA, SWP, and New Left programs were handled in the Internal
Security Section; the White Hate program was first handled in a short-lived
three-man "COINTELPRO unit" which, during the three years of its existence,
supervised the OP and SWP programs as well, and then was transferred to the
Extremists Section; the Black Nationalist program was supervised by the Racial
Intelligence Section. The Swtion Chief would then route the proposal to the
COINTELPRO supervisor for each program. Occasionally the Section Chief
made a recommendation as to the proposal; more often the supervisor made
the initial decision to approve or deny.
' No control file was maintained of these directives. Since these directives
were sent out under the investigative caption, the first time the COINTELPRO
caption would be used was on the field proposal which responded to the
directives.
2 (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 167.) There is no central file of such awards, so the
number is retrievable only by searching each agent's personnel file.
4. Blurred Distinction Between Counterintelligence and In-
vestigation
It is ssible that some actions did not receive headquarters scrutiny
simply ecause the field offices were never told precisely what "counter-
intelligence" was. Although Bureau procedures strictly required
COINTELPRO proposals to be approved at headquarters and a con-trol file to be maintained both in the field and at headquarters, the
field offices had no way to determine with any certainty just what was
counterintelligence and what was investigation. Many of the tech-
niques overlap: contacts with employers, contacts with family members,
contacts with local law enforcement, even straight interviewing, areall investigative techniques which were used in COINTELPRO ac-tions.255 More importantly, actions in the Rev. Martin Luther King
case which cannot, by any stretch of the language, be called "investiga-
tive" were not called COINTELPRO, but were carried under theinvestigative caption.256
The Bureau witnesses agree that COINTELPRO has no fixed defini-tion, and that there is a large grey area between what is counterintelli-
gence and what is aggressive investigation. As the Black Nationalist
supervisor put it, "Basically actions taken to neutralize an individual
or disrupt an organization would be COINTELPRO; actions which
were primarily investigative would have been handled by the investi-
gative desks," even though the investigative action had disruptive
effects. 256a Aggressive investigation continues, and in many cases may
be as disruptive as COINTELPRO, because in an investigation the
Bureau can and does reveal its interest. An anonymous letter (COIN
TELPRO) can be discarded as the work of a crank; but if the local
FBI agent says the subject of an investigation is a subversive an em-
ployer or family member pays attention.
5. Inspection
The Inspection Division attempted to ensure that standard proce-
dures were being followed. The Inspectors focused on two things: field
office participation, and the mechanics of headquarters approval. How-ever, the Inspection Division did not exercise oversight, in the sense of
looking for wrongdoing. Rather, it was an active participant in
COINTELPRO by attempting to make sure that it was being effi-
ciently and enthusiastically conducted.257
m According to Moore, even the "snitch jacket"-labeling a group member asan informant when he is not-is not solely a counterintelligence technique, butmay be used, in an ordinary investigation, to protect a real informant, "Maybe. . . you had an informant whose life was at stake because somebody suspectedhim and the degree of response . . . might be the degree that you would haveto use in order to sow enough suspicion on other people to take it away fromyour informant." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 70)
2 See Dr. Martin Luther King Report.
2' Black Nationalist deposition, 10/17/75, p. 15.
'57 As Moore put it, "This was a program, and whenever the Bureau had a pro-gram, you had to produce results because it was scrutinized by the inspectors, notonly during your own inspection on a yearly basis, but also scrutinized in the fieldduring field inspections." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 43.) The New Left supervisor, whoreceived copies of the inspection reports, stated that "it would be an innocuoustype report in every instance I can recall." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 72)For example, one Domestic Intelligence Division inspection report on the"White Hate" programs noted under "Accomplishments" that the decline in Klanorgaiizatiofis is attributable to "hard-hitting investigations, counterintelligence
(Continued)
As the Assistant Director then in charge of the Inspection Division
testified, the "propriety" of COINTELPRO was not investigated. He
agreed that his job was to "determine whether the program was being
pursued effectively as opposed to whether it was proper," and added,
"There was no instruction to me, nor do I believe there is any instruc-
tion in the Inspector's manual that the Inspector should be on the alert
to see that constitutional values are being protected." 258
B. Outside the Bureau: 1956-1971
There is no clear answer to the question whether anyone outside the
Bureau knew about COINTELPRO. One of the hallmarks of
COINTELPRO was its secrecy. No one outside the Bureau was to
know it existed. 2 5 9 A characteristic instruction appeared in the Black
Nationalist originating letter:
You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor
is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the
program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate
within-office security should be afforded to sensitive opera-
tions and techniques considered under the program. 26 o
Thus, for example, anonymous letters had to be written on commer-
cially purchased stationery; newsmen had to be so completely trust-
worthy that they were guaranteed not to reveal the Bureau's interest;
and inquiries of law enforcement officials had to be under investigative
pretext. In approving or denying any proposal, the primary consid-
eration was preventing "embarrassment to the Bureau." Embarrass-
ment is a term of art. It means both public relations embarrassment-
criticism-and any revelation of the Bureau's investigative interest
to the subject, which may then be expected to take countermeasures.
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(Continued)
programs directed at them, and penetration ... by our racial informants." The
report then lists several specific actions, including the defeat of a candidate with
Klan affiliations; the removal from office of a high Klan official; and the issuance
of a derogatory press release. (Inspection, Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/8-
26/71, pp. 15, 17-19.)
2 Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/76, pp. 56, 65.
" For security reasons, no instructions were printed in the Manual. In service
training for intelligence agents did contain an hour on COINTELPRO, so it may
be assumed that most agents knew something about the programs.
For instances in which Attorneys General, the Cabinet, and the House Sub-
committee on Appropriations were allegedly informed of the existence of the
OPUSA and Klan COINTELPROs.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67.
2m One example of the lengths to which the Bureau went in maintaining
secrecy may be instructive. The Bureau sent a letter to Klan members purport-
ing to be from the "National Intelligence Committee"-a super-secret Klan
disciplinary body. The letter fired the North Carolina Grand Dragon and sus-
pended the Imperial Wizard, Robert Shelton. Shelton complained to both the
local postal inspector and the FBI resident agency (which solemnly assured him
that his complaint was not within the Bureau's jurisdiction). The Bureau had
intended to mail a second "NIC" letter, but the plans were held in abeyance
until it could be learned whether the postal inspector intended to act on Shelton's
complaint. The Bureau, therefore, contacted the local postal inspector, using
their investigation of Shelton's complaint as a pretext, to see what the inspector
intended to do. The field office reported that the local inspector had forwarded
the complaint to regional headquarters, which in turn referred it to a Chief Postal
Inspector in Washington, D.C. The Bureau's liaison agent was then sent to that
office to determine what action the postal authorities planned to take. He
returned with the information that the Post Office had referred the matter to the
Fraud Section of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, under a cover
This secrecy has an obvious impact on the oversight process. There is
some question whether anyone with oversight responsibility outside
the Bureau was informed of COINTELPRO. In response to the Com-
mittee's request, the Bureau has assembled all documents available in
its files which indicate that members of the executive and legislative
branches were so informed.262
1. Executive Branch
On May 8, 1958, Director Hoover sent two letters, one to the Hon-
orable Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, and
the other to Attorney General William Rogers, containing the same
information. The Attorney General's letter is captioned "COMMU-NIST PARTY, USA-INTERNAL SECURITY." The letters arefairly explicit notification of the CPUSA COINTELPRO:
In August of 1956, this Bureau initiated a program designed
to promote disruption within the ranks of the Communist
Party (CP) USA ... Several techniques have been utilized
to accomplish our objectives.263
The letters go on to detail use of informants to engage in controver-sial discussions, after which "acrimonious debates ensued, suspicions
were aroused, and jealousies fomented"; and anonymous mailings ofanti-communist material, both reprinted and Bureau-prepared, toactive CP members.264 (Two examples of the Bureau's product wereenclosed.) "Tangible accomplishments" achieved by the program were"disillusionment and defection among Party members and increasedfactionalism at all levels." 265 However, the only techniques disclosedwere use of informants and anonymous propaganda mailings. There isno record of any reply to these letters.
letter stating that since Shelton's allegations "appear to involve an internalstruggle" for Klan control, and "since the evidence of mail fraud was somewhattenuous in nature," the Post Office did not contemplate any investigation. Neither,apparently, did the Department. The Bureau did not inform either the PostalInspector or the Criminal Division that it had authored the letter under review.Instead, when it appeared the FBI's role would not be discovered, the Bureauprepared to send out the second letter-a plan which was discontinued when theKlan "notional" was proposed.
Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/9/67;memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 5/24/67; memo-randum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/31/67; memoran-dum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/7/67; memorandum fromAtlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/13/67; memorandum from Birming-ham Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/67; memorandum from CharlotteField Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/28/67; memorandum from FBI Headquartersto Atlanta and Charlotte Field Offices, 6/29/67; memorandum from AtlantaField Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/27/67; memorandum from Bernard Rachnerto Charles Brennan, 7/11/67; memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBIHeadquarters, 8/22/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to CharlotteField Office, 8/21/67.
' These documents were also made available to the Petersen Committee. ThePetersen Committee twice asked the Bureau for documents showing outsideknowledge, and twice was told there were none. Only as the Petersen report wasready to go to press did the Bureau find the documents delivered. (Staff inter-view with Henry Petersen.)
Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.
'5 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.
On January 10, 1961, letters from the Director were sent to Dean
Rusk, Robert Kennedy, and Byron R. White, who were about to take
office as Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Deputy Attorney
General, respectively. The letters enclosed a top secret summary mem-
orandum setting forth the overall activities of the Communist Party,
USA, and stated, "Our responsibilities in the internal security field
and our counterattack against the CPUSA are also set out in this
memorandum." 266
The five-page memorandum contains one section entitled "FBI
Counterattack." This section details penetration of the Party at all
levels with security informants; use of various techniques to keep the
Party off-balance and disillusioned; infiltration by informants; in-
tensive investigation of Party members; and prosecution. Only one
paragraph of that report appears at all related to the Bureau's claim
that the CPUSA COINTELPRO was disclosed:
As an adjunct to our regular investigative operations, we
carry on a carefully planned program of counterattack
against the CPUSA which keeps it off balance. Our primary
purpose in this program is to bring about disillusionment
on the part of individual members which is carried on from
both inside and outside the Party organization. [Sentence
on use of informants to disrupt excised for security reasons.]
In certain instances we have been successful in preventing
communists from seizing control of legitimate mass orga-
nizations and have discredited others who were secretly oper-
ating inside such organizations. For example, during 1959
we were able to prevent the CPUSA from seizing control of
the 20,000-member branch of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People in Chicago, Illinois.261
The only techniques disclosed were use of informants and COMINFIL
exposure. There is no record of any replies to these letters.
On September 2, 1965, letters were sent to the Honorable Marvin
Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson and Attorney General
Katzenbach (whose letter was captioned "PENETRATION AND
DISRUPTION OF KLAN ORGANIZATIONS-RACIAL MAT-
TERS"). These two-page letters refer to the Bureau's success in solv-
ing a number of cases involving racial violence in the South. They
then detail the development of a large number of informants and the
value of the information received from them.
One paragraph deals with "disruption":
We also are seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities
of Klan organizations. Typical is the manner in which we
exposed and thwarted a "kick back" scheme a Klan group was
using in one southern state to help finance its activities. One
member of the group was selling insurance to other Klan mem-
bers and would deposit a generous portion of the premium
refunds in the Klan treasury. As a result of action we took, the
insurance company learned of the scheme and cancelled all
the policies held by Klan members, thereby cutting on a siz-
M emorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 1/10/61.
__ Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 1/10/61, p. 4.
able source of revenue which had been used to finance Klan
activities.268
Notifying an insurance company of a kick back scheme involving its
premiums is not a "typical" COINTELPRO technique. It falls within
that grey area between counterintelligence and ordinary Bureau re-
sponsibilities. Nevertheless, the statement that the Bureau is "seizing
every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan organizations" is
considered by the Bureau to be notification of the White Hate
COINTELPRO, even though it does not distinguish between the inevi-
table and sometimes proper disruption of intensive investigation and
the intended disruption of covert action.
On September 3, 1965, Mr. Katzenbach replied to the Director's letter
with a two-paragraph memorandum captioned "Re: Your memo-
randum of September 2, regarding penetration and disruption of Klan
organizations." The body of the memorandum makes no reference to
disruption, but praises the accomplishments of the Bureau in the area
of Klan penetration and congratulates Director Hoover on the devel-
opment of his informant system and the results obtained through it.
The letter concludes:
It is unfortunate that the value of these activities would in
most cases be lost if too extensive publicity were given to
them; however, perhaps at some point it may be possible to
place these achievements on the public record, so that the -
Bureau can receive its due credit.269
The Bureau interpreted this letter as approval and praise of its White
Hate COINTELPRO. Mr. Katzenbach has said that he has no memory
of this document, nor of the response. He testified that during his term
in the Department he had never heard the terms "COINTEL" or
COINTELPRO, and that while he was familiar with the Klan inves-
tigation, he was not aware of any improper activities such as letters
to wives. 27 0 Mr. Katzenbach added:
It never occurred to me that the Bureau would engage in the
sort of sustained improper activity which it apparently did.
Moreover, given these excesses, I am not surprised that I and
others were unaware of them. Would it have made sense for
the FBI to seek approval for activities of this nature-espe-
cially from Attorneys General who did not share Mr. Hoover's
political views, who would not have been in sympathy with
the purpose of these attacks, and who would not have con-
doned the methods ? 271
The files do not reveal any response from Mr. Watson.
On December 19, 1967, Director Hoover sent a letter to Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, with a copy to Deputy Attorney General-
Warren Christopher, captioned "KU KLUX KLAN INVESTIGA-
TIONS-FBI ACCOMPLISHMENTS" and attaching a ten-page
memorandum with the same caption and a list of statements and pub-
m Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 9/2/65, p. 2.
Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/3/65.
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 206-207.
Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 217.
lications regarding the Ku Klux Klan "and the FBI's role in investi-
gating Klan matters." The memorandum was prepared "pursuant to
your conversation with Cartha DeLoach of this Bureau concerning
FBI coverage and penetration of the Ku Klux Klan." 272
The memo is divided into eleven sections: Background, Present
Status, FBI Responsibility, Major Cases, Informants, Special Proj-
ects, Liaison With Local Authorities, Klan Infiltration of Law En-
forcement, Acquisition of Weapons and Dynamite of the Ku Klux
Klan, Interviews of Klansmen, and Recent Developments.
The first statement in the memorandum which might conceivably
relate to the White Hate COINTELPRO appears under the heading
"FBI Responsibility":
. . . We conduct intelligence investigations with the view
toward infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan with informants,
neutralizing it as a terrorist organization, and deterring vio-
lence.273
The Bureau considers the word "neutralize" to be a COINTELPRO
key word.
Some specific activities which were carried out within the Bureau
under the COINTELPRO caption are then detailed under the heading
"Special Projects." The use of Bureau informants to effect the re-
moval of Klan officers is set forth under the subheadings "Florida,"
"Mississippi," and "Louisiana." More significantly, the "Florida"
paragraph includes the statement that, "We have found that by the
removal of top Klan officers and provoking scandal within the state
Klan organization through our informants, the Klan in a particular
area can be rendered ineffective." 274 This sentence, although somewhat
buried should, if focused upon, have alerted the recipients to actions
going beyond normal investigative activity. Other references are
more vague, referring only to "containing the growth" or "controlling
the expansion" of state Klans .2 75 There is no record of any reply to this
letter, which Clark does not remember receiving:
Did [these phrases in the letter] put me on notice? No. Why?
I either did not read them, or if I did read them, didn't read
them carefully.... I think I didn't read this. I think perhaps
I had asked for it for someone else, and either bucked it on
to them or never saw it.276
' Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 12/19/67, p. 1.
2" Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 2/19/67, p. 4.
171 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 12/19/67, p. 8.
"'The paragraph under the subheading "Tennessee" includes the statement
that, through a highly placed Bureau informant, "we were able to control the ex-
pansion of the Klan." The paragraphs under the subheading "Virginia" states
that, after the United Klans of America began an intensive organizational effort
in the state, "We immediately began an all-out effort to penetrate the Virginia
Klan, contain its growth, and deter violence." The specific examples given, how-
ever, are not COINTELPRO actions, but liaison with state and local authorities,
prosecution, cooperation with the Governor, and warning a civil rights worker of
a plot against his life. The paragraph under the subheading "Illinois" contains
nothing relating to COINTELPRO activities, but refers to cooperation with
state authorities in the prosecution of a Klan official for a series of bombings.
(Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, 12/19/67, pp. 8-10.)
... Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 235.
He added, "I think that any disruptive activities, such as those you
reveal, regarding the COINTEL program and the Ku Klux Klan,
should be absolutely prohibited and subjected to criminal prosecu-tion." 277
Finally, on September 17, 1969, a letter was sent to Attorney General
Mitchell, with copies to the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant
Attorneys General of the Criminal Division, Internal Security Divi-
sion, and Civil Division, captioned "INVESTIGATION OF KLAN
ORGANIZATIONS-RACIAL MATTERS (KLAN)," which in-
forms the recipients of the "significant progress we have recently madein our investigation of the Ku Klux Klan." The one page letter states
that, "during the last several months, 278 while various national and-
state leaders of the United Klan of America remain in prison, we have
attempted to negate the activities of the temporary leaders of the Ku
Klux Klan. ' 279
The only example given is the "careful use and instruction of selected
racial informants" to "initiate a split within the United Klans ofAmerica." This split was evidenced by a Klan rally during whichapproximately 150 Klan membership cards were tacked to a cross
and burned to signify this breach." 280
The letter concludes, "We will continue to give full attention to our
responsibilities in an effort to accomplish the maximum possible neu-
tralization of the Klan." 281 There is no record of any replies to these
letters.
While the only documentary evidence that members of the executive
branch were informed of the existence of any COINTELPRO has
been set forth above, the COINTELPRO unit chief stated that he was
certain that Director Hoover orally briefed every Attorney General
and President, since he wrote "squib" for the Director to use in such
briefings. He could not, however, remember the dates or subject matter
of the briefings, and the Bureau was unable to produce any such"squibs" (which would not, in any case, have been routinely saved).
Cartha DeLoach, former Assistant to the Director, testified that
he "distinctly" recalled briefing Attorney General Clark, "generall... concerning COINTELPRO.282 Clark denied that DeLoach's testi-
mony was either true or accurate, adding "I do not believe that he
briefed me on anything even, as he says, generally concerning
COINTELPRO, whatever that means." 283 The Bureau has failed to
produce any memoranda of such oral briefings, although it was the
habit of both Director Hoover and DeLoach to write memoranda for
the files in such situations.284
2. The Cabinet
The Bureau has furnished the Committee a portion of a briefing
paper prepared for Director Hoover for his briefing of the Cabinet,
m Clark. 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 221.
' The White Hate COINTELPRO had been going on for five years.
2 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 9/17/69.
m Ibid.
Ibid.
2 8 DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearings. Vol. 6, p. 183.
Clark. 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 232.
2m Unit Chief, 10/14/75, p. 136; and 10/21/75, p. 42.
presided over by President Eisenhower, dated November 6, 1958.
There is no transcript of the actual briefing. The briefing as a whole
apparently dealt with, among other things, seven programs which
are "part of our overall counterintelligence operations" and which
are "specific answers to specific problems which have arisen within
our investigative jurisdiction." Six of the programs apparently related
to espionage. The seventh deals with the CPUSA:
To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence
in the United States, we have a seventh program designed
to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its
members. During the past few years, this program has been
most effective. Selective informants were briefed and trained
to raise controversial issues within the Party. In the process,
many were able to advance themselves to higher positions.
The Internal Revenue Service was furnished the names and
addresses of Party functionaries Who had been active in the
underground apparatus. Based on this information, investi-
gations were instituted in 262 possible income tax evasion
cases. Anticommunist literature and simulated Party docu-
ments were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen mem-.
'bers.2 85
This statement, although concise, would appear to be a fairly explicit
notification of the existence of the CPUSA COINTELPRO. There
are no documents reflecting any response.
3. Legislative Branch
The Bureau has furnished excerpts from briefing papers prepared
for the Director in his annual appearances before the House Appro-
priations Subcommittee. During the hearings pertaining to fiscal years
1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1967,286 these briefing papers
were given to the Director to be used in top secret, off-the-record testi-
mony relating to the CPUSA and White Hate COINTELPROs. No
transcripts are available of the actual briefings, and it is, therefore,
not possible to determine whether the briefing papers were used at all,
or, conversely, whether the Director went beyond them to give addi-
tional information. Additionally, portions of the briefing papers are
underlined by hand and portions have been crossed out, also by hand.
Some sections are both underlined and crossed out. The Bureau has
not been able to explain the meaning of the underlining or cross
marks. However, if the briefing papers were used as written, the Sub-
committee was informed of the existence of the CPUSA and Klan
COINTELPROs.
The FY 1958 briefing paper is in outline form. Under the heading
"auxiliary measures directed against Communist Party-USA" is a
paragraph entitled "FBI counterintelligence program to exploit
Party 'split':"
The Bureau also recently inaugurated a newly devised coun-
terintelligence program which is designed to capitalize upon
ExcerYt from FBI Director's briefing to the President and his cabinet,
11/6/58, pp. 35-36.
' The actual dates of the hearings would be 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962, 1965,
and 1966.
the "split" presently existing in the leadership of the Com-
munist Party-USA. Among other objectives, efforts are being
made by the Bureau, through informants and other tech-
niques, to keep these rifts open, and to otherwise weaken the
party where possible to do so in an anonymous manner. The
Internal Revenue Service has -been given the names of 336
communist underground subjects, so that the agency may be
able to entertain prosecutions for filing of false income tax
returns or other violations within the jurisdiction of that
Service.
The FY 1959 briefing paper on the CPUSA deals primarily with
informant penetration, but includes the statement that "to counter-
act [CPUSA] activities the FBI for years has had a planned intensive
program designed to infiltrate, penetrate, disorganize, and disrupt the
Communist Party, USA." 287 In covering informant activities, the
paper includes the statement "they [informants] have likewise worked
to excellent advantage as a disruptive tactic." 288 The one specific ex-
ample cited has been deleted by the Bureau because it tends to identify
an informant.
The FY 1960 briefing paper is even more explicit. The pertinent
section is entitled "FBI's Anti-Communist Counterintelligence Pro-
gram." It details use of informants to engage in controversial discus-
sions "to promote dissension, factionalism and defections" which
"have been extremely successful from a disruptive standpoint." 289 One
paragraph deals with propaganda mailings "carefully concealing the
identity of the FBI as its source"; 290 another paragraph states that
"Communist Party leaders are considerably concerned over this
anonymous dissemination of literature." 291
The FY 1961 briefing paper, again titled "FBI's Counterintelli-
gence Program", states that the program was devised "to promote dis-
sension, factionalism and defections within the communist cause." 292
The only technique discussed (but at some length) is anonymous
propaganda mailings. The effectiveness of the technique, according
to the paper, was proven from the mouth of the enemy that the mail-
ings "appear to be the greatest danger to the Communist Party,
USA." 293
The FY 1963 briefing paper, captioned "Counterintelligence Pro-
gram," is extraordinarily explicit. It reveals that:
Since August, 1956, we have augmented our regular investiga-
tive operations against the Communist Party-USA with a"counterintelligence program" which involves the applica-
" Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee, FY 1959, p. 54.
m Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee, FY 1959, p. 58.
2m Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee, FY 1960, p. 76.
m Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee, FY 1960, p. 76.
m9 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee, FY 1960, p. 77.
2 Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1961, p. 80.
' Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations Subcom-mittee, FY 1961;1 p. S1.
tion of disruptive techniques and psychological warfare di-
rected at discrediting and disrupting the operations of the
Party, and causing disillusionment and defections within
the communist ranks. The tangible results we are obtaining
through these covert -and extremely sensitive operations speak
for themselves.2 9 4
The paper goes on to set forth such techniques as disrupting meet-
ings, rallies, and press conferences through causing the last-minute
cancellation of the rental of the hall, packing -the audience with anti-
communists, arranging adverse publicity in the press, and giving
friendly reporters "embarrassing questions" for Communists they
interviewed. The briefing paper also mentions the use of newsmen to
take photographs which show the close relationship between the
leaders of the CPUSA and officials of the Soviet Union, using inform-
ants to sow discord and factionalism, exposing and discrediting Com-
munists in such "legitimate organizations" as the YMCA and the Boy
Scouts, and mailing anonymous propaganda. 2 9 5
The briefing paper for FY 1966 again refers to "counterintelligence
action:" "We have since 1956 carried on a sensitive program for the
purpose of disrupting, exposing, discrediting, and otherwise neutraliz-
ing the Communist Party-USA and related organizations." 296 The
paper cites two examples. The first is an operation conducted against
a Communist Party functionary who arrived in a (deleted) city to
conduct a secret two-week Party school for local youth. The Bureau
arranged for him to be greeted at the airport by local television news-
men. The functionary lost his temper, pushing the reporter away and
swinging his briefcase at the cameraman, who was busily filming the
entire incident. The film was later televised nationally. The second
technique is described as "the most effective single blow ever dealt
the organized communist movement." The description has been de-
leted "as it tends to reveal a highly sensitive technique." 297 The
COINTELPRO unit chief also stated that this one single action suc-
ceeded in causing a "radical decrease" in CPUSA membership, but
refused to tell the Committee staff what that action was because it
involved foreign counterintelligence.298
The final briefing paper, for FY 1967, refers to the OPUSA pro-
gram and its expansion in 1964 to include "Klan and hate-type or-
ganizations and their memberships." It continues, "counterintelligence
action today is a valuable adjunct to investigative responsibilities and
the techniques used complement our investigations. All information
related to the targeted organizations, their leadership and members,
which is developed from a variety of sources, is carefully reviewed for
its potential for use under this program." 299
" Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1963.
m Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1963.
'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1966, p. 62. This is the first time the targeting of non-Party
members can be inferred.
'Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1966, p. 63.
Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 113.
Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, FY 1967, p. 71.
Examples cited are the Bureau's preparation of a leaflet on the
W.E.B. DuBois Clubs entitled "Target... American Youth!" spon-
sored by the VFW; alerting owners of meeting locations to their use
by Communists; alerting the Veterans Administration to a Klan
member's full-time employment in order to reduce his pension, andthe IRS to the fact that he failed to file tax returns; exposing the in-surance kick back scheme also referred to in the 1965 letters to Watson
and Katzenbach; and increasing informant coverage by duplicating
a Klan business card given to prospective members.300
C. Outside the Bureau: Post-1971.
In the fall of 1973, the Department of Justice released certain
COINTELPRO documents which had been requested by NBC re-porter Carl Stern in a Freedom of Information Act request followingthe Media, Pennsylvania, break-in. In January 1974, Attorney GeneralSaxbe asked Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen to form anintradepartmental committee to study COINTELPRO and reportback to him.a0 The committee was composed of both Department at-torneys and Bureau agents. The Department lawyers did not workdirectly with Bureau documents; instead the Bureau prepared sum-maries of the documents in the COINTELPRO control file, which didnot include the identities or affiliations of the targets, and the Depart-ment members were allowed to do a sample comparison to verify theaccuracy of the summaries.
A revised and shortened version of the report of the Petersen Com-mittee was made public in November 1974. The public report was pref-aced by a statement from Attorney General Saxbe which stated thatwhile "in a small number of instances, some of these programs in-volved what we consider today to be improper activities," most of theactivities "were legitimate." 3o" The public version did not examine thepurposes or legality of the programs or the techniques, although it didstate some COINTELPRO activities involved "isolated instances" ofpractices that "can only be considered abhorrent in a free society." 302
The confidential report to Attorney General Saxbe examined thelegal issues at some length. It emphasized that many COINTELPROactivities "were entirely proper and appropriate law enforcement pro-cedures." 303 These included the following:
notifying other Government authorities of civil and criminal
violations of group members; interviewing such group mem-
bers; disseminating public source material on such individ-
uals and groups to media representatives; encouraging in-
formants to argue against the use of violence by such groups;
and issuing general public comment on the activities, policies
' Excerpt from FBI Director's briefing of the House AppropriationsSubcommittee, FY 1967, pp. 72-73.
' Although portions of the Committee's report were made public in April 1974,Petersen has testified that the purpose of the report was simply to inform theAttorney General. The inquiry was not intended to be conclusive and certainlywas not an adversary proceeding. "We were doing a survey rather than con-ducting an investigation." (Henry Petersen testimony, 12/11/75, Hearing, Vol.6, p. 271.)
' William Saxbe statement, Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Sub-Committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 11/20/74, p. 9." Petersen committee report, CRCR Hearings, 11/20/74, p. 11.
3m Petersen committee report, CRCR, Hearings, 11/20/74, p. 26.
and objectives of such groups through testimony at legisla-
tive hearings and in other formal reports.
3 0 4
On the other hand, the report concluded that many other COINTEL
PRO activities designed to expose, disrupt, and neutralize domestic
groups "exceeded the Bureau's investigative authority and may be said
to constitute an unwarranted interference with First Amendment
rights of free speech and associations of the target individuals and or-
ganizations." 305
Department attorneys prepared two legal memoranda, one view-
ing COINTELPRO as a conspiracy to deprive persons of First
Amendment rights under 18 U.S.C. 241, and the other rejecting that
view.3 0 6 The committee itself reached the following conclusion:
While as a matter of pure legal theory it is arguable that
these programs resulted in Section 241 violations, it is the view
of the committee that any decision as to whether prosecution
should be undertaken must also take into account several
other important factors which bear upon the events in ques-
tion. These factors are: first, the historical context in which
the programs were conceived and executed by the Bureau
in response to public and even Congressional demands for
action to neutralize the self-proclaimed revolutionary aims
and violence prone activities of extremist groups which posed
a threat to the peace and tranquility of our cities in the mid
and late sixties; second, the fact that each of the COINTEL
PRO programs was personally approved and supported by
the late Director of the FBI; and third, the fact that the in-
terferences with First Amendment rights resulting from in-
dividual implemented program actions were insubstantial.
Under these circumstances, it is the view of the committee that
the opening of a criminal investigation of these matters is not
warranted.3 0 7
The report also concluded that there were "substantial questions" as
to the liability of various former and present officials to civil suit
"under tort theories of defamation of interference with contract
rights." 308
The Departmental committee's crucial conclusion was that the inter-
ferences with First Amendment rights were "insubstantial." It appears
to have reached that conclusion by ignoring the declared goals of the
programs: cutting down group membership and preventing the "prop-
agation" of a group's philosophy. Further, the committee brushed over
dangerous or degrading techniques by breaking down the categories
of actions into very small percentages, and then concluded that, if only
1 percent of the actions involved poison pen letters to spouses, then the
activity was "insubstantial" as compared to the entirety of COINTEL
proposals, even though, as to the individuals in that category, the in-
vasion might be very substantial indeed.
m Petersen Committee Report, pp. 26-27.
' Petersen Committee Report, p. 27.
Petersen Committee Report, p. 21.
0 Peterson Committee Report, pp. 21-22.
m Petersen Committee Report, p. 22.
Another weakness in the Petersen committee report is its charac-
terization as legitimate of such techniques as "leaking" public source
material to the media, interviewing group members, and notifying
other government 'authorities of civil and criminal violations. The
term "public source material" is misleading, since the FBI's files con-
tain a large amount of so-called public source data (such as arrest
records, outdated or inaccurate news stories) which should not be
"leaked" outside the Bureau to discredit 'an individual.3 " Interviews
can be conducted in such an intrustive and persistent manner as to
constitute harassment. Minor technical law violations can be mag-
nified when uncovered and reported by the FBI to another agency for
the purpose of disruption rather than objective law enforcement. 310
Claims that a technique is legitimate per se should not be accepted
without examining the actual purpose and effect of the activity.
Although the Petersen committee's report concluded that "the
opening of a criminal investigation of these matters is not war-
ranted." 1 the Committee did recommend broad changes in Bureau
procedures. First, the report urged that "a sharp distinction . . . be
made between FBI activities in the area of foreign counterintelligence
and those in the domestic field." 312 The committee proposed that the
Attorney General issue a directive to the FBI:
prohibiting it from instituting any counterintelligence pro-
gram such as COINTELPRO without his prior knowledge
and approval. Specifically, this directive should make it un-
mistakably clear that no disruptive action should be taken
by the FBI in connection with its investigative responsi-
bilities involving domestic based organizations, except those
For instance, the 20-years-past "Communist" activities of a target professor's
wife were found in "public source material," as were the arrest records of a
prominent civil rights leader. Both were leaked to "friendly" media on condition
that the Bureau's interest not be revealed.
o See, e.g., the attempt to get an agent on the Alcohol Beverage Control Board
to raid a Democratic Party fundraiser.
nx The Civil Rights Division refused to endorse-this conclusion, although it was
under heavy pressure from top Department executives to do so. Assistant Attorney
General J. Stanley Pottinger was first informed of the Petersen committee
report a week before its public release; and no official of the Civil Rights Division
had previously examined any of the COINTELPRO materials or summaries. After
the report's release, the Civil Rights Division was permitted a short time to
review some of the materials. (Staff summary of interview with Assistant
Attorney General Pottinger, 4/21/76.)
Under these restrictions the Civil Rights Division was not able to review
"everything in the voluminous files," but rather conducted only a "general survey
of the program unrelated to specific allegations of criminal violations." Assistant
Attorney General Pottinger advised Attorney General Saxbe, upon the completion
of this brief examination of COINTELPRO, that the Division found "no basis for
making criminal charges against particular individuals or involving particular
incidents." Although some of the acts reviewed appeared "to amount to technical
violations," the Division concluded that "without more" information, prosecutive
action would not be justified under its "normal criteria." However, Pottinger
stressed that a "different prosecution judgment would be indicated if specific acts.
more fully known and developed, could be evaluated in a complete factual
context." (Memorandum from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, to
Attorney General Saxbe, 12/13/74.)
' Petersen Committee Report, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, Hearings, 11/20/74, p. 25.
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which are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially
recognized and accepted police practices, and which are not
in violation of state or federal law. The FBI should also be
charged that in any event where a proposed action may be
perceived, with reason, to unfairly affect the rights of citi-
zens, it is the responsibility of the FBI as an institution and
of FBI agents as individuals to seek legal advice from the
Attorney General or his authorized representative. 1 3
Attorney General Saxbe did not issue such a directive, and the mattei
is still pending before Attorney General Levi.31 4
VI. EPILOGUE
On April 1, 1976, Attorney General Levi announced the establish-
ment of a special review committee within the Department of Justice
to notify COINTELPRO victims that they were the subjects of FBI
activities directed against them. Notification will be made "in those in-
stances where the specific COINTELPRO activity was improper, ac-
tual harm may have occurred, and .the subjects are not already aware
that they were the targets of CONINTELPRO activities." 31
The review committee has established guidelines for determin-
ing which COINTELPRO activities were "improper," but it will
be difficult to make that determination without giving an official im-
primatur to questionable activities which do not meet the notification
criteria. For example, there is little point in notifying all recipients
of anonymous reprint mailings that they received their copy of a
Reader's Digest article from the FBI, but the Department should not
suggest that the activity itself is a proper Bureau function. Other acts
which fall within the "grey area" between COINTELPRO and
aggressive investigation present similar problems.
316
Nevertheless, a Departmental notification program is an important
step toward redressing the wrongs done, and carries with it some
' Petersen Committee Report, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights hearings, 11/20/74, p. 28.
n' Attorney General Levi has proposed a series of guidelines on domestic
intelligence. A set of "preventive action" guidelines was prepared which would
have authorized the Bureau to take "nonviolent emergency measures" to "ob-
struct or prevent" the use of force or violence upon the Attorney Generals'
authorization. These guidelines have now been abandoned because the Attorney
General determined that it was not possible to frame general language which
would permit proper (and indeed ordinary) law enforcement measures such as
increased guards around building or traffic control during a demonstration while
preventing COINTELPRO type activity.
' Department of Justice release, 4/1/76.
n. The notification guidelines read as follows:
1. The review of the COINTELPRO files should be conducted by the existing
Shaheen committee.
2. An individual should be notified in those instances where an action directed
against him was improper and, in addition, there is reason to believe he may
have been caused actual harm. In making this determination in doubtful cases,
the committee should resolve the question in favor of notification.
3. Excluded from notification should be those individuals who are known to be
aware that they were the subjects of COINTELPRO activities.
4. An advisory group will be created to pass upon those instances where the
committee is uncertain as to whether notification should be given, and otherwise
to advise the committee as requested.
5. The manner of notification should be determined in each case to protect
rights to privacy,
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additional benefits. For the first time, Departmental attorneys will
review the original files, rather than relying on Bureau-prepared sum-
maries. Further, the Department will have acknowledged-finally-
that COINTELPRO was wrong. Official repudiation of the programs
is long overdue.
The American people need to be assured that never again will an
agency of the government be permitted to conduct a secret war against
those citizens it considers threats to the established order. Only a
combination of legislative prohibition and Departmental control can
guarantee that COINTELPRO will not happen again. The notifica-
tion program is an auspicious beginning.
6. Notification should be given as the work of the committee proceeds, without
waiting for the entire review to be completed.
7. In the event that the committee determines in the process of review that
conduct suggests disciplinary action or referral of a matter to the Criminal or
Civil Rights Divisions, the appropriate referral should be made.
8. No departure from these instructions will be made without the express
approval of the Attorney General. The committee may request such departure
only through and with the recommendation of the advisory group.
(Letter from Department of Justice to the Select Committee, 4/23/76.)
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DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CASE STUDY
I. INTRODUCTION
From December 1963 until 'his death in 1968, Martin Luther King,
Jr. was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to "neutralize" him as an effective civil rights leader.
In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war" against Dr.
King:
No- holds were barred. We have used [similar] techniques
against Soviet agents. [The same methods were] brought
home against any organization against which we were tar-
geted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough busi-
ness.'
The FBI collected information about Dr. King's plans and activi-
ties through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly
every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal. Wire-
taps, which -were initially approved by Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, were maintained on Dr. King's home telephone from Octo-
ber 1963 until mid-1965; the SCLC headquarter's telephones were
covered by wiretaps for an even longer period. Phones in the homes
and offices of some of Dr. King's close advisers were also wiretapped.
The FBI has acknowledged 16 occasions on which microphones were
hidden in Dr. King's hotel and motel rooms in an "attempt" to obtain
information about the "private activities of King and his advisers"
for use to "completely discredit" them. 2
FBI informants in the civil rights movement and reports from
field offices kept the Bureau's headquarters informed of developments
in the civil rights field. The FBI's presence was so intrusive that one
major figure in the civil rights movement testified that his colleagues
referred to themselves as members of "the FBI's golden record club."3
The FBI's formal program to discredit Dr. King with Government
officials began with the distribution of a "monograph" which the FBI
realized could "be regarded as a personal attack on Martin Luther
King,"'4 and which was subsequently described by a Justice Depart-
ment official as "a personal diatribe . . . a personal attack without
evidentiary support." 6
Congressional leaders were warned "off the record" about alleged
dangers posed by Reverend King. The FBI responded to Dr. King's
receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize by attempting to undermine his re-
ception by foreign heads of state and American ambassadors in the
countries that he planned to visit. When Dr. King returned to the
William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 97.
aMemorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/28/64.
'Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, p. 55.
'Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 10/17/63.
Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 32.
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United States, steps were taken to reduce support for a huge banquet
and a special "day" that were being planned in his honor.
The FBI's program to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil
rights movement entailed attempts to discredit him with churches,
universities, and the press. Steps were taken to attempt to convince the
National Council of Churches, the Baptist World Alliance, and lead-
ing Protestant ministers to halt financial support of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and to persuade them that
"Negro leaders should completely isolate King and remove him from
the role he is now occupying in civil rights activities." 6 When the FBI
learned that Dr. King intended to visit the Pope, an agent was dis-
patched to persuade Francis Cardinal Spellman to warn the Pope
about "the likely embarrassment that may result to the Pope should
he grant King an audience." 7 The FBI sought to influence universities
to withhold honorary degrees from Dr. King. Attempts were made to
prevent the publication of articles favorable to Dr. King and to find
"friendly" news sources that would print unfavorable articles. The
FBI offered to play for reporters tape recordings allegedly made from
microphone surveillance of Dr. King's hotel rooms.
The FBI mailed Dr. King a tape recording made from its micro-
phone coverage. According to the Chief of the FBI's Domestic Intelli-
gence Division, the tape was intended to precipitate a separation be-
tween Dr. King and his wife in the belief that the separation would
reduce Dr. King's stature.7a The tape recording was accompanied by
a note which Dr. King and his advisers interpreted as a threat to re-
lease the tape recording unless Dr. King committed suicide. The FBI
also made preparations to promote someone "to assume the role of
leadership of the Negro people when King has been completely dis-
credited." 8
The campaign against Dr. King included attempts to destroy the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference by cutting off its sources
of funds. The FBI considered, and on some occasions executed, plans
to cut off the support of some of the SCLC's major contributors, in-
cluding religious organizations, a labor union, and donors of grants
such as the Ford Foundation. One FBI field office recommended that
the FBI send letters to the SCLC's donors over Dr. King's forged
signature warning them that the SCLC was under investigation by
the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS files on Dr. King and the
SCLC were carefully scrutinized for financial irregularities. For over
a year, the FBI unsuccessfully attempted to establish that Dr. King
had a secret foreign bank account in which he was sequestering funds.
The FBI campaign to discredit and destroy Dr. King was marked
by extreme personal vindictiveness. As early as 1962, Director Hoover
penned on an FBI memorandum, "King is no good."* At the August
1963 March on Washington, Dr. King told the country of his dream
that "all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gen-
tiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in
the words of the old Negro spiritual, 'Free at last, free at last. Thank
6 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/16/64.
'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/31/64, p. 1.
" William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 104-105.
'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/8/64.
* Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, 2/3/62.
God almighty, I'm free at last.' " 10 The FBI's Domestic Intelligence
Division described this "demagogic speech" as yet more evidence that
Dr. King was "the most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the
country." - Shortly afterward, Time magazine chose Dr. King as the
"Man of the Year," an honor which elicited Director Hoover's com-
ment that "they had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this
one." 12 Hoover wrote "astounding" across the memorandum inform-
ing him that Dr. King had been granted an audience with the Pope
despite the FBI's efforts to prevent such a meeting. The depth of Direc-
tor Hoover's bitterness toward Dr. King, a bitterness which he had
effectively communicated to his subordinates in the FBI, was apparent
from the FBI's attempts to sully Dr. King's reputation long after his
death. Plans were made to "brief" congressional leaders in 1969 to
prevent the passage. of a "Martin Luther King Day." In 1970,
Director Hoover told reporters that Dr. King was the "last one in the
world who should ever have received" the Nobel Peace Prize. 3
The extent to which Government officials outside of the FBI must
bear responsibility for the FBI's campaign to discredit Dr. King is
not clear. Government officials outside of the FBI were not aware of
most of the specific FBI actions to discredit Dr. King. Officials in the
Justice Department and White House were aware, however, that the
FBI was conducting an intelligence investigation, not a criminal
investigation, of Dr. King; that the FBI had written authorization
from the Attorney General to wiretap Dr. King and the SCLC offices
in New York and Washington; and that the FBI reports on Dr. King
contained considerable information of a political and personal nature
which was "irrelevant and spurious" to the stated reasons for the
investigation.14 Those high executive branch officials were also aware
that the FBI was disseminating vicious characterizations of Dr. King
within the Government; that the FBI had tape recordings embar-
rassing to Dr. King which it had offered to play to a White House
official and to reporters; and that the FBI had offered to "leak"
to reporters highly damaging accusations that some of Dr. King's
advisers were communists. Although some of those officials did ask
top FBI officials about these charges, they did not inquire further
after receiving false denials. In light of what those officials did know
about the FBI's conduct toward Dr. King, they were remiss in fail-
ing to take appropriate steps to curb the Bureau's behavior. To the
extent that their neglect permitted the Bureau's activities to go on un-
checked, those officials must share responsibility for what occurred.
The FBI now agrees that its efforts to discredit Dr. King were
unjustified. The present Deputy Associate Director (Investigation)
testified:
Mr. ADAMs. There were approximately twenty-five inci-
dents of actions taken [to discredit Dr. King] . .. I see no
statutory basis or no basis of justification for the activity.
The CHAIRMAN. Was Dr. King, in his advocacy of equal
'o Speech delivered by Dr. Martin Luther King during the March on Washington,
8/28/63.
Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 8/30/63, p. 1.
Hoover note on United Press International release, 12/29/63.
Time magazine, 12/14/70.
"Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, pp. 17-18.
rights for black citizens, advocating a course of action that
in the opinion of the FBI constituted a crime?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. He was preaching non-violence was he not,
as a method of achieving equal rights for black citizens?
Mr. ADAMS. That's right... Now as far as the activities
which you are asking about, the discrediting, I know of no
basis for that and I will not attempt to justify it.15 -
The FBI conducted its investigation of Dr. King and the SCLC
under an FBI manual provision-called COMINFIL-permitting
the investigation of legitimate noncommunist organizations, sus-
pected by the FBI of having been infiltrated by communists, to
determine the extent, if any, of communist influence. The FBI's
investigation was based on its concern that Dr. King was being
influenced by two persons-hereinafter referred to as Adviser A and
Adviser B-that the Bureau believed were members of the Com-
munist Party.
Officials in the Justice Department relied on the FBI's representa-
tions that both of these advisers were communists, that they were in a
position to influence Dr. King, and that Adviser A in fact exercised
some influence in preparing Dr. King's speeches and publications.
Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights from
1961-1965, testified that he "never had any reason to doubt [the FBI's]
allegations concerning [Adviser A]." He recalled that the charges
about Adviser A were "grave and serious," and said that he believed
Attorney General Kennedy had permitted the investigation to pro-
ceed because:
Stopping the investigation in light of those circumstances
would have run the risk that there would have been a lot of
complaints that the Bureau had been blocked for political
reasons from investigating serious charges about communist
infiltration in the civil rights movement.1 7
Edwin Guthman, Press Secretary for the Justice Department from
1961 through 1964, testified that Attorney General Robert Kennedy
"viewed this as a serious matter," that he did not recall "that any of
us doubted that the FBI knew what it was talking about," and that al-
though the question of whether Adviser A was influencing Dr. King
was never fully answered "we accepted pretty much what the FBI
reported as being accurate." 18
We have been unable to reach a conclusion concerning the accuracy
of the FBI's charges that the two Advisers were members of the Com-
munist Party, USA or under the control of the Party during the FBI's
COMINFIL investigation. However, FBI files do contain informa-
tion that Adviser A and Adviser B had been members of the Commu-
nist Party at some point prior to the opening of the COMINFIL in-
vestigation in October 1962. FBI documents provided to the Commit-
tee to support the Bureau's claim that both men were members of the
Communist Party at the time the COMINFIL investigation was
opened are inconclusive. Moreover, the FBI has stated that it cannot
' James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 65.
' Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 55.
' Edwin Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, p. 16.
provide the Committee with the full factual basis for its charges on
the grounds that to do so would compromise informants of continuing
use to the Bureau.
Without access to the factual evidence, we are unable to conclude
whether either of those two Advisers was connected with the Commu-
nist Party when the 'case" was opened in 1962, or at any time there-
after. We have seen no evidence establishing that either of those
Advisers attempted to exploit the civil rights movement to carry out
the plans of the Communist Party.
In any event, the FBI has stated that at no time did it have any
evidence that Dr. King himself was a communist or connected with
the Communist Party. Dr. King repeatedly criticized Marxist philoso-
phies in his writing and speeches. The present Deputy Associate Di-
rector of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, when asked by the
Committee if the FBI ever concluded that Dr. King was a communist,
testified, "No, sir, we did not." 20
The FBI's COMINFIL investigation appears to have centered
almost entirely on discussions among Dr. King and his advisers
about proposed civil rights activities rather than on whether those
advisers were in fact agents of the Communist Party. Although the
FBI conducted disruptive programs-COINTELPROs-against al-
leged communists whom it believed were attempting to influence civil
rights organizations, the Bureau did not undertake to discredit the
individual whom it considered Dr. King's most "dangerous" adviser
until more than four years after opening the COMINFIL investiga-
tion." Moreover, when a field office reported to FBI headquarters in
1964 that the Adviser was not then under the influence and
control of the Communist Party, the FBI did not curtail either its
investigations or discrediting program against Dr. King, and we have
no indication that the Bureau informed the Justice Department of
this finding.22 Rather than trying to discredit the alleged communists
it believed were attempting to influence Dr. King, the Bureau adopted
the curious tactic of trying to discredit the supposed target of Com-
munist Party interest-Dr. King himself.
Allegations of communist influence on Dr. King's organization must
not divert attention from the fact that, as the FBI now states, its
activities were unjustified and improper. In light of the Bureau's
remarks about Dr. King, its reactions to his criticisms, the viciousness
of its campaign to destroy him, and its failure to take comparable
measures against the Advisers that it believed were communists, it is
highly questionable whether the FBI's stated motivation was valid. It
was certainly not justification for continuing the investigation of Dr.
King for over six years, or for carrying out the attempts to destroy
him.
Our investigation indicates that FBI officials believed that some of
Dr. King's personal conduct was improper. Part of the FBI's efforts
to undermine Dr. King's reputation involved attempts to persuade
Government officials that Dr. King's personal behavior would be an
embarrassment to them. The Committee did not investigate Dr. King's
*Adams, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 66.
n Airtel from FBI Director to New York Office, 3/18/66.
" Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 4/14/64.
personal life, since such a subject has no proper place in our investiga-
tion. Moreover, in order to preclude any further dissemination of
information obtained during the electronic surveillances of Dr. King,
the Committee requested the FBI to excise from all documents sub-
mitted to the Committee any information which was so obtained.
We raise the issue of Dr. King's private life here only because it may
have played a part in forming the attitudes of certain FBI and admin-
istration officials toward Dr. King.
Many documents which we examined contained allegations about
the political affiliations and morality of numerous individuals. We
have attempted to be sensitive to the privacy interests of those individ-
uals, and have taken care not to advance the effort to discredit them.
We have excised many of the Bureau's characterizations from the doc-
uments quoted in this report. In some cases, however, in order fully to
explain the story, it was judged necessary to quote extensively from
Bureau reports, even though they contain unsupported allegations.
We caution the reader not to accept these allegations on their face, but
rather to read them as part of a shameful chapter in the nation's
history.
The reader is also reminded that we did not conduct an investigation
into the assassination of Dr. King. In the course of investigating the
FBI's attempts to discredit Dr. King, we came across no indication
that the FBI was in any way involved in the assassination.
H. THE COMINFIL INVESTIGATION
In October 1962 the FBI opened its investigation of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference and of it's president, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. The investigation was conducted under an
FBI manual provision captioned "COMINFIL"-an acronym for
communist infiltration-which authorized investigations of legitimate
noncommunist organizations which the FBI believed to be influenced
by communist party members in order to determine the extent of the
alleged communist influence.23 These wide-ranging investigations were
' FBI Manual Section 87e. The Section in effect at the time the FBI initi-
ated its investigation of Dr. King and the SCLC was captioned, "Legitimate
Noncommunist Organizations that are Communist Infiltrated," and provided
in part:
"(1) No investigation should be conducted without prior Bureau approval.
"(2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced agents.
"Advse Bureau promptly under caption 'COMINFIL (name of organization)'
when one of the following exists and include your recommendation for instituting
an investigation.
"(a) The Communist Party has specifically instructed its members to infil-
trate the organization.
"(b) Communist Party members have infiltrated the organization in suf-
ficient strength to influence or control the organization.
"(7) Data concerning following topics should be fully developed and re-
ported on :
"(a) Basis for investigation and fact that our investigation is directed solely
toward establishing extent of Communist Party infiltration, or that organiza-
tion is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legiti-
mate activities of organization.
"(b) Address of organization.
"(c) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership.
"(d) Principal officers of organization.
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conducted with the knowledge of the Attorney General and- were pred-
icated on vague executive directives and broad statutes."
The FBI kept close watch on Dr. King and the SCLC long before
opening its formal investigation. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
reacted to the formation of the SCLC in 1957 by reminding agents
in the field of the need for vigilance:
In the absence of any indication that the Communist Party
has attempted, or is attempting, to infiltrate this organization
you should conduct no investigation in this matter. However,
in view of the stated purpose of the organization, you should
remain alert for public source information concerning it in
connection with the racial situation.'-
In May 1962 the FBI had included Dr. King on "Section A of the
Reserve Index" as a person to be rounded up and detained in the
event of a "national emergency." 26 During this same period the FBI
"(e) Communist Party program to infiltrate this organization and influence
its policy.
"(f) Results of this program, including Communist Party affiliations of
officers and members." I
Clarence Kelley, the present Director of the FBI, was asked by the Com-
mittee:
"Taking the current manual and trying to understand its applicability laid
against the facts in the Martin Luther King case, under section 87 permission
is granted to open investigations of the influence of non-subversive groups,
and the first sentence reads: 'When information is received indicating that
a subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a non-
subversive group or organization, an investigation can be opened.'"
"Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used in opening the
investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 1960's,
so that investigation could still be opened today under the current FBI
manual?"
Mr. KELLEY. "I think so."
(Clarence Kelley testimony, 12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 308.)
24 See Report, on the Development of FBI Domestic Investigations, p. 479.
2 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agent in Charge, Atlanta,
9/20/57. The "stated purpose" of the SCLC was to organize a register-and-
vote campaign among Negroes in the South. (Trezz Anderson, Pittsburgh
Courier, 8/17/57.) Considerable "public source" information was recorded
in FBI files both before and after this date.
, The action memorandum stated that Dr. King's name "should be placed in
Section A of the Reserve Index and tabbed communist." (Memorandum
from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 5/11/62.) Persons to be listed in Section A
of the Reserve Index were described by the FBI as people "who in time of
national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national
interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due
to their subversive associations and ideology." The types of persons to be listed
in Section A included:
"(a) Professors, teachers or leaders;
"(b) Labor union organizers or leaders;
"(c) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in the mass media
field;
"(d) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists;
"(e) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level;
"(f) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid." See
Committee staff report on Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence
Investigations.
Dr. King was placed on the Reserve Index despite the fact that as late as
November 1961 the Atlanta Field Office had advised FBI Headquarters that there
was "no information on which to base a security matter inquiry." (Airtel from
SAC, Atlanta, to Director, FBI, 11/21/61.)
ordered its field offices to review their files for "subversive" infor-
mation about Dr. King and to submit that information to FBI head-
quarters in reports "suitable for dissemination." 2
The Bureau had apparently also been engaged in an extensive sur-
veillance of Dr. King's civil rights activities since the late 1950s
under an FBI program called "Racial Matters." This program, which
was unrelated to COMINFIL, required the collection of "all perti-
nent information" about the "proposed or actual activities" of indi-
viduals and organizations "in the racial field." - Surveillance of Dr.
King's civil rights activities continued under the Racial Matters pro-
gram after the COMINFIL case was opened. Indeed, the October
1962 memorandum which authorized the COMINFIL case specifically
provided that "any information developed concerning the integra-
tion or racial activities of the SCLC must [also] be reported
[under a] Racial Matters caption." 2
The first FBI allegations that the Communist Party was attempt-
ing to infiltrate the SCLC appeared in a report from the FBI to
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, dated January 8, 1962.30 The
report stated that one of Dr. King's advisers-hereinafter referred
to as "Adviser A"-was a "member of the Communist Party, USA." 31
Within a few months FBI reports were describing another of Dr.
King's associates-hereinafter referred to as "Adviser B"-as a "mem-
ber of the National Committee of the Communist Party." 2 The
allegations concerning these two individuals formed the basis for
opening the COMINFIL investigation in October 1962.
It is unclear why the FBI waited nine months to open the COMIN
FIL investigation.3 The Bureau might have been hoping to acquire
new information from microphone and wiretap surveillance of Ad-
viser A's office, which was initiated in March 1962.34 However, it does
* Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 2/27/62. The instructions
did not define what was meant by "subversive." Reports from field offices during
the ensuing months considered as "subversive" such information as the fact that
Dr. King had been one of 350 signers of a petition to abolish the House Committee
on Un-American Activities. (FBI Report, New York, 4/13/62.) These instructions
to the field were issued on the first day of Dr. King's trial in which he and seven
hundred other civil rights demonstrators were charged in Albany, Georgia, with
parading without a permit. (Atlanta Constitution, 2/28/62, p. 1.)
" FBI Manual Section 122, p. 5. This policy was later interpreted as requiring
"coverage" of demonstrations, meetings, "or any other pertinent information
concerning racial activity." (Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta,
6/27/63.)
" Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 10/23/62, p. 2.
* On the same day the Southern Regional Counsel-a respected civil rights
study group-issued a report criticizing the Bureau's inaction during civil rights
demonstration that were then occurring in Albany, Georgia. This report is dis-
cussed at pp. 89-90.
Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 1/5/62.
a Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/22/62.
" FBI headquarters first requested the field offices for recommendations con-
cerning whether a COMINFIL investigation should be opened on July 20, 1962.
This was the same day on which officials in Albany, Georgia, sought a judicial
ban against demonstrations led by Dr. King, alleging that Negroes had been en-
dangering the lives of police officers "and agents of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation." (New York Times, 7/22/62).
"A microphone was installed in Adviser A's office on March 16, 1962 (Airtel
from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 3/16/62) and a wiretap was installed
on his office telephone on, 3/20/62 (Airtel from SAO, New York to Director, FBI,
3/20/62). The wiretap was authorized by the Attorney General (Memorandum
from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/6/62). The microphone was approved
not appear that these surveillances collected any additional informa-
tion bearing on the FBI's characterization of Adviser A as a "com-
munist."
Despite the goals and procedures outlined in the COMINFIL sec-
tion of the FBI Manual, the Bureau's investigation of Dr. King did not
focus on whether any of his advisers were acting under Communist
Party discipline and control or were working to enable the Commu-
nist Party to influence or control the SCLC.- The microphone which
had been installed in Adviser A's office in March 1962 was discontinued
before the COMINFIL investigation began,"3 and, although wiretap
coverage of Adviser A continued-and even intensified 3 7-the infor-
mation obtained appears to have related solely to his advice to Dr.
King concerning the civil rights movement and not at all to the-alleged
Communist Party origins of that advice."8 Two FBI reports prepared
in succeeding years which summarize the FBI's information about
Adviser A do not contain evidence substantiating his purported rela-
tionship with the Communist Party."
Without full access to the Bureau's files, the Committee cannot de-
termine whether the FBI's decision to initiate a COMINFIL investi-
gation was motivated solely by sincere concerns about alleged com-
munist infiltration, or whether it was in part influenced by Director
Hoover's animosity toward Dr. King. The FBI Director's sensitivity
to criticism and his attitude toward Dr. King are documented in sev-
eral events which occurred during the period when the FBI was con-
sidering initiating the COMINFIL investigation.
As early as February 1962, Director Hoover wrote on a memorandum
that Dr. King was "no good." 'o
In January 1962 an organization called the Southern Regional
Council issued a report criticizing the Bureau's inaction during civil
rights demonstrations in Albany, Georgia.4' An updated version of
that report was released in November 1962. A section entitled "Where
was the Federal Government" made the following observations about
the FBI:
only at the FBI division level (Memorandum from James Bland to William Sul-
livan, 3/2/62).
8 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 12-13, 83-85. Former Assistant Director Sullivan
testified: "If a man is not under the discipline and control of the Communist
Party, ipso facto he is not really a member of the Communist Party. The Party
demands the man's complete discipline, the right of complete discipline over a
Party member. That is why they have the graduations, you see, the fellow
traveler, not a Party member, because he would not accept the entire discipline
of the Party. The sympathizer, another graduation of it, what we call the dupe,
the victim of Communist fronts and so forth. The key-I am glad you raised this
question-the key to membership is does this man accept completely the Party
discipline. If he does not, he is not regarded as a genuine member." (Sullivan,
11/1/75, p. 18.)
" It was discontinued on August 16, 1962. See Airtels from SAC, New York to
Director, FBI, 8/16/62 and 11/15/62, and Memorandum from Director, FBI to
SAC, New York, 11/23/62.
' The Attorney General authorized a wiretap on Adviser A's home telephone in
November 1962 (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General,
11/20/62).
' E.g., Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General Kennedy.
* Indeed, in April 1964 a field office reported that Adviser A was not under the
influence of the Conununist Party. Memorandum from SAC New York to Director,
FBI, 4/14/64.
' Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, 2/3/62.
" Special Report, -Southern Regional Council, 1/8/62.
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-There is a considerable amount of distrust among Al-
bany Negroes for local members of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.
-With all the clear violations by local police of constitu-
tional rights, with undisputed evidence of beatings by sheriffs
and deputy sheriffs, the FBI has not made a single arrest on
behalf of Negro citizens.
-The FBI has [taken] dozens of affidavits from Negro
citizens complaining that their constitutional rights had been
violated by city and county officials. But eight months later,
there was no sign of action on these charges.
-The FBI is most effective in solving ordinary crimes,
and perhaps it should stick to that.4 2
Newspaper coverage of the report's allegations were forwarded to
Bureau headquarters by the Atlantic office. Although Bureau rules
required prompt investigation of allegations such as those in the South-
orn Regional Council's Report, no investigation was undertaken.
4
1
Before even receiving the full report, Bureau officials were describing
it as "slanted and biased," and were searching their files for informa-
tion about the report's author.4 4
Shortly after the Report was issued, newspapers quoted Dr. King as
saying that he agreed with the Report's conclusions that the FBI had
not vigorously investigated civil rights violations in Albany. Dr. King
reportedly stated:
One of the great problems we face with the FBI in the
South is that the agents are white Southerners who have been
influenced by the mores of the community. To maintain their
status, they have to be friendly with the local police and
people who are promoting segregation.
Every time I saw FBI men in Albany, they were with the
local police force.4 5
FBI headquarters was immediately notified of Dr. King's re-
marks.46 After noting that Dr. King's comments "would appear to
dovetail with information . . . indicating that King's advisors are
Communist Party (CP) members and he is under the domination of
4 "Albany, A Study of Racial Responsibility," Southern Regional Council,
11/14/62.
" Item #17, FBI Response to Senate Select Committee, 10/15/75. FBI rules
provided that allegations about Bureau misconduct had to be investigated and
that "every logical lead which will establish the true facts should be completely
run out unless such action would embarrass the Bureau. . . ."
" Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 11/15/62. The updated
report was received at headquarters on December 5, 1962. (Memorandum from
SAC, Atlanta to Director, FBI, 12/4/62.)
a Atlanta Con8titution, 11/19/62, p. 18. In 1961 a report issued by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, entitled "Justice," had addressed the problem
of FBI agents investigating local law enforcement officials and reached a similar
conclusion, including mistrust of the FBI by southern Blacks.
'Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta, to Director, FBI, 11/19/62.
III. CONCERN INCREASES IN THE FBI AND THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
OVER ALLEGATIONS OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, AND THE FBI INTENSIFIES THE INVESTIGATION: JANUARY
1962-OCTOBER 1963
Introduction and Sunmary
This chapter explores developments in the Martin Luther King case
from the period preceding the FBI's opening of the COMINFIL in-
vestigation in October 1962 through the FBI's decision to intensify
its investigation of suspected communist influence in the civil rights
movement in October 1963. Particular emphasis is placed on the inter-
nal reasons for the FBI's intensification of its investigation of Dr.
King and on the interplay between the Justice Department and the
FBI during this period.
In summary, the evidence described in this chapter establishes that
the FBI barraged the Justice Department with a stream of memo-
randa concerning the Communist Party's interest in the civil rights
movement and Dr. King's association with two individuals, referred
to in this report as Advisers A and B, who were alleged to have strong
ties to the Party.60 In response to the Bureau's warnings, the Justice
Department endeavored to convince Dr. King to sever his relations
with those individuals, but met with only mixed success. Dr. King
continued to turn to Adviser A for advice; Adviser B, whose asso-
ciation with Dr. King and allegedly with the Communist Party had
been picked up by the press in late 1962, publicly announced his resig-
nation from the SCLC in early July 1963, although he apparently
continued to associate with Dr. King on an informal basis.
During hearings over the administration's proposed public accom-
modations bill in July 1963, critics of the bill charged that the civil
rights movement, and Dr. King in particular, were influenced by Com-
munists. Dr. King's plans for a civil rights march on Washington in
August were receiving increasing publicity. On July 16, the Attorney
General raised with the FBI's Justice Department liaison, Courtney
Evans, the possibility of a wiretap on Dr. King and one of his legal
advisers.
The following day the FBI sent an analysis of its COMINFIL
information to the Justice Department. The administration decided to
continue its public support of Dr. King. During the ensuing week, the
President informed the press that there was no evidence that civil
rights demonstrations were Communist-inspired; the Attorney Gen-
eral announced that the FBI had no evidence that any civil rights
leaders were controlled by Communists; and the Attorney General
rejected the FBI's request for authority to wiretap Dr. King.
In August 1963, the Justice Department received a report from
the FBI which apparently contained allegations extremely unfavor-
able to Dr. King. The Attorney General told Courtney Evans that he
faced impeachment if the report was "leaked," and demanded that it
be resubmitted with a cover memorandum detailing the factual basis
for the allegation. The memorandum submitted in response to that
request contained no information concerning Dr. King that had not
already been known to the Attorney General in July, but the Attorney
General permitted the investigation to proceed.
* The memoranda also contained information about the civil rights movement
of considerable political value to the administration.
.. In late July 1963, the FBI opened a file entitled "Communist In-
fluence in Racial Matters," and closely monitored preparations for the
August 28 Civil Rights March on Washington. The FBI's Domestic
Intelligence Division informed Director Hoover shortly before the
March that Communist influence in the civil rights movement wasnegligible. The Director disagreed. The head of the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division, William Sullivan, responded by recommending more
intense FBI surveillance of the civil rights movement.
A. The Justice Department Warn Dr. King About Advisers A and
B: January 1962-June 1963
The Kennedy administration's concern over FBI allegations that
Communists were influencing the civil rights movement led the Justice
Department to make several attempts to persuade Dr. King to sever
his relations with Advisers A and B. In January 1962, Hoover first
warned Attorney General Kennedy that Advisor A, a member of the
Communist Party, U.S.A., "is allegedly a close adviser to the Reverend
Martin Luther King." 62 Shortly afterwards, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Burke Marshall of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Di-
vision told Dr. King that the Bureau claimed Adviser A was a com-
munist and advised that they break off relations." According to an
FBI memorandum, Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White also
considered speaking with Dr. King about Adviser A, but decided
against doing so when told by the FBI that revealing too much of the
FBI's information might tip off Dr. King or Adviser A to the identity
of certain FBI informants."
Dr. King gave no indication of breaking off relations with Adviser
A, who was a close friend and trusted advisor. He did, however, appar-
ently consider the adverse effects on the civil rights movement that
his association with Adviser B might cause.65 In June 1962 the FBI
intercepted a conversation " in which Adviser A recommended that
Dr. King informally use Adviser B as his executive assistant, noting
that "as long as Adviser B did not have the title of Executive Direc-
tor, there would not be as much lightning flashing around him." Dr.
King was reported to have agreed, remarking that "no matter what
a man was, if he could stand up now and say he is not connected, then
as far as I am concerned, he is eligible to work for me." 67
On October 8, 1962, the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division pre-
pared a memorandum summarizing accounts that had previously
appeared in newspapers concerning Adviser B's alleged Communist
background and his association with Dr. King. The Division for-
warded the memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach, head of the Crime
Records Division, the FBI's public relations arm, for "possible use
by his contacts in the news media field in such Southern states as
Alabama where Dr. King has announced that the next targets for
a Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General 1/8/62.
O Burke Marshall testimony, 3/31/76, p. 10.
' Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 2/6/62.
r Allegations concerning Adviser B's membership in the Communist Party had
received wide publicity in the newspapers. There were no such press allegations
about Adviser A.
Adviser A's phones were covered by FBI wiretaps. See p. 88..
* Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/21/62, p. 6.
integration of universities are located." DeLoach's signature and the
notation, "handled, Augusta (illegible), Atlanta, 1-/19" appear on
the recommendation.68
The article was apparently disseminated, because an October 25,
1962, article in the Augusta Chronicle described Adviser B as a mem-
ber of the CPUSA's National Committee who was serving as Dr.
King's "Acting Executive Director." Dr. King publicly responded,
on October 30, that "no person of known Communist affiliation"
could serve on the staff of the SCLC and denied any knowledge that
Adviser B had Communist affiliations. Dr. King also announced Ad-
viser B's temporary resignation from the SCLC pending an SCLC
investigation of the allegations.
A stream of memoranda from the FBI, however, warned the Jus-
tice Department that Adviser B continued as an associate of Dr.
King despite his apparent resignation from the SCLC. In December,
Director Hoover was cautioning the Attorney General that Adviser B
continued to "represent himself as being affiliated with the New York
Office of the SCLC and, during late November and early December
1962, was actively engaged in the work of this organization." 69A few
days later, the Attorney General was informed that Advisers A and
B were planning a "closeted . . . critical review" with Dr. King con-
cerning the direction of the civil rights movement. Kennedy penned on
the memorandum: "Burke-this is not getting any better." "
In early February 1963, Dr. King asked the Justice Department
for a briefing on Adviser B's background, apparently in response to
newspaper articles about Adviser B resulting from the Bureau's cam-
paign to publicize Adviser B's relationship with Dr. King. Assistant
Attorney General Marshall noted in a memorandum that he had "been
in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to
have it handled as soon as possible." "1 Sometime later in February,
Marshall spoke with Dr. King about severing his association with Ad-
visers A and B. Memoranda from Director Hoover to the Justice De-
partment during the ensuing months, however, emphasized that Dr.
King was maintaining a close relationship with both men. Those
memoranda to the Justice Department contained no new information
substantiating the charges that either was a member of the Communist
Party, or that either was carrying out the Party's policies. 7 2
8 Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/8/62, p. 2.
The memorandum bears the caption "Communist Party, USA, COINTELPRO."
This is the first indication of a counterintelligence program directed against Ad-
viser B. Adviser A became the subject of such a program in 1966. For a discussion
of the FBI's COINTELPRO effort, see staff report on COINTELPRO.
* Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 1/23/63, p. 1.
" Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 1/10/63. The At-
torney General was subsequently told that Adviser B, Dr. King, and Adviser A
conferred with other members of the SCLC on January 10 and 11. (Memorandum
from Director, FBI to Burke Marshall, 1/31/63.)
" Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 2/4/63.
72On March 10 the Attorney General was informed that Adviser A and Dr.
King had engaged in a lengthy conversation concerning an article that Dr. King
was preparing for The Nation. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney
General, 3/12/6.) On June 3, the Director sent the Attorney General a nine-
page "concise summary" of information about Adviser A, emphasizing his role
as Dr. King's adviser. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General,
6/3/63.) An FBI memorandum in early June reported a discussion between
The Attorney General's concern over Dr. King's association with
the two advisers continued. A memorandum by Hoover states that on
June 17, 1963:
The Attorney General called and advised he would like to
have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to
Martin Luther King and tell Dr. King he has to get rid of
[Advisers A and B], that he should not have any contact with
them directly or indirectly.
I pointed out that if Dr. King continues this association, heis going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more
Communists trying to take advantage of [the] movement and
bigots down South who are against integration are beginning
to charge Dr. King is tied in with Communists. I stated I
thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is
rather widely known and, with things crystalizing for them
now, nothing could be worse than for Dr. King to be associ-
ated with it."
Marshall subsequently spoke with Dr. King about Advisers A and
B." In a follow-up memorandum written several months later Marshall
stated:
. . . I brought the matter to the attention of Dr. King very
explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a
scheduled meeting which Dr. King had with the President.
This was done at the direction of the Attorney General, and
the President separately [and] strongly urged Dr. King that
there should be no further connection between Adviser B and
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dr. King
stated that the connection would be ended."
Dr. King later told one of his associates that the President had told
him "there was an attempt (by the FBI) to smear the movement on
the basis of Communist influence. The President also said, 'I assume
you know you're under very close surveillance.' " "
Adviser A and Dr. King concerning whether Dr. King would appear on a tele-vision program in connection with a projected article in the Saturday EveningPost. Dr. King accepted Adviser A's recommendation that he read the articlebefore committing himself because the reporter "raised a lot of questions about[Adviser B] and that kind of thing." (Memorandum from Director, FBI toAttorney General, 6/7/63.)
. 7Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Clyde Tolson, Alan Belmont, CarthaDeLoach, Alex Rosen, William Sullivan, 6/17/63. During this period the AttorneyGeneral requested a report from the Internal Security Division concerning Dr.King. The reply, dated June 28, cited Advisers A and B as the chief sources ofalleged Communist influence on Dr. King. (Memorandum from J. Walter Yeag-ley to the Attorney General, 6/28/63.)" Andrew Young, who was present at the meeting with Burke Marshall, testi-
fied that Marshall had said that the Bureau had informed the Justice Depart-ment that there was in fact Communist influence in the civil rights movement,and had explicitly mentioned Adviser A. When Young asked Marshall for proof,he said that he had none, and that he "couldn't get anything out of the Bureau."
Young recalled that Marshall had said, "We ask (the Bureau) for things andwe get these big memos, but they don't ever really say anything." Young testified
that Marshall "was asking us to disassociate ourselves from (Adviser A] alto-gether." (Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, pp. 40-44)
5 Memorandum from Burke Marshall to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/12/63.
' Young, 2/19/76, p. 40.
Marshall's and the President's warnings did not go unheeded. On
July 3, 1963, Dr. King sent the Attorney General a copy of a letter
to Adviser B bearing that date.7 In that letter, Dr. King stated that
an investigation by the SCLC had proven the charges concerning Ad-
viser B's association with the Communist Party groundless, but that
his permanent resignation was necessary because "the situation in
our country is such that . .. any allusion to the left brings forth an
emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the
Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired." 7
B. Allegations About Dr. King During Hearings on the Public
Accomnwdations Bill and the Administration's Response:
July 1963
Allegations of Communist influence in the civil rights movement
were widely publicized in the summer of 1963 by opponents of the ad-
ministration's proposed public accommodations bill. On July 12, 1963,
Governor Ross E. Barnett of Mississippi testified before the Senate
Commerce Committee that civil rights legislation was "a part of the
world Communist conspiracy to divide and conquer our country from
within." 79 Barnett displayed a photograph entitled "Martin Luther
King at Communist Training School" taken by an informant for the
Georgia Commission of Education, which showed Dr. King at a 1957
Labor Day Weekend seminar at the Highland Folk School in Mont-
eagle, Tennessee with three individuals whom he alleged were com-
munists. When Senator Mike Monroney challenged the accuracy of
this characterization, Barnett stated that he had not checked the al-
legations with the FBI and suggested that the Commerce Committee
do so. The FBI subsequently concluded that the charges were false.",
Later that day, Senator Monroney asked Director Hoover for his
views on.whether Dr. King and the leaders of other civil rights orgam-
zations had Communist affiliations."' Senator Warren G. Magnuson
also asked Hoover about the authenticity of the photograph,
the status of the Georgia Commission on Education, and the nature of
the Highlander Folk School.82 Director Hoover forwarded these
requests and similar inquiries from other Senators to the Justice
" Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Adviser B, 7/3/63.
7 King letter, 7/3/63, which concluded: "We certainly appreciate the years of
unselfish service which you have put into our New York Office and regret the ne-
cessity of your departure. Certainly yours is a significant sacrifice commensurate
with the sufferings in jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation. We
all pray for the day when our nation may be truly the land of the free. May God
bless you and continue to inspire you In the service of your fellowman."
" Ross Barnett testimony, Senate Commerce Committee, 7/12/63, p. 1.
' The FBI informed the Justice Department that none of those individ-
uals were Communist Party members, and that there was no evidence sup-
porting the charge that the school was a communist training center. (Memo-
randum from Milton Jones to Cartha DeLoach, 7/16/63, p. 2).
Congressman Andrew Young, then an adviser to Dr. King, testified that the
Highlander Folk School photograph had been frequently used to smear Dr. King
in the South. Congressman Young's testimony that the School was not a Commu-
nist institution was consistent with the FBI's conclusion (Andrew. Young testi-
mony, 2/18/76, p. 53).
* Letter from Senator Mike Monroney to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/12/63.
" Letter from Senator Warren G. Magnuson to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/16/63.
Department"3 with a memorandum summarizing the COMINFIL
information about SCL:
In substance, the Communist Party, USA, is not able to as-
sume a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time.
However, the Party is attempting to exploit the current
racial situation through propaganda and participation in
demonstrations and other activities whenever possible.
Through these tactics, the Party hope8 ultimately to pro-
gress from its current supporting role to a position of active
leadership. [Emphasis added.]
In the same memorandum, Director Hoover brought up the subject
of Advisers A and B's alleged Communist affiliations. He claimed that
the Communist Party had pinned its hopes on Adviser A, and that
although Adviser B had resigned from the SCLC, he continued to
associate with Dr. King." 
On July 15, Governor George C. Wallace of Alabama testified
before the Senate Commerce Committee in opposition to the Civil
Rights bill, berating officials for "fawning and pawing over such
people as Martin Luther King and his pro-Communist friends and
associates." Wallace referred to the picture displayed by Governor
Barnett three days before and added:
Recently Martin Luther King publicly professed to have
fired a known Communist, [Adviser B], who had been on his
payroll. But as discovered by a member of the US Congress,
the public profession was a lie, and Adviser B had re-
mained on King's payroll."6
On July 17, the President announced at a news conference:
We have no evidence that any of the leaders of the civil
rights movement in the United States are Communists. We
have no evidence that the demonstrations are Communist-
inspired. There may be occasions when a Communist takes
part in a demonstration. We can't prevent that. But I think
it is a convenient scapegoat to suggest that all of the difficul-
ties are Communist and that if the Communist movement
would only disappear that we would end this. 7
'Tolson urged Hoover to let the Attorney General respond to these reports;otnerwise, Hoover might be called before the Committee to testify concerningcurrent racial agitation." The Director noted on the bottom of the memoran-
(um, "I share Tolson's views." Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to the Director,7/16/63.
Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 7/17/63.
Wallace introduced into the record a copy of an article from the Birming-&am News, "King's SCLC Pays [Adviser B.] Despite Denial," June 30, 1963.The article stated that Dr. King had told reporters that Adviser B had not beenassociated with the SCLC since December 1962. but that a "highly authorizedsource" revealed that Dr. King was continuing to accept Adviser B's servicesand to pay his expenses. The article also reported allegations about Adviser B'sassociation with the Communist Party.
3 Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, p. 574.
On July 23, Robert Kennedy sent to the Commerce Committee the
Justice Department's response to the queries of Senators Monroney
and Magnuson:
Based on all available evidence from the FBI and other
sources, we have no evidence that any of the top leaders of the
major civil rights groups are Communists, or Communist con-
trolled. This is true as to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., about
whom particular accusations were made, as well as other
leaders.
It is natural and inevitable that Communists have made
efforts to infiltrate the civil rights groups and to exploit the
current racial situation. In view of the real injustices that
exist and the resentment against them, these efforts have been
remarkably unsuccessful."8
Burke Marshall, who aided in formulating these responses for the
Justice Department, told the Committee that rumors of communist
infiltration in the civil rights movement had caused the Administra-
tion considerable concern.
At that point, in some sense the business was a political
problem, not from the point of view of the support that the
civil rights movement was giving the administration or any-
thing like that, but how to be honest with the Senators with
this problem facing us and at the same time not to give ammu-
nition to people who for substantive reasons were opposed to
civil rights legislation.
Generally, for years the civil rights movement in the South
and to some extent in some quarters in the North . . . were con-
stantly referred to as communist infiltrated, communist in-
spired, radical movements. . . . So that the political problem
that I would identify with this whole situation would be that
and not a question of whether or not there was support given
the Administration by civil rights groups in the South. 9
C. The Attorney General Considers a TViretap of Dr. King and
Rejects the Idea: July 1963
On July 16, 1963, the day after Governor Wallace's charges that
Dr. King was dominated by Communists and the day before the Presi-
dent's denial of Communist influence in the civil rights movement, the
Attorney General raised with Courtney Evans the possibility of wire-
tap coverage of Dr. King. According to Evans' memorandum about
this meeting:
The AG was contacted at his request late this afternoon.
He said that . .. a New York attorney who has had close asso-
ciation with Martin Luther King, and with [Adviser A] had
been to see Burke Marshall about the racial situation. Ac-
" Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, who had also inquired of the FBI about
Dr. King, was orally briefed by Nicholas Katzenbach and Courtney Evans on
November 1, 1963. According to a memorandum by Evans, the Attorney General
had made several attempts to draft a reply to Senator Russell's inquiries, and had
finally settled on an "innocuous" written reply and an oral briefing. (DeLoach to
Mohr, 2/5/76).
* Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 13.
cording to the AG, [the attorney] had indicated he had some
reservations about talking with [Adviser A] on the phone.
Marshall thought he might have been referring to a possible
phone tap, and passed it off by telling [the New York at-
torney] this was something he would have to take up with
[Adviser A.]
The purpose of the AG's contact was that this brought
to his attention the possibility of effecting technical coverage
on both [the New York attorney] and Martin Luther King.
I told the AG that I was not at all acquainted with [the New
York attorney], but that, in so far as Dr. King was concerned,
it was obvious from the reports that he was in a travel status
practically all the time, and it was, therefore, doubtful that
a technical surveillance on his office or home would be very
productive. I also raised the question as to the repercussions
if it should ever become known that such a surveillance had
been put on Dr. King.
The AG said this did not concern him at all, that in view
of the possible Communist influence in the racial situation,he thought it advisable to have as complete coverage as
possible. I told him, under the circumstances, that we would
check into the matter to see if coverage was feasible, and,
if so, would submit an appropriate recommendation to him.90
Reports from the FBI offices indicated that wiretaps were feasible, 9
and Director Hoover requested the Attorney General to approve wire-
taps on phones in Dr. King's home, SCLC offices, 92 and the New York
attorney's home and law office.93
On July 24, the day after his letter to the Commerce Committee
exonerating Dr. King, the Attorney General informed Evans that
he had decided against technical surveillance of Dr. King but had ap-
proved surveillance of the New York Attorney.**
The Attorney General informed me today that he had been
considering the request he made on July 16, 1963, for a
technical surveillance on Martin Luther King at his home
and office and was now of the opinion that those would be
ill-advised.
At the time the Attorney General initially asked for such
a surveillance, he was told there was considerable doubt that
the productivity of such surveillance would be worth the
risk because King travels most of the time and that there
might be serious repercussions should it ever become known
" Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 7/16/63. The New
York attorney was described by the FBI as a counsel to Dr. King, and an activist
in civil rights matters, (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney
General, 7/22/63.)
91 Airtel, from SAC Atlantic to Director FBI, 7/24/63: "Technical surveillance
feasible with full security."
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General, 7/23/63.m Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General, 7/22/63.
H The only evidence of communist ties of the New York attorney that the FBI
appears to have given the Attorney General was an Informant's allegation that in1953 and 1954 he had been an active member of the Labor Youth League, an
organization which had been cited as "subversive" under Executive Order
10450 (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General).
the Government had instituted this coverage. These were the
very thoughts that the Attorney General expressed today in
withdrawing his request.
With reference to the other technical surveillance requested
at the same time, namely, the one on [the New York at-
torney], the Attorney General felt this was in a different
category and we should go forward with this coverage. It is
noted that this was previously approved in writing by the
Attorney General.
... We will take no further action to effect technical cover-
age on Martin Luther King, either at his home or at his office
at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, in the
absence of a further request from the Attorney General.95
In June 1969, Director Hoover told a reporter for the Washington
Evening Star that Attorney General Kennedy had "requested that the
telephones of Dr. King be covered by electronic devices and was per-
suaded by our people not to do it in view of the possible reper-
cussions," and because Dr. King's constant traveling made a wiretap
impractical. 96 When the Committee asked Courtney Evans whether
the idea of installing a wiretap originated with the Attorney General,
he testified:
No, this is not clear in my mind at all. The record that has
been exhibited to me really doesn't establish this definitely,
although that inference can be drawn from some of the memo-
randa. But it is my recollection, without the benefit of any
specifics, that there was much more to it than this. And I
have the feeling that there were pressures existing in time to
develop more specific information that may have. had a
bearing here.
Q. Pressures emanating from where and upon whom?
A. I think from both sides, the Bureau wanted to get more
specific information, and the Department wanted resolved
the rather indefinite information that had been received
.indicating the.possibility of Communist influence on the Dr.
King movement.97
D. The Attorney General Voices Concern Over Continuing FBI
Reports About King: July-August 1963
Following the appearance of an article on July 25, 1963, in the
Atlanta Constitdion, titled "One-time Communist Organizer Heads
Rev. King's Office in N.Y.," Dr. King announced that an SCLC inves-
tigation of Adviser B indicated that he had "no present connection
with the CP nor any sympathy with its philosophy." Dr. King ex-
plained that Adviser B had been on the SCLC staff on a temporary
basis since his resignation in December 1962, but that he had left the
SCLC on June 26, 1963, by "mutual agreement" because of concern
a Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 7/25/63.
" Jeremiah O'Leary, The Evening Star, 6/19/69; Hoover memorandum for
record, 6/19/69.
* Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, pp. 7-8.
that his affiliation with the integration movement would be used
against it by "segregationists and race baiters."
The Justice Department, however, continued to receive reports
from the FBI that Dr. King was continuing his association with Ad-
visers A and B. 99 Shortly after Attorney General Kennedy's July 23
response to the Commerce Committee, Courtney Evans:
Advisor B, [deleted].
pointed out to Marshall the undesirability of making the spe-
cific comments . .. as to giving complete. clearance to Martin
Luther King as Marshall had had the full details as to King's
association with [Adviser A] and [Adviser B.]
Marshall said that he was most appreciative of our warning
him about these pitfalls and he would be guided accordingly
in any future statements. He added that he would also appre-
ciate our continuing to highlight for him any information
concerning communist activity in the Negro movement." 00
On July 29, Director Hoover sent the Justice Department a report
from the New York Office entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr.: Affilia-
tion with the Communist Movement." 101 The entry under the caption,
"Evidence of Communist Party Sympathies," has been deleted by the
FBI from copies of the report given to the Committee on the grounds
that it might compromise informants. It was a general characteriza-
tion and ran for only one and one-half lines. A memorandum from
Courtney Evans described Attorney General Kennedy's reaction:
The Attorney General stated that if this report got up to
the Hill at this time, he would be impeached. He noted if this.
report got out, it would be alleged the FBI said King was
[excised by the FBI].
The Attorney General went on to say that the report had
been reviewed in detail by Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall who had told him there wasn't anything now.here
concerning King's alleged communist sympathies but that it
was the timingof the report and its possible misuse that con-
cerned him. The Attorney General went on to say that he
didn't feel he could fully trust everyone in the Internal Secu-
rity Division of the Department.
I pointed out to the Attorney General that first of all this
.report was classified secret and was just a summary report
to bring our files and that of the Department's up to date. He
said that while this was undoubtedly true, the submission of
the report at this time in this form presented definite hazards.
He therefore asked that the report be resubmitted to him with
a cover memorandum setting forth the exact evidence avail-
"On July 17, in the midst of publicity concerning Dr. King's association with
Adviser B, Director Hoover informed the Attorney General that although Ad-
viser B had formally resigned from the SCLC, he was continuing his associa-
tion with Dr. King. (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General,
7/17/63.)
" Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont; 7/29/63.
m'Report of Special Agent: Martin Luther King, Jr.: Affliation with the Com-
muni8t Movement, 7/22/63.
able to support the statement that King has been described
[excised by the FBI]. 0 2
The reason for Attorney General Kennedy's reaction is unclear.'0'
It may be that he feared a "leak" of the FBI's allegations concerning
communist influence over Dr. King would be particularly embarrass-
ing in light of the Administration's recent statements in support of
Dr. King. The Attorney General's insistence on a supplemental
memorandum detailing the underlying evidence, coupled with the tone
of the memorandum, also suggests that he was anxious to get to the
bottom of the charges.
Hoover resubmitted the report with a cover letter stating in part:
In this connection, your attention is invited to my letter of
February 14, 1962, in captioned matter and to my letter of
July 17, 1963, captioned "Request from Senator Monroney
Concerning Current Racial Agitation," both of which contain
information to the effect that Adviser A has characterized
King [deleted by FBI] .104
The relevant portions of the February 14, 1962, memorandum and
the July 17, 1963, memorandum have been deleted from copies sup-
plied to the Committee. It is clear, however, that the Attorney Gen-
eral had been aware of whatever information those memoranda con-
tained when he had decided not to approve the King wiretaps the
previous month.
Despite the FBI's failure to produce any new evidence to substan-
tiate its apparently unfavorable characterization of Dr. King, the
question of whether Advisers A and B continued to influence Dr. King
remained a matter of concern to the Justice Department. On Aug-
ust 20, 1963, Evans reported:
Today the Attorney General asked if we would continue to
keep him closely informed of information received relative
to Advisers B's contact with Martin Luther King. He had
specific reference to our letter of August 2, 1963.
It appears that the Attorney General is receiving conflict-
ing advice within the Department proper as to whether there
is sufficient evidence of a continuing contact between King
and Adviser B to justify some action. The Civil Rights Divi-
sion has expressed the thought that nothing need be done by
the Department. On the other hand, Andrew Oehmann, the
Attorney General's Executive Assistant, has counseled him
that in his judgment there is ample evidence there is a con-
tinuing relationship which Martin Luther King is trying to
conceal. 0 5
E. The FBI Intensife8 It8 Inve8tigation of Alleged Communist
Influence in the Civil Rights Movement: July-September 1963
On July 18, 1963, in response to intelligence reports that the Com-
munist Party was encouraging its members to participate actively in
"2 Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 8/1/63.
x" Burke Marshall testified that he could not recall this incident. Burke Mar-
shall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 25.
10' Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney Qeneral, 8/2/63.
" Memorandum from Courtney'Evans to Alan Belmont, 8/20/6%.
the CP," 4 Bureau officials decided to contact Dr. King in an effort to"set him straight." 48
The FBI's effort to contact Dr. King consisted of a telephone call
to the SCLC office in Atlanta by Cartha D. DeLoach, head of the
FBI's Crime Records Division, and one by the Atlanta Special Agent
in Charge. Both calls were answered by secretaries who promised to
ask Dr. King to return the calls. When Dr. King did not respond,DeLoach observed:
It would appear obvious that Rev. King does not desire to
be told the true facts. He obviously used deceit, lies, and
treachery as propaganda to further his own causes .. . I see
no futher need to contacting Rev. King as he obviously does
not desire to be given the truth. The fact that he is a vicious
liar is amply demonstrated in the fact he constantly -associates
with and takes instructions from [a] .. . member of the Com-
munist Party."9
Two years later-in late 1964-the Director was refusing to meet with
Dr. King because "I gave him that opportunity once and he ignoredit." 50
William Sullivan, who was head of the Domestic Intelligence
Division during the investigation of Dr. King, testified:
[Director Hoover] was very upset about the criticism that
King made publicly about our failure to protect the Negro in
the South against violations of the Negro civil liberties, and
King on a number of occasions soundly criticized the Direc-
tor.... Mr. Hoover was very distraught over these criticisms
and so that would figure in it.... I think behind it all was the
racial 'bias, the dislike of Negroes, the dislike of the civil
rights movement. . . . I do not think he could rise above
that.6'
4 7Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 11/20/62.
" Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 11/26/62. A decision wasmade that Dr. King should be contacted by both Assistant Director DeLoachand Assistant Director William Sullivan "in order that there will be a witnessand there can be no charge of provincialism inasmuch as Cartha D. DeLoachcomes from the South and Mr. Sullivan comes from the North." (Ibid.)
Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 1/15/63. FBI officialsalso "interviewed" or otherwise contacted various newspaper publishers to set[them] straight" about Dr. King's remarks. (Memorandum from Alex Rosen toAlan Belmont, 1/17/63.) One of the publishers contacted was described as "im-pressed with the Director" and as being on the "Special Correspondents List."
(Letter from Cartha DeLoach to one of the publishers, 11/29/62, p. 3.)The FBI also took steps 'to "point out" the "evasive conduct of King" to theAttorney General and Civil Rights Commission. (Letter, FBI Director to AttorneyGeneral, 1/18/63; Letter, FBI to Staff Director, Commission on Civil Rights,1/18/63.)
SNote. on memorandum from Frederick Baunmgardner to William Sullivan,11/20/64.
' William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 62. Sullivan's assessment must beviewed in light of the feud that subsequently developed between Sullivan andHoover and which ultimately led to Sullivan's dismissal from the FBI. That feudis discussed in the committee's final report.
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The FBI sent frequent reports about Dr. King's plans and activities
to officials in both the Justice Department and the White House from
the initiation of the COMINFIL investigation until Dr. King's death
in 1968. Despite the fact that the investigation of Dr. King failed to
produce evidence that Dr. King was a communist, or that he was being
influenced to act in a way inimical to American interests, no responsi-
ble Government official ever asked the FBI to terminate the investiga-
tion. Their inaction appears to have stemmed from a belief that it was
safer to permit the FBI to conduct the investigation than to stop the
Bureau and run the risk of charges that the FBI was being muzzled
for political reasons.
Burke Marshall testified that the "charges" made by the Bureau
against Adviser A "were grave and serious." The Kennedy Admin-
istration had been outspoken in its support of Dr. King, and ordering
the FBI to terminate its investigation would, in Marshall's opinion,
"have run the risk" that there would have been a lot of complaints that
the Bureau had been blocked for political reasons from investigating
serious charges about communist infiltration in the civil rights
movement.5 2
Edwin 0. Guthman, Press Chief for the Justice Department under
Attorney General Kennedy, testified that Robert Kennedy viewed the
charges about Adviser A:
as a- serious matter and not in the interest of the country
and not in the interest of the civil rights movement. . . . The
question of whether he was influencing King and his contacts
with King, that was a matter which was not fully decided,
but in those days we accepted pretty much what the FBI
reported as being accurate. 3
Guthman testified that he was told by Kennedy in 1968 that Kennedy
had approved wiretap coverage of Dr. King's home and of two SCLC
offices in October 1963 because "he felt that if he did not do it, Mr.
Hoover would move to impede or block the passage of the Civil Rights
Bill . . . and that he felt that he might as well settle the matter as to
whether [Adviser A] did have the influence on King that the FBI
contended ... ."5 Attorney General Kennedy's reasons for approving
the wiretaps are discussed at length in a subsequent chapter.
5 Of
relevance here is the support which Guthman's observations lend to
Marshall's recollection that Attorney General Kennedy permitted the
COMINFIL investigation to continue from concern about the truth
of the FBI's charges and about the political consequences of terminat-
ing the investigation.
The Johnson Administration's willingness to permit the FBI to
continue its investigation of Dr. King also appears to have involved
political considerations. Bill Moyers, President Johnson's assistant,
testified that sometime around the spring of 1905 President Johnson
"seemed satisfied that these allegations about Martin Luther King
were not founded." Yet President Johnson did not order the investi-
gation terminated. When asked the reason, Moyers explained that
President Johnson:
5 Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 55.
" Edwin Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, p. 16.
64Guthman, 3/16/76, p. 5.
" See pp. 115-116.
was very concerned that his embracing the civil rights move-
ment and Martin Luther King personally would not backfire
politically. He didn't want to have a southern racist Senatorproduce something that would be politically embarassing
to the President and to the civil rights movement. We had lotsof conversations about that.... Johnson, as everybody knows,
bordered on paranoia about his enemies or about beingtrapped by other people's activities over which he had noresponsibility.-
Intelligence reports submitted by the Bureau to the White Houseand the Jutice Department contained considerable intelligence of po-tential political value to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
TheAttorneys General were informed of meetings between Dr. Kingand his advisers, including the details of advice that Dr. King received,the strategies of the civil rights movement, and the attitude of civil-rights leaders toward the Administrations and their policies." Theimplications of this inside knowledge were graphically described byone of Dr. King's legal advisers, Harry Wachtel:
The easiest example I can give is that that if I'm an attorneyrepresenting one side, negotiating and trying to achieve some-thing, and if the Attorney on the other side had information-
about what my client was thinking and what we were talking
about, it would become a devastatingly important impedi-ment to our negotiation, our freedom of action."
Burke Marshall, however, described the Bureau's reports about Dr.,-King and the SOLC as "of no use: it was stupid information." Heelaborated:
I was in touch with Martin King all the time about allkinds of information that went way beyond what was report-ed by the Bureau about what he was going to do, where he wasgoing to be, the wisdom of what lie was going to do, who hewas going to do it with, what the political situation was. TheSouthern Christian Leadership Conference and Dr. Kingwere in some sense close associates of mine. [Information ofthe type included in FBI reports] was all information that Iwould have had any way."
" Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 22.
"The FBI files are replete with examples of politically valuable intelligenceabout Dr. King that was sent to the Justice Department and the White House.For instance, in May 1963, at a critical point in the Congressional debate overthe public accommodations bill, Hoover informed the Attorney General of a dis-cussion between Dr. King and an adviser "concerning a conference which Rev-erend King reportedly has requested with you and the President." The discus-sion was reported to have centered on the Administration's sensitivity over its in-ability to control the racial situation and on the need to maintain the pace ofcivil rights activities "so that the President will have to look for an alternative."Dr. King was said to believe that the President would then be receptive to ideasfrom Dr. King which would provide a solution to "his problem, [his] fear ofviolence....1'Dr. King was said to have stated that if a conference with thePresident could not be worked out, then the movement would have to be "en-larged," and that "he would like to put so much pressure on the President thathe would have to sign an Executive Order making segregation unconstitutional."(Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 5/31/63.)Harry Wachtel testimony, 2/27/76, p. 12.
Burke Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 54; 56-57.
III. CONCERN INCREASES IN THE FBI AND THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
OVER ALLEGATIONS OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, AND THE FBI INTENSIFIES THE INVESTIGATION: JANUARY
1962-OCTOBER 1963
Introduction and Summary
This chapter explores developments in the Martin Luther King case
from the period preceding the FBI's opening of the COMINFIL in-
vestigation in October 1962 through the FBI's decision to intensify
its investigation of suspected communist influence in the civil rights
movement in October 1963. Particular emphasis is placed on the inter-
nal reasons for the FBI's intensification of its investigation of Dr.
King and on the interplay between the Justice Department and the
FBI during this period.
In summary, the evidence described in this chapter establishes that
the FBI barraged the Justice Department with a stream of memo-
randa concerning the Communist Party's interest in the civil rights
movement and Dr. King's association with two individuals, referred
to in this report as Advisers A and B, who were alleged to have strong
ties to the Party.c" In response to the Bureau's warnings, the Justice
Department endeavored to convince Dr. King to sever his relations
with those individuals, but met with only mixed success. Dr. King
continued to turn to Adviser A for advice; Adviser B, whose asso-
ciation with Dr. King and allegedly with the Communist Party had
been picked up by the press in late 1962, publicly announced his resig-
nation from the SCLC in early July 1963, although he apparently
continued to associate with Dr. King on an informal basis.
During hearings over the administration's proposed public accom-
modations bill in July 1963, critics of the bill charged that the civil
rights movement, and Dr. King in particular, were influenced by Com-
munists. Dr. King's plans for a civil rights march on Washington in
August were receiving increasing publicity. On July 16, the Attorney
General raised with the FBI's Justice Department liaison, Courtney
Evans, the possibility of a wiretap on Dr. King and one of his legal
advisers.
The following day the FBI sent an analysis of its COMINFIL
information to the Justice Department. The administration decided to
continue its public support of Dr. King. During the ensuing week, the
President informed the press that there was no evidence that civil
rights demonstrations were Communist-inspired; the Attorney Gen-
eral announced that the FBI had no evidence that any civil rights
leaders were controlled by Communists; and the Attorney General
rejected the FBI's request for authority to wiretap Dr. King.
In August 1963, the Justice Department received a report from
the FBI which apparently contained allegations extremely unfavor-
able to Dr. King. The Attorney General told Courtney Evans that he
faced impeachment if the report was "leaked," and demanded that it
be resubmitted with a cover memorandum detailing the factual basis
for the allegation. The memorandum submitted in response to that
request contained no information concerning Dr. King that had not
already been known to the Attorney General in July, but the Attorney
General permitted the investigation to proceed.
* The memoranda also contained information about the civil rights movement
of considerable political value to the administration.
S.In: late July 1963, the FBI opened a file entitled "Communist In-
fluence in Racial Matters," and closely monitored preparations for the
August 28 Civil Rights March on Washington. The FBI's Domestic
Intelligence Division informed Director Hoover shortly before the
March that Communist influence in the civil rights movement wasnegligible. The Director disagreed. The head of the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division, William. Sullivan, responded by recommending more
intense FBI surveillance of the civil rights movement.
A. The Justice Department Warns Dr. King About Advisers A and
B: January 1962-June 1963
The Kennedy administration's concern over FBI allegations that
Communists were influencing the civil rights movement led the Justice
Department to make several attempts to persuade Dr. King to sever
his relations with Advisers A and B. In January 1962, Hoover first
warned Attorney General Kennedy that Advisor A, a member of the
Communist Party, U.S.A., "is allegedly a close adviser to the Reverend
Martin Luther King." 62 Shortly afterwards, Assistant Attorney Gen-eral Burke Marshall of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Di-vision told Dr. King that the Bureau claimed Adviser A was a com-
munist and advised that they break off relations.63 According to an
FBI memorandum, Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White also
considered speaking with Dr. King about Adviser A, but decided
against doing so when told by the FBI that revealing too much of the
FBI's information might tip off Dr. King or Adviser A to the identity
of certain FBI informants."
Dr. King gave no indication of breaking off relations with Adviser
A, who was a close friend and trusted advisor. He did, however, appar-
ently consider the adverse effects on the civil rights movement thathis association with Adviser B might cause.65 In June 1962 the FBIintercepted a conversation 66 in which Adviser A recommended thatDr. King informally use Adviser B as his executive assistant, notingthat "as long as Adviser B did not have the title of Executive Direc-tor, there would not be as much lightning flashing around him." Dr.King was reported to have agreed, remarking that "no matter whata man was, if he could stand up now and say he is not connected, then
as far as I am concerned, he is eligible to work for me." 67
On October 8, 1962, the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division pre-pared a memorandum summarizing accounts that had previously
appeared in newspapers concerning Adviser B's alleged Communist
background and his association with Dr. King. The Division for-
warded the memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach, head of the Crime
Records Division, the FBI's public relations arm, for "possible useby his contacts in the news media field in such Southern states asAlabama where Dr. King has announced that the next targets for
2Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General 1/8/62.Burke Marshall testimony, 3/31/76, p. 10.
Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 2/6/62.Allegations concerning Adviser B's membership in the Communist Party hadreceived wide publicity in the newspapers. There were no such press allegationsabout Adviser A.
*Adviser A's phones were covered by FBI wiretaps. See p. 88..Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/21/62, p. 6.
integration of universities are located." DeLoach's signature and the
notation, "handled, Augusta (illegible), Atlanta, 1-/19" appear on
the recommendation.-*
The article was apparently disseminated, because an October 25,
1962, article in the Augusta Chronicle described Adviser B as a mem-
ber of the CPUSA's National Committee who was serving as Dr.
King's "Acting Executive Director." Dr. King publicly responded,
on October 30, that "no person of known Communist affiliation"
could serve on the staff of the SCLC and denied any knowledge that
Adviser B had Communist affiliations. Dr. King also announced Ad-
viser B's temporary resignation from the SCLC pending an SCLC
investigation of the allegations.
A stream of memoranda from the FBI, however, warned the Jus-
tice Department that Adviser B continued as an associate of Dr.
King despite his apparent resignation from the SCLC. In December,
Director Hoover was cautioning the Attorney General that Adviser B
continued to "represent himself as being affiliated with the New York
Office of the SCLC and, during late November and early December
1962, was actively engaged in the work of this organization." 69 A few
days later, the Attorney General was informed that Advisers A and
B were planning a "closeted . . . critical review" with Dr. King con-
cerning the direction of the civil rights movement. Kennedy penned on
the memorandum: "Burke-this is not getting any better." 7e
In early February 1963, Dr. King asked the Justice Department
for a briefing on Adviser B's background, apparently in response to
newspaper articles about Adviser B resulting from the Bureau's cam-
paign to publicize Adviser B's relationship with Dr. King. Assistant
Attorney General Marshall noted in a memorandum that he had "been
in touch with the Attorney General on this matter and is anxious to
have it handled as soon as possible." 71 Sometime later in February,
Marshall spoke with Dr. King about severing his association with Ad-
visers A and B. Memoranda from Director Hoover to the Justice De-
partment during the ensuing months, however, emphasized that Dr.
King was maintaining a close relationship with both men. Those
memoranda to the Justice Department contained no new information
substantiating the charges that either was a member of the Communist
Party, or that either was carrying out the Party's policies. 72
" Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/8/62, p. 2.
The memorandum bears the caption "Communist Party, USA, COINTELPRO."
This is the first indication of a counterintelligence program directed against Ad-
viser B. Adviser A became the subject of such a program in 1966. For a discussion
of the FBI's COINTELPRO effort, see staff report on COINTELPRO.
* Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 1/23/63, p. 1.
" Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 1/10/63. The At-
torney General was subsequently told that Adviser B, Dr. King, and Adviser A
conferred with other members of the SCLC on January 10 and 11. (Memorandum
from Director, FBI to Burke Marshall, 1/31/63.)
Memorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 2/4/63.
On March 10 the Attorney General was informed that Adviser A and Dr.
King had engaged in a lengthy conversation concerning an article that Dr. King
was preparing for The Nation. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney
General, 3/12/63.) On June 3, the Director sent the Attorney General a nine-
page "concise summary" of information about Adviser A, emphasizing his role
as Dr. King's adviser. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General,
6/3/63.) An FBI memorandum in early June reported a discussion between
The Attorney General's concern over Dr. King's association with
the two advisers continued. A memorandum by Hoover states that on
June 17, 1963:
The Attorney General called and advised he would like to
have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to
Martin Luther King and tell Dr. King he has to get rid of
[Advisers A and B], that he should not have any contact with
them directly or indirectly.
I pointed out that if Dr. King continues this association, he
is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more
Communists trying to take advantage of [the] movement and
bigots down South who are against integration are beginning
to charge Dr. King is tied in with Communists. I stated I
thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is
rather widely known and, with things crystalizing for them
now, nothing could be worse than for Dr. King to be associ-
ated with it."
Marshall subsequently spoke with Dr. King about Advisers A and
B.74 In a follow-up memorandum written several months later Marshall
stated:
. . . I brought the matter to the attention of Dr. King very
explicitly in my office on the morning of June 22 prior to a,
scheduled meeting which Dr. King had with the President.
This was done at the direction of the Attorney General, and
the President separately [and] strongly urged Dr. King that
there should be no further connection between Adviser B and
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dr. King
stated that the connection would be ended. 75
Dr. King later told one of his associates that the President had told
him "there was an attempt (by the FBI) to smear the movement on
the basis of Communist influence. The President also said, 'I assume
you know you're under very close surveillance.' "76
Adviser A and Dr. King concerning whether Dr. King would appear on a tele-vision program in connection with a projected article in the Saturday EveningPost. Dr. King accepted Adviser A's recommendation that he read the articlebefore committing himself because the reporter "raised a lot of questions about[Adviser B] and that kind of thing." (Memorandum from Director, FBI toAttorney General, 6/7/63.)
. " Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Clyde Tolson, Alan Belmont, CarthaDeLoach, Alex Rosen, William Sullivan, 6/17/63. During this period the AttorneyGeneral requested a report from the Internal Security Division concerning Dr.King. The reply, dated June 28, cited Advisers A and B as the chief sources ofalleged Communist influence on Dr. King. (Memorandum from J. Walter Yeag-ley to the Attorney General, 6/28/63.)
" Andrew Young, who was present at the meeting with Burke Marshall, testi-fied that Marshall had said that the Bureau had informed the Justice Depart-ment that there was in fact Communist influence in the civil rights movement,and had explicitly mentioned Adviser A. When Young asked Marshall for proof,he said that he had none, and that he "couldn't get anything out.of the Bureau."
Young recalled that Marshall had said, "We ask (the Bureau) for things andwe get these big memos, but they don't ever really say anything." Young testified
that Marshall "was asking us to disassociate ourselves from [Adviser A] alto-
gether." (Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, pp. 40-44)
"5Memorandum from Burke Marshaell to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/12/63.
"Young, 2/19/76, p. 40.
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Marshall's and the President's warnings did not go unheeded. On
July 3, 1963, Dr. King sent the Attorney General a copy of a letter
to Adviser B bearing that date.? In that letter, Dr. King stated that
an investigation by the SCLC had proven the charges concerning Ad-
viser B's association with the Communist Party groundless, but that
his permanent resignation was necessary because "the situation in
our country is such that . .. any allusion to the left brings forth an
emotional response which would seem to indicate that SCLC and the
Southern Freedom Movement are Communist inspired." 78
B. Allegations About Dr. King During Hearings on the Public
Accommodations Bill and the Administration's Response:
July 1963
Allegations of Communist influence in the civil rights movement
were widely publicized in the summer of 1963 by opponents of the ad-
ministration's proposed public accommodations bill. On July 12, 1963,
Governor Ross E. Barnett of Mississippi testified before the Senate
Commerce Committee that civil rights legislation was "a part of the
world Communist conspiracy to divide and conquer our countr from
within." 7 Barnett displayed a photograph entitled "Martin Luther
King at Communist Training School" taken by an informant for the
Georgia Commission of Education, which showed Dr. King at a 1957
Labor Day Weekend seminar at the Highland Folk School in Mont-
eagle, Tennessee with three individuals whom he alleged were com-
munists. When Senator Mike Monroney challenged the accuracy of
this characterization, Barnett stated that he had not checked the al-
legations with the FBI and suggested that the Commerce Committee
do so. The FBI subsequently concluded that the charges were false.
80
Later that day, Senator Monroney asked Director Hoover for his
views on whether Dr. King and the leaders of other civil rights orgam-
zations had Communist affiliations.s" Senator Warren G. Magnuson
also asked Hoover about the authenticity of the photograph,
the status of the Georgia Commission on Education, and the nature of
the Highlander Folk School.8 2 Director Hoover forwarded these
requests and similar inquiries from other Senators to the Justice
" Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Adviser B, 7/3/63.
"King letter, 7/3/63, which concluded: "We certainly appreciate the years of
unselfish service which you have put into our New York Office and regret the ne-
cessity of your departure. Certainly yours is a significant sacrifice commensurate
with the sufferings in jail and through loss of jobs under racist intimidation. We
all pray for the day when our nation may be truly the land of the free. May God
bless you and continue to inspire you in the service of your fellowman."
Ross Barnett testimony, Senate Commerce Committee, 7/12/63, p. 1.
* The FBI informed the Justice Department that none of those individ-
uals were Communist Party members, and that there was no evidence sup-
porting the charge that the school was a communist training center. (Memo-
randum from Milton Jones to Cartha DeLoach, 7/16/63, p. 2).
Congressman Andrew Young, then an adviser to Dr. King, testified that the
Highlander Folk School photograph had been frequently used to smear Dr. King
in the South. Congressman Young's testimony that the School was not a Commu-
nist institution was 'conslstent with the FBI's conclusion (Andrew Young testi-
mony, 2/18/76, p. 53).
' Letter from Senator Mike Monroney to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/12/63.
" Letter from Senator Warren G. Magnuson to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/16/63.
Department" with a memorandum summarizing the COMINFIL
information about SCL:
In substance, the Communist Party, USA, is not able to as-
sume a role of leadership in the racial unrest at this time.
However, the Party is attempting to exploit the current
racial situation through propaganda and participation in
demonstrations and other activities whenever possible.
Through these tactics, the Party hope8 ultimately to pro-
gress from its current supporting role to a position of active
leadership. [Emphasis added.]
In the same memorandum, Director Hoover brought up the subject
of Advisers A and B's alleged Communist affiliations. He claimed that
the Communist Party had pinned its hopes on Adviser A, and that
although Adviser B had resigned from the SCLC, he continued to
associate with Dr. King.4 -
On July 15, Governor George C. Wallace of Alabama testified
before the Senate Commerce Committee in opposition to the Civil
Rights bill, berating officials for "fawning and pawing over such
people as Martin Luther King and his pro-Communist friends and
associates." Wallace referred to the picture displayed by Governor
Barnett three days before and added:
Recently Martin Luther King publicly professed to have
fired a known Communist, [Adviser B], who had been on his
payroll. But as discovered by a member of the US Congress,
the public profession was a lie, and Adviser B had re-
mained on King's payroll."
On July 17, the President announced at a news conference:
We have no evidence that any of the leaders of the civil
rights movement in the United States are Communists. We
have no evidence that the demonstrations are Communist-
inspired. There may be occasions when a Communist takes
part in a demonstration. We can't prevent that. But I think
it is a convenient scapegoat to suggest that all of the difficul-
ties are Communist and that if the Communist movement
would only disappear that we would end this.11
'Tolson urged Hoover to let the Attorney General respond to these reports;otherwise, Hoover might be called before the Committee to testify concerning'current racial agitation." The Director noted on the bottom of the memoran-
(um, "I share Tolson's views." Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to the Director,7/16/63.
"Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 7/17/63.
Wallace introduced into the record a copy of an article from the Birming-ham News, "King's SCLC Pays [Adviser B.] Despite Denial," June 30, 1963.The article stated that Dr. King had tdld reporters that Adviser B had not beenassociated with the SCLO since December 1962. but that a "highly authorizedsource" revealed that Dr. King was continuing to accept Adviser B's servicesand to pay his expenses. The article also reported allegations about Adviser B'sassociation with the Communist Party.
" Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, p. 574.
On July 23, Robert Kennedy sent to the Commerce Committee the
Justice Department's response to the queries of Senators Monroney
and Magnuson:
Based on all available evidence from the FBI and other
sources, we have no evidence that any of the top leaders of the
major civil rights groups are Communists, or Communist con-
trolled. This is true as to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., about
whom particular accusations were made, as well as other
leaders.
It is natural and inevitable that Communists have made
efforts to infiltrate the civil rights groups and to exploit the
current racial situation. In view of the real injustices that
exist and the resentment against them, these efforts have been
remarkably unsuccessful.*8
Burke Marshall, who aided in formulating these responses for the
Justice Department, told the Committee that rumors of communist
infiltration in the civil rights movement had caused the Administra-
tion considerable concern.
At that point, in some sense the business was a political
problem, not from the point of view of the support that the
civil rights movement was giving the administration or any-
thing like that, but how to be honest with the Senators with
this problem facing us and at the same time not to give ammu-
nition to people who for substantive reasons were opposed to
civil rights legislation.
Generally, for years the civil rights movement in the South
and to some extent in some quarters in the North . .. were con-
stantly referred to as communist infiltrated, communist in-
spired, radical movements. . . . So that the political problem
that I would identify with this whole situation would be that
and not a question of whether or not there was support given
the Administration by civil rights groups in the South. 9
C. The Attorney General Considers a Wiretap of Dr. King and
Rejects the Idea: July 1963
On July 16, 1963, the day after Governor Wallace's charges that
Dr. King was dominated by Communists and the day before the Presi-
dent's denial of Communist influence in the civil rights movement, the
Attorney General raised with Courtney Evans the possibility of wire-
tap coverage of Dr. King. According to Evans' memorandum about
this meeting:
The AG was contacted at his request late this afternoon.
He said that . .. a New York attorney who has had close asso-
ciation with Martin Luther King, and with [Adviser A] had
been to see Burke Marshall about the racial situation. Ac-
" Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, who had also inquired of the FBI about
Dr. King, was orally briefed by Nicholas Katzenbach and Courtney Evans on
November 1, 1963. According to a memorandum by Evans, the Attorney General
had made several attempts to draft a reply to Senator Russell's inquiries, and had
finally settled on an "innocuous" written reply and an oral briefing. (DeLoach to
Mohr, 2/5/76).
*' Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 13.
cording to the AG, [the attorney] had indicated he had some
reservations about talking with [Adviser A] on the phone.
Marshall thought he might have been referring to a possible
phone tap, and passed it off by telling [the New York at-
torney] this was something he would have to take up with
[Adviser A.]
The purpose of the AG's contact was. that this brought
to his attention the possibility of effecting technical coverage
on both [the New York attorney] and Martin Luther King.
I told the AG that I was not at all acquainted with [the New
York attorney], but that, in so far as Dr. King was concerned,it was obvious from the reports that he was in a travel status
practically all the time, and it was, therefore, doubtful that
a technical surveillance on his office or home would be very
productive. I also raised the question as to the repercussions
if it should ever become known that such a surveillance had
been put on Dr. King.
The AG said this did not concern him at all, that in view
of the possible Communist influence in the racial situation,
he thought it advisable to have as complete coverage as
possible. I told him, under the circumstances, that we would
check into the matter to see if coverage was feasible, and,
if so, would submit an appropriate recommendation to him.90
Reports from the FBI offices indicated that wiretaps were feasible,91
and Director Hoover requested the Attorney General to approve wire-
taps on phones in Dr. King's home, SCLC offices,92 and the New York
attorney's home and law office.93
On July 24, the day after his letter to the Commerce Committee
exonerating Dr. King, the Attorney General informed Evans that
he had decided against technical surveillance of Dr. King but had ap-
proved surveillance of the New York Attorney.94
The Attorney General informed me today that he had been
considering the request he made on July 16, 1963, for a
technical surveillance on Martin Luther King at his home
and office and was now of the opinion that those would be
ill-advised.
At the time the Attorney General initially asked for such
a surveillance, he was told there was considerable doubt that
the productivity of such surveillance would be worth the
risk because King travels most of the time and that there
might be serious repercussions should it ever become known
* Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 7/16/63. The New
York attorney was described by the FBI as a counsel to Dr. King, and an activist
in civil rights matters (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney
General, 7/22/63.)
' Airtel, from SAC Atlantic to Director FBI, 7/24/63: "Technical surveillance
feasible with full security."
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General, 7/23/63.
Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General, 7/22/63.
"The only evidence of communist ties of the New York attorney that the FBIappears to have given the Attorney General was an informant's allegation that in1953 and 1954 he had been an active member of the Labor Youth League, an
organization which had been cited as "subversive" under Executive Order
10450 (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General).
the Government had instituted this coverage. These were the
very thoughts that the Attorney General expressed today in
withdrawing his request.
With reference to the other technical surveillance requested
at the same time, namely, the one on [the New York at-
torney], the Attorney General felt this was in a different
category and we should go forward with this coverage. It is
noted that this was previously approved in writing by the
Attorney General.
... We will take no further action to effect technical cover-
age on Martin Luther King, either at his home or at his office
at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, in the
absence of a further request from the Attorney General.9 5
In June 1969, Director Hoover told a reporter for the Washington
Evening Star that Attorney General Kennedy had "requested that the
telephones of Dr. King be covered by electronic devices and was per-
suaded by our people not to do it in view of the possible reper-
cussions," and because Dr. King's constant traveling made a wiretap
impractical. 96 When the Committee asked Courtney Evans whether
the idea of installing a wiretap originated with the Attorney General,
he testified:
No, this is not clear in my mind at all. The record that has
been exhibited to me really doesn't establish this definitely,
although that inference can be drawn from some of the memo-
randa. But it is my recollection, without the benefit of any
specifics, that there was much more to it than this. And I
have the feeling that there were pressures existing in time to
develop more specific information that may have. had a
bearing here.
Q. Pressures emanating from where and upon whom?
A. I think from both sides, the Bureau wanted to get more
specific information, and the Department wanted resolved
the rather indefinite information that had been received
.indicating the.possibility of Communist influence on the Dr.
King movement.97
D. The Attorney General Voice8 Concern Over Continuing FBI
Reports About King: July-August 1963
Following the appearance of an article on July 25, 1963, in the
Atlanta Constitution, titled "One-time Communist Organizer Heads
Rev. King's Office in N.Y.," Dr. King announced that an SCLC inves-
tigation of Adviser B indicated that he had "no present connection
with the CP nor any sympathy with its philosophy." Dr. King ex-
plained that Adviser B had been on the SCLC staff on a temporary
basis since his resignation in December 1962, but that he had left the
SCLC on June 26, 1963, by "mutual agreement" because of concern
" Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 7/25/63.
" Jeremiah O'Leary, The Evening Star, 6/19/69; Hoover memorandum for
record, 6/19/69.
' Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, pp. 7-8.
that his affiliation with the integration movement would be used
against it by "segregationists and race baiters."
The Justice Department, however, continued to receive reports
from the FBI that Dr. King was continuing his association with Ad-
visers A and B.9" Shortly after Attorney General Kennedy's July 23
response to the Commerce Committee, Courtney Evans:
Advisor B, [deleted].
pointed out to Marshall the undesirability of making the spe-
cific comments .. . as to giving complete clearance to Martin
Luther King as Marshall had had the full details as to King's
association with [Adviser A] and [Adviser B.]
Marshall said that he was most appreciative of our warning
him about these pitfalls and he would be guided accordingly
in any future statements. He added that he would also appre-
ciate our continuing to highlight for him any information
concerning communist activity in the Negro movement." 100
On July 29, Director Hoover sent the Justice Department a report
from the New York Office entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr.: Affilia-
tion with the Communist Movement." 101 The entry under the caption,
"Evidence of Communist Party Sympathies," has been deleted by the
FBI from copies of the report given to the Committee on the grounds
that it might compromise informants. It was a general characteriza-
tion and ran for only one and one-half lines. A memorandum from
Courtney Evans described Attorney General Kennedy's reaction:
The Attorney General stated that if this report got up to
the Hill at this time, he would be impeached. He noted if this.
report got out, it would be alleged the FBI said King was
[excised by the FBI].
The Attorney General went on to say that the report had
been reviewed in detail by Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall who had told him there wasn't anything now. here
concerning King's alleged communist sympathies but that it
was the timing of the report and its possible misuse that con-
cerned him. The Attorney General went on to say that he
didn't feel he could fully trust everyone in the Internal Secu-
rity Division of the Department.
I pointed out to the Attorney General that first of all this
report was classified secret and was just a summary report
to bring our files and that of the Department's up to date. He
said that while this was undoubtedly true, the submission of
the report at this time in this form presented definite hazards.
He therefore asked that the report be resubmitted to him with
a cover memorandum setting forth the exact evidence avail-
"On July 17, in the midst of publicity concerning Dr. King's association with
Adviser B, Director Hoover informed the Attorney General that although Ad-
viser B had formally resigned from the SCLC, he was continuing his associa-
tion with Dr. King. (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General,
7/17/63.)
"m Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont; 7/29/63.
1mReport of Special Agent: Martin Luther King, Jr.: Affliation with the Com-
munist Movement, 7/22/63.
able to support the statement that King has been described
[excised by the FBI].1 02
The reason for Attorney General Kennedy's reaction is unclear.
0
It may be that he feared a "leak" of the FBI's allegations concerning
communist influence over Dr. King. would be particularly embarrass-
ing in light of the Administration's recent statements in support of
Dr. King. The Attorney General's insistence on a supplemental
memorandum detailing the underlying evidence, coupled with the tone
of the memorandum, also suggests that he was anxious to get to the
bottom of the charges.
Hoover resubmitted the report with a cover letter stating in part:
In this connection, your attention is invited to my letter of
February 14, 1962, in captioned matter and to my letter of
July 17, 1963, captioned "Request from Senator Monroney
Concerning Current Racial Agitation," both of which contain
information to the effect that Adviser A has characterized
King [deleted by FBI]. 0 4
The relevant portions of the February 14, 1962, memorandum and
the July 17, 1963, memorandum have been deleted from copies sup-
plied to the Committee. It is clear, however, that the Attorney Gen-
eral had been aware of whatever information those memoranda con-
tained when he had decided not to approve the King wiretaps the
previous month.
Despite the FBI's failure to produce any new evidence to substan-
tiate its apparently unfavorable characterization of Dr. King, the
question of whether Advisers A and B continued to influence Dr. King
remained a matter of concern to the Justice Department. On Aug-
ust 20, 1963, Evans reported:
Today the Attorney General asked if we would continue to
keep him closely informed of information received relative
to Advisers B's contact with Martin Luther King. He had
specific reference to our letter of August 2,1963.
It appears that the Attorney General is receiving conflict-
ing advice within the Department proper as to whether there
is sufficient evidence of a continuing contact between King
and Adviser B to justify some action. The Civil Rights Divi-
sion has expressed the thought that nothing need be done by
the Department. On the other hand, Andrew Oehmann, the
Attorney General's Executive Assistant, has counseled him
that in his judgment there is ample evidence there is a con-
tinuing relationship which Martin Luther King is trying to
conceal. 0 5
E. The FBI Intensifle8 It8 Inve8tigation of Alleged Communis8t
Influence in the Civil Right8 Movement: July-September 1963
On July 18, 1963, in response to intelligence reports that the Com-
munist Party was encouraging its members to participate actively in
Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 8/1/63.
Burke Marshall testified that he could not recall this incident. Burke Mar-
shall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 25.
m Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney general, 8/2/63.
* Memorandum from CourtneyEvans to Alan Belmont, 8/20/6%.
the forthcoming March on Washington, the FBI opened a file captioned.
"Communist Influence in Racial Matters." Field offices were advised:
it is reasonable to assume that the future will witness a
strong effort on the part of the CPUSA to inject itself into
and to exploit the struggle for equal rights for Negroes.
Therefore, during the investigation of the CPUSA, each re-
cipient office should be extremely alert to data indicating in-
terest, plans, or actual involvement of the Party in the
current Negro movement. This matter should be given close
attention and the Bureau kept currently advised.0c
The results of voluminous reports from field offices around the coun-
try concerning the plans of the Communist Party and "other subversive
groips" were summarized by the Domestic Intelligence Division in a
report dated August 22, 1963.107 That report concluded that there was
io evidence that the March "was actually initiated by or is controlled
by the CP," 108 although the Party had publicly endorsed the March
and had urged members to "clandestinely participate" in order to
"foster the illusion that the CP is a humanitarian group acting in the
interest of the Negro." The Party's tactics were summarized:
CP leaders have stressed the fact that the March is not the
be all and end all in itself. Events which subsequently flow
from the March will be of utmost importance, such as follow-
ing up in contacts now being made by CP members working in
support of the demonstration. Utilizing the March, the Party
has three basic general objectives:
(1) Participation by CP members through legitimate
organizations.
(2) Attempt to get the Party line into the hands of sym-
pathizers and supporters of the March through distribution
of "The Worker" and Party pamphlets.
(3) Utilize the March as a steppingstone for future Party
activity through contacts now being made by Party members
involved in the March.109
The next day the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted to the
Director a 67-page Brief detailing the CPUSA's efforts to exploit the
American Negro, and finding virtually no successes in these efforts. A
synopsis observed:
(1) "The 19 million Negroes in the United States today
constitute the largest and most important racial target of the
Communist Party, USA. Since 1919, communist leaders have
devised countless tactics and programs designed to penetrate
and control Negro population." The "colossal efforts" focused
around "equal opportunity," and efforts were presently being
Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agents in Charge, 7/18/63, p. 2.Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/22/63,p. 1.
m Baumgardner memorandum, 8/22/63, p. 1. The report noted that Adviser Awas critical of the Party's role In the civil rights movement and that he had saidhe did not consider himself under the control of the Party In his dealings withDr. King.
1 Baumgardner memorandum, 8/22/63, p. 2.
made with "limited degrees of success" to infiltrate legitimate
Negro organizations. " [T] here is no known substantial imple-
mentation of Communist Party aims and policies among
Negroes in the labor field."
(2) "While not the instigator and presently unable to direct
or control the coming Negro August 28 March on Washing-
ton, D.C., communist officials are planning to do all possible to
advance communist aims in a supporting role."
(3) "Despite tremendous sums of money and time spent by
the Communist Party, USA, on the American Negro during
the past 44 years, the Party has failed to reach its goal with
the Negroes."
(4) "There has been an obvious failure of the Communist
Party of the United States to appreciably infiltrate, influence,
or control large numbers of American Negroes in this coun-
try .. . The Communist Party in the next few years may
fail dismally with the American Negro as it has in the past.
On the other hand, it may make prodigious strides and great
success with the American Negroes, to the serious detriment of
our national security. Time alone will tell." xxo
William Sullivan, who then headed the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion of the FBI, testified that this "Brief" precipitated a dispute
between Director Hoover and the Domestic Intelligence Division over
the extent of communist influence in the civil rights movement, and
that the resulting "intensification" was part of an attempt by the
Intelligence Division to regain Hoover's approval."'1 The documentary
evidence bearing on the internal FBI dispute is set forth below, with
Sullivan's explanation of what occurred. Sullivan's comments, how-
ever, should be considered in light of the intense personal feud that
subsequently developed between Sullivan and Director Hoover, and
which ultimately led to Sullivan's dismissal from the Bureau. While
Sullivan testified that the intensified investigation of the SCLC was
the product of Director Hoover's prodding the Domestic Intelligence
Division to conform its evidence to his preconceptions, the documen-
tary evidence may also be read as indicating that the Domestic Intel-
ligence Division was manipulating the Director in a subtle bureau-
cratic battle to gain approval for expanded programs.
Sullivan testified that a careful review of the files in preparation for
writing the "Brief" revealed no evidence of "marked or substantial"
Communist infiltration of the movement, and that he had instructed
his assistant to "state the facts just as they are" and "then let the
storm break." 112 Sullivan said he had known that Hoover would be
displeased with his conclusions because Hoover was convinced the civil
rights movement was strongly influenced by communists. Sullivan's
prediction was borne out by Hoover's observations, scrawled across
the bottom of the memorandum:
This memo reminds me vividly of those I received when
Castro took over Cuba. You contended then that Castro and
his cohorts were not communists and not influenced by com-
no0 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/23/63,
p. 1 [Emphasis added].
m William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 12.
m Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 13.
munists. Time alone proved you wrong. I for one can't ignore
the memoes . . . re King, Advisers A and B . . . et al.
as having only an infinitesimal effect on the efforts to exploit
the American Negro by the Communists.113
Sullivan recalled:
This [memorandum] set me at odds with Hoover . . . A few
months went by before he would speak to me. Everything was
conducted by exchange of written communications. It was
evident that we had to change our ways or we would all be
out on the street.114
The Director penned sarcastic notes on subsequent memoranda from
the Domestic Intelligence Division. In the margin of a report that
over 100 Communist Party members were planning to participate
in the March on Washington, the Director wrote, "just infinitesi-
mal!" 1159 A preliminary report on possible communist influence on
the March noted that Party functionaries were pleased with the
March, believed it would impress Congress, and that a "rally of
similar proportions on the subject of automation could advance the
cause of socialism in the United States." Director Hoover remarked,
"I assume CP functionary claims are all frivolous." 116 Sullivan tes-
tified:
the men and I discussed how to get out of trouble. To be in
trouble with Mr. Hoover was a serious matter. These men were
trying to buy homes, mortgages on homes, children in school.
They lived in fear of getting transferred, losing money on
their homes, as they usually did. In those days the market
was not soarig, and children in school, so they wanted
another memorandum written to get us out of this trouble we
were in. I said I would write the memorandum this time. The
onus always falls on the phrson who writes a memorandum."'
On August 30, Sullivan wrote his apologetic reply:
The Director is correct. We were completely wrong about
believing the evidence was not sufficient to determine some
years ago that Fidel Castro was not a communist or under
communist influence. On investigating and writing about
communism and the American Negro, we had better remember
this and profit by the lesson it should teach us.
. . . Personally, I believe in the light of King's powerful
demagogic speech yesterday 118 he stands head and shoulders
over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to
Baumgardner memorandum, 8/23/63, p. 3.
n' Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 20.
m Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/26/63,p. 1.
"a Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/29/63,
p. 3.
m"Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 22.
"'The "demagogic speech" was Dr. King's "I have a dream" speech. When
shown this entry by the Committee, Sullivan testified:
"I do not apologize for this tactic. You either had to use this tactic or you didnot exist. I put in this memorandum what Hoover wanted to hear. He was sodamn mad at us." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 29)
69-984 0 - 76 - 8
influencing great masses of Negroes. We must mark him now,
if we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro
of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of com-
munism, the Negro and national security.
[I]t may be unrealistic to limit ourselves as we have
been doing to legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive evi-
dence that would stand up in testimony in court or before
Congressional Committees that the Communist Party, USA,
does wield substantial influence over Negroes which one day
could become decisive.
We regret greatly that the memorandum did not measure
up to what the Director has a right to expect from our
analysis. 19
Sullivan testified concerning this memorandum:
Here again we had to engage in a lot of nonsense which
we ourselves really did not believe in. We either had to do
that or we would be finished.120
The memorandum stated that "The history of the Communist Party,
U.S.A., is replete with its attempts to exploit, influence and recruit
the Negro." After reading this entry, Sullivan testified:
These are words that are very significant to me because I
know what they mean. We build this thing ... and say all this
is a clear indication that the Party's favorite target is the
Negro today. When you analyze it, what does it mean? How
often has it been able to hit the target? ... We did not discuss
that because we would have to say they did not hit the target,
hardly at all.121
In an apparent further effort to please the Director, Sullivan recom-
mended, on September 16, 1963, "increased coverage of communist in-
fluence on the Negro." His memorandum noted that "all indications"
pointed toward increasing "attempts" by the Party to exploit racial
unrest. The field was to "intensify" coverage of communist influence
on Negroes by giving "fullest consideration to the use of all possible
investigative techniques."
Further, we are stressing the urgent need for imaginative
and aggressive tactics to be utilized through our Counter-
intelligence Program-these desi-ned to attempt to neutral-
ize or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field.122
Hoover rejected this proposal with the remarks:
No. I can't understand how you can so agilely switch your
thinking and evaluation. Just a few weeks ago you contended
that the Communist influence in the racial movement was in-
effective and infinitesimal. This-notwithstanding many
memos of specific instances of infiltration. Now you want to
load the Field down with more coverage in spite of your re-
"' Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 8/30/63, p. 1.
Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 30.
121 Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 41.
" Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/16/63.
cent memo depreciating C.P. influence in racial movement. I
don't intend to waste time and money until you can make up
your minds what the situation really iS.123
Sullivan testified that he had interpreted Hoover's note to mean that
the Director was:
egging us on, to come back and say, "Mr. Hoover, you are
right, we are wrong. There is communist infiltration of the
American Negro. We think we should go ahead and carry on
an intensified program against it." He knew when he wrote
this, he knew precisely what kind of reply he was going to
get.124
Sullivan responded in a memorandum to the Deputy Associate
Director, Alan Belmont:
On returning from a few days leave I have been advised
of the Director's continued dissatisfaction with the manner
in which we prepared a Brief on [communist influence in
racial matters] and subsequent memoranda on the same sub-
ject matter. This situation is very disturbing to those of us in
the Domestic Intelligence Division and we certainly want to
do everything possible to correct our shortcomings. . . . The
Director indicated he would not approve our last SAC letter
until there was a clarification and a meeting of minds relative
to the question of the extent of communist influence over
Negroes and their leaders . . . .
As we know, facts by themselves are not too meaningful,
for they are somewhat like stones tossed in a heap as con-
trasted to the same stones put in the form of a sound edifice.
It is obvious that we did not put the proper interpretation
upon the facts which we gave to the Director. [Emphasis
added.]
As previously stated, we are in complete agreement with
the Director that communist influence is being exerted on
Martin Luther King, Jr., and that King is the strongest of
the Negro leaders . . . [w]e regard Martin Luther King to
be the most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the
country.
May I repeat that our failure to measure up to what the
Director expected of us in the area of Communist-Negro
relations is a subject of very deep concern to us in the Domes-
tic Intelligence Division. We are disturbed by this and ought
to be. I want him to know that we will do everything that is
humanly possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to
m Director Hoover's note on Baumgardner memorandum, 9/16/63. p. 2. Hoover
commented on the transmittal slip:
"I have certainly been misled by previous memos which clearly showed com-
munist penetration of the racial movement. The attached is contradictory of all
that. We are wasting manpower and money investigating CP effort in racial
matter if the attached is correct. (Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to the Direc-
tor. 9/18/63.)
m Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 46.
communist penetration and influence over Negro leaders and
their organizations.125
Sullivan resubmitted his proposed intensification instructions to the
field. This time the Director agreed.
The intensification was put into effect by an SAC letter dated Octo-
ber 1, 1963, which contained the usual allusion to "efforts" and "at-
tempts" by the Communist Party to influence the civil rights move-
ment, but which said nothing about the absence of results:
The history of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), is
replete with its attempts to exploit, influence and recruit
the Negro. The March on Washington, August 28, 1963, was
a striking example as Party leaders early put into motion
efforts to accrue gains for the CPUSA from the March. The
presence at the March of around 200 Party members, ranging
from several national functionaries headed by CPUSA Gen-
eral Secretary Gus Hall to many rank-and-file members, is
clear indication of the Party's favorite target (the Negro)
today.
All indications are that the March was not the "end of the
line" and that the Party will step up its efforts to exploit
racial unrest and in every possible way claim credit for itself
relating to any "gains" achieved by the Negro. A clear-cut
indication of the Party's designs is revealed in secret informa-
tion obtained from a most sensitive source that the Party
plans to hold a highly secretive leadership meeting in Novem-
ber, 1963, which will deal primarily with the Negro situation.
The Party has closely guarded plans for Gus Hall to under-
take a "barnstorming" trip through key areas of the country
to meet Party people and thus better prepare himself for the
November meeting.
In order for the Bureau to cope with the Party's efforts
and thus fulfill our responsibilities in the security field, it is
necessary that we at once intensify our coverage of communist
influence on the Negro. Fullest consideration should be given
to the use of all possible investigative techniques in the in-
vestigation of the CP-USA, those communist fronts through
which the Party channels its influence, and the many individ-
ual Party members and dupes. There is also an urgent need
for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through
Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 9/25/63, p. 1. Sullivan
named the "changing situation in the Communist Party-Negro relations area" as
the reason for a more intense investigation of communist influence in racial
matters:
"During the past two weeks in particular there have been sharp stepped-up
activities on the part of communist officials to infiltrate and to dominate Negro
developments in this country. Further, they are meeting with successes."
A review of the Bureau files for the month prior to Sullivan's memorandum
reveals no increase in CPUSA activity or any success on its part. The only rele-
vant entries indicate:
(1) At a meeting on August 30. leading Party functionaries termed the
March on Washington a 'success,' and discussed what action to take to advance
civil rights legislation. Demonstrations were discussed, but none were planned.
(Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 9/5/63).
(2) On August 30. Adviser B was observed spending an hour in the building
housing the New York SCLC offices. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attor-
ney General, 9/5/63).
our Counterintelligence Program for the purpose of attempt-
ing to neutralize or 'disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro
field. Because of the Bureau's responsibility for timely dis-
semination of pertinent information to the Department and
other interested agencies, it is more than ever necessary that
all facets of this matter receive prompt handling.126
The instruction to use "all possible investigative techniques" appears
to have dictated the intensification of the COMINFIL investigation
of the SCLC.
This was consistent with Sullivan's assurance to Director Hoover at
the end of September that "we will do everything that is humanly
possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to the Communist
penetration and influence over Negro leaders and their organizations."
The emphasis on "imaginative and aggressive tactics" to disrupt
Communist Party activities in the Negro field appears to have in-
volved an expansion of the COINTELPRO operation already under-
way against the Communist Party. In 1956, the Bureau had ini-
tiated a COINTELPRO operation against the Communist Party,
USA, with the goal of "feeding and fostering" internal friction within
the Party. The program was soon expanded to include "preventing
communists from seizing control of legitimate mass organizations,
and . . . discrediting others who [are]1 secretly operating inside such
organizations." 127 The October 1, 1963 "intensification" instruction
emphasized this latter objective of disruption.1
2 9
The intensification order appears to have been more a product of
preconceptions and bureaucratic squabbles within the FBI than a
response to genuine concerns based on hard evidence that communists
might be influencing the civil rights movement. Because Director
Hoover is deceased, the Committee was able to obtain only one
side of the story. Sullivan's version depicts the Domestic Intelligence
Division executing an about-face after Director Hoover rejected its
conclusion that evidence did not indicate significant communist influ-
ence, reinterpreting its original data to reach conclusions the Director
wanted to hear, and then basing its recommendations for action on the
new "analysis." However, the memoranda could also support a conten-
tion that the Domestic Intelligence Division misled Director Hoover in
order to maneuver him into supporting expanded domestic intelligence
programs.
IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
Introduction and Summary
In October 1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved an
FBI request for permission to install wiretaps on phones in Dr. King's
'" Director, FBI to SAC, 10/1/63. [Emphasis added.]
1' The history of COINTELPRO-FBI's counterintelligence operations to dis-
rupt various domestic dissident groups-is discussed in a separate staff report.
Adviser B had been the target of one such COINTELPRO operation in 1962, when
the Bureau attempted to generate a series of newspaper articles designed to ex-
pose his alleged Party background. See pp. 95-96.
" The use of COINTELPRO techniques to discredit Dr. King is discussed in
the ensuing chapters.
home and in the SCLC's New York and Atlanta offices to determine
the extent, if any, of "communist influence in the racial situation." The
FBI construed this authorization to extend to Dr. King's hotel rooms
and the home of a friend. No further authorization was sought until
mid-1965, after Attorney General Katzenbach required the FBI for
the first time to seek renewed authorization for all existing wiretaps.
The wiretaps on Dr. King's home were apparently terminated at that
time by Attorney General Katzenbach; the SCLC wiretaps were
terminated by Attorney General Ramsay Clark in June 1966.
In December, 1963-three months after Attorney General Kennedy
approved the wiretaps-the FBI, without informing the Attorney
General, planned and implemented a secret effort to discredit Dr. King
and to "neutralize" him as the leader of the civil rights movemeit.
One of the first steps in this effort involved hiding microphones in
Dr. King's hotel rooms. Those microphones were installed without
Attorney General Kennedy's prior authorization or subsequent noti-
fication, neither of which were required under practices then current.
The FBI continued to place microphones in Dr. King's hotel rooms
until November 1965. Attorney General Katzenbach was apparently
notified immediately after the fact of the placement of three micro-
phones between May and November 1965. It is not clear why the FBI
stopped its microphone surveillance of Dr. King, although its decision
may have been related to concern about public exposure during the
Long Committee's investigation of electronic surveillance.
This chapter examines the legal basis for the wiretaps and micro-
phones, the evidence surrounding the motives for their use, and the
degree to which Justice Department and White House officials were
aware of the FBI's electronic surveillance of Dr. King.
A. Legal Standards Governing the FBI's Duty to Inform the Justice
Department of TViretaps and Microphones During the Period of
the Martin Luther King Investigation
The FBI's use of wiretaps and microphones to follow Dr. King's
activities must be examined in light of the accepted legal standards
and practices of the time. Before March 1965, the FBI followed differ-
ent procedures for the authorization of wiretaps and microphones.
Wiretaps required the approval of the Attorney General in advance.
However, once the Attorney General had authorized the FBI to initi-
ate wiretap coverage of a subject, the Bureau generally continued the
wiretap for as long as it judged necessary. As former Attorney General
Katzenbach testified:
The custom was not to put a time limit on a tap, or any wiretap
authorization. Indeed, I think the Bureau would have felt
free in 1965 to put a tap on a phone authorized by Attorney
General Jackson before World War II.so
In "national security" cases, the FBI was free to carry out micro-
phone surveillances iwithout first seeking the approval of the Attorney
General or informing him afterward. The Bureau apparently derived
authority for its microphone practice from a 1954 memorandum sent
by Attorney General Brownell to Director Hoover, stating:
I Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 11/12/75, p. 87.
It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone sur-
veillance is the only possible way to uncovering the activities
of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive per-
sons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national
interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be
limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The
FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal
security matters equally as important as the duty of develop-
ing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national
security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone
surveillance for the proper discharge of both such functions.
The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone
surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for
these purposes.. . . I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its
important intelligence function, considerations of internal
security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore,
may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the na-
tional interest .1131
The Justice Department was on notice that the FBI's practice was
to install microphones without first informing the Justice Department.
Director Hoover'told Deputy Attorney General Bryon White in May
1961:
in the internal security field we are utilizing microphone
surveillances on a restricted basis even though trespass is nec-
essary to assist in uncovering the activity of Soviet intelli-
gence agents and Communist Party leaders. . . . In the inter-
est of national- safety, microphone surveillances are also uti-
lized on a restricted basis, even though trespass is necessary,
in uncovering major criminal activities.132
A memorandum by Courtney Evans indicates that he discussed
microphones in "organized crime cases" with the Attorney General in
July 1961:
It was pointed out to the Attorney General that we had taken
action with regard to the use of microphones in [organized
crime] cases and . . . we were nevertheless utilizing them in
all instances where this was technically feasible and where
valuable information might be expected. The strong objec-
tions to the utilization of telephone taps as contrasted to
microphone surveillances was stressed. The Attorney General
stated he recognized the reasons why telephone taps should
be restricted to national-defense-type cases and he was pleased
we had been using microphone surveillances, where these ob-
m Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, "Micro-
phone Surveillance," 5/20/54. Attorney General Brownell's memorandum au-
thorizing "unrestricted use" of microphone surveillance in national security cases
was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1961), in which the Court denounced as "obnoxious" the installation of a micro-
phone in a criminal suspect's bedroom.
m Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Deputy Attorney General Byron White,
5/4/61.
jections do not apply, wherever possible in organized crime
matters. 3 3
The Justice Department later summarized this practice in a brief to
the Supreme Court:
Under Departmental practice in effect for a period of years
prior to 1963, and continuing into 1965, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was given authority to ap-
prove the installation of devices such as [microphones] for
intelligence (but not evidentiary) purposes when required
in the interest of internal security or national safety, includ-
ing organized crime, kidnappings, or matters wherein human
life might be at stake.13 4
On March 30, 1965, at the urging of Attorney General Katzenbach,
the FBI adopted a uniform procedure for submitting both wiretaps
and microphones to the Attorney General for his approval prior to in-
stallation. Director Hoover described the new procedures in a memo-
randum to the Attorney General:
In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already
set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for
phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the place-
ment of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you
from time to time requests for authority to install micro-
phones where deemed imperative for your consideration and
approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed
that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the
installation of a microphone, you will be advised when such
is discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontin-
ued in less than six months, that a new request be submitted
by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone
installation.u5
One week later Katzenbach sent to the White House a proposed
Presidential directive to all Federal agencies on electronic surveillance.
This directive, formally issued by President Johnson on June 30,
1965, forbade the nonconsensual interception of telephone communica-
tions by Federal personnel, "except in connection with investigations
related to the national security" and then only after obtaining the
written approval of the Attorney General. The directive was less
precise concerning microphone surveillance:
Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear
nontelephone conversations is an even more difficult problem,
1" Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, July 7, 1961. A Bureau
memorandum by Director Hoover several years later states that Evans subse-
quently gave then Senator Robert Kennedy a letter, dated February 17, 1966,
stating that Evans had never discussed the use of microphones with Kennedy and
that Evans "did not know of any written material that was sent to you (Ken-
nedy)" concerning microphone surveillances. The letter from Evans to Kennedy
was released to the press. Director Hoover concluded in his memorandum report-
ing this incident that in view of Evans "disregard for the truth and duplicity
toward the FBI, he should not be contacted without prior Bureau approval."
(Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover, Re: Courtney A. Evans, Person Not To Be
Contacted, December 15, 1966.)
1" Black v. United States 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
" Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/30/65, p. 2.
which raises substantial and unresolved questions of con-
stitutional interpretation. I desire that each agency conduct-
ing such investigations consult with the Attorney General
to ascertain whether the agency's practices are fully in accord
with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of
others.136
B. TViretap Surveillance of Dr. King and the SCLC: October 1963-
June 1966
On September 6, 1963, Assistant Director William Sullivan first
recommended to Director Hoover that the FBI install wiretaps on )r.
King's home and the offices of the Southern Christian Leadership Con-
ference.a'1 Sullivan's recommendation was apparently part of an at-
tempt to improve the Domestic Intelligence Division's standing with
the Director by convincing him that Sullivan's Division was concerned
about alleged communist influence on the civil rights movement and
that the Division intended, as Sullivan subsequently informed theDirector, to "do everything that is humanly possible" in conducting its
investigation .13s
Sullivan's recommendation was viewed with scepticism by the FBI
leadership since Attorney General Kennedy had rejected a similarproposal two months earlier. Associate Director Clyde Tolson noted
on the memorandum containing Sullivan's proposal: "I see no pointin making this recommendation to the Attorney General in viewof the fact that he turned down a similar recommendation on July 22,1963." 139 Director Hoover scrawled below Tolson's note: "I willapprove though I am dizzy over vacillation as to influence ofCPUSA." 140
In late September 1963 the FBI conducted a survey and concluded
that wiretap coverage of Dr. King's residence and of the New YorkSCLC office could be implemented without detection.14 On October 7,citing "possible communist influence in the racial situation," Hoover
requested the Attorney General's permission for a wiretap "on King athis current address or at any future address to which he may move"
and "on the SCLC office at the current New York address or to anyother address to which it may be moved." 142 Attorney General Ken-nedy signed the request on October 10 and, on October 21, also ap-proved the FBI request for coverage of the SCLC's Atlanta office.143
Two memoranda by Courtney Evans indicate that the Attorney Gen-eral was uncertain about the advisability of the wiretaps. On Octo-ber 10, the Attorney General summoned Evans to discuss the FBI'srequest for the wiretaps on Dr. King's home telephone and the New
York SCLC telephones. Evans wrote:
Lyndon B. Johnson, Presidential Directive, 6/30/65.
Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, 9/6/63.Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 9/25/63, p. 5. Thedispute between Sullivan and Hoover, and the intensification which developedfrom it, are described pp. 104 et. seq.m Memorandum from James Bland to William Sullivan, 10/4/63, attachment.Bland memorandum, 10/4/63, attachment.
"' Bland memorandum, 10/4/63, p. 1.
10/7Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy,10/7/63.
""Hoover memorandum, 10/7/63; Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover toAttorney General Robert Kennedy, 10/18/63.-
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The Attorney General said that he recognized the import-
ance of this coverage if substantial information is to be de-
veloped concerning the relationship between King and the
communist party. He said there was no question in his mind
as to the coverage in New York City but that he was worried
about the security of an installation covering a residence in
Atlanta, Georgia. He noted that the last thing we could af-
ford to have would be a discovery of a wiretap on King's
residence.
I pointed out to the Attorney General the fact that a resi-
dence was involved did not necessarily mean there was any
added risk because of the technical nature of the telephone
system. . . . After this discussion the Attorney General said
he felt we should go ahead with the technical coverage on
King on a trial basis, and to continue it if productive results
were forthcoming. He said he was certain that all Bureau
representatives involved would recognize the delicacy of this
particular matter and would thus be even more cautious than
ever in this assignment.. .1.
According to Evans' memorandum, the Attorney General signed the
authorization for the wiretap immediately after this conversation.
Another memorandum by Evans describes the Attorney General's
reaction on approving the Bureau's request for a wiretap on the
Atlanta SCLC office a week later:
The Attorney General is apparently still vacillating in his
position as to technical coverage.. . . I reminded him of our
previous conversation wherein he was assured that all possible
would be done to insure the security of this operation.
The Attorney General advised that he was approving [the
wiretaps] but asked that this coverage and that on King's
residence be evaluated at the end of thirty days in light of the
results secured so that the continuance of those surveillances
could be determined at that time.145
Wiretaps were installed on the SCLC's New York office on Octo-
ber 24, 1963, and at Dr. King's home and the SCLC's Atlanta office
on November 8, 1963. The FBI made an internal evaluation of the
wiretaps in December 1963 and decided on its own to extend the
wiretaps for three months. Reading the Attorney General's authori-
zation broadly, the FBI construed permission to wiretap Dr. King "at
his current address or at any future address" to include hotel room
phones and the phone at the home of friends with whom he tempo-
rarily stayed. The FBI installed wiretaps, without seeking further
authorization, on the following occasions:
Location Installed Discontinued
KinR's Atlanta home------------------------------------------------------ Nov. 8, 1963 Apr. 30,1965
A friend's home ------------------- ------------------------------- Aug. 14,1964 Sept. 8,1964
Hyatt House Motel Los Angeles --------------------------------------- Apr 24 1964 Apr 26,1964
Hyatt House Mote( Los Angeles-------------------------------- July Y, 1964 July 9,1964
Claridge Hotel Atlantic City ------------------------------------------ Aug. 22,1964 Aug. 27, 1964
SCLC Atlanta headquarters ------------------------------------------------ Nov. 8, 163 June 21, 1966
SCLC New York headquarters ---------------------------------------------- Oct. 24,1963 Jan. 24, 1964
July 13, 1964 July 31, 1964
~Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 10/10/68.
'~Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 10/21/63.
The Committee was not able to ascertain why Attorney General Ken-
nedy approved the FBI's request for wiretaps in October 1963 after
refusing an identical -request in July 1963. Burke Marshall, Ken-
nedy's assistant in charge of civil rights affairs, testified that he could
not recall ever having discussed the matter with the Attorney General.
It was his opinion, however, that the decision had been influenced by
events arising out of concern about possible communist influence in the
civil rights movement that had been widely publicized during the
hearings on the Public Accommodations Act in the summer of 1963.
Marshall recalled that Dr. King had made a "commitment" to the
Attorney General and to the President to "stop having any communi-
cation" with Advisers A and B. Subsequently,
information came in, not as far as Adviser B, but as far
as Adviser A was concerned, that that commitment was not
lived up to, and I have assumed since, although I do not re-
member discussing it with Robert Kennedy, that the reason
that he authorized the tap . . . was that he wanted to find out
what was going on.
From his point of view, Martin Luther King had made a
commitment on a very important matter. . . [and] King had
broken that commitment. So therefore the Attorney General
wanted to find out whether [Adviser A] did in fact have
influence over King, what he was telling King, and so forth."'
Marshall's answer to a question concerning whether anyone in the
Justice Department ever considered asking the FBI to discontinue
the investigation of Dr. King also sheds some light on why the Attor-
ney General might have decided to approve the wiretaps:
Not that I know of. [The FBI's allegations concerning Ad-
viser A] were grave and serious, and the inquiries from the
Senate and from the public, both to the President and to the
Attorney General, as well as the Bureau, had to be answered
and they had to be answered fully. Stopping the investiga-
tion in light of those circumstances would have run the risk
that there would have been a lot of complaints that the Bureau
had been blocked for political reasons from investigating seri-
ous charges about communist infiltration in the civil rights
movement.1 4 8
Edwin 0. Guthman, the Justice Department Public Relations Chief
during Robert Kennedy's tenure as Attorney General, told the Com-
mittee that he had spoken with then Senator Robert Kennedy about
the wiretap when it was revealed in a Jack Anderson story in 1968.
According to Guthman, Robert Kennedy told him:
he had been importuned or requested by the FBI over a pe-
riod of time to wiretap the phones of Dr. King, specifically
wiretap the phones, as I recollect, at the headquarters of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and, I think,
"' Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 20. The "commitment on a very impor-
tant matter" had been Dr. King's promise to sever his relations with Adviser A.
'"Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 55.
Martin Luther King's home, but I'm not certain about
that....
Robert Kennedy said that he finally agreed in the fall of
1963 to give the FBI permission to wiretap the phones, and
my clear recollection on this is that his feeling was that if he
did not do it, Mr. Hoover would move to impede or block the
passage of the civil rights bill, which had been introduced in
the summer of 1963, and that he felt that he might as well
settle the matter as to whether (Adviser A) did have the in-
fluence on King that the FBI contended.. . . My recollection
is that there had been a number of conversations with King by
Burke Marshall and Robert Kennedy, and I think President
Kennedy had indicated to King that he ought not to have any-
thing to do with (Adviser A). My understanding and recol-
lection is that King said he would, and then each time the FBI
would come back and say, he's still in contact with (Adviser
A) ... Robert Kennedy viewed this as a serious matter and not
in the interest of the country and not in the interest of the
civil rights movement, if the FBI information was accu-
rate.1 4 9
Guthman testified that he could not recall Kennedy's elaborating
on the steps that he had feared Director Hoover would take against
the civil rights legislation if he had not agreed to the wiretap,
against the civil rights legislation if he had not agreed to the wiretap,
but gave his own opinion that "Hoover's influence on the Hill could
be considerable and it could have been a form of public statement or
conferring with Senators in that area." 10
It is also not clear why Attorney General Kennedy insisted that the
wiretaps be evaluated after 30 days and then failed to complain when
the FBI neglected to send him an evaluation. Evans, after reviewing
his memorandum stating that the Attorney General required the FBI
to evaluate the wiretaps after 30 days, testified that he assumed the
Attorney General had "expected the Bureau to . .. submit the results
of that evaluation to him." When asked if the Attorney General had
ever inquired into whether the evaluation had been made, Evans
testified:
I am reasonably certain he never asked me. I would point out,
however, that the assassination of President Kennedy fol-
lowed these events reasonably close in point of time, and this
disrupted the operation of the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral'51
In March 1965 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach requested the
FBI to submit all of its wiretaps for reauthorization.15 2 He testified:
In late April 1965, in accordance with this program, I re-
ceived a request from the Bureau to continue a tap on Dr.
King's personal phone. I ordered it discontinued. It is, how-
ever, possible that a request for the continuation of a pre-
existing tap on the headquarters of the Southern Christian
us Edwin 0. Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, pp. 5, 15-17.
Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, p. 17.
23 Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, p. 15.
"'Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
Leadership Conference was made about the same time, and
I may have approved that tap. I do not recall the date or the
circumstances which would have led me to do so."12
Documents provided to the Committee by the FBI reflect that in
early April 1965 the Atlanta office informed headquarters that it was
discontinuing the wiretap on Dr. King's home because he was moving.
On April 19 the Director authorized a survey to determine if a wire-
tap could be placed on the phone in Dr. King's new residence with
"full security." The Director's memorandum also stated that "After
receipt of results of survey and Atlanta's recommendations, a memo-
randum will be prepared along with any necessary correspondence
with the Attorney General.""15 A memorandum from the Atlanta
office the next month states: "On [May 6, 19651, Mr. Sullivan tele-
phonically advised that the installation of this Tesur [technical sur-
veillance] was not authorized at this time." 15.
The Bureau has been unable to find a record of any discussions be-
tween FBI officials and Attorney Katzenbach concerning this wiretap,
and there are no memoranda in the Bureau files which indicate the
reason that the wiretap on Dr. King's new home was not authorized.
The FBI terminated the wiretap on the New York SCLC office in
January 1964, only two months after it had been installed, "for lack
of productivity." 156 The wiretap was reinstalled in July 1964 and
discontinued later that month because "the office moved." 15 No fur-
ther wiretaps were placed on the New York office.
The wiretap on the Atlanta SCLC office was reviewed by Attorney
General Katzenbach on October 27, 1965, and received his approval.
A Bureau memorandum recommending continuation of the coverage
in April 1966 was returned with a notation by Katzenbach, dated
June 20, 1966, stating: "I think this coverage should be discontinued,
particularly in light of possible charges of a criminal nature against
[certain SCLC employees]."159 Technical coverage was discontinued
the following day.160
Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned down two requests by the
FBI for wiretaps on the phones of the SCLC, once on January 3, 1968,
and again on January 17, 1969.101 Clark wrote the Director concern-
ing the 1968 request:
I am declining authorization of the requested installation of
the above telephone surveillance at the present time. There
has not been an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to
national security.162
Clark's refusal to authorize an SCLC wiretap in 1969 occurred two
days before he left office, at the termination of the Johnson Admin-
a Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 210.
Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 4/19/65.
Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta to Director, FBI, 5/19/65.
"'Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 1/27/64.
'sMemorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, New York, 8/7/64.
"Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 6/22/66. The charges
had nothing to do with Dr. King.
1 Memorandum from Joseph Sizoo to Files. 6/23/66.
'Memorandum from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/3/68; memorandum
from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/17/69.
" Clark memorandum, 1/3/68.
istration. Less than a month later the Director informed the Atlanta
office that an SCLC wiretap "is in line to be presented to the new At-
torney General, and a survey, with full security assured .. . is desir-
able.' 163 FBI files contain no indication of the disposition of this final
request.
C. MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE OF DR. KING: JANU-
ARY 1964-NOVEMBER 1965.
From January 1964 through November 1965, the FBI installed at
least 15 hidden microphones in hotel and motel rooms occupied by
Martin Luther King. 164 The FBI has told the Committee about the
following microphone surveillances:
-Willard Hotel, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 1964).
-Shroeder Hotel, Milwaukee (Jan. 27, 1964).
-Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (Feb. 18,1964).
-Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles (Feb. 20,1964).
-Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles (Feb. 22, 1964).
-Statler Hotel, Detroit (Mar. 19, 1964).
-Senator Motel, Sacramento (Apr. 23, 1964).
-Hyatt House Motel, Los Angeles (July 7,1964).
-Manger Hotel, Savannah, Ga. (Sept. 28,1964).
-Park Sheraton Hotel, New York (Jan. 8,1965).
-Americana Hotel, New York (Jan. 28, 1965).
-Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York (May 12, 1965).
-Astor Hotel, New York (Oct. 14, 1965).
-New York Hilton Hotel, New York (Oct. 28,1965).
-Americana Hotel, New York (Nov. 29, 1965). 5
1. Reasons for the FBPs Microphone Surveillance of Dr. King.
The wiretaps on Dr. King's home telephone and the phones of the
SCLC offices were authorized by the Attorney General for the stated
purpose of determining whether suspected communists were influenc-
ing the course of the civil rights movement. FBI documents indicate
that the microphone coverage, (which was initiated without the
knowledge of the Attorney Generals, in cQnformance with practice
then current), was originally designed not only to pick up information
bearing on possible Communist influence over Dr. King, but also to
obtain information for use in the FBI's secret effort to discredit Dr.
* Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 2/14/69.
'" Witnesses have indicated that other microphones might have been used to
cover the activities of Dr. King and his associates, although those microphones
might have been placed by local law enforcement officers. Bureau documents
indicate that the New York and Miami police did in fact place microphones in
Dr. King's hotel rooms. (Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agent in
Charge, New York, 5/7/65; Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to Wil-
liam Sullivan, 5/27/66). Congressman Andrew Young, who was one of Dr. King's
chief aides, testified: "We found a bug in the pulpit in a church in Selma, Ala-
bama. in 1965, and we didn't even move it or destroy it. We took it out from under
the pulpit, taped it on top of the pulpit, 'and Reverend Abernathy called it, 'this
little do-hickey' and he said, 'I want you to tell Mr. Hoover, I don't want it under
here where there is a whole lot of static, I want him to get it straight,' and he
preached to the little bug." (Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, p. 55.)
" Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 7/24/75, pp. 4-5. (The Bureau
also authorized the installation of a microphone at the Park Sheraton Hotel in
New York on March 29. 1965, but Dr. King did not stay at the hotel and the
coverage was terminated.)
King as the leader of the. civil rights movement. 166 By 1965,
references to discrediting efforts had been dropped, and documents
requesting authorization for microphones mentioned only the purpose
of obtaining information about possible communist influences.1 6 7 The
details of the Bureau's efforts to undermine Dr. King are discussed in
the ensuing chapters.
The first microphones were installed about two weeks after a Decem-
ber 23, 1963, FBI conference at which methods of "neutralizing" Dr.
King were explored.** Microphone surveillance was again discussed
at an all-day conference at FBI Headquarters in February 1964,
attended by representatives of the FBI laboratory "preparatory to
effecting coverage of the activities of Martin Luther King, Jr., and
his associates in Honolulu." 169 Justifying the need for microphone
coverage, the Chief of the FBI's Internal Security Section wrote that
the FBI was "attempting" to obtain information about 'the [private]
activities of Dr. King and his associates" so that Dr. King could be
"completely discredited." 170
The FBI memorandum authorizing the placement of the first micro-
phone on Dr. King-at the Willard Hotel in early January 1964-gave
as a basis "the intelligence and counterintelligence possibilities which
thorough coverage of Dr. King's activities might develop. . "171
The Willard Hotel "bug" yielded 19 reels of tape. A memorandum
summarizing the tapes was sent to the Director with William Sullivan's
recommendation that it be shown to Walter Jenkins, President John-
son's Special Assistant, "inasmuch as Dr. King is seeking an appoint-
ment with President Johnson." 12 Cartha D. DeLoach, Assistant to
the Director, showed the summary memorandum to Jenkins, and later
wrote:
I told Jenkins that the Director indicated I should leave this
attachment with him if he desired to let the President person-
ally read it. Jenkins mentioned that he was sufficiently aware
of the facts that he could verbally advise the President of
the matter. Jenkins was of the opinion that the FBI could
perform a good service to the country if this matter could
somehow be confidentially given to members of the press. I
See, for example, Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont,
1/6/64; memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/28/64.
Some Bureau witnesses have suggested that the microphones were installed only
to intercept conversations between Dr. King and other individuals, such as Ad-
viser A, to determine the extent of communist influence over King. The Bureau,
however, was unable to produce any evidence that it had anticipated meetings be-
tween Dr. King and Adviser A or between Dr. King and any other of his advisers
whom the Bureau alleged had communist connections on the initial occasions
when microphones were used.
"'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/29/65;
memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/29/65.
'
6 Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/13/64. This con-
ference and the FBI's attempts to discredit King are discussed infra, pp. 133
et seq.
"'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 2/4/64.
.o Baumgardner memorandum, 1/28/64.
"'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/6/64.
'"Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/13/64. The memo-
randum did not indicate how the information had been obtained.
told him the Director had this in mind, however, he also be-
lieved we should obtain additional information prior to dis-
cussing it with certain friends.13
The FBI was apparently encouraged by the intelligence afforded by
"bugs" and by the White House's receptiveness to that type of infor-
mation. A microphone was installed at the Shroeder Hotel in Mil-
waukee two weeks later, but was declared "unproductive" because
"there were no activities of interest developed." 174 Dr. King's visit to
Honolulu in mid-February 1964 was covered by a squad of
surveillance experts brought in for the occasion from San Francisco.
One of these experts was described in a Bureau memorandum as the
"most experienced, most ingenious, most unruffled, most competent
sound man for this type of operation in the San Francisco Office;"
another was chosen because he had "shown unusual ingenuity, persis-
tence, and determination in making microphone installations;" and a
third had "been absolutely fearless in these types of operations for
over twelve years." "I More than twenty reels of tape were obtained
during Dr. King's stay in Honolulu and his sojourn in Los Angeles
immediately afterward.176 Director Hoover agreed to send a copy of a
memorandum describing the contents of the tapes to Jenkins and
Attorney General Kennedy in order to:
remove all doubt from the Attorney General's mind as to the
type of person King is. It will probably also eliminate King
from any participation in [a memorial for President Kennedy
which the Attorney General was helping to arrange] .x7
Dr. King's stay in Los Angeles in July 1964 was covered by both
wiretaps and microphones in his hotel room. The wiretap was intended
to gain intelligence about Dr. King's plans at the Republican National
Convention. Microphone surveillance was requested to attempt to ob-
tain information useful in the campaigns to discredit him.17 SIli-
van's memorandum describing the coverage was sent to Hoover with
a recommendation against dissemination to the White House or the
Attorney General:
as in this instance it is merely repetitious and does not have
nearly the impact as prior such memoranda. We are continu-
ing to follow closely King's activities and giving considera-
tion to every possibility for future similar coverage that will
add to our record on King so that in the end he might be dis-
credited and thus be removed from his position of great stat-
ure in the Negro community. 79
"' Memorandum from Cartha D. DeLoach to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/14/64. Jenkins
told members of Committee staff in an informal interview that he had never
suggested diseminating derogatory material about Dr. King to the press. (Staff
summary of interview with Walter Jenkins, 12/1/75, p. 2.) The Committee did
not take Jenkins testimony because Jenkins informed the Committee that he
was ill.
"' Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/28/64.
"' Airtel, Special Agent In charge, San Francisco, to FBI Director, 2/25/64.
u. The FBI also covered Dr. King's activities with photographic surveillance.
'" Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/4/64.
The memorandum did not show how the information had been obtained.
1 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 7/2/64.
"' Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 7/15/64.
Hoover wrote on the memorandum, "Send to Jenkins." The sum-
mary memorandum and -a cover letter were sent to Jenkins on
July 17.1so
It should also be noted that Dr. King's activities at the Democratic
National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey in August 1964
were closely monitored by the FBI. Microphones were not installed
on that occasion, although wiretaps were placed on Dr. King's hotel
room phone. The stated justification for the wiretap was the investi-
gation of possible comniunist influence and the fact that Dr. Kin
may indulge in a hunger fast as a means of protest." 181 A great deal
of potentially useful political information was obtained from this
wiretap and disseminated to the White House.18 2
The memorandum authorizing microphone coverage of Dr. King's
room in Savannah, Georgia during the annual SCLC conference in
September and October 1964 described surveillance as necessary be-
cause it was "expected that attempts will again be made to exert in-
fluence upon the SCLC and in particular on King by communists." "8
The seven "bugs" in Dr. King's rooms during visits to New York
from January to November 1965 were justified in contemporaneous
internal FBI memoranda by anticipated meetings of Dr. King with
several people whom the FBI claimed had affiliations with the Com-
munist Party.1 8 4 No mention was made of the possibility of obtaining
private life material in memoranda concerning these "bugs." 185
2. Evidence Bearing on Whether the Attorneys General Au-
thorized or Knew About the Microphone Surveillance of
Dr. King
In summary, it is clear that the FBI never requested permission for
installing microphones to cover Dr. King from Attorney General Ken-
nedy, and there is no evidence that it ever directly informed him that
it was using microphones. There is some question, however, concerning
whether the Attorney General ultimately realized that the FBI was
using "bugs" because of the nature of the information that he was
being sent.
Evidence concerning Attorney General Katzenbach's knowledge of
microphone surveillance of Dr. King is contradictory. In March 1965,
Katzenbach required the FBI for the first time to seek the Justice
Department's approval for all microphone installations. The FBI has
given the Committee documents which indicate that Katzenbach was
a Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Walter Jenkins, 7/17/64.
a Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 8/21/64.
a The FBI's surveillance of Dr. King and other civil rights leaders at the
Atlantic City Democratic National Convention is discussed at length in a separate
staff report dealing with electronic surveillance.
*Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/28/64.
Memoranda from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan, 1/8/65, 1/29/65, and
5/13/65; memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 10/14/65; memo-
randa from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sulliyan, 10/29/65 and 11/29/65.
"" Possible reasons that the mention of the collection of private life material
was dropped from FBI memoranda during this period include (1) the "truce"
between Dr. King and the FBI after December 1964 (see, pp. 163 et seq.) and
(2) the fact that after May 1965 the FBI was required to inform the Attorney
General of microphone surveillance and did not want to leave a "paper record"
referring to. the FBI's program to discredit Dr. King.
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informed shortly after the fact of three microphone installations on
Dr. King, that he did not object to those installations, and that he
urged the FBI to use caution in its surveillance activities. Katzenbach
does not now recall having been informed about the FBI's micro-
phone surveillance of Dr. King.
(a) Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.-The FBI makes no
claim that Attorney General Kennedy was expressly informed about
the microphones placed in Dr. King's hotel rooms. The only FBI claim
that Attorney General Kennedy might have been aware of the micro-
phones is a Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum written in
December 1966, which states:
concerning microphone coverage of King, Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy was furnished the pertinent information
obtained, perusal of which would indicate that a microphone
was the source of this information.1 8 6
Next to this entry, Hoover wrote: "when?" A memorandum from the
Domestic Intelligence Division a few days later explained:
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy was furnished an eight
page "Top Secret" memorandum . .. dated March 4, 1964.
This memorandum is a summary of microphone coverage . . .
in the Willard Hotel, Washington, D.C.; Hilton Hawaiian
Village, Honolulu, Hawaii; Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles,
California; and the Hyatt House Hotel, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia. The wording of the memorandum is couched in such
a manner that it is obvious that a microphone was the
source. 87
The question of whether Attorney General Kennedy suspected
that the FBI was using microphones to gather information about
Dr. King must also be viewed in light of the Attorney -General's express
authorization of wiretaps in the King case on national security
grounds, and of the FBI's practice-known to officials in the Justice
Department-of installing microphones in national security cases
without notifying the Department. We have examined the Bureau's
claim with respect to Attorney General Kennedy's possible knowledge
about the microphones and have found the following evidence.
As noted above, on January 13, 1964, William Sullivan recom-
mended to Hoover that President Johnson's assistant, Walter Jenkins,
be given a copy of a memorandum detailing information discovered
through the Willard Hotel bug.a8s Sullivan expressed doubts, how-
ever, about whether the Attorney General should be given the in-
formation:
The attached document is classified "Top Secret" to mini-
mize the likelihood that this material will be read by someone
who will leak it to King. However, it is possible despite its
classification, the Attorney General himself may reprimand
King on the basis of this material. If he does, it is not likely
' Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/15/66, p. 2.
1 Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/19/66.
m Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/13/64. This incident
is discussed, at p. 121.
we will develop any more such information through the
means employed. It is highly important that we do develop
further information of this type in order that we may com-
pletely discredit King as the leader of the Negro people.
Next to Sullivan's recommendation that Courtney Evans hand-deliver
a copy of the memorandum to the Attorney General, Director Hoover
wrote: "No. A copy need not be given the A.G." 189
Jenkins was subsequently shown a copy of the report, but was not
told the source of the information.
Shortly after the Honolulu bug, Sullivan changed his mind and
recommended that the Attorney General be informed of information
gathered by both the Willard and Honolulu bugs to "remove all doubt
from the Attorney General's mind about the type of person King
is." 190 Sullivan suggested:
Mr. Evans personally deliver to the Attorney General a
copy of the attached "Top Secret" memorandum. It is also
believed that Mr. Evans should indicate to the Attorney Gen-
eral that if King was to become aware of our coverage of him
it is highly probable that we will no longer be able to develop
such information through the means employed to date and
that we, of course, are still desirous of continuing to develop
such information.
Director .loover wrote next to this recommendation "O.K." A notation
in the margin states: "Done. 3/10/64. E [vans]." 191 The memorandum
sent to the Attorney General did not state the source of the informa-
tion that it contained.
When shown Sullivan's memorandum by the Committee, Courtney
Evans testified that he did not recall delivering the memorandum about
Dr. King to the Attorney General, but that "I assume I must have in
view of this record." 192 He doubted that he had spoken with the At-
torney General about the substance of the memorandum, however, be-
cause "if I did have a conversation with him, I believe I would have
written a memorandum as to that conversation." 193 When asked if he
recalled ever telling the Attorney General that the memorandum con-
tained information obtained through microphone coverage, Evans
testified:
No, I do not. And considering the tenor of the times then,
I would probably have been very circumspect and told him
'Sullivan memorandum, 1/13/64. Sullivan's remarks in this passage under-
score the tension generated by the mutually inconsistent policies of the FBT
and the Justice Department toward Dr. King. Sullivan viewed the FBI's task
as gathering information with which to discredit Dr. King. He perceived the At-
torney General's goal was to prevent Dr. King from being discredited. Sullivan
feared that if the Attorney General were told of the derogatory information about
Dr. King, the Attorney General might reprimand Dr. King. Thus, the FBI would
be thwarted in its goals if it gave the Attorney General information which he
needed to ensure that Dr. King not be discredited.
' Baumgardner memorandum, 3/4/64. See p. 122. The memorandum also
stated: "We avoided mentioning specific dates as to when it took place or men-
tion of when the information was received-thus to avoid, if possible, a ques-
tion being raised by the Attorney General as to why he was not told earlier of
the Willard incident."
" Baumgardner memorandum, 3/4/64, p. 2.
"'Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, p. 20.
'" Evans, 12/1/75, p. 20. The FBI has told the Committee that no such memoran-
dum exists in its files.
exactly what I was instructed to tell him and nothing
more. ... I think it is a matter of record that the relation-
ship between the Attorney General and the Director had
deteriorated to the point that they weren't speaking to each
other. And consequently I felt that it was essential that I
followed these instructions very explicitly. 94
A memorandum from Evans dated September 11, 1964, indicates
that the Attorney General had in fact received the summary mem-
orandum, but sheds no light on whether he was told the source of the
information:
Before leaving office, Attorney General Kennedy instructed
his Executive Assistant, Harold Reis, to return to the Bu-
reau copies of top secret memoranda submitted to him by
the FBI . . on March 4, 1964, and June 1, 1964, as Mr.
Kennedy did not feel this material should go to the general
Department files. These memoranda deal with activities of
Martin Luther King. Reis accordingly handed these mem-
oranda to me. They are attached.195
It is uncertain whether the Attorney General understood the source
of the information after reading the FBI summary memoranda.
Evans told the Committee that he never received any indication that
the Attorney General suspected the FBI was following Dr. King's
activities with hidden microphones, and surmised that the Attorney
General might have assumed the information was the product of live
informants, or surveillance by local law enforcement agencies. 96
Walter Jenkins, who also read these memoranda, told the Committee
that he had not suspected that the FBI had obtained the informa-
tion in them by using microphones.'1' Bill Moyers, President John-
son's Assistant, also saw several of the memoranda concerning Dr.
King, and testified that he had not realized that the FBI had col-
lected the information through microphones. He told the Committee,
however, that "the nature of the general references that were being
made, I realized later, could only have come from that kind of
knowledge unless there was an informer in Martin Luther King's
presence a good bit of the time. 99
(b) Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbac.-Four FBI doc-
uments appear to indicate that Attorney General Katzenbach was
informed about the FBI's microphone surveillance of Dr. King. Kat-
zenbach testified that he could not recall having been informed of the
surveillance, and stated that it would have been inconsistent with his
claimed disapproval of a wiretap on Dr. King's home at the same time.
The Bureau's position appears in a Domestic Intelligence memoran-
duin listing the wiretaps and microphones installed in the investigation
of Dr. King:
Attorney General Katzenbach was specifically notified of
three of these microphone installations. In each of these three
'" Evans, 1/21/75, pp. 21-22.
Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 9/11/64.
'" Evans 12/1/75,. pp. 21-22.
m Staff summary of Walter Jenkins interview, 1975, p. 3.
'Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 89.
instances the Attorney. General was advised that a trespass
was involved in the installation.199
The Bureau maintains that Attorney General Katzenbach was advised
of microphone placements in Dr. King's hotel rooms on the following
occasions:
On May 13, 1965, the New York field office installed a microphone
m Dr. King's suite at the Sheraton Atlantic Hotel in New York,
pursuant to authorizatioi from an Inspector in the -Domestic Intelli-
gence Division, apparently without Director Hoover's prior knowl-
edge. According to a contemporaneous memorandum, the New York
office had only a few hours notice of Dr. King's arrival and needed
to install the microphone "immediately." 200 A memorandum dated
May 17, addressed to the Attorney General and signed by Director
Hoover, stated:
On May 12, 1965, information was obtained indicating a meet-
ing of King and his advisors was to take place in New York
on that date. Because of the importance of that meeting and
the urgency of the situation, a microphone surveillance was
effected on May 13 . . .201
On October 14, 1965, a microphone was installed in Dr. King's
room in the Astor Hotel in New York. This installation was approved
by William Sullivan, head of the Domestic Intelligence Division, again
without Director Hoover's prior knowledge, "on New York's assur-
ance that full security was available, and since time was of the essence"
(Sullivan claimed that the FBI had learned of Dr. King's plan to visit
New York only a few hours before.) 202 On his memorandum inform-
ing Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont of the microphone place-
ment, Sullivan wrote: "Memo to AG being prepared." A memorandum
to the Attorney General, dated October 19 and signed by Director
Hoover, stated that the Astor Hotel surveillance had been placed
because of the "importance" of Dr. King's meeting with his advisers
in New York "and the urgency of the situation." 203
On November 9, 1965, a microphone was installed in Dr. King's
room in the Americana Hotel in New York. A Domestic Intelligence
Division memorandum of that date states:
On New York's assurance that full security was available
and since time was of the essence [as the FBI had learned of
- Dr. King's planned visit to New York on that day], New
York was told to go ahead with the installation.... Inasmuch
as the installation will be made today (11/29/65) and deac-
tivated immediately upon King's departure,, probably
11/30/65, we will promptly submit a memorandum to the
Attorney General advising when the installation was made
and when it was taken off.204
m Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/15/75, p. 2.
* Memorandum from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan, 5/13/65.
2n Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 5/17/65.
' Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 10/14/65.
* Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 10/19/65.n Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/29/65.
A memorandum to the Attorney General, dated December 1, 1965,
and bearing Director Hoover's signature, stated that "a microphone
surveillance was effected November 29, 1965 on King.. . and was dis-
continued on November 30, 1965." The reason for the installation was
the "importance of the meeting and the urgency of the situation
1 205
The FBI has given the Committee copies of the three memoranda
to Attorney General Katzenbach informing him that microphones
had been placed on Dr. King's rooms. Each is initialed "N deB K"
in the upper right hand corner. When shown these memoranda, Katzen-
bach testified: "Each of these bears my initials in what appears to be
my handwriting in the place where I customarily initialed Bureau
memoranda." 206 He denied, however, any recollection of having
received the memoranda.2 0 7
The Bureau also supplied the Committee with a transmittal slip
dated December 10, 1965.
Mr. Hoover-
Obviously these are particularly delicate surveillances and
we should be very cautious in terms of the non-FBI people
who may from time to time necessarily be involved in some
aspect of installation.
N deB K20*
Katzenbach identified the handwritten note as his, and testified
that although he recalled writing the note, he could not recall why
he had written it. When asked if he recalled the "delicate surveil-
lances" mentioned in the note, Katzenbach told the Committee:
I don't recall, and I have nothing in my possession that
has served to refresh my recollection, and nothing has been
shown to me by the Committee staff that serves to refresh
my recollection.
Q. In your opinion, could this note have referred to the
three mentioned electronic surveillances against Dr. King?
Mr. KATZENBACHI. On its face it says that it did . . . it
would seem to me that would be a possibility. I point out
that it could refer to almost anything. My opinion is obvi-
ously, since I don't recall getting the first three, that this was
not associated with it, and I really don't have enough recol-
lection of what was associated with it to say. I did see Mr.
* Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 12/1/65.
Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 211.
2 When asked if he thought his initials in the corner of the three documents
were forgeries, Katzenbach testified: "Let me be just as clear about that as
I can. I have no recollection of receiving these documents, and I seriously
believe that I would have recollected them had I received them. If they are my
initials and if I put them on, then I am clearly mistaken in that recollection."
(Katzenbach. 12/3/75. Hearings, p. 227.)
" Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/10/65.
The Bureau asserts that the transmittal slip, which bears an FBI secretary's
notation "Martin Luther King," was located in the FBI's Martin Luther King
file. The serial number for filing on the transmittal slip is immediately sub-
sequent to the serial number of the December 1 notification. The Bureau has
informed the committee, however, that there is no evidence that the two
memoranda were ever attached to one another, or that anything was attached
to the transmittal slip when it came to the Bureau.
Helms on that date. Whether it related to something he asked
for, I don't know. 20 9
Katzenbach added that he was:
puzzled by the fact that the handwritten note, if related to
the December 1 memorandum from the Director, is written
on a separate piece of paper. It was then, and is now, my con-
sistent practice to write notes of that kind on the incoming
piece of paper, provided there is room to do so.210
The documentary evidence-the, three notices that a microphone
had been placed on a room occupied by Dr. King shortly before, and
the note in Katzenbach's handwriting referring to "delicate surveil-
lances" which the FBI states was sent to the Bureau with the last of
the notices-indicates that Attorney General Katzenbach knew of the
microphone surveillance but did not order it halted. Katzenbach, in
denying any knowledge of the microphones, pointed to two factors
mitigating against the likelihood of his having permitted the surveil-
lance to continue once learning of it: his rejection of a wiretap on
Dr. King's new home in April 1965, the fact that his handwritten note
urged caution in future surveillances, and that no microphone sur-
veillances were carried out after the date of the note.2 1 '
Katzenbach's position throughout his testimony before the Commit-
tee is best summarized by a portion of a written, sworn statement that
he submitted at the time of his public appearance:
These memoranda do not indicate on their face the Bureau
sought any prior authorization, or state any reasons why it
was not sought. They appear to present me with information
after the fact and request no authority to perform similar
surveillances in the future. I believe the bureau knew full well
that I would not authorize the surveillances in question, not
only because of the circumstances surrounding Dr. King, but
particularly because the bugs were to be placed in a hotel
room. That is among the worst possible invasions of privacy
and would demand the strongest conceivable justification. In-
deed, I believe this position had been made clear in written
memoranda to the Bureau dating back to the 1950s, and I
have a clear recollection of being critical of the Bureau for
installing a bug in the bedroom of a leading member of the
Mafia. I reaffirmed this position to the Bureau sometime in
1965 or 1966, but that reaffirmation may have postdated these
memoranda.
Finally, I cannot recall any memoranda at any time inform-
ing me that the Bureau had installed a tap or a bug without
* Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 229. Katzenbach also told the Committee:
"My calendar does show that on that date I had a meeting alone with the Deputy
Director of the CIA, Mr. Helms, which he had requested the previous afternoon.
The meeting was a brief one and would be consistent with a request by the CIAfor domestic surveillances by the FBI. I rarely saw Mr. Helms alone, and hedid on one or two occasions make such a request. But I have no recollection ofthe subject matter of that particular meeting and cannot. therefore say that thishandwritten note is related to it." (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 211.)
"'Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, p. 211.
" Katzenbach, 11/12/75, pp. 75-76.
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my prior authorization. While I authorized Mr. Hoover to do
so in emergency circumstances in a memorandum written in
the summer of 1965, not only does the May memorandum pre-
date that authorization, but there is nothing in the memo-
randa which suggests that on any of these occasions was there
an "emergency." Further, my calendars, which are in the
possession of the Committee, indicate my general avail-
ability 212 to the Bureau on two occasions involving these
memoranda, and my total availability to the Bureau on the
third. Nor do I have any recollection that the "emergency"
procedure was ever invoked by the Bureau during my term
in office.
Obviously I do not believe that I received these memo-
randa. Equally obvious is the fact that if I initialed them, I
am mistaken in my belief. 213
Although apparently no microphones were placed in Dr. King's
hotel rooms after the November 29, 1965 "bug" at the Americana Hotel,
the Domestic Intelligence Division did make one further attempt to
install a microphone. A memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha
DeLoach, then Assistant to the Director, dated January 21, 1966, states
that Sullivan had authorized the New York office to "bug" King's room
during an anticipated three-day stay. Clyde Tolson wrote across this
memorandum, "Remove this surveillance at once. 1/21," and Hoover
added his "yes." Tolson added a note on the bottom of the memoran-
dum, complaining, "No one here approved this. I have told Sullivan
again not to institute a mike surveillance without the Director's ap-
proval." Hoover wrote next to this comment, "Right." 214
212 Katzenbach wrote in a footnote, asterisked after this reference to his "gen-
eral availability": "For communications purposes, it was my consistent practice
to be met by Bureau agents whenever I traveled. In addition, I kept the White
House operator informed of how to reach me at all times. In the first occasion,
I left my office for a flight to Chicago at 2:30 p.m. and was, as a practical matter,
unavailable to the Bureau only during the two-hour flight. On the second occa-
sion, I left my office at 12:35 p.m. for a one-hour flight to New York, and was
similarly unavailable only during the flight. On the third occasion, I was in my
Washington office all day, and thus always available to the Bureau."
"Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, pp. 211-212.
0" Memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 1/21/66. The
significance of this memorandum is unclear. Hoover's and Tolson's strong reactions
to Sullivan's approval of a microphone on King's room-an action which Sullivan
had taken several times before-may have been In response to the "delicate
surveillances" warning of the Attorney General, or an added caution in light of
the Long Committee investigation into electronic surveillance. (The Long Com-
mittee investigation is discussed in the Committee Staff Report about electronic
surveillance.) It is perhaps significant that on the same day that Tolson ordered
Sullivan to remove the "bug" from Dr. King's hotel room, C. D. DeLoach met
with Senator Long and, according to a memorandum by DeLoach, secured Senator
Long's promise not to call any FBI witnesses to testify before his Subcommittee.
DeLoach's account of that meeting states:
"While we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Sub-
committee, we have not yet eliminated certain dangers which might be created
as a result of newspaper pressure on Long. We therefore must keep on top of
this situation at all times." (Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach t') C. Tolson,
1A21/66. Ordering Sullivan to remove the microphone in Dr. King , _otel room,
which would have proven extremely embarrassing if it had been discovered,
might have been one of Tolson's responses to DeLoach's warning.)
V. THE FBT'S EFFORT TO DISCREDIT DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING: 1964
Introduction and Summary
In December 1963, a meeting was convened at FBI headquarters to
discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as
an effective Negro leader." Two weeks later, FBI agents planted the
first microphones in Dr. King's hotel rooms in an "attempt" to obtain
information about the private "activities of Dr. King and his asso-
ciates" so that Dr. King could be "completely discredited." That same
week, the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended
the promotion of a new "national Negro leader" who could "over-
shadow King and be in the position to assume the role of the leader-
ship of the Negro people when King has been completely discredited."
The FBI's effort to discredit Dr. King and to undermine the SCLC
involved plans touching on virtually every aspect of Dr. King's life.
The FBI scrutinized Dr. King's tax returns, monitored his financial
affairs, and even tried to establish that he had a secret foreign bank
account. Religious leaders and institutions were contacted in an effort
to undermine their support of him, and unfavorable material was
"leaked" to the press. Bureau officials contacted members of Congress,
and special "off the record" testimony was prepared for the Director's
use before the House Appropriations Committee. Efforts were made
to turn White House and Justice Department Officials against Dr.
King by barraging them with unfavorable reports and, according to
one witness, even offering to play for a White House official tape
recordings that the Bureau considered embarrassing to King.
This chapter examines not only the Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr.
King, but the degree to which officials in other branches of the Govern-
ment were responsible for those actions. A few months before the FBI
held its December 1963 conference at which its program against Dr.
King was apparently formulated, the Director distributed a "mono-
graph" about Dr. King to the heads of several Governmental agencies.
Attorney General Kennedy ordered it immediately withdrawn. During
the course of the following year, the FBI sent several intelligence re-
ports bearing on Dr. King's private life to the White House and Jus-
tice Department. Although government officials outside the FBI were
not aware of the extent of the FBI's efforts to discredit Dr. King,
officials of the Justice Department and of the White House did know
that the FBI had offered tape recordings and derogatory information
about Dr. King to reporters. The Attorney General went no further
than complaining to the President and accepting a Bureau official's
representation that the allegations were not true. President Johnson
not only failed to order the Bureau to stop, but indeed cautioned it
against dealing with certain reporters who had complained of its
conduct.
A. The FBI Di8seminate8 the Fir8t King "Monograph" and Attorney
General Kennedy Order8 It Reoalled* October 1963
On October 15, 1963, William Sullivan forwarded to Assistant Di-
rector Alan Belmont for his approval a monograph entitled "Commu-
nism and the Negro Movement-A Current Analysis." He proposed
that it be distributed to the Attorney General, the White House, CIA,
State Department, Defense Department, and Defense Department in-
telligence agencies.215 Sullivan testified that the purpose of the mono-
graph was to "discredit King." 216
Belmont submitted the monograph to the Director with a note
stating:
The attached analysis of Communism and the Negro move-
ment is highly explosive. It can be regarded as a personal
attack on Martin Luther King. There is no doubt it will have
a heavy impact on the Attorney General and anyone else to
whom we disseminate....
The memorandum makes good reading and is based on in-
formation from reliable sources. We may well be charged,
however, with expressing opinions and conclusions, particu-
larly with reference to some of the statements about King.
This memorandum may startle the Attorney General, par-
ticularly in view of his past association with King, and the
fact that we are disseminating this outside the Department.
He may resent this. Nevertheless, the memorandum is a power-
ful warning against Communist influence in the Negro move-
ment, and we will be carrying out our responsibility by dis-
seminating it to the people indicated in the attached memo-
randum.2"
The monograph was distributed on October 18, 1963. One week later,
the Attorney General called Courtney Evans and stated that he had
just learned that the Army had received a copy of a report about Dr.
King's alleged communist activities. Evans reported to Belmont:
He was obviously irritated. He went on to ask if the Army
got copies of all reports submitted to him. . . . The Attorney
General asked what responsibilities the Army had in relation
to the communist background of Martin Luther King. I told
the Attorney General . . . that the Army had an interest in
communist activities particularly in relation to racial matters -
because the military had to be called on if civil disturbances
arising out of such matters went beyond the ability of civilian
authorities. This explanation seemed to serve no purpose.
2 18
Director Hoover recorded in a memorandum of the same date:
The Attorney General called and advised me there was a lot
of talk at the Pentagon regarding the document.... The At-
torney General anticipated that this information would leak
out as the military didn't like the Negroes.
The Attorney General felt we should get back all copies of
the document. I told him .. . we would get them from all agen-
" Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont,. 10/15/63.
William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 49.
m Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 10/17/63. Hoover wrote in
the margin "We must do our duty" and "I am glad you recognize at last that
there exists such influence." Copies were sent to the Attorney General, the White
House, the Secretary of State, the Director of Certtral Intelligence, the Secretary
of Defense, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, and the Department of Special Investigations of 'the Air Force.
m Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 10/25/63.
cies to which they were disseminated.... I also told-him if any
newspapers asked about this, no comment would be made and
no mention would be made that such a document existed.2 19
All copies were recovered by October 28.
Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Rights Division under Robert Kennedy, told the Committee that the
monograph was:
a personal diatribe . . .- a personal attack without eviden-
* tiary support on the character, the moral character and
person of Dr. Martin Luther King, and it was only peripher-
ally related to anything substantive, like whether or not there
was communist infiltration or influence on the civil rights
movement. ... It was a personal attack on the man and went
far afield from the charges [of possible communist
influence]. 220
Marshall recalled that he had been very "irritated" about the mono-
graph and that the Attorney General had "thought it was outrageous."
He remembered that the Attorney General had ordered the mono-
graph withdrawn, but did not know if the Attorney General had taken
any further steps to reprimand the Bureau. 2 21
B. The FBI Plans Its Campaign To Discredit Dr. King: December 23,
1963
On December 23, 1963, a nine-hour conference was held at FBI
headquarters to discuss Martin Luther King. In attendance were As-
sistant Director Sullivan, Internal Security Section Chief Frederick
Baumgardner, three other FBI headquarters officials, and two agents
from the FBI's Atlanta Field Office.
.A prepared list -of twenty-one proposals was presented and dis-
cussed. The proposals raised the possibility of "using" ministers, "dis-
gruntled" acquaintances, "aggressive" newsmen, "colored" agents, Dr.
King's housekeeper, and even suggested using- Dr. King's wife or
"placing a good looking female plant in King's office." 22 2 An
account of the meeting written by William Sullivan emphasized that
the Bureau must take a "discreet approach" in developing informa-
tion about Dr. King for use "at an opportune time in a counterintelli-
"Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Clyde Tolson, Alan Belmont, John
Mohr, Cartha DeLoach, Alex Rosen, and William Sullivan, 10/25/63.
" Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 32. Carl T. Rowan, then Director of
USIA, was sent a copy of the monograph. In a newspaper article in 1969, Rowan
wrote, "(p)erhaps this is the time for me to reveal that I have read the FBI
reports based on electronic surveillance of the late Nobel Prize-winner. I know
how much dirt the FBI has dug up, and 90 percent of it is barn-yard gossip that
has nothing to do with 'internal security' or 'Marxist influences.'" (Carl T.
Rowan, "FBI Won't Talk About Additional Wiretappings," The Washington
D.C. Evening Star, 6/20/69, p. A-13)
Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 34.
FBI work paper, "Questions To Be Explored at Oonference 12/23/63 re:
Communist Influence in Racial Matters."
The Bureau subsequently considered the possibility of getting Detroit police-
men to raid Dr. King's hotel room in March 1964 and kept abreast of the Miami
police force's plans to raid Dr. King's hotel room in 1966 (Unsigned Bureau
memorandum, "For Telephonic Briefing of Detroit Office;" Airtel, Miami Office to
Director, FBI, 5/23/66).
gence move to discredit him." It was generally agreed that the Bureau
should make use of "all available investigative techniques coupled with
meticulous, planning, boldness, and ingenuity, tempered only with
good judgment," but that "discretion must not reach the point of
timidity." 223
Sullivan's memorandum reported that the following decisions were
made at the conference:
(1) We must determine and check out all of the employees
of the SCLC.
(2) We must locate and monitor the funds of the SCLC.
(3) We must identify and check out the sources who con-
tribute to the SCLC.
(4) We must continue to keep close watch on King's per-
sonal activities.
(5) We will, at the proper time when it can be done with-
out embarrassment to the Bureau, expose King as an op-
portunist who is not a sincere person but is exploiting the
racial situation for personal gain.
(6) We will explore the possibility of utilizing additional
specialized investigative techniques at the SCLC office.
Sullivan described the purpose of the meeting as
To explore how best to carry on our investigation to pro-
duce the desired results without embarrassment to the Bu-
reau. Included in our discussion was a complete analysis of
the avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an ef-
fective Negro leader and developing evidence concerning
King's continued dependence on communists for guidance
and direction.2 2 4
Precisely what prompted the Bureau to decide upon this drastic
new approach is still unclear.
William Sullivan was asked by the Committee whether tactics, such
as placing female "plants," were common practices of the FBI. Sulli-
van testified that they were:
common practice among intelligence services all over the
world. This is not an isolated phenomenon. . . . This is a
common practice, rough, tough, dirty business. Whether we
should be in it or not, that is for you folks to decide. We are
in it.. . . No holds were barred. We have used that technique
against Soviet agents. They have used it against us.
Question. The same methods were brought home?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Brought home against any organization
against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate.
This is a rough, tough business.
Senator MONDALE. Would it be safe to say that the tech-
niques we learned in fighting . . . true espionage in World
Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63. Six months
later, in April 1964, FBI headquarters was-still instructing agents in the field to
"continue to gather information concerning King's personal activities ... in
order that we may consider using this information at an opportune time in a
counterintelligence move to discredit him" and to consider the possibility of
"utilizing contracts in the news media field." (Memorandum from FBI Director
to Atlanta Office, April 1, 1964)
1 Sullivan memorandum, 12/24/63.
War II came to be used against some of our own American
citizens?
Mr. SULLIVAN. That would be a correct deduction.225
Sullivan testified that the plans formulated at the December 24,
1963 meeting were in accord with "Mr. Hoover's policy." 22 After
reviewing the memoranda, Sullivan emphasized,
I want to make this clear, this is not an isolated phenomenon,
that this was a practice of the Bureau down through the
years. I might say it often became a real character assassifia-
tion.227
Sullivan was asked by the Committee whether he or any other em-
ployees of the Bureau ever objected to using these tactics. Sullivan
responded:
Not to my recollection . .. I was not ready at that time to
collide with him.. Everybody in the Division went right along
with Hoover's policy. I do hot recall anybody ever raising
a question.
never once did I hear anybody, including myself,
raise the question, is this course of action which we have
agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral? We
never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning, because
we were just naturally prAgmatists. The one thing we were
concerned about will this course of action work, will it get
us what we want, will we reach the objective that we desire
to reach ?
As far as legality is concerned, morals or ethics, was never
raised by myself or anybody else.... I think this suggests
really in government we are amoral.221
On Decenber 29, 1963, less than a week after the FBI conference,
Time magazine chose Dr. King as the "Man of the Year," describing
him as the "unchallenged voice of the Negro people . . . [who] has
infused the Negroes themselves with the fiber that gives their revolu-
tion its true stature." 229 Hoover wrote across the memorandum in-
forming him of this honor: "They had to dig deep in the garbage
to come up with this one. 230
C. William Sullivan proposes a plan to promote a new negro leader:
January 1964
On January 6, 1964-about two weeks after the FBI's conference
to plan methods of "neutralizing" Dr. King's influence and to gather
information about D. King's personal life-the FBI installed the
microphone in Dr. King's room at the Willard Hotel. As explained
in the preceding chapter, additional microphones soon followed;
_ Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 97.
2 Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 85.
' Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 87.
"'Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 92-93.
2 United Press International release, 12/29/63, regarding 1/3/64 Time cover
story.
'* UPI release, 12/29/63.
physical and photographic surveillance was initiated; special
Headquarters "briefings" were held; "dry runs" were planned;
and the most sophisticated and experienced Bureau personnel were
deployed to gather information that might be used in a concerted
effort to destroy Dr. King's influence.
Two days after the installation of the Willard Hotel microphones,
Assistant Director William Sullivan proposed that the FBI select
a new "national Negro leader" as Dr. King's successor. In proposing the
plan, Sullivan stated:
It should be clear to all of us that Martin Luther King
must, at some propitious point in the future, be revealed to
the people of this country and to his Negro followers as
being what he actually is-a fraud, demagogue and scoundrel.
When the true facts concerning his activities are presented,
such should be enough, if handled properly, to take him off
his pedestal and to reduce him completely in influence. When
this is done, and it can be and will be done, obviously much
confusion will reign, particularly among the Negro people.
... The Negroes will be left without a national leader of
sufficiently compelling personality to steer them in the proper
direction. This is what could happen, but need not happen
if the right kind of a national Negro leader could at this
time be gradually developed so as to overshadow Dr. King
and be in the position to assume the role of the leadership
of the Negro people when King has been completely dis-
credited.
For some months I have been thinking about this matter.
One day I had an opportunity to explore this from a philo-
sophical and sociological standpoint with [an acquaintance]
whom I have known for some years. . . . I asked [him] to
give the matter some attention and if he knew any Negro of
outstanding intelligence and ability to let me know and we
would have a discussion. [He] has submitted to me the name
of the above-captioned person. Enclosed with this memoran-
duin is an outline of [the person's] biography which is truly
remarkable for a man so young. On scanning this biography,
it will'be seen that [he] does have all the qualifications of the
kind of a Negro I have in mind to advance to positions of na-
tional leadership....
If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in
any way becoming directly involved, I think it would be not -
only a great help to the FBI but would be a fine thing for
the country at large. While I am not specifying at this
moment, there are various ways in which the FBI could give
this entire matter the proper direction and development.
There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be
very helpful to further such a step. These can be discussed in
detail later when I have probed more fully into the
possibilities 231
When Sullivan was shown this memorandum by the Committee, he
testified:
Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/8/64.
I'm very proud of this memorandum, one of the best mem-
oranda I ever wrote. I think here I was showing some con-
cern for the country. 232
Sullivan sought the Director's approval "to explore this whole mat-
ter in greater detail." The Director noted his own "o.k." and added:
I am glad to see that "light" has finally, though dismally
delayed, come to the Domestic Int. Div. I struggled for
months to get over the fact that the communists were taking
over the racial movement but our experts here couldn't or
wouldn't see it.233
It is uncertain whether the FBI took steps to implement Sullivan's
plan. The FBI files contain no additional memoranda on the subject.
The successor for Dr. King proposed in Sullivan's memorandum has
told the Committee that he was never contacted by the FBI, and that
he was not aware of the FBI's plans for him or of any attempts by the
FBI to promote him as a civil rights leader.2 3
D. FBI Headquarters Orders the Field Of)ices To Intensify Efforts
to Discredit Dr. King: April-August 1964
On April 1, 1964, in response to a suggestion from the Atlanta field
office for another conference in Washington to plan strategy against
Dr. King, FBI Headquarters ordered the Atlanta and New York
offices to:
give the matter of instant investigation a thorough analysis
with a view toward suggesting new avenues of investigation
and intensification in areas already being explored. Bear in
mind the main goals of this matter; namely, determining the
extent of the communist influence in racial matters and taking
such action as is appropriate to neutralize or completely dis-
credit the effectivness of Martin Luther King, Jr., as a Negro
leader.... 235 [Emphasis added.]
Headquarters listed several areas "having potential for further
inquiry":
possibilities of anonymous source contacts, possibilities of uti-
lizing contacts in the news media field; initiating discreet
checks relative to developing background information on
employees of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC); remaining alert to the possibility of capitalizing
on any disgruntled SCLC employee; the possibility of de-
veloping information concerning any financial dealings of
King which may be illegal; and the development of sub-
versive information pertaining to SCLC employees.2 3 6
The Atlanta Office responded with several ideas for "how the ef-
fectiveness of King can be neutralized or discredited. 23 7
"Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 149.
S ullivan memorandum, 1/8/64.
"Staff interview, 11/17/75. This note by Director Hoover should be read in light
of his "feud" with the Domestic Intelligence Division described pp. 104 et seq.
Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC Atlanta, 4/1/64.
Director, FBI memorandum, 4/1/64.
2" Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta to Headquarters, 4/14/64, p. 11.
-Determining whether a "rift" was developing between Dr. King
and Roy Wilkins, head of the NAACP, and if so, using newspapers
friendly to the Bureau to "feed pertinent subversive connections and
dealings of King to Wilkins."
-"Furnishing to friendly newspapers on an anonymous basis, cer-
tain specific leads where he may develop the necessary data so that
he may further write critical news stories."
-"Discreetly investigate the background of twelve key (SCLC)
employees and associates in an effort to obtain some weakness that
could be used for counter-intelligence activities."
-"Injection of false information with certain discontented (SCLC)
employees."
-Sending letters to SCLC's financial donors, written on SCLC sta-
tionery fabricated in the FBI laboratory and bearing Dr. King's signa-
ture, advising the donors that the IRS was checking SCLC's tax
records. "It is believed that such a letter of this type from SCLC
may cause considerable concern and eliminate future contributions."
-Placing a pretext call to an SCLC creditor to impress him with
the "financial plight" of the SCLC so that he "may be incited into
collection efforts."
-Examining Dr. King's checking accounts and credit card accounts
to develop information about his financial affairs.
-Making a survey to determine whether to install a "trash cover"
of the SCLC office in Atlanta.2 3 8
The Atlanta office also assured the Bureau that it would continue
to explore the possibility of technical coverage of an Atlanta apart-
ment frequently used by Dr. King, although coverage would involve
several security problems. 2 3 9
Shortly after these proposals were submitted, the Director ex-
pressed "the Bureau's gratitude" to the Atlanta agents for their "ag-
gressive imagination looking toward more and better ways of meeting
the problems involved" in the investigation.240
The New York office submitted only a few new suggestions, assert-
ings that "It is felt that [our] coverage is adequate." 241 To this the
Dirqotor ryplied:
The Bureau cannot adjudge as adequate any coverage which
does not positively provide to the Bureau 100 percent of the
intelligence relating to the communist influence in racial mat-
" SAO, Atlanta memorandum, 4/14/64.
2 The FBI overcame similar security problems in another city where hotel
room coverage of Dr. King was desired by supplying "lead" information to
newsmen "in order that they might determine if they could develop sufficient
facts to cause an expose of King."
2" Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 4/24/64. The Domestic
Intelligence Division ultimately approved taking preliminary steps for possible
anonymous mailings to the newsman and to install coverage on any new apart-
ments that King might lease. The other suggestions were rejected because they
did "not appear desirable and/or feasible for direct action by the Bureau at this
time." (Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 5/6/64.)
" Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 4/14/64, p. 2. Those
suggestions essentially included increasing coverage of the New York SCLC office
and sending an anonymous letter to a disaffected SCLO employee "to cause dis-
ruption in the New York office." The anonymous letter was ultimately mailed.
(Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, New York, 4/20/64.)
ters. Obviously, we are not securing all the information that
is pertinent and needs to be secured. Our coverage, therefore,
is not deemed adequate.242
With respect to the New York office's conclusions about a civil rights
leader and associate of Dr. King, who was also under close Bureau
scrutiny for alleged "subversive" ties, the Director wrote:
The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the
New York office that [ ] is not sympathetic to the Party
cause. While there may not be any direct evidence that
[. ] is a communist, neither is there any substantial evi-
dence that he is anticommunist.143
Surprisingly, the Bureau did not even comment on, the statement
of the New York office that Adviser A was "not now under CP dis-
cipline in the civil rights field." 244
In June 1964 a special unit was established in the Bureau's Internal
Security Section to handle exclusively "the over-all problem of com-
munist penetration with the racial movement." 245 The memorandum
justifying the special unit pointed out that "urgency for the FBI to'stay ahead' of the situation is tied to pending civil rights legislation
and foreseeable ramifications arising out of the complex political situ-
ations in an election year where civil rights and social disturbances will
play a key role in campaign efforts and possible election results." 246
In August the Bureau issued new instructions directing the field "to
broaden its efforts relating to communist influences in the racial
field." 247 The term "communist," the field was told, "should be inter-
preted in its broadest sense as including persons not only adhering to
the principles of the CPUSA itself, but also to such splinter and off-
shoot groups as the Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor and
the like." 248 The Director pointed out:
The news media of recent months mirror the civil rights
issue as probably the number one domestic issue in the politi-
cal spectrum. There are clear and unmistakable signs that we
are in the midst of a social revolution with the racial move-
ment as its core. The Bureau, in meeting its responsibilities in
this area, is an integral part of this revolution. . . .249
The Special Unit that had been established in June was made a per-
manent unit.
M Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, New York, 4/24/64.
m Director, FBI memorandum, 4/24/64, p. 2.
4 SAC, New York memorandum, 4/14/64. A detailed, comprehensive, 163-page
internal Headquarters working paper, entitled "Communist Party, USA, Negro
Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters," dated April 27, 1964, includes
14 pages dealing solely with Adviser A, but does not include the information
received from New York just two weeks earlier that Adviser A "is not now
under CP discipline in the civil rights field."
" Unsigned FBI Memorandum, Addendum by Inspection Division, 6/4/64.
' Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 5/20/64,
addendum by Inspection Division, p. 1.
" Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/25/64.
' Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, Atlanta, 8/28/64, p. 6.
Director, FBI memorandum, 8/28/64, pp. 1-2.
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E. Steps Taken by the FBI in 1964 to Discredit Dr. King
The FBI's program to "neutralize" Martin Luther King as the leader
of the civil rights movement went far beyond the planning and collec-
tion stage. The Committee has discovered the following attempts by
the FBI to discredit Dr. King in 1964.
1. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King 'with the White House
As set forth in the preceding chapter, a memorandum summarizing
the contents of the Willard Hotel tapes was shown to presidential
assistant Walter Jenkins in January 1964 "inasmuch as King is seek-
ing an appointment with President Johnson." 250 The summary of in-
formation obtained from surveillance at the Willard, Honolulu, and
Los Angeles hotels was sent to the White House and to the
Attorney General in March 1964 in order to "remove all doubt from
the Attorney General's mind as to the type of person King is." 251 A
third memorandum derived from microphone surveillance was sent to
the White House in July.2 52
2. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King With the Congress
In January 1964, Director Hoover gave off-the-record testimony
before the House Appropriations Committee. His precise comments
are not known. The briefing paper prepared for his appearance by the
Domestic Intelligence Division, however, indicates that Director
Hoover was prepared to represent to the Committee that Dr. King's
advisers were communists and that Dr. King engaged in improper
behavior .253
The Director's off-the-record briefing had an immediate impact.
The FBI was soon told that the members of the Committee were "very
concerned regarding the background" of Dr. King, and that some
members of the Committee felt that the President should be requested
to instruct the USIA to withdraw a film dealing favorably with the
August 1963 March on Washington. They were reported. to be "par-
ticularly disturbed and irked at the fact that Martin Luther King
appears to predominate the film." 254
In March 1964 Cartha DeLoach, Assistant to the Director, reported
that he had been approached by Representative Howard Smith (D-
Va.), Chairman of the House Rules Committee. According to De-
Loach's memorandum, Representative Smith said that he had heard
about the Director's remarks before the Appropriations Committee.
Congressman Smith was reported to have asked for information for
a speech about Dr. King on the floor of the House. DeLoach declined
to furnish the required information, but recommended to the Director
Sullivan memorandum, 1/13/64,.p. 2.
Baumgardner memorandum, 3/4/64.
25 2See Chapter IV.
* Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/22/64.
' Memorandum from N. P. Callahan to John Mohr, 1/31/64.
Carl Rowan told a Committee staff member that shortly before his appoint-
ment as Director of USIA was announced, he had been invited to the White
House for a Sunday evening dinner with the President and Mrs. Johnson to
view the film about the March. Rowan said that when the President asked him
if he was going to distribute the film. Rowan replied that if he could not, "you
have to find yourself a new Director." Rowan recalled that the President replied,
"That's good enough for me." Rowan recalled that after the film had been dis-
tributed, he had been called aside by Congressman Rooney, who repeated stories
abolt Dr. King that had been given to him by the Bureau. Rowan stated that
Rooney had specifically mentioned the bugging of Dr. King's suite at the Willard
Hotel. (Staff Interview of Carl T. Rowan, 8/29/75)
that Congressman Smith might be useful in the future because a
speech by him about Dr. King would be picked up.by "newspapers all
over the Nation." 255
In a television interview.several years later, Congressman Rooney
stated:
Now you talk about the FBI leaking something about Mai-
tin Luther King. I happen to know all about Martin Luther
King, but I. have never told anybody.
INTERVIEWER. How do you know everything about Martin
Luther King ?
Representative ROONEY. From the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
INTERVIEWER. They've told you-gave you information
based on tapes or other sources about Martin Luther King?
Representative ROONEY. They did.
INTETRVIEWER. Is that proper.?
Representative RooNy. Why not? 256
3. A ttempts to Discredit Dr. King with Universities
In early March 1964, the Bureau learned that Marquette University
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin contemplated awarding Dr. King an honor-
ary degree. A memorandum noted:
It is shocking indeed that the possibility exists that King
may receive an Honorary Degree from the same institution
which honored the Director with such a degree in 1950. . . .
By making pertinent information available to [a University
official] at this time, on a strictly confidential basis, we will
be giving the University sufficient time to enable it to take
postive action in a manner which might avoid embarrassment
to the Universityais
The university official was briefed by an FBI agent on Dr. King's
background and assured the Bureau that Dr. King would not be
considered for an honorary degree. The result of this FBI project is
unclear.
In April 1964, the FBI learned that Dr. King had been offered -an
honorary degree by Springfield College. DeLoach visited Senator
Leverett Saltonstall, who was a member of the board of.the College,
in an effort to convince him to influence the College to withdraw its
offer. According to DeLoach, Senator Siltonstall promised to speak
with an official of the College. The College official was reported to
have subsequently visited DeLoach, 68 but to have said that he would
be unable to "uninvite" Dr. King because the information concerning
* Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 3/16/64, p. 2. Hoover
wrote on Del6ach's memorandum: "Someoie on Senator [sic] Rooney's commit-
tee certainly betrayed the secrecy of the 'off-the-record' testimony I gave re: King.
I do not want anything on King given -to Smith nor anyone else at this time."
Interview with Congressman Rooney, NBC News' "First Tuesday," 6/1/71.Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/4/64.
The officer who handled this assignment was given a letter of commendation by
the Director and a monetary award.
DeLoach had originally intended not to contact the College official because
of his "close association with (Sargent) Shriver." Senator Saltonstall, however,
requested the College official to confer with DeLoach.
Dr. King had to be held in confidence, and the board of trustees was
governed by "liberals." 259
4. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Churches
On June 12, 1964, William Sullivan wrote a memorandum stating
that he had been contacted by the General Secretary of the National
Council of the Churches of Christ. Sullivan reported that, "I took
the liberty of advising [him] confidentally of the fact that Dr. Martin
Luther King not only left a great deal to be desired from the stand-
point of Communism, but also from the standpoint of personal con-
duct." Sullivan observed:
I think that we have sowed an idea here which may do some
good. I will follow up on the matter very discreetly to see
what desirable results may emanate therefrom.
26 0
Sullivan met again with the General Secretary in mid-December
1964 and reported that the General Secretary had assured him "steps
have been taken by the National Council of the Churches of Christ to
make certain from this time on that Martin Luther King will never
get 'one single dollar' of financial support from the National Council."
Sullivan reported that the Secretary stated that he had discussed
Dr. King's background with some "key" protestant clergymen who
were "horrified." Sullivan also noted that the Secretary said that he
also intended to discuss the matter with Roy Wilkins to persuade
Wilkins "that Negro leaders should completely isolate King and
remove him from the role he is now occupying in civil rights
activities." 261
On December 8, 1964, the Director authorized the disclosure of infor-
mation about Dr. King's personal life to an influential member of the
Baptist World Alliance (BWA), so that he could pass the informa-
tion along to the General Secretary of BWA, and to BWA Program
Committee members, to prevent the Committee from inviting Dr. King
to address the BWA's 1965 Congress in Miami Beach. The Director
rejected a proposal, however, for "arranging for [certain BWA mem-
bers] to listen to sources we have concerning this matter." 262
5. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with the Pope
On August 31, 1964, the FBI learned that Dr. King, who was going
to be touring Europe in September, might have plans to visit the Pope.
Internal Security Section Chief Baumgardner observed:
It would be shocking indeed for such an unscrupulous
character as King to receive an audience with the Pope. It is
believed that if a plan to see the Pope is in the making, it
ought to be nipped in the bud. We have considered different
possibilities for meeting this problem and believe that the
best one would be to have Assistant Director Malone of the
New York office personally contact Francis Cardinal Spell-
man and on a highly confidential basis bring to the Cardinal's
attention the fact that King is to visit Rome....
'Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 4/8/64. DeLoach stated
that he would "deny any such information had been furnished" if the official
told anyone that the FBI had briefed him.
'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/16/64.
m Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/16/64.
Memorandum from Milton Jones to Cartha DeLoach, 12/8/64.
Malone should be able to impress upon the Cardinal the
likely embarrassment that may result to the Pope should he
grant King an audience and King is later discredited.263
On September 8, Baumgardner reported:
Malone called today and stated that he had discussed the
situation with Cardinal Spellman over the weekend and
he said that the Cardinal took instant steps to advise the
Vatican against granting any audience to King . . . Cardi-
nal Spellman is going to Rome next week . . . and thus will
be on the scene personally and further insure that the Pope is
not placed in an embarrassing position through any contact
with King.26"
The FBI's efforts were to no avail. The Pope met with Dr. King. The
Director wrote across the memoranda informing him of that meeting,
"astounding," and "I am amazed that the Pope gave an audience to
such a [excised by FBI] .265 The Director then initiated inquiries into
the reason for the failure of this project.
6. The Attempt to Discredit Dr. King During His Receipt of
the Nobel Peace Prize
On October 14, 1964, Martin Luther King was named to win the
Nobel Peace Prize. He received the prize in Europe on December 10,
1965. The FBI took measures to dampen Dr. King's welcome, both in
Europe and on his return home.
On November 22, 1964-two weeks before Dr. King's trip to receive
the prize-the Domestic Intelligence Division assembled a thirteen-
page updated printed version of the monograph which Attorney Gen-
eral Kennedy had ordered recalled in October 1963.21" A copy was sent
to Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, on December 1, 1964,
with a letter requesting his advice concerning whether the monograph
should also be distributed to "responsible officials in the Executive
Branch." 267 Moyers gave his permission on December 7,26 and copies
were distributed to the heads of several executive agencies.269
Information about Dr. King's private life was also made available
to United Nations representatives Adlai Stevenson and Ralph Bunche,
who the Bureau had learned were being considered as possible par-
a Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 8/31/64,
p'. 1.
The Chief of the Security Section recommended:
"If approved, Assistant Director Malone should personally orally brief Francis
Cardinal Spellman in accordance with the attached Top Secret summary [con-
taining information about Dr. King's private life] ... This is the same summary
we previously used in preventing King's receiving an honorary degree from
Marquette University." (Baumgardner to Sullivan, 8/31/64.)2 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/8/64.
'Director's notes on UPI release, 9/8/64, and New York Herald Tribune,
9/19/64.
'Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 11/22/64. See pp. 131,
et seq.
26 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Bill Moyers, 12/1/64.
Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/7/64.
Copies were distributed to Acting Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach,
the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the CIA. and the heads of
the Military Intelligence agencies, as well as to USIA.
ticipants at the December 1964 "welcome home" reception for Dr.
King-.270
Three days after Vice President-elect Humphrey participated in
one of the "welcome home" receptions for Dr. King in New York, the
Bureau sent him a copy of the updated King monograph and a sep-
arate memorandum entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal
Conduct." 272 On December 8, 1964, the Bureau decided to brief Gov-
ernor Nelson Rockefeller about Dr. King's private life and alleged
Communist associations, apparently to dissuade the Governor from
taking part in ceremonies commending Dr. King for having received
the Nobel Prize."
Upon learning that Dr. King might meet with a certain foreign
leader, FBI headquarters instructed the FBI representative in that
country to brief the proper authorities about Dr. King.2 7 4 The United
States ambassadors in London and Oslo were briefed about Dr. King
because "the Ambassadors might consider entertaining King while
he is in Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize" and it might be
possible to "forestall such action by the Ambassadors if they were
briefed." The ambassadors in Stockholm and Copenhagen were also
briefed because "King is also to visit those cities." 275
On November 10, 1964, the FBI learned that the United States
Information Agency was considering requesting Dr. King to engage
in a one-week lecture tour in Europe following his receipt of the Noble
Prize. Hoover approved the Domestic Intelligence Division's recom-
mendation that USIA be furnished with the latest critical Bureau
reports about Dr. King. 2 7 6
7. Attempts to Block Dr. King's Publications
On September 11, 1964, the FBI learned that Dr. King intended to
publish an article in a major national publication. The Domestic Intel-
ligence Division noted that it did not know "what line King will take
in the article or what its specific stands will be," but, nonetheless rec-
ommended that "it would be well to prevent any publication of his
views." 277
The task of preventing publication was assigned to an agent with
contacts at the magazine who had "forestalled" the publication of an
article by Dr. King in that magazine earlier in 1964.278
The agent subsequently reported that he had contacted an official
of the magazine in late September. According to the agent, the
official had agreed to "endeavor to assist" the FBI, and had been
briefed about King, but; was unable to block publication because
a contractual agreement had already been made.2 7 9 The FBI did ap-
parently have some influence at the magazine, however, because a mem-
orandum reporting the incident concludes:
2 o Untitled memorandum, 11/12/64.
Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Hubert Humphrey, 12/21/64.
m lemorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 12/8/64.
C able from Director, FBI to Legat, 11/10/64.
l Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/30/64.
'6 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/12/64.
M Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 9/11/64.
a Baumgardner memorandum, 9/11/64.
M Memorandum to Cartha DeLoach, 11/3/64.
In connection with this [magazine] article by King, our
sources have indicated that since he was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize he has attempted through some of his associates
to change the [magazine] article in an effort to soften criti-
cism made by him against other civil rights groups and
leaders. King feared that such criticism would cause difficul-
ties in the civil rights movement. The [magazine], however,
has resisted King's efforts to make these changes.so
In February 1964, the Director alerted the field offices that Dr. King
was writing a new book, and noted that "it is entirely possible that
with the publication of the book the Bureau may desire to take some
action, possibly in the counterintelligence area or otherwise, which
may be designed to discredit King or otherwise neutralize his
effectiveness . . *' 281
The field offices were instructed to maintain information relating
to the preparation and publication of the book. The FBI files indicate
that this information was collected, but it is not clear whether it was
ever used.
8. Attempt to Undermine the National Science Foundation's
Cooperation with the SCLC
The FBI sent the National Science Foundation (NSF) a copy of the
second printed monograph on King in order to convince the NSF to
remove the SCLC from "the NSF program to obtain qualified Negro
students from southern schools." 282
9. Unsuccessful FBI Attempts to Locate Financial Improprie-
ties
In early January 1964, the Chief of the Internal Security Section of
the Domestic Intelligence Division, Frederick J. Baumgardner, rec-
ommended that "examination of recent income tax returns of King
might:well reveal information which could assist the Bureau in its
efforts to discredit King or neutralize his effectiveness." 283 The In-
telligence Division subsequently acquired from the Internal Revenue
Service copies of income tax returns for the prior five years of Dr.
King, the SCLC, and the Gandhi Society, 284 an organization which
the FBI stated "augmented" the fund-raising activities of the
SCLC.28 5 The Intelligence Division of the IRS told the Bureau that
"IRS had very carefully scrutinized King's returns in the past but
had not been able to establish a cause of action against him." 286 How-
ever, the IRS assured the FBI that Dr. King's current returns would
FBI memorandum, 11/g/64, p. 21.
Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, New York,
2/18/64.
20 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 12/17/64,
p. 2.
' Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/8/64.
Baumgardner observed that it was "essential that our current requests of the
IRS . .. be handled in a manner which would provide for optimum security so
that neither King nor any other unauthorized individuals may become aware of
the Bureau's interest and so that no embarrassment may come to the Bureau."
2A wiretap had been placed on the Ghandi Society in July, 1963.
Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/25/64.
Memorandum from Daniel Brennan to William Sullivan, 3/27/64.
be scrutinized "very carefully to determine whether any violations ap-
pear." 287 None did.
Undeterred, the Director informed the field offices that "the Bureai
believes that more than ever it would be most desirable to identify any
bank where [King] may have an account . .. and consider an audit
of such account." 288
One effort to uncover derogatory information about Dr. King was
conceived by the Supervisor in charge of the King case during a golf
game.28 9 A remote acquaintance of the Supervisor mentioned that he
had heard from a friend that an acquaintance had said that Dr. King
had a numbered account in a foreign bank with a balance of over one
million dollars. The Supervisor suggested to Sullivan:
If we can prove that King is hoarding large sunis of money,
we would have, available possibly the best information to date
which could be used to discredit him, especially in the eyes of
his own people . . . . we may take the action to discredit
King ourselves through friendly news sources, or the like, or
we might turn the information over to the Internal Revenue
Service for possible criminal prosecution.29 o
The plan was approved by Director Hoover and an inquiry was
initiated. By December 1965, the investigation into a possible foreign
bank account was described by the Director as "the most important
presently pending" facet of the King investigation.291 The investiga-
tion was dropped shortly afterward, however, when it developed that
the initial source of the allegation informed the FBI that "it was
merely a wild conclusion that had been previously drawn by someone
whose identity he does not now recall.'" 292
F. The Question of Whether Govennaent Officials Outside of the FBI
Were Aware of the FBI's Effort to Discredit Dr. King
There is no doubt that the responsible officials in the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations were aware of the FBI's COMINFIL in-
vestigation involving Dr. King and the SCLC and that the wiretaps
used by the FBI to collect its information were authorized under
procedures existing at the time. While there is some question con-
cerning whether officials outside of the FBI were aware that the FBI
was using microphones to cover Dr. King's activities, there is no doubt
that the product of the microphone surveillance was widely dis-
seminated within the executive branch. Indeed, dissemination of the
printed "monograph" about Dr. King to several executive agencies
was expressly approved by Bill Moyers, President Johnson's assistant,
in January 1965.
m Brennan memorandum, 3/27/64. On the bottom of this memorandum, Hoover
wrote "What a farce!"
' Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agent in Charge, New York,
5/21/64.
a It should be noted that the Supervisor in charge of the King case is still in
a high position with the FBI and handled the committee's documents requests in
the King case investigation.
Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 6/29/65.
M Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, New Orleans,
12/3/65.
m -Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan. 12/10/65.
The Committee has been unable to determine the extent to which
the FBI's effort to discredit Dr. King and the SCLC by disseminating
unfavorable information outside of the Government was suspected
or known about by Government officials responsible for supervising
the FBI. The Committee requested the FBI to provide any informa-
tion in its possession reflecting that any Presidents or Attorneys
General during the relevant periods were aware of any FBI efforts to
"discredit" or "neutralize" Dr. King. The Bureau replied:
A review of the King file. in response to other items in-
cluded in the request and a polling of all Headquarters per-
sonnel involved in that and previous reviews did not result
in the location or recollection of any information in FBIHQ
files to indicate any of the aforementioned individuals were
specifically aware of any efforts, steps or plans or proposals
to "discredit" or "neutralize" King.
It is, of course, evident that much information developed
in the course of the King case involving him in activities of
interest to the White House and to representatives of the
Department of Justice, including Attorneys General Kennedy
and Katzenbach, as well as Assistant Attorney General
Marshall, was such that it could conceivably have been the
opinion of one or more of the above individuals that such
information was being provided to "discredit" or "neutralize"
King."'
Nicholas Katzenbach, Burke Marshall, Walter Jenkins, and Bill
Moyers have told the Committee that they did not realize that the
FBI was engaged in a concerted effort to discredit Dr. King, and that
to the best of their knowledge, Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon
Johnson, as well as Attorney General Robert Kennedy, were not aware
of that effort. There was no evidence that the FBI~s program to dis-
credit Dr. King was authorized outside of the FBI. There is evidence,
however, that officials responsible for supervising the FBI received
indications that such an effort to discredit Dr. King might be taking
place, and failed to take adequate steps to prevent it. President John-
son and his Attorneys General were aware at least of Bureau attempts
to disseminate unfavorable reports about Dr. King to the press. Top
Executive Branch officials have told the Committee that they had
believed that the FBI3 had tape recordings embarrassing to Dr. King,
and that the FBI had offered to play those tapes both to a government
official and to reporters. The evidence reveals a disturbing attitude of
unconcern by responsible officials and a failure on their part to make
appropriate corrective measures. As Nicholas Katzenbach explained
to the Committee:
Nobody in the Department of Justice connected with Civil
Rights could possibly have been unaware of Mr. Hoover's
feelings (against Dr. King). Nobody could have been un-
aware of the potential for disaster which those feelings em-
bodied. But, given the realities of the situation, I do not
" Letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee. 11/6/75.
believe one could have anticipated the extremes to which it
was apparently carried.2 4 a
The following incidents have played a part in our determination
that high officials of the Executive Branch must share responsibility
for the FBI's effort against Dr. King.
(1) As described in the previous chapter, a summary memorandum
containing information gathered from the FBI microphone placed in
Dr. King's room in the Willard hotel was shown to Presidential
Assistant Walter Jenkins by Cartha DeLoach on January 14, 1964.
According to DeLoach's contemporaneous account of that meeting:
Jenkins was of the opinion that the FBI could perform a
good service to the country if this matter could somehow be
confidentially given to members of the press. I told him the
Director had this in mind, however, also believed we should
obtain additional information prior to discussing it with cer-
tain friends.295
DeLoach testified that he could not recall the meeting with Jenkins,
but that the memorandum should accurately reflect his conversation.'"
Jenkins told the Committee staff in an unsworn interview that he
did not recall the meeting described in DeLoach's memorandum, but
that he had no reason to doubt that he had read the summary memoran-
dum which DeLoach claims Jenkins saw. Jenkins expressly denied,
however, that he had suggested that the information in the summary
memorandum should be "leaked" to the press, or that either he or
President Johnson had ever suggested that information about Dr.
King should be "leaked" to anyone. He added, however, that he might
have used words to the effect that "this is something people should
know about"-referring to people in the Government-which could
have been misinterpreted by DeLoach. He did not recall DeLoach
telling him that the Director ultimately planned to leak this informa-
tion to "certain friends." 29
(2) A February 5, 1964 FBI memorandum reports a conversation
between Edwin Guthman, the Justice Department's press secretary,
and John Mohr of the Domestic Intelligence Division. According to
Mohr's memorandum, Guthman told Mohr that he had heard that
a reporter was preparing an article about Dr. King's alleged Com-
munist affiliations.
Guthman stated he was quite concerned inasmuch as it
appeared there had been a leak from the FBI in connection
with this matter. He told me the Attorney General had been
most hopeful that there would be no "leaks" concerning
King.
From the tone of Guthman's entiie remarks, it would ap-
pear he had two thoughts in mind without actually stating
such thoughts. These thoughts were (1) that the Attorney
24 Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 209.
' Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/14/64. This
memorandum is also discussed pp. 121-122.
m Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 150.
' Staff summary, Walter Jenkins interview, 12/1/75. pp. 1-2. Jenkins said that
he was physically unable to undergo the strain of a sworn and transcribed
session.
General is most anxious that information concerning King
not be released; and (2) that the Attorney General's connec-
tions with King, and his defensive statements concerning
King to Congress in Civil Rights hearings, would certainly
injure the Attorney General's political chances for the
future.
(H)e told me once again the Attorney General was not
worried about what an exposure of King could do to him.
He stated he and the Attorney General are only trying to
protect FBI sources of information.298
The memorandum states that Guthman was told "there had been no
leaks from the FBI concerning Dr. Martin Luther King," and that
Guthman had responded that "he had no proof whatsoever that the
FBI had furnished information to the newspapers concerning King."
Guthman testified that he recalled the Justice Department had "sus-
pected that the information had been leaked by the FBI." When asked
the basis for that suspicion, he said that "we felt that the question of
King and the association with [Advisers A] was a matter which was
rather tightly held since it was not something of general knowl-
edge." 299 Guthman said that he could "not specifically" recall a reac-
tion by Attorney General Kennedy to -this "leak":
except to be somewhat displeased over it, But that was in a
sense all in a day's work and I don't recall anything
specific.300
Guthman testified that he did not recall any further efforts to deter-
mine whether the FBI had in fact leaked the story.s0
Guthman testified that DeLoach's memorandum "distorted" his
remarks. Guthman said that his visit had been motivated, not by con-
cerns about Kennedy's political future, but rather by a concern to pro-
tect FBI sources.Aola A memorandum dated February 5, 1964, by Guth-
man, does not mention a meeting with Mohr, 'but does contain an
account of a meeting between Guthman -and Cartha DeLoach on the
previous day.
We both agreed that it was inevitable that King's connec-
tions with (Adviser A) would ultimately become public. I
told DeLoach that our concern was over the FBI's source and
that we had no other concern as to what the Attorney Gen-
eral had said or what our actions had been in connection with
Martin Luther King.
DeLoach said he thought we should be concerned in view of
what the Attorney General had said on the subject. I pointed
out that anything 'the Attorney General had said had been
cleared with the FBI. I told Deke that our record in this mat-
ter could stand any scrutiny and that both Senator Russell
Memorandum from John Mohr to Cartha DeLoach, 2/5/64. Hoover wrote
next to the last paragraph quoted above, "There has never been such solicitude
in the past."
Edwin Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, p. 13.
Guthman, 3/16/76, p. 12.
Guthman, 3/16/76, p. 20.
" Guthman, 3/16/76, p. 22.
and Senator Monroney had been fully apprised of the facts
last summer or last fall. 0 2
A memorandum by Courtney Evans later that day reports that
Evans discussed this matter with Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall, who said that he did not intend to tell the reporter anything
about Dr. King, but that "if he developed anything at all with regard
to [the reporter's] source of information, he would pass this along to
us . . ." Evans' memorandum also notes, "According to information
developed by our Atlanta office on February 4, 1964, [the reporter] had
in his possession what appeared to be a blind memorandum containing
information as to [Adviser A's alleged connections with the Commu-
nist Party]." 303
A memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Director Hoover dated
February 18, 1964, apparently alludes to this incident and provides
some insight into the political implications of the FBI's investigation
of Dr. King. According to DeLoach's memorandum, Walter Jenkins
and Bill Moyers of the White House told him that Burke Marshall had
called and "indicated that the Attorney General had thought it highly
advisable for the President to see the Department of Justice file on
Martin Luther King . . . to make certain that the President knew all
about King." 304
The memorandum states that Marshall then:
told Moyers that he wanted to give the White House a little
warning. He stated that he personally knew that the FBI
had leaked information concerning Martin Luther King to a
newspaper reporter. Marshall told Moyers that he thought
the White House should know this inasmuch as information
concerning King would undoubtedly be coming out before
the public in the near future.
Director Hoover wrote next to this entry, "Marshall is a liar." 30
The memorandum reports that Jenkins told DeLoach that he
thought the Attorney General was concerned with "being on record
with the President with the fact that although he has, for political
purposes, defended King, he wants the President to realize that he,
the Attorney General, is well aware of King's- Communistic back-
ground." 306
The Director's handwritten note states: "Katzenbach did his dirt
against us before Warren Commission and now Marshall is trying to
poison the W (hite) H (ouse) about FBI." 307
Neither Burke Marshall nor Bill Moyers recalled the events de-
scribed in DeLoach's memorandum. Marshall testified, however, about
an incident involving the FBI's leaking information to a reporter
that may well have been the same incident. Marshall recalled that
sometime in 1964, a reporter told him that the Atlanta office of the
FBI had given him information unfavorable to Dr. King. Marshall
said that he phoned the Bureau official with whom he normally con-
m lemorandum, Edwin Guthman, 2/5/64.
' Memorandum from Courtney Evans to Alan Belmont, 2/5/64.
1 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to .T. Edgar Hoover, 2/18/64.
0 ' DeLoach memorandum, 2/18/64.
" DeLoach memorandum, 2/18/64.
' DeLoach memorandum, 2/18/64.
ducted business and said, "I'm informed by a reporter that your people
in Atlanta have given this information about Martin Luther King, and
that I think it is outrageous." The official at first said, "I don't believe
it," but promised to inquire further. He later called and said, "The
Director wants you to know that you're a .. . damned liar." Marshall
told the Committee, "It was very difficult with the Bureau because
if you said that they were leaking derogatory information, they would
say, 'no, we're not.' " 308
(3) Bill Moyers, President Johnson's assistant, testified that some-
time during the "hurley-burley disorganized period" shortly after
President Kennedy's assassination and prior to President Johnson's
state of the Union address, he heard laughter inside Walter Jenkins'
office. Moyers inquired and was told by a secretary that an FBI agent
had come to the office and offered to play for Jenkins a tape recording
which would have been personally embarrassing to Dr. King. Jenkins
refused to listen to the tape. A week later, the same FBI agent again
came to the White House and offered to play the tape for Jenkins,
and. again Jenkins refused to listen to it.3"
Jenkins told the Committee that he did not recall ever having been
offered tapes by the FBI, and did not know of anyone on the White
House staff who had been.3 1 0
In addition to this incident, Moyers testified that he had been
generally aware that the FBI reports about Dr. King included infor-
mation of a personal nature, unrelated to the purpose of the FBI's in-
vestigation. When asked if he had ever asked the FBI why it was dis-
seminating this type of material to the White House, Moyers re-
sponded:
I don't remember. I just assumed it was related to a fallout
of the investigations concerning the communist allegations,
which is what the President was concerned about.
Question. Did you ever question the propriety of the FBI's
disseminating that type of information?
Answer. I never questioned it, no. I thought it was spurious
and irrelevant ... If they were looking for other alleged com-
munist efforts to embarrass King and the President, which is
what the President thought, Kennedy or Johnson, it would
just seem natural that other irrelevant and spurious infor-
mation would come along with that investigation.
Question. And you found nothing improper about the
FBI's sending that information along also?
Answer. Unnecessary? Improper at that time, no.
Question. Do you recall anyone in the White House ever
questioning the propriety of the FBI's disseminating this
type of material?
Answer. I think ... there were comments that tended to
ridicule the FBI's doing this, but no.3 '
Moyers testified that he had not suspected that the FBI was cov-
ering Dr. King's activities with microphones, although he con-
s Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, pp. 467.
" Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19, staff summary of Bill Moyers Inter-
view, 11/24/75.
m Jenkins (staff summary), 12/1/75, p. 4.
m Moyers, 3/2/76, p. 17.
ceded, "I subsequently realized I should have assumed that. . . . The
nature of the general references that were being made, I realized
later could only have come from that kind of knowledge unless
there was an informer in Martin Luther King's presence a good bit
of the time." 312
(4) According to Nicholas Katzenbach, on November 25, 1964, the
Washington Bureau Chief of a national news publication told him
that one of his reporters had been approached by the FBI and given
an opportunity to listen to some "interesting" tapes involving Dr.
King."' Katzenbach told the Committee:
I was shocked by this revelation, and felt that the Presi-
dent should be advised immediately. On November 28, I flew,
with Mr. Burke Marshall, the retiring head of the Civil
Ri hts Division, to the LBJ Ranch.
On that occasion he and I informed the President of our
conversation with the news editor and expressed in very
strong terms our view that this was shocking conduct and po-
litically extremely dangerous to the Presidency. I told the
President my view that it should be stopped immediately and
that he should personally contact Mr. Hoover. I received the
impression that President Johnson took the matter very seri-
ously and that he would do as I recommended.
On the following Monday, I was informed by at least one
other reporter, and perhaps two, of similar offers made to
them the prior week. I spoke to the Bureau official who had
been identified as having made the offer and asked him about
it. He flatly denied that any such offer had been made or that
the FBI would engage in any such activity. Thereupon I
asked at least one of the reporters-perhaps all of them-
whether they would join me in confronting the Bureau on this
issue. They declined to do so.
I do not know whether President Johnson discussed this
matter with Mr. Hoover, or what, if anything, was said. How-
ever, I was quite confident that that particular activity
ceased at that time, and I attributed it to Mr. Johnson's inter-
vention. Fronm that time until I left the Justice Department I
never heard from any person of subsequent similar activity
by the Bureau, and I assumed it had ceased. I should add only
this: I believed that the tapes in question were not tapes re-
sulting from Bureau surveillance but tapes acquired from
State law enforcement authorities, and that such a representa-
tion was made to the reporter at the time.314
Katzenbach testified that Cartha DeLoach was the Bureau official
whom the reporters had identified as having offered the tapes. Katzen-
bach said that he had contacted DeLoach on his own volition, and that
he did not tell DeLoach that he had discussed the matter with the
President. He said that when he asked DeLoach if the Bureau had
*1 Moyers. 3/2/76, p. 17.
n The two newsmen turned down the Bureau's offer.
3" Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
been offering to play tape recordings concerning Dr. King to report-
ers, DeLoach "told me rather angrily they were not." *31
Burke Marshall, when questioned by the Committee about these
events, testified that the same two reporters had also informed him
that Director Hoover was offering to play tape recordings of Dr. King.
He testified that he had assumed the reporters "were telling the truth,
that these tape recordings existed, and that they were being leaked by
the FBI." 316 He testified that he had not suspected that the FBI had
produced the tapes itself from microphone coverage, but that he had
assumed the FBI had acquired the tape recordings from Southern law
enforcement agencies.
It did not occur to me that the FBI would go around placing
microphones in Dr. King's hotel . . . The notion that they
would plant the microphone, that they had a whole system of
surveillance of that sort, involving illegal entry and trespass
and things like that, did not occur to me. I would not have put
it past the local police, but I considered at the time-except
for Mr. Hoover himself-that the Bureau was a tightly con-
trolled, well-run, efficient, law abiding law enforcement
agency, that it didn't do things like that, and therefore, it
didn't occur to me that they had done it.31 7
Marshall recalled that he and Katzenbach had flown to President
Johnson's ranch in Texas and had told the President that the FBI was
offering the tape recordings to reporters. Marshall said that the Presi-
dent was "shocked," and that the "conversation was in the context of
it being very important and a very nasty piece of business that had
to be stopped." Marshall did not know, however, what action the
President subsequently took, if any, and could not remember whether
the President had voiced an intention to take any specific action."'
DeLoach, when asked if he had ever discussed the contents of tape
recordings or surveillances of Dr. King with members of the press,
testified: "I don't recall any such conversations." 3 DeLoach did
state, however, that he had known about the tape recordings of Dr.
King. He testified that one such tape recording had been in his office on
one occasion, and that "it was so garbled and so terrible, I mean from
the standpoint of fidelity, that I told them to knock it off and take
it back." 320
The only record of this episode in the FBI files is a memorandum
by DeLoach dated December 1, 1964, stating in part:
Bill Moyers, while I was at the White House, today, advised
that word had gotten to the President this afternoon that [the
newsman] was telling all over town . . . that the FBI had
told him that Martin Luther King was [excised]. [The
newsman] according to Moyers, had stated to several people
a Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 11/12/75, pp. 97-98.
Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 39.
m Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 43.
:n8 Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 43.
DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 156.
DeLoach testimony, 11/25/76, p. 188.
that, "If the FBI will do this to Martin Luther King, they
will undoubtedly do it to anyone for personal reasons."
Moyers stated the President wanted to get this word to us
so we would know not to trust [the newsman]. Moyers also
stated that the President felt that [the newsman] lacked in-
tegrity and was certainly no lover of the Johnson administra-
tion or the FBI. I told Moyers this was certainly obvious. 3 2 1
DeLoach testified that he could not recall the events surrounding
this memorandum. Bill Moyers, after reviewing DeLoach's memo-
randum, testified that. he recalled nothing -about the incident involving
the newsman or about Katzenbach's and Marshall's discussion with
the President. He did not recall ever having heard that the Bureau
had offered to play tape recordings of Dr. King to reporters, or ever
having discussed the matter with DeLoach. He testified, however, that
DeLoach's memorandum:
sounds very plausible. I'm sure the President called me or he
told me to tell him whatever [DeLoach's document reflects].
Question. Did the President tell you that he understood
that [the newsman] was saying all over town that the Bureau
had been offering tapes?
Answer. I can't remember the details of that. You know, I
cant tell you the number of times the President was sounding
off at [the newsman] .322
When asked if it would be fair to conclude that the President had com-
plained to Moyers about the newsman's revealing that the Bureau
had offered to play tapes rather than about the fact that the Bureau
had such tapes and had offered to play them, Movers replied, "It would
be fair to conclude that. I don't recall if that was exactly the way the
President said it." 323
Vi. THE HOOVER-KING CONTROVERSY BECOMES PUBLIC AND A TRUCE IS
CALLED: APRIL-DECEMIIER 1 964
Sum mary
Director Hoovers dislike for )r'. King, which had been known with-
in the Bureau since early 1962, 3 2 4 became a matter of public record in
November 1964 when Director Hoover described Dr. King at a meet-
ing with women reporters as the "most notorious liar" in the country.
Dr. King responded that the Director was obviously "faltering" under
the responsibilities of his office. The FBI immediately intensified its
secret campaign against Dr. King, offering to play the tapes from
microphone surveillance of Dr. King to reporters and.to leak stories
concerning him to the press. The FBI also sent a tape recording made
from the microphone surveillance to Dr. King, with a warning which
Dr. King and his close associates interpreted as an invitation to
suicide.
The public aspects of the dispute peaked in December 1964, shortly
before Dr. King went to Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Dr.
2 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/1/64.
" Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 8.
Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 9.
324 As early as February 1962, the Director had informed the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division: "King is no good anyway."
King publicly announced that it was time for the controversy to end,and arranged a meeting with Director Hoover to seal a truce. The
FBI's public criticism stopped, but the Bureau's secret campaign to
discredit Dr. King continued. Believing that Dr. King's downfall
would severely harm the entire movement for racial equality, several
prominent civil rights figures met with FBI officials to voice their con-
cern and seek assurances from the FBI that the attacks on Dr. King
would stop.
A. First Steps in the Public Controversy April-November 1964
Although the FBI had been covertly engaged in a massive campaign
to discredit Dr. King for several months, the fact that the FBI was
the source of. allegations about communist influence in the civil rights
movement did not become public until the release of Director Hoover's
off-the-record testimony before the House Appropriations Committee
in April 1964. The Director was quoted in the press as having testi-
fied that " 'Communist influence does exist in the Negro movement' and
can influence 'large masses' of people." 325 Dr. King immediately issued
a forceful reply:
It is very unfortunate that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, in his
claims of alleged communist infiltration in the civil rights
movement, has allowed himself to aid and abet the salacious
claims of southern racists and the extreme right-wing
elements.
We challenge all who raise the "red" issue, whether they
be newspaper columnists or the head of the FBI himself-to
come forward and provide real evidence which contradicts
this stand of the SCLC. We are confident that this cannot be
done.
We affirm that SCLC is unalterably opposed to the mis-
guided philosophy of communist.
It is difficult to accept the word of the FBI on commu-
nist infiltration in the civil rights movement, when they have
been so completely ineffectual in resolving the continued may-
hem and brutality inflicted upon the Negro in the deep south.
It would be encouraging to us if Mr. Hoover and the FBI
would be as diligent in apprehending those responsible for
bombing churches and killing little children as they are in
seeking out alleged communist infiltration in the civil rights
movement. 326
In early May 1964, Director Hoover made the following response to a
question from United Presss International concerning whether any
New York Times, 4/22/64, p. 30.
'" FBI transcription of Dr. King's statement to press, Memorandum from Wil-liam Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 4/23/64. Another FBI memorandum which dealtwith Dr. King's statement indicated the Bureau's opinion that someone "high inthe Administration not known to us . .. apparently agreed with Dr. King's pressrelease." Sullivan's report about Dr. King's statement pointed out that "Kingquoted the AG against the Director, to the effect that it is to be expected thatcommunist will try to infiltrate civil rights movements, but they had not suc-ceeded in making the expected impact." (Memorandum from William Sullivanto Alan Belmont, 4/23/64.)
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communists were in positions of leadership in the civil rights
movement:
Let me first emphasize that I realize the vast majority of
Negroes have rejected and recognize communism for what it
is....
The existence and importance of the communist influence
in the Negro movement should not be ignored or minimized,
nor should it be exaggerated. The Communist Party will use
its forces either in the open forum of public opinion or
through its sympathizers who do not wear the badge of com-
munism but who spout some of the same ideas carried in the
Communist Party line. This is the influence which is capable
of moving large masses of loyal and dedicated citizens toward
communist objectives while being lured away from the true
issues involved.. It is up to the civil rights organizations them-
selves to recognize this and face up to it.327
On May 11, Dr. King appeared on the news program, "Face the
Nation." He denied communists had infiltrated decision-making posi-
tions in the civil rights movement or the SCLC and remarked that it
was "unfortunate" that "such a great man" as Director Hoover had
made allegations to that effect.. Dr. King added that the Director
should more appropriately have remarked on how surprising it was
that so few Negroes had turned to communism in light of the treatment
they had received. Dr. King said that the Justice Department had
warned him of only one suspected communist in the SCLC, and that
he had fired that individual. 3 2
The feud between Director Hoover and Dr. King heightened on No-
vember 18, 1964, with the Direector's public allegation that Dr. King
was the "most notorious liar" in the country. Director Hoover made
that comment during a meeting with women reporters in the context
of explaining how FBI agents were assigned in civil rights cases.
According to a memorandum of the meeting written by DeLoach:
[The Director] stated it was a common belief in some circles
that Special Agents in the South were all, without exception,
southern born agents. As a matter of fact, 70% of the agents
currently assigned to the South were born in the North. He
stated that the "notorious" Martin Luther King had at-
tempted to capitalize on this matter by claiming that all
agents assigned to the Albany, Georgia, Resident Agency
were southern born agents. As a matter of fact, 4 out of 5 of
a Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Edwin Guthman, 5/14/64, p. 4.
Director Hoover's answer was initially submitted to Guthman, the Attorney
General's Special Assistant for Public Information. Guthman strongly objected to
the answer because It "put communist influence in the civil rights movement out
of perspective." He then had a lengthy conference with DeLoach, and the answer,
quoted above, was agreed upon. (Memorandum from Edwin Guthman to Cartha
DeLoach, 5/12/64; DeLoach memorandum, 5/14/64.)
1 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 5/11/64.
The Headquarters agent who reported on the television program added the com-
ment: "King's obvious reference was to the 'removal' of (Adviser B) from the
SCLC. As expected, King lied about being warned of anyone else because he had
been warned about (Adviser A) and has nevertheless maintained a close associa-
tion with (Adviser A)." (Baumgardner memorandum, 5/11/64.)
the agents assigned to the.Albany, Georgia, Resident Agency
were northern born. The Director stated he had instructed
me to get in touch with Reverend King and line up an ap-
pointment so that King could be given the true facts. He
stated that King had refused to give me an appointment and,
therefore, he considered King to be the most "notorious liar"
in the country.329
When the reporters asked Director Hoover for more details about
Dr. King,
he stated, off the record, "He is one of the lowest characters
in the country." There was an immediate inquiry as to whether
he could be quoted on the original statement that Martin
Luther King was a liar and he stated, "Yes-that is public
record." 330
Nicholas Katzenbach, who was then Acting Attorney General, testi-
fRed that he talked with Director Hoover about that press conference
and
[Hoover] told me that it was not his practice to have press
conferences, had not done so in the past, and would not do so
again in the future. Perhaps the depth of his feeling with
respect to Dr. King was revealed to me by his statement that
he did not understand all the publicity which the remark hadattracted because he had been asked a simple question and
given a simple truthful answer. 3 3 1
Some of Dr. King's advisers drafted a strong response, one of which
would have "blown Hoover out of the water, calling him every name
in the book." 332 Before they had an opportunity to release the state-
ment, Dr. King, who was then in Bimini, issued the following public
reply:
I cannot conceive of Mr. Hoover making a statement like this
without being under extreme pressure. He has apparently fal-
tered under the awesome burden, complexities and responsi-
bilities of his office.333
Dr. King also sent a telegram to Director Hoover, which was made
public, stating:
I was appalled and surprised at your reported statement
maligning my integrity. What motivated such an irresponsi-
ble accusation is a mystery to me.
.. Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 11/18/64, p. 6.
DeLoach memorandum, 11/18/64, p. 10. DeLoach told the Committee about
the incident: "I passed Mr. Hoover a note and told him that if he really felt that
way, he should keep it off the record. He paid no attention to that note. I passed
him a second note and made the same statement and he paid no attention to that,
and on the third occasion that I passed him a note, he said out loud to the women
that 'DeLoach tells me I should keep these statements concerning King off the
record, but that's none of his business. I made it for the record and you can use
it for the record.' " (Cairtha DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 169. See also
DeLoach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 173.)
Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.m Harry Wachtel testimony, 2/27/76, p. 42.
'New York Times, 11/20/64, p. 18.
I have sincerely questioned the effectiveness of the F.B.I. in
racial incidents, particularly where bombings and brutalities
against Negroes are at issue . . .
I will be happy to discuss this question with you at length
in the near future. Although your statement said you have at-
tempted to meet with me, I have sought in vain for any record
of such a request.34
Dr. King also criticized Director Hoover in a press interview on the
same day for "following the path of appeasement of political powers
in the South." "3
The Domestic Intelligence Division prepared an analysis of the
allegations in Dr. King's telegram, emphasizing the events two years
earlier which the FBI had interpreted as a refusal by Dr. King to be
interviewed.'3 6 Sullivan recommended against replying to Dr. King's
charges or meeting with Dr. King. The Director penned his agreement
on Sullivan's memorandum:
O.K. But I can't understand why we are unable to get the true
facts before the public. We can't even get our accomplish-
ments published. We are never taking the aggressive, but
above lies remain unanswered. 3 7
The following day, the FBI mailed a tape recording from the Wil-
lard Hotel microphone surveillance to Dr. King accompanied by a
letter which Dr. King and his associates interpreted as an invitation
to suicide.
B. Tapes Are Mailed to King: November 21, 1964
Sometime in mid-November 1964 a decision was made at FBI Head-
quarters to mail a tape recording made during microphone surveillance
of Dr. King to the SCLC office in Atlanta. William Sullivan, who was
responsible for the proiect, testified that he first learned of the plan
when Alan Belmont, Assistant to the Director, told him that Director
Hoover wanted one of the King tapes mailed to Coretta King to
precipitate their separation, thereby diminishing Dr. King's stature.
Belmont told Sullivan that the FBI laboratory would "sterilize the
tape to prevent its being traced to the Bureau." Sullivan was to have
the tape mailed from a southern state."'
Sullivan told the Committee that he had opposed the plan because
it would warn Dr. King that his activities were being covered by micro-
phones. According to Sullivan, Belmont agreed that the plan was
unwise, but said that he had no power to stop it because the orders had
come from Hoover and Tolson.339
"' New York Times, 11/20/64, p. 18.
a New York Times, 11/20/64, p. 18.
" That incident is described at pp. 89-91.
m'"1emorandum from Alex Rosen to Alan Belmont, 11/20/64, p. 4. Director
Hoover remarked on another memorandum, "I have no intention of seeing King.
I gave him that opportunity once and he ignored it."
m William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 104-105. The Willard Hotel tape
was called in from the Washington field office on November 19, 1964. The de-
cision at Headquarters would have been made sometime earlier, probably as a
result of the "notorious liar" controversy.
" Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 105.
The FBI technician who prepared the tape told the Committee that
he had been ordered to produce a "composite" tape from coverage of
hotel rooms in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Los Angeles.
After the tape was completed, a copy was left with Sullivan.340
Sullivan testified that he ordered a "tight-lipped . . . reliable"
agent to fly to Tampa, Florida to mail a package to Coretta King. He
did not tell the agent that the package contained the King tape.'4 ' The
agent testified that he flew to Miami and then called Sullivan, who in-
structed him to address the package to Martin Luther King, Jr. The
agent said that he mailed the package from a post office near the
Miami airport.342 A travel voucher provided to the Committee by the
FBI indicates that the agent flew to Miami on November 21, 1964.
Congressman Andrev Young, who was then Dr. King's assistant,
recalled that the tape arrived at the SCLC Headquarters in Atlanta
sometime before December 1964. Congressman Young said that the
office personnel assumed the tape contained another of Dr. King's
speeches; it was stored for a while, and later sent to Dr. King's home
along with several other tapes. 343 Dr. King, Congressman Young, and
some others listened to the tape sometime after Dr. King had returned
from receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, probably in January 1965. Con-
gressman Young testified that he probably destroyed the tape several
years later.
Congressman' Young recalled that the tape was of "very poor qual-
ity, very garbled," but that at least part of it appeared to have been
made during a conversation between Dr. King and other civil rights
leaders at the Willard Hotel. He testified that none of the comments
on the tape related to the commission of a crime or to "affection" for
communism. "It was personal conversation among friends."44
According to Congressman Young a letter had accompanied the
tape, stating that the tape would be released in 34 days and threatening
"there is only one thing you can do to prevent this from happening."
Congressman Ypung said that when he and Dr. King read the letter,"we assumed that the letter and the tape had been mailed 34 days
before the receipt of the Nobel Prize, and that this was a threat to
expose Martin just before lie received the Nobel Prize." Congressman
Young testified:
I think that the disturbing thing to Martin was that he
felt somebody was trying to get him to commit suicide, and
because it was a tape of a meeting in Washington and the
postmark was from Florida, we assumed nobody had the
capacity to do that other than the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation.345
3 Staff summary of [FBI Technician] interview, 7/25/75, p. 5. The tape which
was ultimately sent to Dr. King, however, may have consisted of the Willard
coverage.
m Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 106.
m' Staff summary of [FBI Agent] interview, 4/23/75. The agent recalled that
the package, which was marked "fragile," did not have a return address. Sulli-
van remembered that the agent had commented that he had had trouble mailing
the package because it had no return address, but that he had "talked his way
around it." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 109.)
. "Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, pp. 6-9. Young recalled that the package
containing the tape had a Florida postmark.
m Young, 2/19/76, p. 7.
'Young, 2/19/76, p. 8.
Both Young and Ralph Abernathy, who also heard the tape and read
the letter, interpreted it as inviting Dr. King to take his own life.
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William Sullivan testified that he could not recall such a letter."'
The FBI provided the Committee with a copy of a letter which was
found in Sullivan's office files following his discharge in 1971.348 The
letter stated in part:
King, look into your heart. You know you are a complete
fraud and a greater liability to all of us Negroes. White people
in this country have enough frauds of their own but I am sure
they don't have one at this time that is any where near your
equal. You are no clergyman and you know it. I repeat that
you are a colossal fraud and an evil, vicious one at that.
King, like all frauds your end is approaching. You could
have been our greatest leader. . . . But you are done. Your
"honorary' degrees, your Nobel Prize (what a grim farce)
and other awards will not save you. King, I repeat you are
done....
The American public, the church organizations that have
been helping-Protestants, Catholics and Jews will know you
for what you are-an evil beast. So will others who have
backed you. You are done.
King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know
what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact
number has been selected for a specific reason, it has definite
practical significance). You are done. There is but one way
out for you. You better take it before your filthy fraudulent
self is bared to the nation.
Andrew Young stated that the last paragraph of this letter was
identical with the letter that had been sent to the SCLC headquarters,
but that the other portions of the letter appeared to be an earlier draft
of the letter that he had seen.34 9 Sullivan testified that he did not re-
call ever having seen the document, although it was "possible" that he
had something to do with it and simply cannot remember.
3 5 0 Sullivan
also testified that he could not recall any conversations at the FBI con-
cerning the possibility of Dr. King's committing suicide. After read-
ing the last paragraph of the letter, he conceded that it could be inter-
preted as an invitation to suicide, although so far as Sullivan knew,
14 Young, 2/19/76, p. 8; staff summary of Ralph Abernathy interview, 11/19/
75, p. 3.
" Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 112.
" The Bureau said it could not find a copy in any of its other files.
'" The letter given to the Committee by the FBI was single spaced; Andrew
Young testified that Dr. King had received "a double spaced letter and it was
about a page and a half. It was typed in a very old typewriter, very bad typing."
He was certain, however that the last paragraph of the two letters were nearly
identical. The one sent to Dr. King "was simplified and has shorter, simpler
sentences, but essentially said the same thing, especially the part about 'there's
only one thing left for you to do. . . .' I remember that vividly." (Young,
2/19/76, p. 36)
1 Sullivan, 11/1/75, p. 112. Sullivan suggested that the letter might have
been "planted" in his files.
the FBI's goal was simply to convince Dr. King to resign from the
SCLC, not to kill himself.351
When asked by the Committee what had ultimately happened to
the letter received by Reverend King, Andrew Young testified:
I'm not really sure about this now, but I think we discussed
something about a letter with DeLoach-I'm not certain
whether it was DeLoach or the local FBI agents-and they
said they would be glad to look into it. They said, whenever
we got any of these kind of threatening letters, to send them
to them, and they would be glad to investigate. That letter
may have been sent back to DeLoach.352
C. Attempts by the FBI to "Leak- to Reporters Tape Recordings
Embarrassing to Dr. King
After Director Hoover denounced Dr. King as a "notorious liar" in
mid-November, the FBI apparently made several attempts to "leak"
tape recordings concerning Dr. King to newsmen. One offer involving
the Bureau Chief of a national news publication has been discussed at
length in the preceding chapter. 15 David Kraslow, another reporter.
has told a Committee staff member, that one of his "better sources at
the Bureau" offered him a transcript of a tape recording about Dr.
King. Kraslow said that his source read him a portion of the transcript
on the phone, and claimed that it came from a "bug" operated by a
Southern police agency. Kraslow said that he declined the offer.35 4
It is not known how many other reporters were approached by the
FBI during that period; Nicholas Katzenbach testified that at least
one other reporter had informed him of a similar Bureau offer, ' and
other witnesses, such as James Farmer, have mentioned additional
"leaks" from the Bureau.11
a One FBI witness testified that he interpreted the "34 days" to refer to
Christmas, and that the FBI had apparently hoped Dr. King would resign for
Christmas. (James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings. Vol. 6. pp. 66-68.)
When asked about this interpretation, Andrew Young testified:
"We didn't think of that. We thought that he was talking about committing
suicide, and we tied the date to the Noble Prize. . . . That is the way we dis-
cussed It; to commit suicide, or that he was going to be publicly humiliated
just at the moment of his receipt of the Noble Prize." (Andrew Young, 2/19/76,
p. 37)
Carl Rowan stated during a staff interview that he had been informed by
a reliable source, whom he declined to identify, that the decision to mail the
tape recording and letter had been made during a meeting at which Director
Hoover was present. Rowan's source said that the Director was "livid" over
Dr. King's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, and that methods of preventing Dr.
King from receiving the Prize were discussed at the meeting. According to the
source, there was a discussion at the meeting concerning allegations that Dr.
King had tried to commit suicide when he was young (such allegations had
-appeared in the news media-e.g. Time 1/3/64, p. 14), and that he still had
suicidal tendencies. The source told Rowan that the participants in the meeting
had concluded that if the tape were mailed. Dr. King might be so distressed that
he would commit suicide. (Staff summary of Carl Rowan interview, 8/29/75.
p. 2.)
Young, 2/19/76, p. 38. Young's conference with DeLoach is discussed p. 169.
p.
See p. 152 et seq.
a Staff summary. David Kraslow interview.
a Katzenbach, 11/12/75. p. 91. Katzenbach was unable to recall the identity
of the reporter.
'0 James Farmer Staff Interview, 11/13/75, p. 5.
D. Roy Wilkins of NAACP meetewith DeLoach to discu88 allegation8s
about Dr. King: November 27,1994
On November 24, 1964, Director Hoover gave a speech at Loyola
University in Chicago in which he referred to moral laxness in civil
rights group. On November 27, Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of
NAACP, phoned DeLoach and requested a meeting. Wilkins told the
Committee that he had been disturbed by Hoover's Loyola University
speech a few days before, and that he had realized Hoover had been
referring to Dr. King because of rumors then circulating that the
FBI had developed "derogatory" material about Dr. King. Wilkins
was spurred into meeting with DeLoach by pointed inuiries from
several reporters about whether Director Hoover's remarks had been
directed toward Dr. King. Wilkins described his motivation in re-
questing the meeting as 'protecting the civil rights movement." He
said that Dr. King did not learn of his meeting with DeLoach until
over a week after it had occurred.357
DeLoach and Wilkins have given the Committee differing accounts
of what was said at their meeting. DeLoach's version is summarized
in a letter that he sent to President Johnson on November 30, 1964:
Wilkins said that. . . the ruination of King would spell the
downfall of the entire civil rights movement. . .Wilkins indi-
cated that [if allegations concerning King's personal conduct
and supposed connections with communists were publicized],
many of his Negro associates would rise to his defense. He
felt, however, that many white people who believe in the civil
rights movement and who yearly contribute from $500 to
$50,000 to this movement would immediately cease their finan-
cial support. This loss, coupled with the loss of faith in King
by millions of Americans, would halt any further progress of
the civil rights movement.358
A memorandum by DeLoach written shortly after the meeting states:
I told him . . . that if King wanted war we certainly would
give it to him. Wilkins shook his head and stated there was no
doubt in his mind as to which side would lose if the FBI really
came out with all its ammunition against King. I told him the
ammunition was plentiful and that while we were not respon-
sible for the many rumors being initiated against King, we
had heard of these rumors and were certainly in a position to
substantiate them.359
DeLoach's memorandum stated that the meeting had concluded with
Wilkins' promise to "tell King that he can't win in a battle with the
FBI and that the best thing for him to do is to retire from public life."
Wilkins told the Committee that DeLoach's description of the meet-
ing was "self serving and filled with inaccuracies" and denied De-
Loach's description of his remarks as "pure invention." see Wilkins
stated that he had expressed his concern that accusations about Dr.
King would cripple the civil rights movement, noting that if charges
a Staff summary, Roy Wilkins interview, 11/23/75, p. 1.
* Letter, Hoover to President, 11/30/64.
Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 11/27/64, p. 2.
Wilkins staff summary, 11/23/75, p. 2.
were publicly levied against Dr. King, the black community would
side with Dr. King and the white community with Director Hoover.
Wilkins said that he advised DeLoach that the FBI should not over-
react to Dr. King's criticisms and that he considered Dr. King's criti-
cism of the FBI's failure to vigorously enforce the civil rights laws to
be totally justified. Wilkins told the Committee that although he had
considered the meeting a "success" at the time, after reading DeLoach's
.memorandum he realized that he had failed to convey the impression
that he had intended, since DeLoach had clearly misinterpreted his
remarks.6 1
When DeLoach was asked by the Committee if the "ammunition"
he had threatened to -use against Dr. King was the tape recordings,
DeLoach replied, "I don't know what I had in mind, frankly, it's been
so long ago, I can't recall." 362 Wilkins did not remember DeLoach's
use of the term "ammunition," but did recall that DeLoach frequently
alluded to "derogatory information," although Wilkins was unclear
whether DeLoach was referring to allegations about Dr. King's per-
sonal conduct or about Communist infiltration of the SCLC.3 6 3
The following day, an official of the Domestic Intelligence Division
proposed to William Sullivan, head of the Division, that several lead-
ing members of the Black community should be briefed about Dr.
King by the FBI "on a highly confidential basis." It was proposed
that "the use of a tape, such as contemplated in your memorandum,
together with a transcript for convenience in following the tape,"
should be used.
"The inclusion of U.S. Government officials, such as Carl
Rowan or Ralph Bunch, is not suggested as they might feel
a duty to advise the White House of such contemplated meet-
ing. . . . This group should include such leadership as would
be capable of removing King from the scene if they, of their
own volition, decided this was the thing to do after such a
briefing." 363a
E. Dr. King and Director Hoover Meet: December 1, 1964
According to one of Dr. King's legal counsels, Harry Wachtel, sev-
eral prominent civil rights leaders told Dr. King of their concern that
public controversy with Director Hoover would hurt the civil rights
movement, but promised to support Dr. King should such a confronta-
tion occur. Wachtel recalled that Dr. King and his staff pondered "how
to defuse this and prevent it from becominer the principal focus of the
struggle, Hoover versus King," which "could only have lead to a divi-
sion and thus a dilution of the growing strength of the civil rights
movement." Wachtel testified:
Everything pointed toward the problem of how Hoover would
respond if Dr. King said in effect, "you're a liar; prove your
case. If you call me a liar, prove it." Every lawyer worth his
salt knows this is the beginning of the Alger IHiss type of
dilemma. Libel and slander litigation or public debate of
" Wilkins (staff summary), 11/23/75, p. 2.
3m Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 173.
a'Wilkins (staff summary). 11/23/75. p. 2.
ma (Memorandum from J. A. Sizoo to W. C. Sullivan, 12/1/64.)
famous personalities can easily lead to destruction of an on-
going movement. You end up spending your time fighting
over "truth as a defense." 36
Dr. King and his advisers settled on an approach to the problem, and
on the evening of November 30, 1964, at a public meeting in honor of
his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Dr. King announced his intention
to meet with Director Hoover to iron out their differences.
I do not plan to engage in public debate with Mr. Hoover and
I think the time has come for all this controversy to end, and
for all of us to get on with the larger job-of civil rights and
law enforcement. 3 6 5
According to Andrew Young, who was then Dr. King's Executive
Assistant, the meeting was arranged by Dr. Archibald Carey, a close
friend of both DeLoach and Dr. King, at King's request.
3 6 6
Young recalled that Dr. King had been surprised by Director
Hoover's "most notorious liar" allegation and wanted to find out what
was at the heart of the problem.3 17 Walter Fauntroy, who said that his
recollection of events surrounding the meeting was "fuzzy," added that
Dr. King had also been motivated by a desire to bring to the Direc-
tor's attention complaints of Southern SCLC workers concerning the
lack of FBI protection during civil rights demonstrations.
3 6 8
The meeting between Dr. King and Director Hoover took place at
3:30 p.m. on the afternoon of December 1, 1964. Dr. King was accom-
panied by Ralph Abernathy, Secretary of the SCLC; Andrew Young,
Dr. King's Executive Assistant; and Walter Fauntroy, the SCLC rep-
resentative in Washington. Director Hoover was accompanied by
Cartha DeLoach.
DeLoach detailed the meeting in a twelve-page memorandum which
Young and Abernathy described as "substantially" accurate, find-
ing fault chiefly with the praise of Director Hoover and of the FBI
which DeLoach attributed to Dr. King. According to the DeLoach
account, Dr. King said:
(he) wanted to clear up any misunderstanding which might
have occurred. He stated that some Negroes had told him that
the FBI had been ineffective, however, he was inclined to dis-
count such criticism. Reverend King asked that the Direc-
tor please understand that any criticism of the Director and
the FBI which had been attributed to King was either a mis-
quote or an outright misrepresentation. He stated this par-
ticularly concerned Albany, Georgia.
Reverend King stated lie personally appreciated the great
work of the FBI which had been done in so many instances ...
Reverend King stated he has never made any personal at-
.. Harry Wachtel testimony, 2/27/76. p. 46.
m United Press International release. 12/1/64.
Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, p. 13. Carey's recollection supports this
account. (Staff summary of Archibald Carey interview, 11/21/75.)
' Staff summary of Andrew Young interview. 11/19/75, p. 1.
*' Staff summary of Walter Fauntroy interview, 11/17/75, p. 1.
tack upon Mr. Hoover . .. Reverend King said that the Di-
rector's report to the President this summer on rioting was
a very excellent analysis.
Reverend King stated he has been, and still is very con-
cerned regarding the matter of communism in the civil rights
movement. Reverend King stated that from a strong philo-
sophical point of view he could never become a communist
... He claimed that when he learns of the identity of a com-
munist in his midst he immediately deals with the problem
by removing this man. He stated there have been one or two
communists who were engaged in fund raising for the SCLC.
Reverend King then corrected himself to say that these one
or two men were former communists and not Party members
at the present time . . . He stated that he had insisted that
[Adviser B] leave his staff because the success of his organiza-
tion . .. was far more important than friendship with [Ad-
viser B.] 369
According to Young, the meeting opened with a simple exchange
of greetings-not with the excessive praise of the Director reflected in
DeLoach's memorandum-and then Director Hoover proceeded to
give a monologue that lasted for some fifty-five minutes. DeLoach's
summary memorandum bears out Young's characterization of the
meeting as essentially a briefing by Director Hoover on FBI opera-
tions relating to civil rights.10
'" Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/2/64, pp. 1-2... After reporting Dr. King's opening remarks to Director Hoover. the para-graphs from the bottom of the second page to the end of'the memorandum begin:"The Director interrupted King of state ...
"The Director told King and his associates...
"The Director told Reverend King that the FBI ...
"The Director told King that many cases...
"The Director made it clear to Reverend King and his associate...
"The Director made reference to Reverend King's allegation ..."The Director made reference to the recent case in ...
"The Director explained that there is a great misunderstanding today"The Director spoke of the FBI's successful penetration of the KKK..."He spoke of the FBI's case in Louisiana ...
"The Director told the group that...
"The Director explained that in Alabama ...
"The Director told Reverend King and his associates that ..."The Director made it very clear to Reverend King and his associates...The Director told Reverend King he desired to give him some advice..."The Director told Reverend King that in due time...
"The Director praised the Georgia papers that ...
"The Director told King that he wanted to make it very clear ..."The Director explained that we have ...
"The Director spoke once again of the necessity of...
"The Director spoke of a ...
"Reverend King interrupted the Director at this point and asked..."The Director told Reverend King and his associates...
"The Director mentioned that he wanted to make it very plain that...The Director proudly spoke of the ability of Agents to ...
"The Director spoke of the Mack Charles Parker case in...
"The Director told Reverend King that in many instances...
"Reverend Abernathy stated that the Negroes have a real problem in."The Director explained that ...
"Reverend Abernathy stated that...
"The Director stated that ...
"The Director reiterated that ...
"The Director interrupted King and briefly detailed five cases ...
Congressman Young testified that neither the Director's pointed cri-
ticism of Dr. King nor the possibility that the FBI was spreading
rumors about Dr. King was raised at the meeting.3 7' Neither Young nor
Abernathy recalled any hint of blackmail, but Abernathy did remember
quite clearly that at one point Hoover "gave King a lecture reminding
him that he was a man of the cloth" and a national leader, and that he
should "behave himself." Abernathy did not discern any hint that Dr.
King had not lived up to the expected standards. He said that Dr. King
remained "very calm," thanked Director Hoover for the reminder, and
agreed that it was important for a national leader to set a moral exam-
ple. Abernathy said that the Director then told Dr. King, "If you
haven't done anything wrong, you don't have anything to worry
about." 3
Although DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting states that Direc-
tor Hoover and Dr. King discussed possible Communist influence in
the SCLC, Andrew Young testified:
He never brought up the subject of Communism at all ...
(Adviser A's) name never came up, and there was never any
discussion in our meeting about Communism or Communist
advisers.373
DeLoach described the meeting to the Committee as follows:
I fully expected it to be a confrontation. However, to the con-
trary, it was more or less of a love feast with Mr. Hoover tell-
ing Dr. King that Dr. King is a symbol of leadership for 12
million Negroes and should be careful about his associations
and about his personal conduct, and Dr. King telling Mr.
Hoover that he had not wished to cast any reflection upon the.
FBI and had no intention of doing so in the future. In other
words, it was a very peaceful meeting. (DeLoach, p. 170) 37
37 Young, 2/19/73, p. 14.
372 Staff summary of Ralph Abernathy interview, 11/14/75, p. 2. Upon reflection.
Abernathy stated that he was uncertain whether this latter exchange had oc-
curred at the December 1 meeting or at some other meeting. However, he could
not recall any other meeting between Director Hoover and Dr. King at which he
was present. DeLoach's memorandum account of the meeting does not mention
this exchange. and Andrew Young could not recall it.
In 1970, when the Bureau received a series of inquiries following a series of
stories in the press suggesting that Director Hoover had "blackmailed" Dr. King
at the December 1964 meeting by threatening to "expose" his alleged "extramari-
tal activities," the FBI prepared a form letter stating:
"I received your letter of - and would like to assure that the FBI does not
engage in blackmail activities. Also. there is not one shred of truth in the allega-
tion that this Bureau blackmailed Martin Luther King."
" Young, 2/19/76. p. 19.
DeLoach, 11/25/75, p. 170.
Time magazine subsequently carried two accounts of the Hoover-King meeting.
According to the December 14, 1970 issue of Time, Director Hoover deseribed the
meeting as follows:
"I got a wire from the Reverend King in New York. He was getting ready to
get the Nobel Prize. He was the last one in the world who should ever have re-
ceived it. He wired asking to see me. I held him in complete contempt because of
the things he said and because of his conduct. First I felt I shouldn't see him, but
then I thought he might become a martyr if I didn't. King was very suave and
smooth. He sat right there where you're sitting and said, he never criticized the
FBI. I said, Mr. King-I never called him reverend-stop right there, you're lying.
He then pulled out a press release that he said he intended to give to the press. I
said, don't show it to me or read it to me. I couldn't understand how he could have
Andrew Young agreed that there had been
not even an attitude of hostility. In fact, Hoover was very
disarming in that he congratulated Dr. King for having won
the Nobel Prize, and as far as we are concerned, this was not
the same man that called Martin a notorious liar. We at-
tributed it to the fact of his age and the kinds of possible
fluctuations that are possible with people under pressure in
advanced years.3 75
Young also told the Committee that within a few weeks of the meet-
ing, the FBI announced that it had arrested suspects in the summer
murder of three civil rights workers in the South. "So in a sense we
were reassured that the FBI was doing its law enforcement job, and we
hoped the personal tensions, as far as Dr. King was concerned, were
over and done." 376
Harry Wachtel said that Dr. King and his advisors had viewed the
meeting as a success because it had "defused" the FBI's attacks in
time to permit Dr. King to travel to Europe and receive the Nobel
Prize. Wachtel believed that Dr. King's response to Hoover's chal-
lenge prevented the FBI from succeeding in what Wachtel viewed as
an attempt to promote disputes and factionalism among the civil rights
leaders:
The factionalism that the FBI sought to create was wide-
spread. It came out in the Committee's record that they were
even seeking a new leader. In CIA terms, you find yourself a
new president of a country who is in your control . . . They
were applying to domestic affairs the type of factionalism
that they had worked on so successfully.... And you had to be
around to know that it didn't take much to disrupt this deli-
cate marriage of the leadership of the civil rights move-
ment.3 7 7
A memorandum written by DeLoach on December 12, 1964, indi-
cates that the FBI also viewed the feud with Dr. King as having
quieted. In response to an inquiry from William Sullivan concerning
prepared a press release even before we met. Then he asked if I would go out andhave a photograph taken with him, and I said I certainly would mind. And I said,if you ever say anything that is a lie again, I will brand you a liar again. Strangeto say, he never attacked the Bureau again for as long as he lived."
The exchange which Director Hoover reported to Time magazine does not ap-pear in DeLoach's detailed memorandum of the meeting. Young also denied theDirector's account, and noted that "there was a public Hoover that made remarks
about Dr. King that were more on that tone, but in the meeting, none of that kindof attitude or none of those statements were made." (Young, 2/19/75, p. 17.)
The August 17, 1970 issue of Time magazine states:
"Hoover, Time learned, explained to King just what damaging private detail hehad on the tapes, and lectured him that his morals should be those befitting aNobel Prize winner. He also suggested that King should tone down his criticismof the FBI."
Young testified, "there was nothing like that at the meeting." (Young, 2/19/76,p. 17) and DeLoach's memorandum of the meeting does not report such aconversation.
' Young, 2/19/76, p. 15.
37 Young, 2/19/75, p. 14.
m'Wachtel, 2/27/76, p. 48.
whether the remainder of the tape recordings about Dr. King should
be transcribed, DeLoach responded:
I fully agree that the work should eventually be done, partic-
ularly if an additional controversy arises with King. I see no
necessity, however, in this work being done at the present time
inasmuch as the controversy has quieted down considerably
and we are not in need of transcripts right now . . . I would
recommend that we hold off doing this tremendous amount of
work until there is an actual need.
3 78
F. Civil Rights Leaders Attempt To Dissiuade the FBI From Dis-
crediting Dr. King: December 1964-May 1965
1. Farmer-DeLoach Meeting: December 1, 1964
On December 1, 1964-apparently immediately following Hoover's
meeting with Dr. King 379-James Farmer, National Director of the
Congress of Racial Equality, met with DeLoach to convince him not to
launch a smear campaign against Dr. King. Farmer explained the
circumstances leading up to the meeting to the Committee as follows.
During the last week in November 1964, Farmer met with the editor
of a New York newspaper who said that he had been with an FBI
agent when Director Hoover's accusation of Dr. King as a "notorious
liar," was reported. The editor told Farmer that the Agent had re-
marked, "the Chief has finally gotten it off his chest." The Agent then
went into a "tirade" against Dr. King. A few days later, Farmer was
told by a reporter from the New York Post that stories about Dr. King
were being repeated in journalistic circles. Shortly afterwards, Farmer
was informed that a conservative columnist was preparing a deroga-
tory story about Dr. King, and that the FBI was prepared to back up
his allegations.
Farmer told the Committee that a CORE staff member had verified
this rumor with an FBI contact who reportedly said "the chief
wants Farmer to know" that he had no interest in "getting Farmer,
Whitney Young, or Roy Wilkins-only King." 
3 8 0
Farmer then called DeLoach, whom he considered to be a "man of
his word," and asked for a private conference. Before the meeting,
Farmer met with Dr. King and told him about the allegations. Dr.
King approved Farmer's meeting with DeLoach, but did not tell
Farmer that he was intending to meet with Director Hoover.
On December 1, Farmer conferred with DeLoach in the back seat
of a limousine while driving around Washington, D.C. Farmer told the
Committee that DeLoach began the conversation by remarking, "I
know why you wanted to come down here." He recalled that DeLoach
' DeLoach memorandum, 12/10/64, addendum. Director Hoover wrote on the
memorandum. "I think it should be done now while it is fresh in the minds of the
specially trained agents." A notation states: "Done. We have prepared 321 pp.
of transcripts, 3/26/65."
7 Deboach's memorandum of the meeting sets it at 5 p.m., after the King-
Hoover meeting. Farmer, however, said that DeLoach left the King-Hoover
meeting to confer with him. (Staff summary of James Farmer interview,
11/13/75, p. 5.)
' Farmer (staff summary), 11/13/75, pp. 1- 2 .
said that the FBI did have evidence which supported the rumors aboutDr. King, but that the Bureau was not "peddling" the information.381
DeLoach's memorandum of that meeting states:
Farmer told me that he had heard from a number of news-
men that the FBI planned to expose Reverend King by
tomorrow, Wednesday, December 2, 1964. He stated that he
and King had had a lengthy conference last night in New
York City and that it had been agreed that Farmer should
come down to see me and prevent this action being taken if
at all possible. He stated he knew that King had made a
sudden decision to come down also and that he hoped that
King's meeting with the Director had been an amiable one.
I told him that it had been.
I told Farmer that we, of course, had no plan whatsoever
to expose Reverend King. I told him that our files were
sacred to us and that it would be unheard of for the FBI
to leak such information to newsmen. I told him I was com-
pletely appalled at the very thought of the FBI engaging in
such endeavors....
I again repeated that we had never entertained the idea
to expose Reverend King; however, I wanted Farmer to defi-
nitely know that the campaign of slander and vilification
against the Director and the FBI should stop without any
delay. I told him that if this war continued that we, out of
necessity, must defend ourselves. I mentioned that I hoped
it would not be necessary for the FBI to adopt defensive
tactics. Farmer got the point without any difficulty what-
soever. He immediately assured me that there would be no
further criticism from him. He stated he felt certain there
would be no further criticism from King.
Farmer was shown DeLoach's memorandum by the Committee. He
denied that he had assured DeLoach that his or Dr. King's criticism
of the FBI would cease, that there had been any discussion of "war-
fare," and he stated that he did not know what the reference to his
"getting the point" meant.31 3
2. Young-A bernathy-DeLoach Meeting: January 8, 1965
On January 8, 1965-shortly after the tape and letter were brought
to the attention of the leaders of the SCLC-Andrew Young and
Ralph Abernathy, at Dr. King's urgings, requested a meeting with
Director Hoover.
Both Young and Abernathy told the Committee that the purpose
of the meeting was to determine why the FBI was antagonistic toward
Dr. King and to stem continuing attacks against Dr. King's character.
Young said that the meeting was prompted by the receipt of the tape
and letter.384 Abernathy confirmed this account, and added that al-
a Farmer (staff summary), 11/13/75, pp. 2-4.
- Farmer (staff summary), 11/13/76, p. 4.
' Young, 2/19/76, p. 20. Young testified that:
"We asked for the meeting because even though we thought that Hooverwasn't as bad as he seemed publicly, and we thought this was just a sort of lapsein his behavior, we still kept getting reports from the press about stories thatwere still being told, and we received the tape."
though they had not assumed that the FBI had sent the tape itself,
they did believe that the FBI had at least known about the tape and
could help in terminating the campaign of personal abuse directed
against Dr. King.38 1
DeLoach, rather than Director Hoover, met with Young and Aber-
nathy. Abernathy told the Committee that he had made it unmis-
takably clear to DeLoach they were concerned about charges bearing
on Dr. King's personal conduct.36 DeLoach's memorandum of the
meeting states:
Reverend Abernathy spoke very generally, pointing out
that people were always "making charges" and "innuendoes"
against Mr. King. . .. Reverend Young said it looked like
there were some attempts to smear and ruin the civil rights
movement; that just lately there has been some new evidence
in this regard and that very obviously the activities of Mr.
King and the SCLC are under close surveillance....
[Young] said he did feel though there must be some sort of
concerte organized campaign that was being directed against
King and the SCLC....
Reverend Abernathy stated that there were three points
they had wanted to discuss; communist infiltration, allega-
tions that King was getting rich on the civil rights move-
ment and the third point had to do with allegations about
the personal life and moral character of King. ... Abernathy
said that he was not going to make allegations against the
FBI but that some things were gping on they just could not
understand.
Reverend Young said that King had been receiving letters
charging him with immorality, that these letters attacked
his personal life.
Reverend Young said that he was deeply concerned about
irresponsible usage of personal information on the part of
scandalmongers and wondered if there could be any "leaks"
from the Government. He was assured that there were no leaks
from the FBI, that the Director ran a tight organization and
that any irresponsibility on the part of any agent would not
be tolerated.38 7
Andrew Young testified that he "thought" that he had mentioned the
letter and tape recording that had been received by Dr. King. He re-
called that DeLoach
denied everything. He denied that an FBI agent would ever
talk to the press about anything.
Question. Did you bring up the issue of whether the FBI
was tapping Dr. King's phone, SCLC's phone, or bugging
Dr. King?
YOUNG. Yes, we did. He assured us that was not true."
" Abernathy (staff summary), 11/14/75, pp. 2-3.
m Abernathy (staff summary), 11/14/75, p. 2.
Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 1/11/65, pp. 1-3.
* Young, 2/19/76, p. 38.
3. Carey-DeLoach Meeting: May 19, 1965
On May 19, 1965, Dr. Archibald J. Carey, Jr., then a Chicago
attorney who was well acquainted with Dr. King, DeLoach, and
Director Hoover, met with DeLoach to "mediate" in what he re-
garded as an unfortunate dispute among his friends. Dr. Carey told
the Committee staff that Dr. King had first brought to his attention
rumors about Dr. King's "communist sympathies" and personal con-
duct during a weekend visit to Chicago some time in May 1965. On that
occasion, Dr. King told Dr. Carey that the FBI was trying to dis-
credit him and might release stories to the press regarding his per-
sonal life in the near future. Dr. Carey told the Committee that
Dr. King did not ask him to talk with the FBI about their attempt
to discredit him, but rather that he had volunteered-to "see what he
could do." Dr. King gave his assent.8 9
DeLoach, in a. memorandum of the meeting, wrote that "Carey
told me that he wanted to enlist the sympathies of the FBI in not
letting any effort to discredit King occur." DeLoach said that he
had told Dr. Carey that "the FBI had plenty to do without being
.responsible for a discrediting campaign against Reverend King.
DeLoach ended the memorandum with the comment:
Dr. Carey is the third individual that King has had come to
see us relative to requesting that we not expose him. Roy
Wilkins, Jim Farmer, and Reverend Abernathy have all
been here for the same purpose. It is obvious that King is
becoming very disturbed and worried about his background,
else he would not go to such great efforts to have people ap-
proach the FBI. I did not commit the FBI in any manner
insofar as exposing King is concerned. To the contrary, I
let Carey flatly know of King's derelictions insofar as false
-allegations against us are concerned and of the fact that
King and other civil rights workers owed the FBI a debt
of gratitude they would never be able to repay.9 o
Director Hoover wrote on the memorandum, "Well handled."
Dr. Carey told the Committee staff that he contacted Dr. King
after the meeting and suggested that criticizing the FBI was not
the best strategy for the civil rights movement. Dr. Carey said that
he had asked both Dr. King and Director Hoover not to alienate each
other. He also said that he had been concerned less with the truth
or falsity of any of the allegations that were made than with ending
the dispute.390a
m Staff summary of Archibald Carey interview 12/21/75, pp. 1-2. DeLoach
in a memorandum concerning his meeting with Dr. Carey, wrote that Dr. Carey
had said:
"He had come to see us on behalf of Martin Luther King. He added that King
was in Chicago last weekend and stayed in Carey's home, and at that time
indicated every evidence of great disturbance. King told Carey he had been
reliably informed there was a massive effort to discredit him by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. This effort is to begin this week." (Memorandum from
Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 5/19/65, p. 1)
Dr. Carey told the Committee that DeLoach had exaggerated Dr. King's concern
over these rumours in his memorandum.
DeLoach memorandum, 5/19/65, p. 2.
* Carey (staff summary), 11/21/75, p.3.
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VII. THE FBI PROGRAM AGAINST DR. KING: 1965-1968
The public dispute between Dr. King and Director Hoover ended
with their December 1, 1964, meeting. The Bureau's covert attempts
to discredit Dr. King and undermine his influence in the civil rights
movement did not cease, however, but continued unabated until Dr.
King's death.-' Although the intensity of the FBI's campaign against
Dr. King appears to have been reduced somewhat in 1966 and 1967,
Dr. King's public stand against the war in Vietnam in mid-1967 re-
vived the FBI's attempt to link Dr. King and the SCLC with com-
munism.
A. Major Efforts to Discredit Dr. King: 1965-1968
1. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King With Churches
On February 1, 1965, The Domestic Intelligence Division learned that
Dr. King was scheduled to speak at the Davenport, Iowa, Catholic
Interracial Council's banquet and receive a "Pacem in Terris" award
in memory of Pope John. Internal Security Section chief Frederick
Baumgardner observed, "it is shocking indeed that King continues to
be honored by religious groups." 32 Baumgardner recommended that
Assistant Director Malone contact Francis Cardinal Spellman and
suggest that "in the end it might well be embarrassing to the Catholic
Church for having given honors to King." The Director noted on the
memorandum, "I see no need to further approach Spellman"; he was
apparently alluding to the unsuccessful attempt to sabotage Dr. King's
audience with the Pope through Spellman's intervention. There is no
record of any further action.
In February 1966 Dr. King held a press conference following a
meeting with the Reverend John P. Cody, Archbishop of the Chicago
Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, and announced that he and
Cody were in agreement on general civil rights goals and that he hoped
priests and nuns in Chicago would participate in SCLC programs.
The Domestic Intelligence Division subsequently recommended that a
special agent acquainted with the Archbishop brief him about Dr.
King to aid "the Archbishop in determining the degree of cooperation
his archdiocese will extend to King's program in Chicago and [to]
result in a lessening of King's influence in Chicago." 3
The Archbishop was briefed on February 24, 1966, "along the lines
discussed with Assistant Director Sullivan."*3 The agent who con-
ducted the briefing wrote that he felt "certain that [Cody] will do
everything possible to neutralize King's effect in this area." "
In April 1966 the FBI Legal Attach6 in Paris requested permission
to inform the pastor of the American Church in Paris of Dr. King's
background "in an effort to convince him that his continued support
of Martin Luther King may result in embarrassment for him and the
n Even after Dr. King's death, the FBI tried to tarnish his public image. See
pp. 183.
'"Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William -Sullivan, 2/1/65.
'-Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 2/18/66.
' Memorandum from SAC, Chicago, to Director, FBI, 2/24/66. Sullivan had
apparently suggested that the Archbishop be informed about alleged communist
influence on Dr. King and about Dr. King's private life.
' SAC, Chicago memorandum, 2/24/66.
American Church in Paris." 396 The pastor was briefed on May 9, 1966.
According to the agent who conducted the briefing, the pastor was
skeptical about the FBI allegations, but promised to keep the informa-
tion in mind for future dealings with Dr. King.397
2. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King With Heads of Government
Agencies
In March 1965 the FBI contacted former Florida Governor LeRoy
Collins. Collins was then Director of the Community Relations Serv-
ice, Department of Commerce, a position the Bureau viewed as "some-
thing of a 'mediator' in problems relating to the racial field." The
FBI told Collins that Corretta King had criticized his participation
n developments in Selma, Alabama and had said that Collins was
"blinded by prejudice." A copy of the December 1964 monograph
about Dr. King was also sent to Collins, "in view of [his] important
position relative to the racial movement." 3"
Also in March 1965 the FBI learned that the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice intended to invite Dr. King as one of 19 guest lecturers at a series
of seminars on Equal Employment Opportunities. When the IRS
requested routine name checks on the 19 individuals, Director Hoover
approved a Domestic Intelligence Division request to send the IRS a
copy of the December 1964 monograph; normal procedures were fol-
lowed in checking the other 18 people.400 :
In December 1966 Domestic Intelligence Director William Sullivan
reported that he had met with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson during
a tour of the FBI's Legal Attach6 Office in Japan and was surprised
to learn that Johnson was unaware of allegations that communists were
influencing Dr. King. Sullivan recommended that Johnson be sent a
copy of the monograph about Dr. King "because of his position." 401
Director Hoover approved the plan, and a copy of the monograph
was sent to the FBI Legal Attach6 in Tokyo for hand-delivery to the
Ambassador.402
Dr. King publicly announced his opposition to American involve-
ment in the war in Vietnam in a speech at New York's Riverside
Church on April 4, 1967. Six days later, Charles Brennan of the Do-
mestic Intelligence Division recommended the circulation of an up-
dated draft of the King monograph to the White House. Brennan's
memorandum states that the revised monograph contained allegations
about communist influence over Dr. King as well as personally deroga-
tory allegations.4os
Director Hoover approved and copies of the revised monograph were
sent to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
* Memorandum from LEGAT, Paris, to Director, FBI, 4/14/66.
Memorandum from LEGAT, Paris, to Director, FBI, 5/9/66.
3 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/23/65.
* Baumgardner memorandum, 3/23/65.
O Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/31/65.
The delivery was made shortly thereafter (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover
to Internal Revenue Service, 4/2/65).
* Memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 12/19/66.
* Memorandum from Director, FBI to LEGAT, Tokyo, 12/28/66.
' Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 4/10/67.
fense, the Director of the Secret Service, and the Attorney General."o'
A copy was subsequently sent to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
who had been interested in "King's activities.in the civil rights move-
ment but recently had become quite concerned as to whether there are
any subversive influences which have caused King to link the civil
rights movement with the anti-Vietnam War movement." The Do-
mestic Intelligence Division recommended that a copy be given to the
Marine Commandant because "it is felt would definitely be to the bene-
fit of [the Commandant] and to the Bureau.. . . ." 405
In February 1968, FBI Headquarters learned that Dr. King planned
a "Washington Spring Project" for April 1968. According to a Do-
mestic Intelligence Division memorandum, the Director suggested that
the King monograph be again revised. That memorandum noted:
Bringing this monograph up-to-date and disseminating it
at high level prior to King's "Washington Spring Project"
should serve again to remind top-level officials in Government
of the wholly disreputable character of King....
Because of the importance of doing a thorough job on this,
we will conduct an exhaustive field review to bring together
the most complete and up-to-date information and to present
it in a hard-hitting manner.40 0
The revised monograph, dated March 12, 1968, was disseminated to
the White House, the Attorney General, and the heads of various gov-
ernment intelligence agencies. 4 0 7
3. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King By Using the Press
Despite Cartha DeLoach's assurances to Andrew Young and Ralph
Abernathy that the FBI would never disseminate information to the
press, the Bureau continued its efforts to cultivate "friendly" news
sources that would be willing to release information unfavorable to
Dr. King. Ralph McGill, the pro-civil rights editor of the Atlanta
Constitution, was a major focus of the Bureau's attentions. The Bu-
reau apparently first furnished McGill with derogatory information
about' Dr. King as part of an attempt to dissuade community leaders
in Atlanta from participating in a banquet planned to honor Dr. King
upon his return from the Nobel Prize ceremonies. After a meeting
with McGill, William Sullivan reported that McGill said that he had
stopped speaking favorably of Dr. King, that he had refused to take an
active part in preparing for the banquet, and that he had even taken
steps to undermine the banquet. McGill's version of what transpired
will never be known, since McGill is deceased. According to Sullivan's
memorandum, however:
Mr. McGill told me that following my first discussion with
him a few weeks ago he contacted a banker friend in Atlanta
who was helping to finance the banquet to be given King next
Wednesday night. The banker was disturbed and said he
'" Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General; Director, U.S. Secret
Service; the Secretary of State; the White House; and the Secretary of Defense,
4/10/67.
' Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 8/30/67.
Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 2/29/68.
" Memoranda from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/11/68 and 3/19/68.
would contact some other bankers also involved and see if sup-
port could be quietly withdrawn. McGill's friend and some of
the bankers did take steps to withdraw but this was very
quickly relayed to bankers in Haiti who were on the thres-
hold of an important financial deal with the Atlanta, Georgia,
bankers. They took the position that if the Atlanta bankers
did not support the Martin Luther King party, their finan-
cial deal with these Georgia bankers was off. . . . As a result
they got cold feet and decided to go ahead with financing
King's party.
McGill told me that... , a Catholic leader in Georgia, an
Episcopal clergyman and a Jewish rabbi are also quite active
in support of this party for King. .. I told him that ... he
might want to explore very confidentially and discreetly the
subject matter with these three men. . . .
McGill told me that he thinks it is too late now, especially
in view of the financial interest of the Georgia bankers in
the Haiti deal, to prevent the banquet from taking place.
However, McGill said he would do what he could to encourage
key people to limit their praise and support of King as much
as possible.
McGill also told me that he is taking steps through [a
Negro leader] to get key Negro leaders to unite in opposition
to King and to gradually force him out of the civil) rights
movement if at all possible.409
The FBI subsequently told the White House that McGill:
believes that the very best thing that could happen would be
to have King step completely out of the civil rights move-
ment and public life for he feels that if this is not done,
sooner or later King will be publicly exposed. Mr. McGill
believes that an exposure of King will do irreparable harm
to the civil rights movement in which he, Mr. McGill, and
others are so interested and have worked so hard for; and
likewise it will do injury to different citizens of the country
who have been supporting King. . . .410
In late May 1965, a reporter from United Press International re-
quested the Bureau for information about Dr. King for use in a series of
articles about the civil rights leader. The Special Agent in Charge in
Atlanta recommended that the Bureau give the reporter both public
source and confidential information about Dr. King because the re-
porter "is the UPI's authority in the South on the Negro movement
and his articles carry a great deal of influence and [the SAC did not
believe] that he would prepare anything flattering or favorable to
King." The Director approved a recommendation that the reporter be
supplied with a public source document and with a "short summa-
tion" of allegations concerning communist influence over Dr. King to
be used "merely for orientation purposes." 411
.. Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/21/65.4 eLetter from J. Edgar Hoover to Bill Moyers, 1/22/65.
'uMemorandum from Joseph Sizoo to William Sullivan, 5/24/65.
In October 1966, the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended
that an article "indicting King for his failure to take a stand on the
[black power] issue and at the same time exposing the degree of com-
munist influehee on him" be given to a newspaper contact "friendly"
to the Bureau, "such as . . . [the] Editor of U.S. News and World
Report."
It is felt that the public should again be reminded of this com-
munist influence on King, and the current controversy among
civil rights leaders makes this timely to do s6.412
Attached to the memorandum was a proposed article which noted
that the efforts of several civil rights leaders to denounce "Black
Power" had been "undermined by ofie man in the civil rights move-
ment who, holds in his hands the power to silence the rabble rousers and
to give the movement renewed rnomeritum." The article attributed Dr.
King's equivocation to his advisers, who were alleged to have had
affiliations with the Communist Party or organizations associated with
the Party. Dr. King's decision to oppose the Vietnamese war was also
attributed to these advisers.
One project involving the mass media which the FBI felt had been
particularly successful was its attempt to prevent Dr. King from ob-
taining contributions from James Hoffa of the Teamsters Union. In
October 1966, the FBI discovered that Dr. King planned to meet with
Hoffa, but that Dr. King had wanted to avoid publicity because, in
the words of the Bureau:
Disclosure of King's transpareit attempt to blackmail Hoffa
with the large Negro membership of Hoffa's union, to solve
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's financial
Problems, would cause an uproar among leaders of organiza-
tiois having large Negro. memberships; pointing out their
own vulnerability to such a squeeze by any unscrupulous civil
rights leader. This, potential ;collusion between large labor
unions and the civil rights movement could also react to the
detriment of the Negro in that through large financial dona-
tions, an unscrupulous labor.,leader could subvert the legiti-
mate aims and objectives of the civil rights movement to' his
own purposes.414.
The Crime Records Division prepared an article for p'ublic release
raising the question of "who really gets squeezed when these two
pythons get together." 4 16 The Donestic Intelligence Division also
recommended:
a Bureau official be dedsignated how to alert friendly news
media of the meeting once the meeting date is learned so that
'Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/27/66.Q3 Director Hoover's "O.K." appears at the bottom of the memorandum. There
is also a note stating, "U.S. .News and World Reportwill not use article of this
fiatufe." It is not knowir whether the article was actually distributed.
'" 3fWmorafidum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/28/66.
" emorandum from Charles Brennan to Frederick Baumgardner, William
SBillivan, attached to Baumgardner memorandum, 10/28/66.
arrangements can be made for appjopriate press coverage of
the planned meeting to expose and disrupt it.'
Director Hoover's "O.K." app~isblow that re&nmendation.
On discovering that the meetifig was about to occur, the Crime
Records Division notified a reporter for the New York Daily News
and a national columnist. "News photographers and wire services are
also being alerted to give coverage. . . ." 1s
A Crime Records Division meiiorandukh on the following day re-
ported that "in view of publicity in the New York Daily News regard-
ing this proposed meeting, King and his aides had decided that it would
be unwise to meet with Hoffa." The Bureau then notified reporters that
Dr. King was coming to Washington, D.C. The reporters "cornered"
Dr. King as he came off the plane and quizzed hinm about the proposed
meeting. The Crime Records Division reported these events to the
Director with the assessment that "our counterintelligence aim to
thwart King from receiving money from the.Teaisters has been quite
successful to date." Director Hoover inifiaied the memorandum re-
porting this news, "Excellent." "49
In March 1967 Director Hoover approved a recommendation by the
Domestic Intelligence Division t6dfu-iish "fiendly" reporters ques-
tions to ask Dr. ,King. The- Iitelli'Oibe Division believed that Dr.
King would be',particulaily ."vuirabfie" to qfuesfions concerning his
opposition to the war in Vietnam, and recommended that a reporter
be selected to inedviW Dr.. Kiiig "osteisibly to Auestion King about
his new book," but with the obJective of bringing out the foreign-
policy as ects of Dr. Kirig's philosophy.
This could then be linked to show that King's current policies
remarkably parallel communist efforts. This would cause ex-
treme embarrassment to King.420
In October 1967 the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended
that an editorial in a Negro magazine, which criticized Dr. King for
his stance on the Vietnam war, be given to "friendly news sources."
The purpose of the dissemination was to "publicize King as a traitor
to his country and his race" and to "reduce his income" from a series of
shows given by Harry Belafonte to earn funds for the SCLC. The
recommendation was approved by the Directr and is marked
"Handled 10/28/67." 421
4. Attempts to Discredit br. King I ikh Aidfar Polilical and
Financial Leaders
In March 1965 the FBI learned that a "Martin Luther King Day"
was being planned in a major city. The Domdstic Intelligence Division
recommended that the Special Agent in. Charge "persofnally nue t
with the Governor and brief him 66ncering King" in order to "in-
duce him to minimize the affair and especially the ayiard for King."
m Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 11/3/66.
.a Memorandum from Robert Wick to Cartha DeLoach, 11/8/66.
.Memorandum from Robert Wick to Cartha DeLoach, -1/9/66.
40 Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 3/8/67. The pro-
posal was given Director Hoover's "O.K." and a liandwritten note in the margin
initialed by the Chief of the Crime Records Division tates, "handled."
a Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivdit, 10/18/7.
The Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum was initialed by
the Director and bears the handwritten notation, "handled 3-5-65,
WCS [ullivan]." 4
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In October 1966 the FBI learned that Dr. King had met with
McGeorge Bundy, then Director of the Ford Foundation, and received
a tentative offer of a grant for the SCLC. The Domestic Intelligence
Division decided that officials of the Foundation might not be aware
of the "subversive backgrounds of King's principal advisers," but
that if they were briefed, "this might preclude any assistance being
granted." Director Hoover approved a plan to have a former FBi
agent, who was then a vice-president of the Ford Motor Company,
approach Bundy.423 The ex-agent was contacted, briefed on Dr. King,
and according to DeLoach, "stated he would personally contact Bundy
in an effort to put a stop to King receiving any funds from the Ford
Foundation." 424
In a memorandum dated October 26, 1966, DeLoach reported that
the ex-agent had contacted Bundy, but that Bundy had refused to
talk with him about Dr. King, saying that he would only talk with
a person having first-hand knowledge about Dr. King, and would not
listen to rumors. DeLoach recommended that the FBI not directly ap-
proach Bundy, since "it is doubtful that contact with him by the FBI
will convince him one way or another." Director Hoover wrote on
DeLoach's memorandum, "Yes. We would get no where with
Bundy."425
5. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King With Congressional Leaders
According to a memorandum by Assistant to the Director DeLoach,
Speaker of the House John McCormack requested a briefing about
Dr. King's background and activities in August 1965. DeLoach re-
ported that he briefed McCormack for 45 minutes about Dr. King's
private life and about possible communist influence over Dr. King.
According to DeLoach, McCormack stated that "he now recognized
the gravity of the situation and that something obviously must be
done about it." 426 McCormack was not interviewed by the committee
staff.
Not all Congressional inquiries about Dr. King, however, were an-
swered -by the Bureau. For example, in January 1968, DeLoach re-
ported that he had met with Senator Robert C. Byrd at the Senator's
request. DeLoach's memorandum of the 'ieeting states that the Sen-
ator expressed concern over Dr. King's plan for demonstrations in
Washington, D.C. during the summer and said that it was time Dr.
King "met his Waterloo." DeLoach's memorandum states that Sen-
ator Bvrd asked if the FBI would prepare a speech about Dr. King
which he could deliver on the floor of the Senate. DeLoach declined
to provide any information that was not on the public record, al-
4 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 3/2/65.
4 Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 10/24/66.
" Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 10/26/66.
4 Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 10/26/66. DeLoach's
memorandum noted: "I Personally feel that Bundy is of the pseudo-intellee-
tual. Ivy .League group that has little respect for the FBI." Bundy confirmed
that he had been approached concerning Dr. King and that he had refused to
talk about Dr. King.
' Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/14/65.
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though he did promise to keep the Senator informed of new public
source items.427 The Commnittee staff did not interview Senator Byrd.
B. COINTELPRO Operation8 Against Dr. King and His Assoiate8
The FBI elevated its activities against Dr. King and his associates
to the status of formal counterintelligence programs (COINTEL
PRO) during this period.428 . In July 1966, the Director instructed
the New York field office that "immediate steps should be taken
to discredit, expose, or otherwise neutralize Adviser A's role as a
clandestine communist." 42 An agent was assigned full-time to "care-
fully review the [Adviser A] case file seeking possible counterintel-
ligence approaches." He reported that there was no derogatory in-
formation on Adviser A's personal life,430 and that the only "effective
way to neutralize [him] is by public exposure" of his alleged Com-
munist Party associations.431 None of the FBI's efforts against Ad-
viser A appear to have met success.
The FBI considered initiating a formal COINTELPRO to dis-
credit Dr. King and Dr. Benjamin Spock in May 1967 when rumors
developed concerning the possibility that King and Spock might run
as "peace" candidates in the 1968 presidential election. The New York
field office recommended postponing the effort to expose "communist
connections" of persons associated with King and Spock until they had
formally announced their candidacy. 3 2 The Chicago field office pro-
posed waiting until the summer of 1968, reasoning that by then the
Administration would have either resolved the Vietnam conflict or,
if not, the Communist Party would be emphasizing the peace theme,
and exposure of Communist Party links with the King-Spock cam-
Daign "would doubtlessly be appreciated by the Administration." 411
While the Chicago field office felt that the Bureau should not "rule
out" the use of "flyers, leaflets, cards and bumper stickers" to discredit
the King-Spock ticket, it recommended "the use of a political column-
ist or reporter for this purpose."43 Apparently no steps were taken
to implement the plan.
In August 1967 the Bureau initiated a COINTELPRO captioned
"Black Nationalist-Hate Groups." This program is extensively de-
scribed in the Staff Report on COINTELPRO. The document initiat-
ing the program states:
Memorandum from Gartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 1/19/68.
"'COINTELPRO is discussed at length in the Staff Report on OINTELPRO.
c Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, New York, 7/18/66. Allegations
concerning Adviser A's suspected Communist Party affiliations are discussed
at pp. 149-150.
" The complete absence of any derogatory information on Adviser A's per-
sonal life did not prevent the Bureau from attempting to develop such informa-
tion. In October 1967 the New York office Informed Washington it would "con-
tinue its efforts to place [Adviser A] in a compromising position" with a woman
acquaintance. (Memorandum from SAC New York to Director. FBI. 10/7/66.)
' Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI. 8/15/66.
'* Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 2/25/67.
.. Memorandum from SAC The field office noted: "Effectively tabbing as com-
munists or as communist-backed the more hysterical opponents of the President
on the Vietnam question in the midst of the Presidential campaign would be a
real boon to Mr. Johnson."
' Memorandum from SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI, 6/1/67. The Chicago
office observed : "It is emphasized that this person should be respected for his
balance and fair-mindedness. An article or series by an established -conservative
would not adequately serve our purposes."
The purpose of this -new counterintelligence endeavor is to
expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize
the activities of black-nationalist, hate-type organizations and
groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership and
supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence
and civil disorder.
Intensified attention under this program should be afforded
to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons
for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the
Nation of Islam. [Emphasis added.] 43
The Domestic Intelligence Division expanded the Black National-
ist-Hate Groups COINTELPRO in February 1968. The instructions
to the field offices listed as a "goal":
Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify and elec-
trify the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X
might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr of the
movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael,
and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position. Elijah
Muhammed is less of a threat because of his age. King could
be a real contender for this position should he abandon his
supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonvio-
lence) and embrace black nationalism. . . .36
The SCLC was retained as a "primary target" of the COINTELPRO,
and Martin Luther King's name was added to the list of persons who
were targets.'
The supervisor of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, told the
Committee that he could recall no counterintelligence activities di-
rected against the SCLC, but that several were taken against Dr.
King.
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C. The FBI's Efforts to Discredit Dr. King During His Last Months
Between 1965 and early 1967, the files indicate that Bureau concern
about Dr. King had decreased. This concern was revived by Dr. King's
April 4, 1967, speech at New York's Riverside Church, 'in which lie
opposed the Administration's position in Vietnam. The FBI inter-
preted this position as proof he "has been influenced by communist
advisers," and noted that King's remarks were "a direct parallel of
the communist position on Vietnam." 438 A week after the speech the
FBI sent the White House and the Justice Department a revised edi-
tion of the printed King monograph.
In early December 1967 Dr. King announced plans to hold demon-
strations in major American cities, including Washington, D.C., to
spur Congress into enacting civil rights legislation. The FBI followed
closely developments in Dr. King's "Washington Spring Project" for-
warding to the White House information concerning Adviser A's
' Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agents in Charge, 8/25/67.
' Memorandum from Director, FBI to Special Agents in Charge, 3/4/68.
4" Testimony, 10/17/75, p. 14.
' Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 4/10/67.
fund-raising activities and Dr. King's plans to tape a lecture series for
a foreign television system, allegedly to raise funds for the project."
In February 1968 the FBI again revised the King monograph and
distributed it to certain officials in the Executive Branch. The Domestic
Intelligence Division memorandum recommending the new monograph
stated that its dissemination "prior to King's 'Washington Spring
Project' should serve again to remind top-level officials in Govern-
ment of the wholly disreputable character of King." 441
In early March, the Bureau broadened its Black Nationalist-Hate
Groups COINTELPRO explicitly to include Dr. King.442 Toward the
end of the month, the FBI began to disseminate information to the
press "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund
raising campaign for the Washington Spring Project." The first of
many plans included circulating a story
that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people
he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more
money is needed and any contributed would only be used by
King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide
circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and
curtail their donations.443
On March 25, the Bureau approved a plan to mail an anonymous
letter to a civil rights leader in Selma, Alabama, who was "miffed"
with Dr. King, and a copy of that letter to a Selma newspaper, hoping
that the newspaper might interview the leader about its contents. The
Bureau described the purpose of the letter as calling
to the attention of [the civil rights leader] that King is merely
using the Negroes of the Selma area for his own personal
aggrandizement; that he is not genuinely interested in their
welfare, but only in their donations; that in all probability
the individuals going to Washington for the Spring Project
will be left stranded without suitable housing or food. The
letter should also play up the possibility of violence.444
There is no indication in FBI files that the letter was mailed.
, During the latter part of March, Dr. King went to Memphis, Ten-
nessee, where a strike by Sanitation Workers had erupted into violent
riots.
A March 28, 1968, Iomestic Intelligence Division memorandum
stated:
A sanitation strike has been going on in Memphis for some
time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed
of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King
was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march
developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including
the breaking of windows in stores and some looting.
"0 Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 12/18/67; memo-randum from Director, FBI to LEGAT, 12/21/67.
' Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 2/29/68.See discussion, 8upra, p. 180.
"'Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/26/68.
Memorandum from SAC, Mobile to Director, FBI, 3/25/68; memorandum
from Director, FBI to SAC, Mobile, 4/2/68.
This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence
advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could
happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washing-
ton in April.
ACTION
Attached is a blind memorandum pointing out the above,
which if you approve, should be made available by Crime
Records Division to cooperative news media sources.
The memorandum carried Director Hoover's "O.K." and the notation,
"handled on 3/28/68." 44
On March 29, 1968, the Domestic Intelligence Division recommended
that the following article be furnished to a cooperative news source:
Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike
in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott down-
town white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3/29/68
King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas lead-
ing lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and
when the violence broke out, King disappeared.
The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patron-
ized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there for his
hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn
Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively patron-
ized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of
white merchants for King, only for his followers.446
On April 4, Dr. King returned to Memphis. This time he registered
at the Lorraine Hotel. We have discovered no evidence that the FBI
was responsible for Dr. King's move to the Lorraine Hotel.44 '
"Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/28/68. An article
about violence in the sanitation strike, published in the Memphis Commercial
Clarion on March 29, 1968, echoed the wording of the FBI memorandum, although
there is no proof that the FBI was responsible for the article. The article stated:
"Yesterday's march, ostensibly a protest on behalf of the city's striking sanita-
tion workers, was generally considered to be a 'dress rehearsal' by Dr. King for
his planned march on Washington April 22." (Memphis Commercial Clarion,
3/29/68.)
'" Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/29/68.
"'Dr. King's associates and the FBI both deny that this last effort to discredit
Dr. King influenced his decision to move to the Lorraine Hotel. Dr. Ralph Aber-
nathy, who was with Dr. King during his last days, told the Committee that he
had not been aware of any newspaper articles criticizing Dr. King for staying at
the Holiday Inn during his visit the previous week. He was certain that the Lor-
raine had not been chosen because of any articles that might have appeared and
said that Dr. King always stayed at the Lorraine when he visited Memphis, with
the exception of the prior visit. In that instance, Dr. King had been brought to
the Holiday Inn by police following a riot during the sanitation strike. (Staff sum-
mary of Ralph Abernathy interview, 11/19/75, p. 2.)
A handwritten note on the FBI memorandum criticizing Dr. King for staying
at the Holiday Inn states: "handled, 4-3-68." The FBI questioned the agent
who wrote "handled" on the memorandum and informed the Committee that he
did not recall the memorandum, and did not know whether "handled" indicated
that he had disseminated the article or simply cleared the memorandum through
the Crime Records Division of the FBI.
According to the FBI, Dr. King checked into the Lorraine Hotel at 10:30 a.m.
on April 3. The FBI has concluded that "the notation indicating that the pro-
posed furnishing of information to news media was 'handled' on April 3, 1968,
would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press
prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine. . . ."
D. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King's Reputation After His Death
The FBI's attempts to discredit Dr. King did not end with his
death. In March 1969 the Bureau was informed that Congress was
considering declaring Dr. King's birthday a national holiday, and
that members of the House Committee on Internal Security might be
contacting the Bureau for a briefing about Dr. King. The Crime
Records Division recommended briefing the Congressmen because they
were "in a position to keep the bill from being reported out of Com-
mittee" if "they realize King was a scoundrel." DeLoach noted: "This
is a delicate matter-but can be handled very cautiously." Director
Hoover wrote, "I agree. It must be handled very cautiously." o4a
In April 1969 FBI Headquarters received a recommendation for a
counterintelligence program from the Atlanta Field Office. The nature
of the proposed program has not been revealed to the Committee.
A memorandum concerning the plan which the Bureau has given
to the Committee, however, notes that the plan might be used "in
the event the Bureau is inclined to entertain counterintelligence action
against Coretta Scott King and/or the continuous projection of the
public image of Martin Luther King. .. ." 447b The Director informed
the Atlanta office that "the Bureau does not desire counterintelligence
action against Coretta King of the nature you suggest at this time.48
CONCLUSION
Although it is impossible to gauge the full extent to which the
FBI's discrediting programs affected the civil rights movement, the
fact that there was impact is unquestionable.
Rumors circulated by the FBI had a profound impact on the
SCLC's ability to raise funds. According to Congressman Andrew
Young, a personal friend and associate of Dr. King, the FBI's effort
against Dr. King and the SCIT' "chilled contributions. There were di-
rect attempts at some of our larger contributors who told us that they
had been told by agents that Martin had a Swiss bank account, or that
Martin had confiscated some of the monies from the March on Wash-
ington for his personal use. None of that was true." "* Harry Wachtel,
one of Dr. King's legal counsels who handled many of the financial and
fund raising activities of the SCLC, emphasized that the SCLC was
always in need of funds. "Getting a grant or getting a contribution
is a very fragile thing. A grant delayed has a very serious impact on
an organization whose financial condition was pretty rough." 4 5 0
Wachtel testified that the SCLC continually had to overcome rumors
of poor financial management and communist connections.
The material . . . stayed in the political bloodstream all the
way through to the time of Dr. King's death, and even after.
In our efforts to build a King Center, it was around. It was
like a contamination.451
"' Memorandum from Milton Jones to Thomas Bishop, 3/18/69. [Emphasis in
original.]
7b Memorandum from SAC, Atlanta to Director. FBI, 4/3/69.
4 Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, Atlanta, 4/14/69.
"' Young, 2/19/76, pp. 25-26.
' Wachtel, 2/27/76, pp. 31-32.
Wachtel, 2/27/76, p. 49.
The SCLC leadership assumed that anything said in meetings or
over the telephone would be intercepted by wiretaps, bugs, or in-
formants. Ironically, the FBI memorandum reporting that a wiretap
of the SCLC's Atlanta office was feasible stated:
In the past when interviews have been conducted in the
office of Southern Christian Leadership Conference certain
employees when asked a question, in a half joking manner
and a half serious manner replied, "You should know that
already, don't you have our wires tapped?" It is noted in the
past, State of Georgia has conducted investigations regard-
ing subject and Southern Christian Leadership Conference.452
Harry Wachtel commented on the impact constant surveillance on
members of the SCLC:
When you live in a fishbowl, you act like you're in a fish-
bowl, whether you do it consciously or unconsciously. ... I
can't put specifics before you, except to say that it beggars
the imagination not to believe that the SCLC, Dr. King, and
all its leaders were not chilled or inhibited from all kinds of
activities, political and even social.4 53
Wachtel also pointed out the ramifications stemming from the Gov-
ernment's advance knowledge of what civil rights leaders were
thinking:
It is like political intelligence. It did not chill us from saying
it, but it affected the strategies and tactics because the people
you were having strategies and tactics about were privy to
what you were about. They knew your doubts. . . . Take
events like strategies in Atlantic City.. .. Decision-making
concerning which way to go, joining one challenge or not,
supporting a particular situation, or not, had to be limited
very strongly by the fact that information which was ex-
pressed by telephone, or which could even possibly be picked
up by bugging, would be in the hands of the President.45 4
Perhaps most difficult to gauge is the personal impact of the
Bureau's programs. Congressman Young told the Committee that
while Dr. King was not deterred by the attacks which are now known
to have been instigated in part by the FBI, there is "no question" but
that he was personally affected:
It was a great burden to be attacked by people he respected,
particularly when the attacks engendered by the FBI came
from people like Ralph McGill. He sat down and cried at the
New York Times editorial about his statement on Vietnam,
but this just made him more determined. It was a great
personal suffering, but since we don't really know all that
they did, we have no way of knowing the ways that they
affected us. "
Memorandum, Special Agent In Charge, Atlanta, to Director, FBI, 10/10/63.
'53Wachtel, 2/27/76, pp. 10, 19.
' Wachtel, 2/27/76, p. 10.
"-Young, 2/19/76, p. 16.
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THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM TO DESTROY
THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
INTRODUCTION
In August 1967, the FBI initiated a covert action program-
COINTELPRO-to disrupt and "neutralize" organizations which
the Bureau characterized as "Black Nationalist Hate Groups." I The
FBI memorandum expanding the program described its goals as:
1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist
groups....
2. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and elec-
trify the militant nationalist movement . . . Martin Luther
King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire
to this position. . . .
3. Prevent violence on the Dart of black nationalist
groups....
4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders
from gaining respectability by discrediting them....
5. . .. prevent the long-range growth of militant black
nationalist organizations, especially among youth." 2
The targets of this nationwide program to disrupt "militant black
nationalist organizations" included groups such as the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Revolutionary Action Move-
ment (RAM), and the Nation of Islam (NOI). It was expressly
directed against such leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr.,. Stokley
Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Maxwell Stanford, and- Elijah
Muhammad.
The Black Panther Party (BPP) was not among the original
"Black Nationalist" targets. In September 1968, however, FBI Di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover described the Panthers as:
"the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.
"Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the teaching
of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung. its members
have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and have
engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the
country. Leaders and representatives of the Black Panther
Party travel extensively all over the United States preaching
their gospel of hate and violence not only to ghetto residents,
'For a description of the full range of COINTELPRO programs, see the staff
report entitled "COINTELPRO: The FBI's Covert Action Programs Against
American Citizens."
'Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 2/29/68, pp. 3-4.
(187)
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but to students in colleges, universities and high schools as
well." 3
By July 1969, the Black Panthers had become the primary focus of
the program, and was ultimately the target of 233 of the total 295
authorized "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO actions.4
Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau's COINTELPRO
tactics was to prevent violence, some of the FBI's tactics against the
BPP were clearly intended to foster violence, and many others could
reasonably have been expected to cause violence. For example, the
FBI's efforts to "intensify the degree of animosity" between the BPP
and the Blackstone Rangers, a Chicago street gang, included sending
an anonymous letter to the gang's leader falsely informing him that
I he Chicago Panthers had "a hit out" on him.5 The stated intent of the
letter was to induce the Ranger leader to "take reprisals against" the
Panther leadership."
Similarly, in Southern California, the FBI launched a covert effort
to "create further dissension in the ranks of the BPP."7 This effort
included mailing anonymous letters and caricatures to BPP members
ridiculing the local and national BPP leadership for the express pur-
pose of exacerbating an existing "gang war" between the BPP and
an organization called the United Slaves (US). This "gang war" re-
sulted in the killing of four BPP members by members of US and in
numerous beatings and shootings. Although individual incidents in
this dispute cannot be directly traced to efforts by the FBI, FBI offi-
cials were clearly aware of the violent nature of the dispute, engaged
in actions which they hoped would prolong and intensify the dispute,
and proudly claimed credit for violent clashes between the rival fac-
tions which, in the words of one FBI official, resulted in "shootings,
beatings, and a high degree of unrest . . in the area of southeast
San Diego.""
James Adams, Deputy Associate Director of the FBI's Intelligence
Division, told the Committee:
None of our programs have contemplated violence, and the
instructions prohibit it, and the record of turndowns of rec-
ommended actions in some instances specifically say that we
do not approve this action because if we take it it could result
in harm to the individual.'
But the Committee's record suggests otherwise. For example, in
May 1970, after US organization members had already killed four
BPP members, the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles FBI
office wrote to FBI headquarters:
Information received from local sources indicate that, in
general, the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physical-
'New York Times, 9/8/68.
4 This figure is based on the Select Committee's staff study of Justice Depart-
ment COINTELPRO "Black Nationalist" summaries prepared by the FBI during
the Petersen Committee inquiry into COINTELPRO.
*Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/13/69.
a Ibid.
7 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13
other offices), 11/25/68.
'Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/16/70.
9 James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 76.
ly afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions
to avoid confrontations.
In view of their anxieties, it is not presently felt that the
Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in
an internecine struggle between the two organizations. . . .
The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile
feelings harbored between the organizations and the first
opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized.
It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and discreet-
ly advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order
that the two organizations might be brought together and
thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course.
[Emphasis added.] 10
This report focuses solely on the FBI's counterintelligence program
to disrupt and "neutralize" the Black Panther Party. It does not exam-
ine the reasonableness of the basis for the FBI's investigation of the
BPP or seek to justify either the politics, the rhetoric, or the actions
of the BPP. This report does demonstrate, however, that the chief
investigative branch of the Federal Government, which was charged
by law with investigating crimes and preventing criminal conduct,
itself engaged in lawless tactics and responded to deep-seated social
problems by fomenting violence and unrest.
A. The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party
and Other TWell-Armed, Potentially Violent Organizations
The Select Committee's staff investigation has disclosed a number
of instances in which the FBI sought to turn violence-prone orgam-
zations against the Panthers in an effort to aggravate "gang warfare."
Because of the milieu of violence in which members of the Panthers
often moved we have been unable to establish a direct link between
any of the FBI's specific efforts to promote violence and particular
acts of violence that occurred. We have been able to establish beyond
doubt, however, that high officials of the FBI desired to promote
violent confrontations between BPP members and members of other
groups, and that those officials condoned tactics calculated to achieve
thit end. It is deplorable that officials of the United States Govern-
ment should engage in the activities described below, however danger-
ous a threat they might have considered the Panthers; equally dis-
turbing is the pride which those officials took in claiming credit for
the bloodshed that occurred.
1. The Effort to Pronwte Violence Between the Black Panther
Party -and the United Slaves (US), Inc.
FBI memoranda indicate that the FBI leadership was aware of a
violent power struggle between the Black Panther Party and the
United Slaves (US) in late 1968. A memorandum to the head of the
FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, for example, stated:
On 11/2/68, BPP received information indicating US
members intended to assassinate Leroy Eldridge Cleaver . . .
'0 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/26/70,
pp. 1-2.
at a rally scheduled at Los Angeles on 11/3/68. A Los
Angeles racial informant advised on 11/8/68 that [a BPP
member] had been identified as a US infiltrator and that
BPP headquarters had instructed that [name deleted] should
be killed.
During BPP rally, US members including one [name
deleted], were ordered to leave the rally site by LASS mem-
bers (Los Angeles BPP Security Squad) and did so. US
capitulation on this occasion prompted BPP members to
decide to kill [name deleted] and then take over US orga-
nization. Members of LASS . . . were given orders to elimi-
nate [name deleted] and [name deleted]."
This memorandum also suggested that the two US members should
'be told of the BPP's plans to "eliminate" them in order to convince
them to become Bureau informants.12
In Novemiber 1968, the FBI took initial steps in its program to
disrupt the Black Panther Party in San Diego, California by ag-
gravating the existing hostility between the Panthers and US. A
memorandum from FBI Director Hoover to 14 field offices noted a
state of "gang warfare" existed, with "attendant threats of murder
and reprisals," between the BPP and US in southern California and
added:
In order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences
as well as to exploit all avenues of creating further dissention
in the ranks of the BPP, recipient offices are instructed to
submit imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence
measures aimed at crippling the BPP."
As the tempo of violence quickened. the FBI's field office in San
Diego developed tactics calculated to heighten tension between the hos-
tile factions. On January 17, 1969, two members of the Black Panther
Party-Apprentice "Buchey" Carter and John Huggins-were killed
by US members on the UCLA campus following a meeting involving
the two organizations and university students." One month later, the
San Diego field office requested permission from headquarters to mail
derogatory cartoons to local BPP offices and to the homes of promi-
nent BPP leaders around the country.'5 The purpose was plainly
stated:
The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP
that the US organization feels that they are ineffectual, in-
adequate, and riddled with graft and corruption.16
In the first week of March, the first cartoon was mailed to five BPP
members and two underground papers, all in the San Diego area."
According to an FBI memorandum, the consensus of opinion within
n Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 11/5/68.
"Ibid. An earlier FBI memorandum had informed headquarters that "sources
have reported that the BPP has le't a contract on Karenga [the leader of US]
because they feel he has sold out to the establishment." (Memorandum from
Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/25/68, p. 1.)
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13
other field offices), 11/25/68.
14 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/20/69.
'* Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/20/69.
* Ibid.
" See memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/12/69.
the BPP was that US was responsible and that the mailing consti-
tuted an attack on the BPP by US.'
In mid-March 1969, the FBI learned that a BPP member had been
critically wounded by US members at a rally in Los Angeles. The
field office concluded that shots subsequently fired into the home of
a US member were the results of a retaliatory raid by the BPP. 9
Tensions between the BPP and US in San Diego, however, appeared
to lessen, and the FBI concluded that those chapters were trying
"to talk out their differences." The San Diego field office reported:
On 3/27/69 there was a meeting between the BPP and US
organization. . . . Wallace [BPP leader in San Diego] . . .
concluded by stating that the BPP in San Diego would not
hold a grudge against the US members for the killing of the
Panthers in Los Angeles (Huggins and Carter). He stated
that he would leave any retaliation for this activity to the
black community....
On 4/2/69, there was a friendly confrontation between US
and the BPP with no weapons being exhibited by either side.
US members met with BPP members and tried to talk out
their differences.20
On March 27, 1969-the day that the San Diego field office learned
that the local BPP leader had promised that his followers "would
not hold a grudge" against local US members for the killings in Los
Angeles-the San Diego office requested headquarters' approval for
three more cartoons ridiculing the BPP and falsely attributed to US.
One week later, shortly after the San Diego office learned that US
and BPP members were again meeting and discussing their differ-
ences, the San Diego field office mailed the cartoons with headquarters'
approval. 2 1
On April 4, 1969 there was a confrontation between US and BPP
members in Southerest Park in San Diego at which, according to an
FBI memorandum, the BPP members "ran the US members off." 22
On the same date. US members broke into -a BPP political education
meeting and roughed up a female BPP member.- The FBI's Special
Agent in Charge in San Diego boasted that the cartoons had caused
these incidents:
The BPP members ... strongly objected being made fun of
by cartoons being distributed by the US organization (FBI
cartoons in actuality) ... [Informant] has advised on several
occasions that the cartoons are "really shaking up the BPP."
They have made the BPP feel that US is getting ready to
move and this was the cause of the confrontation at South-
crest Park on 4/4/69.24
'Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/12/69. p. 4.'9Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/17/69.SMemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 4/10/69.
nMemorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/27/69.
Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/10/69, p. 4.
'4Ibid.
'4Ibid.
The fragile truce had ended. On May 23, 1969, John Savage, a mem-
ber of the BPP in Southern California, was shot and killed by US
member Jerry Iorne, aka Tambuzi. The killing was reported in an
FBI memorandum which stated that confrontations between the
groups were now "ranging from mere harrassment up to and includ-
ing beating of various individuals." 25 In mid-June, the San Diego
FBI office informed Washington headquarters that members of the
US organization were holding firearms practice and purchasing large
quantities of ammunition:
Reliable information has been received ... that members of
the US organization have purchased ammunition at one of the
local gun shops. On 6/5/69, an individual identified as [name
deleted] purchased 150 rounds of 9 MM ammunition, 100
rounds of .32 automatic ammunition, and 100 rounds of .38
special ammunition at a local gun shop. [Name deleted] was
tentatively identified as the individual who was responsible
for the shooting of BPP member [name deleted] in Los An-
geles on or about 3/14/69.26
Despite this atmosphere of violence, FBI headquarters authorized
the San Diego field office to compose an inflammatory letter over the
forged signature of a San Diego BPP member and to send it to BPP
headquarters in Oakland, California.7 The letter complained of the
killing of Panthers in San Diego by US members, and the fact that
a local BPP leader had a white girlfriend.28
According to a BPP bulletin, two Panthers were wounded by US
gunman on August 14, 1969, and the next day another BPP member,
Sylvester Bell, was killed in San Diego by US members. 2 9 On August
30, 1969, the San Diego office of US was bombed. The FBI believed
the BPP was responsible for the bombing.3o
The San Diego office of the FBI viewed this carnage as a positive
development and informed headquarters: "Efforts are being made
to determine how this situation can be capitalized upon for the benefit
of the Counterintelligence Program. . . 1 The field office further
noted:
In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell,a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will
assist in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US.32
The San Diego FBI office pointed with pride to the continued vio-
lence between black groups:
Shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest continues
to prevail in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego. Al-
though no specific counterintelligence action can be credited
with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a
2 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69, p. 3.
n Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/13/69.
'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 6/17/69.
' Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/6/69.2'Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/20/69.
'a Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/18/69.
" Ibid, p. 3.
82 Jbid,, p. 1.
substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to
this program. [Emphasis added.] 33
In early September 1969, the San Diego field office informed head-
quarters that Karenga, the Los Angeles US leader, feared assassina-
tion by the BPP.3 4 It received permission from headquarters to
exploit this situation by sending Karenga a letter, purporting to be
from a US member in San Diego, alluding to an article in the BPP
newspaper criticizing Karenga and suggesting that he order reprisals
against the Panthers. The Bureau memorandum which originally
proposed the letter explained:
The article, which is an attack on Ron Karenga of the US
organization, is self-explanatory. It is felt that if the follow-
ing letter be sent to Karenga, pointing out that the contents
of the article are objectionable to members of the US orga-
nization in San Diego, the possibility exists that some sort
of retaliatory action will be taken against the BPP. . . ."
FBI files do not indicate whether the letter, which was sent to
Karenga by the San Diego office, was responsible for any violence.
In January 1970, the San Diego office prepared a new series of
counterintelligence cartoons attacking the BPP and forwarded them
to FBI headquarters for approval. 6 The cartoons were composed to
look like a product of the US organization.
The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that
the US Organization considers them to be ineffectual, in-
adequate, and [considers itself] vitally superior to the
BPP 37
One of the caricatures was "designed to attack" the Los Angeles
Panther leader as a bully toward women and children in the black
community. Another accused' the BPP of "actually instigating" a re-
cent Los Angeles Police Department raid on US headquarters. A
third cartoon depicted Karenga as an overpowering individual "who
has the BPP completely at his mercy ... " 38
On January 29, 1970, FBI headquarters approved distribution of
these caricatures by FBI field offices in San Diego, Los Angeles, and
San Francisco. The authorizing memorandum from headquarters
stated:
US Incorporated and the Black Panther Party are oppos-
ing black extremist organizations. Feuding between repre-
sentatives of the two groups in the past had a tendency to
limit the effectiveness of both. The leaders and incidents de-
picted in the caricatures are known to the general public,
particularly among the Negroes living in the metropolitan
areas of Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco.
The leaders and members of both groups are distrusted
by a large number of the citizen within the Negro commu-
"Ibid., p. 2.
" Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/3/69.
" Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69.
"0 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/23/70.
" Ibid., p. 1.
"Ibid., p. 2.
nities. Distribution of caricatures is expected to strengthen
this distrust.39
Bureau documents provided to the Select Committee do not indicate
whether violence between BPP and US members followed the mail-
ing of this third series of cartoons.
In early May 1970, FBI Headquarters became aware of an article
entitled "Karenga King of the Bloodsuckers" in the May 2, 1970,
edition of the BPP newspaper which "vilifies and debases Karenga
and the US organization." - Two field offices received the following
request from headquarters:
[s]ubmit recommendation to Bureau . . . for exploitation
of same under captioned program. Consider from two
aspects, one against US and Karenga from obvious subject
matter; the second against BPP because inherent in article
is admission by BPP that it has done nothing to retaliate
against US for killing of Panther members attributed to
US and Karenga, an admission that the BPP has been
beaten at its own game of violence.41
In response to this request, the Special Agent in Charge in Los
Angeles reported that the BPP newspaper article had already re-
sulted in violence, but that it was difficult to induce BPP members
to attack US members in Southern California because they feared
US members.42 The Los Angeles field office hoped, however, that
"internecine struggle" might be triggered through a skillful use of
informants within both groups:
The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile
feelings harbored between the organizations and the first
opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized.
It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and dis-
cretely advised of the -time and location of BPP activities
in order that the two organizations might be brought to-
gether and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her
due course. [Emphasis added.] 4
The release of Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, from
prison in August 1970 inspired yet another counterintelligence plan.
An FBI agent learned from a prison official that Newton had told
an inmate that a rival group had let a $3,000 contract on his life.
The Los Angeles office presumed the group was US, and proposed
'that an anonymous letter be sent to David Hilliard, BPP Chief of
Staff in Oakland, purporting 'to be from the person holding the
contract on Newton's life. The proposed letter warned Hilliard not
to be around when the "unscheduled appointment" to kill Newton
was kept, and cautioned Hilliard not to "get in my way." "
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 1/29/70.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco
Field Offices, 5/15/70.
"flbid.
Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/26/70.
42 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
"Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/10/70.
FBI headquarters, however, denied authority to send the letter
to Hilliard. Its concern was not that the letter might cause violence
or that it was improper action by a law enforcement agency, but that
the letter might violate a Federal statute:
While Bureau appreciates obvious effort and interest ex-
hibited concerning anonymous letter ... studied analysis of
same indicates implied threat therein may constitute extor-
tion violation within investigative jurisdiction of Bureau
or postal authorities and may subsequently be embarrassing
to Bureau.45
The Bureau's stated concern with legality was ironic in light of the
activities described above.
2. The Effort To Pronote Violence Between the Blackstone
Rangers and the Black Panther Party
In late 1968 and early 1969, the FBI endeavored to pit the Black-
stone Rangers, a heavily armed, violence-prone organization, against
the Black Panthers." In December 1968, the FBI learned that the
recognized leader of the Blackstone Rangers. Jeff Fort, was resisting
Black Panther overtures to enlist "the support of the Blackstone
Rangers." 4 In order to increase the friction between these groups,
the Bureau's Chicago office proposed sending an anonymous letter
to Fort, informing him that two prominent leaders of the Chicago
BPP had been making disparaging remarks about his "lack of com-
mitment to black people generally." The field office observed:
Fort is reportedly aware that such remarks have been
circulated, but is not aware of the identities of the indi-
vidual responsible. He has stated that he would "take care
of" individuals responsible for the verbal attacks directed
against him.
Chicago, consequently, recommends that Fort be made
aware that [name deleted] and [name deleted] together with
other BPP members locally, are responsible for the circula-
tion of these remarks concerning him. It is felt that if Fort
were to be aware that the BPP was responsible, it would
lend impetus to his refusal to accept any BPP overtures to
the Rangers and additionally might result in Fort having
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 9/30/70.
" There is no question that the Blackstone Rangers were well-armed and
violent. The Chicago police had linked the Rangers and rival gangs in Chicago
to approximately 290 killings from 1965-69. Report of Captain Edward Buckney,
Chicago Police Dept., Gang Intelligence Unit, 2/23/70, p. 2. One Chicago police
officer, familiar with the Rangers, told a Committee staff member that their
governing body, the Main 21, was responsible for several ritualistic murders
of black youths in areas the gang controlled. (Staff summary of interview with
Renault Robinson, 9/25/75.)
' Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68.
Forte also had a well-earned reputation for violence. Between September 1964
and January 1971, he was charged with more than 14 felonies, including murder
(twice), aggravated battery (seven times), robbery (twice), and contempt of
Congress. (Select Committee staff interview of FBI criminal records.) A De-
cember 1968 FBI memorandum noted that a search of Forte's apartment had
turned up a .22 caliber, four-shot derringer pistol. (Memorandum from Chicago
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/12/68, p. 2.)
active steps taken to exact some form of retribution toward
the leadership of the .BPP. [Emphasis added.] 11
On about December 18, 1968, Jeff Fort and other Blackstone
Rangers were involved in a serious confrontation with members of
the Black Panther Party.
During that day twelve members of the BPP and five known mem-
bers of the Blackstone Rangers were arrested on Chicago's South
Side.4 9 A report indicates that the Panthers and Rangers were arrested
following the shooting of one of the Panthers by a Ranger.49a
That evening, according to an FBI informant, around 10:30 p.m.,
approximately thirty Panthers went to the Blackstone Rangers' head-
quarters at 6400 South Kimbark in Chicago. Upon their arrival Jeff
Fort invited Fred Hampton, Bobby Rush and the other BPP members
to come upstairs and meet with him and the Ranger leadership.
49b The
Bureau goes on to describe what transpired at this meeting:
. . . everyone went upstairs into a room which appeared to
be a gymnasium, where Fort told Hampton and Rush that
he had heard about the Panthers being in Ranger territory
during the clay, attempting to show their "power" and he
wanted the Panthers to recognize the Rangers "power."
Source stated that Fort then gave orders, via walkie-talkie,
whereupon two men marched through the door carrying
pump shotguns. Another order and two men appeared car-
rying sawed off carbines then eight more, each carrying a .45
caliber machine gun, clip type, operated from the shoulder
or hip, then others came with over and under type weapons.
Source stated that after this procession Fort had all Rangers
present, approximately 100, display their side arms and about
one half had .45 caliber revolvers. Source advised that all
the above weapons appeared to be new.
Source advised they left the gym, went downstairs to an-
other room where Rush and Hampton of the Panthers and
Fort and two members of the Main 21 sat by a table and dis-
cussed the possibility of joining the two groups. Source re-
lated that Fort took off his jacket and was wearing a .45
caliber revolver shoulder holster with gun and had a small
caliber weapon in his belt.
Source advised that nothing was decided at the meeting
about the two groups actually joining forces, however, a de-
cision was made to meet again on Christmas Day. Source
stated Fort did relate that the Rangers were behind the
Panthers but were not to be considered members. Fort wanted
the Panthers to join the Rangers and Hampton wanted the
opposite, stating that if the Rangers joined the Panthers,
then together they would be able to absorb all the other Chi-
cago gangs. Source advised Hampton did state that they
couldn't let the man keep the two groups apart. Source ad-
* Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68, p. 2.
* Letter Head Memorandum, 12/20/68.
"' From confidential FBI interview with inmate at the House of Correction,
26th and California St. in Chicago, 11/12/69.
49b Letterhead Memorandum, 12/20/68.
vised that Fort also gave Hampton and Rush one of the
above .45 caliber machine guns to "try out."
Source advised that based upon conversations during this
meeting, Fort did not appear over anxious to join forces with
the Panthers, however, neither did it appear that he wanted
to terminate meeting for this purpose.490
On December 26, 1968 Fort and Hampton met again to discuss the
possibility of the Panthers and Rangers working together. This meet-
ing was at a South Side Chicago bar and broke up after several
Panthers and Rangers got into an argument.49d On December 27,
Hampton received a phone call at BPP Headquarters from Fort tell-
ing him that the BPP had until December 28, 1968 to join the Black-
stone Rangers. Hampton told Fort he had until the same time for the
Rangers to join the BPP and they hung up.49 e
In the wake of this incident, the Chicago office renewed its proposal
to send a letter to Forte, informing FBI headquarters:
As events have subsequently developed . . . the Rangers
and the BPP have not only not been able to form any alliance,
but enmity and distrust have arisen, to the point where each
has been ordered to stay out of the other territory. The BPP
has since decided to conduct no activity or attempt to do
recruiting in Ranger territory.50
The proposed letter read:
Brother Jeff:
I've spent some time with some Panther friends on the
west side lately and I know what's been going on. The
brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their
thing and there'8 supposed to be a hit out for you. I'm not a
Panther, or a Ranger, just black. From what I see these Pan-
thers are out for themselves not black people. I think you
ought to know what they're up to, I know what I'd do if I was
you. You might hear from me again.
(sgd.) A black brother you don't know.
[Emphasis added.] 5
The FBI's Chicago office explained the purpose of the letter as follows:
It is believed the above may intensify the degree of ani-
mosity between the two groups and occasion Forte to take
retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead
to reprisals against its leadership.
Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the
BPP alleging a Ranger plot against the BPP leadership;
however, it is not felt this would be productive principally
because the BPP at present is not believed as violence prone
as the Rangers to whom violent type activity-shooting and
the like-is second nature.5 2
490 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Ild FBI Special Agent Informant Report, 12/30/68.
* Ibid.
0 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/10/69.
Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/13/69, p. 1.
" Ibid;
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On the evening of January 13, 1969, Fred Hampton and Bobby
Rush appeared on a Chicago radio talk show called "Hot Line." Dur-
ing the course of the program Hampton stated that the BPP was in
the "process of educating the Blackstone Rangers." 52a Shortly after
that statement Jeff Fort was on the phone to the radio program and
stated that Hampton had his facts confused and that the Rangers
were educating the BPP.52b
On January 16, Hampton, in a public meeting, stated that Jeff Fort
had threatened to blow his head off if lie came within Ranger
territory.52c
On January 30, 1969, Director Hoover authorized sending the anon-
ymous letter. 5 While the Committee staff could find no evidence link-
ing this letter to subsequent clashes between the Panthers and the
Rangers, the Bureau's intent was clear.
5
4
B. The Effort To Disrupt the Black Panther Party by Promoting
Internal Dissension
1. General Efforts to Disrupt the Black Panther Party Mem-
bership
In addition to setting rival groups against the Panthers, the FBI
employed the full range of COINTELPRO techniques to create rifts
and factions, within the Party itself which it was believed would
"neutralize" the Party's effectiveness.5 5
Anonymous letters were commonly used to sow mistrust. For exam-
ple, in March 1969 the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a local
BPP member feared that a faction of the Party, allegedly led by
Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush, was "out to get" him.56 Headquar-
ters approved sending an anonymous letter to Hampton which was
drafted to exploit dissension within the BPP as well as to play on
mistrust between the Blackstone Rangers and the Chicago BPP lead-
ership:
Brother Hampton:
Just a word of warning. A Stone friend tells me [name
deleted] wants the Panthers and is looking for somebody to
get you out of the way. Brother Jeff is supposed to be in-
terested. I'm just a black man looking for blacks working to-
gether, not more of this gang banging.5 7
Memorandum from Special Agent to SAC, Chicago, 1/15/69.
G2b Ibid.
52c Memorandum from Special Agent to SAC, Chicago, 1/28/69, reporting on
informant report.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office. 1/30/69.
" There are indications that a shooting incident between the Rangers and
the Panthers on April 2, 1969, in a Chicago suburb may have been triggered
by the FBI. According to Bobby Rush, coordinator of the Chicago BPP at the
time, a group of armed BPP members had confronted the Rangers because
Panther William O'Neal-who has since surfaced as an FBI informant-had
told them that a Panther had been shot by Blackstone Rangers and had insisted
that they retaliate. This account, however, has not been confirmed. (Staff sum-
mary of interview with Bobby Rush, 11/26/75.)
" The various COINTELPRO techniques are described in detail in the Staff
Report on COINTELPRO.
0 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/24/69.
5 7Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 4/8/69.
Bureau documents indicate that during this time an informant with-
in the BPP was also involved in maintaining the division between the
Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers.s5a
In December 1968, the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a
leader of a Chicago youth gang, the Mau Mau's, planned to complain
to the national BPP headquarters about the local BPP leadership and
questioned its loyalty.5s FBI headquarters approved an anonymous
letter to the Mau Mau leader, stating:
Brother [deleted]:
I'm from the south side and have some Panther friends
that know you and tell me what's been going. I know those
two [name deleted] and [name deleted] that run the Panthers
for a long time and those mothers been with every black outfit
going where it looked like they was something in it for -them.
The only black people they care about is themselves. I heard
too they're sweethearts and that [name deleted] has worked
for the man that's why he's not in Viet Nam. Maybe that's
why they're just playing like real Panthers. I hear a lot of
the brothers are with you and want those mothers out but
don't know how. The Panthers need real black men for
leaders not freaks. Don't give up 'brothers. [Emphasis
added.] 50
A black friend.
The FBI also resorted to anonymous phone calls. The San Diego
Field Office placed anonymous calls to local BPP leaders naming other
BPP members as "police agents." According to a report from the field
office, these calls, reinforced by rumors spread by FBI informants
within the BPP, induced a group of Panthers to accuse three Party
members of working for the police. The field office boasted that one
of the accused members fled San Diego in fear for his life.GO
The FBI conducted harassing interviews of Black Panther mem-
bers to intimidate them and drive them from the Party. The Los
Angeles Field Office conducted a stringent interview program
in the hope that a state of distruct [sic] might remain among
the members and add to the turmoil presently going on within
the BPP.6 1
The Los Angeles office claimed that similar tactics had cut the mem-
bership of the United States (US) by 50 percent. 2
"7 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/28/69.
8 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/30/68.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/12/69.
The FBI had success with this technique in other cases. For example, the FBI
placed another anonymous call to Stokely Carmichael's residence in New York
City. Carmichael's mother was informed falsely that several BPP 'members were
out to kill her son, and that he should "hide out." The FBI memorandum report-
ing this incident said that Mrs. Carmichael sounded "shocked" on hearing the
news and stated that she would tell Stokely when he came home. The memo-
randum observed that on ithe next day, Stokely Carmichael left New York for
Africa. (Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68,
p. 2.)
* Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/17/69,
p. 1.
" Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/3/69.
FBI agents attempted to convince landlords to force Black Panther
members and offices from their buildings. The Indianapolis Field Office
reported that a local landlord had yielded to its urgings and promised
to tell his Black Panther tenants to relocate their offices. 8 The San
Francisco office sent an article from the Black Panther newspaper to
the landlord of a BPP member who had rented an apartment under
an assumed name. The article, which had been written by that member
and contained her picture and true name, was accompanied by an anon-
ymous note stating, " (false name) is your tenant (true name) " 61
The San Francisco office secured the eviction of one Black Panther
who lived in a public housing project by informing the Housing Au-
thority officials that she was using his apartment for the BPP Free
Breakfast Program." When it was learned that the BPP was con-
ducting a Free Breakfast Program "in the notorious Haight-Ashbury
District of San Francisco," the Bureau mailed a letter to the owners
of the building:
Dear Mr. (excised)
I would call and talk to you about this matter, but I am not
sure how you feel, and I do not wish to become personally em-
broiled with neighbors. It seems that the property owners on
(excised) Street have had enough trouble in the past without
bringing in Black Panthers.
Maybe you are not aware, but the Black Panthers have
taken over (address deleted). Perhaps if you drive up the
street, you can see what they are going to do to the property
values. They have already plastered a nearby garage with big
Black Panther posters.
-A concerned property owner.6 1
The Bureau also attempted to undermine the morale of Panther
members by attempting to break up their marriages. In one case, an
anonymous letter was sent to the wife of a prominent Panther leader
stating that her husband had been having affairs with several teenage
girls and had taken some of those girls with him on trips." Another
Panther leader told a Committee staff member that an FBI agent had
attempted to destroy his marriage by visiting his wife and showing
photographs purporting to depict him with other women.68
2. FBI Role in the Newton-Cleaver Rift
In March 1970, the FBI initiated a concerted program to drive a
permanent wedge between the followers of Eldridge Cleaver, who was
then out of the country and the supporters of Huey P. Newton,-who
"Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/8/69. The
FBI discovered that the Indianapolis BPP would have difficulty in new quarters
because of its financial plight, a fact which was discovered by monitoring its
bank account. (Memorandum from Indianapolis Field Office to FBI Head-
quarters, 9/23/69.)
* Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/15/69.
* Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/21/70.
' Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/22/70.
* Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/26/68.
3 The Bureau documents presented to the Committee do not record of this
contact.
was then serving a prison sentence in California.69 An anonymous
letter was sent to Cleaver in Algeria stating that BPP leaders in Cali-
fornia were seeking to undercut his influence. The Bureau subse-
quently learned that Cleaver had assumed the letter was from the then
Panther representative in Scandanavia, Connie Matthews, and that
the letter had led Cleaver to expel three BPP international repre-
sentatives from the Party.7o
Encouraged by the apparent success of this letter, FBI headquar-
ters instructed its Paris Legal Attache to mail a follow-up letter, again
written to appear as if Matthews was the author, to the Black Panther-
Chief-of-Staff, David Hilliard, in Oakland, California. The letter al-
leged that Cleaver "has tripped out. Perhaps he has been working too
hard," and suggested that Hilliard "take some immediate action before
this becomes more serious." The Paris Legal Attache was instructed to
mail the letter:
At a time when Matthews is in or has just passed through
Paris immediately following one of her trips to Algiers. The
enclosed letter should be held by you until such an occasion
arises at which time you are authorized to immediately mail
it in Paris in such a manner that it cannot be traced to the
Bureau .7
In early May, Eldridge Cleaver called BPP national headquarters
from Algeria and talked with Connie Matthews, Elbert Howard, and
Roosevelt Hilliard. A Bureau report stated:
Various items were discussed by these individuals with Hil-
liard. Connie Matthews discussed with Hilliard "those letters"
appearing to relate to the counterintelligence letters, which
have been submitted to Cleaver and Hilliard purportedly
by Matthews....
It appears . . . that [Elbert Howard] had brought copies
of the second counterintelligence letter to David Hilliard
with him to Algiers which were then compared with the ...
letter previously sent to Cleaver in Algiers and that ... dis-
cussed this situation .... 72
The San Francisco Field Office reported that some BPP leaders sus-
pected that the CIA or FBI had sent the letters, while others sus-
pected the Black Panther members in Paris. A subsequent FBI
memorandum indicated that suspicion had focused on the Panthers
in Europe."7
On August 13, 1970-the day that Huey Newton was released from
prison-the Philadelphia Field Office had an informant distribute a
fictitious BPP directive to Philadelphia Panthers, questioning New-
In September 1969, FBI Headquarters had encouraged the field offices to
undertake projects aimed at splitting the BPP on a nationwide basis. (Memoran-
dum from FBI Headquarters to Newark, New York, and San Francisco Field
Offices, 9/18/69.)
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Legat, Paris and San Francisco
Field Office, 4/10/70.
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/8/70.
Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters 5/28/70.
ton's leadership ability.1 The Philadelphia office informed FBI
Headquarters that the directive:
stresses the leadership and strength of David Hilliard and
Eldridge Cleaver while intimating Huey Newton is useful
only as a drawing card.
It is recommended this directive .. . be mailed personally
to Huey Newton with a short anonymous note. The note would
indicate the writer, a Community Worker in Philadelphia for
the BPP, was incensed over the suggestion Huey was only
being used by the Party after founding it, and wanted no part
of this Chapter if it was slandering its leaders in private.
75
Headquarters approved this plan on August 19, 1970.76
FBI officials seized on several incidents during the following months
as opportunities to advance their program. In an August 1970 edition
of the BPP newspaper, Huey Newton appealed to "oppressed groups,"
including homosexuals, to "unite with the BPP in revolutionary
fashion." 7 FBI headquarters approved a plan to mail forged letters
from BPP sympathizers and supporters in ghetto areas to David Hil-
liard, protesting Newton's statements about joining with homosexuals,
hoping this would discredit Newton with other BPP leaders."
In July and August 1970, Eldridge Cleaver led a United States dele-
gation to North Korea and North Vietnam. Ramparts editor Robert
Scheer, who had been a member of the delegation, held a press con-
ference in New York and, according to the Bureau, glossed over the
Panther's role in sponsoring the tour.7 The New York office was au-
thorized to send an anonymous letter to Newton complaining about
Sheer's oversight to strain relations between the BPP and the "New
Left." 80 On November 13, 1970, the Los Angeles field office was asked
to prepare an anonymous letter to Cleaver criticizing Newton for not
aggressively obtaining BPP press coverage of the BPP's sponsorship
of the trip.81
In October 1970, the FBI learned that Timothy Leary, who had
escaped from a California prison where he was serving a sentence for
possessing marijuana, was seeking asylum with Eldridge Cleaver in
Algiers. The San Francisco field office, noting that the Panthers were
officially opposed to drugs, sent Newton an anonymous letter call-
ing his attention to Cleaver "playing footsie" with Leary.
2 In Janu-
ary when Cleaver publicly condemned Leary, FBI headquarters ap-
proved sending Newton a bogus letter from a Berkeley, California
commune condemning Cleaver for "divorcing the BPP from white
revolutionaries." l'8
"Memorandum from Philadelphia Field. Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/13/70.
7 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
"6 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Philadelphia and San Francisco
Field Offices, 8/19/70.
* Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/31/70.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/9/70.
* Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/21/70.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and New York Field
Office, 10/29/70.
81 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 11/3/70.
Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/28/70.
a Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and New York Field
Offices, 2/5/71.
In December 1970, the BPP attempted to hold a Revolutionary Peo-
ples' Constitutional Convention (RPCC) in Washington, D.C. The
Bureau considered the convention a failure and received reports that
most delegates had left it dissatisfied." The Los Angeles FBI field
office suggested a letter to Cleaver designed to
provoke Cleaver to openly question Newton's leadership ... It
is felt that distance and lack of personal contact between New-
ton and Cleaver do offer a counterintelligence opportunity
that should be probed.
In view of the BPP's unsuccessful attempt to convene a
Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC),
it is suggested that each division which had individuals attend
the RPCC write numerous letters to Cleaver criticizing New-
ton for his lack of leadership. It is felt that, if Cleaver re-
ceived a sufficient number of complaints regarding Newton it
might . . . create dissension that later could be more fully
exploited."1
FBI headquarters approved the Los Angeles letter to Cleaver and
asked the Washington field office to supply a list of all organizations
attending the RPCC."e A barrage of anonymous letters to Newton and
Cleaver followed:
Two weeks later, the San Francisco office mailed Newton an anony-
mous letter, supposedly from a "white revolutionary," complaining
about the incompetence of the Panthers who had planned the confer-
ence.Ia The New York office mailed a complaint to the BPP national
headquarters, purportedly from a black student at Columbia Univer-
sity who attended the RPCC as a member of the University's student
Afro-American Society.86b The San Francisco office sent a letter con-
taining an article from the Berkeley Barb to Cleaver, attacking New-
ton's leadership at the RPCC. Mailed with the article was a copy of
a letter to Newton criticizing the RPCC and bearing the notation:
Mr. Cleaver,
Here is a letter I sent to Huey Newton. I'm sincere and hope
you can do something to set him right and get him off his
duff.86C
In January 1971, the Boston office sent a letter, purportedly from a
"white revolutionary," to Cleaver, stating in part:
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington Field Offices, 12/15/70.
' Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/70,
p. 2.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington Field Offices, 12/15/70. A list of 10 organizations whose members at-
tended the RPCC was forwarded to the FBI offices in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago,
Detroit, New York, and San Francisco. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to
Atlanta (and 5 other Field Offices), 12/31/70.) There is no indication concerning
how the Bureau obtained this list.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
12/16/70.
Mb Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/14/70.
o emorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 1/6/71.
69-984 0 - 76 - 14
Dear Revolutionary Comrade:
The people's revolution in America was greatly impeded
and the stature of the Black Panther Party, both nationally
and internationally, received a major setback as an outcome
of the recent Revolutionary People's Constitutional Conven-
tion. . . .
The Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention did
little, if anything, to organize our forces to move against the
evils of capitalism, imperialism and racism. Any unity or
solidarity which existed between the Black Panther Party
and the white revolutionary movement before the Conven-
tion has now gone down the tube. . .
The responsibility of any undertaking as meaningful and
important to the revolution . . . should not have been dele-
gated to the haphazard ways of [name deleted] whose title
of Convention Coordinator . . . places him in the . . . posi-
tion of receiving the Party's wrath . . . Huey Newton him-
self (should) have assumed command. . . .
The Black Panther Party has failed miserably. No longer




Students for a Democratic Society.
Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/8/71. This let-
ter was sent to Cleaver through Oakland BPP headquarters to determine whether
the BPP in California would forward the letter to him. (Ibid.)
One letter to Cleaver, written to appear as if it had come from Con-
nie Matthews, Newton's personal secretary read in part:
Things around headquarters are dreadfully disorganized
with the comrade commander not making proper decisions.
The newspaper is in a shambles. No one knows who is in
charge. The foreign department gets no support . . . I fear
there is rebellion working just beneath the surface. . . .
We must either get rid of the Supreme Commander [New-
ton] or get rid of the disloyal members. 7
In a January 28, 1971, evaluation, FBI headquarters noted that
Huey Newton had recently disciplined high BPP officials and that he
prepared "to respond violently to any question of his actions or poli-
cies." The Bureau believed that Newton's reaction was in part a "result
of our counterintelligence projects now in operation."
7 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/18/70.
FBI headquarters authorized this letter on January 21, 1971 stating that the
Bureau must now seize the time and "immediately" send the letter. (Memo-
randum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 1/21/71, p. 2.)
Shortly afterward, a letter was sent to Cleaver from alleged Puerto Rican po-
litical allies of the BPP in Chicago, The Young Lords.
What do we get. A disorganized Convention, apologetic speakers and flunkys
who push us around, no leadership, no ideas, no nothing.... [Y]our talk is nice,
but your ideas and action is nothing. . . . You are gone, those you left behind
have big titles but cannot lead, cannot organize, are afraid to even come out
among the people. The oppressed of Amerikka cannot wait. We must move with-
out you. . . . (Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/19/71; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago and San Francisco
Field Offices, 1/27/71.)
The present chaotic situation within the BPP must be ex-
ploited and recipients must maintain the present high level
of counterintelligence activity. You should each give this mat-
ter priority attention and immediately furnish Bureau rec-
ommendations . . . designed to further aggravate the dis-
sention within BPP leadership and to fan the apparent dis-
trust by Newton of anyone who questions his wishes.*8
The campaign was intensified. On February 2, 1971, FBI headquar-
ters directed each of 29 field offices to submit within eight days a pro-
posal to disrupt local BPP chapters and a proposal to cause dissention
between local BPP chapters and BPP national headquarters. The di-
rective noted that Huey Newton had recently expelled or disciplined
several "dedicated Panthers" and
This dissention coupled with financial difficulties offers an ex-
ceptional opportunity to further disrupt, aggravate and pos-
sibly neutralize this organization through counterintelligence.
In light of above developments this program has been intensi-
field . .. and selected offices should ... increase measurably
the pressure on the BPP and its leaders."1
A barrage of anonymous letters flowed from FBI field offices in
response to the urgings from FBI headquarters. A fictitious letter to
Cleaver, signed by the "New York 21," criticized Newton's leadership
and his expulsion of them from the BPP.9 0 An imaginary New York
City member of the Youth Against War and Facism added his voice
to the Bureau's fictitious chorus of critics of Newton and the RPCC.1
An anonymous letter was sent to Huey Newton's brother, Melvin New-
ton, warning that followers of Eldridge Cleaver and the New York
BPP chapter were planning to have him killed.2 The FBI learned
that Melvin Newton told his brother he thought the letter had been
written by someone "on the inside" of the BPP organization because
of its specificity." Huey Newton reportedly remarked that he was
"definitely of the opinion there is an informer in the party right in the
ministry." 93a -
On.February 19, 1971, a false letter, allegedly from a BPP official
in Oakland, was mailed to Don Cox, a BPP official close to Cleaver in
Algeria. The letter intimated that the recent death of a BPP member
in California was the result of BPP factionalism (which the Bureau
knew was not the case.) The letter also warned Cleaver not to allow
his wife, Kathleen, to travel to the United States because of the pos-
sibility of violence.94
A letter over the forged signature of "Big Man" Howard, editor
of the BPP newspaper, told Cleaver:
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston, Los Angeles, New York, and
San Francisco Field Offices, 1/28/71.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to 29 Field Offices, 2/2/71.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York and San Francisco Field
Offices, 2/3/71.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/3/71.
M emorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/10/71.
9Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/12 71.
"' The FBI was able to be specific because of its wiretaps on the phones of Huey
Newton and the Black Panther headquarters.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/19/71.
Eldridge:
[Name deleted] told me Huey talked with you Friday and
what he had to say. I'm disgusted with things here and the
fact that you are being ignored... . It makes me mad to learn
that Huey now has to lie to you. Im referring to his fancy
apartment which he refers to as the throne. . . .
I can't risk a call as it would mean certain expulsion. You
should think a great deal before sending Kathleen. If I could
talk to you I could tell you why I don't think you should.95
The San Francisco office reported to headquarters that because of
the various covert actions instituted against Cleaver and Newton
since November 11, 1970:
fortunes of the BPP are at a low ebb.... Newton is positive
there is an informant in Headquarters. Cleaver feels isolated
in Algeria and out of contact with Newton and the Supreme
Commander's [Newton's] secretary (Connie Matthews) has
disappeared and been denounced.*
On April 8, 1976 in Executive Testimony Kathleen Cleaver testified
that many letters, written to appear as if they had come from BPP
members living in California caused disruption and confusion in the
relationship between the Algerian Section and the BPP leadership
in Oakland. She stated:
We did not know who to believe about what, so the general
effect, not only of the letters but the whole situation in which
the letters were part was creating uncertainty. It was a very
bizarre feeling. 96a
On February 26, 1971, Eldridge Cleaver, in a television interview,
criticized the expulsion of BPP members and suggested that Pan-
ther Chief-of-Staff David Hilliard be removed from his post. As a
result of Cleaver's statements, Newton expelled him and the "Inter-
communal Section of the Party" in Algiers, Algeria."
On March 25, 1971, the Bureau's San Francisco office sent to
various BPP "Solidarity Committees" throughout Europe bogus let-
ters on "fascsimiles of BPP letterhead" stating:
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/24/71.
The phone call from Cleaver to Newton mentioned in this letter had been in-
tercepted by the FBI. An FBI memorandum commented that the call had been
prompted by an earlier Bureau letter purporting to come from Connie Mat-
thews: "The letter undoubtedly provoked a long distance call from Cleaver to
Newton which resulted in our being able to place in proper perspective the
relationship of Newton and Cleaver to obtain the details of the Geronimo [Elmer
Pratt] Group and learn of the disaffections and the expulsion of the New York
group." (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters.
2/25/71.)
" Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/25/71.
"" Kathleen Cleaver testimony, 4/8/76, p. 34.
" Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/71.
FBI headquarters instructed the SAC, San Francisco to mail Cleaver a copy of
the March 6 edition of the BPP newspaper which announced his expulsion from
the BPP, along with an anonymous note saying, "This is what we think of
punks and cowards." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco
Field Office, 3/10/71.)
To Black Panther Embassies,
You have received copies of February 13, 1971 issue of The
Black Panther declaring [three BPP members] as enemies
of the People.
The Supreme Servant of the People, Huey P. Newton, with
concurrence of the Central Committee of the Black Panther
Party, has ordered the expulsion of the entire Intercommunal
Section of the Party at Algiers. You are advised that
Eldridge Leroy Cleaver is a murderer and a punk without
genitals. D.C. Cox is no better.
Leroy's running dogs in New York have been righteously
dealt with. Anyone giving any aid or comfort to Cleaver and
his jackanapes will be similarly dealt with no matter where
they may be located.
[Three BPP international representatives, names deleted]
were never members of the Black Panther Party and will
never become such.
Immediately report to the Supreme Commander any
attempts of these elements to contact you and be guided by
the above instructions.
Power to the People
David Hilliard, Chief of Staff
For Huey P. Newton
Supreme Commander.98
On the same day, FBI headquarters formally declared its counter-
intelligence program simed at "aggravating dissension" between New-
ton and Cleaver a success. A letter to the Chicago and San Francisco
Field Offices stated:
Since the differences 'between Newton and Cleaver now
appear to be irreconcilable, no further counterintelligence
activity in this regard will be undertaken at this time and
now new targets must be established.
- David Hilliard and Elbert "Big Man" Howard of National
Headquarters and Bob Rush of Chicago BPP Chapter are
likely future targets....
Hilliard's key position at National Headquarters makes
him an outstanding target.
Howard and Rush are also key Panther functionaries; and
since it was necessary for them to affirm their loyalty to New-
ton in "The Black Panther" newspaper of 3/20/71, they must
be under a certain amount of suspicion already, making them
prime targets.
San Francisco and Chicago furnish the Bureau their com-
ments and recommendations concerning counterintelligence
activity designed to cause Newton to expell Hilliard, Howard
and Rush. 9
" This letter was contained in a memorandum from San Francisco Field Office
to FBI Headquarters, 3/16/71, pp. 1-2.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and Chicago Field
Offices, 3/25/71.
C. Covert Efforts To Undermine Support of the Black Panther Party
and to Destroy the Party's Public Image
1. Efforts To Discourage and To Discredit Supporters of the
Black Panthers
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's program to "neutralize"
the Black Panther Party included attempts to deter individuals and
groups from supporting the Panthers and, when that could not be
accomplished, often extended to covert action targeted against those
supporters.
The Bureau made a series of progressively more severe efforts to
destroy the confidence between the Panthers and one of their major
California supporters, Donald Freed, a writer who headed an or-
ganization of white BPP sympathizers called "Friends of the Pan-
thers." In July 1969, the Los Angeles Field Office sent the local BPP
office a memorandum bearing Freed's name and address to "Friends
of the Panthers." Written in a condescending tone and including a
list of six precautions whites should keep in mind when dealing with
Panthers, the memorandum was calculated to cause a "rift between
the Black Panther Party and their assisting organizations." 100 A few
days later, the Bureau had leaflets placed in a park near a BPP-
sponsored national conference in Oakland, California, alleging that
Freed was a police informant.'0 '
The FBI viewed with favor an intensive local investigation of Freed
for "harboring" and "possession of illegal firearms."
It is felt that any prosecution or exposure of either Freed or
[name deleted] will severely hurt the BPP. Any exposure
will not only deny the Panthers money, but additionally,
would cause other white supporters of the BPP to withdraw
their support. It is felt that the Los Angeles chapter of the
BPP could not operate without the financial support of
white sympathizers. 0 2
The Bureau's Los Angeles Division also arranged for minutes of
a BPP support group to be provided to the BPP when it was learned
that statements of members of the support group were critical of
Panther leaders.' 0 3
The FBI attempted to disaffect another BPP supporter, Ed Pearl
of the Peace and Freedom Party, by sending him a cautionary letter
bearing a fictitious signature. A Bureau memorandum describing the
letter says:
The writer states that although he is not a member of the
BPP, he is a Mexican who is trusted by BPP members. The
writer advises that he has learned from BPP members that
certain whites in the PFP who get in the way of the Panthers
will be dealt with in a violent manner. The object sought in
this letter is to cause a breach between the PFP and the BPP.
The former organization had been furnishing money and
support to the latter. 10
'"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 7/25/69.
'c Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/28/169.
' Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/24/69.
* Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/29/69,
p. 1.
"' Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 12/27/68.
Famous entertainment personalities who spoke in favor of Panther
goals or associated with BPP members became the targets of FBI
programs. When the FBI learned that one well-known Hollywood
actress had become pregnant during an affair with a BPP member,
it reported this information to a famous Hollywood gossip columnist
in the form of an anonymous letter. The story was used by the Holly-
wood columnist.o1 In June 1970, FBI headquarters approved an
anonymous letter informing Hollywood gossip columnist Army
Archerd that actress Jane Fonda had appeared at a BPP fund-raising
function, noting that "It can be expected that Fonda's involvement
with the BPP cause could detract from her status with the general
public if reported in a Hollywood 'gossip column.' ', 106 The wife of
a famous Hollywood actor was targeted by the FBI when it discovered
that she was a financial contributor and supporter of the BPP in Los
Angeles."o, A caricature attacking her was prepared by the San Diego
FBI office.10
A famous entertainer was also targeted after the Bureau concluded
that he supported the Panthers. Two COINTELPRO actions against
this individual were approved because FBI headquarters "believed"
they:
would be an effective means of combating BPP fund-raising
activities among liberal and naive individuals.10
The Bureau also contacted the employers of BPP contributors. It
sent a letter to the President and a Vice-President of Union Carbide in
January 1970 after learning that a production manager in its San
Diego division contributed to the BPP. The letter, which centered
around a threat not to purchase Union Carbide stock, stated in part:
Dear Mr. -[name deleted]:
I am writing to you in regards to an employee in your San
Diego operation, [name deleted]....
I am not generally considered a flag-waving exhibition-
ist, but I do regard myself as being a loyal American citizen.
I, therefore, consider it absolutely ludicrous to invest in any
corporation whose ranking employees support, assist, and
encourage any organization which openly advocates the vio-
lent overthrow of our free enterprise system.
It is because of my firm belief in this self-same free enter-
prise, capitalistic system that I feel morally obligated to




San Diego, California 110
10 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/70.xw Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 6/25/70.
.o. Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/3/70.
... Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/70.
'
0 oMemorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 3/5/70.
Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/22/70.
The name "T. F. Ellis" is completely fictitious and the Post Office Box could not
have been traced to the FBI.
The response of Union Carbide's Vice President was reported in a
San Diego Field Office memorandum:
On 3/21/70, a letter was received from Mr. [name deleted],
Vice President of the Union Carbide Corporation, concern-
ing a previously Bureau-approved letter sent to the Union
Carbide Corporation objecting to the financial and other sup-
port to the BPP of one of their employees, [name deleted].
The letter indicated that Union Carbide has always made it
a policy not to become involved in personal matters of their
employees unless such activity had an adverse affect upon
that particular employee's performance."n
One of the Bureau's prime targets was the BPP's free "Breakfast
for Children" program, which FBI headquarters feared might be a
potentially successful effort by the BPP to teach children to hate
police and to spread "anti-white propaganda." 112 In an admitted at-
tempt "to impede their contributions to the BPP Breakfast Program,"
the FBI sent anonymous letters and copies of an inflammatory Blck
Panther Coloring Book for children to contributors, including Safe-
way Stores, Inc., Mayfair Markets, and the Jack-In-The-Box Cor-
poration.113
On April 8, 1976 in Executive Testimony a former member of the
BPP Central Steering Committee stated that when the coloring book
came to the attention of the Panther's national leadership, Bobby
Seale ordered it destroyed because the book "did not correctly reflect
the ideology of the Black Panther Party . . . 114
Churches that permitted the Panthers to use their facilities in the
free breakfast program were also targeted. When the FBI's San Diego
office discovered that a Catholic Priest, Father Frank Curran, was
permitting his church in San Diego to be used as a serving place for
the BPP Breakfast Program, it sent an anonymous letter to the
Bishop of the San Diego Diocese informing him of the priest's ac-
tivities.11 In August 1969, the San Diego Field Office requested per-
mission from headquarters to place three telephone calls protesting
Father Curran's support of the BPP program to the Auxiliary Bishop
of the San Diego Diocese:
All of the above calls will be made from "parishioners" ob-
jecting to the use of their church to assist a black militant
cause. Two of the callers will urge that Father Curran be re-
moved as Pastor of the church, and one will threaten suspen-
sion of financial support of the church if the activities of
the Pastor are allowed to continue.
Fictitious names will be utilized in the event a name is re-
quested by the Bishop. It is felt that complaints, if they do
not effect the removal of Father Curran . . . will at least
result in Father Curran becoming aware that his Bishop is
n. Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/70.
112 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 7/30/69.
n. Ibid.; Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/30/70.
" K. Cleaver, 4/8/76, p. 16.
* Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/29/69;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 9/9/69.
cognizant of his activities and will thus result in a curtail-
ment of these activities.11
After receiving permission and placing the calls, the San Diego office
reported: "the Bishop appeared to be . . . quite concerned over the
fact that one of his Priests was deeply involved in utilization of church
facilities for this purpose." "1,
A month later, the San Diego office reported that Father Curran
had been transferred from the San Diego Diocese to "somewhere in
the State of New Mexico for permanent assignment."
In view of the above, it would appear that Father Curran
has now been completely neutralized.
The BPP Breakfast Program, without the prompting of
Father Curran, has not been renewed in the San Diego area.
It is not anticipated at this time that any efforts to re-estab-
lish the program will be made in the foreseeable future.'1 8
In another case, the FBI sent a letter to the superior of a clergyman
in Hartford, Connecticut who had expressed support for the Black
Panthers, which stated in part:
Dear BisHor:
It pains me to have to write this letter to call to your at-
tention a matter which, if brought to public light, may cause
the church a great deal of embarrassment. I wish to remain
anonymous with regard to the information because in divulg-
ing it I may have violated a trust. I feel, however, that what
I am writing is important enough that my conscience is clear.
Specifically, I'm referring to the fact that Reverend and
Mrs. [name deleted] are associating with leaders of the Black
Panther Party. I recently heard through a close friend of Rev-
erend [name deleted] that he is a revolutionist who advocates
overthrowing the Government of the United States and that
he has turned over a sizable sum of money to the Panthers.
I can present no evidence of fact but is it possible Reverend
[name deleted] is being influenced by Communists? Some
statements he has made both in church and out have led me to
believe he is either a Communist himself, or so left-wing that
the only thing he lacks is a card.
I beseech you to counsel with Reverend [name deleted] and
relay our concern over his political philosophies which among
other things involves association with a known revolutionist,
[name deleted], head of the Black Panther Party in New
Haven. I truly believe Reverend [name deleted] to be a good
man, but his fellow men have caused him to go overboard




"'Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/29/69.
"'Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/18/69.
"' Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/6/69,
p. 3.
" Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69,
p. 3 .
Anonymous FBI mailings were also sent to public officials and
persons whose help might sway public opinion against the BPP. In
December 1969, the FBI mailed Bureau-reproduced copies of BPP
"Seasons Greetings" cards to ten FBI field offices 120 with the follow-
ing instructions:
Enclosed for each office are 20 copies of reproductions of
three types of Black Panther Party (BPP) "seasons greetings
cards" which depict the violent propensities of this organiza-
tion. You should anonymously mail these cards to those news-
paper editors, public officials, responsible businessmen, and
clergy in your territory who should be made aware of the
vicious nature of the BPP.121
The San Francisco office mailed its cards to several prominent local
persons and organizations.22
The Bureau also targeted attorneys representing Black Panther
members. In July 1969, the Los Angeles Field Office suggested that a
break between the BPP membership and Charles Garry, an attorney
who frequently represented BPP members, might be accomplished by
planting a rumor that Garry, Bobby Seale, and David Hilliard were
conspiring to keep BPP leader Huey Newton in jail.123 This proposal
was rejected by FBI headquarters out of concern that the Bureau
might be recognized as the source of the rumor.12
4 Headquarters did
suggest, however:
Los Angeles should review the ideas set forth . .. especially
as they pertain to Charles Garry, Bobby Seale, and David
Hilliard, and prepare a specific counterintelligence proposal
designed to create a breach between the BPP and Garry,
Consider such things as anonymous communications and
anonymous telephone calls as well as cartoons and other logi-
cal methods of transporting your idea.1'
When the San Francisco Division learned that Garry intended to
represent Bobby Seale at the Chicago 7 trial, it sent the Chicago office
transcripts of hearings before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and the California State Senate's Report on Un-American
Activities, which allegedly showed that Garry was connected with the
Communist Party. It was intended to distribute this material "to co-
operative news media in that city." 126
' The offices were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles,
Newark, New Haven, New York, San Diego, and San Francisco.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore (and 9 other Field
Offices), 12/24/69, p. 1.
" These included the Mayor; the Glide Foundation (church foundation);
Catholic Archdiocese of San Francisco; Episcopal Diocese of California; Lu-
theran Church; Editor, San Francisco Chronicle; Editor, San Francisco
Exraminer; United Presbyterian Church, San Francisco Conference of Christians
and Jews; San Francisco Chamber of Commerce; San Francisco Bar Association;
and San Francisco Board of Supervisors. (Memorandum from San Francisco
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/12/70.)
m Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/1/69.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 7/14/69.
12Ibid.
" Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquartrs, 10/6/69.
Similarly, when two local BPP leaders filed suit against the San
Diego Police Department charging harassment, illegal arrest, and
illegal searches, the San Diego Field Office reviewed its files
to determine if any public source information is available
which describes [the attorney's] activities in behalf of CP
(Communist Party) activities. If so, an appropriate request
will be forwarded to the Bureau concerning a possible letter to
the editor and/or an editorial.1 2 1
The FBI also sought to destroy community support for individual
BPP members by spreading rumors that they were immoral. This idea
was originally advanced in an August 1967 memorandum from FBI
headquarters to all major field offices:
Many individuals currently active in black nationalist orga-
nizations have backgrounds in immorality, subversive ac-
tivity, and criminal records. Through your investigation of
key agitators, you should endeavor to establish their unsavory
backgrounds. Be alert to determine evidence of misappropria-
tion of funds or other types of personal misconduct on the
part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical or war-
ranted counterintelligence may be instituted. 2 8
An example of "successful" implementation of this program was a
1970 report from the San Diego Field Office that it had anonymously
informed the parents of a teenage girl that she was pregnant by a
local Panther leader:
The parents showed extreme concern over a previously un-
known situation and [name deleted] was forced to resign
from the BPP and return home to live. It also became gen-
eral knowledge throughout the Negro community that a BPP
leader was responsible for the difficulty being experienced by
[name deleted]. 129
The field office also considered the operation successful because the
mother of another girl questioned the activities of her own daughter
after talking with the parent the agents had anonymously contacted.
She learned that her daughter, a BPP member, was also pregnant, and
had her committed to a reformatory as a wayward juvenile.130
2. Efforts To Promote Criticism of the Black Panthers in the
Mass Media and To Prevent the Black Panther Party and
Its Sympathizers from Expressing Their Views
The FBI's program to destroy the Black Panther Party included
a concerted effort to muzzle Black Panther publications to prevent
Panther members and persons sympathetic to their aims from express-
ing their views, and to encourage the mass media to report stories un-
favorable to the Panthers.
Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/2/70.
12 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albany (and 22 other Field Of-
flees), 8/25/67, p. 2.
m Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/17/70,
p. 3.
Lw Ibid., p. 5.
In May 1970, FBI headquarters ordered the Chicago, Los Angeles,
Miami, Newark, New Haven, New York, San Diego, and San Fran-
cisco field offices to advance proposals for crippling the BPP news-
paper, The Black Panther. Immediate action was deemed necessary
because:
The Black Panther Party newspaper is one of the most
effective propaganda operations of the BPP.
Distribution of this newspaper is increasing at a regular
rate thereby influencing a greater number of individuals in
the United States along the black extremist lines.
Each recipient submit by 6/5/70 proposed counterintelli-
gence measures which will hinder the vicious propaganda be-
ing spread by the BPP.
The BPP newspaper has a circulation in excess of 100,000
and has reached the height of 139,000. It is the voice of the
BPP and if it could be effectively hindered it would result in
helping to cripple the BPP. Deadline being set in view of the
need to receive recommendations for the purpose of taking
appropriate action expeditiously.1 3'
The San Francisco Field Office submitted an analysis of the local
Black Panther printing schedules and circulation. It discouraged dis-
ruption of nationwide distribution because the airline company which
had contracted with the Panthers might lose business or face a law
suit and recommended instead:
a vigorous inquiry by the Internal Revenue Service to have
"The Black Panther" report their income from the sale of
over 100,000 papers each week. Perhaps the Bureau through
liaison at SOG [seat of government] could suggest such a
course of action. It is noted that Internal Revenue Service at
San Francisco is receiving copies of Black Panther Party
funds and letterhead memoranda.
It is requested that the Bureau give consideration to dis-
cussion with Internal Revenue Service requesting financial
records and income tax return for "The Black Panther." 132
The San Diego Field Office, while noting that the BPP newspaper
had the same legal immunity from tax laws and other state legislation
as other newspapers, suggested three California statutes which might
be used against The Black Panther. One was a State tax on printing
equipment; the second a "rarely used transportation tax law"; and
the third a law prohibiting business in a residential area.13 3
The San Diego Field Ofce had a more imaginative suggestion how-
ever; spray the newspaper printing room with a foul-smelling
chemical:
The Bureau may also wish to consider the utilization of
"Skatol", which is a chemical agent in powdered form and
when applied to a particular surface emits an extremely
noxious odor rendering the premises surrounding the point of
application uninhabitable. Utilization of such a chemical of
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago (and seven other Field
Offices), 5/15/70.
.' Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/22/70.
ma Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/20/70.
course, would be dependent upon whether an entry could be
achieved into the area -which is utilized for the production of -
"The Black Panther." 134
The San Diego Division also thought that threats from another
radical organization against the newspaper might convince the BPP
to cease publication:
Another possibility which the Bureau may wish to consider
would be the composition and mailing of nunerous letters
to BPP Headquarters from various points throughout the
country on stationary .[sic] containing-the national emblem
of the Minutemen organization. These letters, in several dif-
ferent forms, would all have the common theme of warning
the Black Panthers to cease publication or drastic measures
would be taken by the Minutemen organization....
Utilization of the Minutemen organization through direc-
tion of informants within that group would also be a very
effective measure for the disruption of the publication of this
newspaper. 1 35
On another occasion, however, FBI agents contacted United Air-
lines officials and inquired about the rates being charged for transport-
ing the Black Panther magazine. A Bureau memorandum states that
the BPP was being charged "the General Rate" for printed material,
but that in the future it would be forced to pay the "full legal rate
allowable for newspaper shipment." The memorandum continued:
Officials advise this increase . . . means approximately a
forty percent increase. Officials agree to determine consignor
in San Francisco and from this determine consignees
throughout the United States so that it can impose full legal
tariff. They believe the airlines are due the differences in
freight tariffs as noted above for past six to eight months, and
are considering discussions with their legal staff concerning
suit for recovery of deficit. . . . (T)hey estimate that in New
York alone will exceed ten thousand dollars. 36
In August 1970, the New York Field Office reported that it was con-
sidering plans:
directed against (1) the production of the BPP newspaper;
(2) the 'distribution of that newspaper and (3) the use of
information contained in particular issues for topical counter-
intelligence proposals.
The NYO [New York Office] realizes the financial benefits
coming to the BPP through the sale of their newspaper.
Continued efforts will be made to derive logical and practical
plans to thwart this crucial BPP operation.13 7
A few months later, FBI headquarters directed 39 field offices to dis-
tribute copies of a column written by Victor Riesel, a labor colunnist,
m Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/20/70, p. 2.
m Ibid., p. 3.
m Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters and San
Francisco Field Office, 10/11/69.
Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/19/70.
calling for a nationwide union boycott 'against handling the BPP
newspaper.
Enclosed for each office are 50 reproductions of a column
written by Victor Riesel regarding the Black Panther Party
(BPP).
Portions of the column deals with proposal that union
members refuse to handle shipments of BPP newspapers.
Obviously if such a boycott gains national support it will
result in effectively cutting off BPP propaganda and finances,
therefore, it is most desirable this proposal be brought to at-
tention of members 'amnd officials of unions such as Teamsters
and others involved in handling of shipments of BPP news-
papers. These shipments are generally by air freight. The
column also deals with repeated calls for murder of police
that appear in BPP paper; therefore, it would also be desir-
able to bring boycott proposal to attention of members and of-
ficials of police associations who might be in a position to
encourage boycott.
Each office anonymously mail copies of enclosed to offi-
cials of appropriate unions, police organizations or other in-
dividuals within its territory who could encourage such a
boycott....
Handle promptly and advise Bureau of any positive re-
sults noted. Any publicity observed concerning proposed boy-
cott should be brought to attention of Bureau.
Be alert for any other opportunities to further exploit
this proposal.' 8
Bureau documents submitted to the Select Committee staff do not
indicate the outcome of this plan.
On one occasion the FBI's Racial Intelligence Section concocted
a scheme to create friction between the Black Panthers and the Na'-
tion of Islam by reducing sales of the NOI paper, Muhammed Speaks:
While both papers advocate white hate, a noticeable loss
of revenue to NOI due to decreased sales of their paper
caused by the BPP might well be the spark to ignite the fuel
of conflict between the two organizations. Both are extremely
money conscious.
We feel that our network of racial informants, many of
whom are directly involved in the sale of the NOI and BPP
newspapers, are in a position to cause a material reduction in
NOI newspaper sales. Our sources can bring the fact of reve-
nue loss directly to NOI leader, Elijah Muhammad, who
might well be influenced to take positive steps to counteract
the sale of BPP papers in the Negro community. We feel
that with careful planning and close supervision an open
dispute can be developed between the two organizations. 39
FBI headquarters promptly forwarded this suggestion to the field
offices in Chicago, New York, and San Francisco with the express
hope that Elijah Muhammed might be influenced "to take positive
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to SAC's in 39 cities, 11/10/70.
" Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 6/26/70.
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steps to counteract the sale of BPP newspapers in the Negro com-
munity." 140 The following month, the Chicago Field Office advised
against using informants for this project because animosity was al-
ready developing between the BPP and NOI, and any revelation of a
Bureau attempt to encourage conflict might serve to bring the BPP
and NOI closer together.1"
Numerous attempts were made to prevent Black Panthers from
airing their views in public. For example, in February 1969, the FBI
joined with the Chicago police force to prevent the local BPP leader,
Fred Hampton, from appearing on a television talk show. The FBI
memorandum explaining this incident states:
the [informant] also enabled Chicago to further harass the
local BPP when he provided information the afternoon of
1/24/69 reflecting that Fred Hampton was to appear that
evening at local TV studio for video tape interview. . . . The
tape was to be aired the following day.
Chicago was aware a warrant for mob action was outstand-
ing for Hampton in his home town and the above informa-
tion . . . was provided the May wood Police Department with
a suggestion that they request the Chicago Police Department
to serve this arrest warrant. This was subsequently done with
Hampton arrested at television studio in presence of 25 BPP
members and studio personnel. This caused considerable em-
barrassment to the local BPP and disrupted the plans for
Hampton's television appearance. 1 42
Headquarters congratulated the Chicago Field Office on the timing of
the arrest "under circumstances which proved highly embarrassing
to the BPP." 143
The Bureau's San Francisco office took credit for preventing Bobby
Seale from keeping a number of speaking engagements in Oregon and
Washington. In May 1969, while Seale was traveling from a speaking
engagement at Yale University to begin his West Coast tour, a bomb-
ing took place in Eugene, Oregon which the FBI suspected involved
the Black Panthers. The San Francisco Field Office subsequently
reported:
As this was on the eve of Seale's speech, this seemed to be
very poor advance publicity for Seale. . . . It was . . . de-
termined to telephone Mrs. Seale [Bobby Seale's mother]
claiming to be a friend from Oregon, bearing the warning that
it might be dangerous for Seale to come up. This was done.
Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Seale reported this to BPP head-
quarters, claiming an unknown brother had sent a warning
to Bobby from Oregon. Headquarters took this very seriously
and when Bobby arrived shortly thereafter, he decided not to
go north with "all the action going on up there." He subse-
quently cancelled a trip to Seattle. It is believed that the
'4 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago, New York, and San
Francisco Field Offices, 6/26/70.
'n Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/15/70.
Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/10/69.
14 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 2/20/69.
above mentioned telephone call was a pivotal point in persuad-
ing Seale to stay home.1"
The San Francisco office reported that not only had Seale been pre-
vented from making his appearances, but that he had lost over $1,700
in "badly needed" fees and that relations between Seale and "New
Left" leaders who had been scheduled to appear with him had become
strained.
In December 1969, FBI headquarters stressed to the San Francisco
Field Office the need to prevent Black Panther speaking engagements:
Several recent communications received at the Bureau indi-
cate the BPP is encouraging their branches to set up speaking
engagements at schools and colleges and the showing of films
in order to raise money. . . San Francisco should instruct
[local FBI] office covering to immediately submit to the Bu-
reau for approval a counterintelligence proposal aimed at pre-
venting the activities scheduled. . . .
The BPP in an effort to bolster its weak financial position
is now soliciting speaking engagements and information has
been developed indicating they are reducing their monetary
requirements for such speeches. We have been successful in
the past through contacts with established sources in prevent-
ing such speeches in colleges or other institutions. 
4 5
In March 1970, a representative of a Jewish organization contacted
the San Francisco FBI Field Office when it learned that one of its local
lodges had invited David Hilliard, BPP Chief-of-Staff, and Attorney
Charles Garry to speak. San Francisco subsequently reported to
headquarters:
Public source information relating to David Hilliard, Garry,
and the BPP, including "The Black Panther" newspaper it-
self, was brought to [source's] attention. He subsequently
notified the [FBI] office that the [name deleted] had altered
their arrangements for this speech and that the invitation to
Hilliard was withdrawn but that Charles Garry was per-
mitted to speak but his speech was confined solely to the re-
cent case of the Chicago 7.146
The FBI exhibited comparable fervor in disseminating informa-
tion unfavorable to the Black Panthers to the press and television
stations. A directive from FBI headquarters to nine field offices in
January 1970 explained the program:
To counteract any favorable support in publicity to the
Black Panther Party (3PP) recipient offices are requested
to submit their observations and recommendations regarding
contacts with established and reliable sources in the television
and/or radio field who might be interested in drawing up a
program for local consumption depicting the true facts re-
garding the BPP.
'"Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/26/69.
'4 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 12/4/69.
u. Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/18/70.
The suggested program would deal mainly with local BPP
activities and data furnished would be of a public source
nature. This data could be implemented by information on
the BPP nationally if needed.
All offices should give this matter their prompt considera-
tion and submit replies by letter.1 47
Soon afterward, the Los Angeles office identified two local news
reporters whom it believed might be willing to help in the effort to
discredit the BPP and received permission to
discreetly contact [name deleted] for the purpose of ascer-
taining his amenability to the preparation of a program
which would present the true facts about the Black Panther
Party as part of a counterintelligence effort.48
Headquarters also suggested information and materials to give to a
local newsman who expressed an interest in airing a series of pro-
grains against the Panthers.19
In July 1970, the FBI furnished information to a Los Angeles TV
news commentator who agreed to air a series of shows against the
BPP, "especially in the area of white liberals contributing to the
BPP." 150 In October, the Los Angeles Division sent headquarters a
.copy of an FBI-assisted television editorial and reported that an-
other newsman was preparing yet another editorial attack on the
Panthers.51
In November 1970, the San Francisco Field Office notified the Direc-
tor that Huey Newton had "recently rented a luxurious lakeshore
apartment in Oakland, California." The San Francisco office saw
"potential counterintelligence value" in this information since this
apartment was far more elegant than "the ghetto-like BPP 'pads' and
community centers utilized by the Party." It was decided not to
"presently" leak "this information to cooperative news sources," be-
cause of a "pending special investigative technique." 152 The informa-
tion was given to the San Francisco Exainer, however, in February
1971, and an article was published stating that Huey P. Newton, BPP
Supreme Commander, had moved into a $650-a-month apartment
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field -Office (and 8
other offices), 1/23/70. The San Diego office had already made efforts along the
lines proposed in this memorandum. In November 1969 it requested permission
from headquarters to inform two newscasters "for use in editorials" that the
sister and brother-in-law of a Communist Party member were believed to be
members of the local Black Panthers. The office also proposed preparing "an
editorial for publication in the Copley press." (Airtel from SAO, San Diego to
Director, FBI, 11/12/69.) The San Francisco office had also leaked information
to a San Francisco Examiner reporter, who wrote a front-page story complete
with photographs concerning "the conversion by the BPP of an apartment into
a fortress." (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/21/70.)
... Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/6/70;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office 3/5/70 (this
memorandum bears Director Hoover's initials).
'" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco
Field Offices, 5/27/70.
" -Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/70,
p. 2.
... Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/23/70.
' Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/24/70.
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overlooking Lake Merritt in Oakland, California, under the assumed
name of Don Penn.' 3 Headquarters approved anonymously mailing
copies of the article to BPP branches and ordered copies of the article
for "divisions with BPP activity for mailing to newspaper editors." "
The San Francisco office informed FBI headquarters later in Feb-
ruary that
BPP Headquarters was beseiged with inquiries after the
printing of the San Francisco Examiner article and the
people at headquarters refuse to answer the news media or
other callers on this question. This source has further reported
that a representative of the Richmond, Virginia, BPP con-
tacted headquarters on 2/18/71, stating they had received a
xeroxed copy of . . . the article and 'believed it had been
forwarded by the pigs but still wanted to know if it was
true.1 55
D. Cooperation Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Local Police Departments in Disrupting the Black Panther
Party
The FBI enlisted the cooperation of local police departments in
several of its covert action programs to disrupt and "neutralize" the
Black Panther Party. The FBI frequently worked with the San
Diego Police Department, supplying it with informant reports to
encourage raids on the homes of BPP members, often with little or no
apparent evidence of violations of State or Federal law.'*
Examples are numerous. In February 1969, the San Diego Field
Office learned that members of the local BPP chapter were following
each other to determine if police informants had infiltrated their
organization. The field office passed this information to the San
Diego police with the suggestion that BPP members engaged in these
surveillances might be followed and arrested for violations of "local
' Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/12/71.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
2/8/71.
' Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/18/71. In a February 1971 report on recent COINTELPRO activity, the San
Francisco Division described the San Francisco Examiner article as one of its
"counterintelligence activities." This report said that because of the article,
Newton had given an interview to another 'San Francisco daily to try to explain
his seemingly expensive lifestyle. The report also states that copies of the article
were sent to "all BPP and NCCF [National Committee to Combat Fascism]
offices in the United States and to three BPP contacts in Europe." (Memorandum
from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/25/71.)
' The suggestion of encouraging local police to raid and arrest members of
so-called "Black Nationalist Hate Groups" was first put forward in a February
29, 1968 memorandum to field offices. This memorandum cited as an example of
successful use of this technique: "The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM).
a pro-Chinese Communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer
of 1967. The Philadelphia office alerted local police who then put RAM leaders
under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they
could no longer make 'bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the sum-
mer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place." (Memorandum from
G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 2/29/68, p. 3.)
Motor Vehicle Code laws." 1m7 When the San Diego Field Office re-
ceived reports that five BPP members were living in the local BPP
headquarters and "having sex orgies on almost a nightly basis," it in-
formed the local police with the hope that a legal basis for a raid could
be found.166 Two days later, the San Diego office reported to head-
quarters:
As a result of the Bureau-approved information furnished
to the San Diego Police Department regarding the "sex
orgies" being held at-BPP Headquarters in San Diego, which
had not previously been known to the Police Department,
a raid was conducted at BPP Headquarters on 11/20/69.
[Name deleted], San Diego Police Department, Intelligence
Unit, advised that, due to this information, he assigned two
officers to a research project to determine if any solid basis
could be found to conduct a raid. His officers discovered two
outstanding traffic warrants for [name deleted], a member
of the BPP, and his officers used these warrants to obtain
entry into BPP Headquarters.
As a result of this raid [6 persons] were all arrested.
Seized at the time of the arrests were three shotguns, one
of which was stolen, one rifle, four gas masks and one tear
gas canister.
Also as a result of this raid, the six remaining members
of the BPP in San Diego were summoned to Los Angeles on
11/28/69. ... Upon their arrival, they were informed that due
to numerous problems with the BPP in San Diego, including
the recent raid on BPP Headquarters, the BPP Branch in
San Diego was being dissolved.
Also, as a direct result of the above raid [informants]
have reported that [name deleted] has been severely beaten
up by other members of the BPP due to the fact that she
allowed the officers to enter BPP Headquarters the night
of the raid.'15
A later memorandum states that confidential files belonging to the
San Diego Panthers were also "obtained" during this raid.so
In March 1969, the San Diego Field Office informed Bureau head-
quarters:
information was made available to the San Diego Police
Department who have been arranging periodic raids in the
15 The San Diego office reported to headquarters: "As of one week ago, theBPP in San Diego was so completely disrupted and so much suspicion, fear,and distrust has been interjected into the party that the members have takento running surveillances on one another in an attempt to determine who the'police agents' are. On 2/19/69, this information was furnished to the SanDiego Police Department with the suggestion that possibly local Motor VehicleCode laws were being violated during the course of these surveillances.'"(Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters 2/27/69.)" Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/10/69.Headquarters told the San Diego office that if there was no legal basis fora raid, it should "give this matter further thought and submit other proposalsto capitalize on this information in the counterintelligence field." (Memoran-dum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 11/18/69, p. 1.)pp Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/69,pp. 2-3.
360 memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/17/70.
hope of establishing a possession of marijuana and dangerous
drug charge [against two BPP members]. . . .
The BPP finally managed to rent the Rhodesian Club at
2907 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, which will be utilized for
a meeting hall. A request will be forthcoming to have the
San Diego Police Department and local health inspectors
examine the club for health and safety defects which are
undoubted by [sic] present.'
The San Diego office also conducted "racial briefing sessions" for the
San Diego police. Headquarters was informed:
It is also felt that the racial briefing sessions being given
by the San Diego Division are affording tangible results for
the Counterintelligence Program. Through these briefings,
the command levels of virtually all of the police departments
in the San Diego Division are being apprised of the identi-
ties of the leaders of the various militant groups. It is felt
that, although specific instances cannot be attributed directly
to the racial briefing program, police officers are much more
alert for these black militant individuals and as such are con-
tributing to the over-all Counterintelligence Program,
directed against these groups.162
The Committee staff has seen documents indicating extensive coop-
eration between local police and the FBI in several other cities. For
example, the FBI in Oakland prevented a reconciliation meeting
between Huey Newton's brother and former Panthers by having the
Oakland police inform one of the former Panthers that the meeting
was a "set up." The San Francisco office concluded:
It is believed that such quick dissemination of this type of
information may have been instrumental in preventing the
various dissidents from rejoining forces with the BPP. 
6 3
Another Bureau memorandum reflected similar cooperation in Los
Angeles:
The Los Angeles office is furnishing on a daily basis informa-
tion to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office Intelligence
Division and the Los Angeles Police Department Intelli-
gence and Criminal Conspiracy Divisions concerning the
,activities of the black nationalist groups in the anticipation
that such information might lead to the arrest of these mili-
tants.16 4
Information from Bureau files in Chicago on the Panthers was given
to Chicago police upon request, and Chicago Police Department files
were open to the Bureau.'65 A Special Agent who handled liaison be-
tween the FBI's Racial Matters Squad (responsible for monitoring
BPP activity in Chicago) and the Panther Squad of the Gang In-
telligence Unit (GIU) of the Chicago Police Department from 1967
through July 1969, testified that he visited GIU between three and
... Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/26/69.
x'T Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/15/69.
" Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/21/69.
Memorandum Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/1/69.
'" Special Agent deposition, 2/26/75, p. p. 90.
five times a week to exchange information. 6 6 The Bureau and Chicago
Police both maintained paid informants in the BPP, shared in-
formant information, and the FBI provided information which was
used by Chicago police in planning raids against the Chicago BPP.6 -
According to an FBI memorandum, this sharing of informant
information was crucial to police during their raid on the apartment
occupied by several Black Panther members which resulted in the
death of the local Chairman, Fred Hampton, and another Panther:
[Prior to the raid], a detailed inventory of the weapons and
also a detailed floor plan of the apartment were furnished
to local authorities. In addition, the identities of BPP mem-
bers utilizing the apartment at the above address were fur-
nished. This information was not available from any other
source and subsequently proved to be of tremendous value in
that it subsequently saved injury and possible death to police
officers participating in a raid ... on the morning of 12/4/69.
The raid was based on the information furnished by the
informant ... .168 [Emphasis added.]
Special Agent deposition, 2/26/75, p. 84. The Agent also testified that other
FBI agents in the Racial Matters Squad were also involved in the "free flow
of information between the Racial Matters Squad and GIU," and that at one
time or another, every agent had exchanged information with GIU.
m Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/69, p. 2;
memorandum from Special Agent to Chicago Field Office, 12/12/69.
' Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/8/69.
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THE USE OF INFORMANTS IN FBI DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The dangers to a free society that are implicit in the use of secret
intelligence informers have long been recognized. In his Constitu-
tional History of England, written in the mid-19th century, Sir
Thomas May observed:
Men may be without restraints upon their liberty; they may
pass to and fro at pleasure: but if their steps are tracked by
spies and informers, their words noted down for crimination,
their associates watched as conspirators-who shall say that
they are free? 1
May pointed to the use of informers by "continental despotisms,"
noting that "the freedom of a country may be measured by its immu-
nity from this baleful agency." 2
On the other hand, law enforcement officials see informants3 as a
highly effective technique-one justified by the public's interest in the
detection of crime and the prosecution of criminals. FBI officials testi-
fied to the Committee that informants "provide one of the best and
most complete forms of coverage" in their investigations.4 Former
Attorney General Katzenbach testified that the use of intelligence
informants in the mid-1960s to infiltrate the Ku Klux Klan-a tech-
nique urged upon the FBI by President Johnson, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, and Mr. Katzenbach-was a principal factor in
stopping repeated acts of criminal violence.
This Appendix, pursuant to the Committee's mandate under
Senate Resolution 21, focuses on the use of informants in FBI intelli-
gence investigations who are recruited, paid and directed by Bureau
Special Agents. The Committee did not examine the use of informants
in FBI criminal investigations nor did the Committee examine in-
stances of the "walk-in" who volunteers information to the FBI on a
one-time basis. As discussed in more detail below, paid and directed
intelligence informants are extensively used in FBI domestic intelli-
gence investigations of groups and individuals. These intelligence
informants are the subject of this Appendix.
The use of informants to collect intelligence on Americans is not
confined to the FBI. The Committee also examined the use of intelli-
'T. May, Constitutional History of England (1863), p. 275.2 Id.3 The term "informant" is used throughout the remainder of this report. That
is the term employed in the statute which provides that appropriations for theDepartment of Justice are available for payment of "informants," 28 U.S.C.§ 524, and is also the term which the FBI employs in its directives.
'Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 11/25/75, Exhibit
33, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 444.
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gence informants by other governmental agencies. In the late 1960s,
informants and undercover agents were used by the CIA and Army
Intelligence to secretly penetrate domestic groups. In 1968, about 1500
Army intelligence agents were engaged in monitoring and penetrating
civilian activity in the United States; although a 1971 Defense Depart-
ment directive now generally limits the military's collection of infor-
ination about private groups and individuals, the directive permits the
military to secretly penetrate civilian groups where approved by the
Defense Department. See the Appendices on Improper Surveillance
of Private Citizens by the Military and CIA Intelligence Activities
Regarding Americans. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service uses
informants for intelligence purposes. See the IRS Report: p. 863,
"Selective Enforcement for Non-Tax Purposes."
A. Swmmary of Facts
1. The Extensive Use of Intelligence Informants
The paid and directed informant is the most extensively used tech-
nique in FBI domestic intelligence investigations. Informants were
used in 85 percent of the domestic intelligence investigations an-
alyzed in a recent study by the General Accounting Office.' By com-
parison, electronic surveillance was used in only 5 percent of the cases
studied. The FBI places strong emphasis on informant coverage in in-
telligence investigations, instructing agents to "develop reliable in-
formants at all levels and in all segments" of groups under investiga-
tion.'
The Committee's investigation revealed that the FBI was using
more than 1,500 domestic intelligence informants as of June 30, 1975.'
The FBI budget for Fiscal Year 1976 programmed a total of $7,401,-
000 for the intelligence informant program, more than twice the
amount allocated for the organized crime informant program."
The number of intelligence informants has been substantially larger
in previous years because of the "Ghetto Informant Program," which
at its height comprised over 7,000 informants. The FBI began the
Ghetto Informant Program in 1967 in the context of the urban riots
and violence of the mid-1960's, and in response to instructions from the
White House and the Attorney General. Although "ghetto" inform-
ants were initially used as "listening posts" to provide information on
the planning or organizing of riots and civil disturbances, many were
eventually given specific assignments to attend public meetings of
"extremists" and to identify bookstores and others distributing "ex-
tremist literature". The FBI terminated the program in 1973 after
sharp debate within the Bureau over the program's effectiveness and
the propriety of the listening post concept.
Generally, there are two types of intelligence informants: those the
FBI first recruits and then inserts into investigated group under
investigation, and those who are already members of such a group and
are "turned" or recruited as FBI informants.
" General Accounting Office, Domestio Intelligcwe Operations of the FBI
(2/24/76).
6 FBI Manual of Instructions Section 87 B (6), hereinafter cited as "FBI, MOI".
FBI Memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 11/28/75.
'Memorandum, "FBI overall Intelligence Program FY 1977 compared to FY
1976." The intelligence informant program includes payments to informants for
services and expenses as well as FBI personnel and support costs and overhead.
In addition to paid and directed informants, the FBI uses "con-
fidential sources," defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as per-
sons who furnish the FBI information available to them through
their position, such as "bankers, telephone company employees, and
-landlords." 9 Confidential sources were used in 50 percent of the cases
analyzed by the GAO, ranking behind informants and local law en-
forcement officials as the third most used techniques in intelligence
cases. As of June 1975, there were 1,254 confidential sources approved
by FBI headquarters for domestic intelligence purposes.9a
2. The Unpublished Standards for the Use of Intelligence
Informants.
The standards for the use of intelligence informants are contained
in internal FBI directives that are not available to the public.
The FBI Manual of Instructions sets few limits on the scope of
intelligence informant reporting. The Manual proscribes only the re-
porting of communications 'between an attorney and client, legal
"defense plans or strategy," "employer-employee relationships"
(where an informant is connected with a labor union), and "legitimate
institution or campus activities" in schools. 0 The Manual contains
no standard limiting an informant's reporting to information relating
to the commission of criminal offenses or even to violent or potentially
violent activity. In fact, intelligence informants report on virtually
every aspect of a group's activity serving, in the words of both FBI
officials and an informant, as a "vacuum cleaner" of information."
FBI officials recognized this broad scope of informant reporting as
a. problem area, pointing out that it produces "too much information"
in FBI files.Ila They expressed their belief that an informant should
report to some degree the lawful aspects of a group's activity in
order to permit an accurate picture to be drawn. But they did recog-
nize the need "to narrow down" informant reporting from its pres-
ent broad scope.12
The Manual does not set independent standards which must be
supported by facts before an organization can be the subject of in-
formant coVerage. Once the criteria for opening a regular intelligence
investigation are met, and the case is opened, informants can be used
without any restrictions.12a There is no specific determination made as
to whether the substantial intrusion represented by informant coverage
is justified by the government's interest in obtaining information.
There is nothing that requires that a determination be made of
whether less intrusive means will adequately serve the government's
interest. There is also no requirement that the decisions of FBI offi-
cials to use informants be reviewed by anyone outside the Bureau. In
'FBI, MOI Sec. 107, A (4).
FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 12.
"FBI, MOI, -Sees. 107 D(2d), U(1b).
xx James Adams testimony 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135; Mary Jo Cook
testimony 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 111.
" Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135.
2 Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135.
"' Under a Manual provision adopted in 1973, established informants may sup-
ply information in a preliminary investigation, but new informants may not be
recruited. (FBI, MOI, Sec. 87, B(4c).) The Attorney General's draft guidelines
for domestic intelligence investigation similarly provide that only established in-
formants may be used in preliminary investigations. (Draft Guidelines for Do-
mestic Security Investigations, 12/0/75, Sec. II (E) (G).)
short, intelligence informant coverage has not been subject to the
standards which govern the use of other intrusive techniques such as
wiretapping or other forms of electronic surveillance. (Compare the
requirements for use of electronic surveillance and wiretaps discussed
in "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans"; Part IV.)
B. Policy and Constitutional Issues Raised by the Use of Intelligence
I'nfo'nunts
The use of informants and confidential sources in intelligence in-
vestigations of domestic groups and citizens can raise important policy
and Constitutional issues. Unlike investigations of specific criminal
activity, intelligence investigations frequently have involved continu-
ous surveillance across a broad spectrum of activity. Where "intelli-
gence" rather than evidence of particular criminal activity is collected,
informants and confidential sources give the FBI a large amount of
information dealing with the lawful political and personal activity of
citizens. Former FBI informants infiltrated into organizations testified
that they reported "any and everything" they saw or heard pertaining
to the group's members," and that -they took membership lists, finan-
cial data, and other records and gave them to the FBI. This testimony
was confirmed by the FBI agents to whom they reported. As one agent
testified, his informant "told me everything she knew" about the politi-
cal organization she infiltrated.14
Under the Bill of Rights, particularly the First and Fourth Amend-
ments, our Constitution protects freedom of speech and political asso-
ciation and the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
In the light of the protections guaranteed by our Constitution, the
use of informants for intelligence purposes raises three principal
issues:
(1) The first issue concerns whether informants should be used at all
in intelligence investigations,15 and, if so, under what circumstances.
The use of informants in the investigation of groups and individuals
involved in political activity may chill the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights. For example, citizens interested in attending a meeting of
a political group either to join or to express support for a lawful
interest they share with the group, may be deterred by the fear that
their attendance would mark them as a member in an informant's eyes.
They may fear an informant's report will prevent their gaining a job
requiring a security clearance, even though in fact they supported no
unlawful activity. Although citizens may not know that a secret
informant is reporting on a particular group, the mere existence of
the FBI intelligence informant system can be sufficient to cause them
to curtail their exercise of First Amendment rights for fear they will
be reported to the FBI.
(2) The second issue concerns the scope of an informant's report-
ing. Should an informant report only indications of criminal or violent
activity, or should. he report all aspects of a group's activity and the
" Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116, Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, vol. 6, p. 111.
:'Special Agent, 11/20/75, p. 55.
' This Report focuses solely on the informant technique as used in intelligence
investigations. It does not address the question of whether intelligence investiga-
tions are themselves consistent with Constitutional guarantees and sound law
enforcement policy or can be made so by appropriate standards and controls. See
the Committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence and the Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendations in that Report.
personal lives of individuals in the interest of intelligence? In this
connection, there is the further question of whether an informant
should be permitted to take the confidential records and documents of
a group or individual (such as membership lists or financial data)
and give them to the FBI, when the Government cannot properly
obtain them through statutory disclosure requirement, subpoena, or
search warrant.
(3) Finally, there is the issue of an informant's conduct and be-
havior. The Committee heard testimony on the difficulties inherent
in an informant reporting on violent and criminal activity. To be
in a position to report, the informant may have to participate in the
unlawful activity to some degree. As one FBI handling agent testified
of an informant in a violence-prone element of the Ku Klux Klan, "he
couldn't be an angel and be a good informant.16 Where such an in-
formant is paid and directed by the FBI, the Government may be
placed in the at least unseemly posture of involvement through its
agents in the activity it is seeking to prevent. At the extreme, the Gov-
ernment's informant may be held to have acted as an agent provoca-
teur, that is, an agent of the Government who has provoked illegal or
violent activity.
C. The Lack of Judicial Treatment of Intelligence Informant Issues
These issues have rarely been before the courts. This is in part due
to the nature of secret intelligence informant activity. Members of a
group will seldom learn that an FBI intelligence informant has been
in their midst or has copied their records for the FBI because intelli-
gence investigations almost invariably do not result in prosecutions."
Without knowledge of an informant's activity and in the absence of a
prosecution, a group or its members will not come before a court to
raise Constitutional objections. Consequently, there are few court deci-
sions and those that do exist usually concern criminal, rather than in-
telligence informants. In Hoffa v. United States,'18 a criminal case
involving charges of bribing a jury, the Supreme Court held that an
informant's testimony concerning a defendant's conversations could
not be considered the product of a search where the defendant had con-
sented to the presence of the individual who served as an informant.
The facts did not, however, present the issue of whether an inform-
'8 Special Agent, 11/21/75, p. 12.
.17 Only 16 of the domestic intelligence cases reviewed by the General Account-
ing Office-or less than 3 percent-were referred to a U.S. attorney or to local
authorities for possible prosecution. Of the 16 referrals for criminal violations,
only 7 were prosecuted. (GAO Study, p. 33)
Even where there are grounds for prosecution in a domestic intelligence case,
such as acts of violence, the decision may be made to forego prosecution rather
than surface an informant. The informant's continued reporting from within an
organization may be deemed more valuable than a particular prosecution. This
in turn may lead to the use of illegitimate action to prevent violence, such as that
employed in the FBI's "COINTELPRO" operation. (See COINTELPRO Report.)
"385 U.S. 293 (1966). The Hoffa court stated: "The risk of ... being betrayed
by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is
probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we
necessary assume whenever we speak." In another criminal case, Letois v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), the Court, in declining to rule that the use of
undercover agents is unconstitutional per se, stated: "In the detection of many
types of crime, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the
identity of its agents."
ant's surreptitious taking of documents for the Government consti-
tuted an unlawful search.
The Select Committee's investigation has revealed for the first time
the extremely broad scope of FBI intelligence informant surveillance
and reporting. The Supreme Court has yet to be presented with the
types of factual situations-such as intensive informant coverage of
lawful political activity and personal matters-which may produce the
chilling of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Moreover,
apart from particular cases which may come before a court, the over-
all effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights in the society at
large may be very great where it is known that a large-scale intelli-
gence informant system is operating. No court has seen the overall pat-
tern of FBI intelligence informant coverage of citizens and groups.
Consequently, courts have been unable to assess the full impact of the
informant system on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
A U.S. Army surveillance system was challenged on First Amend-
ment grounds in Laird v. Tatum, but the Court described the informa-
tion gathered in that case as "nothing more than a good newspaper
reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public meetings and
the clipping of articles from publications available on any news-
stand." 19
In a more recent case, the California Supreme Court held that secret
surveillance of classes and group meetings at a university through the
use of undercover agents was "likely to pose a substantial restraint
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights." 20 Citing a number of
U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the California Supreme Court stated in
its unanimous decision:
In view of this significant potential chilling effect, the
challenged surveillance activities can only be sustained if [the
Government] can demonstrate a "compelling" state interest
which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment
rights and which cannot be served by alternative means less
intrusive on fundamental rights.2 1
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held only that a complaint that First Amendment
rights were chilled by "the mere existence, without more" of an Army intelli-
gence activity alleged to be broader than necessary did not present a justiciable
controversy in Federal court. Because the complaint failed to allege more specific
harm than mere subjection to governmental scrutiny, it failed to state a Federal
claim. 408 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)
However, Justice Marshall, sitting as a Circuit Justice, held that a Federal
claim under the First Amendment was stated in Socialist workers Party v.
Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1315 (1974). There, Justice Marshall found that alle-
gations of a "chilling effect" on First Amendment rights were sufficiently specific
to satisfy jurisdictional requirements where it was complained that FBI in-
formants were to monitor a public meeting of the Socialist Workers Party. The
complaint stated that FBI informant coverage would have the concrete effect of
dissuading delegates from participating in the convention and lead to possible
loss of employment for those identified by the informants as attending. Although
Justice Marshall refused to grant an injunction against the use of informants at
the convention, he did prohibit the Government from transmitting any informa-
tion obtained at the convention to nongovernmental entities and left to a trial on
the merits the question of whether the claimed "chill" was substantial enough to
justify permanent injunctive and monetary relief.
2 White v. Davis, 533 Pac. Rep. 2d, 222, 232 (California Supreme Oourt, 1975).
m' 533 Pac Rep. 2d, at 232.
D. The Scope of the Coqnmittee's Investigation
Before turning to the discussion below, two points as to the Com-
mittee's investigation must be noted.
First, in recognition of the sensitive nature of the informant tech-
nique, including the risk of exposure or physical harm to present and
former informants, the Committee worked out procedures with the
cooperation of the Attorney General and the FBI to protect the in-
tegrity of the FBI's operations while assuring the Committee's ability
to conduct a thorough investigation. For example, while materials on
full FBI intelligence investigations were examined, including infor-
mant reports on target groups and particular incidents, the names and
identities of informants were not revealed unless they had previously
been made public through court proceedings or the informant's own
choice.
Second, as noted above, the Committee's investigation focused on
the use of FBI-paid and directed intelligence informants and FBI-
approved confidential sources, not criminal informants, one-time
"walk-ins" or citizens who provide information to FBI Special
Agents on their own initiative. In short, the Committee's investigation
dealt not with the citizen's right to communicate with a law enforce-
ment agency, but with a specific and substantial government intelli-
gence program employing individuals who are pa-id and directed by
the FBI Intelligence Division. It is in this sense that the discussion
that follows uses the term "intelligence informant."
The discussion below is in two parts. To illustrate the nature of the
intelligence informant technique, Part One examines the case histories
of two former FBI intelligence informants. Part One also sets out
eleven additional examples of informant coverage in domestic intel-
ligence investigations and describes the "Ghetto Informant Program,"
conducted from 1967 to 1973, as well as other: past FBI informant pro-
grams directed towards specific concerns.
Part Two discusses the size and scope of the FBI intelligence in-
formant program and the standards that exist for the use of intel-
ligence informants.
II. THE NATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMANT TECHNIQUE
A. Case His tories of Particular Informants
To provide an understanding of the intelligence informant tech-
nique, two case studies are presented. The first case study involves a
former FBI "subversive" informant in the Vietnam Veterans Against
the War, Mary Jo Cook. The second case study involves a former FBI
"extremist" informant in the Ku Klux Klan, Gary Rowe. Before turn-
ing to those cases, the FBI's definitions of subversive and extremist
informants are set forth below.
Subversive Infonnants.-The FBI classifies its paid and directed
intelligence informants into two categories, "subversive" and "extrem-
ist," corresponding to the two types of domestic intelligence investiga-
tions. "Subversive" 22 informants are those used in the investigation of
"subversive activities," defined in Section 87 of the FBI Manual as
"activities aimed at overthrowing, destroying, or undermining the
Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions"
by illegal means. 2 3 Section 87 has been applied to the activities of the
Communist Party and a wide variety of other organizations which
the FBI believes have revolutionary characteristics. During the Viet-
nam War, investigations of individuals labeled "Key Activists" were
conducted under Section 87, in which informant coverage was stressed.
For example, in January 1968, instructions went out to ten major field
offices to designate certain persons as "Key Activists." They were
defined as "individuals in the Students for a Democratic Society and
the anti-Vietnam war groups [who] are extremely active and most
vocal in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for
civil disobedience and other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts." 24
There was to be "an intensive investigation" of each "key activist":
Because of their leadership and prominence in the "new
left" movement, as well as the growing militancy of this
movement, each office must maintain high-level informant
coverage on these individuals so that the Bureau is kept
abreast of their day-to-day activities as well as the organiza-
tions they are affiliated with, to develop information regard-
ing their sources of funds, foreign contacts, and future
plans.25
Extremist Informants.-"Extremist" informants 25a are those used
in the investigation of "extremist" activities, defined in Section 122 of
the FBI Manual in the same way as subversive activities but also
including "denying the rights of individuals under the Constitu-
tion." 26 In practice, "extremist" investigations have concerned vio-
lence-prone groups composed of members of one or another race. Sec-
tion 122 is intended to cover what the Bureau calls "White Hate"
2 A subversive informant (sometimes referred to as an "internal security"
informant), is defined in the FBI Manual as:
"Individual actively engaged in obtaining furnishing current information on
security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be
protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive orga-
nization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able
to provide current information of value. (FBI, MOI, See. 107, I, A (1).)"
" FBI, MOI, Sec. 87.A(4).
2 4 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 1/30/68.
" Ibid.
" An extremist informant is defined in the FBI Manual as:
"An individual whose identity must be protected and who is actively engaged in
obtaining and furnishing current information on extremist matters exclusively
to the Bureau. Extremist informants include any individual:
"a. Who is a member of or attends meetings of an extremist group (white,
black, or Indian) which has a propensity for violence or which strives to deny
individuals certain constitutional rights through the use of force, violence, or
intimidation;
"b. Who is in a position to obtain and provide current information of value
concerning such organizations;
"c. Or who furnishes information on extremists who may or may not be mem-
bers of extremist groups but are engaged in planning or carrying out any type
of guerrilla warfare against established institutions, which may be in violation
of local, state, or Federal laws." (FBI, MOI, Sec. 130, A (1).)
2' FBI, MOI, Sec. 122 A (1-e).
groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, and "Black Nationalist Hate"
groups, such as the Black Panther Party and the Nation of Islam. It
also applies to some American Indian groups such as the American
Indian Movement, as 'well as a variety of terrorist organizations
engaged in "urban guerrilla warfare." 2
In the case of organizations of blacks, informant coverage in Sec-
tion 122 investigations extended beyond the Black Panthers. In the
fall of 1970, the FBI decided to include "every Black Student Union
and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in
disorders." 28 The initial proposal for informant coverage called for
"preliminary inquiry through established sources and informants to
determine background, aims and purposes, leaders and Key Activ-
ists." 29 It was estimated this would cause FBI field offices to open
4,000 cases on both groups and individuals. The subsequent instruc-
tions to the field offices stresse.d the need to investigate Black Student
Unions and similar groups and to "target informants and sources to
develop information regarding these groups on a continuing basis ...
and to develop such coverage where none exists." 30
The case histories illustrating the activity of FBI's subversive and
extremist intelligence informants are presented below.
1. Mary Jo Cook-FBI Informant in the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War
In June 1973, Mary Jo Cook was recruited by the FBI field office
in Buffalo, New York to serve as a paid and directed informant in
the Buffalo chapter of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War
(VVAW). 3
a. Background.-The FBI made limited investigations in 1967
and 1968 to determine if the Communist Party or other "subversive"
elements were directing or controlling the VVAW but concluded that
there was no such outside influence.32
In August 1971, a full investigation of the VVAW was opened on
the basis of reports that Communist youth groups were infiltrating
the VVAW and the alleged involvement of some VVAW members
in illegal demonstrations; militant antiwar activity by the VVAW,
including reported links with foreign elements, was also a basis for
the full investigation.33 FBI concern centered on the national office
"FBI, MOI, Sec. 22(A).
Memorandum of the Executives Conference 10/29/70.
*Id.
2 9"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/4/70.
Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6 p. 112.
" FBI Memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 12/2/75; Hearings, Vol. 6,
Exhibit 72.
' In a Memorandum to the Committee, the FBI described the basis for the
opening of the full investigation as follows:
"[In August 1971] information from a variety of sources dictated the need to
determine the extent of control over VVAW by subversive groups and/or vio-
lence-prone elements in the antiwar movement. Sources had provided informa-
tion that VVAW was stockpiling weapons, VVAW had been in contact with
North Vietnam officials in Paris, France, VVAW was receiving funds from for-
mer CPUSA members and VVAW was aiding and financing U.S. military de-
serters. Additionally, information had been received that some individual chap-
ters throughout the country had been infiltrated by the youth groups of the
CPUSA and the SWP. A trend of increased militancy developed within the
VVAW and the possibilities of violence escalated within the organization. Dur-
ing December 1971, VVAW members forcibly and illegally occupied or sur-
(Continued)
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of the VVAW, which the FBI saw as adopting Marxist-Leninist doc-
trine and anti-imperialist positions.
The FBI's investigation of local VVAW chapters was, in part, de-
signed to determine the extent to which they were following the posi-
tion of the VVAW national office or were being infiltrated by Com-
munist elements.3
b. Cook's Instructions.-From her initial meeting with the FBI
agent who recruited her, Cook understood that she was to serve
as both a reporter of information and a moderating force in the
VVAW. Cook testified that she understood she was to act as "a voice
of reason . . . a guiding force in the organization and keep things
calm, cool and collected." 3 Cook testified:
The major understanding that I got from the meeting was
that VVAW-WSO was an organization primarily of veterans
who were possible victims of maiipulation. They had been
through the Vietnam War. They had legitimate readjust-
ment needs, and the Bureau was afraid that they could become
violent or could become manipulated in a cause or social con-
cern, and they wanted me to go in there and participate in
the organization and make sure that the veterans didn't get
"ripped off".3*
Cook's handling agent similarly testified that one of the main pur-
poses of placing Cook in the VVAW chapter was to neutralize any
violence or illegal activities, as well as to -report them.37
c. The Scope of Cook's Reporting.-As to her reporting function,
Cook testified that she was to report virtually everything about the
VVAW and its members. She stated that:
... I was to go to meetings, write up reports . . . on what
happened, who was there . .. to try to totally identify the
background of every person there, what their relationships
were, who they were living with, who they were sleeping with,
to try to get some sense of the local structure and the local
relationships among the people in the organization."
The FBI Special Agent to whom Cook reported similarly testified
as to the broad scope of Cook's reporting: "She told me everything
she knew about the Buffalo chapter of the VVAW." 39
To obtain the type of information desired by the FBI, Cook testi-
fied that she took a leadership role in the VVAW. The FBI asked her
to go to as many regional and national meetings of the VVAW as
possible to "get a good sense of how the local chapter fit in [the]
national organization".40 Cook stated "it was a very democratic proc-
(Continued)
rounded public buildings and national monuments in New York City, Philadelphia,
Austin, Texas, and Washington, D.C." FBI Memorandum to Senate Select
Committee, 12/2/75, pp. 2-3; Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 72.
' Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 135. Cook had expressed an interest in being
an FBI informant to a close friend who was an informant with the VVAW for
the FBI. Cook's friend put her in touch with an FBI agent. (Cook, 12/2/75, Hear-
ings, p. 110.)
O Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 110, 111.
' Ibid.
"' Special Agent, 11/20/75, p. 47.
a Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 111.
3 Special 'Agent, 11/20/75, p. 55.
' Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 121.
ess [in the VVAW] so that there was no way-that I could . .. fulfill
the request of the FBI . . . without actually becoming elected leader-
ship in the chapter".41
The scope of Cook's intelligence reporting, including identities of
individuals, personal matters, and lawful political activity, is illus-
trated by the following FBI summaries 42 of two reports given the
FBI by Cook:
Report No. 1
Report concerns a meeting of the VVAW/WSO Women's
Group held November 5, 1973, in Buffalo, New York. Nine
women attended, all named in the report. One woman had
been the girlfriend of an individual named in the report who
was associated with the Martin Sostre Defense Committee
and lived with him for a while. Report concluded with plans
for a men's group meeting to be held later.
Report No. 2
Report concerns a meeting of the VVAW/WSO Steering
Committee held 11/10/73. Five identified individuals were
present. There was a discussion of finances and some displeas-
ure at the financial record system. Plans for a benefit at a bar
were discussed. Information was presented concerning a news-
letter to be mailed out which will discuss the VVAW/WSO's
position on amnesty, the upgrading of discharges, information
about a strike at a Buffalo firm.
Some objections were raised concerning the wording of
some VVAW/WSO objectives.
Plans for a future coalition meeting organized by two indi-
viduals were discussed, the same coalition that worked on the
Impeach Nixon rally.
Matters concerning possible new members and/or attendees
at future meetings were discussed. Plans for a VVAW/WSO
team on a television sports quiz show were discussed.
One member raised four criticisms of the VVAW/WSO,
all listed. One member wrote a regional newsletter.
d. Cook'8 Taking of VVA W Documents.-Besides reporting in de-
tail on VVAW -members and meetings, Cook also took VVAW docu-
ments and gave them to the FBI.4" For example, Cook testified that
she gave the FBI VVAW mailing lists, thus providing the FBI with
the names of many individuals outside of the smaller number of peo-
ple who attended VVAW meetings."4
In addition to the mailing lists which Cook gave to the FBI, she
also took a number of other VVAW documents, including papers re-
SIbid.
" The Committee had full access at FBI Headquarters to the reports of theintelligence informants whose cases were examined. In view of the FBI's posi-tion that delivery to the Committee of these reports would endanger the securityof the FBI's relations with present informants, it was agreed that FBI SpecialAgents would prepare summaries of those informant reports to be referred to atthe public hearings or in the Committee's Report. The Committee staff verifiedthese summaries for accuracy and completeness against the full informantreports.
Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 112.
"Ibid.
lating to legal defense matters. As Cook's FBI handling agent testi-
fled:
She brought back several things .. . various position papers
taken by various legal defense groups, general statements of
the VVAW, legal thoughts on various trials, the Gaines-
ville (Florida) 8 ... the Camden (New Jersey) 9. . . various
documents from all of these groups."'
Cook also gave the FBI a confidential legal manual prepared by
VVAW attorneys as a guide for legal defense strategy and methods
should VVAW members be arrested in demonstrations or other polit-
ical activity.45 As discussed in more detail below, the FBI Manual
provides that legal defense matters are not to be reported by inform-
ants. However, the FBI interprets this provision as prohibiting only
the reporting of privileged attorney-client communications or legal
defense matters in connection with a specific trial. Since the VVAW
legal manual was intended for general use, rather than in connection
with a particular case, the FBI considered that the VVAW manual
did not fall within the prohibition.
e. Reporting on Non-VVATV Group8 and Individuals.-In addi-
tion to reporting on the VVAW itself, Cook also reported on those
individuals and groups who worked on political issues in conjunc-
tion with the VVAW:
Senator HART: . . . did you report also on groups and indi-
viduals outside the [VVAW], such as other peace groups
or individuals who were opposed to the war whom you came
in contact with because they were cooperating with the
[VVAW] in connection with protest demonstrations and
petitions?
Ms. CooK: . . . I ended up reporting on groups like the
United Church of Christ, American Civil Liberties Union,
the National Lawyers Guild, liberal church organizations
[which] quite often went into coalition with the [VVAW] .45a
As a result of this broad reporting scope, Cook estimated that
she identified as many as 1,000 people to the FBI in the 18 months
she worked as an informant.6 Cook estimated that sixty to seventy
percent of these 1,000 people were nonveterans who had participated
with the VVAW in various political efforts.4 1
In November 1974, Cook quit her work as an informant because
of her belief that the VVAW was engaged in lawful political
activity and her conclusion that she could not in conscience inform
on its members and others working with them.48 Cook concluded that
the Buffalo VVAW Chapter was working towards ending the in-
volvement of U.S. in Vietnam, amnesty for draft resisters, upgrading
military discharges, and better health and drug treatment for Viet-
nam veterans.4 9
"Special Agent 11/20/75, pp. 15-16.
* Cook deposition, 11/14/75, p. 36.
4s Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 119.
4 Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 112.
" Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 120
a Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, pp. 112-114.
* Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 119.
Cook testified:
. . . I started talking with the FBI about all of the contradic-
tions that I was starting to see. I didn't understand what my
involvement was anymore . . . I didn't see the reason for my
continuance . . . [I said to the FBI] these people don't need
me functioning in their midst, and if you can't give me assur-
ances that the information that I am giving you, which you
seem to strip the context away from isn't going to be used
against these people, then I cannot continue . . . and they
could not give me any assurance that this information would
not be used against people. . . ..o
2. Gary Roe-FBI Informant in the Ku Klux Klan
Gary Rowe worked as an FBI informant in the Birmingham, Ala-
bama chapter of the Ku Klux Klan from 1959 until March 1965, when
he surfaced to testify as an eyewitness to the killing of a civil rights
worker, Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, by Klan iembers.51
Rowe's activity as an FBI informant illustrates the distinction be-
tween an informant's reporting of information relating to violence or
criminal activity and the reporting of general intelligence. On the one
hand, Rowe provided the FBI with a great deal of information on
Klan violence and criminal activity. At the same time, however, Rowe
reported virtually every aspect of Klan activity, regardless of its rela-
tion to actual or potential violence or criminal offenses. In addition,
on a number of occasions Rowe participated in Klan violence in order
to be in a position to report its occurrence to the FBI. Consequently,
even though Rowe was able to report significant violence and criminal
activity, his case highlights two principal issues: 1) the question of
overbreadth in intelligence informant reporting, and 2) the govern-
ment's participation or unseemly involvement through its paid and
directed informants in the violent or criminal activity it is investigat-
img.
a. The Use of Intelligence Informants to Report Klan Violence and
Criminal Activity.-In testimony before the Committee, former At-
torney General Nicholas Katzenbach emphasized the violent acts com-
mitted by some Ku Klux Klan members in the South during the years
Rowe was an FBI informant:
The central point of . . . my testimony is that some Klan
members in those states, using the Klan as a vehicle, were en-
gaged in repeated acts of criminal violence. It had nothing
to do with preaching a social point of view: it had to do with
proven acts of violence.52
5 Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, pp. 112-113. In 1974, investigations of a number of
VVAW chapters were closed. The FBI Memorandum to the Committee stated:
"In 1974, FBI field offices were instructed to analyze the chapters and regions
in their respective territories. If the local organization did not subscribe to the
policies of the National Office and were not Marxist-Leninist groups advocating
the overthrow of the Government. the investigation of the local organization was
to be terminated. . . . Many of the investigations of the various chapters were
closed, not because they were no longer active, but because of their apparent
failure to follow the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary posture of the National
Office." (FBI Memorandum to Select Committee, 2/2/76, p. 5; Cook, Hearings,
Exhibit 72.)
Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. -15.
a Katzenbach Testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207.
Katzenbach stated that to deal with the problem of Klan violence, At-
torney General Robert Kennedy had suggested to President Johnson
an intensified use of FBI informants in the Klan, along the lines em-
ployed by the FBI against Communist groups. Katzenbach quoted
from a letter Robert Kennedy had sent to the President in mid-1964
just prior to the murders of three civil rights workers in Mississippi:
The unique difficulty as it seems to me to be presented by the
situation in Mississippi (which is duplicated in parts of Ala-
bama and Louisiana at least) is in gathering information on
fundamentally lawless activities which have the sanction of
local law enforcement agencies, political officials and a, sub-
stantial segment of the white population. The techniques fol-
lowed in the use of specially trained, special assignment
agents in the infiltration of Communist groups should be of
value. If you approve, it might be desirable to take up with
the Bureau the possibility of developing a similar efort to
meet this new problem.5 3
And Katzenbach pointed out that informants were critical to the solu-
tion of the murders of the three civil rights workers: "That case could
not have been solved without acquiring informants who were highly
placed members of the Klan." 54
Katzenbach emphasized his view that the use of FBI informants in
the Klan should be viewed as a criminal investigation technique, point-
ing out that, in the case of the Klan, "these techniques were designed
to deter violence-to prevent murder, bombings, and beatings. In my
judgment, they were successful." 55 At the same time, he indicated the
disruptive results. that "an effective informant program" 56 may pro-
duce. He stated:
It is true that the FBI program with respect to the Klan
made extensive use of informers. That is true of virtually
every criminal investigation with which I am familiar. In an
effort to detect, prevent, and prosecute acts of violence, Presi-
dent Johnson, Attorney General Kennedy, Mr. Allen Dulles,
myself and others urged the Bureau to develop an effective
informant program, similar to that which they had developed
with respect to the Communist Party. It is true that these
techniques did in fact disrupt Klan activities, sowed deep
mistrust among the Klan members, and made Klan members
aware of the extensive informant system of the FBI and the
fact that they were under constant observation.5 1
Rowe played a critical role in the solution of the murder of Mrs.
Viola Liuzzo. Owing to his close relationship to Klan leaders, Rowe
was asked to accompany several Klansmen in an unspecified mission
against those participating in a civil rights march in Alabama in
March, 1965. Rowe reported this invitation to his FBI handling agent,
who told him to go and report what occurred.5 7 a As a result, Rowe
" Ibid, p. 214.




wa Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, pp. 32-33.
was an eyewitness to the murder of Mrs. Liuzzo, and reported the
crime to the FBI within hours of its occurrence. Subsequently, Rowe's
testimony was a critical element in the ultimate conviction of the
Klansmen responsible for the killing. 5
b. Tihe Scope of Rowe's Reporting.-Rowe's assignment, according
to the FBI Special Agent who recruited him - and served as his first
handling agent, was
to gather information as to members, leaders, because I did
not know who they were, if he could get the number of Klav-
erns .. . in the Birmingham area, and just keep in touch with
me as to the activities that occurred. That was his initial
instruction.
I wanted information that would be of assistance to make
a determination as to the violent nature of the organization.
This would be, violations of civil rights, things of this na-
ture . . . you certainly can't get it on the outside.6 0
' The murder of Mrs. Liuzzo took place in 1965; from the outset of his in-
formant activity in 1961, Rowe provided the FBI with a great deal of informa-
tion on planned and actual violence by the Klan throughout his years as an
informant. (Rowe, 12/2/75, Vol. 6, pp. 117-118; Adams, 12/2/75, Vol. 6, 142-143).
Only rarely, however, did Rowe's information lead to the prevention of violence
or arrests of Klan members.
There were several reasons for this, including the difficulty of relying on local
police to enforce the law against the Klan in the early 1960's, the failure of
the Federal Government to initially mobilize its own resources, and the role of
the FBI as an investigative rather than police organization.
Former Attorney General Katzenbach pointed out that, at the outset of the
1960s, when Rowe began his work as an informant, "neither the [Justice]
Department nor the Bureau fully appreciated the significance or indeed the
genesis of the repeated acts of violence and bloodshed" committed by the Klan
and that Federal efforts against Klan violence "did not crystallize" until the
murder in June 1964 of three civil rights workers in Mississippi. (Katzenbach,
12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 213-214) and FBI Deputy Director Adams
testified:
"We do not have police powers like the United States Marshalls do . .. We are
the investigative agency of the Department of Justice and during these times the
Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency.
We were to furnish the information, to the local police, who had an obligation
to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice." (Adams, 12/2/75, Vol. 6,
pp. 142-143.)
Katzenbach and Adams pointed out that in the early 1960s, local police in
parts of the South refused to act on information the FBI provided about Klan
violence. Katzenbach testified:
". . . because local law enforcement organizations-the traditional first line of
defense against (and the Bureau's primary source of information about) such
violence-were infiltrated by the very persons who were responsible for much
of the violence, the net effect was that there was in many sections of the South a
total absence of any law enforcement whatsoever." (Katzenbach, 12/3/75,
Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 213-214.)
" Rowe was not a member of the Klan or sympathetic with Klan objectives when
he was recruited to serve as an informant. In his initial interviews with the
FBI Special Agent who recruited him, Rowe indicated "he was not in favor of
the things the Klan did". (Special Agent No. 1, 11/19/75, p. 7.) Rowe had previ-
ously served in the United States Marine Corps, enlisting at the age of 14. (Rowe,
12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 115.) During his initial talks with the FBI, Rowe
stated he wanted to work in law enforcement and to serve his country; the FBI
told Rowe that to serve as an FBI informant in the Klan would enable him to do
both of these things. (Special Agent No. 1, 11/19/75, p. 6.)
0 Special Agent No. 1, 11/19/75, p. 8.
In practice, Rowe testified that he reported to the FBI "any and
everything that I observed or heard pertaining to any Klansmen." 6
This broad scope of Rowe's reporting was confirmed by the FBI agents
to whom he reported. As one agent testified:
. . . he furnished us inforimation on the meetings and the
thoughts and feelings, intentions and ambitions, as best he
knew them, of other members of the Klan, both the rank and
file and the leadership.2 Special Agent No. 3, 11/21/75, p. 7.
According to another of Rowe's FBI handling agents, Rowe's mission
was "total reporting," including membership lists, financial matters,
and political positions, as well as Klan violence.6 3 Rowe also testified
that, in line with his "total reporting" instructions he reported inti-
mate details of the personal lives of Klan members.64
Rowe was able to give the FBI extensive information about Klan
membership as a result of his position in the "Klan Bureau of Investi-
gation," the Klan's security and investigative arm.65 Rowe did most of
the investigation of prospective members in the Birmingham area,
and would regularly make their applications available to his FBI
handling agent, who would copy the applications before returning
them to Rowe."
In addition, Rowe took Klan membership lists and gave them to the
FBI. Rowe's handling agent testified as to the way such lists were
taken:
I remember one evening during the course of a meeting that
was going on .. . he called my home and said I will meet you
in a half an hour. . . I have a complete list of everybody that
I have just taken out of the files, but I have to have it back
within such a length of time.
Well, naturally I left home and met him and had the list
duplicated forthwith, and back in his possession and back in
the files with nobody suspecting.67
Rowe also reported on political matters relating to the Klan.6 8 Dur-
ing a campaign for mayor in Birmingham, Rowe was instructed to
attend public political meetings to assess the candidates' position on
integration, and to identify Klan members present and the extent to
which they were actively engaged in the campaign.69 Rowe also reported
on "National Conventions" of the Klan, closed meetings at which
officers were elected and Klan positions determined. 0
Rowe, 12/2/75, Vol 6, p. 116.
Special Agent No. 3, 11/21/75, p. 7.
6 Special Agent No. 2, 11/21/75, p. 4. Rowe also carried out certain activities
designed to disrupt the Klan. In early 1964, Rowe testified, his FBI handling
agent told him of the "COINTEL" or counterintelligence program of the FBI
against the Klan. (See COINTELPRO Report). In connection with the COINTEL
program. Rowe sought to disrupt the campaign of a Klansman who was a can-
didate for city police commissioner by spreading innuendo that the Klansman was
a homosexual. (Rowe Depsoition, 10/17/75, pp. 14-15.) Rowe also testified
that he was instructed to plant stories calculated to cause divorces and marital
problems among Klansmen. (Ibid., p. 17)
6 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.
a Rowe, 12/2/75, Vol. 6, p. 116.
* Rowe Deposition, 10/17/75, p. 21.
67 Special Agent No. 1, 11/19/75, p. 10-11.
* Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116; Special Agent No. 2, 11/21/75, p. 4.
Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116; Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 11.
0 Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 23.
In addition to Klan activities, Rowe reported on the activities of
other organizations to the FBI. As a member of the "Klan Bureau of
investigation," Rowe was instructed by the Klan to attend and report
on meetings of civil rights groups. Rowe gave the information he devel-
oped on these civil rights organizations to the FBI as well, even
though this fell outside the area of reporting on Klan activities.71
c. The Issue of Participation in Criminal or Violent Activity.-In
addition to general intelligence, Rowe was particularly instructed to
report any instances of planned or actual violence by the Klan.7 2 Merely
attending Klan meetings as an ordinary member did not put Rowe in
a position to observe the planning for, or occasion of violence, by the
Klan.73 As Rowe's FBI handling agent testified, "to gather informa-
tion [on violence] you have to be there." 7
Consequently, the FBI instructed Rowe to join a smaller group of
Klan members, a so-called "Action Group", which conducted violent
acts against blacks and civil rights workers.7 '
At the outset, Rowe's handling agent had instructed him that "under
no conditions should I participate in any violence whatsoever." 76 Al-
though these instructions continued to be formally reiterated to Rowe,
Rowe and his FBI handling agents understood that for Rowe to be able
to report Klan violence, he would have to be present for-and at times
might be involved in-that violence.
Rowe testified as to a number of instances where he and other Klans-
men had "beaten people severely, had boarded buses and kicked people
off; had went in restaurants and beaten them with blackjacks, chains,
pistols." 7
For example, on one occasion, Rowe gave the FBI advance warning
that Klan members were planning to assault and beat blacks attending
a country fair. His FBI handling agent instructed him "to go and see
what happened." 7 To accomplish this, Rowe accompanied the Klans-
men to the fair, where, to preserve his cover, he participated in the
resulting violence.79 On another occasion, Rowe's throat was cut while
he -was participating with other Klansmen in large-scale violence
against Freedom Riders at the Birmingham bus depot in May, 1961.80
Rowe described how he and other Klansmen used "baseball bats,
clubs, chains, and pistols" in attacking the Freedom Riders (Rowe,
12/2/75, p. 1867). Rowe recalled that, when he asked why there was no
apparent action on his reports of the impending violence, his FBI
handling agent told him "who the hell are we going to report it to? ...
the [Birmingham] police department helped set [the violence] up.
" Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116.
72 Special Agent No. 1, 11/10/75, p. 8; Rowe, Hearings, 12/2/75, p. 116.
1 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116-117.
* Special Agent No. 1, 11/19/75, p. 4.
" Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 144; Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116-117.
"Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116; Special Agent No. 1, 11/19/75, p. 9. Rowe's
first FBI handling agent testified:
"My specific instructions to [Rowe] were that he was not to be involved in any
violence. He was not to be involved in any criminal activity, that if he was in-
volved in any such activity, that I nor anyone else would come to his rescue."
(Special Agent No. 1, 11/19/75, p. 9).
7 Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 12.
7 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 117.
7 Ibid.
" Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 118.
We are an investigating agency not an enforcement agency. All we do
is gather information." "
The resulting dilemma was described by one of Rowe's FBI handling
Agents:
... it is kind of difficult to tell him that we would like you
to be there on deck, observing, be able to give us information
and still keep yourself detached and uninvolved and clean,
and that was the problem that we constantly had.
... I'm sure he was present many, many times, when lie
participated in things, and I'm sure he reported them at that
time, but we certainly cautioned him against that.
8 2
Although Rowe's participation in Klan violence was practically
an inherent feature of his informant's role, the FBI took particular
care in at least one instance that Rowe did not suggest or lead violent
activity. In April 1964, several years after Rowe joined the Klan
"Action Group," the Birmingham Field Office reported that Rowe
had become an Action Group squad leader. Bureau Headquarters or-
dered that Rowe resign this leadership position or be discontinued as
an informant.83 The Bureau further advised the Field Office:
in those cases where you have an informant who is a member
of a violent squad .. . you should insure that the informant
understands he is not to direct, lead, or instigate any acts of
violence."4
Nevertheless, even these instructions did not extend to ruling out
Rowe's participation in violence, but rather only leading or directing
violent acts. The essential characteristic of Rowe's status was ex-
pressed by the following testimony of his FBI handling agent:
If he happened to be with some Klansman and they decided
to do something, he couldn't be an angel and be a good in-
formant. 5
B. Exanples of Intelligence Informant Coverage of Groups Subject
to Intelligence Investigations
In addition to the case histories of the informants described above,
the nature of the intelligence informant technique can also be illus-
trated by other examples of informant coverage in domestic intelli-
gence investigations. The cases of informant coverage set out below
indicate the types of information intelligence informants produce for
FBI files.
In summary, these cases further demonstrate the extremely broad
scope of informant reporting, including both lawful political activity
and details of the personal lives of citizens. For example, informants
' Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 118.... The reasons for the lack of response
by the FBI and the Federal Government to Klan violence at the outset of the
1960s have been described above. The 1961 violence at the Birmingham bus depot
did lead to a decision by the Kennedy Administration to send U.S. marshals to
Alabama to protect the Freedom Riders as they proceeded to other cities. (Adams,
12/2/75, Hearings, p. 142-143.)
" Special Agent No. 3, 11/21/75, pp. 16-17.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Birmingham Field Office 4/17/64.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Birmingham Field Office 5/4/64.
Special Agent No. 3, 11/21/75, p. 12.
in the Women's Liberation Movement (Case No. 9, below) reported the
identities of women who belonged to Women's Liberation groups at
several Midwest universities, and statements made by women concern-
ing the personal reasons that motivated them to participate in the
Women's Movement. Informant coverage of lawful political activity is
also shown in Case No. 1 which involved a public meeting held by a citi-
zens group to debate the merits of developing a certain U.S. missile.
Several cases presented below involve instances where informants in
violence-prone groups provided information that led to arrests and
prosecutions or the prevention of violence. (See Case Nos. 3, 6, and 8
below.) The Socialist Workers Party (Case No. 10, below) is an exam-
ple of informant coverage and intelligence surveillance that continued
uninterrupted for many years, despite the fact that for more than three
decades the group has committed no criminal acts.86
Case No. 1-Citizens Panel on the Merits of an Anti-Ballistic
Missile System (1969)
An FBI informant and two FBI confidential sources reported on a
meeting of a Washington, D.C., group that expressed concern about
the development of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) in the
late 1960s.8' The meeting was targeted for informant coverage because
the Daily World, a communist newspaper, had commented on the
formation of the group.8 The informant reported on plans for the
meeting which was to be held in a high school auditorium where the
merits of development of the ABM would be debated, and on publicity
materials distributed at churches and schools. The informant also re-
ported that the speakers for the debate would include, on the "pro side,"
a Defense Department official and a Defense Department consultant
and on the "con side" a political science professor and a well-known
scientist." A confidential FBI source reported on the past and present
residence of the person who had applied to rent the auditorium and
on his current position in the military. Another confidential source
informed the FBI of the anti-Vietnam war and anti-ABM articles
being distributed at the meeting." The informant and source reports
on plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated
by teletype to the White House, the Vice President, the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Secret Service, the State Department, the CIA, and various
military intelligence agencies.91 A subsequent report described plans
for a similar meeting in the District of Columbia and included the
names of prominent D.C. politicians who planned to attend.92
" Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89.
'Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 137.
Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 138.
" Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to Washington Field Office 6/3/69.
* Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69.
* Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters 6/3/69.
With respect to this intelligence investigation, FBI Deputy Associate Di-
rector Adams testified that, due to the notice in the Daily World communist news-
paper, the FBI "took a quick look" at the group, and "the case apparently was
opened on May 28, 1969, and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this
organization." (Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 138.)
" Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69.
Case No. 2-Dr. Carl McIntyre's American Christian Action
Couwil (1971)
An FBI confidential source and an informant reported information
about the formation of this group by Dr. McIntyre. The group was
established to act as a counter to various liberal groups and to the
"Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam". The initial report
from a confidential source mentioned plans to picket NBC--TV studios
in Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, D.C., and named all the
members of the Board of Directors." Subsequent reports from an in-
formant described the group's plans to oppose the President's trip to
China and to support prayer in the public schools. 9 The informant
also reported on the group's convention held jointly with Dr. McIn-
tyre's missionary group and on plans for the group's future organiza-
tion and activities.9
Case No. 3-Detroit Black Panther Party 1970
An FBI extremist informant involved in an intelligence investiga-
tion of the Detroit Black Panther Party, (BPP) furnished advance in-
formation regarding a planned ambush of Detroit police officers which
enabled the Detroit Police Department to take action to prevent in-
jury or death to the officers. The information led to the arrest of eight
persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons. The informant also furn-
ished information resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau
agents of approximately fifty sticks of dynamite available to BPP,
which likely resulted in saving of lives and preventing property
damage."
On June 20, 1970, the informant furnished the names of three BPP
members who were supposed to carry out the ambush on June 27,
1970 and reported that others whose identity he did not know would
also be involved. This information was furnished to the Detroit Police
Department who in turn monitored the ambush site. On June 27, 1970,
the informant advised that the planned ambush of police officers would
definitely take place that night, shortly after midnight. On June 28,
1970, two Detroit police officers, while patrolling on the east side of
Detroit a few minutes after midnight, were fired upon by snipers.
Immediately after the shooting, Detroit police officers arrested the
three individuals identified by the informant and charged them with
assault with intent to commit murder. In addition, three other indi-
viduals were arrested in connection with this shooting. A cache of
weapons and ammunition was recovered from the residence of one of
those arrested.9 6
On July 25, 1970, the informant advised that a member of the Detroit
National Committee to Combat Fascism, and another individual, whom
he believed to be a member of the White Panther Party, stole some
dynamite on or about July 11, 1970. The informant was directed to
ascertain the location of this dynamite. He later determined that it had
been stored at the farm of the second individual's mother. The inform-
" Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/71.ma Memorandum from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/72.9 1Ibid.
'Joseph Deegan testimony, 2/13/76, p. 54.
" FBI Response to Select Committee Request for Documents.
ant further advised that the mother did not share her son's radical
views and had no knowledge that the dynamite was on her farm. On
September 16, 1970, the mother gave Bureau agents permission to
search her property. Approximately fifty sticks of dynamite were
discovered.97
Case No. 4-National Conference on Amnesty (1974)
Several FBI informants provided information on a national con-
ference held to support amnesty for veterans of the Vietnam war. The
FBI targeted the conference for informant coverage because of other
informant reports that the Vietnam Veterans Against the War were
instrumental in organizing the conference and might attempt to take
it over.98 The informant's reports identified the various church and
civil liberties groups who sponsored and organized the conference, as
well as the participation of a draft evader and several "subversives." "
The reports described the topics for workshops at the conference, and
the organization of a steering committee which would include dele-
gates from families of men killed in Vietnam and Congressional staff
aides. 00
Case No. 5-Public Meeting Opposing U.S. Involvement in Vietnam
TVar (1966)
Informants were used extensively in FBI investigations of possible
Communist links to the antiwar movement. An example is the FBI's
coverage of various antiwar -teach-ins and conferences sponsored by
the Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace. A forty-
one page report from the Philadelphia office-based on coverage -by
thirteen informants and confidential sources--described in detail
a "public hearing on Vietnam." 1o1 A Communist Party official
had "urged all CP members" in the area to attend, and one of the
organizers was alleged to have been a Communist in the early 1950's.
Upon receipt from an informant of a list of the speakers, the FBI
culled its files for data on their backgrounds. One wvas described -by a
source 'as a Young Socialist Alliance "sympathizer." Another was a
conscientious objector to military service. A third had contributed
$5,000 to the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee
on Un-American Activities. A speaker representing the W.E.B.
DuBois Club was identified as a Communist.102 The FBI covered the
meeting with an informant who reported practically verbatim the re-
marks of all the speakers, including the following:
the Chairman of the Philadelphia Ethical'Society
a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union
a representative of the United Electrical Workers
a spokesman for the Young Americans for Freedom
a member of the staff of the "Catholic Worker"
" Ibid.
* Wannall, 12/2/75, p. 139-140.
" Memorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/21/74.
'0Ibid.
... Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/22/66.
2" Ibid.
a minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church
a minister of the Episcopal Church
a representative of the Philadelphia Area Committee to
End the War in Vietnam
a Professor of Industrial Economics at Columbia
University
a representative of the Inter-University Committee for
Debate on Foreign Policy
a member of Women's Strike for Peace who had traveled
to North Vietnam
a member of Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom who had visited South Vietnam
a chaplain from Rutgers University
a professor of political science from Villanova University
another member of Young Americans for Freedom
the former Charge d'Affaires in the South Vietnamese
Embassy 103
This informant's report was so extensive as to be the equivalent of
a tape recording, although the FBI report does not indicate that the
informant was "wired." Another informant reported the remarks of
the following additional participants:
an official of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
a minister of the Church of the Brethren
a Unitarian minister
a representative of United World Federalists
a member of Students for a Democratic Society
a member of the Socialist Workers Party
a spokesman for the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs o
The report was prepared as a Letterhead Memorandum with four-
teen copies for possible dissemination by the FBI to other Executive
Branch agencies. Copies were disseminated to military intelligence
agencies, the State Department, and the Internal Security and Civil
Rights Divisions of the Justice Department.o-
Case No. 6-Black Nationalist Gromp (1968)
On July 22, 1968, in connection with an intelligence investigation
of a Cleveland black nationalist group called "New Libya," an ex-
tremist informant reported that a cache of rifles and automatic weap-
ons was in the hands of group members. The informant was later able
to determine where these weapons were located and that the group
was formulating plans for disturbances in Cleveland and other cities.
On July 23, 1968. a racial disturbance broke out in Cleveland trig-
gered by the Black Li'bya group. The riot lasted three days and re-
sulted in a number of police and civilian deaths. The informant's




' 0 Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.
The informant's advance reports were instrumental in successful
prosecutions on first degree murder charges against "New Libya"
members.10 6
Case No. 7-Investigation of "Free Universities" (1966)
The FBI used informants in investigations of "Free Universities"
in proximity to college campuses to determine whether they were con-
nected with "subversive" groups. For example, when an article ap-
peared in a Detroit newspaper stating that a "Free University" was
being formed in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and that it was "anti-institu-
tional," FBI Headquarters instructed the Detroit field office to "as-
certain through established sources [i.e., informants already in place]
the origin of this group and the identity of the individuals who are
responsible for the formation of the group and whether any of these
individuals have subversive backgrounds." 107 A note on the instruc-
tion pointed out that even if there was no specific prior indication of
Communist involvement, established informants were to be used in
investigations of such "free universities":
Several "Free Universities" have been formed in large cities
recently by the Communist Party and other subversive
groups. We are therefore conducting discreet investigations
through established sources regarding all such "Free Univer-
sities" that come to the Bureau's attention to determine .
whether they are in- any way connected with subversive
groups.1 0s
Based on the reports of five informants and confidential sources, the
field office prepared a ten-page letterhead memorandum describing in
detail the formation, curriculum content, and associates of the group-
including several members of Students for a Democratic Society and
the Socialist Workers Party.109 Although no further investigation was
recommended, the report was disseminated to local military intelli-
gence and Secret Service offices, military intelligence and Secret Serv-
ice headquarters in Washington, the State Department, and Internal
Security Division of the Justice Department.1 o
Case No. 8-Washington, D.C. Black Panther Party (1970-1971)
An informant of the Richmond FBI Field Office reported a con-
spiracy by leaders of the Washington, D.C., Chapter of the Black
Panther Party (BPP) and leaders of the Richmond Information Cen-
ter (RIC), an affiliate of the BPP, to steal and transport weapons
from Richmond, Virginia, to Washington, D.C. Five persons were
ultimately indicted by a federal grand jury. A subsequent trial resulted
in the conviction of four of the individuals.
On May 14, 1970, the informant reported that in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, a leader of the Black Panther Party asked a leader of the
FBI Memorandum in Response toSelect Committee Request.
'" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66.
Ibid.
1.'Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
"0 iemorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
Richmond Information Center if he was in a position to obtain guns
for the Washington BPP chapter.'1 ' FBI investigation failed to de-
velop any further information regarding guns. However, on Janu-
ary 8, 1971, a recently developed informant advised that around April
1970 four individuals from the Richmond area had burglarized a pri-
vate residence. Seven weapons were stolen during the burglary. The
informant advised that on November 3, 1970, the guns were then
transported from the Richmond area to Washington, D.C., by rented
automobile.112
Case No. 9-Women's Liberation Movement (1969)
Informants were a principal source of information in the FBI's
investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement. For example, in
the spring of 1969, the New York field office drew largely on informant
reporting to describe the Movement's basic philosophy and to report
particular meetings in the New York area. In describing one such
meeting, the report stated:
On [ ]69, informant, who has furnished reliable infor-
mation in the past, advised that a WLM meeting was held on
[ ] 69, at [ ] New York City. Each woman at this
meeting stated why she had come to the meeting and how she
felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise.
According to this informant, these.women are mostly con-
cerned with liberating women from this "oppressive society."
They are mostly against marriage, children, and other states
of oppression caused by men. Few of them, according to the
informant, have had political backgrounds. The informant
stated that a mailing list was passed around at this meeting
for WLM and the "Red Stockings," another women's
group. 1 3
Similarly, the Kansas City Field Office used informant reports to
describe the extent of Women's Liberation Movement activity and
to identify individual members at three universities in the Field Office
territory: the University of Missouri at Kansas City, the University
of Missouri at Columbia, and the University of Kansas at Lawrence.
The level of detail as to personal identities of persons participating
in the Women's Movement at University of Missouri, Kansas City, is
illustrated by the following passage from the Field Office Report:
[informant] indicates members of Women's Liberation Move-
ment campus group who are now enrolled as students at Uni-
versity of Missouri, Kansas City, are [five names deleted]. Of
these five, [informant] said [names deleted] are indicated to
be at least potential "New Left Radicals." [Informant] noted
that [names deleted], not currently students on the UMKC
campus, are reportedly roommates at . . . Kansas City.'
Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/22/70.
m Ibid.
m Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69, p. 2.
"' Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/20/70.
Case No. 10-Socialist Workers Party (1940 to date)
FBI informants are operating within the Socialist Workers Party
(SWP) as part of the FBI's long-term intelligence investigation of
the SWP.11 Informants report the political positions taken by the
SWP with respect to such issues as the "Vietnam War," "racial mat-
ters," "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," and any SWP
efforts to support a non-SWP candidate for political office.1 16 To en-
able the FBI to develop background information on SWP leaders, in-
formants report certain personal aspects of their lives, such as marital
status.*7 The informants also report on SWP cooperation with other
groups who are not the subject of separate intelligence investiga-
tions.",,
The intelligence investigation of the SWP began in 1940 as a result
of the SWP's description of itself as a Marxist-Leninist "combat"
organization which foresaw the inevitability or desirability of violence
should revolutionary conditions arise in the United States."1 The FBI
conceded, however, that since shortly after its formation the SWP has
not committed any violent acts, nor have its expressions "constituted
an indictable incitement to violence." 120 Nevertheless, the FBI's in-
telligence investigation of the SWP-and the use of informants against
the party and its members-has continued from 1940 to the present
day.
Case No. 11-Ku Klux Klan
As part of its COINTEL Program of using covert action against
domestic groups,12' the FBI assisted an informant in the Ku Klux Klan
in his efforts to set-up a new state-wide Klan organization independent
of the regular Klan. The FBI saw the formation of a rival group as an
opportunity to promote dissension in the regular Klan both at the
state and national levels. In approving the operation, FBI headquar-
ters stated its belief that "if a death-dealing blow can be dealt to the
[state Klan], the entire Klan organization in the United States will
collapse." 122 The FBI indicated that if the new Klan organization was
"successful in obtaining a sizable following," it would be "controlled"
by the FBI "through our informant." 123
Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89.
no Ibid., p. 91.
m Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid., p. 92.
'"Ibid., pp. 88-89.
1 Ibid., p. 89. In 1942, the conviction a year earlier of 18 SWP members
for violation of the Smith Act was upheld on appeal. Dunne v. United States,
188 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert den. 320 U.S. 790 (1943). In upholding
the conviction, however, the appellate court relied on a precedent which has since
been expressly repudiated by the Supreme Court. In Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) the Supreme Court abandoned the "bad tendency" standard
followed by the appellate court in Dunne in favor of a standard whereby speech
must present a grave and probable danger of bringing about a prohibited act
before a conviction may be sustained.
m For a full treatment of the FBI's COINTEL (counterintelligence) program,
which involved covert actions against groups and individuals, see COINTELPRO
Report.
m Brennan to Sullivan [date deleted for security reasons].
m Memorandum from field office to FBI Headquarters [date deleted for security
reasons].
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Two years after the formation of the new Klan group, a status re-
port by the FBI Field Office described the operation as "successful"
in capitalizing on the opportunity to "further disrupt [the regular
Klan] and to entice members of the regular Klan into the new Klan
organization. At that time, the new Klan group had issued several
dozen charters (although in many instances no chapter was in fact or-
ganized) and included nearly 200 members. The report stated fur-
ther that the new Klan organization would be phased out when it had
"done its ultimate damage to the regular Klan." m
The Committee's investigation revealed that this tactic risked in-
creasing violence and racial tension. The Director of the State Bureau
of Investigation testified that there were dangerous confrontations
between the two Klan groups. He testified as to one such occasion "in
which the two groups met in force, and both elements had .. . guns,
including shotguns . . . they were physically armed and facing each
other." 124a The FBI informant in the rival Klan group also called
for violence against blacks. The State Bureau of Investigation Direc-
tor further testified that he witnessed the FBI informant address a
Klan rally attended by several thousand persons and heard the inform-
ant state: "We are going to have peace and order in America if we have
to kill every Negro." 124b
C. Special FBI Informant Programs
In addition to the use of informants in particular domestic intelli-
gence investigations of groups or individuals, the FBI has conducted
special programs to develop informants for general reporting pur-
poses. These were (1) the Ghetto Informant Program (1967-1973);
(2) the development of informants in defense industrial facilities
under the Plant Informant Program (1940-1969) and (3) the
American Legion Contact Program (1940-1954). These programs are
outlined below.
1. The Ghetto Informant Program
This program was begun in 1967 to develop informants who would
provide general intelligence on the potential for violence and civil
unrest in black urban areas.' In July 1973, after considerable debate
within the FBI over the program's propriety, value, and cost, the pro-
gram was terminated by Director Kelley, with instructions to field
offices that ghetto informants were to be either included in the regular
FBI informant categories (subversive, extremist or criminal) or
discontinued.'
As of September 1972, there were 7,402 ghetto informants. Fig-
ures for previous years were: 1971-6,301; 1970-5,178; 1969-4,067.'
FBI officials saw the Ghetto Informant Program as their response
to the possibility that the urban riots and violence that occurred in the
summer of 1967 might be repeated and the express desire of White
House and Justice Department officials for advance warnings.' In
A Memorandum from field office to FBI Headquarters [date deleted for secu-
rity reasons].
'2 Deposition of Director, State Bureau of Investigation, 4/1/76, p. 36.
124b Ibid., p. 52.
' Memorandum from Moore to Sullivan, 10/11/67; memoranda from FBI
Headquarters to all SACs, 10/17/67.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 7/31/73.
FBI Memoranda in Response to Select Committee Request, 8/20/74.
m Memorandum from Moore to Sullivan, 10/11/67.
September 1967 Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote to FBI Direc-
tor Hoover:
There persists . . . a widespread belief that there is more
organized activity in the riots than we presently know about.
We must recognize, I believe, that this is a relatively new area
of investigation and intelligence reporting for the FBI and
the Department of Justice. We have not heretofore had to
deal with the possibility of an organized pattern of violence,
constituting a violation of federal law, by a group of persons
who make the urban ghetto their base of operation and whose
activities may not have been regularly monitored by existing
intelligence sources.
In these circumstances, we must make certain that every
attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon
these problems, to take every step possible to determine
whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to
determine the identity of the people and interests involved;
and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action.
As a part of the broad investigation which must necessarily
be conducted . . . sources or informants in black nationalist
organizations, SNCC and other less publicized groups should
be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose
of these groups and their relationship to other groups, and
also to determine the whereabouts of persons who might be
involved in instigating riot activity in violation of federal
law.129 [Emphasis added.]
In announcing the program to FBI Field Offices, Director Hoover
stated that "it is imperative and essential that the Bureau learn of any
indications of advance planning or organized conspiracy on the part
of individuals or organizations in connection with riots and civil
disturbances." 130
As originally conceived, a "ghetto informant" was to act as a "listen-
ing post" rather than an informant who actively sought information or
who infiltrated particular groups."' The FBI defined a ghetto inform-
ant as "an individual who lives or works in a ghetto area and has access
to information regarding the racial situation and racial activities in his
area which he furnishes to the Bureau on 'a confidential basis." 132 A
1972 Inspection Division memorandum noted that the concept of a
ghetto informant "includes the proprietor of a candy store or barber-
shop" in an urban ghetto area.1 33
At the outset of the program, 'ghetto informants, in contrast to reg-
ular subversive or extremist informants, were not given specific as-
signments or directed to infiltrate groups. As the program developed,
however, this changed. A Bureau document described this change:
The "listening post" concept was expanded and ghetto in-
formants are now utilized to attend public meetings held by
extremists, to identify extremists passing through or locating
a Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Director, FBI,
9/14/67.
m' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/17/67, p. 8.
M Memorandum from Moore -to Miller, 9/8/72.
m Memorandum from Moore to Brennan, 10/27/70.
x"Memorandum from Inspection Division, 11/24/72.
in the ghetto area, to identify purveyors of extremist litera-
ture as well as given specific assignments where appropri-
ate.1 3 4
In addition to specific assignments to report indications of poten-
tial violence, ghetto informants were focused on "Afro-American type
bookstores." A Philadelphia Field Office directive to Special Agents
listed the following such assignment as suitable for ghetto informants:
"Visit Afro-America-type bookstores for the purpose of determining
if militant extremist literature is available therein and, if so to iden-
tify the owners, operators, and clientele of such stores." 135
The "listening post" concept of the Ghetto Informant Program
became the subject of sharp debate within the FBI in 1972. The FBI
Inspection Division criticized the program for counting a ghetto in-
formant's report that there was no indication of civil unrest in his
area as "positive" information. The Inspection Division observed that
"negative information is not counted as positive information in any
other informant program." 136 The Inspection Division further stated:
Some Ghetto Informants have in the past furnished informa-
tion in extremist or criminal matters. This has been recog-
nized as a by-product of the Ghetto Informant Program. A
more meaningful approach to this whole problem might be to
concentrate more heavily in ghetto areas to develop proven
Security, Extremist, Revolutionary Activities, and Criminal
Informants upon whom we can then rely to keep us advised
of civil disturbance plans as a steady by-product to the in-
formation they are regularly furnishing on domestic intelli-
gence or criminal matters.13 '
The Inspection Division further noted that there might be "justifiable
apprehension" outside the FBI regarding the "listening post" concept.
... we have some concern of justifiable apprehension that
might be expressed by the Congress or the public if this
program were to be described in terms out of context with our
real intentions. We could fully defend informants providing
us regularly with information directly related to our juris-
dictional responsibilities and using them for "by-product" in-
formation on civil unrest. It would be much more difficult
to defend establishment of ghetto or urban listening posts all
over the country with a possible by-product of information
directly within our jurisdiction. 1 7
The Inspection Division concluded that ghetto informants who had
proven to be productive informants "should be converted to the ap-
propriate substantive informant program to which their services
relate." 138
On July 31, 1973, Director Kelley terminated the Ghetto Informant
Program, eliminating the category of "ghetto informant" and m-
structing that "no individual will be operated as an [extremist inform-
a Memorandum from Moore to Miller, 9/27/72.
m SAO memorandum, 8/12/68, re: Racial Informants.




ant] solely because he is in a 'listening post' position." :i" Under the
revised extremist informant program, extremist activity and potential
violence were to be monitored through regular extremist informants.
2. The Plant Informant Program (1940-1969)
This program developed out of discussions in October, 1938 among
the Army, Navy, and FBI as to which entity would have responsibility
for the security of defense industries against espionage and sabo-
tage.' As a result of these discussions, it was decided that the FBI
would assume the responsibility.
The program was begun in September 1940, when FBI Field Offices
were instructed to develop confidential sources in defense plants iden-
tified to the FBI on lists submitted by the Army and Navy."'1 By
September, 1942, there were 23,746 such confidential sources in 3,879
defense plants.142
The program was cut back sharply after World War II, but con-
tinued in existence until its termination in March, 1969.'0 Generally,
the confidential sources in the program were used as a point of contact
and potential source of information in investigations of suspected
espionage matters.'1 4
3. The American Legion Contact Program (1940-1954)
This program arose out of a proposal submitted by the American
Legion to the Attorney General in 1939. When World War II broke
out in Europe, the American Legion submitted to the Attorney. Gen-
eral a proposal to use its local posts to investigate and report indica-
tions of subversive or espionage activity.' ' The Attorney General
turned down the proposal but referred it to the FBI for comment. The
FBI came forward with an alternative plan, which in essence called
for the use of local American Legion post members as potential "confi-
dential sources" in their communities.146 After background checks, such
sources were to be used to provide information without payment on
domestic security matters.47 The FBI proposal was approved by the
Attorney General and the American Legion in November 1940.10 The
program'was terminated on August 17, 1954. FBI Field Offices how-
ever were instructed to maintain contact with American Legion of-
ficials in their areas.'
D. The Use of Informant8 at Colleges and Universities
1. Pre8ent FBI Policy
In the course of its domestic intelligence investigations, the FBI
regularly uses students, teachers and school officials at colleges and
universities as informants and confidential sources.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 7/31/73.
"0 FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 22.
"'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 9/23/40.
"o Ibid., p. 24.
"o Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/25/69.
'4 FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 23.
1 Ibid., p. 20.
8 Ibid., p. 20. As discussed in greater detail at p. 260 below, confidential sources
are defined by the FBI manual as individuals who furnish information "available
to them through their employment or position in the community."
1"'Ibid.
"8 Ibid., p. 21.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/17/54.
Under present FBI policy, there are two measures that apply solely
to the use of campus informants. Students under 18 years of age may
not be used as informants in other than "highly unusual circum-
stances" and justification for their use must be submitted to Bureau
Headquarters.5 o Second, student informants and confidential sources
are requested to sign a statement that they are "voluntarily" submit-
ting information because of their "concern over individuals and groups
that may be inimical to interests of U.S. Government".15 1 The state-
ment also provides that the student informant or source "understands
[the] FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activi-
ties." 151a However, the Manual does not further explain or specify
the distinction between relevant matters in intelligence investigations
and.such "legitimate activity."
The FBI Manual emphasizes that, despite these two measures re-
quiring "care" in the use of campus informants, FBI Field Offices must
have "well-plined [informant] coverage" at colleges and universities.
The Manual provides:
Each office must have continuous and well-planned program
to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so
that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this
must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each field
office to have proper coverage."'2
2. The Background to Present Policy
FBI policy on the use of informants and sources at colleges and
universities underwent a number of changes between 1965 and 1970,
the period of campus unrest. In 1967 as a result of the Katzenbach
Report on CIA involvement with student groups, FBI Director
Hoover cut back sharply on the use of campus, informants, imposing
a number of restrictions on their use. Later, despite strong pressure
from the Justice Department for more intelligence on campus groups,
Hoover initially refused to relax these restrictions. Gradually, how-
ever, the restrictions were lifted and indeed in September 1970 the
age limit for campus informants (and all informants) was lowered
from 21 to 18.
The development of FBI policy on campus informants in the crit-
ical period 1965-1970 is reviewed below.
a. Initial Guidelines for Use of Campus Informant.-FBI field
offices had been instructed as early as 1965 to intensify their investi-
gation of "subversive activity" among student groups.1 5 3 In 1967,
however, the FBI became concerned that its intelligence activity on
college campuses might be exposed by the controversy over CIA links
with the National Student Association.'15 Therefore. field offices were
' FBI, MOI Sec. 107 U(1) (a).
'
1 FBI, MOI See. 107 U(1) (b).
l5" Ibid.
1m2 FBI, MOI Sec. 107, U(3).
'" SAC Letter No. 65-44, 8/17/65.
" Referring Ito the exposure of CIA involvement with the National Student
Association, the FBI informed its field offices:
"It is possible that this current controversy could focus attention on the
Bureau's investigation of student groups on college campuses." (SAC Letter No.
67-13, 2/21/67.)
advised to conduct campus investigations in a "most discreet and
circumspect" manner:
You should ... bear in mind that in our continuing investiga-
tions to keep abreast of subversive influence on campus groups,
in discharging our responsibilities in the internal security
field, such investigations should be conducted in a most dis-
creet and circumspect manner. Good judgment and common
sense must prevail so that the Bureau is not compromised or
placed in an embarrassing position.as
Field offices were reminded that existing FBI policy required approval
from headquarters before investigating individuals or groups "con-
nected with an institution of learning," before interviewing students
or faculty members, and before developing a student or faculty mem-
ber "as an informant source." These interviews or contacts were also
to "be made away from the campus." 156
b. The 1967 Restrictions.-When the Katzenbach Committee issued
its report on CIA involvement with student groups, FBI Director
Hoover canceled all outstanding authorizations "to contact students,
graduate students, and professors of educational institutions in secu-
rity matters . . . [including] established sources, informants, and
other sources." Field Offices were instructed to request new authority
from FBI headquarters "where contacts with such individuals are
particularly important and necessary." 157
Shortly after the 1967 cutback in campus coverage, however, the
FBI formally characterized the Students for a Democratic Society
for the first time, stressing its "subversive" connections. As intelli-
gence investigations of SDS chapters expanded, FBI officials realized
that the restrictions on campus contacts "impose problems for the
field." 158
Field Offices were advised to stress "the development of noncampus
informants and sources" to maintain intelligence coverage of "sub-
versive" activity at educational institutions."5 Shortly thereafter, the
restriction 'was lifted for contacts on campuses with "established
sources functioning in 'an administrative capacity such as a Registrar,
Director of Admissions, Dean of Men, Dean of Women and Security
Officer. and their subordinates." Headquarters approval, however,
was still required to contact students or professors. 60
C. Hoover's Resistance to New Pressure for Relaxed Re8tritions on
Campus Informants.-The urban riots of the summer of 1967 greatly
intensified FBI domestic intelligence operations. Equally important,
the Detroit and Newark riots brought other agencies of the Federal
Government into the picture. A Presidential Commission was estab-
lished to study civil disorders and the Attorney General reexamined
statutes on sedition, conspiracy and insurrection. Consequently, the
Internal Security Division asked the FBI:
- SAC Letter No. 67-13, 2/21/67.
SAC Letter No. 67-13, 2/21/67.
m SAC Letter No. 67-20, 4/7/67.
.. SAC Letter No. 67-24, 5/2/67.
1 SAC Letter No. 67-24, 5/2/67.
* SAC Letter No. 67-29, 5/24/67.
to furnish us with the names of any individuals who appear
at more than one campus either before, during, or after any
active disorder or riot and the identities of those persons from
outside the campus who might be instigators of these inci-
dents.16 '
The FBI was asked to use not only its "existing sources," but also
"any other source you may be able to develop . . ." 162
Despite the pressure for greater intelligence about campus groups,
Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot
be developed." 163 Nevertheless, the FBI field offices were instructed to
intensify their efforts: "It is . . . recognized that with the graduation
of senior classes, you will lose a certain percentage of your existing
student informant coverage. This decreasing percent of coverage will
not be accepted as an excuse for not developing the necessary
information." 164
One way to achieve this result without the FBI itself recruiting
additional student informants was to have local police do so. Thus,
when field officers were reminded of the need for gathering intelligence
so that the Justice Department could be provided "data regarding
developing situations having a potential for violence," FBI Headquar-
ters stressed the need for "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement
agencies." 165
In September 1969, the restriction on recruitment of new campus
informants was finally relaxed, although field officers were still for-
bidden to develop informants under the age of 21. Procedures were
instituted, however, "for tight controls and great selectivity in this
most sensitive area". Field offices were given the following instruction:
Upon initial contact with a potential student informant or
source, informant or source should be requested to execute
brief signed written statement for the field file to the effect
that such individual has voluntarily furnished information to
the FBI because of his concern of [sic] individuals and groups
acting -against the interests of his government and that he
understands that the FBI is not interested in the legitimate
activities of educational institutions.
Field offices were also to submit quarterly reports assessing the pro-
ductivity of each student informant so as "to justify the continued
utilization of the source." 166
d. The Huwton Plan's Recommendation for Expanded Campus In-
formant Coverage.-FBI Intelligence Division officials were greatly
dissatisfied with these restrictions, particularly the age restriction on
"" Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the
Director FBI, 3/3/69.
" Ibid.
"" SAC Letter No. 69-16, 3/11/69.
"' Ibid.
'e SAC Letter 69-44, 8/19/69. Local police use of intelligence undercover agents
in college classrooms in California was held by the California Supreme Court to
likely "pose a substantial restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights." (White v. Davi8, 533 Pac Rep. 2d., 222, 232. California Supreme Court,
1975.)
1" SAC Letter No. 69-55, 9/26/69.
students informants. 6 7 This dissatisfaction surfaced in June 1970 as
the Intelligence Community developed recommendations (the "Hus-
ton Plan") for President Nixon for the relaxing of restrictions on
domestic intelligence operations.6 8 Among other items, the Huston
Plan recommended to the President:
Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded
coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related
groups. 169
Over Hoover's specific objection, this recommendation had also been
contained as an option in the earlier Special Report of the intelligence
agencies which led to the Huston Plan. In the Special Report, Hoover
noted his objection in the following words:
The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls and
restrictions relating to the development of campus sources.
To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations and
could result in charges that investigative agencies are inter-
fering with academic freedom.x10
e. The Removal of the Age Restriction.-Despite Hoover's recorded
opposition in June 1970 to expanded campus informer coverage and
President Nixon's ultimate decision not to implement the Huston Plan,
in September 1970 the FBI lifted the principal restriction on campus
informant use. On September 15, 1970, the FBI authorized its field
offices "to develop student security and racial informants who are 18
years of age or older." 171 FBI Headquarters pointed out to the field
that the removal of the age restriction presented the field "with a tre-
mendous opportunity to expand your coverage." 172
The expanded campus coverage called for by FBI Headquarters was
quickly implemented at the Field Office level as part of the FBI's
effort to have New Left campus groups think "there is an FBI agent
behind every mailbox." 173 On September 16, 1970-the day following
the Headquarters letter lifting the age restriction-the Philadelphia
Field Office for example, advised its agents:
The Director has okayed PSI's [potential security inform-
ants] and SI's [security informants] age 18 to 21. We have
been blocked off from the critical age group in the past. Let us
take advantage of this opportunity."
"e Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoe), the
"Huston Plan," 6/70, (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit No. 1.) p. 34.
1 See the Detailed Report on the Huston Plan.
'" Huston Plan, p. 36.
1" Huston Plan, p. 36.
1 SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70.
172 SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70.
'm Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 9/16/70.
The Philadelphia Field Office pointed out that on September 10 and 11, 1970, a con-
ference at FBI Headquarters on the New Left had reached a consensus that FBI
interviews with persons on campuses might result in identification of new campus
informants and "will further serve to get the point across there is an FBI agent
behind every mailbox." (Ibid.)
' Ibid.
III. THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMANTPROGRAM-SIZE, SCOPE AND STANDARDS
A. The Number of Intelligence Informant8
As of June 30, 1975, the FBI was using over 1,500 domestic intel-
ligence informants.'7 There were 1,040 FBI regular informants
approved by Bureau Headquarters (another 554 were in probationary
status pending establishment of their reliability) ."' The FBI pro-
gramed a total of $7,401,000 for its intelligence informants program
in Fiscal Year 1976. This amount is more than double the amount the
FBI programmed for its organized crime informant program in
1976.177
In addition to paid and directed informants, the FBI uses con-
fidential and panel sources in its intelligence investigations. Con-
fidential sources are defined by the FBI as individuals who furnish the
FBI information available to them through their employment or posi-
tion in the community."78 The FBI Manual cites as examples of con-
fidential sources "bankers, telephone company employees, and land-
lords." "
In practice, FBI Field Offices designate individuals as confidential
sources who are logical and convenient points of contact and informa-
tion. The source then becomes a matter of administrative record and
is available to all agents in the Field Office, minimizing the need
for an agent to start from scratch in selecting persons to interview
when the need arises.1 8 o Confidential sources are not usually informed
that they have been so designated, nor are they usually paid for any
information they provide.181 As of June 1975, there were 605 confi-
dential extremist sources, and 649 confidential subversive sources.
(By comparison, in 1973 there were 837 confidential sources and, in
1972, 684 confidential subversive sources.) ,,,
Panel sources are defined as individuals who are not involved in an
investigated group but who "will attend its public gatherin on behalf
of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witnesses.' 181b Panel
sources were first developed to meet the need for witnesses in the course
of Smith Act trials of Communist Party members in the 1950s. In those
trials, it was necessary to prove, for example, simple facts as to the
existence of the Communist Party, the dates and places of public
meetings held by the Party, and similar matters. To avoid surfacing
"5 Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 11/28/75..
"' By comparison, in 1971 the FBI had 1,731 regular informants, nearly 700
more than in 1975, and, as of 1972, 7,482 informants in the Ghetto Informant Pro-
gram. The decline since 1971 in the number of regular informants is largely at-
tributable to the decline in dissident political activity with the end of the Vietnam
War and the institution of somewhat stricter standards for the opening or contin-
uation of domestic intelligence investigations. As discussed above, the Ghetto
Informant Program was discontinued in 1973.
"7 FBI, Overall Intelligence Program, FY 1977 Budget Compared to FY 1976.
The cost of the intelligence informant program comprises payments to inform-
ants and FBI personnel, and overhead costs.
FBI, MOI Sec. 107, A (4).
FBI, MOI Sec. 107, A (4).
* FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 13.
FBI deposition, 2/10/76, pp. 10-12.
ma Ibid.
11b FBI, MOI, Sec. 107, A.
regular informants within the Party to establish such facts, panel
sources were developed. Panel sources are used for similar purposes
today.182 As of 1975, there were approximately 200 panel sources.8 3
As discussed in more detail above, there were 7,482 informants in
the Ghetto Informant Program in 1972, the year before its termination.
B. The FBI Administrative Sy8tem for Intelligence Informants
The FBI administers its intelligence informants through a cen-
tralized system from Bureau Headquarters. FBI Special Agents may
not operate or pay informants and sources without approval of FBI
Headquarters or the Special Agent in charge of a Field Office. FBI
Headquarters approval is required to designate an individual as a
potential subversive informant. 8
All potential informants are subjected to a background check.
Military records, police files, and employment and credit history are
typical items reviewed.8 5 The results of this background investiga-
tion are submitted to Bureau Headquarters. Potential extremist in-
formants may be operated on the personal authority of the Special
Agent in Charge at the Field Office level, unless the individual is in a
sensitive position where his disclosure as an informant "could cause
inordinate concern to the Bureau," is a member of or may soon join an
extremist organization, or has a criminal or other unsavory back-
ground. 186 In such instances, FBI Headquarters' authority must be
obtained, along with a statement outlining the intended use of the
informant.187
Although titled "potential" informants, such individuals neverthe-
less provide the FBI with intelligence information during this initial
stage and are paid for what they supply. 8
Special Agents in Charge may pay an informant up to $400 on their
own authority; 189 after that amount has been expended Bureau Head-
quarters authorization is required for any additional payments. 9 o
Although there is no formal ceiling on payments for services (i.e.,
information provided) FBI informants average approximately $100
a month, with the most valuable and productive informants, such as
Rowe and Cook, earning in the range of $300-$400 monthly.191
FBI Headquarters approval is required to raise both potential sub-
versive and extremist informants to regular informant status. The
request must be initialed by the Field Office SAC or his Deputy. 92
In addition, every six months FBI Headquarters reviews a com-
Pleted form on each informant submitted by the Field Office. The form
summarizes the informant's activities, his pay, the type of informa-
tion supplied (including the percentage verified from other sources)
and an assessment of his value. On the basis of this report, and a
FBI deposition, 2/10/76, pp. 16-17.
mIbid.
"'FBI, MOI Sec. 107, D(1).
FBI, MOI, Sec. 107.C.
m FBI, MOI, Sec. 130, C(l and 2).
"' FBI, MOI, Secs. 107, C; 103, D(1).
FBI, MOI, Sec. 107, D (5).
" FBI, MOI, Sec. 107, I(2a).
'" FBI, MOI, Sec. 107, L (3).
'oxFBI deposition, 2/10/75, p. 6; Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 12.
a FBI, MOI, Sec. 106, D (10).
comparison of the informant's information with that of others in simi-
lar circumstances, a monthly payment limit is established for the next
six-month period. 9 3
There are periodic reviews of informant activities in addition to
those described above. The FBI Manual provides that every sixty days
the SAC or his deputy are to review each informant's file.194 In addi-
tion, the Inspection Division reviews informant files during its annual
inspections of each Field Office.195
To operate confidential and panel sources, FBI Headquarters ap-
proval is also required. Background investigations are also performed
on these sources and the results submitted to Bureau Headquarters.""6
Each informant is assigned a "handling agent," an FBI Special
Agent who is in contact with the informant on a regular basis, re-
ceives the informant's information, and pays him, usually on a
monthly basis. The Manual provides that the handling agent "should
not only collect information, but direct the informant, be aware of his
activities, and maintain such close a relationship that he knows in-
formant's attitude towards the Bureau." 197
The FBI Manual contains detailed provisions for the correction
of false information .97a If it is learned an informant has given false
information, "all communications which have been disseminated to
(FBI HQs), other Bureau offices and to outside agencies must be
corrected." '" In addition, corrective letters are to be written to amend
any reports which contain the incorrect information. Moreover, a
control file is to be established and a letter to FBI HQs must be sent
which is to be used "to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that
necessary corrective action has been taken." 119
The Manual also provides that informants must submit written
reports or sign transcriptions of their oral reports.1 9 9 a A limited ex-
ception to this rule exists for extremist informants who may submit
oral reports in cases of imminent violence.199b
C. Standards for the Use of Intelligence Infornnts
There are three types of standards for intelligence informants.
These are (a) the criteria that govern the decision to use informants
against groups and individuals; (b) the limits that are set on the
type of information an informant may report to the FBI; and (c)
the limits -that are placed on an informant's conduct.
At present, the standards for intelligence informants are contained
in internal FBI directives. There are no statutes or published gov-
ernment regulations to govern the use of intelligence informants.
"'FBI, MOI, Sec. 107, L(3).
m letter from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 12/2/75, Hearings,
Vol. 6, Exhibit 33.
* Ibid.
.. FBI, MOI Secs. 107, R (5), S (2)
" FBI, MOI Secs. 107, R (5), S (2).
7a The process for verifying any informant's information is a continuous one
in which the Handling Agent cross checks an informant's reports through other
sources and separate investigation. Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate
Select Committee, 12/2/75, p. 4.)
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'
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Unlike wiretap and electronic surveillance, which are subject to
an elaborate system of review and approval by the Department of
Justice and the courts, there is no review outside the FBI of decisions
on intelligence informants. Thus, decisions as to intelligence inform-
ant coverage-e.g., the number of informants to be used in an investiga-
tion, the scope and duration of their reporting-are made exclusively
by FBI officials. In addition, since the standards for informant use
are in internal FBI directives, it is also within the discretion of FBI
officials to change these standards.
1. Criteria for the Decision to Use Informants
Under the FBI Manual, once a full intelligence investigation of a
group or individual is opened, informants can be used without limita-
tion. In a preliminary investigation, established informants may sup-
ply information, but new informants may not be recruited.2 0 0
Since September 1973, the FBI has distinguished between full intel-
ligence investigations and preliminary ones, and has imposed differing
limitations on the length, scope, and sources of information for pre-
liminary investigations. A preliminary investigation may be under-
taken when the subject's involvement in subversive or extremist activi-
ties is questionable or unclear to further define his involvement and
to determine whether a statutory basis exists for a full investigation.
A preliminary investigation is supposed to be confined to a review of
public source documents, record checks, and established sources and
informants. The General Accounting Office Study on FBI domestic
intelligence operations found, however, that in practice, FBI Field
Offices have not adequately distinguished between the two types of in-
vestigations.201 In particular, the GAO found that the limits on the
use of informants in preliminary investigations was subject to varying
interpretations and loose observance. The GAO Study stated:
Although the Manual of Instructions confines the scope
of preliminaries to the use of established sources, our review
of the cases showed that the 10 field offices generally used the
same sources in the preliminary cases as full-scale cases.
Most of the field offices interpreted "established sources"
broadly and did not believe the type of investigation placed
restrictions on who was contacted. An "established source"
was generally described by the field offices as'being any source
previously used by the Bureau. In addition, some field of-
fices indicated that information could come from whatever
source-established or otherwise-which is necessary to estab-
lish a subject's identity and subversive or extremist affilia-
tion.202
Under current standards, full domestic intelligence investigations
may be opened on groups and individuals-and thus informants may
be recruited and targeted against them-if (1) they have, or allegedly
- FBI, MOI Sec. 87, (F).
20 GAO Study, p. 27.
'"GAO Study, pp. 113-114.
have, violated certain statutes; .0. (2) they are "engaged in activities
which may result in" a violation of these statutes, (3) they advocate
activities which may result in a violation of these statutes.2 0 4
Informants may also infiltrate groups who are not the subject of
intelligence investigations under certain circumstances. The FBI
Manual provides that if a group which is the subject of a subversive in-
vestigation is seeking "to systematically infiltrate and control" an-
other group, an intelligence investigation of the infiltration (as op-
posed to the second group itself) may be opened.20 Informants may
join or participate in the activities of the second group if requested
by the first group.
In addition, subversive investigations under Section 87 of the FBI
Manual examine any significant connections or cooperation between a
group under investigation and any other groups.206
Thus, under this standard, informants in the group under investiga-
tion may report on those who happen to work with the group or its
members under investigation, even if the cooperation involves lawful
activity.
In summary, the scope of informant coverage may extend to (1)
groups that are the subject of intelligence investigations; (2) groups
which an investigated group is attempting to infiltrate or control; and
(3) groups having "significant connections," or which cooperate with
investigated groups.
2. Limits on the Information an Informant May Report
There are few limits on the information an informant may report
to the FBI. The FBI Manual does not limit an intelligence informant's
reporting to information relating to the planning or commission of
criminal offenses or violence. As indicated by the case histories ex-
amined earlier, informants are expected to report virtually everything
they observe regarding a group or individual's activity to fulfill their
intelligence purpose.
One rationale for this unlimited reporting was expressed by FBI
officials in their testimony to the Committee. In response to a question
as to the desirability of limiting an informant's reporting to informa-
tion pertaining to violence or criminal activity, Deputy Associate
Director Adams stated:
Here is the problem that you have with that. When you're
looking at an organization, do you report only the violent
2 For subversive intelligence investigations, the principal statutes are 18 U.S.C.
2383-85 relating to rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy, and advocat-
ing the overthrow of the government. The same statutes are involved in extremist
investigations as well as the Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 241.
2"FBI Manual of Instruction, Section 87, A.(1) (4); Section 122, A.(1) (2).
Section 87, A.(1) dealing with subversive investigations, provides, for example:
"Investigations conducted under this section are to be directed to the gather-
ing of material pertinent to a determination whether or not the subject has
violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation of [certain
statutes] or in fulfillment of Departmental instructions." [Emphasis added.]
The manual further provides that "subversive organization" or "subversive
movement" denotes a (FBI, MOI Sec. 107,A(4)) group "which is known to . . .
advocate subversive activities." [Emphasis added.] Subversive activities are
defined in terms of activities which violate or may violate relevant statutes.
(FBI, MOI Sec. 107,A(1).)
0 FBI, MOI, Sec. 87, B.4.
I FBI, MOI Sec. 107,B (3-9)
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statements made by the group or do you also show that you
may have one or two violent individuals, but you have some
of these church groups that were mentioned, and others, that
the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the statutes.
You have to report the good, the favorable along with the un-
favorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with informa-
tion in our files. We are accused of being vacuum cleaners,
and [we] are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the real
purpose of an orgaziization, do you only report the violent
statements made and the fact that it is by a small minority,
or do you also sh gw the broad base of the organization and
what it really is?
However, FBI offijials indicated that new limits on the scope of an
informant's reportJng were needed. As Adams stated". . . we have to
have guideline§y . . . we have to narrow down [informant report-
ing] because wT recognize we do wind up with too much information in
our files.soza
The FBI 1,anual does proscribe the reporting of certain types of
information. irst, informants are not to report certain legal defense
information. ,he Manual states intelligence informants should de-
cline to assi't in legal defense matters or to "handle an assignment
where such Jnformation is readily available." 208 If an informant can-
not avoid*involvement, his handling agent is to instruct the inform-
antj'"Tot to report any information pertaining to defense plans or
strategy," 209 The Manual's limitations on legal-related information are
as follows:
If an informant is present in conversation between an attor-
ney and individual under criminal indictment, he should im-
mediately leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently
learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the
substance of any conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the
informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a con-
versation with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense
for which the defendant is under indictment.210
The FBI interprets these provisions as prohibiting only the report-
ing of privileged attorney-client communications or legal defense mat-
ters in connection with a specific proceeding. So-called "standard"
legal defense information, such as manuals or general use in legal
matters, can be taken by an informant and given to the FBI. The
meaning of legal "defense plans or strategy" is not defined in the FBI
Manual and can lead to varying interpretations of what can be re-
ported. Thus, as indicated above, Cook's FBI handling agent testifi-
fied he took from Cook papers discussing legal matters involving the
VVAW.
She 'brought back several things . . . various position papers
taken by various legal defense groups, general statements of
. . . the VVAW, legal thoughts on various trials, the Gaines-
" James Adams testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135.
'7 Ibid.
"FBI, MOI Sec. 107, A (12).
2
9 Ibid.
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ville (Florida) 8 .. . the Camden (New Jersey) 9.. . . Vari-
ous documents from all of these groups. 211
Cook also testified that she gave the FBI a confidential legal
manual prepared by VVAW attorneys as a guide for legal defense of
VVAW members in the event of prosecution for dissident activity.21 2
Since this manual did not derive from an attorney-client communica-
tion in connection with a specific court proceeding, the FBI considered
the VVAW legal defense manual could be taken.
Besides the above limit on legal -informatiqn, the only other limita-
tions in the FBI Manual on reporting concen informants in labor
unions and at colleges and universities. The .anual states that if an
informant "is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him
that Bureau is not interested in employer-empoyee relationships as
such and is only concerned with obtaining informion on infiltration
of unions by subversive elements." 213 Similarly, stude~nt informants or
sources at colleges and universities are to be told thah the FBI "has
no interest in legitimate institution or campus activitiks." 214
3. Limits on an Informant'8 Condwt and Be hvior
The FBI Manual contains provisions dealing with the "direction
and control of informants." The Manual states:
Contacting Agent should not only collect informa on but
direct informant, be aware of his activities. . ..
Close control must be exercised over activities of inforin-.
ants to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible
embarrassment to Bureau.2 1 5
The Manual speaks of exercising control in order to obtain "maxi-
mum results" and prevent "embarrassment" to the Bureau; it does
not, however, contain any guidelines as to the limits on informant
conduct with respect to violence or illegal conduct.
The FBI points to the limits on FBI Special Agents as the means
by which guidelines for intelligence informants are applied. The
FBI memorandum tb the Committee states: "Specifically, informant
development and handling are extensively discussed in the FBI's
training programs and there is no question as to Special Agents being
aware that informants cannot be directed to perform a function that
the Special Agent may not legally perform.' 216 The FBI memoran-
dum also points to the FBI Rules and Regulations which state that
FBI employees "must not engage in any investigative activity which
could abridge in any way" constitutional rights of citizens.217
These limits apply to FBI Agents and employees in their handling
of informants. However, the FBI does not consider informants as
FBI employees or "undercover agents," and informants are so
advised. 2 18 Thus, these limits are not directly applicable to informants.
m Special Agent 11/20/75, pp. 15-16.
a Cook deposition, 11/14/75, p. 36.
FBI, MOI See. 107D(2d).
mFBI, MOI, See. 107U (1-b).
1 Manual, Section 107, F(4) (7).
FBI Memorandum, 2/2/76, p. 3.
2m Ibid.
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On December 23, 1974, FBI Headquarters reiterated the rules for
FBI employee conduct by the Director to all FBI Field Offices and
further stated: "You are reminded that these instructions relate to
informants in the internal security [domestic intelligence] field and
no informant should be operated in a manner which would be in con-
tradiction of such instructions." 219 This instruction appears to be the
only written provision applying FBI employee conquet standards
to informants.220 Prior to the issuance of this instruction in 1974,
there were no formal or specific provisions relating to informant con-
duct in FBI directives. The resulting effect on FBI agent direction of
informants can be illustrated by two additional cases. The first case
involved an FBI informant in a group of anti-war protestors. In
August 1970, this group broke into the Camden, New Jersey, Draft
Board, after several months of planning and preparation. The in-
formant, Robert Hardy, testified that he provided essential direction
and materials to the group, making the break-in possible. Hardy
testified:
Everything they learned about breaking into a building or
climbing a wall or cutting glass or destroying lockers, I
taught them. I got sample equipment, the type of windows
that we would go through, I picked up off the job and taught
them how to cut the glass, how to drill holes in the glass so
you cannot hear it and stuff like that, and the FBI supplied
me with the equipment needed. The stuff I did not have, the
[FBI] got off their own agents.22 1
Second, in late 1966 or early 1967 the FBI Field Office in San Diego,
California was approached by one Howard Berry Godfrey. Godfrey
testified that he was "approached" by a member of a right-wing
paramilitary group to join. The Committee received varying informa-
tion concerning why Godfrey contacted the FBI and at whose initia-
tive the informant relationship arose. 2 2 2 In any event, Godfrey and
the FBI entered into a relationship in 1967 by which Godfrey would
provide the Bureau information. This relationship was formalized in
August of 1967 when Godfrey was officially "approved" by the FBI's
Washington Headquarters as an informant.
Godfrey's relationship with the FBI lasted over five years, terminat-
ing in November of 1972. Godfrey was paid varying amounts from
1967 through 1970 when he began to receive $250 per month plus up
2" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 12/23/74.
m FBI officials testified, however, that it is unwritten Bureau practice to in-
struct informants that they are not to engage in violence or unlawful activity and,if they do so, they may be prosecuted. FBI Deputy Associate Director Adams
testified:
". . . we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,
and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the sub-
ject, and have prosecuted, I would say, offhand ... around 20 informants...
(Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 150.)
2 Hardy testimony, 9/29/75, pp. 16-17.
m Staff summary of Howard Berry Godfrey interview, 1/18/76.
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to $100 per month in expenses. 224 He continued at that level until his
termination. 2 25
Godfrey's case study, albeit dealt with here briefly, illustrated a
number of the issues which wove their way through the Committee's
inquiry into the FBI's use of informants. The first issue is control
over the informant by the Bureau. In accord with FBI procedure,
Godfrey always was assigned to a principal case agent. The Com-
mittee's investigation determined, however, that the actions of God-
frey and his cohorts in the San Diego area were rife with destruction
and violence. There is little evidence, other than Godfrey's less than
convincing claims, that he actually prevented any violence or destruc-
tion from occurring. As a member of the District Attorney's office
told the Committee:
They [the FBI] couldn't control him [Godfrey]. Godfrey's
actions went well beyond those which we would allow any
informant operating under this office to become involved
in.226
For a large part of his time as an FBI informant, the responsibility
for monitoring Godfrey was in the hands of a single FBI agent.
Moreover, under Bureau procedure, the reports of the informant
are only sent to Washington every six months. And, the reports in
the case of Godfrey were largely "form" type responses, providing
an inadequate basis for any reviewing authority in Washington to
determine Godfrey's usefulness.
The second overriding issue present in the Godfrey case study was
how the Bureau could prevent the informant from actually inciting,
encouraging or participating in violence and/or destruction without
losing his utility as an informant. Godfrey admits to participating in
some violence and destruction and the record suggests that he may
have participated in even more than he now admits to.
22
7
Examples of the types of actions Godfrey and/or the Secret Army
were involved in include firebombing, smashing windows, placing
stickers bearing SAO or Minutemen symbols on cars and buildings,
propelling lug nuts through windows with sling shots, and breaking
and entering.228
Upon questioning by the Committee, all FBI agents who dealt
with Godfrey testified that while Godfrey was specifically instructed
never to engage in illegal acts such as firebombings, etc., they rec-
ognized that this was often difficult if not impossible to accomplish.
One FBI agent put it this way:
Well, I remember almost on a daily basis, this matter would
come up. What can I do such and such. And I've said, well,
obviously you can't do that. Stay with them as long as you
" It should be noted, however, that Godfrey did not always receive exactly
$250; it often depended upon the degree of his activity.
'As earlier referenced, the average FBI informant salary was $100 per month.
' Staff summary of member of San Diego District Attorney's office interview,
1/22/76.
' Staff summary of Godfrey interview, 1/18/76.
m Indeed, the literature of the Secret Army features a pamphlet which
instructs the public in the art of burglary complete with diagrams of "forced
entry of building."
can and then find some logical excuse to bow out at the last
minute. But he was never asked by me to participate in any-
thing that I would consider illegal or that I think that he
would consider illegal and to the best of my recollection,
during our association. I can't recall anything specific . . .
Now there were occasions when I know that he didn't get out
of it. He might have been in one, he had to go and be involved
or he would have been out of the group. I really don't re-
member anything right definite at this time but there were
several of those cases, no question about it.229
And, Godfrey himself described his instructions as:
Q. Was there ever a conversation in which [you and the
FBI agent] decided [that] while you would attempt to stay
out of [a violent or destructive activity] if it came down to
either getting involved in it, or having to just leave the scene
[with] a number of questions [being] asked later, under
those circumstances that you would go ahead and do the
particular activity?
A. Yes. 30
The SAO's actions escalated to a level of violence and destruction
where Godfrey's name had to be revealed as an FBI informant. Two
events precipitated this. The first was the shooting of Paula Tharp,,
who was in the residence of the San Diego State University professor
Peter Bohmer. Briefly, while Godfrey and an SAO associate were"on a surveillance" of Bohmer's residence (instituted by Godfrey), the
associate, according to Godfrey, picked up a gun Godfrey had under
the seat of his car and fired shots into the Bohmer house, one of which
struck Ms. Tharp.2 31 Previously the SAO and Godfrey had singled
out Professor Bohmer in their literature for special attention:
For any of our readers who may care to look up Red Scum,
and say hello, here is some information that may help. His
address is 5155 Muir, Ocean Beach, telephone number is
222-7243, he drives a dark blue 1968 VW Sedam, California
licence DKY 147. Just to make sure you talk to the right guy
here is his description: he has dark brown shoulder length
hair, green eyes, weight is about 160 lbs. and he is 5'10" tall.
Now in case any of you don't believe in hitting people who
wear glasses, to be fair I guess we will have to tell you he
wears contact lences. [sic]
The significant factor for the Committee's analysis of FBI in-
formants is that even this shooting incident did not immediately
terminate Godfrey as an informant. Rather the FBI records show
that Godfrey remained on the Bureau payroll until November, 1972.
' Staff summary of FBI Agent #1 interview, 1/22/76, pp. 26-27.
Staff summary of Godfrey interview, 1/18/76, pp. 54-55.
m This incident is nlot only a matter of pending civil litigation but Godfrey's
SAO associate was convicted in a criminal trial in San Diego. The details of the
shooting are a matter of public record in the trial transcript.
And, it was not until the second major act of destruction that God-
frey was "surfaced" as an informant.2 3 2
The second major act of destruction which occurred was the bomb-
ing of the Guild theatre in San Diego. According to Godfrey, the
bombing was perpetrated by his subordinate in the SAO, one Wil-
liam Yakopec. 2 3 3 Godfrey participated in the SAO sale of some ex-
plosives to Yakopec. Yet, he promptly notified the FBI of Yakopec's
alleged involvement in the Guild Theatre bombing. Yakopec, who
maintains his innocence, was subsequently indicted and convicted
of the bombing offenses in the local courts of San Diego.
Godfrey testified publicly at both the Yakopec and Hoover trials
and was thereafter re-located to another part of California and
ceased to serve as an FBI informant. Godfrey's use as a Government
informant is now in litigation.
The intelligence informant technique is not a precise instrument.
By its very nature, it risks governmental monitoring of Constitu-
tionally-protected activity and the private lives of Americans. Un-
like electronic surveillance and wiretaps, there are few standards
and no outside review system for the use of intelligence informants.
Consequently, the risk of chilling the exercise of First Amendment
rights and infringing citizen privacy is increased. In addition,
existing guidelines for informant conduct, particularly with respect
to their role in violent organizations and FBI use of intelligence in-
formants to obtain the private documents of groups and individuals,
need to be clarified and strengthened.
4 Godfrey did turn over the weapon to his FBI supervisor after the shooting.
The FBI did tell a representative of the San Diego police department that they
had an informer who was a witness to the shooting, but neither this information
nor the existence of the gun was furnished to the unit of the San Diego Police
Department which investigated the Tharp shooting for several months.
m Godfrey testified before a San Diego grand jury that Yakopec was a "lieu-
tenant in my-an assistant San Diego County commander."
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WARRANTLESS FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological developments in this century have rendered the most
private conversations of American citizens vulnerable to interception
and monitoring by government agents. The electronic means by which
the Government can extend its "antennae" are varied: microphones
may be secretly planted in private locations or on mobile informants;
so-called "spike mikes" may be inserted into the wall of an adjoining
room; and parabolic microphones may be directed at speakers far
away to register the sound waves they emit. Telephone conversations
may be overheard without the necessity of attaching electronic devices
to the telephone itself or to the lines connecting the telephone with the
telephone company. An ordinary telephone may also be turned into an
open microphone-a "miketel"---capable of intercepting all con-
versations within hearing range even when the telephone is not in
use.
Even more sophisticated technology permits the Government to
intercept any telephone, telegram, or telex communication which is
transmitted at least partially through the air, as most such com-
munications now are. This type of interception is virtually undetect-
able and does not require the cooperation of private communications
companies.
Techniques such as these have been used, and continue to be used,
by intelligence agencies in their intelligence operations. Since the
early part of this century the FBI has utilized wiretapping and
"'bugging" techniques in both criminal and intelligence investigations.
In a single year alone (1945), the Bureau conducted 519 wiretaps and
186 microphone surveillances (excluding those conducted by means of
microphones planted on informants).' Until 1972, the Bureau used
wiretaps and bugs against both American citizens and foreigners
within the United States- without judicial warrant-to collect for-
eign intelligence, intelligence and counterintelligence information, to
monitor "subversive" and violent activity, and to determine the sources
of leaks of classified information. The FBI still uses these techniques
without a warrant in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
investigations.
The CIA and NSA have similarly used electronic surveillance tech-
niques for intelligence purposes. The CIA's Office of Security, for
example, records a total of fifty-seven individuals who were targeted
by telephone wiretaps or microphones within the United States be-
tween the years 1947 and 1968.2 Of these, thirty were employees or
former employees of the CIA or of another federal agency who were
presumably targeted for security reasons; four were United States
'Attorney General Edward H. Levi testimony, 11/6/75, Hearings, Vol. 5,
pi. 68.
'Office of Security, Domestic Surveillance summary, undated.
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citizens unconnected with the CIA or any federal agency.
3 One of the
primary responsibilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) is to
collect foreign "communications intelligence." To fulfill this responsi-
bility, it has electronically intercepted an enormous number of inter-
national telephone, telegram, and telex communications since its in-
ception in the early 1950's.4
Electronic surveillance techniques have understandably enabled
these agencies to obtain valuable information relevant to their legiti-
mate intelligence missions. Use of these techniques has provided the
Government with vital intelligence, which would be difficult to acquire
through other means, about the activities and intentions of foreign
powers, and has provided important leads in counterespionage cases.
By their very nature, however, electronic surveillance techniques
also provide the means by which the Government can collect vast
amounts of information, unrelated to any legitimate governmental in-
terest, about large numbers of American citizens. Because electronic
monitoring is surreptitious, it allows Government agents to eavesdrop
on the conversations of individuals in unguarded moments, when they
believe they are speaking in confidence. Once in operation, electronic
surveillance techniques record not merely conversations about criminal,
treasonalble, or espionage-related activities, but all conversations about
the full range of human events. Neither the most mundane nor the
most personal nor the most political expressions of the speakers are
immune from interception. Nor are these techniques sufficiently precise
to limit the conversations overheard to those of the intended subject
of the surveillance: anyone who speaks in a bugged room and anyone
who talks over a tapped telephone is also overheard and recorded.
The very intrusiveness of these techniques implies the need for strict
controls on their use, and the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures demands no less. Without such con-
trols, they may be directed against entirely innocent American citizens,
and the Government may use the vast range of information exposed by
electronic means for partisan political and other improper purposes.
Yet in the past the controls on these techniques have not been effective;
improper targets have been selected and politically useful information
obtained through electronic surveillance has been provided to senior
administration officials.
Until recent years, Congress and the Supreme Court set few limits
on the use of electronic surveillance. When the Supreme Court first
considered the legal issues raised by. wiretapping, it held that the war-
rantless use of this technique was not unconstitutional because the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did not extend to the seizure
of conversations. This decision, the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, arose in the context of a criminal prosecution,
and it left agencies such as the Bureau of Prohibition and the Bureau
of Investigation (the former name of the FBI) free to engage in the
unrestricted use of wiretapping in both criminal and intelligence
investigations.
'Office of Security, Domestic Surveillance summary, undated.
' See generally the Select Committee's Report on NSA.
Six years later, Congress imposed the first restrictions on wiretapping
in the Federal Communications Act of 1934,1 which made it a crime for
"6any person" to intercept and divulge or publish the contents of wire
and radio communications. The Supreme Court subsequently construed
this section to apply to federal agents as well as ordinary citizens, and
held that evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the interception
of wire and radio communications was inadmissible court.6 .But Con-
gress acquiesced in the Justice Department's interpretation that these
cases did not prohibit wiretapping per se, only the divulgence of the
contents of wire communications outside the federal establishment,
and government wiretapping for purposes other than prosecution
continued.
The Supreme Court reversed its holding in the Olmstead case in
1967, holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did apply to electronic
surveillances. But it expressly declined to extend this holding to cases
"involving the national security." Congress followed suit the next
year in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968,9 which established a
warrant procedure for electronic surveillance in criminal cases but in-
cluded a provision that neither it nor the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 "shall limit the constitutional power of the President" '0
a provision which has been relied upon by the Executive Branch as
permitting "national security" electronic surveillances.
In 1972, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of warrant-
less electronic surveillance. It held in United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), that the constitutional power of
the President did not extend to authorizing warrantless electronic sur-
veillance in cases involving threats to the "domestic security." The
Court distinguished-but remained silent on-the question of warrant-
less electronic surveillance where there was a "significant connection
with a foreign power, its agents or agencies." 11
Without effective guidance by the Supreme Court or Congress, ex-
ecutive branch officials developed -broad and ill-defined standards for
the use of warrantless electronic surveillance. Vague terms such as
"subversive activities," "national interest," "domestic security," and
"national security" were relied upon to electronically monitor many in-
dividuals who engaged in no criminal activity and who, by any ob-
6 47 U.S.C. 605.
0Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 397 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939).7 See pp. 278-279.
'389 U.S. at 358 n. 23.
18 U.S.C. 2510-20.
018 U.S.C. 2511(3).
" 407 U.S. at 309 n. 8. United States v. United States District Court remains
the only Supreme Court case dealing with the issue of warrantless electronic sur-
veillance for intelligence purposes. Three federal Courts of Appeal have con-
sidered this issue since 1972, however. The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit
both held that the President may constitutionally authorize warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance for foreign 'counterespionAge and foreign intelligence purposes.
(United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) ; and United States v. Brown, 484
F.2d 418 (5th Cir., 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 960 (1974).) The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held unconstitutional the warrantless electronic sur-
veillance of the Jewish Defense League, a domestic organization whose activities
allegedly affected UjS.4Sov.iet relations but which was neither the agent of nor in
collaboration with a foreign power. (ZwAeibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (en bane).) See p. 292.
jective standard, represented no genuine threat to the security of the
United States.
The secrecy which has enshrouded the twarrantless use of this tech-
nique moreover, facilitated the occasional violation of the generally
meager procedural requirements for warrantless electronic surveil-
lance. Since the early 1940's, for example, Justice Department policy
has required the approval of the Attorney General prior to the insti-
tution of wiretaps; 12 such approval has been required prior to the
institution of microphone surveillances since 1965.13 This requirement
has often been ignored for wiretaps and bugs,"' and it was not even
applied to NSA's electronic monitoring system and its Program for
"Watch Listing" American citizens. From the early 1960 s until 1973,
NISA compiled a list of individuals and organizations, including more
than one thousand American citizens and domestic groups, whose com-
munications were segregated from the mass of communications inter-
cepted by the Agency, transcribed, and frequently disseminated to
other agencies for intelligence purposes. The Americans on the list,
many of whom were active in the anti-war and civil rights movements,
were placed there by the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, Defense Depart-
ment, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs without
judicial warrant, without prior approval by the Attorney General,
and without a determination that they satisfied the executive branch
standards for warrantless electronic surveillance.15 For many years
in fact, no Attorney General even knew of this project's existence.
16
Electronic monitoring by the National Security Agency and the
CIA, however, is outside the scope of this Report. This Report focuses
exclusively on the FBI's use of electronic surveillance; NSA's moni-
toring system is described at length in the Committee's Report on
NSA. Because the legal issues and the FBI's policy and practice re-
garding consensual monitoring devices such as "body recorders" are
distinct from those of nonconsensual wiretaps and microphone instal-
lations,17 the Report is also confined to the latter forms of electronic
surveillance.
1 See p. 283.
" See p. 298.
1 See pp. 342-343.
1 See generally, NSA Report: Sec. II.
"NSA Report: Sec. II.
'"'Consensual electronic surveillance, where one party to the conversation con-
sents to the monitoring, has been held by the Supreme Court not to be covered
by the Fourth Amendment. (United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971.) How-
ever, -the Committee has discovered that the FBI used such techniques in un-
justified circumstances and with inadequate controls.
In 1970, all FBI field offices were instructed that '"9pecial Agents in Charge
(SA4s) may, on their own initiative, authorize the use of concealed recording
devices by a Special Agent or proven source In covering public appearances by
black and New Left extremists except when such appearances are at educa-
tional institutions." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all field offices,
11/5/70.)
In view of the broad meaning given the term "black and New Left extremists"
by the Bureau at that time, this policy vested wide discretion in -the field to
use consensual electronic surveillance to record lawful political expression.
Bureau informants could be "wired" to record everything they heard at a public
II. PRESIDENTIAL AND ATTORNEY GENERAL AUTHORIZATION FOR
WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING
FBI use of warrantless wiretapping for limited purposes has re-
ceived the approval of Presidents and Attorneys General consist-
ently-with only one three month exception in 1940-from 1931 to
the present day. The legal theories advanced to justify the use of this
technique, however,. have been developed almost entirely by the execu-
tive branch itself, and have been "legitimized" largely by the reluc-
tance of Congress and the Supreme Court to confront directly the argu-
ments presented by executive officers.
The evolution of executive branch wiretapping policies from 1924
to 1975, and of the legislative and judicial reaction to these policies,
is summarized below.
A. Pre-1940
Justice Department records indicate that the first time an Attorney
General formally considered the propriety of warrantless wiretapping
for either law enforcement or intelligence purposes, he found it to be"unethical:" in 1924, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone ordered
a prohibition on the use of this technique by Justice Department per-
sonnel, including those of the Bureau of Investigation (the original
name of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) .18 To implement this
policy, the Director of the Bureau of Investigation, with the approval
of Stone's successor, Attorney General John G. Sargent, included the
following section in the Bureau's Manual of Rules and Regulations:
Unethical tactics: Wiretapping, entrapment, or the use of any
other improper, illegal, or unethical tactics in procuring in-
formation in connection with investigative activity will not be
tolerated by the Bureau.19
This prohibition only applied to the Justice Department. During
the 1920's, wiretapping was extensively used by the Bureau of Prohi-
bition, then a part of the Department of the Treasury, in its investi-
gations of violations of the National Prohibition Act. In Olmtead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), criminal defendants charged with
violating this Act challenged the Bureau of Prohibition's use of this
technique, but the challenge was unsuccessful. In that case, the Court
held that evidence obtained from wiretapping which did not involve a
meeting, and there was no requirement that the technique be limited to the inves-
tigation of possible crime.
In 1972, however, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst issued a directive
to all federal agencies, including the FBI, 8tating:
"All federal departments and agencies shall, except in exigent circum-
stances . . . , obtain the advance authorization of the Attorney General or anydesignated Assistant Attorney General before using any mechanical or elec-
tronic device to overhear, transmit, or record private conversations other than
telephone conversations without the consent of all the participants. Such au-
thorization is required before employing any such device, whether it is carried
by the cooperating participant or whether it is installed on premises under the
control of the participant." (Memorandum from Attorney General Kleindienst
to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 10/16/72.)
" Memorandum from William Olson, Assistant Attorney General for Internal
Security, to Attorney General Elliot Richhrdson, undated.
* FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, Rule change issued 3/1/28.
physical intrusion or trespass was admissible and that wiretapping
was not unconstitutional because the Fourth Amendment's protections
did not apply to the seizure of conversations. The Bureau of Prohibi-
tion continued thereafter to employ this technique in its investigations,
but the restrictive policy of the Justice Department remained
unchanged for the next three years.
In 1930, the Bureau of Prohibition was transferred from the Treas-
ury Department to the Justice Department, and the differing policies
regarding wiretapping posed a problem for Attorney General Wil-
liam B. Mitchell. " [T]he present condition in the Department cannot
continue," he wrote. "We cannot have one Bureau in which wiretap-
ping is allowed and another in which it is prohibited." 20 He ultimately
resolved his dilemma by permitting both the Bureau of Investigation
and the Bureau of Prohibition to engage in wiretapping with senior
level approval for limited purposes.
On February 19, 1931, instructions were issued at the direction of
Attorney General Mitchell stating that no wiretap should be instituted
without the written approval of the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the particular case, and that such approval would only be
given in cases "involving the safety of victims of kidnappings, the
location and apprehension of desperate criminals, and in espionage
and sabotage and other cases considered to be of major law enforce-
ment importance." 21 The Manual provision relating to wiretapping
was consequently altered to read as follows:
Wiretapping: Telephone or telegraph wires shall not be
tapped unless prior authorization of the Director of the
Bureau has been secured. 2 2
Three years later, Congress' first pronouncement on wiretapping
threatened to invalidate the policy enunciated by Mitchell: in June
1934, Congress enacted Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. 605, which made it a crime for "any person" to inter-
cept and divulge or publish the contents of wire and radio communica-
tions. The Supreme Court construed this section in 1937 to apply to
Federal agents and held that evidence obtained from the interception
of wire and radio communications was inadmissible in court. 23
The Court elaborated on this decision two years later, holding that
not only was evidence obtained from such interceptions inadmissible,
but that evidence indirectly derived from such interceptions was
equally inadmissible.2"
The Justice Department did not interpret these decisions as pro-
hibiting the interception of wire communications per se, however;
only the interception and divulgence of their contents outside the
federal establishment was considered by the Department to be un-
lawful.25 Even after the Nardone decisions, the Department continued
to authorize warrantless wiretapping, albeit with the recognition
a Memorandum from William Olson to Elliot Richardson, undated.
a Ibid.
MFBI anual of Rules and Regulations, Rule change issued 2/19/31.
* Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 397 (1937).
4 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
' For example, letter from Attorney General Robert Jackson to Rep. Hatton
Summers, 3/19/41. This interpretation was undercut by the Third Circuit in
1974. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir., 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Ianov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
that evidence obtained through the use of this technique would be in-
admissible in court.
B. 1940 to 1968
1. The Roosevelt Administration
Shortly after taking office in 1940, Attorney General Robert H.
Jackson reversed the existing Justice Department policy concerning
wiretapping. By Order No. 3343, issued March 15, 1940, he prohibited
all wiretapping by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the previ-
ously operative Manual section, which described wiretapping as an
unethical practice, was reinstated at his direction.
Jackson's prohibition proved to be short-lived, however, for less
than three months later- President Franklin D. Roosevelt informed
the Attorney General that he did not believe the Supreme Court in-
tended the 1939 Nardone decision to prohibit wiretapping in "matters
involving the defense of the nation." The President sent the following
memorandum to Attorney General Jackson, granting him authority to
approve wiretaps on "persons suspected of subversive activities against
the Government of the United States:"
I have agreed with the broad purpose of the Supreme
Court decision relating to wiretapping in investigations.
The Court is undoubtedly sound both in regard to the use of
evidence secured over tapped wires in the prosecution of
citizens in criminal cases; and it is also right in its opinion
that under ordinary and normal circumstances wiretapping
by Government agents should not be carried on for the ex-
cellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil
rights.
However, I am convinced that the Supreme Court never
intended any dictum in the particular case which it decided
to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the
nation.
It is, of course, well known that certain other nations have
been engaged in the organization of propaganda of so-called
"fifth column" in other countries and in preparation for sabo-
tage, as well as in actual sabotage.
It is too late to do anything about it after sabotage, assassi-
nations and "fifth column" activities are completed.
You are, therefore, authorized and directed in such cases
as you may approve, after investigation of the need in each
case, to authorize the necessary investigating agents that
they are at liberty to secure information by listening devices
directed to the conversation or other communications of
persons suspected of subversive activities against the Govern-
ment of the United States, including suspected spies. You are
requested furthermore to limit these investigations so con-
ducted to a minimum and -to limit them insofar as possible
to aliens. 28
" Franklin D. Roosevelt, Confidential Memorandum for the Attorney General
5/21/40. [Emphasis added.] Francis Biddle, who became Attorney General in
1941, stated later:
"The memorandum was evidently prepared in a hurry by the President per-
sonally, without consultation, probably after he had talked to Bob [Attorney
(Continued)
In 1940 and 1941, several bills were introduced in Congress to
authorize electronic surveillance for the purpose Roosevelt articulated
in his letter to Jackson and for other purposes as well. One of these
was a joint resolution introduced by Representative Emmanuel Cel-
ler authorizing the FBI "to conduct investigations, subject to the
direction of the Attorney General, to ascertain, prevent, and frustrate
any interference with the national defense by sabotage, treason, sedi-
tious conspiracy, espionage, violations of neutrality laws, or in any
other manner." 27 This resolution would have lifted Section 605's ban
on wiretapping for such investigations.
Both President Roosevelt and Attorney General Jackson endorsed
such legislation. Roosevelt wrote to Representative Thomas Eliot on
February 21, 1941, "I have no compunction' in saying that wire tap-
ping should be used against those persons, not citizens of the United
States, and those few citizens who are traitors to their country, who
today are engaged in espionage or sabotage against the United
States . . . 28
The Justice Department also informed Congress about the theory
that had been developed to rationalize ongoing electronic surveil-
lance under Section 605. Attorney General Robert Jackson advised
Representative Hatton Summers on March 19, 1941, "The only offense
under the present law is to intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the same . . Any person, with no risk of penalty, may
tap telephone wires . . and act upon what he hears or make any
use of it that does not involve divulging or publication." 29
The import of these two statements was undoubtedly clear to the
members of the House Judiciary Committee to whom they were ad-
dressed. The FBI would use wiretaps in the investigation of espionage
and sabotage, despite the Federal Communications Act, since the
results of the wiretaps would not be "divulged" outside the govern-
ment. Legislation was needed only in order to use wiretap-obtained
evidence or the fruits thereof in criminal prosecutions; a new statute
was not necessary if the purpose of wiretapping was to gather intelli-
gence that would not be used in court."o
(Continued)
General Jackson]. It opened the door pretty wide to wiretapping of anyone sus-
pected of subversive activities. Bob didn't like it, and, not liking it, turned it over
to Edgar Hoover without himself passing on each case. When it came to my turn
I studied the applications carefully, sometimes requesting more information, occa-
sionally turning them down when I thought they were not warranted." (Francis
Biddle, In Brief Authority, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, N.Y. 1967,
p. 167.)
" House Joint Resolution 553, 5/27/40.
* Letter from President Roosevelt to Rep. Thomas Eliot, 2/21/41.
29 Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Rep. Hatton Summers, 3/19/41.
[Emphasis added.]
" FBI Director Hoover strongly opposed any legislation requiring a judicial
warrant for wiretapping. He told Attorney General Jackson in 1941:
"Wire-tapping, in my estimation, should only be used in cases of kidnaping,
extortion, espionage and sabotage. It is, therefore, imperative that the use
of it not be known outside of a very limited circle if the best results 'are to be
obtained. We are dealing with realities in this -matter, and we must recognize
that many times United States Attorneys' offices are not as close-mouthed as
they should be and that matters handled therein do become known to certain
favored representatives of the press, with the result that items appear in
columns that are many times alarmingly correct. Likewise, we know that there
are certain Federal Judges who are not as close-mouthed as they should be
This policy was explicitly acknowledged several months later. After
an incident where labor leader Harry Bridges discovered he was
under surveillance, Attorney General Francis Biddle announced that
FBI agents were, in fact, authorized to tap wires in cases involving
espionage, sabotage, and serious crimes such as kidnapping after first
securing the permission of the FBI Director and the Attorney Gen-
eral.3i At the same time Attorney General Biddle advised FBI Direc-
tor Hoover:
A good deal of my press conference yesterday was con-
sumed in questions about wiretapping. I refused to comment
on the Bridges incident, on the ground that it would be
improper for me to comment on a case now pending before
me.
I indicated that the stand of the Department would be,
as indeed it had been for some time, to authorize wire-
tapping in espionage, eabotage, and kidn ing cases, where
the orcumstances warranted. I described Section 605 of the
Communications Act, pointing out that under the Statute
interception alone was not illegal; that there must be both
interception and divulgence or publication; that the Courts
had held only that evidence could not be used which resulted
from wiretapping; that the Courts had never defined what
divulgence and publication was; that I would continue to
construe the Act, until the Courts decided otherwise, not to
prohibit interception of communications by an agent, and
his reporting the result to his superior officer, as infraction
of the law; that although this could be said of all crimes,
as a matter of policy wiretapping would be used sparingly,
and under express authorization of the Attorney General.32
about matters brought before them and certainly, In those cases in which wire-
tapping would be used, if limited to the few violations that I have referred
to, they are so interesting and so mysterious that I fear it would encourage
the Sherlock Holmes complex that many persons have, to whisper about what
is 'being done, and then the value of the wiretapping would be completely lost.
That is why I feel that the 'Attorney General of the United States should be
the Executive Official designated to -authorize -the use of this procedure in
certain specific types of investigations, and that these types of investigations
should be very definitely limited and restricted." Memorandum from Director
Hoover to the Attorney General, 1/27/41.
" New York. Times, 10/9/41. Former Attorney General Francis Biddle re-
called a meeting with President Roosevelt regarding the FBI wiretap on Harry
Bridges:
"When all this came out in the newspapers I could not resist suggesting to
Hoover that he tell the story of 'the unfortunate tap directly to the President.
We went over to the White House together. F.D.R. was delighted; and, with
one of his great grins, intent on every word, slapped Hoover on the back when
he had finished, 'By . . ., Edgar, that's the first time you've been caught with
your pants down!' The two men liked and understood each other," (Biddle, In
Brief Authority, p. 166.)
" Francis Biddle, Attorney General, Confidential Memorandum for Mr. Hoover,
10/9/41. [Emphasis added.]
In a memorandum to Attorney General Biddle shortly before this press con-
ference, Director Hoover stated, "It was my understanding in our conversation
with the President that the matter of estaiblishing technical surveillance was to
be continued . . ." (Memorandum from Hoover to Biddle, 10/2/41.)
Assistant Solicitor General Charles Fahy also wrote a memorandum to Attor-
ney General Biddle prior to the press conference which attempted to justify
(Continued)
2. The Truman Administration
The permissible scope of wiretapping was expanded after World
War II by President Truman to include "cases vitally affecting the
domestic security, or where human life is in jeopardy." The documen-
tary evidence suggests, however, that this expansion was inadvertent
on Truman's part and that he actually intended simply to continue
in force the policies articulated by President Roosevelt in 1940.
By memorandum of July 17, 1946, Attorney General Tom Clark
asked President Truman to renew Roosevelt's authorization for war-
rantless wiretapping issued six years earlier. Attorney General Clark
quoted from that authorization but omitted the portion of Roose-
velt's letter which read: "You are requested furthermore to limit these
investigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar
as possible to aliens." He then stated to President Truman:
It seems to me that in the present troubled period in inter-
national affairs, accompanied as it is by an increase in sub-
versive activity here at home, it is as necessary as it was in
1940 to take the investigative measures referred to in Presi-
dent Roosevelt's memorandum. At the same time, the country
is threatened by a very substantial increase in crime. While
I am reluctant to suggest any use whatever of these special
investigative measures in domestic cases, it seems to me im-
perative to use them in cases vitally affecting the domestic
security, or where human life is in jeopardy.
As so modified, I believe the outstanding directive should
be continued in force . . . In my opinion the measures pro-
posed are within the authority of law, and I have in the files
of the Department materials indicating to me that my two
most recent predecessors as Attorney General would concur
in this view.3
Truman approved the Attorney General's 1946 memorandum, but
four years later aides to President Truman discovered Clark's incom-
plete quotation and the President considered returning to the terms of
the original 1940 authorization. A February 2, 1950, memorandum lo-
(Continued)
warrantless wiretaps not only on the interpretation of the 1934 Act, but also
on the President's power as Commander in Chief. Fahy stated:
"What has been said . , . seems to me also to leave open the question
whether the general purpose and content of this statute, notwithstanding the
rigidness with which the Court has thus far construed its prohibitions, is in-
tended by Congress to apply to the President as Commander in Chief of theArmy and Navy. It is my opinion that the Commander in Chief as such may
lawfully have divulged to him or to someone on his behalf intercepted informa-
tion relative to the security of the nation. If our armies were in the fieldwithin the United States, it seems to me very clear that the statute would notbe construed to prohibit such divulgence. The fact is our Navy is in a sense 'in
the field' now, engaged in perilous duty. Our general policy against interceptionand divulgence, the nature of the wiretapping, and the abuse to which its use
lends itself, unite to require that the use to which I think it may be legally
put, be most carefully circumscribed. But I conclude that divulgence to or onbehalf of the Commander in Chief with respect to matters relating to themilitary security of the nation is not illegal." (Memorandum from Charles Fahy,Assistant Solicitor General, to the Attorney General, 10/6/41.)
Letter from Tom C. Clark, Attorney General, to the President, 7/17/46. [Em-phasis added.)
cated in the Truman Presidential Library reflects that discovery:
George M. Elsey, the Assistant Counsel to the President, wrote Tru-
man that
Not only did Clark fail to inform the President that Mr.
Roosevelt had directed the F.B.I. to hold its wiretapping to a
minimum, and to limit it insofar as possible to aliens, he re-
quested the President to approve very broad language which
would permit wiretapping in any case 'vitally affecting the
domestic security, or where human life is in jeopardy.' This
language is obviously a very far cry from the 1940 directive."
Elsey recommended in this memorandum that "the President consider
rescinding his 1946 directive." An order was drafted which closely
paralleled the Roosevelt's 1940 directive, but for reasons that are un-
clear it was never issued.3
The wiretapping standards that were expressed in Clark's 1946
memorandum and approved by President Truman were continued
under Attorney General J. Howard McGrath. In a 1952 memorandum
to J. Edgar Hoover, McGrath also made explicit the requirement of
prior approval by the Attorney General, which had been informally in-
stituted by Attorney General Biddle in 1941:
There is pending, as you know, before the Congress legisla-
tion that I have recommended which would permit wiretap-
ping under appropriate safeguards and make evidence thus
obtained admissible. As you state, the use of wiretapping is
indispensable in intelligence coverage of matters relating to
espionage, sabotage, and related security fields. Consequently,
I do not intend to alter the existing policy that wiretapping
surveillance should be used under the present highly restric-
tive basis and when specifically authorized by me.36
3. The Eisenhower Administration
The Government's perceived inability to prosecute in espionage
and sabotage cases where electronic surveillance had been used, which
stemmed from the Nardone decisions in the late 1930's, led -Attorney
General Herbert Brownell to press strongly in 1954 for legislation
to authorize "national security" wiretapping without judicial war-
rant. Rejecting arguments for a warrant requirement, Brownell con-
" Memorandum from George M. Elsey to the President, 2/2/50. Harry S. Tru-
man Library.
' Memorandum from "H. S. T." to the Attorney General, draft dated 2/7/50.
Harry S. Truman Library.
" Memorandum from J. Howard McGrath to Mr. Hoover, 2/26/52.
McGrath added: "it is requested when iany case is referred to the Depart-
ment in which telephone, microphone or other technical surveillances have been
employed by the Bureau or other Federal Agencies (when known) that the De-
partment be advised of the facts at the time the matter is first submitted."
This passage may have referred to the problems that had arisen between the
FBI and the Justice Department in the prosecution of Judith Coplon for attempt-
ing to deliver government documents to a Soviet agent. The FBI apparently failed
to inform Federal prosecutors of electronic surveillance of Miss Coplon and the
Soviet agent, and subsequent disclosure of the surveillance led to reversal of her
conviction on the grounds that the trial judge improperly withheld the surveil-
lance records from scrutiny by defense counsel. United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d
629 (2d Cir. 1950) On a second appeal her conviction was reversed because tele-
phone conversations between the defendant and her attorney were intercepted
during the trial. Coplon v. United States, 191 F. 2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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tended that responsibility should be centralized in the hands of the
Attorney General.37 He also saw a "strong danger of leaks if applica-
tion is made to a court, because in addition to the judge, you have
the clerk, the stenographer and some other officer like a law assistant
or bailiff who may be apprised of the nature of the application."8
Discussing the objectives of "national security" wiretapping, Brownell
observed:
We might just as well face up to the fact that the com-
munists are subversives and conspirators working fanati-
cally in the interests of a hostile foreign power ...
It is almost impossible to "spot" them since they no longer
use membership cards or other written documents which will
identify them for what they are. As a matter of necessity,
they turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue. The
success of their plans frequently rests upon piecing together
shreds of information received from many sources and many
nests. The participants in the conspiracy are often dispersed
and stationed in various strategic positions in government
and industry throughout the country. Their operations are
not only internal. They are also of an international and in-
tercontinental character ...
It is therefore neither reasonable nor realistic that Com-
munists should be allowed to have the free use of every
modern communication device to carry out their unlawful
conspiracies, but that law enforcement agencies should be
barred from confronting these persons with what they have
said over them.39
The House Judiciary Committee accepted Brownell's reasoning
and reported out warrantless wiretapping legislation in 1954.40 The
full House, however, rejected the arguments in support of warrant-
less wiretapping and amended the bill on the floor to require a prior
judicial warrant." Without the support of the Justice Department,
the House bill received no formal consideration in the Senate and
no serious attempt was again made to enact electronic surveillance
legislation until the 1960s.
Because of Congressional deliberations regarding wiretapping, J.
Edgar Hoover wrote a memorandum to Attorney General 
Brownell
on March 8, 1955, in which he outlined the current FBI policy in 
that
area and stated that this policy was based on the May 21, 1940, 
letter
from President Roosevelt and the July 17, 1946, memorandum 
from
Attorney General Clark, which was signed by President Truman."
Specifically, he noted that the current policy permitted wiretapping,
with the prior written approval of the Attorney General, 
in "cases
vitally affecting the domestic security or where human 
life is in
jeopardy."
Hoover also asked Brownell if he believed the Roosevelt and 
Truman
statements constituted sufficient legal authority for wiretapping 
at the
7Brownell, The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 Cornell L.Q. 195 (1954).
8 Ibid.
* Ibid.
'0 H. Rep. 1461, 4/1/54.
"House Resolution 8649, 100 Cong. Rec. 4653, 4/8/54.
"Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 3/8/55.
present time, and suggested that if Brownell did not believe they
did, he "may want to present this matter to President Eisenhower to,
determine whether he holds the same view with respect to the policies
of the Department of Justice with respect to wiretapping."1"
Brownell responded that he did not believe it necessary to obtain fur-
ther approval of the existing practice from President Eisenhower as
he was of the opinion that President Roosevelt's approval was suffi-
cient. The Attorney General wrote, in part:
In view of the fact that I personally explained to the Presi-
dent, the Cabinet, the National Security Council and the
Senate and House Judiciary Committees during 1954 the
present policy and procedure on wiretaps, at which time I
referred specifically to the authorization letter to the Attor-
ney General from President F. D. Roosevelt, I do not think
it necessary to reopen the matter at this time. . . . You will
also remember that I made several public speeches during
1954 on the legal basis for the Department of Justice policy
and procedure on wiretaps."
4. The Kennedy Administration
The existing policy and procedures for wiretapping continued in
force through the Kennedy administration. On March 13, 1962, Attor-
ney General Robert F. Kennedy issued Order No. 263-62, which finally
rescinded Attorney General Jackson's March 15, 1940, order prohibit-
ing wiretapping, and noted that this rescission was necessary "in
order to reflect the practice which has been in effect since May 21,
1940."" This order also changed the Manual provisions relating to
wiretapping to formally permit use of this technique and reaffirned
the vitality of "[e]xisting instructions to the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation with respect to obtaining the approval of the Attorney
General for wiretapping. . . .4
5. The Johmon Administration
During the Johnson administration, the procedures for conducting
wiretaps were tightened and the criteria for use of this technique were
altered. Until March 1965, no requirement had existed for the periodic
re-authorization of wiretaps by the Attorney General: some surveil-
lances consequently remained in operation for years without review.41
On March 30, 1965, Attorney General Katzenbach therefore suggested
to J. Edgar Hoover that authorizations for individual telephone taps
should 'be limited to six months, after which time a new request should
"Ibid.
" Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 3/16/55.
' Memorandum from William Olson to Elliot Richardson, undated.
" Attorney General Order No. 263-62, 3/13/62.
" A wiretap on Elijah Muhammed leader of the Nation of Islam, which was
originally approved by Attorney General Brownell in 1957, for example, con-
tinued until 1964 without subsequent re-authorization. (Memorandum from J.
Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 12/31/56, initialed "Approved: HR
1/2/57.")
As former Attorney General Katzenbach recently testified: "The custom was
not to put a time limit on a tap, or any wiretap authorization. Indeed, I think
the Bureau would have felt free in 1965 to put a tap on a phone authorized by At-
torney General Jackson before World War II." Nicholas Katzenbach testimony,
11/12/75, p. 87.
be submitted for the Attorney General's reauthorization.48 This sug-
gestion was immediately implemented by the FBI.
One week later, on April 8, 1965, Katzenbach sent to the White House
a proposed Presidential directive to all federal agencies on wiretap-
ping." This directive, formally issued by President Lyndon Johnson
in slightly modified form on June 30, 1965,0 revoked Attorney Gen-
eral Tom Clark's wiretapping standard of "cases vitally affecting the
domestic security or where human life is in jeopardy." The new direc-
tive forbade the nonconsensual interception of telephone communica-
tions by federal personnel within the United States "except in con-
nection with investigations related to the national security," and then
only after first obtaining the written approval of the Attorney General.
The President stated, in part:
I am strongly opposed to the interception of telephone con-
versations as a general investigative technique. I recognize
that mechanical and electronic devices may sometimes be
essential in protecting our national security. Nevertheless, it
is clear that indiscriminate use of these investigative devices
to overhear telephone conversations, without the knowledge or
consent of any of the persons involved, could result in serious
abuses and invasions of privacy. In my view, the invasion of
privacy of communications is a highly offensive practice
which should be engaged in only where the national security
is at stake. To avoid any misunderstanding on this subject in
the Federal Government, I am establishing the following
basic guidelines to be followed by all government agencies:
(1) No federal personnel is to intercept telephone conver-
sations within the United States by any mechanical or elec-
tronic device, without the consent of one of the parties in-
volved (except in connection with investigations related to
the national security.)
(2) No interception shall be undertaken or continued with-
out first obtaining the approval of the Attorney General.
(3) All federal agencies shall immediately conform their
practices and procedures to the provisions of this order.
5 '
Despite this Presidential approval of "national security" wiretap-
ping, Director Hoover informed Katzenbach on September 14, 1965,
that he was restricting or eliminating the use of a number of investiga-
tive techniques by the Bureau
in view of the present atmosphere, brought about by the un-
restrained and injudicious use of special investigative tech-
0 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/30/65.
AIMemorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach to the President, 4/8/65.
* Directive from President Lyndon Johnson to Heads of Agencies, 6/30/65. The
restriction on wiretapping in Katzenbach's draft order applied to "all federal
agene[ies]." In the final version, issued by President Johnson, the restriction
applied to "federal personnel."
" Directive from President Johnson to Heads of Agencies, 6/30/65. [Emphasis
added.] Mr. Katzenbaeh testified that this order "required the specific approval
of the Attorney General and referred to all agencies in the Government, and 
it
was drafted [as] explicitly . . . as one could draft it, although it has proven
rather difficult because of terms like national security to know precisely what
you are dealing with." (Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 5/t/75, p. 15.)
niques by other agencies and departments, resulting in con-
gressional and public alarm and opposition to any activities
which could in any way be termed an invasion of privacy.
With regard to wiretapping, Hoover wrote that
[w]hile we have traditionally restricted wiretaps to internal
security cases and an occasional investigation involving pos-
sible loss of life, such as kidnapping, I have further cut down
on wiretaps and I am not requesting authority for any addi-
tional wiretaps."5
Katzenbach responded on September 27, with a memorandum setting
forth what he believed to be appropriate guidelines for the use of the
techniques Hoover had restricted or eliminated. He noted that " [t]he
use of wiretaps and microphones involving trespass present more dif-
ficult problems because of the inadmissibility of any evidence ob-
tained in court cases and because of current judicial and public at-
titudes regarding their use." 5 He continued:
It is. my understanding that such devices will not be used'
without my authorization, although in emergency circum-
stances they may be used subject to my later ratification. At
this time I believe it is desirable that all such techniques be
confined to the gathering of intelligence in national security
matters, and I will continue to approve all such. requests in the
future as I have in the past. I see no need to curtail any such
activities in the national security field.
It is also my belief that there are occasions outside of the
strict definition of national security (for example, organized
crime) when it would be appropriate to use such techniques
for intelligence purposes. However, in light of the present.
atmosphere, I believe that efforts in the immediate future
should be confined to national security. I realize that this
restriction will hamper our efforts against organized crime
and will require a redoubled effort on the part of the Bureau
* to develop intelligence through other means."
While suggesting the possibility that warrantless wiretapping might
appropriately be used at some future time in cases involving organized
crime, in short, Katzenbach endorsed its use only in "the national
security field."
On November 3, 1966, Attorney General Ramsey Clark circulated a
memorandum to all United States Attorneys in which he reiterated the
"national security" limitation on wiretapping contained in President
Johnson's June 30, 1965, directive and in Katzenbach's September 27,
1965, letter to Hoover. He quoted as follows from the 1966 Supple-
mental Memorandum to the Supreme Court that had been filed in
Black v. United States," a criminal case which involved a microphone
installation:
Present practice, adopted in July 1965 in conformity with the
policies declared by President Johnson on June 30, 1965, for
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/14/65.
" Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/27/65.
"Ibid.
*385 U.S. 26 (1966).
the entire Federal establishment, prohibits the installation
of listening devices in private areas (as well as the intercep-
tion of telephone and other wire communications) in -all
instances other than those involving the collection of intelli-
gence affecting the national security. The specific authoriza-
tion of the Attorney General must be obtained in each in-
- stance when this exception is invoked. Intelligence data so
collected will not be available for investigative or litigative
purposes. 6
Clark's subsequent guidelines for the use of wiretapping and elec-
tronic eavesdropping, issued in June 1967 to the heads of executive
agencies and departments, reaffirmed the prohibition of wiretapping
in all but "national security" cases.5 7
C. The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968
Although Justice Department policy regarding wiretapping re-
mained essentially constant f rom 1965 to 1968, two Supreme Court
decisions during this period significantly altered the constitutional
framework for electronic surveillance generally. In Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead and held that the
Fourth Amendment did apply to searches and seizures of conversa-
tions and protected all conversations of an individual as to which he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz explicitly left open the
question, however, whether or not a judicial warrant was required in
cases "involving the national security." 58
In part as a response to the Berger and Katz decisions, Congress en-
acted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510-20. This Act established procedures for obtaining
judicial warrants permitting wiretapping by government officials,55 but
the issue of "national security" wiretaps, which was left open in Katz,
was similarly avoided. Section 2511(3) of the Act stated that nothing
in the Omnibus Crime Control Act or the Federal Communications Act
of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President in certain
vaguely defined areas. The text of this subsection reads as follows:
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of
the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143, 47 U.S.C.
605) shall limit the constitutional powers of the President
" Memorandum from the Attorney General to all United States Attorneys,
11/3/66, quoting the Supplemental Memorandum to the Supreme Court in Black
v. United States, filed 7/13/66.
" Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies, 6/16/67.
As a matter of practice, Attorney General Olark was more restrictive in approv-
ing wiretaps tha nthe stated policy suggested was necessary. He stated that his
practice was "to confine the area of approval to international activities directly
related to the military security of the United States." (Te'stimony of Ramsey
Clark, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Proce-
dure, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (1974).) See p. 349 for
an example of a request involving purely domestic "national security" consider-
ations which was turned down by Mr. Clark.
" 389 U.S. at 358 n. 23.
* Wiretapping by private citizens and unauthorized wireftpping by government
employees was also made a criminal offense.
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence infor-
mation deemed essential to the security of the United States,
or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this
chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the United States against the overthrow of the
Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any
other clear and present danger to the structure or existence
of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral com-
munication intercepted by authority of the President in the
exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence
in any trial hearing or other proceeding only where such
interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used
or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power."
Significantly, this subsection dose not define the scope of the Presi-
dent's constitutional power in the national security area. As the
Supreme Court noted in the Keith case, it is merely a statement that
to the extent such powers exist, if they exist at all they override the
procedural requirements for electronic surveillance th-at are outlined
in thnis statute and in the 1934 Act.61
D. Justice Department Criteria for Warrantless Wiretaps: 1968-1975
1. 1968-1972
In fields other than national security, the Justice Department was
obligated to conform with the warrant procedures of the 1968
statute. But in national security cases, Justice Department policy per-
mitted-and the Act did not forbid-warrantless wiretapping if the
proposed surveillance satisfied one or more of the following criteria
(which paralleled the standards enunciated in Section 2511(3)) :
(1) That it is necessary to protect the nation against actual
or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign
power;
* A bill drafted by the Justice Department in 1967 would have specifically
authorized the President to use warrantless electronic surveillance, but it was
limited to the three foreign-related purposes and would have barred the use of
information obtained thereby in judicial or other administrative proceedings.
(Hearings on H.R. 5386 before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1967).)
During the Senate debate on the 1968 Act, an amendment was proposed to
eliminate the references to the domestic security purposes for warrantless. elee-
tronic surveillance. Attorney General Ramsey Clark endorsed the amendment;
and the Justice Department stated, "The concept of a domestic threat to the
national security is vague and undefined: Use of electronic surveillance in such
cases may be easily abused." (114 Cong. Rec. 14717, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).)
The amendment was defeated.
01 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303--04 (1972).
In so interpreting Section 2511(3), the Court relied in part on its legislative his-
tory, which made it clear that the section was not intended to confer any power
upon the President. The Court quoted the remarks of Senator Philip Hart that
". . . [NIothing in Section 2511(g) even attempts to define the limits of the
President's national security power under present law, which I have always
found extremely vague. . . . Section 2511(3) merely says that if the President
has such a power, then its exercise is in no way affected by Title III." (407 U.S.
at 307.)
(2) That it is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation deemed essential to the security of the United
States;
(3) That it is necessary to protect national security infor-
mation against foreign intelligence activities;
(4) That it is necessary to protect the United States
against the overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means; or
(5) That it is necessary to protect the United States against
a clear or present danger to the structure or the existence of
its Government.62
Existing procedures for warrantless wiretaps requiring the prior
written authorization of the Attorney General and subsequent re-
authorization after 90 days remained in effect after the passage of
the 1968 Act.
2. The Keith Case: 1972
On June 19, 1972, the Supreme Court decided the so-called Keith
case, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972), which held that the Fourth Amendment required prior judi-
cial approval for "domestic security" electronic surveillance. The Court
acknowledged the constitutional power of the President to 'protect
our Government against ,those who would subvert or overthrow it by
unlawful means," 63 but it held that this power did not extend to the
authorization of warrantless electronic surveillance directed at a
domestic organization which was neither directly nor indirectly con-
nected with a foreign power.6 4
To conform with the Keith decision, the Justice Department there-
after limited warrantless wiretapping to cases involving a "significant
connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies." 65 A spokes-
man for the Department stated that such a connection might be shown
by "the presence of such factors as substantial financing, control by or
active collaboration with a foreign government and agencies thereof in
unlawful activities directed against the Government of the United
States." Sa
' Letter from William Olson to Attorney General Elliot Richardson, undated.
*407 U.S. at 310.
" At the same time the Court recognized that "domestic security surveillance
may involve different policy and practical considerations apart from the surveil-
lance of 'ordinary crime,'" (407 U.'S. at 322), and thus did not hold that "the
same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III [of the 1968 Act]
are necessarily applicable to this case." (407 UJS. at 322). The court noted:
"Given [the] potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances
and those involving domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective
standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified
crimes in Title HI. Different standards may be complete with the Fourth Amend-
ment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Govern-
ment for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens." (407
U.S. at 322-23). 407 U.S. at 309, 321.
a Testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney, Hear-
ings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
6/29/72, p. 10. This language paralleled that of the Supreme Court in Keith, 407
U.S. at 309, n. 8.
"a Maroney Testimony, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Adminis-
tration Practice and Procedure, 6/29/72, p. 10.
3. 1972-1975
The Justice Department's criteria for warrantless electronic surveil-
lance were next modified in 1975. On June 24, 1975, Attorney General
Edward H. Levi wrote Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy
a letter in which he set forth his standards for warrantless wiretaps.
He wrote, in part:
Under the standards and procedures established by the
President, the personal approval of the Attorney General is
required before any non-consensual electronic surveillance
may be instituted within the United States without a judicial
warrant. All requests for surveillance must be made in writ-
ing by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and must set forth the relevant factual circumstances that
justify the proposed surveillance. Both the agency and the
Presidential appointee initiating the request must be identi-
fied. Requests from the Director are examined by a special
review group which I have established within the Office of the
Attorney General. Authorization will not be granted unless
the Attorney General has satisfied himself that the requested
electronic surveillance is necessary for national security or
foreign intelligence purposes important to national security.
In addition, the Attorney General must be satisfied that
the subject of the surveillance is either assisting a foreign
power or foreign-based political group, or plans unlawful
activity directed against a foreign power or foreign-based
political group. Finally, he must be satisfied that the mini-
mum physical intrusion necessary to obtain the information
will be used.
All authorizations are for a period of ninety days or less,
and the specific approval of the Attorney General is again
required for continuation of the surveillance beyond that pe-
riod. The Attorney General has also been directed to review
all electronic surveillance on a regular basis to ensure that the
aforementioned criteria are satisfied. Pursuant to the man-
date of United States v. United States District Court, elec-
tronic surveillance without a judicial warrant is not con-
ducted where there is no foreign involvement.",
In his public testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities on November 6, 1975, Attorney General Levi
again articulated current Department of Justice criteria for the ap-
proval of warrantless electronic surveillance. His formulation on that
date returned to the three foreign-related categories which were basedon Section 2511(3) of the 1968 Act, between 1972 and 1975, and a fourthcategory was also added. He stated:
Requests are only authorized when the requested electronic
surveillance is necessary to protect the nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power; to
obtain foreign intelligence deemed essential to the security of
the nation; to protect national security information against
foreign intelligence activities; or to obtain information cer-
" Letter from Attorney General Edward Levi to Senators Frank Church andEdward Kennedy, 6/24/75. [Emphasis added.]
tified as necessary for the conduct of foreign affairs matters
important to the national security of the United States.67
In his November 1975 testimony, the Attorney General also omitted
the phrase in his June 24 letter which would have permitted warrant.
less electronic surveillance to be directed against American citizens or
domestic groups which "plan[ned] unlawful activity directed against
a foreign power or a foreign-based political group." Warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance, he said, would only be authorized when the sub-
ject of the proposed surveillance is "consciously assisting a foreign
power or a foreign-based political group." 68 The elimination of this
category was apparently due to the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F. 2d
594 (D.C. Cir., 1975) (en bano), which held unconstitutional warrant-
less electronic surveillance of a domestic organization that was neither
the agent of nor collaborator with a foreign power."
To date, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever squarely
faced the issue of whether the President may legitimately authorize
warrantless electronic surveillance in "national security" cases involv-
ing the activities of foreign powers or their agents. As noted above,
Section 2511(3) of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act does not rep-
resent an affirmative grant of power to the President; it is simply an
acknowledgement that Congress does not intend to limit or restrict
whatever constitutional power the President may have in connection
with "national security" cases. And the Supreme Court in Keith ex-
plicitly wrote that it only reached the question of the constitutionality
of "national security" electronic surveillance in cases that involved
"domestic security." While two federal circuit courts have determined
that the President may constitutionally authorize warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance directed against foreign agents or collaborators,7 0
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases and has yet to decide
the issue. In the absence of a mandate f roni Congress or the Supreme
Court, the Justice Department has relied on these circuit court cases to
support its current standards for warrantless electronic surveillance.7
a Edward H. Levi testimony, 11/6/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 70, 71.
Unlike the first three phrases, the last criterion-"to obtain information certi-
fied as necessary for the conduct of foreign affairs matters important to the
national security of the United States"-does not parallel the language of Sec-
tion 2511(3).
* Ibid.
* In Zweibon, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant former Attorney
General's theory that a wiretap on a domestic organization was justified as a
proper exercise of the President's foreign affairs powers when the activities of
that group adversely affected this country's relations with a foreign power.
" United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir., 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) ; and United States v. Brown, 484
F.2d 418 (5th Cir., 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
'A Justice Department memorandum states that the current policy of the
Attorney General is to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance "only when
it is shown that its subjects are the active, conscious agents of foreign powers."
This standard "is applied with particular stringency where the subjects are
American citizens or permanent resident aliens."
In one instance during 1975, it was decided that there was not sufficient infor-
mation to "meet these strict standards;" and the Department went to a court
for "orders approving, for periods of twelve days each, wiretaps of the telephone
of two individuals." The court issued the orders, according to this Justice Depart-
Legislation has recently been introduced, with the support of At-
torney General Levi, to require a prior judicial warrant for electronic
surveillance of an "agent of a foreign power." One of seven specially
designated federal judges would be authorized to issue a warrant upon
a finding that there is "probable cause to believe that the target of the
electronic surveillance is a. foreign -power or an agent of a foreign
power." The term "agent of a foreign power" is defined as
(i) a person who is not a permanent resident alien or citi-
zen of the United States and who is an officer or employee
of a foreign power; or
(ii) a person who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign
power, is engaged in clandestine intelligence activities, sabo-
tage, or terrorist activities, or who conspires with, assists or
aids and abets such a person in engaging in such activities.72
Thus, the legislation would not define the activities which could sub-
ject an American to electronic. surveillance in terms of the federal
criminal laws.
The new legislation also would not reach electronic surveillance of
Americans abroad or other "facts and circumstances ... . beyond the
scope" of its provisions. Authority for such surveillance would con-
tinue to be based on whatever may be "the constitutional power of the
President." In other respects, however, the proposed statute is a sig-
nificant step towards effective regulation of FBI electronic surveil-
lance.
IIT. PRESIDENTIAL AND ATTORNEY GENERAL AUTHORIZATION FOR
WARRANTLESS MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE
Warrantless microphone surveillance, while perhaps the most in-
trusive type of electronic surveillance, has received significantly less
attention from Presidents and Attorneys General than has warrantless
wiretapping. The first documentary indication that microphone sur-
veillance was separately considered by any Attorney General is not
found until 1952, when Attorney General McGrath prohibited its use
in cases involving trespass. Two years later, Attorney General Brown-
ell issued a sweeping authorization for microphone surveillance, even
when it involved physical trespass, in cases where the Bureau deter-
mined such surveillance was in the national interest; no prior ap-
proval by the Attorney General was required. This policy continued
until 1965, when microphone surveillance was placed on an equal foot-
ment memorandum, even though "there was not probable cause to believe that
any of the particular offenses listed in" the provisions of the 1968 Act for court-
ordered electronic surveillance "was being or was about to be committed." The
facts supporting the application showed, according to the Department, "an
urgent need to obtain information about possible terrorist activities"; that the
information was "essential to the security of the United States;" that the infor-
mation was-likely to be obtained by means of the surveillance; and that it "couldnot practicably be obtained by any other means." The Department has describedthis "ad hoc adjustment" of the 1968 statute as "extremely difficult and lessthan satisfactory." (Justice Department memorandum from Ron Carr, SpecialAssistant to the Attorney General, to Mike Shaheen, Counsel on ProfessionalResponsibility, 2/26/76.)
72 S. 3197, introduced 3/23/76.
ing with telephone surveillance, and since that time the policies for
both these forms of electronic surveillance have remained identical.
A. Pre-1952
1. 1931 to 1942
The legal status of microphone, as opposed to telephone, surveillance
was not addressed by the Supreme Court until 1942, and it was not ad-
dressed by Congress until 1968. It is perhaps for this reason that the
Justice Department developed no distinct policy on mircophone sur-
veillance during the first half of the century.
The Olmstead case in 1928 involved a wiretap rather than a micro-
phone surveillance. Similarly, the Federal Communications Act of
1934 was addressed only to the interception of wire and radio con-
munications; microphone surveillance was not within its ambit.
Neither Attorney General Mitchell's nor Attorney General Jackson's
instructions on wiretapping in 1931 and 1940, respectively, encom-
passed microphone surveillance, and President Roosevelt's 1940
authorization and President Truman's 1946 authorization were also
limited to wiretapping.
An internal Justice Department memorandum from William Olson,
former Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, to Attorney
General Elliot Richardson notes that " [d]uring the period 1931-1940,
it appears safe to assume that microphone surveillances were utilized
under the same standards as telephone surveillances-'in those cases
involving the safety of the victims of kidnapping, the location and ap-
prehension of desperate criminals, and in espionage, sabotage, and
other cases considered to be of major law enforcement importance.' " '
2. 1942-1952
In 1942, the Supreme Court decided Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129, which held in the context of a criminal case that a
microphone surveillance was constitutional when it did not involve
physical trespass. Thereafter, the test for the validity of a microphone
surveillance appeared to be whether or not it involved a trespass.7 4
There is no evidence, however, that an Attorney General gave any
firm guidance to the FBI in this area until 1952. Although there did
not appear to be any distinct articulated Justice Department policy
7 Memorandum from William Olson to Elliot Richardson, undated.
" In 1944, Alexander Holtzoff, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General,
prepared a memorandum on "admissibility of evidence obtained by trash covers
or microphone surveillance" in response to a series of hypothetical questions sub-
mitted by the FBI. Holtzoff stated that "evidence obtained by an unlawful search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible as against
. . . the person in control of the premises that have been illegally searched."
He added that "the secret taking or abstraction of papers or other property
from the premises without force is equivalent to an illegal search and seizure."
However, Holtzoff expressed the view "that microphone surveillance is not
equivalent to illegal search and seizure" and "that evidence so obtained should
be admissible" even where "an actual trespass is committed." (Memorandum
from Holtzoff to J. Edgar Hoover 7/4/44.)
Holtzoff disregarded the implication of Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942), that microphone surveillance involving trespass .would violate the Fourth
Amendment. Nevertheless, the Goldman case did not deal directly with this
issue, since it upheld the constitutionality of a microphone surveillance not
installed by trespass.
on microphone surveillance for a decade after Goldman, J. Edgar
Hoover summarized FBI practice since Goldman in a 1951 memoran-
dum to Attorney General McGrath:
As you are aware, this Bureau has also employed the use of
microphone installations on a highly restrictive basis, chiefly
to obtain intelligence information. The information obtained
from microphones, as in the case of wiretaps, is not admissible
in evidence. In certain instances, it has been possible to install
microphones without trespass, as reflected by opinions ren-
dered in the past by the Department on this subject matter. In
these instances, the information obtained, of course, is treated
as evidence and therefore is not regarded as purely intelli-
gence information.
As you know, in a number of instances it has not been possi-
ble to install microphones without trespass. In such instances
the information received therefrom is of an intelligence na-
ture only. Here again, as in the use of wiretaps, experience
has shown us that intelligence information highly pertinent
to the defense and welfare of this nation is derived through
the use of microphones.76
B. 1952 to 1965
The first clear instruction to the FBI from an Attorney General
regarding microphone surveillance was issued in 1952. On Febru-
ary 26, 1952, Attorney General McGrath wrote to Mr. Hoover as
follows:
The use of microphone surveillance which does not involve
a trespass would seem to be permissible under the present state
of the law, United States v. Goldman, 316 U.S. 129. Such sur-
veillances as involve trespass are in the area of the Fourth
Amendment, and evidence so obtained and from leads so
obtained is inadmissible.
The records do not indicate that this question dealing with
microphones has ever been presented before; therefore, please
be advised that I cannot authorize the installation of a micro-
phone involving a trespass under existing law."
As a result of this instruction, Hoover declared in a March 4, 1952,
internal FBI memorandum that he would similarly not approve any
request for a microphone surveillance in a case involving trespass. 78
The FBI evidently considered this policy on microphone surveil-
lance to be too restrictive, however, especially in the area of internal
security.79 Under pressure from the FBI-and despite the 1954
"Memorandum from Director FBI to the Attorney General, Subject: "Tech-
nical Coverage," 10/6/51. [Emphasis added.]
" Memorandum from the Attorney General to J. Edgar Hoover, 2/26/52.
[Emphasis added.]
7 Memorandum from William Olson to Elliott Richardson, undated.
"A Justice Department memorandum from Thomas K. Hall, Smith Act Unit
to William E. Foley, Chief, Internal Security Section, Subject: "Microphone
Surveillances," 12/22/53, reflects a meeting between Justice Department officials
and Alan Belmont and Carl Hennrich of the Bureau to determine how the use
of this technique could be broadened.
Supreme Court decision in Irvine v. California s0-Attorney General
Brownell reversed his predecessor's position. On May 22, 1954, he
wrote Director Hoover:
The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone
surveillances by city police in a gambling case, makes ap-
propriate a reappraisal of the use. which may be made in
the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of micro-
phone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the
internal security of the country.
It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone
surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activ-
ities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive
persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the na-
tional interest requires that microphone surveillance be uti-
lized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need
not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution.
The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with
internal security matters equally as important as the duty of
developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the na-
tional security requires that the FBI be able to use micro-
phone surveillance for the proper discharge of both such
functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of
microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circum-
stances and for these purposes.
I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in
Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That
case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of
the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones
which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal
security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case
the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they
regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a
bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods
of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's
action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and
intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in
all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously,
the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some
comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever
possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence
or evidence relating to matters connected with the national
security can only be obtained by the installat of a micro-
phone in such a location. It is my opinion tat under such
circumstances the installation is proper and not prohibited
by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.
... It is realized that not infrequently the question of tres-
pass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone.
* 347 U.S. 128 (1954). In Irvine, the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained
in a criminal case from a warrantless microphone installation involving trespass
was inadmissible in court. The fact that the microphone had been planted in
a bedroom particularly offended the court,
The question of whether a trespass is actually involved
and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon
the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must
necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each
case. The Department in resolving the problems which may
arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance
will review the circumstances in each case in light of the
practical necessities of investigation and of the national in-
terest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the
Department should adopt that interpretation which will
permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most
conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the
FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considera-
tions of internal security and the national safety are para-
mount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this
technique in the national interest.8 '
Brownell cited no legal support for this sweeping authorization.
.By not requiring prior approval by the Attorney General for specific
microphone installations, moreover, he largely undercut the policy
which had developed for wiretapping. The FBI in many cases could
obtain equivalent coverage by utilizing bugs rather than taps and
would not be burdened with the necessity of a formal request to the
Attorney General.
On May 4, 1961, Director Hoover wrote a memorandum to Deputy
Attorney General Byron R. White, in which he informed the Depart-
ment that the FBI's policy with regard to microphone surveillance
was based on the 1954 Brownell memorandum quoted above. Hoover
stated that Brownell had "approved the use of microphone surveil-
lances with or without trespass," and noted that "in the internal se-
curity field we are utilizing microphone surveillances on a restricted
basis even though trespass is necessary to assist in uncovering the ac-
tivities of [foreign] intelligence agents and Communist Party leaders."
He continued: "In the interests of national safety, microphone sur-
veillances are also utilized on a restricted basis, even though trespass
is necessary, in uncovering major criminal activities. We are using
such coverage in connection with our investigations of clandestine ac-
tivities of top hoodlums and organized crime." 82 This memorandum
apparently did not lead to further reconsideration of microphone sur-
veillance policy by Justice Department officials, and the practice ar-
ticulated by Hoover continued without change until 1965.82a
81Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.
[Emphasis added.]
" Memorandum from the Director, FBI to Mr. Byron R. White, Deputy At-
torney General, 5/4/61. Less than three months earlier, however, the FBI had
planted a bug in a hotel room occupied by a United States Congressman in con-
nection with an investigation that was unrelated to either Communist activities
or organized crime. See pages 329-330.
'2 For an account of a subsequent meeting between Attorney General Kennedy
and the FBI's liaison to the Attorney General regarding certain FBI microphone
surveillance practices in 1961, see the Committee's Report on Warrantless Sur-
repitious Entries, Sec. II.
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The Department later summarized the policy during these years in
the Supplemental Memorandum to the Supreme Court in the case of
Black v. United States, 8 referred to above.
The memorandum read, in part: "Under Department practice in ef-
fect for a period of years prior to 1963, and continuing until 1965,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was given au-
thority to approve the installation of devices such as that in question
[a microphone] for intelligence (and not evidentiary) purposes when
required in the interest of internal security or national safety, in-
cluding organized crime, kidnappings, and matters wherein human life
may be at stake. Acting on the basis of the aforementioned Depart-
mental authorization, the Director approved installation of the device
involved in the instant case." 84
C. 1965 to the Present
On March 30, 1965, when Attorney General Katzenbach instituted
the six month limitation on telephone taps, he also expressed the view
that proposals for microphone surveillances should be submitted for
the Attorney General's prior approval and that this type of sur-
veillance should also be limited to six month periods.15 While Attor-
neys General since the 1950s had sporadically given their prior ap-
proval to microphone surveillances, the requirement of such approval
had never been a consistent policy of the Justice Department, as it
had been with respect to wiretapping for more than two decades. 8 a
With the immediate implementation of Katzenbach's suggestions,
therefore, the Justice Department procedures with regard to both wire-
tapping and microphone surveillance became identical.
President Johnson's June 30, 1965, directive to all federal agencies,
which formally prohibited all wiretapping except in connection with
"national security" investigations and then only with the prior ap-
proval of the Attorney General, referred to the issue of microphone
surveillances only tangentially. It read:
Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear
nontelephone conversations is an even more difficult problem,
which raises substantial and unresolved questions of constitu-
tional interpretation. I desire that each agency conducting
such investigations consult with the Attorney General to as-
certain whether the agency's practices are fully in accord
with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of
others.86
"385 U.S. 26 (1966).
Supplemental Memorandum for the United State8, Black v. United State8,
385 U.S. 26 (1966), submitted by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 7/13/66.
* Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/30/65.
'" Mr. Katzenbach testified as follows concerning the requirement he imposed
on microphone surveillance:
"Curiously, 'bugs,' which in my judgment are far more serious invasions of
privacy than are taps, were not subject to the same authorization procedure in
the Department of Justice until I so directed on March 30, 1965. Theretofore, the
Bureau had claimed an authority to install bugs at its sole discretion under a
memorandum from then Attorney General Brownell dated May 20, 1954. I
thought the claim that Attorney General Brownell's memorandum authorized the
widespread use of bugs was extremely tenuous." (Katzenbach testimony, Hear-
ings, Vol. 6, p. 200.)
" Directive from President Johnson to Heads of Agencies, 6/30/65.
Apparently, J. Edgar Hoover did not find his "consultations" with
the Attorney General to be encouraging. It is noted above that on
September 14, 1965, the Director informed Katzenbach that, "[i]n
accordance with the wishes you have expressed during various recent
conversations with me" and because of public alarm at alleged in-
vasions of privacy by Federal agencies, he was severely restricting or
eliminating the use of a number of investigative techniques. Specifi-
cally with regard to microphone surveillance, he wrote that "we have
discontinued completely the use of " this technique "'-despite Katzen-
bach's approval of the limited use of microphone surveillance in March
of that year and despite the absence of a prohibition on the use of the
technique in the President's June directive.
It is also noted above in Section II that Katzenbach responded about
two weeks later with a memorandum setting forth what he believed to
be appropriate guidelines for the use of the techniques Hoover had re-
stricted or eliminated. He gave virtually unrestricted authorization
to the FBI to conduct microphone surveillances not involving trespass,
writing, "[w]here such questions [i.e., of trespass] are not raised, I
believe the Bureau should continue to use these techniques in cases
where you believe it appropriate without-further authorization from
me." 88 With regard to microphone surveillances that did involve tres-
pass, he again treated the use of this technique in a fashion identical
to warrantless wiretapping: for both he required his prior approval
(except in "emergency circumstances") and for both the legitimate
purposes were limited to the gathering of intelligence in "national
security matters." While he expressed the belief that both wiretaps
and microphone surveillances involving trespass might at some future
time be appropriate to use in the area of organized crime, he gave no
authority for such use at that time.
The policy set out in Katzenbach's September 27 letter to Hoover
was reaffirmed by the Justice Department at least three times prior to
the 1967 Katz decision and the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1968.
In the July 1966 Supplemental Memorandum filed in the Black case,
the Justice Department stated that "[p] resent Departmental practice,
adopted in July 1965, prohibits the use of such listening devices in all
instances other than those involving the collection of intelligence af-
fecting the national security. The specific authorization of the At-
*torney General must be obtained in each instance when this exception
is involved." This language was quoted by Attorney General Ramsey
Clark in his Novemiber 3, 1966 memorandum to all United States At-
torneys 9 and reaffirmed in Clark's 1967 memorandum to heads of
executive departments.90
The Katz decision, in December 1967, held that a warrantless micro-
phone installation on the side of a public telephone booth was uncon-
stitutional in the context of a criminal case. Thus, Justice Department
policy prohibiting microphone surveillances in non-"national security"
' Memorandum from the Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 9/14/65.
. Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/27/65.
Memorandum from the Attorney General to all United States Attorneys,11/3/66.
9 Memorandum from the Attorney General to Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 6/16/67.
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cases became a constitutional requirement as well-regardless of
Whether or not the installation involved trespass.9" As noted above,
however, the issue of electronic surveillance in "national security" cases
was not addressed by the Supreme Court in Katz.
The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act, unlike the Federal Commu-
nications Act of 1934, applies to both telephone wiretaps and micro-
phone surveillances. Because of this, and because the Justice Depart-
ment policy regarding both techniques became virtually identical in
1965, the description of the evolution of wiretapping policy over the
past decade applies equally to the technique of microphone surveil-
lance. In recent years, for all practical purposes, there has been but a
single policy for both forms of electronic surveillance.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PRACTICES
The preceding two sections have dealt with the legal framework
and Justice Department policy regarding warrantless wiretapping and
bugging. This section attempts to provide an overview of FBI elec-
tronic surveillance practices. Without purporting to explore the full
range of FBI electronic surveillance practices, a limited number of key
areas are highlighted in order to suggest the manner in which elec-
tronic surveillances are conducted. More specifically, this section dis-
cusses the frequency of FBI use of this technique since 1940; inter-
nal FBI restrictions on the maximum number of simultaneous
electronic surveillances; the method by which requests have been
initiated and approved; the manner in which wiretaps and bugs
have been installed; the means by which the FBI has responded to
the legal obligation to produce electronic surveillance records in crimi-
nal trials; and the traditional reluctance of the FBI to permit outside
scrutiny 9 f its electronic surveillance practices. A discussion of the
application of the Justice Department's standards for wiretapping
and bugging to particular cases is reserved for Section VII below.
A. Extent of FBI Electronic Surveillance: 1940-1975
While FBI use of warrantless electronic surveillance has not been
as pervasive as many other investigative techniques such as inform-
ants, both 'wiretaps and 'bugs have been strategically utilized in a large
number of intelligence investigations. The Bureau's reliance on these
techniques was greatest during World War II and the inunediate
postwar period. During the 1960s and early 1970s, internal FBI policy
placed a ceiling on the number of simultaneous electronic surveillances
conducted by the Bureau. This self-restriction did not act to. curtail
all use of this technique, but it apparently frustrated intelligence of-
ficials in the FBI and other agencies who sought-unsuccessfully-a
change in this policy through the Huston Plan in 1970. In recent years,
judicial decisions have severely restricted the use of warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance against domestic targets, although wiretaps and
bugs still continue to be commonly used in the area of foreign intelli-
gence and counterintelligence.
e The Court in Katz rejected the distinction made in Goldman, between tres-
passory and nontrespassory microphone surveillances, and the resulting doctrine
of "constitutionally protected areas." ". . . [T]he Fourth Amendment," the Court
wrote in Katz, "protects people, not places." 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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1. Annual Totals for -Wiretaps and Microphone Installations
According to Justice Department records, the annual totals of war-
rantless FBI wiretaps and microphones in operation between 1940
and 1974 were as follows:
Telephone Telephone
Year wiretaps Microphones Year wiretaps Microphones
1940 -------------------- 6 6 1958-------------------- 166 70
1941 -------------------- 67 25 1959 --- ---------------- 120 75
1942-------------------- 304 88 1960 -------------------- 115 74
1943-------------------- 475 193 1961 --------------------- 140 85
1944 -------------------- 517 198 1962. ------------------- 198 100
1945 -------------------- 519 186 1963 -------------------- 244 83
1946 -------------------- 364 84 1964.-------------------- 260 106
1947----- 374 81 1965 -------------------- 233 67
1948 --------------------- 416 67 1966 -------------------- 174 10
1949- ------------------ 471 75 1967 -------------------- 113 0
1950-------------------- 270 61 1968 -------------------- 82 9
1951-------------------- 285 75 1969 -------------------- 123 14
1952 -------------------- 285 63 1970 -------------------- 102 19
1953-------------------- 300 52 1971- -------------------- 101 16
1954 -------------------- 322 99 1972 -------------------- 108 32
1955-------------------- 214 102 1973 -------------------- 123 40
1956.-------------------- 164 71 1974 ----------------- 190 142
1957 -------------------- 173 73
I Attorney General Edward H. Levi testimony, Nov. 6, 1975, hearings, vol. 5, pp. 68-70. The statistics before 1968 encom-
pans electronic surveillances for both intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Those after 1968, when the Omnibus
Crime Control Act was enacted, include surveillances for intelligence purposes only; electronic surveillances for law
enforcement purposes were thereafter subject to the warrant procedures required by the Act.
Comparable figures for the year 1975, through October 29, are: 121
telephone wiretaps and 24 microphone installations.9 '
It should be noted that these figures are cumulative for each year;
that is, a wiretap, on an individual in one year which continued into a
second year is recorded in both years. The figures are also duplicative
to some extent, since a telephone wiretap or microphone which was
installed, then discontinued, and later reinstated is counted as a new
surveillance upon reinstatement.
2. FBI Policy on the Maximum Number of Simultaneous Elec-
tronic Surveillances
From at least the early 1960s, J. Edgar Hoover placed a ceiling on
the number of warrantless electronic surveillances that could be in op-
eration at any one time. As expressed by Charles D. Brennan, who be-
came Assistant Director in charge of the FBIs Domestic Intelligence
Division in 1970, ". . . there was always a maximum figure which you
were not allowed to exceed, and if you recommended an additional
wiretap, it had to be done with the recognition that in another area you
would take one off." "
" Levi, 11/6/76, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 70.
02 Charles Brennan deposition, 9/23/75, p. 44. An example of this relatively
frequent occurence is reflected in an FBI memorandum dated June 25, 1962,
which recommended that seven wiretaps should be instituted in connection with
the Bureau's "Sugar Lobby" investigation (see pp. 328-330.)
"As mentioned in memorandum of 6/21/62, for each technical surveillance
installed in instant matter, we will temporarily suspend coverage which we
have for intelligence purposes on some other establishments so as not fo increase
total number of technical installations in operation." (Memorandum from W. R.
Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 6/25/62.)
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Until the mid-1960s, the maximum figure was approximately
eighty.9 3 In response to the 1965 and 1966 investigation by the Senate
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure into the use
of electronic surveillance and other techniques by federal agencies,
however, Hoover instructed Bureau officials to reduce by one-half
the number of warrantless electronic surveillances then in effect.
According to Brennan, the ceiling was lowered out of a concern that
this subcomittee's "inquiry might get into the use of that technique
by the FBI. . . ." 9 The number of warrantless wiretaps in the "secu-
rity field" was subsequently reduced from 76 to 38, and remained close
to the latter figure for several years thereafter.
9 5
Intelligence officials both within the FBI itself and in other intelli-
gence agencies clearly felt constrained by Hoover's policy, and
through the Huston Plan in 1970 they attempted to raise or eliminate
the internal limitations on the number of simultaneous electronic sur-
veillances. The Report that was presented to President Nixon in June
of 1970 noted: "The limited number of electronic surveillances
and penetrations substantially restricts the collection of valuable in-
telligence information of material important to the entire intelligence
community," 96 and it presented the President with the option of
modifying "present procedures" to "permit intensification of coverage
of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major
threat to the internal security." 9 7 This option was specifically recom-
mended to the President by Tom Charles Huston.
98
" Because this restriction applied only to 8imultaneous electronic surveillances,
the ceiling figures are invariably lower than the annual statistics reflected in
the chart on p. 301. The annual statistics include all electronic surveillances con-
ducted for any length of time, however brief, during the year indicated.
9 'Brennan deposition, 9/23/75, p. 43.
* Brennan deposition, -9/23/75, p. 42. It has been alleged that the number of
wiretaps was temporarily reduced for a brief period each year during J. Edgar
Hoover's annual appearances before the House Appropriations Committee so
that he could report, if asked, a relatively small number of wiretaps in operation.
(ISee, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 8/20/74, p. 149.) In one instance involving the so-called "17 wiretaps"
in February 1971, Hoover did insist that ongoing surveillances should be discon-
tinued prior to such an appearance. (Memorandum from W. S. Sullivan to Mr.
Tolson, 2/10/71.)
But no general pattern of temporary suspensions or terminations during the
Director's -appearances before the House Appropriations Committee is revealed
by Bureau records.' The following figures represent the number of warrantless
electronic surveillances in operation approximately thirty days prior to, during,
and approximately thirty days after Hoover's testimony before that committee
from 1967 to 1972:
Before Date of Director's testimony After
"Retrieval not practicable -------------- Feb. 16,1967 (38) ------------------ Mar. 13 1967 (42).
Jan. 15,1968 (33)-----.------------------ Feb. 23, 1968 (33) ------------------ Mar. 22, 1968(33).
Mar. 14, 1969 (46)--------------------- Apr. 17,1969 (49) ------------------ May 15, 1969(50).
Feb. 5 1970 (38)---------....... --------- Mar 5 1970 (36) -6------------------ ,A 1970 (37).
Feb. lb 1971 (33) Mar: D,1971(33)....------------------- Apr. p 1971(40).
Jan. 31, 1972 (32).--------------------- Mar. 2, 1972 (34).-------------------- Mar. 31, 1972 (35).
(Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 6/9/75.)
" Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoe) June
1970, p. 26.
" Ibid., p. 28.
9 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7/70.
Director Hoover nonetheless remained strongly opposed to lifting
restraints on the FBI's use of warrantless electronic surveillance. He
added a footnote to the electronic surveillance section of the Huston
Report which read:
The FBI does not wish to change its present procedure of
selective coverage of major internal security threats as it
believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The FBI
would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of the
Attorney General for coverage required by them and there-
after instituting such coverage themselves."9
In part because of Hoover's opposition to the Huston Plan, President
Nixon, who had originally endorsed the recommendations, withdrew
his approval 100 and the maximum number of electronic surveillance
stayed essentially constant until 1972.
The policy of placing an arbitrary ceiling on simultaneous warrant-
less electronic surveillances was apparently terminated after J. Edgar
Hoover's death in 1972. With the apparent lifting of this self-
restriction, the number of foreign-related surveillances increased 1o1
a fact which is reflected in the annual totals listed above.
B. Requests, Approvals, and Implementation
1. The Request and Approval Process
Recommendations for the use of electronic surveillance in particu-
lar cases are typically initiated at the field level of the Bureau, al-
though at times they have originated with the Attorney General, the
White House, and the head of another agency.102 If Headquarters
approves a field request, the appropriate field office then conducts a
feasibility study to determine whether or not the surveillance can be
conducted with complete security. Upon a favorable security finding,
the Director personally sends the Attorney General a formal request
for coverage, setting forth the name and address of the person or per-
sons to be monitored as well as pertinent facts about the case."03
According to former Attorney General. William Saxbe, the "re-
quest must contain very detailed information." 104 In numerous cases
in the past, however, the information supplied in the request has
been minimal at best. For example, several of the so-called "17 wire-
taps" during the Nixon administration were approved by Attorney
General John Mitchell despite the lack of any data in the formal
requests to support the need for the technique's use. 0 5 It is possible
' Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970,
p. 28.
'" Report on the Huston Plan: See. VI, Recision of the Huston Plan: A Time
for Reconsideration.
'2 The Keith case, decided in 1972, inhibited a similar increase in warrantless
electronic surveillances directed against American citizens connected with
domestic organizations.
"2 For examples of wiretap requests which have originated outside the Bureau,
see pp. 312, 337.
1 As noted above, the approval of the Attorney General has been required
prior to the implementation of telephone wiretaps since the early 1940s and prior
to the implementation of microphone surveillances since 1965.2. Attorney General William Saxbe testimony before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, ex-
cerpted in Department of Justice press release, 10/2/74, pp. 5, 6.
"0s See pp. 337-3W.
that these and similarly defective requests submitted to other Attor-
neys General were supplemented by information imparted orally, but,
as the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated in Zweibon v.
Mitchell:
. . . we nevertheless note the possibility of abuse when there
are no written records of the justifications for instituting a
surveillance. Such lack of records allows a search to be justi-
fied on information subsequently obtained from the surveil-
lance and permits the assertion that more information was
relied on than was in fact the case. Prior judicial approval for
wiretapping, among other benefits, of course freezes the
record as to the data upon which the surveillance was based.""6
2. Implementation of Wiretaps and Buge
If the Director receives the written approval of the Attorney
General for a particular surveillance, the field office is instructed to
implement it. In the case of wiretapping, an agent from the field
office generally contacts a representative of the local telephone com-
pany who acts as Government liaison. One such telephone company
representative in Washington, D.C., testified that he was simply
orally advised by an agent of the FBI's Washington Field Office that
authority had been granted to tap a particular telephone number."0
According to the Washington Field Office supervisor in charge of
the employees who implemented and monitored "national security"
wiretaps, the telephone company representative would then assign
"pair numbers" in the cable connecting the FBI's Washington, D.C.
Field Office with the company's central office in the city, and the
recording and monitoring devices would be attached to the assigned
cable pair at the field office, where the Bureau monitoring agents were
located. After the supervisor verified the wiretap by determining that
the intercepted line was the correct one, he would give the tap a
symbol number to be used in lieu of the words "telephone surveillance"
in any later communication.xo8
Generally, two agents would conduct the monitoring operation in
eight-hour shifts. These monitors typically tape-recorded all calls on
the line and added supplementary notes concerning such items as the
identity of the caller and the subject of the conversation if unclear
from the tape.o9 Each day, they typed up log summaries, which in-
cluded anything they believed was consequential. Because the monitors
were not told specifically what to look for, however, the summaries
tended to be over-inclusive rather than under-inclusive: the supervis-
ing agent noted, for instance, that any information obtained about
the subject's sex life or drug use would usually be included in the log
summaries.110 He also stated that he disliked having empty summaries
for any day, and so issued a general instruction to his monitors that
an attempt should be made to include at least one item in the log each
1o Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F. 2d 594, 609 n. 24 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"' Horace R. Hampton, Former Director of Government Communications Serv-
ice, Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 1/27/75, Halperin v. Kissinger,
Civ. No. 1187-73 (D.D.C.), pp. 12, 13.
10 FBI Special Agent deposition, 4/7/75, Halperin v. Kissinger, Civ. No. 1187-
73 (D.D.C.), pp. 10, 11.
10' FBI Special Agent deposition, 4/7/75, pp. 38, 39.
n0 FBI Special Agent deposition, 4/7/75, pp. 40-42.
305
day."'1 Even if there was no activity, a monitor would still have to file
a log summary stating "no activity" or "no pertinent activity." 112
A special squad within the Washington Field Office was responsible
for implementing microphone installations. According to one Bureau
agent who served on this squad for a number of years, the authorizing
document (which, he said, invariably bore J. Edgar Hoover's initials)
would be transmitted to the field office and shown to him and the
other members of the squad prior to the installation. This agent stated.
that in the majority of cases he was able to obtain a key to the target's
premises, either from a landlord, hotel manager, or neighbor. In other
cases, he simply entered through unlocked doors. He stated that only
in a small proportion of the cases to which he was assigned was it
necessary to pick a lock.113 Once the bug was planted, it was generally
necessary for Bureau agents to monitor the conversations from a loca-
tion close to the targeted premises.
C. The ELSUR Index
In the mid-1960s, the Justice Department established a policy of
filing disclosures in the courts in cases where criminal defendants had
been monitored by electronic surveillance.114 As a result, it became
necessary to establish a general index of the names of all persons over-
heard on such surveillances. In September 1966, the Assistant Attor-
ney General of the Criminal Division informed Director Hoover that:
In recent months the Department has been confronted
with serious problems concerning the prospective or continued
prosecution of individuals who have been the subject of prior
electronic surveillance. These problems have sometimes arisen
comparatively late in the investigative or prosecutive process.
For example, we recently were forced to close an important
investigation involving major gambling figures in Miami be-
cause we were advised that the evidence necessary to obtain
a conviction was tainted....
In view of these experiences, it appears necessary and de-
sirable that the Department have full knowledge of the extent
of any device problem at as early a stage of preparation for
prosecution as possible in order to determine whether a partic-
ular case may or may not be tainted or what responses will
be necessary with respect to a motion under Rule 16 to pro-
duce statements.
Accordingly, I feel it is imperative for us to establish be-
tween the Bureau and the Department . . . some sort of
"early warning" system. This may require the Bureau to set
up and maintain appropriate indices vith respect to electronic
surveillance and the materials derived therefrom.
I have discussed this suggestion with the Attorney General
FBI Special Agent deposition, 4/7/75, pp. 45, 58-59.
FBI Special Agent deposition, 4/7/75, pp. 58, 59.
" Staff summary of former FBI Special Agent interview, 9/5/75.
"In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Supreme Court held
that this policy was constitutionally required. The court held in this case that
the Government is legally obligated to produce all materials generated by elec-
tronic surveillance for inspection by the court in criminal cases.
and the Deputy Attorney General. Both feel that the estab-
lishment of such indices is necessary. . . .n1
In fact, for a number of years prior to this suggestion the Bureau had
maintained rudimentary indices within each field office, although there
was no central index and those which existed on the field level were be-
lieved to be inadequate by Justice Department officials. Because Hoover
believed the existing system was adequate, he reacted defensively when
Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson requested a conference be-
tween the Department and the Bureau to discuss the details of the
Justice Department's proposal. The Director penned the following
notation on the Vinson memorandum: "Since [an indexing system]
is already operating, I see no need for such a conference... . Tell him
it is already done and see that it is meticulously operated." 116
About one week later, however, Hoover directed officials at Head-
quarters to send a teletype to all field offices which had conducted elec-
tronic surveillances since January 1960.117 These offices were instructed
to transmit to Headquarters the names of all individuals whose voices
were monitored through electronic surveillance any time within the
previous six years, as well as the initial date of the monitoring and the
identity of the subject against whom the installation was directed.
Each office was also informed that it had a continuing obligation to
submit to Headquarters on a weekly basis the names of any additional
individuals monitored in the future. 18
The Bureau has since maintained a central index at Headquarters,
referred to as the ELSUR Index, which contains the names of all indi-
viduals overheard, even incidentally, on both court-ordered and war-
rantless electronic surveillances. Additional information such as the
initial date of the monitoring and the identity of the target of the
surveillance is also included in the index. The method by which this
index has been compiled, however, raises some questions as to its accu-
racy and completeness.
Although -the ELSUR Index covers the period January 1, 1960, to
the present, for example, the FBI's response to a request by the Senate
Select Committee for the date and location of all electronic overhears
of Martin Luther King, Jr., conceded that retrieval of some of the
overhears of King may be impossible. Three factors contributing to
this difficulty were set forth by the Bureau:
1. Prior to issuing instructions to field offices in October,
1966, directing them to submit the names of all individuals
whose voices have been monitored through a microphone in-
stalled or a telephone surveillance operated by the offices any-
time since 1/1/60, additional surveillances on which King
was monitored are unaccountable for as these surveillance
logs may have been destroyed.
2. Prior to the instructions, personnel handling logs may
have felt that overhears were of no substance or significance
and consequently were not recorded.
m Memorandum from Fred M. Vinson, Jr. to the Director, FBI, 9/27/66.
(Emphasis added.]
" Memorandum from Fred Vinson to the Director, FBI, 9/27/66.
n' Memorandum from W.C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 10/4/66.
8 Ibid.
3. The setting up of the ELSUR indices was a fieldwide
project of large proportions and the instructions going to the
field 10/5/66, were subject to broad interpretation, thus lead-
ing to possible misinterpretation of these instructions. Also,
the factor of human error might be involved, thereby causing
incomplete indices until the mechanics of the procedure were
ironed out." 9
In fact, several surveillances of King himself which were known to
personnel at FBI headquarters were apparently not reflected in the
ELSUR Index.
One Special Agent's description of the preparation of ELSUR Index
cards by FBI monitors suggests that the Index may be incomplete
even for the post-1966 period. According to this agent, the FBI mon-
itors are under instructions to prepare ELSUR Index cards for each
identifiable person who speaks over the intercepted line.120 Since the
cards must contain the proper names of these individuals rather than
phonetic spellings, and since this information is often difficult to obtain
from an overhear alone, the monitors maintain a separate index of
phonetic spellings prior to their determination of the proper spelling
and its entry into the ELSUR Index.2' The monitors then attempt to
confirm the identity of the persons overheard from various research
aids kept at their disposal, such as telephone books and Congressional
and federal agency directories, and from discussions with the Bureau
agents assigned to the substantive cases. In most cases, it is possible to
make an accurate identification, but when this proves to be impossible,
the names of unidentified individuals never get entered into the
ELSUR Index.122 Sometimes no entry has been made in the ELSUR
Index even though positive identification was subsequently obtained.12 a
Thus, a person could be overheard and this fact would not be revealed
by a check of the ELSUR Index.123
D. Congressional Investigation of FBI Electronic Surveillance Prac-
tice8: The Long Subcommittee
The Bureau has traditionally been reluctant to permit Congres-
sional investigation into its electronic surveillance practices. During
the 1965 and 1966 inquiry by the Senate Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure into the use of electronic surveillance and
other techniques by federal agencies, the FBI took affirmative steps
to avoid substantial exposure of such practices to the subcommittee.
The Bureau's attempt to thwart this subcommittee's investigation
into the use of mail covers in February and March of 1965 is described
in the Senate Select Committee's Report on CIA and FBI Mail
m Letter from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/3/75.
FBI Special Agent deposition, Halperin v. Kissinger, 4/7/75, pp. 15, 16.
FBI Special Agent deposition, Halperin V. Kis8inger, 4/7/75, p. 19.
FBI Special Agent deposition, Halperin v. Kissinger, 4/7/75, pp. 17-19.
m' FBI Special Agent deposition, Halperin v. Kissinger, 4/7/75, pp. 53, 54.
m In at least two cases, certain very sensitive surveillances were consciously
excluded from the ILSUR Index system. See p. 343. While such exclusion has
been rare, the fact that it occurred twice shows that it is possible to circum-
vent the entire ELSUR Index system.
Opening; 124 a similar attempt, apparently acquiesced in by the sub-
committee, was made in the area of electronic surveillance.
The Bureau's wary attitude toward this investigation is reflected in
an internal memorandum dated August 2, 1965:
'Senator [Edward V.] Long [of Missouri] is Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure. He has been taking testimony in connection with
mail covers, wiretapping, and various snooping devices on
the part of Federal agencies. He cannot be trusted and al-
though the FBI has not become involved in these hearings,
our name has been mentioned quite prominently on several
occasions. . . .125
When the Subcommittee's investigation began to touch on the Bureau's
electronic surveillance practices in connection with organized crime
several months later, Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach and another
ranking Bureau official personally visited the Subcommittee's chair-
man, Senator Edward Long of Missouri, to explain to him the FBI's
practices in the area of electronic surveillance.126 This meeting lasted
approximately one and one-half hours,1 27 and there is no indication in
the documentary record that any other briefing occurred prior to this
visit. Nonetheless, an FBI memorandum notes that after the Senator
"stated that unfortunately a number of people were bringing pressure
on him to look into the FBI's activities in connection with usage of
electronic devices," 128 DeLoach suggested to him:
that perhaps he might desire to issue a statement reflecting
that he had held lengthy conferences with top FBI officials
and was now completely satisfied, after looking into FBI
operations, that the FBI had never participated in uncon-
trolled usage of wiretaps or microphones and that FBI usage
of such devices had been completely justified in all instances.12 9
According to this memorandum, Senator Long agreed, and when
he "stated that he frankly did not know how to word such a release,"' 3 0
DeLoach "told him that we would be glad to prepare the release for
him on a strictly confidential basis." 131
The next day, Bureau agents prepared such a statement for Senator
Long, noting that "it is written from the viewpoint of the Senator
and his Committee in that it indicates they have taken a long, hard
look at the FBI and have found nothing out of order-but that they
will continue looking over our procedures and techniques from time to
time in the future. Such an approach," it was stated, "is felt to be
essential if the statement is to have the desired effect. A statement
reflecting a stronger pro-FBI position might not only prove ineffective
in thwarting those persons who are exerting pressure on the Sub-
m CIA and FBI Mail Opening Report: See, IV, FBI Mail Opening.
Memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. DeLoach, 8/2/66.




committee for a probe of our operations, but it could also bring criti-
cism and additional pressure on Senator Long." 132 The statement
written by the Bureau for Senator Long reads in full:
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
I instructed my staff at the outset of our activities to include
the FBI, together with all other Federal agencies, among the
organizations to be dealt with to ascertain if there had been
invasion of privacy or other improper tactics in their opera-
tions. Toward this end, my staff and I have not only con-.
ferred at length with top officials of the FBI, but we have
conducted exhaustive research into the activities, procedures,
and techniques of this agency.
While my staff and I fully intend to carefully review FBI
operations from time to time in the future, I am at the present
time prepared to state, based upon careful study, that we are
fully satisfied that the FBI has not participated in high-
handed or uncontrolled usage of wiretaps, microphones, or
other electronic equipment.
The FBI's operations have been under strict Justice De-
partment control at all times. In keeping with a rigid system
of checks and balances, FBI installation of wiretaps and
microphones has been strictly limited, and such electronic
devices have been used only in the most important and serious
of crimes either affecting the internal security of our Nation
or involving heinous threats to human life. Included among
these are major cases of murder, kidnapping, and sadism per-
*petrated at the specific instruction of leaders of La Cosa
Nostra or other top echelons of the extralegal empire of orga-
nized crime.
Investigation made by my staff has reflected no independ-
ent or unauthorized installation of electronic devices by indi-
vidual FBI Agents or FBI offices in the field. We have care-
fully examined Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's rules in this regard
and have found no instances of violation.13
As noted above, there is no indication in the record that any briefing
about electronic surveillance by the FBI occurred prior to the prepa-
ration of this statement by Bureau agents other than the ninety-
minute briefing given by DeLoach. No Bureau agents had been called
to testify before the Su'bcommittee. It does not appear that any Sen-
ator or staff members reviewed FBI files on electronic surveillances.
Nor is there any indication in the record that the Subcommittee ever
learned of the bugging of a Congressman's hotel room, the bugging
and wiretapping of Martin Luther King, Jr., or the wiretapping of a
Congressional staff member, two newsmen, an editor of a political
newsletter, and a former Bureau agent-all of which had occurred
within the previous five years.134
Memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. Wick, 1/11/66.
Memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. Wick (attachment), 1/11/66.
'4The details of these cases are discussed in Section VI below.
Ten days after the statement was prepared for Senator Long,
DeLoach again visited him and "asked him point blank whether or
not he intended to hold hearings concerning the FBI at any time in
the future." According to DeLoach's memorandum:
He stated he did not. I asked him if he would be willing to
give us a commitment that he would in no way embarrass the
FBI. He said he would agree to do this.135
When the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel asked DeLoach at this meet-
ing "if it would be possible for [DeLoach] or Mr. Gale [another FBI
Assistant Director] to appear before the Long Subcommittee . . .and
make a simple statement to the effect that the FBI used wiretaps only
in cases involving national security and kidnapping and extortion,
where human life is involved, and used microphones only in those
cases involving heinous crimes and Cosa Nostra matters," DeLoach
refused. He wrote that he informed the Chief Counsel:
that to put an FBI witness on the stand would be an attempt
to open a Pandora's box, in so far as our enemies in the press
were concerned [and] that such an appearance as only a
token witness would cause more criticism than the release of
the statement in question would ever cause.13 6
DeLoach noted that Senator Long then stated "he had no plans
whatsoever for calling FBI witnesses," but that the Chief Counsel
indicated that he would like to call one former FBI agent who was
known to DeLoach. According to DeLoach's memorandum regarding
this meeting, he told the Chief Counsel that this agent "was a first
class s.o.b., a liar, and a man who had volunteered as a witness only to
get a public forum," and that the Chief Counsel then reconsidered.
The memorandum concludes with the observation:
While we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed
by the Long Subcommittee, we have not yet eliminated certain
dangers which might be created as a result of newspaper pres-
sure on Long. We therefore must keep on top of this situation
at all times.3 7
Partly as a result of the Subcommittee's apparently willing "neutral-
ization" by the Bureau, the FBI's electronic surveillance practices
were protected from intensive Congressional and public scrutiny until
the 1970s.
V. WARRANTLESS FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TARGETS WITHIN TH4E UNITED STATES
Foreign agents and foreign establishments within the United States
have often been, and continue to be, the targets of warrantless FBI
electronic surveillance. In general, the Fourth Amendment questions
raised by electronic surveillance of foreigners are not as serious as
those raised by the targeting of American citizens; and surveillance of
foreign targets may be less susceptible to the types of abuses that have
often been associated with wiretapping and bugging of American
" Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 1/21/66.
1w Ibid.
m 7Ibid.
citizens. Because Americans are often overheard on "foreign" taps
and bugs, however, and because American citizens may also be the
indirect targets of "foreign"" surveillances, the rights of Americans
may nonetheless be affected even by surveillance of foreign targets.
Apparently, most warrantless electronic surveillances conducted
by the FBI in the past fifteen years have fallen into this broad cate-
gory. Foreign establishments and foreigners living within the United
States have been the subject of wiretaps and bugs far more frequently
than have American citizens connected with domestic organizations,
for purposes ranging from the collection of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information to the detection of terrorist activity.18
Since the 1972 Keith decision, which invalidated "domestic security"
warrantless electronic surveillances, the proportion of foreign targets
has been even greater. As of November 1975, for example, all existing
warrantless electronic surveillances were directed against foreigners. 1 3 9
The purpose and value of electronic surveillance against foreign
targets, as well as "domestic" abuse questions which have arisen in this
context, are discussed below.
A. Purpose and Value as an Investigative Technique
Electronic surveillance of foreign targets has been used extensively
by the FBI for the purpose of collecting foreign counterintelligence
information. Within the past fifteen years, both wiretaps and bugs
designed to collect such information have been directed against tar-
gets in the following categories: "Foreign Establishments," "Foreign
Commercial Establishments," "Foreign Officials," "Foreign Intelli-
gence Agents," "Foreign Intelligence Contacts," "Foreign Intelligence
Agents Suspect," "Foreign Officials' Contact," and "Foreign Intelli-
gence Agents Business Office." Wiretaps alone have been used against
"Foreign Intelligence Contact Suspect" and "a [foreign] Exile
Group;" bugs alone have been used against the "wife of a foreign in-
telligence contact," a "relative of a foreign intelligence agent suspect,"
a "foreign intelligence agent contact," another "[foreign] exile group,"
and for "coverage of foreign officials." 140
. Electronic surveillance of targets such as these is clearly considered
by FBI officials to be one of the most valuable techniques for the collec-
tion of counterintelligence information. According to W. Raymond
Wannall, the former Assistant Director in charge of the Bureau's
Domestic Intelligence Division, wiretaps and-bugs directed against
foreign targets:
give us a base line from which to operate. . . . Having the
benefit of electronic surveillance, we are in a position to make
evaluations, to make assessments, to make decisions as to [the
conduct of counterintelligence operations]. . . . It gives us
leads as to persons . . . hostile intelligence services are try-
.. Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75. Some
of the surveillances for these purposes targeted Americans, but the FBI has not
until recently identified surveillance targets according to their citizenship or
resident alien status.
" Attorney General Edward H. Levi testimony, 11/6/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. Ti.
n0 Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75. These
category descriptionm are the FBPI's, and some may include Americans.
ing to subvert or utilize in the United States, so certainly it
is a valuable technique.' 4 '
Some of the surveillances in the categories listed above have also
been conducted for the primary purpose of collecting "positive" for-
eign intelligence (which may include economic intelligence) rather
than counterintelligence information.141a While the collection of "posi-
tive" foreign intelligence is outside the FBI's intelligence mandate,
such surveillances have been responsive to specific requests of the
Attorney General by the State Department and the OTA, both of which
have a responsibility for "positive" intelligence.142
In addition, the Bureau has electronically monitored foreign fargets
for the purpose of detecting and preventing violent and terrorist activ-
ities by foreigners within the United States. Wiretaps have been used
for such purposes against a "Foreign Militant Group," a "Foreign
Revolutionary Group," a "Foreign Militant Group Official," and a
"Propaganda Outlet of the League of Arab States." Microphone sur-
veillances in the last two of these categories and of an "Arab Terrorist
Activist," and an "Arab Terrorist Activist Meeting" have been used
for similar purposes. 4 3
B. Foreign Surveillance Abuse Questions
Even properly authorized electronic surveillances directed against
foreign targets for the purposes noted above may result in possible
abuses involving American citizens. Because wiretaps -and bugs Are
capable of intercepting all conversations on a particular telephone or
in a particular area, American citizens with whom the foreign targets
communicate are also overheard, and information irrelevant to the
purpose of the surveillance may be collected and disseminated to senior
administration officials.
It is also possible to institute electronic surveillance of 'a foreigner
for the primary purpose of intercepting the communications of a
particular American citizen with that target; since the "foreign" sur-
1" W. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/21/75, pp. 20, 21. The legitimate counter-
intelligence benefit that acerues to the Bureau through the use of this technique
would not be reduced if a form of judicial warrant were required prior to the
implementation of electronic surveillances directed against foreign agents or
collaborators. See Senate Select Committee Final Report, Book II, Recommen-
dations 51 and 52.
'" Predident Ford's Executive Order on foreign intelligence specifically author-
izes FBI electronic surveillance for this purpose. .(Executive Order. 11509,
2/18/76.)
" See, e.g., Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan, 311/68; Draft
of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, 5/5/75 version. In the
early 1970's, for example, the FBI conducted surveillance of a foreign establish-
ment within the United States at the specific request of the CIA and with clear-
ance from the State Department. This installation received the prior approval
of the Attorney General. (Staff summary of FBI memoranda.)
As noted above, Ramsey Clark testified that while he was Attorney General,
his practice was "to confine the area of approval to international activities
directly related to the military security of the United States." (Ramsey Clark
testimony, Hearings before the Senate 'Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure (1974).) He stated that he denied requests "to tap Abba Eban
when he was on a visit to 'this country, an employee of the United Nations Sec-
retariat, the Organization of Arab Students in the U.S., the Tanzanian Mission
to the U.N., the office of the Agricultural Counselor at the Soviet Embassy and
a correspondent of TASS." (Ibid.).
Io Letter from FBI to the Senate 'Select Conunittee (attachment), 10/23/75.
veillance in this situation can accomplish indirectly what a surveillance
of the American Could accomplish directly, the former may be used to
circumvent the generally more stringent requirements for surveillances
of Americans.
Both of these practices, which clearly affect the rights of the Amer-
icans involved, have occurred in the past and are discussed 'below.
1. Dissemination .of Domestic Intelligence from Incidental
Overhears
Essentially political information-unrelated to the authorized pur-
pose of the surveillance-has occasionally been obtained as a by-
product of electronic surveillance of foreign targets and disseminated
to the highest levels of government. In the early 1960s, for example,
Attorney General Robert Kennedy authorized the FBI to institute
electronic surveillances of certain foreign targets in Washington, D.C.,
in connection with the possibly unlawful attempts of a foreign govern-
ment to influence Congressional deliberations over sugar quota legisla-
tion."' From these surveillances, the Attorney General was provided
with significant information not merely about possible foreign in-
fluence but about the reaction of key members of the House Agriculture
Committee to the administration's sugar quota proposal as well.45
Through the Bureau's coverage of certain foreign establishments
in Washington, it was also able to supply; two Presidents with reports
of the contacts between members of Congress and foreign officials.
According to a 1975 FBI memorandum:
On March 14, 1966, then President Lyndon B. Johnson in-
formed Mr. DeLoach ['Cartha DeLoach, former Assistant
Director of the FBI] .. . that the FBI should constantly keep
abreast of the actions of representatives of these [foreign
countries] in making contacts with Senators and Congressmen
and any citizens of a prominent nature. The President stated
he strongly felt that much of the protest concerning his Viet-
nam policy, particularly the hearings in the Senate, had been
generated by [certain foreign officials] .146
As a result of the President's request, the FBI prepared a chronologi-
cal summary-based in part on existing electronic surveillances-of
the contacts of each Senator, Representative, or staff member who
communicated with selected foreign establishments during the
period July 1, 1964, to March 17, 1966. This summary-which com-
prised 67 pages-was transmitted to the White House on March 21,
1966. The cover letter noted that: "based upon our coverage, it appears
that" certain foreign officials "are making more contacts with" four
named United States Senators "than with other United States
legislators." 147
A second summary was prepared on further contacts between Con-
gressmen and foreign officials and was transmitted to the White House
on May 13, 1966. From that date until January 1969, when the Johnson
1" Memorandum from the Director, FBI for the Attorney General, 2/14/61. Six
American citizens were also wiretapped in the course of this investigation. These
surveillances are discussed at pp. 328-330.
FBI summary memorankla, 2/16/61, 6/15/62.
"6 FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.
FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.
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administration left office, biweekly additions to the second summary
were regularly prepared and disseminated to the White House.1
4 s
This practice was reinstituted during the Nixon administration. On
July 27, 1970, Larry Higby, Assistant to H. R. Haldeman, informed
the Bureau that Mr. Haldeman "wanted any information possessed
by the FBI relating to contacts between [certain foreign officials] and
Members of Congress and its staff." 14 Two days later, the Bureau pro-
vided the White House with a statistical compilation of such contacts
from January 1, 1967 to July 29, 1970.149a As in the case of the informa-
tion provided to the Johnson White House, no members of Congress
were targeted directly but many had been overheard on existing elec-
tronic surveillances of foreign officials in Washington, D.C.
2. ITdirect Targeting of American Citizens Through Electronic
Surveillance of Foreign Targets
There is also evidence that in at least one instance the FBI, at the
request of the President, instituted an electronic surveillance of a for-
eign target for the purpose of intercepting telephone conversations
of a particular American citizen. An FBI memorandum states that
about one week before the 1968 Presidential election, President John-
son became suspicious that South Vietnamese Government might sabo-
tage his peace negotiations in the hope that Presidential candidate
Richard Nixon would win the election and take a "harder line" to-
wards North Vietnam.o5 0 More specifically, the President believed
that Mrs. Anna Chennault, widow of General Clair Chennault and a
prominent Republican leader, was attempting to persuade South Viet-
namese officials "from attending the Paris peace negotiations until
after the election since it would devolve to the credit of the Republican
Party." 151
In order to determine the validity of this suspicion, the White House
instructed the FBI to institute a physical coverage of Mrs. Chennault,
as well as physical and electronic surveillance of the South Vietnamese
Embassy.15la The electronic surveillance of the Embassy was author-
'o FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.
'FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.
' No individual Senators, Congressmen, or staff members were named in the
statistical summary, however. Nor is there any indication that President Nixon
or his aides were specifically concerned about the President's critics. Rather,
the request grew out of concern about "an increase in [foreign] interest on
Capitol Hill" which was expressed to President Nixon by at least one Senator.
(FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.)
"' FBI summary memorandum, 2/1/75.
'n FBI summary memorandum, 2/1/75.
ma Summaries of the information obtained from the physical surveillance of
Mrs. Chennault were subsequently disseminated to the White House "in strictest
confidence." (Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 11/4/68; Tele-
types from Director, FBI to the White House situation room, 10/30/68, 10/31/68,
11/1/68, 11/2/68, 11/3/68, 11/4/68.)
According to an FBI memorandum, a White House official told Assistant Direc-
tor Cartha DeLoach that "this situation may very well 'blow the roof off the
the political race yet.'" (Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson,
11/4/68.)
In addition, the White House requested the FBI to obtain, and the Bureau
did subsequently obtain, the outgoing telephone toll records of Vice Presidential
candidate Spiro Agnew while he was campaigning in New Mexico. (Memorandum
from C. D. DeToach to Mr. Tolson, 11/19/68). The apparent purpose of this
request was to determine whether or not Agnew had communicated with Mrs.
Ohennault or the South Vietnamese Embassy. (FBI summary memorandum,
2v41/75.)
ized by Attorney General Ramsey Clark on October 29, 1968, installed
the same day, and continued until January 6, 1969.152
Significantly, a Bureau memorandum indicates that FBI officials
were ill-disposed toward direct surveillance of Anna Chennault be-
cause "it was widely known that she was involved in Republican
political circles and, if it became known that the FBI was surveilling
her this would put us in a most untenable and embarrassing posi-
tion." 153 Thus, a "foreign" electronic surveillance was instituted to
indirectly target an American citizen, who, it was apparently believed,
should not be surveilled directly.
VI. WARRANTLESS FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS
American citizens and domestic organizations have also been the di-
rect targets of FBI wiretaps and bugs for intelligence purposes. In-
deed, the use of these techniques against Americans for such purposes
has a long history. In 1941, for example, Attorney General Francis
Biddle approved a wiretap on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce
under the standard of "persons suspected of subversive activities." "i
Four years later, a high official in the Truman administration 1, and
a former aide to President Roosevelt 5' were both the subject of war-
rantless electronic surveillance.
Between 1960 and 1972 numerous American citizens and domestic
organizations were targeted for electronic surveillance. Most of these
i" Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 10/29/68;
Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 10/30/68; Memoran-
dum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 3/27/69. Ramsey Clark testified
that he was unaware of the physical coverage of Mrs. Chennault and did not
receive reports on her activities. (Ramsey Clark testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings,
Vol. 6, p. 252.) There is no indication in the request for this wiretap, which was
sent to Attorney General Clark, that the White House or the FBI was specifically
interested in intercepting telephone conversations between Mrs. Chennault and
South Vietnamese officials. Mrs. Chennault's name does not appear on this re-
quest. (Memorandum from Director FBI to the Attorney General, 10/29/68).
'" Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 10/30/68. In the context
of the memorandum, this quotation may relate more directly to close physical
surveillance of Mrs. Ohennault. Direct electronic surveillance of Mrs. Chennault
was also considered (ibfd(.), however, and the reason stated in the quotation pre-
sumably applied to the rejection of the use of that technique against her.
'"Memorandum from Francis Biddle to Mr. Hoover, 11/19/41. This was ap-
proved in spite of his comment to .T. Edgar Hoover that the target organization
has "no record of espionage at this time." Memorandum from Biddle to Hoover,
11/19/41.)
In 1941, J. Edgar Hoover also requested wiretaps on two Americans who were
members of the Communist Party and on a bookstore which was "engaged in the
sale of Communist literature and [was] opened by persons connected with the
Communist Party."- (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Atitorney
General, 10/2/41). It appears that these requests were not approved by Attorney
General Biddle. (Biddle to Hoover, 11/19/41).
.. Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/23/45. Reports sum-
marizing information from this wiretap were delivered to two of President Tru-
man's White House aides. One of the reports included "transcripts of telephone
conversations between [the official] and Justice Frankfurter, and between [the
official] and Drew Pearson." Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 5/23/45. (There
is apparently no record as to who authorized this wiretap.)
'n A memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover indicates that Attorney General Tom
Clark "authorized the placing of a technical surveillance" on this individual and
that, according to Clark. President Truman "was particularly concerned" about
the activities of this individual "and his associates" and wanted "a very thor-
ough investigation" so that "steps might be taken, if possible, to see that such
activities did not interfere with the proper administration of government."
(Hoover memorandum, 11/15/45.) More than 175 reports summarizing informa-
tion overheard on this wiretap, which continued until 1948, were delivered to the
Truman White House. (Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee
(attachment), 3/26/76.)
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warrantless wiretaps and bugs were predicated on the need to protect
the country against "subversive" and/or violent activities; many were
based on the perceived need to discover the source of leaks of classified
information; and an undetermined number 1 5 7 of American citizens
were wiretapped for other reasons such as the desire to obtain foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence information. 5 8
The Keith decision in 1972 sharply restricted the grounds for wire-
tapping and bugging which had been asserted previously, although it
did not prohibit warrantless electronic surveillance of American citi-
zens for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes when a
substantial connection is shown to exist between the American indi-
vidual or group and a foreign power.15 9 No Americans were the sub-
jects of this technique as of November 1975,160 but a small number of
Americans have been electronically monitored since the Keith case on
the basis of such a foreign connection."1
This section focuses on warrantless electronic surveillance of Amer-
ican citizens during the 1960 to 1972 period. It contains a general
description of surveillances which were instituted because of the per-
ceived "subversive" or violent nature of the targets, because of leaks
of classified information, and on various other grounds. In Section
VII, this Report elaborates on three types of abuse questions which
have arisen in connection with warrantless electronic surveillance
of American citizens.
A. Electronic Surveillance Predicated on Subversive Activity
Numerous American citizens and domestic organizations have been
wiretapped and bugged because their activities, while not necessarily
violent, were regarded as sufficiently "subversive" to constitute a
threat to the security of the United States. In many of these cases,
it was believed that the individuals or groups were controlled or fi-
nanced by, or otherwise connected with, a hostile foreign power. In
other cases, the surveillances were based only on the possibility that
the targets, whether consciously or not, were being influenced by
persons believed to be acting under the direction of a foreign power;
w Because the FBI has not always determined the citizenship of electronic
surveillance targets, it is possible that American citizens are included among
the "foreign" categories listed in Section V.
mO These categories are meant to be descriptive only; they do not constitute
the Justice Department standards for warrantless electronic surveillance during
this period. As noted In Section II, the standard for wiretapping until 1965 was
the "domestic security" standard first articulated by Attorney General Tom
Clark in 1946; the microphone surveillance standard until 1965 was that estab-
lished by Attorney General Herbert Brownell: the "national interest." From
1965 until 1968, both wiretapping and microphone surveillances were governed
by the "national security" standard established by President Johnson and At-
torney General Nicholas Katzenbach. From 1968 until 1972, the Justice Depart-
ment relied on criteria based on the five categories set forth in Section 2511 (3)
of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. These criteria applied to both wiretaps and
bugs. The application of these standards to particular cases is discussed in
Section VII.
"m See the discussion of the Keith, case, United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) p. 290.
'm Attorney General Edward H. Levi testimony, 11/6/75, Hearings, Vol. 5,
p. 71.
m For example, memorandum from Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to the
Attorney General, 10/19/72.
such surveillance typically occurred in the context of COMINFIL
(Communist infiltration) investigations.162
The Communist Party, USA, provides the clearest example of a
group that was selected for electronic surveillance on the ground of
foreign-connected "subversive" activities. In addition to a wiretap on
the Headquarters of the Communist Party, the FBI conducted wire-
taps in the following target categories:
Communist Party Functionaries
Communist Party Propaganda Outlet




Microphone surveillances are recorded in these categories:
Communist Party Functionaries
Communist Party Front Groups
Communist Party Propaganda Outlets




Coverage of Communist Party Meeting
Communist Party Youth Activist
Communist Party Labor Group
Communist Party Youth Group
Communist Party Affiliate
Coverage of Communist Party Conference
Communist Party Apologist 163
Other groups adhering to a communist ideology have also been
electronically monitored for similar reasons. According to FBI rec-
ords, wiretaps were used in cases involving a "Marxist-Leninist Group
Affiliate," a "Marxist-Leninist Group Leader," and a "Marxist-Leninist
Group Functionary." Microphone surveillances were also conducted
against a "Basic Revolutionary Group Founder," a "Marxist-Oriented
Youth Group," a "Trotskyite Organization," a "Basic Revolutionary
Group," an "Organizer of a Basic Revolutionary Group," "Marxist-
Leninist Groups," a "Basic Revolutionary Front Group," a "Basic
Revolutionary Front Functionary," a "Marxist-Leninist Front Group,"
and a "Marxist-Oriented Racial Organization." One "Trotskyite Or-
ganization Meeting" was also bugged. 164
Several groups which were believed to have a connection with the
Communist Party in Cuba and China have been targeted as well. Into
this category fell wiretaps which were directed against a "Pro-Castro
Organization," a "Pro-Castro Movement Leader," a "Pro-Castro
Group Functionary," and a "Pro-Chicom [Chinese Communist] Prop-
m See Report on the Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations
for an analysis of COMINFIL investigations.
2asLetter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attacbment). 10/23/75. The
target category descriptions are the FBI's.
1"17"~
aganda Outlet;" and microphones directed against "Pro-Castro Or-
ganizations," a "Pro-Chicom Group," and a "Pro-Cuban American
Group which travelled to Cuba." 16I
The "subversive activities" predicate was stretched ;furthest when
used to support electronic surveillance of American citizens and domes-
tic organizations not primarily because their own activities were con-
sidered to be subversive but because they were believed to be adversely
influenced, whether consciously or not, by persons acting under the
direction of a foreign power. One example of reliance on such a ra-
tionale is seen in the wiretapping and bugging of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and several of his associates. In October 1963, Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Kennedy authorized wiretaps on the residence and two of-
fice telephones of Dr. King on the ground of possible Communist in-
filtration into the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, of which
Dr. King was President.166 The possibility that two of Dr. King's
advisors may have been associated with the Communist Party, USA,
led to four additional wiretaps on King and a total of fifteen micro-
phone installations in his hotel rooms during 1964 and 1965.167 Ap-
parently as part of this COMINFIL (Communist infiltration) investi-
gation, several of King's associates were also wiretapped and bugged.168
At least three other organizations have been targeted for electronic
surveillance primarily on the ground of possible Communist infiltra-
tion. One such organization, believed to have been influenced by the
Communist Party, USA, was wiretapped in 1962.169 In 1965, Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach approved wiretaps on both the Student
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 170 and the Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS) for similar reasons; 171 the former
group had also been the subject of a microphone surveillance in 1964.172
B. Electronic Surveillance Predicated on Violent Activity
Allegations of violent activity, or the threat of violent activity, have
also served as the predicate for numerous warrantless electronic sur-
veillance of Americans.
Most of the wiretaps and bugs which were instituted for this
reason have been directed against "black extremists". and "black
extremist organizations." In 1957, for example, Attorney General
" Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75.
Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/7/63 and
10/18/63. See King Report: Sec. IV, Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.
"7 See King Report: Sec. IV, Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. FBI memoranda make clear, however, that at least some of the microphones
were planted in Dr. King's hotel rooms for the express purpose of obtaining per-
sonal information about him. (For example, memorandum from Frederick Baum-
gardner to W. C. Sullivan, 2/4/64.) On the question of authorization for these
wiretaps and bugs, see the King Report: Sec. IV, Electronic Surveillance of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.
"n Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75. A
1964 wiretap and at least one of the 1965 bugs were on individuals other than
the advisors to Dr. King who were believed to have been associated with the
Communist Party, USA. Wiretaps on three advisors who had alleged Communist
links were instituted in 1962 and 1963.
' Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment). 10/23/75.
27 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/15/65.
I" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/25/65.
" See p. 335.
Herbert Brownell authorized a wiretap on Elijah Muhammad,*a leader
of the Nation of Islam, because of the organization's alleged "violent
nature." "s This tap, which was never re-authorized until 1964, was
finally terminated in 1966. A wiretap was also placed on Malcolm X,
another Nation of Islam leader, in 1964 for essentially the same rea-
son." 4 Similarly, Attorney General Katzenbach approved a wiretap
on a "black extremist leader" of the Revolutionary Action Movement
in 1965."' During the first half of the 1960's, microphone surveillances
were also directed against a "black separatist group". (one surveillance
in 1960 and 1961; two separate surveillances each year from 1962 until
1965) and a "black separatist group functionary"( from 1961 until
1965).1"
The possibility of violent activity also led to wiretaps on the Black
Panther Party and one of its leaders in 1969."' Both of these taps
continued into 1970, when wiretaps on a "black extremist group affi-
liate" and two (non-white) "racial extremist groups" were added to
the list."17 1971 apparently represented the high point of wiretapping
"black extremists :" in that year, there were wiretaps on the Black
Panther Party (six separate taps as of March 29; 1971) ," two (non-
white) "racial extremist groups," two individuals described as "mili-
tant black extremist group members" (one of whom was a member of
SNCC), two individuals described as "militant black extremist group
functionaries," and a "racial group member." A wiretap was also
authorized to cover a "meeting of a militant [black] group." 18o In
1972, wiretaps continued to be used against the Black Panther Party
and one of its leaders, a (non-white) "racial extremist group," a
"militant black extremist group member," and a "militant black ex-
tremist group functionary." 118 Microphone surveillances during the
Nixon Administration years-were directed against the Black Panther
Party in 1970 and a "Black Extremist Group Functionary" (Huey
Newton, a leader of the Black Panther Party) from 1970 to 1972.181
Electronic surveillance based on a "violent activity" predicate was
certainly not confined to "black extremists," however. In the early
and mid-1960's, wiretaps were placed on Ku Klux Klan members
for similar reasons. Two "leaders of a racist organization," one
of whom was a Klan member suspected of involvement in the bomb-
ing of a black church in Birmingham, Alabama, were wiretapped in
1963 and 1964.183 Another Ku Klux Klan member was wiretapped in
"Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 12/31/56, Ini-
tialled "Approved: HB, 1/2/57." In retrospect, however, one FBI supervisor noted
that while the Nation of 'Islam had a "potential" for violence, it was not itself
involved in violence. He stated that "Elijah Muhammad kept them under con-
trol, and he did not have them on the streets at all during any of the riots [in the
1960's]." George C. Moore deposition 11/3/75, pp. 36, 39.
1' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 4/1/64.
"5 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/3/65.
7 Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 10/22/75.
" For example, memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General,
3/20/69; Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/7/69.
"' Letter from FBI to Senate Committee (attachment), 10/23/75.
'9 Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, 3/29/71..
"0 Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75.
1.. Ibid.
.' Ibid.; Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to C. b. Brennan, 3/29/71.
1" Ibid.; Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/9/63.
1964 and 1965.184 FBI records also disclose the bugging of The Na-
tional States Rights Party in 1962.185
White radical organizations were also the subjects of electronic sur-
veillance in the late 1960's and early 1970's on the grounds of violent
or potentially violent activity. A "New Left Campus Group" was both
wiretapped and bugged in 1969, and the wiretap continued into 1970.18
Three anti-war organizations which were involved in planning the
November 1969 "March on Washington" were also wiretapped in
1969.18' In 1970, the Headquarters of the Worker Student Alliance
(an affiliate of SDS) 18> and an individual who was a contact for the
Weatherman organization were wiretapped.
18 9 The tap on the Worker
Student Alliance continued into 1971 and was supplemented in that
year by wiretaps on a "New Left Activist", a "domestic protest group,"
and a "violence prone faction of a domestic protest group" (two
separate wiretaps).190 Additional wiretaps and microphone surveil-
lances during the years 1969 to 1972 fall into the categories: "Investi-
gation of Clandestine Underground Group Dedicated to Strategic
Sabotage;" "Weatherman Organization Publication;" "Publication
of Clandestine Underground Group Dedicated to Strategic Sabotage;"
"Leader of Revolutionary Group;" and "Weather Underground Sup-
port Apparatus." 191
For several years during the 1960's, Puerto Rican nationalist groups
and their members were also electronically monitored because of their
alleged proclivity towards violence. FBI records reveal wiretaps on a
"Puerto Rican Independence Group" in 1960 and 1962; and on a
"Puerto Rican Independence Group Member" in 1965. Microphone
surveillances were placed on a "Contact of Puerto Rican Nationalist
Party" in 1960; a "Puerto Rican Independence Group Office" in 1963,
1964, and 1965; a "Puerto Rican Revolutionary" in 1963; and "Pro-
Puerto Rican Independence Group Activists" in 1964 and 1965.192
Other organizations were the subject of electronic surveillance be-
cause they were seen as violent advocates of the interests of a foreign
power or group. (To the extent an actual connection with a hostile
foreign power was perceived, they would also be considered "subver-
sive.') These organizations, which were, or may have been, composed
at least in part of American citizens, are described by the following
categories: "Pro-Arab Group," "Arab Terrorist Affiliate" "Pro-
Palestine Group," "Militant Pro-Chicom [Chinese Communist]
Group," "West Coast Fundraising Front for Arab Terrorist Groups,"
"Arab Terrorist Activist Affiliates," and "Co-Conspirators in Plot to
Kidnap a Prominent Anti-Castro Cuban Exile."
19 3
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/28/64;
Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75.
.Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75.
" Ibid.
* See p. 338.
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/70.
m Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/22/75.
* Ibid.
m Ibid. The category descriptions are the FBI's.
.m. Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attachment), 10/23/75.
"I Ibid.
C. Electronic Surveillance Predicated on Leaks of Classifled
Information
Another purpose of warrantless electronic surveillance of American
citizens during the period 1960 to 1972 was to determine the source of
perceived leaks of classified information. At least eight separate in-
vestigations into perceived leaks resulted in the wiretapping or bug-
ging of nearly thirty American citizens, yet Bureau memoranda reveal
no case in which the source of any leak was discovered by means of
electronic surveillance. These investigations are described below.
Lloyd Norman: 1961."*-On June 27, 1961, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy informed FBI Director Hoover that the most recent
issue of Newsweek magazine contained an article about American
military plans in Germany, which, the administration believed, was
based on classified information. According to an FBI memorandum,
Kennedy stated that the President had called him to see if it would
be possible to determine who was responsible for the apparent leak.195
On the same day, and without specific authorization from the At-
torney General, the FBI placed a wiretap on the residence of Lloyd
Norman, the Newsweek reporter who wrote the article.196 Kennedy was
informed about the tap on June 28, and formally approved it on
June 30. It was discontinued on July 3, 1961, when "Norman left
Washington, D.C., for the west coast on a month's vacation [and]
the only person left at Norman's residence [was] his son." 197
Hanson Baldwin: 1962.-A July 1962 New York Times article
about Soviet missile systems by Hanson Baldwin, which the adminis-
tration also believed was based on classified information, led to the
installation of wiretaps on the residences of both Baldwin and a New
York Times secretary. According to contemporaneous Bureau memo-
randa, these wiretaps were instituted without the prior written a
proval of the Attorney General, and one of them-the tap on the
secretary-was instituted without the Attorney General's prior
knowledge. 9 8 Formal written approval for these wiretaps was ob-
tained on July 31, 1962, however, three days after the tap on Baldwin
'" This case is also discussed at p. 333.
um Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, 12/15/66.
'"Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/29/61. Since
the early 1940's, the approval of the Attorney General had been required prior
to the implementation of wiretaps. See p. 283. In a 19.5 memorandum
from Attorney General Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, Mr. Katzenbach noted
that: "It is my understanding that such devices [both wiretaps and bugs] will
not be used without my authorization, although in emergency circumstances they
may be used subject to my later ratifleation." (Memorandum from Nicholas
Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/27/65).
x" Memorandum from Mr. S. B. Donaboe to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, 7/3/61.
mA July 27, 1962, memorandum from the "Director, FBI" to the Attorney
General reads in part:
"In accordance with our discussion today, technical coverage will be effective
on Baldwin on the morning of July 28, 1962, at his residence in New York. In
addition, we have learned that Baldwin normally utilized [ ] of
the 'New York Times' Washington office as his secretary to arrange appointments
when he comes to Washington. Consequently, we have placed technical coverage
on her residence. . ." (Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General,
7/27/62.)
was installed and four days after the tap on his secretary was in-
stalled.199 The wiretap on the secretary continued until August 15,
1962; that on Baldwin until August 29, 1962.200
Former FBI Special Agent: 1962.-Warrantless electronic surveil-
lance predicated on classified information leaks continued with the
wiretapping of a former Bureau agent who "disclosed information
of a confidential nature concerning investigations conducted by [the]
Bureau" in a public forum on October 18, 1962.201 According to an
internal memorandum, the coverage lasted from October 18, 1962,
until October 26, 1962, and was repeated in January 1963.202 On Octo-
ber 19, 1962, Attorney General Kennedy was advised that the Bureau
desired to place coverage on this agent; he was apparently not in-
formed that coverage had already been effected the day before.
203
Kennedy's written approval was granted on October 26, the day the
surveillance was terminated. 204 The surveillance was reinstituted in
January: a Bureau memorandum dated January 9, 1963, simply
states:
Mr. Belmont called to say [FBI Assistant Director Court-
ney] Evans spoke to the Attorney General re placing the tech
on [ ] again, and the Attorney General said by all means
do this. Mr. Belmont has instructed New York to do so.205
The authorization for the second surveillance therefore appears to
have been oral. Coverage of this agent was permanently suspended on
September 9, 1963.205a
High Executive Offcial: 1963.-Because of the possibility that a
high-ranking executive official may have provided classified informa-
tion not to the press but to a foreign intelligence officer, the FBI re-
quested the Attorney General in February 1963 to authorize a wiretap
on the residence telephone of this official. 20 5b According to the request
which was sent to Attorney General Kennedy, "The President ex-
pressed personal interest in receiving information concerning the cur-
rent relationship between [the official] and representatives of [a for-
eign country]." 205e
The Attorney General approved the request, and it was instituted
three days later.205d It was discontinued on June 14, 1963, when the tar-
get travelled abroad; 205e reinstituted on July 14, 1963; and perma-
nently discontinued on November 6, 1963, "because of lack of produc-
tivity." 205f
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 7/31/62;
memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 8/13/62.
' Wannall memorandum, 8/13/62; memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C.
Sullivan, 8/28/62.
' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/19/62.
Unaddressed memorandum from A. H. Belmont, 1/9/63.
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/19/62.
m Ibid.
Unaddressed memorandum from "hwg," 1/9/63.
'o Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/63.
mb Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/11/63;
memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 2/8/63.
me Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/11/63.
md Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/11/63;
letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 4/20/76.
Letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 4/20/76.
0e Ibid.
Editor of an Anti-Communist Newsletter: 1965.-The publication
in an anti-Communist newsletter of information believed to be classi-
fied led to the wiretapping of both the editor of the newsletter and an
attorney in the Washington, D.C. area with whom the editor was in fre-
quent contact. These surveillances were approved in writing by Attor-
ney General Nicholas Katzenbach in April and June of 1965, respec-
tively, and each began about three weeks after approval. 20
In November 1965, the FBI recommended discontinuance of the
taps because " [w] e have not developed any data since outset of investi-
gation which would show that [the targets] are currently receiving
information from individuals in the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment. In fact, we now believe that it is highly unlikely that our tech-
nical coverage will develop such information in the future." 206a
According to a memorandum sent to the Attorney General, the tap
on the lawyer was discontinued on November 2, 1965, and that on the
editor on November 10, 1 9 6 5 .206b
Joseph Kraft: 1969.2' 7-The basic facts surrounding the wire-
tapping and microphone surveillance of columnist Joseph Kraft are
a matter of public record. In June 1969, possibly in response to -a leak
from the National Security Council, John Ehrlichman instructed
John Caulfield and John Ragan, two individuals associated with the
White House "Plumbers" and unconnected with the FBI, to place a
wiretap on the Washington, D.C. residence of Mr. Kraft. This tap
was removed one week later, when the columnist left Washington on
an extended trip to Europe. W. 'C. Sullivan, -then Assistant Director
of the FBI, subsequently followed Mr. Kraft abroad, apparently on
instructions from Mr. Hoover and Mr. Ehrlichman. Overseas, Sulli-
van arranged with a .foreign security agency to conduct electronic
surveillance of Kraft in his hotel room: when the iistallation of a tele-
phone tap proved to be impossible because of the "elaborate switch-
board" of the hotel,20 s a microphone was placed in his room instead.2 09
The results of this coverage, which lasted from July 3 to July 7, 1969,
were transmitted back to Mr. Hoover personally through the FBIs
Legal Attache at the American Embassy. 2 1 0
In November and December of that year, Mr. Kraft was again the
target of FBI surveillance: the Washington Field Office conducted
physical surveillance of the columnist from November 5 until Decem-
ber 12.211 In addition, Director Hoover requested approval from At-
torney General Mitchell for a wiretap on Mr. Kraft on November 5,212
but approval was never granted and the wiretap never installed. 2 8
The "Seventeen Wiretaps:"1 969-1971.21 -The wiretaps which were
directed against seventeen government employees and newsmen be-
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 4/19/65;
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the AtItorney General, 6/7/65.
s0' Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to W. 0. Sullivan, 11/3/65.
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 11/16/65.
2' This case is also discussed at pp. 335-337.
Letter from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover, 6/30/69.
Letter from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover, 7/2/69.
See generally, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Prae-
tice and Procedure, 5/10/74, pp. 380-400.
"' Memorandum from Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 11/5/69; Memo-
randum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 12/11/69.
Memorandum from Mr. W. 0. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 11/7/69.
m Hoover memorandum, 12/11/69.
2" Thee wiretaps are also discussed at pp. 337-338 and 349-351.
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tween May 1969 and February 1971 have been the subject of civil
litigation and extensive Congressional inquiries. In view of the pend-
ing civil litigation, the Committee has not attempted to duplicate the
depositions which bear on the authorization of these wiretaps. The
basic facts as recorded in FBI documents and public record testimony,
however, may be summarized as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a story by William Beecher concerning American
bombing raids in Cambodia appeared in the New York Times. Accord-
ing to a contemporaneous internal memorandum from J. Edgar
Hoover to senior FBI officials, Henry Kissinger telephoned him that
morning requesting the Bureau to "make a major effort to find
out where [the story] came from." 215 Kissinger called Mr. Hoover
twice more that day, once to request that additional articles by Beecher
be included in the inquiry and once to request that the investigation
be handled discreetly "so no stories will get out." 216 Before 5:00 p.m.
on May 9, Hoover telephoned Kissinger to inform him that initial
FBI inquiries suggested that Morton Halperin, a staff member of the
National Security Council, could have been in a position to leak the
information upon which Beecher was believed to have based his arti-
cle: Hoover noted that Halperin "knew Beecher and that he [Hoover]
considered [.Halperin] a part of the Harvard clique, and, of course, of
the Kennedy era." 217
According to Hoover, "Dr. Kissinger said he appreciated this very
much and he hoped I would follow it up as far as we can take it
and they will destroy whoever did this if we can find him, no matter
where he is." 1
Dr. Kissinger has testified that he had been asked at a White House
meeting, which, he believed, may have occurred in late April 1969
and which was attended by the President, the Attorney General, and
J. Edgar Hoover, "to supply the names of key individuals having
access to sensitive information which had leaked [even before the
Cambodia story]." 218a He noted that at this meeting "Director Hoover
identified four persons as security risks and suggested that these four
be put under surveillance initially." 218b Among the persons so identi-
fied was Morton Halperin. Kissinger said that when the Cambodia
story was published on May 9, "I called Mr. Hoover at President
Nixon's request to express the President's and my concern about the
seriousness of the leak appearing that date and to request an im-
mediate investigation." 218 He also stated that in these telephone con-
versations, "I do not recall any discussion of wiretapping. At that
time, my understanding was that the wiretapping program had been
authorized and that, therefore, Mr. Hoover or his staff had the right
n Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, DeLoach, Sullivan,
and Bishop, 5/9/69, 10:35 a.m.
' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, DeLoach, Sullivan,
and Bishop, 5/9/69, 11:05 a.m. and 1:05 p.m., respectively.
1 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, DeLoach, Sullivan,
and Bishop, 5/9/69, 5:05 p.m.
"' Hoover memorandum, 5/9/69, 5:05 p.m.
2" Dr. Kissinger's Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, Hal-
perin v. Kissinger, Civ. No. 1187-73 (D.D.C.), 1/12/76, p. 18.
218b id.
2e, Ibid., p. 28.
to use wiretapping in their investigations. I do not recall any dis-
cussions as to when the program would actually be put into effect." 218d
He further testified that "[i]n view of the President's authorization,
Mr. Hoover evidently chose to institute the wiretaps after my calls
to him on May 9, regarding the national security significance of the
Beecher story in the New York Times of the same date." 218e
The wiretap on Halperin was installed without the written ap-
proval of the Attorney General, in late afternoon on May 9, 1969.219
The next morning, Alexander Haig personally visited William Sulli-
van at FBI Headquarters. According to a memorandum from Sulli-
van to Cartha DeLoach, Haig requested that wiretaps be placed on
four individuals, including Halperin, who were members of the
National Security Council staff and Defense Department employees. 220
Haig stated that this request "was being made on the highest author-
ity" and "stressed that it is so sensitive it demands handling on a
need-to-know basis, with no record maintained." 221 According to
Sullivan, Haig said that "if possible, it would be even more
desirable to have the matter handled without going to the [Justice]
Department."1 222
Alexander Haig testified that Dr. Kissinger had instructed him to
see Mr. Sullivan and to act as the "so-called liaison as this program was
instituted, I believe, authorized by the President, the Director, and the
Attorney General." 222i He further stated that Dr. Kissinger provided
him with the names to take to Sullivan 222b and that he had the "im-
pression" that the names were "cleared and concurred in- by" the
President or his representative, the Director, and the Attorney Gen-
eral.222c Haig denied that he requested the Bureau not to maintain a
record of the surveillances, noting that "the point I would recall mak-
ing very clearly was the extreme sensitivity of this thing, and the
avoidance of unnecessar paperwork, which would make this program
subject to compromise.' 222d He also testified that he does not recall
urging Sullivan to avoid going to the Justice Department.222e
218d Ibid.
2m1e Ibid., p. 25. Former President Nixon stated that "I told Dr. Kissinger thathe should inform Mr. Hoover of any names that he considered prime suspects[in the Cambodia leak]. . . . It was Dr. Kissinger's responsibility- not to controlthe program but solely to furnish the information to Mr. Hoover. Mr. Hooverwas then to take it from there and then to get appropriate authority from theAttorney General before, of course, installing any electronic surveillance whichMr. Hoover needed." (Deposition of Richard M. Nixon, Halpertn v. Kissinger,Civ. No. 1187-73 (D.D.C.), 1/15/76, pp. 34, 35.)
The former President also stated: "I do not know the contents of the telephonecalls that Dr. Kissinger had with Mr. Hoover at that time except that I laterlearned he did furnish Mr. Hoover the names of certain individuals that hethought might be potential leakers of this information." (Nixon deposition,1/15/76, p. 23).m FBI Special Agent deposition, Halpern v. Kissinger, Civ. No. 1187-73(D.D.C.), pp. G4, 65; House Judiciary Committee Report, 8/20/74, p. 147.
2 Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach, 5/11/69.
2" Ibid.
* Alexander M. Haig deposition, Halperin v. Kissinger, Civ. No. 1187-73(D.D.C.), 10/25/74, pp. 9, 10.
22 Ibid., p. 10.
222C Ibid., p. 11.
2m2d Ibid., p. 18.
Ibid., p. 19.
On May 12, a formal request was sent by the Director to Attorney
General Mitchell for wiretaps on all four individuals (one of which
had been in operation for three days); Mitchell approved; and the
additional taps were subsequently instituted.2 23
Over the course of the next one and one-half years, thirteen more
individuals became the subjects of, wiretaps in this same program.
Bureau documents reflects the following authorizations from Attorney
General Mitchell:
-May 20, 1969: Two members of the staff of the National
Security Council
-May 29, 1969: A reporter for the London Sunday Times
-June 4, 1969: A reporter for the New York Time8
-July 23, 1969: A White House domestic affairs adviser
-August 4, 1969: A White House speech writer
-September 10, 1969: A correspondent for CBS News
-May 4, 1970: A Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; a
State Department offcial of "Ambassador" rank; and a
Brigadier General with the Defense Department
-May 13 1970: Two additional staff members of the Na-
tional Security Council
-December 14, 1970: A second White House domestic affairs
adviser.2 24
The longest of these wiretaps was the one on Halperin: it con-
tinued for twenty-one months, until February 10, 1971, and was ap-
parently terminated at the insistence of Director Hoover, who was
about to testify before the House Appropriations Committee.22 5 Other
wiretaps lasted for periods of time varying from six weeks to twenty
months.
Charles Radford: 1971-1979.-The December 1971 publication of an
article by Jack Anderson which described private conversations be-
tween President Nixon and Henry Kissinger led to a total of four wire-
taps on American citizens to determine the source of this apparent leak.
According to an internal Bureau memorandum, Attorney General
Mitchell personally contacted Deputy Associate FBI Director W.
Mark Felt on December 22, 1971, and orally instructed him to institute
a wiretap on Charles E. Radford I.226 Radford, a Navy Yeoman who
was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was apparently a primary
suspect because he had frequent contact with the White House and the
National Security Council and belonged to the same church as Jack
Anderson. 2 27 Mitchell informed Felt that this request originated with
the President and noted that no prosecution was contemplated. 228 The
FBI was not requested to conduct a full investigation of the leak, only
to wiretap Radford.229 After obtaining approval from J. Edgar
A Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/12/69.
m Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General on the date
indicated.
ms Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson, 2/10/71. See p. 302 n. 95.




Hoover, Felt secured the institution of the wiretap on Radford's resi-
dence on December 23.
On the basis of certain telephone contacts Radford subsequently
made, additional wiretaps were placed on the residences of two of
Radford's friends, one a former Defense Attache, the other a State
Department employee. These wiretaps were instituted on January 5
and January 14, respectively, and both continued until February 17.230
When Radford was transferred to the Naval Reserve Training Cen-
ter near Portland, Oregon, the Attorney General requested a wiretap
on the home of Radford's step-father,2soa with whom he was to stay
until he could locate a home of his own. This coverage was instituted
immediately,231 and although Radford moved into his own residence
by February 15, when another wiretap was installed on his new home,23 2
the tap on his step-father was not terminated until April 11, 1972.233
Coverage was also instituted on the training center where Radford.
worked on February 7, 1972, and like the tap on his step-father
it continued until April 11.'4
The tap on Radford's Oregon residence was not terminated until
June 20, 1972-one day after the Supreme Court's decision in the
Keith case. One Bureau official wrote that 'it was not discontinued
on 6/19/72, as others falling under the Keith rule had been, since we
were awaiting a decision from the White House." 23
In violation of Justice Department procedures, none of these Rad-
ford wiretaps was ever authorized by the Attorney General in writ-
ing.230 Two of the wiretaps apparently did not even receive the explicit
oral approval of the Attorney General. An internal Bureau memo-
randum states that the surveillance of the State Department employee
and the wiretap on the Naval Reserve Training Center were both
requested by David Young, an assistant to John Ehrlichman, who
merely informed the Bureau that the requests originated with Ehrlich-
man and had the Attorney General's concurrence. 237
Thus, between 1960 and 1972, nearly thirty American citizens osten-
sibly suspected of leaking classified information were wiretapped by
the FBI without a warrant in the United States; another was the
subject of an FBI microphone surveillance abroad. No fewer than
seven of these targets were journalists or newsmen. At least ten of
the wiretaps were instituted without the prior written approval of the
.Attorney General, which was required in every case. Although the
taps generated a significant amount of both personal and political
information-much of which was disseminated to the highest levels in
the White House-Bureau memoranda do not reveal that the wiretaps
succeeded in identifying a single person who had leaked national
security information.
2 Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 6/14/73.
2* The Committee's Final Report inaccurately states that this tap was on
Radford's father-in-law. (Final Report, Book II, p. 187, note 19.)





D. Electronic Surveillance Predicated on Other Grounds
In the course of at least three separate investigations between 1960
and 1972, Americans were the targets of FBI electronic surveillance
for purposes which cannot easily be categorized as collecting informa-
tion about subversive or violent activities or about leaks of classified
material. Two of these cases-the "Sugar Lobby" and the Jewish
Defense League surveillances, described below-related to foreign con-
cerns. The Sugar Lobby investigation was apparently instituted to
gather foreign intelligence information seen as necessary for the con-
duct of foreign affairs and to detect alleged attempts of foreign repre-
sentatives to influence American officials. A wiretap on the Jewish
Defense League (JDL) and one of its members, while requested pri-
marily on the ground of "violent activities," was defended in a subse-
quent civil action as similarly necessary to gather information impor-
tant to United States foreign relations.
The third case occurred in connection with the Warren Commis-
sion's review of events surrounding President John F. Kennedy's
assassination. In 1964, the FBI installed one wiretap (with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General) and two microphone surveillances at
the specific request of this Commission in order to obtain information
about the assassination.2 3
The "Sugar Lobby" Wiretaps: 1961-19692.239-On February 9, 1961,
Attorney General Robert Kennedy requested the FBI to initiate an
investigation for the purpose of:
develop [ing] intelligence data which would provide Presi-
dent Kennedy a picture of what was behind pressures exerted
on behalf of [a foreign country] regarding sugar quota delib-
erations in Congress.. . in connection with pending sugar
legislation. 2 4 0
This investigation lasted for approximately nine weeks, and was
reinstituted for a three-month period in mid-1962. At its height, the
investigation involved a total of twelve telephone wiretaps, three
microphone surveillances, and physical surveillances of eleven separate
individuals. 241 Six of the wiretaps were directed against American
citizens, who included three executive branch employees, a Congres-
sional staff member, and two registered lobbying agents for foreign
interests, one of whom was an attorney whose office telephone was wire-
tapped. One of the microphone surveillances was directed at a United
States Congressman.
The expiration of existing import quotas for sugar in 1961 provided
the backdrop against which these events were set. In early 1961, the
intelligence community had learned that officials of a foreign govern-
ment "intensely desired passage of a sugar bill by the U.S. Congress
which would contain quotas favorable to [that government]." 242 This
fact had significant ramifications on American foreign policy. Accord-
m FBI letter to Senate Select Committee (attachment) 10/23/75.
239 This case is also discussed at pp. 345-346.




ing to a CIA memorandum addressed to the President's national
security advisor:
It is thought by-some informed observers that the outcome
of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the
U.S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the
future of U.S.- [foreign country] relations. 243
There was also a possibility that unlawful influence was involved. In
early February, the FBI discovered that representatives of the foreign
government might have made monetary payments or given gifts to
influence certain Congressmen, Senators, and executive branch of-
ficials.244
Because of the foreign intelligence interest involved, and on the
ground that "the administration has to act if money or gifts are
being passed by the [foreign representatives] ," 245 Robert Kennedy
authorized a number of wiretaps on foreign targets and domestic
citizens who were believed to be involved in the situation. Specifically,
he approved wiretaps on the following American citizens: three
officials of the Agriculture Department (residence telephones
only) ; 240 the clerk of the House Agriculture Committee (residence
telephone only) ; 27 and a registered agent of the foreign country
(both residence and business telephones) .2
In the course of this investigation, the Bureau determined that
Congressman Harold D. Cooley, the Chairman of the House Agri-
culture Committee, planned to meet with representatives of the foreign
country in a hotel room in New York City, in mid-February 1961.249
At the instruction of Director Hoover, the New York Field Office in-
stalled a microphone in Cooley's hotel room to record this meeting,250
and the results were disseminated to the Attorney General. 5 '
Under the Justice Department policy that was in effect at this time,
the Bureau was not required to obtain the prior written approval of
the Attorney General for microphone surveillance, and none was
obtained in this case. It is not certain, moreover, that Attorney General
Kennedy was ever specifically informed that Congressman Cooley
was the target of a microphone surveillance: a review of this case
by Bureau agents in 1966 concluded that "our files contain no clear
indication that the Attorney General was specifically advised that a
microphone surveillance was being utilized. . *.." 252 It was noted,
however, that on the morning of February 17, 1961-after the micro-
phone was in place but an hour or two before the meeting actually
occurred-the Director spoke with the Attorney General and, accord-
ing to Hoover's contemporaneous memorandum, advised him that the
2
" Memorandum from Richard Bissell to Mr. Bundy, 2/16/61.
24 FBI summary memorandum, 2/2/61.
* Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 2/14/61.
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/14/61.
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.
2 FBI summary memorandum, 2/15/61.
2 FBI summary memorandum, 2/15/61; Memorandum from D. E.. Moore to
A. H. Belmont, 2/16/61.
' Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 2/18/61.
m Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/21/66.
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Cooley meeting was to take place that day and that "we are trying
to cover it." 253 Hoover also wrote that he "stated [to the Attorney
General] this New York situation is interesting and if we can get
it covered we will have a full record of it," and that "the Attorney
General asked that he be kept advised. . . " 254 As noted above,
Kennedy did receive a summary of the results of the meeting, although
no specific reference was made to the technique employed.2 5
The 1961 "Sugar Lobby" investigation did discover that possibly
unlawful influence was being exerted by representatives of the foreign
country involved, but it did not reveal that money was actually being
passed to any executive or legislative branch official. All of the elec-
tronic surveillances but two (both of which were on foreign targets)
were discontinued in April 1961, about two weeks after the admin-
istration's own sugar bill passed the Senate.
The investigation was reinstituted in June 1962, however, when
the Bureau learned that representatives of the same foreign country
might be influencing Congressional deliberations concerning an amend-
ment to the sugar quota legislation.256 On June 26, 1962, the Bureau
requested authority for wiretaps on five foreign establishments plus
the office telephones of an attorney who was believed to be an agent for
the foreign country and, again, the residence telephone of the Clerk
of the House Agriculture Committee. Robert Kennedy approved all of
these taps on July 9,257 and they were instituted about one week later.2 59
After one month of operation, the wiretaps on one foreign estab-
lishment and the Clerk of the House Agriculture Committee had "pro-
duced no information of value" and were consequently discontinued.2 59
While there is no indication that the other wiretaps produced evidence
of actual payoffs, they did reveal that possibly unlawful influence was
again being exerted by the foreign government and internal Bureau
permission was obtained to continue them for another sixty days,260
after which time they were presumably terminated.2 1
Jewish Defense League: 1970 and 1971.-On September 14, 1970,
the FBI requested a wiretap on six telephone lines of the New York
Headquarters of the Jewish Defense League, an organization com-
posed of American citizens who opposed, through both peaceful and
violent means, the Soviet Union's treatment of Jewish citizens.262 At-
torney General John Mitchell approved the wiretap on Septem-
ber 15; 262a it was instituted on October 1 and continued for one
month.2 62b It was re-authorized for two three-month periods on
2 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Parsons, Mohr.
Belmont, and DeLoach, 2/17/61.
4 Ibid.
' Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 2/18/61.
" FBI summary memoranda, 6/15/62; 6/18/62; 6/19/62.
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62.
' Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 8/16/62.
a Ibid.
2 Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 8/16/62.
261 Available documents do not reflect the termination date of these wiretaps.
"Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/14/70.
According to FBI records, a "militant pro-Israeli group member" was also wire-
tapped in 1971 and 1972. (Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee (attach-
ment), 10/23/75.)
212, Ibid.
282b Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 4/20/76.
January 4, 1971, and March 31, 1971.263 Coverage was terminated
July 3, 1971.263a
According to Attorney General Mitchell, the JDL wiretap was
"deemed essential to protect this nation and its citizens against hostile
acts of a foreign power and to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States." 264 More specif-
ically, he contended that the activities of the Jewish Defense League
toward official representatives of the Soviet Union, which had allegedly
included acts of violence such as bombing the offices of a Soviet trade
organization and the Soviet airlines, risked "the possibility of inter-
national embarrassment or Soviet retaliation against American citizens
in Moscow," especially in light. of vigorous protests by the Soviet
Union.265 The wiretap was approved in order to obtain "advance
knowledge of any activities of the JDL" which might have such
repercussions; 265a its re-authorization was sought and obtained on the
ground that it had "furnished otherwise unobtainable information,
well in advance of public statements by the JDL, thereby allowing for
adequate countermeasures. to -be taken by appropriate police and
security forces." 266
Criminal indictments were returned against several JDL members
in May 1971, and shortly thereafter the prosecution revealed the
existence of the wiretap to the defendants. In the context of the
criminal case, the Government characterized the JDL wiretap as a
"domestic security wiretap" and conceded that it was unlawful.2 6 7 The
"foreign intelligence" predicate, however, was raised by Attorney
General Mitchell and other civil defendants in the civil action-
Zweibon v. Mitchell-subsequently filed by sixteen members of JDL
who were oveheard on the wiretap.
The District Court in the Zweibon case agreed with Attorney Gen-
eral Mitchell that the JDL wiretap was in fact related to United
States foreign affairs and held that its authorization by the Attor-
ney General was a proper exercise of the constitutional 'power of the
President and his designees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals did
not reexamine the District Court's finding that the wiretap was
originally predicated on foreign affairs needs 268 because it held that
even if one accepts the foreign relationship predicate, the wiretapping
of American citizens who are neither the agents of nor collaborators
"" Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General, 1/4/71 and 3/31/71.
2"' Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 4/20/76.
' Affadavit of Attorney General Mitchell, filed with the Eastern District
Court of New York in United States v. Bieber, 71-CR-479 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
6/12/71.
' The quoted language is that of District of Columbia Court of Appeals Judge
J. Skelly Wright, summarizing the rationale of the former Attorney General in
approving the wiretap against the JDL. (Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F. 2d 594 [D.C.
Cir. 1975].)
a Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/14/70.
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/31/71.
m See United States v. Huss, 482 F. 2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1973).
' The court, nonetheless, found it "curious that surveillances which were
merely a 'domestic security wiretap' which the 'government concede[d] . . .
were unlawful' when a contempt citation was involved ... have become 'foreign'
security wiretaps now that personal liability in damages is alleged." (Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F. 2d 594, 606-07 n. 16 [D.C. Cir. 1975].)
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with a foreign power is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 269
VII. DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE ABUSE QUESTIONS
The possibilities for abuse of warrantless electronic surveillance
have clearly been greatest when this technique is directed against
American citizens and domestic organizations. The application of
vague and elastic standards for wiretapping and bugging has resulted
in electronic surveillances which, by any objective measure, were im-
proper and seriously infringed the Fourth Amendment rights of both
the targets and those with whom the targets communicated. Americans
who violated no criminal law and represented no genuine threat to the
"national security" have been targeted, regardless of the stated
predicate. In many cases, the implementation of wiretaps and bugs
has also been fraught with procedural violations, even when the
required procedures were meager, thus compounding the abuse. The
inherently intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, moreover, has
enabled the Government to generate vast amounts of information-
unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest-about the personal
and political lives of American citizens. The collection of this type of
information has, in turn, raised the danger of its use for partisan polit-
ical and other improper ends by senior administration officials.
A. Questionable and Improper Selection of Targets
Judged against the principles established in the 1972 Keith case,
nearly all of the Americans, unconnected with a foreign power, who
were targets of warrantless electronic surveillance were improperly
selected. Even without retrospective Fourth Amendment analysis of
pre-Keith electronic surveillances, however, a close review of some of
the particular cases 269a outlined above suggests that (regardless of
whether the ostensible predicate was violence, "subversion," or any
other basis) the standards for approval of electronic surveillances were
far too broad to restrict the use of this technique to cases which in-
volved a substantial threat to the nation. Moreover, the use of warrant-
less electronic surveillance against certain categories of individuals,
such as attorneys, Congressmen and Congressional staff members, and
journalists, has revealed an insensitivity to the values inherent in the
Sixth Amendment and in the doctrines of "separation of powers" and
"freedom of the press."
1. Wiretaps Under the "Domestic Security" Standard
In 1940, President Roosevelt approved the use of wiretapping
against "persons suspected of subversive activities against the Gov-
ernment of the United States." 270 As discussed in Section II, this
formulation was supplemented by President Truman in 1946 to include
"cases vitally affecting the domestic security, or where human life is in
See p. 292.
* The omission of other cases from the discussion which follows is not in-
tended to suggest the conclusion that the use of electronic surveillance was justi-
fied or appropriate in such cases under the standards which existed at the time
of the surveillance.
" Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the Attorney General, 5/21/40.
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jeopardy." 271 Several cases from the period 1960 to 1965 (when the
"domestic security" standard was replaced by President Johnson's
"national security" standard) suggest the ease with which the term
"domestic security" was stretched to cover the targeting of Americans
who posed no substantial threat to the internal security of the country.
Prior to the institution of the 1961 and 1962 "Sugar Lobby" wire-
taps,2 7 2 for example, the Government did possess some evidence of
possibly unlawful influence by foreign officials and some evidence of
the importance of the sugar quota legislation to the foreign nation
involved. But there was clearly no evidence that "human life" was in
jeopardy, and neither the possibility of unlawful influence nor the
desire to gain information relevant to our relations with the foreign
country had a significant impact on the domestic security. The docu-
mentary record of the investigation, moreover, contains no suggestion
that the three Agriculture Department employees, one Congressional
staff aide, and two lobbyists who were tapped represented any internal
security threat.
In the case of the 1961 wiretap on Lloyd Norman,"2 7 the FBI ap-
parently had no information beyond the fact of his authorship of the
"suspect" article that Norman had obtained any classified material
or that a leak had actually occurred. Norman himself told Bureau
agents when interviewed that "he based his article on speculation and
conjecture . . ." 274 and a Pentagon source -indicated that he "had no
factual information 'as to who leaked the information or that Norman
was actually the person who obtained the information." 275 The wire-
tap subsequently produced no information which suggested that Nor-
man had received any classified information. 2 76 According to an in-
ternal summary of the final FBI report on the "leak": "The majority
of those interviewed thought a competent, well-informed reporter
could have written the article without having reviewed or received
classified data." 277 This wiretap, in short, was approved by Robert
Kennedy without any apparent evidence that the target had actually
obtained -classified information: the wiretap results, Norman's per-
sonal interview with the FBI, and the entire investigation all sug-
gested, in fact, that he had not.
In April 1964, Kennedy approved "technical coverage" (electronic
surveillance) on Malcolm X after the FBI advised him that the Na-
tion of Islam leader was "forming a new group" which would be
"more aggressive" and would "participate in racial demonstrations
and civil rights activities." 2" The only indication of possible danger
reflected in the wiretap request, however, was that Malcolm X had
"recommended the possession of firearms by members for their self-
protection." 279
mn Memorandum from Attorney General Tom C. Clark to President Truman,
7/17/46.
2" See pp. 328-330.
". See p. 321.
"'Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan, 12/15/66.
m Memorandum from D. E. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 6/28/61.
m An internal FBI memorandum states: "We did not obtain information from
this wiretap which assisted us in determining the identity of the person responsi-
ble for leaking classified information." (Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to W. C.
Sullivan, 12/15/66).
m Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan, 12/15/66.
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 4/1/64.
m'Ibid.
The wiretaps, discussed above, which were placed between 1962 and
1965 as part of COMINFIL investigations, also show the lengths to
which the "domestic security" standard could be stretched. Most of
these wiretaps were based not on specific actions of the targets that
threatened the domestic security but on the pos8ibility that the targets,
consciously or even unwittingly encouraged by communists, would.
engage in such activities in the future. While the Attorney General
and the FBI may properly have been concerned about certain advisors
to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, no serious argument can
be made that Dr. King himself jeopardized the nation's security. Yet
King was the target of no fewer than five wiretaps between 1963 and
1965, and an associate of his (who was not one of his suspected ad-
visors) was also wiretapped in 1964.
In the case of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee,
even potential communist infiltration was apparently seen as sufficient
to justify a wiretap under the "domestic security" standard. The re-
quest for a wiretap on SNCC which was sent to Attorney General
Katzenbach in 1965 noted that "confidential informants" described
SNCC as "the principal target for Communist Party infiltration
among the various civil rights organizations" and stated that some
of its leaders had "made public appearances with leaders of Commu-
nist-front organizations" and had "subversive backgrounds." 280 The
FBI presented no substantial evidence, however, that SNCC was in
fact infiltrated by Communists--only that the organization was alleg-
edly a target for such infiltration in the future.
2. Microphone Surveillances Under the "National Interest"
Standard
Between 1954 and 1965, the prevailing standard for the approval
of microphone surveillances was that established by Attorney General
Brownell in 1954. "Considerations of internal security and the national
safety are paramount," he then wrote, "and, therefore, may compel
the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest." 281
Under this standard, J. Edgar Hoover approved the bugging of
Congressman Cooley's hotel room in February 1961, in connection
with the "Sugar Lobby" investigation. Law enforcement purposes or
the need to gather foreign intelligence information may arguably
have supported this surveillance281a but the documentary record of the
Sugar Lobby investigation reveals no genuine "internal security" or
",national safety" justification for the Cooley bug.28 2
2 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/15/65.
2m Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.
m" As noted above, however, the Sugar Lobby investigation did not show that
any money was passed between foreign representatives and American executive
or legislative branch officials.
m Less than three months after the bug was installed in Congressman Cooley's
hotel room, J. Edgar Hoover wrote Deputy Attorney General Byron White that
the FBI was "utilizing microphone surveillances on a restricted basis even though
trespass is necessary to assist in uncovering the activities of [foreign] intelligence
agents and Communist Party leaders. In the interests of national safety, micro-
phone surveillances are also utilized on a restricted basis, even though trespass
is necessary, in uncovering major criminal activities. We are using such coverage
in connection with our investigations of clandestine activities of top hoodlums
and organized crime." (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Byron R. White,
5/4/61.) No mention was made of the microphone surveillance of the United
States Congressman.
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This standard was also used to justify the fifteen microphone sur-
veillances of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., between January 1964 and
October 1965. Significantly, FBI internal memoranda with respect
to some of these installations, make clear that they were planted in
Dr. King's hotel rooms for the express purpose of obtaining personal
information about him rather than for internal security purposes.283
The validity of the "national interest" rationale for the other bugs-
and for the microphone surveillances of certain associates of Dr.
King-is also open to serious question.28 4
At the 1964 Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New
Jersey, the FBI also planted a microphone in the joint headquarters
of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and the Congress
on Racial Equality. 28 5 The only reason for the SNCC bug expressed in
contemporaneous FBI documents was the following:
Sixty members of the SNCC from Jackson, Mississippi, plan
to attend the Convention to assist in seating the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party delegation. This group also re-
portedly will utilize walkie-talkies in connection with their
planned demonstrations.286
A 1975 Inspection Report on the FBI's activities at the 1964 Conven-
tion speculated that the bug may have been installed because the Bu-
reau had information at that time that "an apparent member of the
Communist Party, USA, was engaging in considerable activity, much
in a leadership capacity in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee." 287 CORE appears to have been an incidental target of
the SNCC bug, since the two groups shared offices in Atlantic City.
3. Wiretaps and Microphone Surveillances Under the Five
Criteria Based on Section 92511(3)
Improper and questionable selection of targets continued after the
Justice Department altered the criteria under which wiretaps and
bugs could be authorized to conform with the five categories set forth
by Congress in Section 2511(3) of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control
Act. (These categories are discussed at p. 288-290.)
There does not appear to have been any genuine national security
justification, for example, supporting the "Plumbers" wiretap on
Joseph Kraft's Washington residence or the FBI's bug in his hotel
room abroad. John Ehrlichman testified before the Senate Watergate
a For example, memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan,
2/4/64; King Report, Sec. IV, Electronic Surveillance on Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.
King Report: See. IV, Electronic Surveillance on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
* One of the wiretaps on Dr. King also occurred while he was attending this
convention. Beyond the fact of the ongoing investigation of Dr. King, the only
recorded reason for instituting this particular tap in Atlantic City was set forth
in an internal memorandum prepared shortly before the Convention:
"Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence (SCLC), an organization set up to promote integration which we are in-
vestigating to determine the extent of Communist Party (CP) influence on King
and the SCLC, plans to attend and possibly may indulge in a hunger fast as a
means of protest." (Memorandum from Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. A. H. Belmont,
8/21/64.)
* Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 8/21/64.
FBI summary memorandum, 1/30/75.
Committee that the "national security" was involved, but did not elab-
orate further.28  According to the transcript of the White House
tapes, President Nixon stated to John Dean, on April 16, 1973 that
... What I mean is I think in the case of the Kraft's stuff what
the FBI did, they were both fine. I have checked the facts.
There were some done through private sources. Most of it
was done through the Bureau after we got-Hoover didn't
want to do Kraft. What it involved apparently, John, was
this: the leaks from the NSC [National Security Council].
They were in Kraft and others columns and we were trying
to plug the leaks and we had to get it done and finally we
turned it over to Hoover. And then when the hullabaloo de-
veloped we just knocked it off altogether ... 289
Beyond these claims, there is little evidence that any national se-
curity issue was involved in the case. Former Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral and Acting FBI Director William Ruckelshaus testified: "I did
review the information on which the effort was made from one of the
operations out of the White House to put a tap on Mr. Kraft and,
frankly, I could never see any national security justification for doing
SO." 290 Of the hotel room bug, Mr. Ruckelshaus stated: "The justifica-
tion would have been that he was discussing with some-asking ques-
tions of some members of the North Vietnamese Government, repre-
sentatives of that government. My own feeling is that this just is not an
adequate national security justification for placing any kind of sur-
veillance on an American citizen or newsman. It just is not an ade-
quate justification . . ." 291 Mr. Kraft stated in a 1974 Congressional
hearing that he was in contact with North Vietnamese officials while
he was overseas in 1969, but he noted that this was a common practice
among journalists and that he never knowingly published any classi-
fied information on the basis of these or any other contacts he made
there.2 9 2 He further stated that Henry Kissinger, then the Presi-
dent's Special Adviser for National Security, informed him that he
had no contemporaneous knowledge of either the wiretap or the hotel
room bug, and that former Attorney General Elliot Richardson indi-
cated to him that "there was no justification for these activities." 293
Attorney General Edward Levi recently wrote Mr. Kraft that the
FBI's 115-document file on the columnist "did not indicate that Mr.
Kraft's activities posed any risk to the national interest." 294
There is also no evidence of a "national security" justification for
the physical surveillance or the proposed electronic surveillance of
I Testimony of John Ehrlichman before the Senate Watergate Committee,
7/24/73, p. 2535.
2 Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by President Richard Nixon,
4/30/74, p. 802.
m William Ruckelshaus testimony, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, p. 320.
m Ibid.
m Joseph Kraft testimony, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure, 5/10/74, p. 381.
m Joseph Kraft testimony, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure, 5/10/74, p. 381.
2'The Washington Post, 3/31/76, p. 1.
Kraft in the fall of 1969. A Bureau memorandum suggests that the
Attorney General did desire some type of coverage of Kraft,295 but
the record reveals no purpose for this coverage.
Perhaps significantly, the physical surveillance was discontinued
after five weeks because it had "not been productive." 296 Apparently,
the Attorney General himself was unconvinced that a genuine "na-
tional security" justification supported the Kraft surveillance: he re-
fused to authorize the requested wiretap and it was consequently never
implemented.
The "Seventeen Wiretaps" in 1969, 1970, and 1971 clearly reveal
the relative ease with which improper targets can be selected for
wiretapping. Shortly after these wiretaps were revealed publicly,
President Nixon stated that they had been justified by the need to
prevent leaks of classified information harmful to the "national secu-
rity." 297 In the cases of several of these taps, however, no "national
security" claim was advanced in the supporting documents that went
to the Attorney General requesting authorization. Two of the targets
were domestic affairs advisers at the White House, who had no foreign
affairs responsibilities and apparently had no access to classified for-
eign policy materials. According to Bureau memoranda, their coverage
was not requested through the President's National Security Advisor
or his assistant, as Bureau memoranda indicate others inthis series
were,298 but by the White House directly: John Mitchell approved the
first of these two taps at the request of "higher authority ;" 299 the
second of these two was requested by H. R. Haldeman.o00
A third target was a White House speech writer who had been over-
heard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a reporter with back-
ground information on a Presidential speech concerning not foreign
policy but revenue sharing and welfare reform.3 0 ' This tap was also
requested by the White House directly. The reinstatement of the tap
on one National Security Council staff member was apparently re-
quested by H. R. Haldeman simply because "they have some concern
[about him]; they may have a bad apple and have to get him out of
the basket." 302 The last four requests which were sent to the Attorney
General, including that for reinstatement of the tap on the NSC staff
member, do not mention any national security justification to support
the requests. 0 3 While national security issues were at least arguably
involved in some of the taps, in short, additional targets were selected
with no national security basis at all. As William Ruckelshaus has
testified:
I think some of the individuals who were tapped, at least to
the extent I have reviewed the record, had very little, if any,
2 Memorandum from Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 11/4/69.
2 Memorandum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 12/11/69.
' Public statement of President Nixon, 5/22/73.
m Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/12/69, 5/20/69,
5/29/69, 6/4/69, 8/4/69, 5/4/70, and 5/13/70.
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 7/23/69.
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 12/14/70.m' Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 8/1/69.
' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan, and C. D.
Brennan, 10/15/70.
" Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/13/70 (two
separate memoranda), 10/16/70, and 12/14/70.
relationship to any claim of a national security tie . . . I
think that as the program proceeded and it became clear to
those who could sign off on taps how easy it was to institute
a wiretap under the present procedure that those kinds of
considerations [i.e., genuine national security justifications]
were considerably relaxed as the program went on.30
4
As noted in Section VI above, wiretaps were also placed on three
antiwar organizations which were involved in planning the "March on
Washington" in November 1969. The first of these three wiretaps,
approved by Attorney General Mitchell on November 6, was directed
against the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
(NMC).a05 The FBI's request for coverage of this group noted that
the anticipated 8ize of the demonstration was cause for "concern"
should violence break out, but it made no claim that NMC members
in particular engaged in or were likely to engage in violent activity.
The entire "justification" portion of the memorandum sent to John
Mitchell reads as follows:
The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet-
nam (NMC) is coordinating efforts for a massive antiwar
manifestation to take place in Washington, D.C., November
12-16, 1969. This group maintains a Washington, D.C., office
at 1029 Vermont Avenue, Northwest, where the planning takes
place.
This demonstration could possibly attract the largest num-
ber of demonstrators ever to assemble in Washington, D.C.
The large number is cause for major concern should violence
of any type break out. It is necessary for this Bureau to keep
abreast of events as they occur, and we feel that in this in-
stance advance knowledge of plans and possible areas of con-
frontation would be most advantageous to our coverage and to
the safety of individuals and property. Accordingly, we are
requesting authorization to install a telephone surveillance
on the Washington office of the NMC.30
Five days after he approved the first tap, the Attorney General au-
thorized wiretaps on the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and a third
antiwar organization, both of which were "closely coordinating their
efforts with NMC in organizing the demonstration." " The only addi-
tional justification given for the wiretap on the Vietnam Moratorium
Committee was that the group "has recently endorsed fully the activi-
ties of the NMC concerning the upcoming antiwar demonstrations." 30
In 1970, approval for a wiretap on a "New Left-oriented campus
group" was granted by Attorney General Mitchell on the basis of an
FBI request which included, among other factors deemed relevant to
the necessity for the wiretap, evidence that the group was attempting
"to develop strong ties with the cafeteria, maintenance and other work-
a Ruckelshaus testimony. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, pp. 311-312.
"'Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 11/5/69.
3 Ibid.
* Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 11/7/69.
* Ibid.
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ers on campus" and wanted to "go into industry and factories and ...
take the radical politics they learned on the campus and spread them
anong factory workers."so
This approval was renewed three months later despite the fact that
the request for renewal made no mention of violent or illegal activity
by the group. The value of the wiretap was shown, according to the
FBI, by such results as obtaining "the identities of over 600 persons
either in touch with the national headquarters or associated with" it
during the prior three months."o Six months after the original au-
thorization the number of persons so identified had increased to 1,428;
and approval was granted for a third three-month period.3 1 '
4. Electronic Surveillance of Journalists, Attorneys and Per-
sons Involved in the Domestic Political Process
As the preceding three subsections indicate, the elasticity of the
standards for instituting electronic surveillance has permitted -this
technique to be directed against American citizens with little or no
adequate justification in the particular case. In addition, the targeting
of individuals in certain categories, such as journalists, attorneys, and
persons involved in the domestic political process, is an inherently
questionable practice because of the special concerns which affect these
groups.
Between 1961 and 1972, at least six American journalists and news-
men were electronically surveilled by the FBI: Lloyd Norman in
1961; 312 Hanson Baldwin in 1962; 33 the editor of an anti-Communist
newsletter in 1965; "4 Joseph Kraft in 1969; 315 and two American
"Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/70. The
strongest evidence that this group's conduct was inimical to the national security
was reported as follows:
"The [group] is dominated and controlled by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist
[excised] . . .
"In carrying out the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the [excised] members have
repeatedly sought to become involved in labor disputes on the side of labor,
join picket lines and engage in disruptive and sometimes violent tactics against
industry recruiters on college campuses . . .
"This faction is currently very active, in many of the major demonstrations
and student violence on college campuses . . ." (Memorandum from J. Edgar
Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/70. The excised words have been deleted
by the FBI.)
no. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/16/70. The
only other results noted by Hoover related to the fact that the wiretap had "ob-
tained information concerning the activities of the national headquarters of [the
group and] plans for [the group's] support'and participation in demonstrations
supporting antiwar groups and the [excised]." It was also noted that the wire-
tap "revealed ... contacts with Canadian 'student elements." (The excised words
have been deleted by the FBI.)
"' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/16/70. The
only other results noted by Hoover again related to obtaining information about
the "plans and activities" of the group. Specifically mentioned were the "plans
for the National Interim Committee (ruling body of [excised]) meeting which
took place in New York 'and Chicago," and the plans "for demonstrations at San
Francisco, Detroit, JSalt Lake City, Minneapolis and Chicago." There was no in-
dication -that these demonstrations were expected to be violent. (The excised
words have been deleted by the FBI.)
3" See p. 321.
"' See pp. 321-322.
3" See p. 323.
" See p. 323.
newsmen in connection with the "Seventeen Wiretaps" during the
period 1969 to 1971.316 All of these surveillances were ostensibly con-
ducted to determine the source of leaks of classified information.
The wiretapping of journalists in the investigation of "leaks," how-
ever has proven to be a fruitless enterprise. As former Secretary of
State Dean Rusk stated:
Tapping newsmen will not stop leaks and for the most part
is not even going to uncover leaks. There are so many different
ways in which leaks can be made and from so many different
quarters that there is no way to get at the business of leaks
and on sheer practical grounds this is rather foolish policy
to pursue. 3 1 7
Aside from matters of practicality, the Constitution gives special pro-
tection to "freedom of the press." The precedent set by wiretapping
newsmen inevitably tends to undermine the Constitutional guarantee
of a free and independent press.
During the 1960s there were also numerous wiretaps on the office
telephones of attorneys. In the course of the Sugar Lobby investigation
in 1962, ten telephone lines of a Washington, D.C., law firm were wire-
tapped in order to intercept the conversations of a single lawyer who
was believed to be acting as a lobbyist for foreign interests."' In that
same year, the office telephone of an advisor to Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.-also a lawyer-was wiretapped and his office was
bugged; 319 his telephone was wiretapped again in 1963.320 A second
attorney who advised Dr. King was wiretapped in 1963; 321 and the
office telephone of an attorney who was in frequent contact with the
editor of an anti-Communist newsletter was wiretapped in 1965.322
Attorneys have also been frequently overheard on wiretaps not specifi-
cally directed at them. The wiretap on the headquarters of the Jewish
Defense League in 1970 and 1971, for instance, intercepted the con-
versations between Bertram Zweibon, an attorney for several JDL
members, and his clients.32 3
Both direct and indirect electronic surveillances of attorneys, such
as those listed above, inevitably jeopardize the Sixth Amendment-
based attorney-client privilege, because this technique, by its intrusive
nature, is capable of providing the means by which the FBI and the
Justice Department can learn the legal strategry to be used by
actual and potential defendants as well as other information given
in confidence by clients to their attorneys. In order to minimize the
possibility of violating the attorney-client privilege, FBI monitoring
agents in court-ordered electronic surveillance cases are currently
See p. 326.
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 7/23/74, p. 232.
31 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62.
e Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/6/62; Memo-
randum from J. F. Blem to W. C. Sullivan, 3/2/62. See also King Report, Sec. II.
3 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/24/65.
"" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/24/65. See
also King Report, Sec. II.
* Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/7/65.
" Zweibon v. Mitokell, 516 F.2d 594, 611 (D.D.C. 1975).
under instructions to shut off interception equipment upon the com-
mencement of conversations between a client and his attorney concern-
ing a "pending criminal case." 324 This policy is also applied to war-
rantless electronic surveillances.""1 As a practical matter, however, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to comply fully with this requirement
since the monitoring agent must listen to the beginning of such a
conversation even to recognize it.
In the Jewish Defense League case, the wiretap continued for more
than a month after federal criminal indictments were returned against
several JDL members. In violation of a specific instruction from the
Attorney General to suspend the overhearing and recording of con-
versations between "individuals who are or may be defendants or
attorneys in pending Federal cases," 326 Bureau agents overheard and
recorded conversations between some of the indicted JDL members and
their attorney, Mr. Zweibon. The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals wrote in regard to this matter:
When criminal indictments have already been returned
against some subjects of a surveillance, as was true in this
case, . . . surreptitious surveillance may . . . deny those sub-
jects effective assistance of counsel in derogation of their
Sixth Amendment rights .. . We do not mean to suggest that
appellees [Attorney General Mitchell and other government
officials] were even partially motivated by a desire to overhear
privileged attorney-client communications concerning pend-
ing criminal trials . . . However, we note that such motiva-
tions may prompt surveillance in other situations and thus
constitute another abuse which prior judicial authorization
may help to curb.17
Electronic surveillance of persons involved in the domestic political
process, such as Congressmen, lobbyists, and Congressional aides, also
raises special problems. Information is often the key to power; and
" Agent's Manual for Conduct of Electronic Surveillance Under Title III of
Public Law 90-351, Section VII. If the attorney-client conversation concerns
a matter other than a pending criminal case, it is the responsibility ' of the
supervising attorney to determine whether or not the conversation is privileged.
If he determines it is not, the interception is treated no differently from any
other overheard conversation. If evidence of crimes other than those specified in
the court's order is obtained, the FBI may disseminate this information both
within the Bureau and to other Federal or state agencies to the same extent
that it could disclose the contents of conversations relating to the crime speci-
fied in the order authorizing interception.
m For example, SAC Letter, 8/13/69.
The "pending criminal case" requirement has been Interpreted less strictly
with respect to some warrantless electronic surveillances, however. On the
May 25, 1965, order authorizing a wiretap on an attorney who was an advisor
to Dr. King, for example, Attorney General Katzenbach wrote: "You should dis-
continue if at any time he is acting as attorney for clients litigating with the
U.S." (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/25/65).
Katzenbach therefore left open the possibility that information obtained from
conservations which related to a state rather than a federal case could be over-
heard, recorded, and presumably disseminated to a state prosecutor. See also
the similar instruction in the Jewish Defense League case, quoted in the text.a Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/14/70, 1/4/71;
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 610-11 (D.C. Cir. 1975).- w Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 634 n. 100 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
the ability of high executive officials to use electronic surveillance to
obtain information about their political opponents can give the Presi-
dent and his aides enormous influence. Apart from violating the rights
of the surveillance targets, wiretapping and bugging on behalf of the
President's political interests destroys the Constitutional system of
checks and balances designed to limit the exercise of arbitrary power.
Electronic surveillance has been used to serve the interests of Presi-
dents in almost every political arena; it has been a resource for execu-
tive power that has tempted administrations of both political parties.
Officials succumbed to the temptation with a consistency which demon-
strates the immense danger of vesting authority over the use of such
techniques solely within the Executive Branch.
B. Procedural Violationa
Frequent violations of the internal procedural requirements for
warrantless electronic surveillance have compounded the abuses to
which this technique is prone. Wiretaps and bugs have often been in-
stalled without the prior authorization of the Attorney General and
at times without prior authority from Bureau Headquarters, thus de-
feating one of the few checks on the unrestricted use of electronic sur-
veillance. Certain very sensitive surveillances have also been intention-
ally excluded from the ELSUR Index, rendering impossible the re-
trieval of overhears and other information about the surveillances
through a regular file search. In two cases, surveillance records were
physically removed from FBI Headquarters and stored at the White
House. The occurrence of procedural violations such as these have
doubtlessly facilitated the improper use of electronic surveillance of
American citizens.
The failure of the FBI to secure the necessary prior approval of
the Attorney General in a number of wiretapping cases has been de-
scribed above. Wiretaps directed against Lloyd Norman, Hanson
Baldwin's secretary, a former FBI agent, and Morton Halperin
were all instituted and continued for a period of days without
any approval or in some cases, apparently even knowledge, on the
part of Attorneys General. 3 2 9 No explicit approval was ever secured
from the Attorney General for two of the four wiretaps in the Charles
Radford series and, also in violation of existing regulations, no written
approval was granted for the other two. After the requirement of
prior Attorney General approval for microphone surveillance was
imposed in 1965, the FBI installed at least three bugs in hotel rooms
occupied by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., without advising the At-
torney General before the fact.3 3 0 Nor was the Attorney General's
approval ever sought for the FBI's bugging of columnist Joseph
Kraft in 1969. Both the SNCC bug in 1964 and an attempted micro-
phone surveillance of Dr. King in 1966, moreover, occurred with-
out even the approval of FBI Director Hoover: a 1975 Inspection
Report on the Bureau's activities at the 1964 Democratic Na-
tional Convention states that* "a thorough review of Bureau rec-
mThe "Plumbers" wiretap against Joseph Kraft was similarly installed
without the prior---or subsequent-approval of the Attorney General.
* Attorney General Katzenbach was apparently given 'after the fact notifica-
tion, however. See King Report: Sec. IV, Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.
ords fails to locate any memorandum containing authorization for
[the bug planted at SNCC headquarters];" 331 and on a January 1966
memorandum reflecting the New York Office installation of a micro-
phone in Dr. King's room, Associate Director Clyde Tolson wrote, "No
one here approved this. I have told [FBI Assistant Director William
C.] Sullvian [who had authorized the New York office to install the
bug] again not to institute mike surveillance without the Director's
approval." 332
Violations of the requirement of periodic re-authorization of elec-
tronic surveillances, imposed in 1965, have also magnified this tech-
nique's abuses in the domestic area. Despite the lack of any evidence
of a "national security" leak obtained from any of the 'Seventeen
Wiretaps," for example,-the President himself privately admitted
that the taps were unproductive and useless in determining the source
of leaks 333-ten of them remained in operation for periods longer than
ninety days and none was ever re-authorized. After the tap on Hal-
perin had been in place for two months, William C. Sullivan wrote
the Director that "Nothing has come to light [on this tap] that is of
significance from the standpoint of the leak in question ;" 334 yet that
tap continued for another nineteen months without re-authorization.
The Halperin tap, and that on another National Security Council
staff member, moreover, remained in operation long after both of
these targets left the employ of the National Security Council and be-
came advisors to Senator Edmund Muskie, then the leading Demo-
cratic prospect for the Presidency. These targets no longer had access
to classified information but they were clearly in a position to provide
political intelligence to the White House unwittingly.3 The wiretap
on Charles Radford was similarly never re-authorized, although it
continued for nearly six months after it was instituted in December
1971.
Because of their perceived sensitivity, the records of some wiretaps
and bugs were purposefully not contemporaneously integrated into
the regular FBI files for warrantless electronic surveillance. When the
Bureau was first advised of the "Seventeen Wiretaps," for example, it
was told that their sensitivity precluded the maintenance of multiple
records; " consequently, only one copy of the records was retained and
no entries were made in the ELSUR Index. According to a 1973 FBI
memorandum regarding the Radford wiretaps, "Our records have
been kept completely isolated from other FBI records, and there are
no indices whatsoever relating to this project." - And in the case of
Joseph Kraft, most of the summaries which W. C. Sullivan sent to
J. Edgar Hoover from abroad were marked "DO NOT FILE" to make
their retrieval through a normal file search impossible. 3 8 In both the
a FBI summary memorandum, 1/30/75.
m Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 1/21/66.
Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 150; p. 345.
Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover, 7/8/69.
In fact a great deal of political information was obtained from these and
other wiretaps in this series. See pp. 349-350.
See p. 325.
w Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 2/26/73.
Staff review of letters sent from W. C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hoover regarding
the Kraft surveillance.
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"Seventeen Wiretaps" case and the Kraft case, moreover, the limited
surveillance records that were maintained were physically removed
from the FBI headquarters and taken by Assistant Attorney General
Robert Mardian to John Ehrlichman at the White House, apparently
at the instruction of President Nixon. 339 On May 12, 1973, these files
were discovered by Acting FBI Director William Ruckelshaus in a
safe in Ehrlichman's outer office and returned to Bureau Head-
quarters.3 40
The circumvention of normal approval and filing requirements, in
short, accompanied and facilitated the improper wiretapping and
bugging of American citizens. The knowledge that these requirements
could, in secrecy, be ignored inevitably increased the likelihood that
wiretaps and bugs would be employed without substantial justifica-
tion.
C. Collection and Dissemination of Information Irrelevant to Legiti-
mate Governmental Objectives
Wiretaps and microphones, by their nature, inevitably intercept con-
versations which are totally unrelated to the authorized purpose of the
surveillance. Virtually all conversations are overheard, no matter how
trivial, personal, or political they might be. In addition, the techniques
are incapable of a surgical precision which would permit the FBI to
overhear only the target's conversations. Anyone using a tapped tele-
phone or conversing in a bugged room can be overheard. These char-
acteristics of electronic surveillance have directly resulted in another
type of abuse: the collection of information, including purely per-
sonal and political information, for dissemination to the highest levels
in the Government.
1. Personal Information
One extreme example of the collection and dissemination of personal
information is found in the surveillance of an American citizen at the
direct request of the White House.*34 Among the items of interest that
the FBI obtained from a wiretap on this idividual-and delivered
in utmost secrecy to a Presidential aide-were the following: that
"meat was ordered [by the target's family] from a grocer"; that the
target's daughter had a toothache; that the target needed grass clip-
pings for a compost heap he was building; and that during a tele-
phone conversation between the target's wife and a friend the "matters
discussed were milk bills, hair, soap operas, and church." 342 Even the
FBI evidently realized that this type of information was unrelated
to national security: for the last four months of the surveillance, most
of the summaries that were disseminated to the White House began,
"The following is a summary of non-pertinent information concerning
captioned individual as of .. "
From the bug planted in Joseph Kraft's hotel room, John Ehrlich-
man learned about this columnist's social contacts there and his views
about the activities of an American politician.343
Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 153.
"3Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 6/8/73.
" The name of this individual and identifying details are withheld for pri-
vacy reasons.
m'Staff summary of FBI file review, 8/22/75.
"'Letter from T. Edgar Hoover to John Ehrlichman, 7/15/69.
The "Seventeen Wiretaps" supplied the White House with a wealth
of information about the personal lives of the targets and the people
with whom they communicated. In the private words of President
Nixon, these wiretaps produced "just gobs and gobs of material: gossip
and bull." 344 The White House did not learn that any of them were
responsible for any national security leaks, but it did learn about their
social contacts, their vacation plans, their employment satisfactions
and dissatisfactions, their marital problems, their drinking habits,
and even their sex lives.345 The fact that an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court was overheard on one of these wiretaps
and intended to review a manuscript written by one of the subjects
was also disseminated to the White House.346
The most blatant example of the collection of entirely personal in-
formation and its dissemination to high-ranking government officials
occurred in connection with the FBI's investigation of Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. As noted above, the Bureau installed at least fifteen
bugs in hotel rooms occupied by Dr. King, some of which were in-
stalled for the express purpose of collecting personal information. In
December 1964, the FBI, with the approval of the White House,
disseminated a monograph on alleged communist influence in the civil
rights movement to the heads of intelligence agencies as well as the
State Department, the Defense Department, and USIA.34 7 This mon-
ograph contained a section on the personal life of Dr. King that was
apparently based in part on the information obtained from these
bugs.34" Between 1965 and 1968, at least two updated versions of the
monograph, including the section on King's personal life, were simi-
larly distributed. 34 Other FBI summaries about Dr. King which were
based in part on microphone surveillance were also disseminated to
executive branch officials outside the FBI.349
2. Political Information
Political information useful to the administration in power has also
been obtained from electronic surveillance of American citizens and
disseminated to Attorneys General and Presidents. While the genera-
tion of this type of information was incidental, in most cases, to the
purpose of the wiretap, its dissemination has armed key officials with
knowledge of the strategies of their political opponents.
The "Sugar Lobby" Investigation.-The "Sugar Lobby" wiretaps
and microphone bugging during the Kennedy administration serve as
one example of the collection and dissemination of essentially political
information. Beyond the Attorney General's concern about American
foreign policy and the possibility of bribery, it is clear that at the
time the initial wiretaps were placed, the Kennedy administration
opposed any sugar bill that provided for the favorable quotas sought
by the foreign government in question. The administration wanted
a" Transcript of Presidential tapes, 2/28/73 (House Judiciary Committee. State-
ment of Information, Book VII, Part 4, p. 1754).
8" For example, Letters from Hoover to the Attorney General and John
Mitchell, 7/21/69, and 7/25/69; Letters from Hoover to H.R. Haldeman, 9/22/70
and 12/17/70.
u" Letter from Hoover to Haldeman, 6/25/70.
3' King Report: Sec. IV, Electronic Surveillance on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
"I Ibid.
* I bi .
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a bill that would give the "Executive Branch necessary flexibility in
establishing country quotas, ostensibly for the purpose of denying
quotas to countries (such as [this particular foreign country])
whose foreign policy was at odds with ours." 350 Even if the 1961 and
the 1962 series of wiretaps were arguably legitimate under electrome
surveillance law of the early 1960s, they generated some information
that was potentially useful to the Kennedy administration in terms
of this legislative objective. Given the nature of the techniques used
and the targets they were directed against, the collection of such in-
formation is not surprising.
One summary of an overhear that was disseminated to the Attor-
ney General noted that a particular lobbyist "mentioned he is working
on the Senate and has the Republicans all lined up . . ." 61 This same
lobbyist was also reported to have said that "he had seen two addi-
tional representatives on the House Agriculture Committee, one of
whom was 'dead set against us' and who may reconsider, and the other
was neutral and 'may vote for us.' "I52 Robert Kennedy further learned
that the "friend" of one of the foreign officials "was under strong pres-
sure from the present administration, and since the 'friend' is a Demo-
crat, it would be very difficult for himlto present a strong front to a
Democratic administration." 3 From the bug in Congressman
Cooley's hotel room, the Attorney General was informed that among
other matters Mr. Cooley believed he "had not accomplished anything"
and that "he had been fighting over the Rules Committee and this had
interferred with his attempt to 'organize.' " 34
In general, coverage of the entire situation was "intensified . . .
during the time preceding the passage of the sugar quota law," 365 and
was apparently terminated in 1961 when the bill desired by the ad-
ministration passed the Senate. According to a memorandum of a
meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and Courtney Evans, an
Assistant Director of the FBI, Kennedy stated that "now [that] the
law has passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing
this extensive investigation." 356 The Bureau's own evaluation of these
wiretaps in 1966 reads in part: "Undoubtedly, data from our coverage
contributed heavily to the administration's success in [passage of the
bill it desired]." 357
The 1964 Democratic National Convention.-The dissemination of
political information from electronic surveillance was repeated during
the Johnson administration. At the request of the White House, the
FBI sent a special squad to the Democratic National Convention site
in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on August 22, 1964, ostensibly to assist
the Secret Service in protecting President Lyndon Johnson and to
ensure that the convention itself would not be marred by civil disrup-
tion. Approximately thirty Special Agents, headed by Assistant Direc-
tor Cartha DeLoach, "were able to keep the White House fully ap-
a Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66.
35 FBI summary memorandum, 6/15/62.
2 Ibid.
'0 FBI summary memorandum, 2/15/62.
m Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 2/18/61.
" Memorandum from C. A. Evans to Mr. Parsons, 4/15/61.
"'Ibid.
' Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66.
prised of all major developments during the Convention's course" by
means of "informant coverage, by use of various confidential tech-
niques, by infiltration of key groups through use of undercover agents,
and through utilization of agents using appropriate cover as report-
ers . ." ' Among the "confidential techniques" were two electronic
surveillances: a wiretap on the hotel room occupied by Martin Luther
King, Jr., and a microphone surveillance of SNCC and CORE.3"
The White House apparently did not know of the existence of either
of these electronic surveillances. Walter Jenkins, an Administrative
Assistant to President Johnson who was present at the Convention
and the recipient of information developed by the Bureau, stated that
he was unaware that any of the intelligence was obtained by wiretap-
ping or bugging.360 DeLoach has testified that he is uncertain whether
he ever informed Jenkins of these sources.3 6 1 It is clear, however, that
Jenkins, and presumably President Johnson, nonetheless, received a
significant volume of information from the King tap and the SNCC
bug-much of it purely political and only tangentially related to pos-
sible civil unrest.
One of the most important issues that might have disturbed Presi-
dent Johnson at the Atlantic City Convention was the seating chal-
lenge of the regular, all-white Mississippi delegation by the predomi-
nantly black Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). From
the electronic surveillances of King and SNCC, the White House was
able to obtain the most sensitive details of the plans and tactics of
individuals supporting the MFDP's challenge. On August 24, 1964,
for example, Cartha DeLoach, the FBI official who was in charge of
the Bureau's special squad in Atlantic City, reported to Jenkins that:
King and [an associate] were drafting a telegram to Presi-
dent Johnson . . . to register a mild protest. According to
King, the President pledged complete neutrality regarding
the selecting of the proper Mississippi delegation to be seated
at the convention. King feels that the Credentials Committee
will turn down the Mississippi Freedom Party and that they
are doing this because the President exerted pressure on the
committee along this line. The MFDP wanted to get the issue
before the full convention but because of the President's
actions, this will be impossible. 362
The next day another associate of King's contacted (on the telephone
in King's room) a member of the MFDP who:
said she thought King should see Governor Endicott Peabody
of Massachusetts, Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City,
Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown of California, Mayor
Richard Daley of Chicago, and Governor John W. King of
New Hampshire.
363
Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, 8/29/64.
* Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, 8/29/64; Cartha DeLoach
testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 177.
m Staff summary of Water Jenkins interview, 12/1/75.
. DeLoach testimony, 11/26/75, p. 114.
m Memorandum from DeLoach to Walter Jenkins, 8/24/64.
m Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
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DeLoach noted that "the purpose of King's seeing these individuals
is to urge them to call the White House directly and put pressure on
the White House in behalf of the MFDP." 3" Jenkins was also in-
formed that:
MFDP leaders have asked Reverend King to call Governor
Egan of Alaska and Governor Burns of Hawaii in an attempt
to enlist their support. According to the MFDP spokesman,
the Negro Mississippi Party needs these two states plus Cali-
fornia and New York for the roll call tonight.36 5
Significantly, a 1975 FBI Inspection Report stated that "several Con-
gressmen, Senators, and Governors of states . . ." were overheard on
this King tap.366
DeLoach reported, too, that an SCLC staff member told a repre-
sentative of the MFDP: "Off the record, of course, you know we will
accept the Green compromise proposed;" and for Jenkins' benefit,
added that "[t]his refers to the proposal of dongresswoman Edith
Green of Oregon." 367
On August 26, 1964, King was overheard conferring with another
civil rights leader on a number of matters relating to the convention.
The report that was sent to Jenkins on this conversation included
the following paragraph:
Discussion of a Vice-Presidential nominee came up and
King asked what [the other leader] thought of Hugh [sic]
Humphrey, and [the other individual] said Hugh Humphrey
is not going to get it, that Johnson needs a Catholic . . . to go
into the ghettos [sic] where Johnson will not journey and,
therefore, the Vice-President will be Muskie of Maine ... 368
According to both Cartha DeLoach and Walter Jenkins, the Bu-
reau's coverage in Atlantic City did not serve political ends. 3 6
9
From the examples cited above, however, it is clear that the FBI's elec-
tronic surveillance did generate a great deal of potentially useful
political intelligence, as well as political commentary that was totally
unrelated to the possibility of civil unrest. A document located at the
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, moreover, suggests that
Ibid.
mIbid.
m Memorandum from H. N. Bassett to Mr. Callahan, 1/29/75.
. Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
"'Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Walter Jenkins, 8/26/64.
' DeLoach testified that:
"I was sent there to provide information ... which would reflect on the
orderly progress of the convention and the danger to distinguished individuals.
and particularly the danger to the President of the United States, as exemplified
by the many, many references [to possible civil disturbances] in the memoranda
furnished Mr. Jenkins ... " (DeLoach testimony, 11/26/75, p. 139.)
Jenkins agreed that the mandate of the FBI's special unit did not encompas4
the gathering of political intelligence and stated that if any such intelligence
was disseminated it was probably due to the inability of Bureau agents to dis-
tinguish between dissident activities which might or might not result in violence.
(Staff summary of Jenkins interview, 12/1/75.) He added that he did not
believe the White House ever made any use of the incidental political intelligence
that might have been received.
at least one actual political use was made of the FBI reports. This
unsigned memorandum, which Walter Jenkins said was clearly in-
tended for the President (although he disclaimed authorship) ,3o dis-
closed Martin Luther King's strategy in connection with a meeting to
be attended by President Johnson. Among other items, this memo-
randum ieports that:
Deac DeLoach called me this morning to say that his in-
formation was that King had been advised by Joe Rauh [an
attorney for the MFDP] that in this morning's meeting you
were not going to let the group discuss seating of the 'free-
dom party" delegation, but would take the initiative. King
was, last night, pondering on whether to refuse to come to the
meeting on the grounds of short notice ...
Deac's information was that if King did show ... he was in-
structed to "speak up to the President." 371
Although FBI and White House officials claimed it was implemented
to prevent violence at the Convention site, in short, the Bureau's cov-
erage in Atlantic City-including two electronic surveillances-un-
deniably provided useful political intelligence to the President as
well.372
The "Seventeen Wiretaps."-In more recent years, FBI wiretaps
have supplied political information to the Nixon administration as
well. Since many of the "Seventeen Wiretaps" targets were personally
involved in the domestic political process-as White House aides, re-
porters, and Congressional consultants-this program inevitably col-
lected large amounts of essentially political information, much of
70 Staff summary of Walter Jenkins interview, 12/1/75.
m Blind memorandum bearing the handwritten date 8/26/69 and the type
written date 8/19/64.
372 In contrast to the use of electronic surveillance at the 1964 Democratic
Convention, Attorney General Ramsey Clark refused to permit any use of this
technique during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968.
A request for a wiretap on the "National Mobilization Office for Demonstrations"
was sent to Attorney General Clark as early as March 1968 on the grounds that:
"A telephone surveillance on this office would provide extremely valuable
information regarding the plans of [numerous] groups to disrupt the National
Democratic Convention. It would also furnish advance notice of any possible
activity by these groups which would endanger the safety of the President or
other Government officials while in Chicago." (Memorandum from J. Edgar
Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/11/68.)
Clark refused to approve the tap. He informed Director Hoover the day after
the request was made that:
". . . There has not been an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to
the national security. Should further evidence be secured of such a threat, or
reevaluation desired, please resubmit.
"Other investigative activities should be undertaken to provide intelligence
necessary to the protection of the national interest." (Memorandum from Ramsey
Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, 3/12/68.)
A total of three more requests for a wiretap on the same proposed target were
submitted during the next three months: on March 22 (Memorandum from J.
Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/22/68) ; on April 24 (Memorandum
from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 4/24/68) ; and for a final time
on June 7 (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/7/68).
None of them were signed by the Attorney General and Bureau records indicate
that no electronic surveillance was conducted in connection with the 1968
Convention.
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which was disseminated to the White House. Among the examples of
such items are the following:
-That one of the targets told a friend it "is clear the administration
will win on the ABM by a two-vote margin." Two Senators who ap-
parently supported the administration's position were named.373
-That one of the targets "recently stated that he was to spend an
hour with [one Senator's] Vietnam man, as [that Senator] is giving a
speech on the 15th." 3
-That one of the targets said Congressional hearings on Vietnam
were being postponed because a key Senator did not believe they would
be popular at that time.375
-That a well-known television news correspondent "was very de-
pressed over having been 'singled out' by the Vice President." 376
-That a friend of one of the targets wanted to see if a particular
Senator would "buy a new [antiwar] amendment" and stated that
"'They' are going to meet with [another influential Senator]."37
-That a friend of one of the targets said the Washington Star
planned to publish an article critical of Henry Kissinger. 378
-That a friend of one of the targets described one Senator as
"marginal" on the Church-Cooper Amendment but noted that another
Senator might be persuaded to support it.379
-That one of the targets helped a former Ambassador write a press
release criticizing a recent speech by President Nixon in which the
President "attacked" certain Congressmen.380
-That one of the targets said Senator Mondale was in a "dilemma"
over the "trade bill." 381
-That the friend of one of the targets said he had spoken to
former President Johnson and "Johnson would not back Senator
Muskie for the Presidency as he intended to stay out of politics." 382
At least one example of a political use which was made of informa-
tion such as this has also been documented. After J. Edgar Hoover in-
formed the Presideit that former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
planned to write a magazine article criticizing President Nixon's
Vietnam policy,383 Jeb Stuart Magruder wrote John Ehrlichman and
H. R. Haldeman that "We are in a position to counteract this article
in any number of ways. ." Ehrlichman then noted to Haldeman
m Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to President Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
7/18/69.
m4Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Preident Nixon, Henry Kissinger, And
the Attorney General, 10/9/69.
*" Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to President Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
12/3/69.
3" Letter from 3. Edgar Hoover to President Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
2/26/70.
_ Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 5/18/70.
'~Letter from 3. Edgar Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 6/2/70.
_Letter from 3. Edgar Hoover, to H. R. Haldeman, 6/23/70.
Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 9/4/70.
''Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 11/24/70.
3" Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 12/22/70.
m Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and
the Attorney General, 12/29/69.
" Memorandum from Jeb S. Magruder to H. R Haldeman and John D. Ehrlch-
man, 1/15/70.
that "This is the kind of early warning we need more of-your game
planners are now in an excellent position to map anticipatory
action-" 385 and Haldeman responded, "I agree with John's point.
Let's get going." 386
Perhaps significantly, after May 1970, copies of the letters sum-
marizing the results of these wiretaps were no longer sent to Henry
Kissinger, the President's national security advisor, but to H.R. Hal-
deman, the President's political advisor.
* * * * * * *
In summary electronic surveillance has proven to be a valuable tech-
nique for the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
information within the legitimate mandate of the FBI. But the history
of the use of this technique by the Bureau also proves that its dangers
are equally great: without precise standards and effective checks to
restrain its use, innocent American citizens may be its victims; without
rigid means of restricting the dissemination of information generated
through electronic surveillance, Government officials may learn the
most personal-and the most political-expressions and beliefs of its
targets.
'Memorandum from "E" (John Ehriehman) to "H" (H. R. Haldeman),
undated.
"0 Memorandum from "H" (H. R. Haldeman) to "M" (apparently Jeb S. Ma-
gruder), undated.
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WARRANTLESS SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES: FBI "BLACK
BAG" BREAK-INS AND MICROPHONE INSTALLATIONS
I. INTRODUCrION
A. FBI Policy and Practice
Since 1948 the FBI has conducted hundreds of warrantless surrep-
titious entries to gather domestic and foreign intelligence, despite the
questionable legality of the technique and its deep intrusion into the
privacy of targeted individuals. Before 1966, the FBI conducted over
two hundred "black bag jobs." 1 These warrantless surreptitious entries
were carried out for intelligence purposes other than microphone in-
stallation, such as physical search and photographing or seizing docu-
ments. Since 1960, more than five hundred warrantless surreptitious
nicrophone irtstallations against intelligence and internal security
targets have been conducted by the FBI, a technique which the Justice
Department still permits. Almost as many surreptitious entries were
conducted in the same period against targets of criminal
investigations.'s
Although several Attorneys General were aware of the FBI prac-
tice of break-ins to install electronic listening devices, there is no in-
dication that the FBI informed any Attorney General about its use
of "black bag jobs."
Surreptitious entries were performed by teams of FBI agents with
special training in subjects such as "lock studies." Their missions were
authorized in writing by FBI Director Hoover or his deputy, Clyde
Tolson. A "Do Not File" procedure was utilized, under which most
records of surreptitious entries were destroyed soon after an entry
was accomplished.
The use of surreptitious entries against domestic targets dropped
drastically after J. Edgar Hoover banned "black bag jobs" in 1966.
In 1970, the relaxation of restraints on domestic intelligence tech-
* niques such as surreptititous entries was proposed in the Huston Plan.
Hoover opposed this proposal, although he expressed a willingness to
follow the Huston Plan, if directed to do so by the Attorney General. 2
'Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 1/13/76.
Throughout this report, the FBI's term "black bag job" will be used, as in.
FBI memoranda, to refer to warrantless surreptitious entries for purposes
other than microphone installation, e.g., physical search and photographing or
seizing documents. The term "surreptitious entries" will be used to refer to all
warrantless entries by the FBI, including both "black bag jobs" and entries for
the purpose of microphone installation. Surreptitious entries of either type often
involved breaking and entering the targeted premises. See the Committee's re-
port on FBI Electronic Surveillance for a general treatment of microphone
installations.
"a Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 10/17/75, p. 3.
2 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell, 7/27/70.
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B. The Legal Context: United States v. Ehrlichman
The legality of warrantless surreptitious entries for intelligence pur-
poses is highly questionable. An FBI official who administered "black
bag" operations in the 1960s expressed the opinion that they were
"clearly illegal," 3 even though a 1954 memorandum from Attorney
General Herbert Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover had provided the color
of legal authority for surreptitious entries to install microphones.4
U.S. v. Ehrlichnn is the only judicial decision on the legality of a
warrantless surreptititous entry and physical search where the action
was justified by the claim that it was "in the national interest." 5 In
that case-which did not involve intelligence agencies-President Nix-
on's assistants, John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, were among five
defendants accused of conspiring to deprive a Los Angeles psychiatrist
of his Fourth Amendment rights "by entering his offices without a war-
rant for the purpose of obtaining the doctor's medical records relating
to one of his patients, Daniel Ellsberg, then under Federal indictment
for revealing top secret documents." 6
Ruling on the defendant's discovery motions, Federal District Judge
Gerhard Gesell found the break-in and search of the psychiatrist's
office "clearly illegal under the unambiguous mandate of the Fourth
Amendment" because no search warrant was obtained:
[T]he Government must comply with the strict constitutional
and statutory limitations on trespassory searches and arrests
even when known foreign agents are involved. . . . To hold
otherwise, except under the most exigent circumstances, would
be to abandon the Fourth Amendment to the whim of the
Executive in total disregard of the Amendment's history and
purpose.7
Gesell also pointed to a passage in the landmark "Keith" case to em-
phasize that surreptitious entries should be viewed by the courts as
more intrusive than other forms of search such as wiretapping:
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.8
Despite the national security defense raised by the defendants, Judge
Gesell concluded that "as a matter of law . . . the President . . .
aMemorandum from William C, Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66. This
memorandum was written by Section Chief F. J. Baumgardner and approved on
Sullivan's behalf by his principal deputy, J. A. Sizoo.
'Memorandum from Brownell to Hoover, 5/20/54.
5 U.S. v. Ehrhihman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 31 (1974).
6 U.S. v. Ehrliohman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 31 (1974).
7Ibid, p. 33, Gesell wrote: "Defendants contend that, over the last few years,
the courts have begun to carve out an exception to this traditional rule for purely
intelligence-gathering searches deemed necessary for the conduct of foreign af-
fairs. However, the cases cited are carefully limited to the issue of wiretapping,
a relatively nonintrusive search, United State8 v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd
Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973), and the Supreme Court has reserved
judgment in this unsettled area. United States v. United State8 District Court,
407 U.iS. 297, 322 n. 20, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972)." Ibid, p. 33.
'U.S. v. Ehrlichman, supra at 33, n. 3 citing U.S. v. U.S. District Court, supra
at 313. This decision, known as the Keith case, after its author, Judge Damon
Keith, is discussed in detail in the report on FBI Electronic Surveillance.
lacked the authority to authorize the Fielding break-in." 9 Gesell
commented that break-ins in the interest of "national security" cannot
be excepted from the requirement of a judicial warrant; the Fourth
Amendment cannot be obviated, he wrote,
. . . whenever the President determines that an American
citizen, personally innocent of wrongdoing, has in his posses-
sion information that may touch upon foreign policy con-
cerns. Such a doctrine, even in the context of purely informa-
tion-gathering searches, would give the Executive a blank
check to disregard the very heart and core of the Fourth
Amendment and the vital privacy interests that it protects.
Warrantless criminal investigatory searches-which this
break-in may also have been-would, in addition, undermine
vital Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights." 1o
Judicial decisions on electronic surveillance have encompassed sur-
reptitious entries for the purpose of installing electronic listening de-
ices. The leading case, Katz v. United States,1 abandoned previous
judicial decisions in which the legality of microphone surveillance de-
pended upon whether or not a "constitutionally protected area," such
as a home or office, had been physically invaded. 1 2 Instead, the Court
declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
wherever they have a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 13 In Katz
the Court recognized a possible exception to the warrant requirement
for "a situation involving the national security"-an exception which
might apply to all forms of electronic surveillance, including surveil-
lance accomplished by trespass to install a microphone.14
The possible exception to the warrant requirement, articulated by
the Supreme Court and sustained by some lower courts in electronic
surveillance cases,15 probably would not apply to surreptitious entries
conducted for the purpose of physical search. As Attorney General
Edward H. Levi testified:
The nature of the search and seizure can be very important.
An entry into a house to search its interior may be viewed -as
more serious than the overhearing of a certain type of con-
versation. The risk of abuse may loom larger in one case than
the other.16
U.S. v. Ehrlichman, 8upra, at 34.
1o 'bid, pp. 33--34. The Ehrlichman decision has been appealed and the Justice
Department has filed a memorandum in the Court of Appeals contesting Judge
Gesell's ruling on the President's power. The Justice Department's position is set
forth later in this report at pp. 369-370.
n Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
" For example, Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 360.
14389 U.S., at 358 n. 23.
'9Although the Supreme Court has never held that there is such an exception, at
least two lower courts have so held in the foreign intelligence and counterintelli-
gence field. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974), United States
v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) ; but cf., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594
(D.C. Cir. 1975, en bane).
' Levi testimony, 11/6/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 97.
II. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE, AUTHORIZATION, AND TARGETING
A. Internal Procedure and Authorization
The only internal FBI memorandum located by the Select Commit-
tee which discussed the policy for surreptitious entries stated:
We do not obtain authorization for "black bag" jobs from
outside the Bureau. Such a technique involves trespassing
and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would 'be impossible to
obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, "black bag"
jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable
tedhnique in combating subversive activities of a clandestine
nature aimed directly at undermining and destroying our
nation."'
The FBI described the procedure for authorization of surrepti-
tious entries as follows:
When a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a field office
considered surreptitious entry necessary to the conduct of an
investigation, he would make his request to the appropriate
Assistant Director at FBIHQ, justifying the need for an
entry and assuring it could be accomplished safely with full
security. In accordance with instructions of Director J. Ed-
gar Hoover, a memorandum outlining the facts of the request
was prepared for approval of Mr. Hoover, or Mr. Tolson,
the Associate Director. Subsequently, the memorandum was
filed in the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File"
procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field office, the
SAC maintained a record of -approval as a control device
in his office safe. At the next yearly field office inspection,
a review of these records would be made by the Inspector to
insure that the SAC was not acting without prior FBIHQ
approval in conducting surreptitious entries. Upon comple-
tion of this review, these records were destroyed.'
One FBI agent who performed numerous "black bag jobs" stated
that he obtained approval from some officer at FBI headquarters,
although not always the Director, before performing a study of
the feasibility of an entry. 9 He said that a feasibility study was in-
tended to determine: whether the entry could 'be accomplished in a
secure manner, who owned the building and whether a key could be
obtained. Floor plans of the building were often procured. If a build-
ing owner appeared to be a "patriotic citizen," FBI agents would ap-
proach him for assistance in enterin a unit of his building-"show
our credentials and wave the flag.' 2o If the FBI agents decided
that they would be unable to obtain the 'building owner's con-
"Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66, Subject:
"Black Bag" Jobs.
'a Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, September 23,
1975.
" Staff summary of interview with former FBI Agent 1, 9/5/75, p. 3.
*0 Ibid, p. 4.
sent to enter the target's premises, the agents would examine the
building and the area to determine the feasibility of a break-in.
2
1
The FBI agent stated that if an entry was considered feasible he
would write a memorandum to "Director, FBI" and, in response,
would invariably receive an authorizing memorandum from head-
quarters initialled "JEH" [J. Edgar Hoover].2 2 Another FBI agent
who frequently participated in break-ins, stated that the directives
for such operations were sometimes initialled by Hoover and usually
initialled by the Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division.2 3
One agent, who served on a special squad responsible for installing
electronic surveillance devices, stated that in the majority of cases he
was able to dbtain a key to the target's premises, either from a land-
lord, hotel manager, 'or neighbor. In other cases, he simply* entered
through unlocked doors. He stated that only in a small proportion of
the cases to which he was assigned was it necessary to pick a lock.2saa
Once a bug was planted, it was generally necessary for Bureau agents
to monitor the conversations from a location close to the targeted
premises.
Selected FBI agents received training courses in the skills necessary
to perform surreptitious entries. An FBI technician provided formal
instruction in "lock studies" as in-service training for experienced
agents; "specialized lock-training" was also provided to each agent
who received training in electronic surveillance at "sound school." 24
These courses were conducted at the direction of the Assistant Director
in charge of the Bureau Laboratory. The Unit Chief who taught the
courses stated that he had participated in numerous "black bag jobs"
in which his only role was to open locks and safes; all other activities
were performed by other 'agents accompanying him. He said that he
would ordinarily receive an incentive award for a successful entry.
25
One agnt involved in surreptitious entries stated that he never
knowing y conducted an entry for, or with. the assistance of, a local
police force; nor was he aware of any information being provided by
the FBI to local police about an entry.
26
The agent said that 'he performed two microphone installations
against CIA employees at the request of the CIA. He also stated that
he was never accompanied on an entry operation by a CIA officer.2 7
B. Target8: Counterintelligenwe and Dome8tic Subversive8
The FBI has identified two broad categories of targets for sur-
reptitious entries from 1942 to April 1968: (1) groups and individ-
n Ibid, p. 4.
* Staff Summary, FBI Special Agent 1 Interview, 9/5/75, p. 4; FBI Special
Agent 1 Interview, 6/27/75, p. 4.
B'Staff 'Summary, FBI Special Agent 2 Interview, 9/10/75, p. 2.
2 FBI Special Agent 1 interview, 9/5/75.
The Committee did not conduct a detailed examination of all operational
techniques and procedures involved in surreptitious entry operations.
2 4Unaddressed memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, 6/22/64.
* FBI Special Agent 2 Interview, 9/10/75. pp. 1-4.
FBI Special Agent 1 Interview, 9/5/75, p. 5.
* FBI Special Agent 1 Interview, 9/5/75, pp. 5,8.
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uals connected with foreign intelligence and espionage operations;
and (2) "domestic subversive and white hate groups." 28
A Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum summarized the
fruits obtained from surreptitious entries against domestic groups:
We have on numerous occasions been able to obtain material
held highly secret and closely guarded by subversive groups
and organizations which consisted of membership lists and
mailing lists of these organizations.29
The memorandum also cited a warrantless surreptitious entry against
the Ku Klux Klan as an example of the utility of the technique:
Through a "black bag" job, we obtained the records in the
possession of three high-ranking officials of a Klan, organi-
zation. . .These records gave us the complete membership
and financial information concerning the Klan's operation
which we have been using most effectively to disrupt the
organization and, in fact, to bring about its near disinte-
gration.30
A former FBI agent has stated that the locations of break-in oper-
ations included the residences of targets of investigation as well as
organizational headquarters.o
The FBI was "unable to retrieve an accurate accounting" of the
number of warrantless surreptitious entries from their files: "there
is no central index, file, or document .. ,. no precise record of entries"
due to the "Do Not File procedure." 32 Relying upon a general review
of files and upon the recollections of FBI agents at headquarters, the
Bureau estimated that, in the "black bag job" category (warrantless
surreptitious entries for purposes other thani microphone installation):
There were at least 239 surreptitious entries conducted
against at least fifteen domestic subversive targets from 1942
to April 1968. . . . In addition, at least three domestic subver-
sive targets were the subject of numerous entries from Octo-
ber 1952 to June 1966.33
"An entry against one white hate group" was also reported.- One ex-
ample of a "domestic subversive target" against whom numerous en-
tries were conducted is the Socialist Workers Party, which may have
T Memorandum from the FBI to the Select Committee, 9/23/75, p. 1. The FBI
compiled a list of the "domestic subversive" targets, based "upon recollections
of Special Agents who have knowledge of such activities, and review of those
files identified by reecllection as being targets of surreptitious entries." The
Bureau admits that this list is "incomplete."
The Select Committee has reviewed this list and has determined that the
specific targets listed fell within what was understood at the time of the
surreptitious entries to be the "domestic subversive" category, as defined in
FBI Manual Section 87 as permissible targets for full investigations (Com-
mittee Stafr Memorandum, September 25, 1975.) [See the discussion of the over-
breadth of FBI full investigations in the Report on the Development of FBI
Domestic Intelligence Investigations; 191 am1976.]
" Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66, p. 2.
m Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, p. 2.
" Staff Summary, Interview of Former FBI Special Agent 3, 5/21/75, p. 4.
2 Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.
BuMemorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 1/13/76.
SMemorandum from the FBI toSenate Select Committee, 1/1s/76.
been targeted for as many as ninety-two break-ins during the period
from 1960 to 1966.35
To have a more complete picture of the extent of "black bag" opera-
tions, two other FBI estimates, also based on incomplete records, must
be considered along with this partial accounting of the number of
"black bag job" entries against domestic subversive groups. First, the
Bureau estimated that between 1960 and 1975, 509 surreptitious micro-
phone installations took place against 420 separate "targets of counter-
intelligence, internal security, and intelligence collection investiga-
tions." 36 It is impossible to determine from the FBI estimates exactly
how many of these installations involved a surreptitious entry because
other techniques were also utilized, such as installing a microphone
prior to the occupancy of the target or encapsulating it in an article
which was sent into the premises. It is also impossible to determine
the number of these targets who were American citizens.
Second, the FBI estimated that between 1960 and 1975, there were
491 surreptitious entries to install electronic surveillance devices
against 396 targets of criminal investigations."
C. Operations Directed Against the Socialist Workers Party
Recently disclosed FBI memoranda pertaining to surreptitious en-
tries directed at the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in 1960-1966
provide additional details on FBI procedures.38 Most of the documents
were to be filed in the "Personal Folder" of the Special Agent in
Oharge of the New York field office.39
The "purpose of assignment" for surreptitious entries against an
SWP affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), was described as
follows:
To locate records and information relating to the national
organization of the YSA, [and] the identity of national mem-
bers located throughout the country. Also it is anticipated
that.records of the local organization will be made available.
40
Sixth Supplementary Response to Requests for Production of Documents of
Defendant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Socialist Workers
Party, et al, v. Attorney General, et al, 73 Civ. 3160 (S.D.N.Y.), 3/24/76.
' Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 10/17/75, p. 3. The
FBI reporting of these statistics does not make clear how many of these installa-
tions, if any, were included in the estimate of the number of surreptitious entries
cited above.
* Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 10/17/75, pp. 4-5.
See Appendix for the complete yearly breakdown of these statistics.
* These materials have been described by the FBI as a response to the Socialist
Workers Party request for "documents relating to any intelligence gathering
burglaries perpetrated by or with knowledge of the F.B.I. against the S.W.P.,
the Y.S.A. (Young Socialist Alliance) or anyone suspected to be a leader or mem-
ber thereof." (Sixth Supplementary Response to Requests for Production of
Documents of Defendant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, So-
cialist Worker's Party, et al. v. Attorney General, et al., 73 Civ. 3160 (S.D.N.Y.),
3/24/76.)
" This method of filing of documents relating to the operational details of sur-
reptitious entries should be distinguished from the "Do Not File" procedure
which led to the destruction of documents recording the authorization of sur-
reptitious entries.
' Memoranda from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/23/60 and
9/26/62.
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To carry out this assignment, the FBI prepared memoranda which
contained detailed plans for post-midnight burglarizing of YSA head-
quarters. The FBI's entry plans included descriptions of "security
aspects" such as building floor plans, locks, lighting, surrounding
streets, entrances, and -the occupants' living habits.4 '
The FBI's Los Angeles field office obtained "photographs of mate-
rial maintained in the office of James P. Cannon, National Chairman of
the SWP," including letters to and from Cannon.42 The field office
reports about this material carried the warning:
"1 Several memoranda describe the "security aspects" of the FBI agents' plans
for securing entry into the headquarters of the Young Socialist Alliance. One
reads as follows:
"The headquarters entrance is a store front on the street level. There is only
one entrance to the headquarters. The door is locked with a Master padlock
only. . . .
"The entrance to the building is located approximately 75 feet on the north side
of [the] Street from Second Avenue. The headquarters is a street front located
adjacent to the entrance to the apartment building. . . . East of the headquar-
ters store front are located 4 similar store fronts within the same building.
These are described as follows from the headquarters going east: New York
Telephone Company; empty store front; law office; empty store front.
"There are 4 floors of apartment dwellings above these store fronts in the
building.
"There is a street light located on the north side of [the] Street, approximately
five store fronts east of the headquarters. Inasmuch as the nearest other street
light Is located on the southeast corner of [the street] and Second [street], the
immediate area of the headquarters is reasonably dark in evening hours.
"Previous spot checks on numerous occasions have shown that there is a very
limited amount of pedestrian and automobile traffic after 12 Midnight. These spot
checks have also shown that the lights of the apartments in the building are
darkened.
"Entrance will be made between the hours of 12 Midnight and 4 AM, June 30,
1960." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office,
6/23/60.)
When the YSA headquarters moved in 1962, the "security aspects" of the FBI's
entry plans were re-evaluated:
"This building is a three-story edifice approximately 25 feet wide by 75 feet
in depth. The second and third floors are loft premises. The first floor is
occupied by [a paint company]. The entrance to the second and third floors of
the building is a door located beside the paint store. This door leads directly to
stair flights to the second and third floors and is secured with a cylinder lock.
This entrance does not connect with the paint store on the street level. . . .
"The third floor loft of this building is occupied by an artist . . . who main-
tains a studio. This individual pursues his profession, together with holding
occasional art classes, in this loft. This activity transpires during the daytime.
[The artist] does not reside on these premises and is not known to frequent the
premises in the evening hours.
"The YSA Headquarters are located on the second floor loft space. The YSA
moved into these headquarters on 9/21/62. Numerous spot checks of the area
have shown very limited pedestrian and automobile traffic after midnight. The
buildings adjacent to this location . . . on both sides of the street, are commercial
establishments and lofts, and contain no residence.
"It has been ascertained that the paint store at this building closes at 6:00
p.m. and that all of the commercial establishments in this area close business
between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. . . .
"Entrance will be made between the hours of twelve midnight and 4:00 a.m., on
9/28/62." Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office,
9/26/62.
'2 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to New York Field Office,
6/16/60; memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
6/17/60.
EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN UTILIZING INFOR-
MATION FURNISHED BY [DELETED] IN ORDER THAT THE IDENTITY
OF THIS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS NOT COMPROMISED.4 3
Several of the reports were "classified" because disclosure could "com-
promise effectiveness of the source."" Moreover, upon receipt of this
information, FBI headquarters advised the Los Angeles field office:
Due to the sensitive nature of [deleted], which may become a
further source of valuable information concerning the Social-
ist Worker's Party, any data obtained from that source should
be paraphrased when submitted to the Bureau or other offices
in memorandum form suitable for dissemination.4 5
The Bureau apparently required such paraphrasing because it con-
temated -te dis i-o +tIde th I of dAta1 obtainedl from
surreptitious entries.
The material photographed by the FBI included membership lists,
photographs of members, contribution lists, and correspondence con-
cerning members' public participation in United States presidential
campaigns, academic debates, and civil rights and antiwar organizing.
For example, the following items were among those photographed by
Bureau agents at the national offices of the Socialist Worker's Party:
-"Items of correspondence between SWP National Head-
quarters and various branches detailing plans to obtain peti-
tion signatures to get on the ballot in 1960 elections."
-- "Letter sent by [SWP leader] to President Eisenhower
(1/21/60) against loyalty program." 46
-"SWP members active in trade unions-identity of union
and members disclosed." 4 7
-"Letter dated 6/1/60 setting forth the topic of speech
to 'be given by . . . SWP Vice-Presidential candidate at
opening of tour at Detroit, and listing complete schedule of
cities to be visited thereafter in nationwide tour." 48
-"Correspondence identifying contributors to SWP elec-
tion campaign fund."
-"Letter proposing picket activity at Democratic Con-
vention." "
-"List naming all students at each session of Trotsky
School from beginning in 1947 to the present." 5o
-"Letter setting forth that [deleted] was cancelling bal-
ance of her national tour because her husband . . . had suf-
fered a stroke." 51
"For example, memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to New York Field
Office, 6/16/60. (Deletion by FBI.)
" For example, memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Head-
quarters, 6/17/60.
5Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 7/1/60.
(Deletion by FBI.)
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 1/29/60.
a Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 3/25/60.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 6/3/60.
4OMemorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 7/11/60.
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 9/26/60.
51 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 10/24/60.
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-"Correspondence re arrangements for [deleted] to debate
at Yale University."
-"Letter announcing death of [deleted] . . . and plans
for NY memorial meeting. . . ." 5
-"Letter of Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) of 5/23/61
organizing Northern support for Southern students in in-
tegration struggle." 13
-"Note from SWP member . . . requesting new key to
headquarters so he could continue delivering newspapers there
when he finished work at night." 5
-"Letter . . . detailing health status of . . . Nat'l Chair-
man." 
-"Several current items of correspondence to and from
SWP members active in integration activities in Georgia." 5
-"Letters from National office to all branches re March
on Washington." .
-"Voluminous correspondence from many areas re SWP
getting on the ballot in 1964 Presidential elections." 5"
-"Complete tour schedule for SWP Presidential candi-
dates Sept.-Oct. 1964." 51
-"Plans of [deleted] to write a book." 60
-"Reports on SWP participation in March on Washington
(against the Vietnam War)." 61
-"Correspondence re new veterans anti-war organization."
-"Current photographs of SWP members."
-"Correspondence re new anti-war front in Cleveland." 02
-"Confidential address book of National-international Trot-
skyites." 63
In addition to these items, the FBI obtained information about other
activities of SWP members, leaders and affiliates, including publish-
ing plans, financial status, international travels and contacts, legal
defense strategy,6 4 and the political conflicts within the party. For
example, information about "proposed legal maneuvers" by a com-
mittee to aid indicted Young Socialist Alliance members in Blooming-
ton, Indiana, was obtained by the FBI.
The number of documents photographed during a single operation
reached as high as 220 .65 and regularly was above 100.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 12/16/60.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 6/6/61.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 9/15/61.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 11/3/61.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 8/24/62.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 8/16/63.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/10/64.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 7/10/64.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 10/30/64.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/30/65.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 12/17/65.
2 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters, to New York Field Office, 4/22/66.
6 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 7/10/64;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 5/14/65;
memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 7/16/65.
6 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/30/65.
III. FBI POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION OUTSIDE THE
BUREAU
A. FBI Policy: The Hoover Termination of "Black Bag Jobs"
After apparently approving hundreds of warrantless surreptitious
entries, J. Edgar Hoover changed the FBI policy in 1966. In response
to a Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum of July 19, 1966,
outlining the procedures used for approval and reporting on "black
bag jobs,' Hoover appended the following handwritten note: "No
more such techniques must be used." 61 Six months later, Hoover for-
malized this directive in a memorandum:
I note that requests are still being made by Bureau officials
for the use of "black bag" techniques. I have previously indi-
cated that I do not intend to approve any such requests in the
future, and, consequently, no such recommendations should
be submitted for approval of such matters. This practice,
which includes also surreptitious entrances upon premises of
any kind, will not meet with my approval in the future.68
The FBI's accounting of surreptitious entries indicated that
Hoover's prohibition applied only to "black bag jobs." Break-ins to
install microphones were not banned. 69 Moreover, Hoover's order did
not finally terminate "black bag jobs" against foreign targets.70 De-
spite Hoover's directive, there is evidence that at least one "black bag
job" directed against a "domestic subversive target" took place be-
tween 1966 and 1968.71'
B. Presidential and Attorney General Authorization
1. The Huston Plan: Proposal to Lift the Ban
In 1970, a plan for the inter-agency coordination of domestic in-
telligence activity was presented to President Nixon. The "Huston
Plan" proposed, among other things, that restrictions against "black
bag" entries "should be modified to permit selective use of this tech-
nique against foreign intelligence targets and other urgent and high
priority internal security targets." 72 Presidential assistant Tom
Charles Huston, the proponent of this plan, which received the sup-
port of many high officials in the intelligence community, was of
67Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. DeLoach, 7/19/66, p. 3.
* Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson and DeLoach, 1/6/67. Hoover's motiva-
tion for issuing this order in 1966 is unclear. His order came during the same
period in which the Bureau's mail opening programs were halted. (See the report
on "CIA and FBI Mail Opening", Sec. III-Termination of the FBI Mail Open-
ing Programs, for a discussion of the possible motivation for Hoover's termina-
tion of both mail opening activities and surreptitious entries.) One agent who
participated in "black bag" operations indicated that he was unaware of any
previous FBI opposition to them. (FBI Special Agent 1 Interview, 9/5/75, p. 8)
* Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 6/26/75, p. 1. Even
today Justice Department policy permits warrantless surreptitious entries both
to install microphones and for other purposes in the area of "foreign espionage
or intelligence." See pp. 369-371.
7 See pp. 369-371.
n Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.
" Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7/70, p. 2.
the opinion that "black bag jobs" were illegal but should be utilized
nonetheless:
Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts to
burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great
embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruit-
ful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot
be obtained in any other fashion.
The FBI, in Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to conduct
such operations with great success and with no exposure. The
information secured was invaluable.
Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by subversive
elements can turn up information about identities, methods
of operation, and other invaluable investigative information
which is not otherwise obtainable. This technique would be
particularly helpful if used against the Weathermen and
Black Panthers.7 3
In a memorandum to Attorney General John Mitchell, J. Edgar
Hoover expressed his "clear-cut opposition to the lifting of the vari-
ous restraints" proposed in the Huston Plan, but he also indicated a
willingness to participate in the plan if it were adopted:
[T]he FBI is prepared to implement the instructions of the
White House at your direction. Of course, we would continue
to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to
utilize the various sensitive investigative techniques in-
volved in individual cases.74
Although President Nixon granted approval for the Huston Plan,
he revoked this approval within five days, in part because of Hoover's
opposition.75
2. Justice Department Policy
(a) Historical Development.-There is no indication that any At-
torney General was informed of FBI surreptitious entries for domes-
tic intelligence purposes other than microphone installation."
During World War II Alexander Holtzoff, a Special Assistant to
the Attorney General, submitted a memorandum to Director Hoover
on the "admissibility of evidence obtained by trash covers or micro-
phone surveillance," in response to a series of hypothetical questions
posed by an FBI official. Holtzoff declared flatly:
The secret taking or abstraction of papers or other property
from the premises without force is equivalent to an illegal
Memorandum from Huston to H.R. Haldeman, 7/70, p. 3.
" Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 7/27/70. p. 3.
* See report on The Huston Plan: Sec. VI, Rescission of the Huston Plan: A
Time for Reconsideration.
7 For a full treatment of memoranda between FBI Director Hoover and
successive Attorneys General on microphone installation policy and an analysis
of legal developments in the field of electronic surveillance, see Report on FBI
Electronic Surveillance.
search and seizure, if the taking or abstraction is effected by a
representative of the United States. Consequently, such
papers or other articles are inadmissible as against a person
whose rights have been violated, i.e., the person in control of
the premises from which the papers or other property has been
taken, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298.
However, Holtzoff interpreted prevailing court decisions as permit-
ting a "microphone installation ... where an actual trespass is com-
mitted." He stated that:
evidence so obtained should be admissible, although no pre-
cise case decided by the courts involving such a situation has
been found. The basic principle governing the situation is
... that microphone surveillance is not equivalent to an illegal
search and seizure, Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129."1
In fact, the Goldman decision did not support Holtzoff's conclusion,
since the microphone surveillance in the case did not involve trespass;
and the Court did not address the question of microphone surveillance
accomplished by surreptitious entry.
In 1952, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath advised Director
Hoover that he could not "authorize the installation of a microphone
involving a trespas8 under existing law." McGrath added, "Such sur-
veillances as involve trespass are in the area of the Fourth Amendment,
and evidence so obtained and from leads so obtained, is inadmissible." 7
A 1954 directive from Attorney General Brownell provided at least
the color of legal authority for microphone surveillance involving
trespass, but did not deal with surreptitious entries for other pur-
poses.7
The Justice Department policy toward warrantless surreptitious
entry for the purpose of microphone installation apparently remained
unchanged until 1965, when Attorney General Katzenbach required
the FBI to seek his prior approval for microphone surveillances in-
" Memorandum from Holtzoff to Hoover, 7/4/44. Holtzoff also advised the FBI
that it could legally use cooperating sources or informants to obtain access to
private materials:
"Where a person (A), having possession of the membership records of an
organization, is told by a person (B) who is a member of the same organization
but who is working in conjunction with the Bureau, that a particular place is a
safe one in which to leave the membership records of the organization. After
the records have been so left agents of this Bureau who have the legal permis-
sion of (B) enter the premises where the material was left, obtain the records
and remove them to another place where they are completely photographed. The
records are then returned to their original place where they are subsequently
obtained by the depositor (A). It can be assured that both the Agent and the
person (B) can testify on behalf of the Government.
The foregoing evidence is probably admissible. No entry to the subject's prem-
ises was involved, nor was the property abstracted from him. He left it volun-
tarily in the possession of (B) whose possession was lawful and who thereafter
was in a position to grant permission to Bureau Agents to photograph it."
" Memorandum from McGrath to Hoover, 2/26/52.
* Memorandum from Brownell to Hoover, 5/20/54. See full discussion in Report
on FBI Electronic Surveillance.
volving trespass, and he restricted the purpose of such operations to
the collection of intelligence affecting the national security.o
(b) FBI Briefings of Attorney General Robert Kennedy.-In 1961,
the FBI reiterated to the Justice Department that the Bureau's prac-
tice was to install microphones, sometimes by trespass, without inform-
ing the Justice Department. In May 1961, Byron White, Deputy Attor-
ney General under Robert Kennedy, was told by Director Hoover
that:
in the internal security field we are utilizing microphone
surveillances on a restricted basis even though trespass is
necessary to assist in uncovering the activity of [foreign]
intelligence agents and Communist Party leaders. . . . In
the interest of national safety, microphone surveillances are
also utilized on a restricted basis, even though trespass is
necessary, in uncovering major criminal activities."'
A memorandum by Courtney Evans, Assistant Director of the FBI
for the Special Investigative Division, indicates that he discussed
microphones in "organized crime cases" with Attorney General Ken-
nedy in July 1961:
It was pointed out to the Attorney General that we had taken
action with regard to the use of microphones in (organized
crime) cases and . . . we were nevertheless utilizing them in
all instances where this was technically feasible and where
valuable information might be expected. The strong objec-
tions to the utilization of telephone taps as contrasted to
microphone surveillances was stressed. The Attorney General
stated he recognized the reasons why telephone taps should
be restricted to national-defense-type cases and he was pleased
we had been using microphone surveillances, where these
objections do not apply, wherever possible in organized crime
matters."
Evans testified that the purpose of this meeting was to secure the
Attorney General's approval for the leasing of a telephone line from
a private company for a wiretap operation."
Evans stated that he was "purposely vague" in this conversation
and did not describe to the Attorney General the kinds of technical
surveillance the Bureau was using or their methods for installing sur-
veillance devices.84 He explained that his "purposely vague" briefing
was consistent with Director Hoover's policy.
Mr. EVANs. Mainly because of a feeling the Director had
expressed, that one shouldn't discuss confidential techniques
used by the Bureau any more than was absolutely necessary.
' Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65. See full discussion in
Report on FBI Electronic Surveillance.
* Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General Byron White, 5/4/61.
* Memorandum from C. A. Evans to A. Belmont, 7/7/71.
3 Courtney Evans, testimony, 12/1/75, p. 24.
* Evans, 12/1/75, p. 25.
Question. It was your understanding that the admonition
applied to the Attorney General as well as all other persons
outside the Bureau?
Mr. EvANs. It was my understanding that if exceptions were
to be made, the Director was going to make them himself."
Evans, who was responsible for the FBI's liaison with Attorney
General Kennedy, testified that it was "entirely possible" that the
Attorney General did not understand that surreptitious entries might
be used in connection with the "microphone surveillance" and leased
telephone line taps which he subsequently authorized. Evans himself
understood that the operation for which the Attorney General's signa-
ture was obtained "could have in some instances" included microphone
installation by means of surreptitious entry, although Evans indicated
that there were several methods by which the Bureau could make a
"legal entry to a location and effect a microphone installation." 88
.(c) Present Policy.-The Justice Department under Attorney Gen-
eral Edward H. Levi has addressed, for the first time, the legal issues
arising from "black bag jobs." This occurred in a statement submitted
by Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeney in the appeal
of the conviction of John Ehrlichman for the break-in by the White
House "plumbers" at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
Assessing the "plumbers" break-in, the Justice Department declared:
The physical entry here was plainly unlawful . . . because
the search was not controlled as we have suggested it must be,
there was no proper authorization, there was no delegation to
a proper officer, and there was no sufficient predicate for the
choice of the particular premises invaded. 7
At the same time, however, the Justice Department defended the
President's constitutional authority to conduct warrantless surrepti-
tious entries in limited circumstances and with proper executive
authorization:
It is the position of the Department that such activities
must be very carefully controlled. There must be solid reason
to believe that foreign espionage or intelligence is involved.
In addition, the intrusion into any zone of expected privacy
must be kept to the minimum and there must be personal
authorization by the President or the Attorney General. The
Department believes that activities so controlled are lawful
under the Fourth Amendment.
In regard to warrantless searches related to foreign espion-
age or intelligence, the Department does not believe there is a
constitutional difference between searches conducted by wire-
T Evans, 12/1/75, pp. 25, 29.
Evans, 12/1/75, p. 31; Memorandum from Evans to Belmont, 8/17/61.
7 Department of Justice Letter, Acting Assistant Attorney General John C.
Keeney to Hugh E. Kline, Clerk of U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, 5/9/75.
tapping and those involving physical entries into private
premises. One form of search is no less serious than another.
It is and has long been the Department's view that warrantless
searches involving physical entries into private premises are
justified.,
The Justice Department and the FBI have not terminated the use of
warrantless surreptitious entry for electronic surveillance purposes
in cases of "foreign espionage or intelligence". Warrantless surrepti-
tious entry for other forms of search is not presently being con-
ducted but, as indicated in the Justice Department statement, has
not been ruled out as a matter of policy in foreign intelligence cases.
The FBI has stated that "microphone surveillances have been con-
tinued and in some instances physical entry of the premises has been
necessary" against foreign counterintelligence targets. In addition,
"a small number" of surreptitious entries which apparently did not
involve microphone installation "were conducted in connection with
foreign counterintelligence investigations having grave impact on the
security of the nation." Entries for the purpose of installing elec-
tronic surveillance devices have also provided an opportunity to con-
duct other forms of search. The Bureau has stated:
Based on available records and discussions with FBI person-
nel, it has been determined that in connection with micro-
phone surveillances in the United States, there have been oc-
casions when observations and recordings were made of per-
tinent information contained within the premises. 9
According to the FBI, this "opportunity" has been "exploited" ex-
clusively against foreign agents.90
Warrantless surreptitious entries against American citizens who
have "no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or
agencies" are undoubtedly unconstitutional.92 The constitutional is-
sues arising from warrantless surreptitious entries against foreign
agents within the United States have not been definitely resolved by the
courts. The Committee recommends as a matter of policy that all gov-
ernmental search and seizure "should be conducted only upon author-
ity of a judicial warrant" issued in narrowly defined circumstances
" Letter from Keeney to Hugh Kline, clerk of U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, 5/9/75.
Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 7/16/75.
* Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 6/26/75.
In contrast to the surreptitious entires conducted against "domestic sub-
versive" targets until 1966, one such foreign intelligence operation studied by
the Committee demonstrated an FBI pattern of conscientiously obtaining
authorization from executive branch officials outside the Bureau: the CIA
initially requested the aid of the FBI in performing the operation; the FBI
secured State Department approval and then submitted the plan to the Attorney
General for his authorization. (Committee staff summary of FBI memoranda.)
"407 U.S. 297, 309, n. 8 (1972). The Keith case did not specifically address the
question of the legality of "black bag jobs." However, by holding that the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers do not enable him to authorize warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance of domestic organizations, the logic of the decision compels
the conclusion that warrantless surreptitious entires are unconstitutional.
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and with procedural safeguards "to minimize the acquisition and re-
tention of non-foreign intelligence information about Americans." 
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APPENDIX'
SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES FOR THE INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. Entries since 2. SeDarate
since 1960 targets each year
since 1960
1960 -- - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- 11 ii1961. ..--------------------------------------------------------------- 69
1962---------------- ----------------------------- -------------------- 106 84
1963:::------------------------- ------ -------------------------------- 84 66
1964------------------------------------------------------------------------- 67
1965------------------------------------------------------------------ 41 35
1966 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 0 0
1967 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 0 0
1968-------------------------------------------------------------00
Subtotal---------------------------------------------------------------- 4312
According to the FBI, the following entries were conducted pursuant to judicial




1971 ----------------------------------------------------------- 7 6
1972 .................... -------------------------------------- - 19 18
1973 -------------------------------------------------------------- 27 20
1974 -------------------------------------------------------------- 22 21
1975 -------------------------------------------------------------- 11 8
Total ------------- ---------------------------------------------- 491 396
1 FBI memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, Oct. 17, 1975, re request pertaining tn surreptitisus entries
for installation of electronic surveillance.
0 Senate Select Committee Report on "Intelligence Activities and the Rights
of Americans," Recommendations 51-54, pp. 327-328.
The Committee made the following recommendation to restrict the use of the
technique of warrantless surreptitious entry (referred to as "unauthorized
entry"-entry unauthorized by the target):
"Unauthorized entry should be conducted only upon judicial warrant issued
on probable cause to believe that the place to be searched contains evidence of a
crime, except unauthorized entry, including surreptitious entry, against for-
eigners: who are officers, employees, or conscious agents Of a foreign power
should be permitted upon judicial warrant under the standards which apply
to electronic surveillance described in Recommendation 52." (Recommendation
54, p. 328.)
This recommendation on "unauthorized entry" incorporates by reference the
standards set forth in Recommendation 52 on electronic surveillance:
"All non-consensual electronic surveillance should be conducted pursuant to
judicial warrants issued under authority of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
"The Act should be amended to provide, with respect to electronic surveillance
of foreigners in the United States, that a warrant may issue if
"(a) There is probable cause that the target is an officer, employee or con-
scious agent of a foreign power.
"(b) The Attorney General has certified that the surveillance is likely to re-
veal information necessary to the protection of the nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of force of a foreign power; to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States; or to protect national security Information against hostile foreign intel-
ligence activity.
"1(c) With respect to any such electronic surveillance, the judge should adopt
procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of non-foreign intelligence
information about Americans.
" (d) Such electronic surveillance should be exempt from the disclosure re-
quirements of Title III of the 1968 Act as to foreigners generally and as to
Americans if they are involved in hostile foreign intelligence activity (except
where disclosure is called for In connection with the defense in the case of
criminal prosecution) ." (Recommendation 54, pp. 327-28.)
It should be noted that there are well established exceptions to the warrant
requirement for searches in exigent circumstances.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF FBI DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
INVESTIGATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past forty years, FBI intelligence investigations have
been one of the federal government's main resources for the protection
of domestic security. The executive branch, not the Congress, too, the
initiative in 1936 to establish the Bureau's intelligence structure. Until
this Committee's investigation, there has never been a substantial
inquiry by the Congress into the policies and practices of the FBI and
the executive for the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.
The purpose of this report is to set forth chronologically the develop-
ment of these policies and practices, as shown by the materials obtained
by the Committee from the FBI and the Justice Department.
A. Scope of the Report
There are several major limits on the scope of this report and of
the inquiry it represents. Since it spans sixty years of American his-
tory, the report does not purport to be an exhaustive discussion of all
the outside events which were the setting for policy decisions and the
development of Bureau programs. Nor does this report touch on many
of the most controversial cases in the FBI's past, such as the Hiss and
Rosenberg cases, which have recently been the subject of extensive
historical reconsideration on the basis of materials made public under
the Freedom of Information Act. Rather, the narrative which follows
concentrates on the Bureau's general policies and formal programs,
with specific illustrations of what appear to be typical applications of
these investigative standards.'
Furthermore, the Committee has not attempted to secure from the
FBI and the Justice Department an exhaustive compilation of all
policy materials relating to domestic intelligence over the entire period
since 1936. For example, the Committee has reviewed all versions of the
FBI Manual Sections pertaining to intelligence only as far back as
1960. The same cut-off date was used in the Committee's requests for
such basic policy documents as the "SAC Letters" (regular instruc-
tions to the Special Agents in Charge of all FBI field offices from
Bureau headquarters) and memoranda recording decisions of the
FBI's Executive Conference (composed of all Bureau executives at
the level of Assistant Director and above). However, substantial in-
formation about pre-1960 intelligence policies was obtained in con-
' Separate Committee Reports deal with the most intrusive investigative tech-
niques (Electronic Surveilliance. Surreptitious Entry, Mail Opening, and In-
formants), FBI programs going beyond investigation to the disruption oftargeted groups and individuals (COINTELPRO). and one specific case stud-
combining all types of Bureau operations (Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
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nection with the Committee's review of the FBI's Security Index and
related programs going back to 1939. Other materials on the, FBI's
overall policy mandate from the President were located in the various
Presidential libraries; and the Bureau volunteered to the Committee
an extensive collection of documents on its operations as part of an
analysis of the origins of its legal authority to conduct domestic in-
telligence investigations.
2
The most significant omission from this report is the FBI's foreign
counterintelligence policies. While they are mentioned from time to
time as part of the larger context for the Bureau's intelligence op-
erations as a whole, they are not considered in the same depth as FBI
domestic intelligence investigations not directed specifically at the
activities of hostile foreign intelligence services in this country.'
Nevertheless, it is essential to examine the nature of foreign counter-
intelligence investigations in order to understand the origins of FBI
domestic intelligence. Counterintelligence investigations are a neces-
sary response to the threat of espionage and related hostile intelligence
activities of foreign governments. Foreign espionage is a tangible and
obvious danger; and clandestine investigations of foreign agents are
a minimal intrusion upon the rights of Americans (even if some for-
eign agents are citizens). The crimes a foreign agent may commit on
-behalf of his principal are extraordinarily serious, for they may result
in disclosure of the nation's most sensitive defense information to a
foreign adversary. The positive foreign intelligence by-product of
counterintelligence may have great significance, since it can alert the
United States to impending hostilities and provide information about
the larger intentions and objectives of other nations.
Before World War II the governments of Nazi Germany, Japan,
and the Soviet Union mounted intelligence efforts directed at the
United States. While their extent was not fully known at the time,
there were sufficient indications as early as the mid-1930s. Given the
international climate and the activities of German and Soviet officials
in the United States, there was every reason to believe that this country
needed a counterintelligence capability to identify and possibly disrupt
the work of hostile intelligence services.
From today's perspective it is harder to understand the nature of
the domestic threats to security which, along with foreign espionage,
were the reasons for establishing the FBI's intelligence program in the
1930s. President Roosevelt and the Congress were not just concerned
about spies and foreign agents in the pre-World War II period. They
saw a threat which combined both foreign and domestic elements, and
FBI intelligence was assigned to deal with it. Only by a closer exam-
ination of the historical record can this assignment be fully explained.
Factors of political belief and association, group membership and na-
tionality affiliation, became the criteria for intelligence investigations
2 FBI Intelligence Division, Position Paper on Jurisdiction, 2/13/75; FBI In-
telligence Division, An Analyi8s of FBI Domestic Security Intelligence Inves-
tigations: Authority, Oficial Attitudes, and Activities in Historical Perspective,
10/28/75.
' A separate Committee report considers the subject of foreign counterintel-
ligence as it relates to both the FBI and U.S. foreign and military intelligence
agencies.
before the war; and they continued to be used through the Cold War
period to the 1960s and early 1970s.
Therefore, this report describes how the policy assumptions behind
FBI domestic intelligence were established in 1930s and 1940s and
became unquestioned dogma as the years went by. In the 1960s, new
and unexpected events occurred which did not fit these established
concepts. There was no longer a consensus among Americans as to the
nature of government's proper response to home-grown dissidents
who might engage in violence as a form of political protest, to racist
groups using force to deprive others of their civil rights, to civil
disorders growing out of minority frustrations, or to large-scale protest
demonstrations. Presidents and Attorneys General turned to the FBI
for intelligence about these matters without adequate controls. The
resulting confusion and mistakes of the past ten years called into
question some of the fundamental assumptions underlying the FBI
intelligence programs of the previous three decades.
B. Issues Presented
Domestic intelligence investigations involve much more than the
neutral collection of information. Intelligence-gathering is a process
including many kinds of activity. The ordinary means of collecting
information inevitably has an adverse impact on the rights of in-
dividuals. The recruitment of informants paid to supply information
about their acquaintances is a fundamental tool of intelligence. By ar-
ranging for what is in effect a government agent to intrude into the
private relationships among people, the FBI substantially interferes
with free association.4 Moreover, like all investigations, intelligence
collection involves extensive interviews with the subjects of investiga-
tion, their friends, employers, neighbors, school officials, sources of
credit, and anyone else who may know something about their back-
ground and activities. The interview is not a neutral event. The way a
person is looked upon by those around him can be significantly af-
fected when they know he is someone "of interest" to the government.
These consequences are the necessary price of investigations of crime,
and they may be justified to satisfy other compelling governmental
interests. But FBI domestic intelligence gathering has gone far beyond
criminal investigation and, in many instances, beyond a reasonable defi-
nition of compelling necessity. No act of Congress has supplied clear
legal standards against which to measure the propriety of domestic
intelligence investigations. Instead, the executive branch has been on
its own with vague legal concepts of "emergency power" or "war
power" or other imprecise doctrines of inherent presidential authority.
These problems have been compounded by practices of secrecy. Con-
gress was often not informed or did not seek information. Even within
the executive branch, the FBI assumed it had a general mandate and
thus frequently did not advise its superiors of specific policies. The
judiciary had no role at all because clandestine investigations did not
lead to prosecutions.5
' See Committee Report on FBI Informants.
5 Instead, the investigations often led to covert actions to disrupt and discredit
the targets. (See Committee Report on COINTELPRO.)
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The FBI's experience in the conduct of domestic intelligence investi-
gations over the past forty years, as it is set forth in this report, argues
strongly for discarding outdated ideas and striking a new balance be-
tween security and liberty. The dangers of domestic intelligence are
real, not imaginary. They underscore the need to circumscribe care-
fully any intelligence operations carried out by the federal government
within the United States or against Americans anywhere else in the
world. Equally important, they demonstrate the need for Congress to
assert its lawmaking power, for the executive to abandon inflated doc-
trines of presidential authority, and for an end to the excessive secrecy
which destroys the effectiveness of the rule of law.
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS-WORLD WAR I, THE "RED SCARE," AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL HARLAN FISKE STONE'S REFORMS
A. Pre-World War I Programs
The first federal domestic intelligence programs originated shortly
before the United States entered World War I in 1917. The initial
threat perceived by federal officials was the activity of German agents,
including sabotage and espionage directed at the United States in the
period before America entered the war. Although the neutrality laws
were on the books, no federal statute made espionage or sabotage a
crime. Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory proposed such legisla-
tion in 1916, but Congress took no action before American entry into
the war. Nonetheless, the Executive Branch went ahead with develop-
ment of a domestic security intelligence capability.
Several federal agencies expanded their operations. The Secret Serv-
ice, which was established in the Treasury Department to investigate
counterfeiting in 1865, had served as the main civilian intelligence
agency during the Spanish-American War. With $50,000 in War De-
partment funds, the Secret Service had organized an emergency auxi-
liary force to track down Spanish spies, placed hundreds of civilians
under surveillance, and asked the Army to arrest a number of alleged
spies.6 After the assassination of President McKinley by an anarchist
in 1901, the Secret Service was authorized to protect the President. Its
agents were also assigned to the Justice Department as investigators
until 1908 when Congress forbade the practice. In 1915 Secretary of
State William Jennings Bryan decided that German diplomats should
be investigated for possible espionage, and he requested and received
President Wilson's permission to use the Secret Service.7
The military had performed extensive security intelligence func-
tions during the Civil War, although operations were largely dele-
gated to commanders in the field. When the military discontinued its
surveillance program after the Civil War, Allan Pinkerton who had
worked for the War Department under President Lincoln founded a
private detective agency. The Pinkerton agency and other private
detective forces served both government and private employers in
later years, frequently to spy upon labor organizing activities.
8 In
6 Joan M. Jensen, Military Surveillance of Civilian8 in America, (Morristown,
N.J.: General Learning Press 1975), p. 5.
7 Joan M. Jensen, The Price of Vigilance (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), p. 12.
'Jensen, Military Surveillance, pp. 4-5.
the years immediately before American entry into World War I, mili-
tary intelligence lacked the resources to engage in intelligence opera-
tions. Therefore, preparation for war rested largely with the Secret
Service and its main competitor, the Justice Department's Bureau
of Investigation.
The Justice Department's investigative authority stemmed from
an appropriations statute first enacted in 1871, allowing the Attorney
General to expend funds for "the detection and prosecution of crimes
against the United States." The Attorney General initially employed
several permanent investigators and supplemented them with either
private detectives or Secret Service agents. When Congress prohibited
such use of Secret Service personnel in 1908, Attorney General Charles
J. Bonaparte issued an order authorizing creation of the Bureau of
Investigation. There was no formal Congressional authorization for the
Bureau, but once it was established its appropriations were regularly
approved by Congress. Members of the House Appropriations Com-
.mittee debated with Attorney General Bonaparte over the need for
safeguards against abuse by the new Bureau. Bonaparte emphasized,
"The Attorney General knows, or ought to know, at all times what
they are doing." Some Congressmen thought more limits were needed,
but nothing was done to circumscribe the Bureau's powers. 0
Passage of the Mann Act and other federal statutes prohibiting in-
terstate traffic in stolen goods, obscene materials, and prizefight films
soon expanded the criminal investigative responsibilities of the Justice
Department and its Bureau of Investigation.
By 1916 Attorney General Gregory had expanded the Bureau's per-
sonnel from 100 to 300 agents, primarily to investigate possible viola-
tions of the neutrality laws. The Attorney General objected to the
Secret Service's investigations of activities which did not involve
actual violations of -federal laws. However, when President Wilson
and Secretary of State Robert Lansing expressed continued interest
in such investigations, Attorney General Gregory went to Congress
for an amendment to the Justice Department's appropriations statute
which would allow the Bureau to do what the Secret Service had al-
ready begun doing. With the agreement of the State Department, the
statute was revised to permit the Attorney General to appoint officials
not only to detect federal crimes, but also "to conduct such other in-
vestigations regarding official matters under the control of the De-
partment of Justice or the Department of State, as may be directed
by the Attorney General." i This amendment to the appropriations
statute was intended to be an indirect form of authorization for in-
vestigations by the Bureau of investigations, although a State Depart-
ment request was seen as a prerequisite for such inquiries.1 2
Under the direction of A. Bruce Bielaski, the Bureau concentrated
at first on investigations of potential enemy aliens in the United
'41st Cong., Sess. III, Ch. 14.
"o Max Lowenthal, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1950), pp. 10-13.
"28 U.S.C. 533(3).
12 Jensen, The Price of Vigilance, 15; Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland,
Federal Justice (New York: MacMillan Co., 1937), pp. 415-416.
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States. According to the authorative history of the Justice Depart-
ment,
The Bureau of Investigation made an index of aliens under
suspicion. At the end of March 1917, just before the en-
trance of the United States into the war, the chief of the
Bureau submitted a list of five classes of persons. One class,
ninety-eight in number, should be arrested immediately on
declaration of war. One hundred and forty should be re-
quired to give bond. Five hundred and seventy-four were
strongly suspected. Five hundred and eighty-nine had not
been fully cleared of suspicion. Three hundred and sixty-
seven had been cleared of specific offenses. Others, after in-
vestigation, had been eliminated from the lists.13
Theoretically, the threat of dangerous aliens was the responsibility
of the Immigration Bureau in the Labor Department. As early as
1903 Congress had enacted legislation requiring the deportation with-
in three years of entry of persons holding anarchistic beliefs or ad-
vocating "the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of
the United States."' 4 In early 1917 the immigration laws were
amended to eliminate the three-year limit and require deportation
of any alien "found advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction
of property ... or the overthrow by force or violence of the Govern-
ment of the United States." 15 Nevertheless, the Immigration Bureau
lacked the men, ability, and time to conduct the kind of investigations
contemplated by the statute."
As the United States entered World War I, domestic security
investigations were the province of two competing civilian agencies-
the Secret Service and the Bureau of Investigation-soon to be joined
by military intelligence and an extensive private intelligence network
called the, American Protective League.
B. Domestic Intelligence in World War I
Shortly after the declaration of war, Congress considerably
strengthened the legal basis for federal investigations by enacting
the Espionage Act of 1917, the Selective Service and Training Act, and
other statutes designed to use criminal sanctions to assist the war
effort. But Congress did not clarify the jurisdiction of the various
civilian and military intelligence agencies. The Secretary of War
established a Military. Intelligence Section under Colonel Ralph Van
Deman, who immediately began training intelligence officers and or-
ganizing civilian volunteers to protect defense plants. By the end of
1917 the MIS had branch offices throughout the United States to con-
duct investigations of military personnel and civilians working for
the War Department. MIS agents cooperated with British intelligence
in Mexico, with their joint efforts leading to the arrest of a German
espionage agent during the war.' 7
Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, p. 416.
"33 U.S. Statutes at Large 1214.
1 39 U.S. Statutes at Large 889.
'6 Wiliam Preston, Aliens and Dissenters (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1963), p. 84.
" Jensen, The Price of Vigilance, pp. 118-119.
A major expansion of federal intelligence activity took place with
the formation of the American Protective League, which worked di-
rectly with the Bureau of Investigation and military intelligence. A
recent FBI study recounts how the added burdens of wartime work
led to the creation of the League:
To respond to the problem, Attorney General Thomas W.
Gregory and then Bureau Chief A. Bruce Bielaski, conceived
what they felt might suffice to answer the problem. The
American Protective League (APL) composed of well-mean-
ing private individuals, was formed as a citizens auxiliary
to "assist" the Bureau of Investigation. In addition to the
authorized auxiliary, ad hoc groups took it upon themselves
to "investigate" what they felt were un-American activities.
Though the intentions of both groups were undoubtedly
patriotic and in some instances beneficial, the overall result
was the denial of constitutional safeguards and administra-
tive confusion. To see the problem, one need only consider the
mass deprivation of rights incident to the deserter and selec-
tive service violator raids in New York and New Jersey in
1918, wherein 35 Agents assisted by 2,000 APL operatives
2,350 military personnel, and several hundred police rounded
up some 50,000 men without warrants of sufficient probable
cause for arrest. Of the 50,000 arrestees, approximately 1,500
were inducted into the military service and 15,000 were re-
ferred to draft boards.'8
The FBI study also cites the recollections of an Agent of the Bureau
of Investigation during World War I regarding the duplication of
effort:
How did we function with relation to other agencies, both.
federal and state? In answering this query, I might say that
while our relationship with the Army and Navy Depart-
ments, was extremely cordial at all times, nevertheless there
was at all times an enormous overlapping of investigative
activities among the various agencies charged with winning
the war. There were probably seven or eight such active
organizations operating at.full force during war days and
it was not an uncommon experience for an Agent of this
Bureau to call upon an individual in the course of his in-
vestigation, to find out that six or seven other government
agencies had been around to interview the party about the
same matter.'9
The Secret Service opposed the utilization of American Protective
League volunteers and recommended, through Treasury Secretary
McAdoo, establishment of a centralized body to coordinate domestic
intelligence work. The Treasury Department's proposal was rejected
in early 1918, because of the objections of Colonel Van Deman, Bureau
' FBI Intelligence Division-An Analysis of FBI Domestic Security Intelli-
gence Investigations: Authority, Oflcial Attitudes, and Activities in Historical
Perspective, 10/28/75.
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Chief Bielaski, and the Attorney General's Special Assistant for war
matters, John Lord O'Brien. Thereafter the role of the Secret Serv-
ice in intelligence operations diminished in importance.20
During World War I the threat to the nation's security and the war
effort was perceived by both government and private intelligence
agencies as extending far beyond activities of enemy agents. Criticism
of the war, opposition to the draft, expression of pro-German or paci-
fist sympathies, and militant labor organizing efforts were all consid-
ered dangerous and targeted for investigation and often prosecution
under federal or state statutes. The federal Espionage Act forbade
making false statements with intent to interfere with the success of
military, attempting to cause insubordination, and obstructing
recruitment of troops.2' With little guidance from the Attorney Gen-
eral, the United States Attorneys across the country brought nearly
2,000 prosecutions under the Espionage Act for disloyal utterances. 2
Not until the last month of the war did Attorney General Gregory
require federal prosecutors to obtain approval from Washington be-
fore bringing Espionage Act prosecutions. John Lord O'Brien, the
Attorney General's Special Assistant, recalled "the immense pressure
brought to bear throughout the war upon the Department of Justice
in all parts of the country for indiscriminate prosecution demanded in
behalf of a policy of wholesale repression and restraint of public
opinion." 23
In addition to providing information for Espionage Act prosecu-
tions intelligence operations laid the foundation for the arrest and
internment of enemy aliens. About 6,300 aliens were arrested, of which
some 2,300 were turned over to military authorities for internment and
the remainder released or placed on parole.24
C. The Po8t-War "Red Scare" and the "Paner Raid8"
The end of the war in 1918 did not bring about the termination of
domestic intelligence operations. The Bureau of Investigation shifted
its attention from critics of the war to the activities of radical and
anarchist groups. The new threat was dramatized vividly by a series
of terrorist bombings in 1919, including an explosion on the doorstep
of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's residence. Congress re-
sounded with calls for action, although the applicable provisions of the
Espionage Act had expired at the end of the war and no new federal
criminal statute was enacted to replace it. Instead, state statutes and
the deportation provisions of the Immigration Act became the basis
for the federal response.
Attorney General Palmer authorized two major revisions in Justice
Department intelligence operations in 1919. First, he established a
General Intelligence Division in the Justice Department, headed by
J. Edgar Hoover, who had served during the war as head of the De-
partment's program for compiling information on enemy aliens. At the
2 Jensen, The Price of Vigilance, pp. 102-103.
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same time, Palmer appointed William J. Flynn, former head of the
Secret Service, as Director of the Bureau of Investigation.
Less than two weeks after the GID was established, Flynn ordered
a major expansion of Bureau investigations "of anarchistic and simi-
lar classes, Bolshevism, and kindred agitations advocating change in
the present form of government by force or violence, the promotion of
sedition and revolution, bomb throwing, and similar activities." Since
the only available federal law was the deportation statute, Flynn
stressed that the investigations "should be particularly directed to
persons not citizens of the United States." Nevertheless, he also di-
rected Bureau agents to "make full investigations of similar activities
of citizens of the United States with a view to securing evidence which
may be of use in prosecutions under the present existing state or fed-
eral laws or under legislation of that nature which may hereinafter be
enacted." (Emphasis supplied.) The instructions discussed the provi-
sions of the recent amendments to the Immigration Act, which
expanded the grounds for deportation to include membership in re-
volutionary organizaitons as well as individual advocacy of violent
overthrow of the government." Director Flynn concluded by urging
Bureau agents to "constantly keep in mind the necessity of preserving
the cover of our confidential informants." 2 .
.The results of these investigations were reported to the Department's
General Intelligence Division for analysis and evaluation. Overall di-
rection of the work of the GID under Hoover and the Bureau under
Flynn was placed in the hands of an Assistant Attorney General,
Francis P. Garvan, who had been a division chief in the New York
district attorney's office before the war.2 7
Historians have documented fully the tremendous pressures placed
on Attorney General Palmer, not just by his subordinates, but by pub-
lic opinion, other members of President Wilson's cabinet, and the
Congress to act decisively -against the radical threat in 1919. For ex-
ample, Secretary of State Lansing declared in a private memorandum
written in July, "It is no time to temporize or compromise; no time to
be timid or undecided; no time to remain passive. We are face to face
with an inveterate enemy of the present social order." The Senate
unanimously passed a resolution demanding that Palmer inform it
whether he had yet begun legal proceedings against those who
preached anarchy and sedition. According to his biographer, after
passage of the Senate resolution Palmer decided that the "very liberal"
provisions of the Bill of Rights were expendable and that in a time
of emergency there were "no limits" on the power of the government
"other than the extent of the emergency." 28
The principal result of the Justice Department's intelligence activi-
ties, in coordination with Immigration Bureau investigations, was the
infamous "Palmer raids" on the night of January 2, 1920. Bureau of
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, Confidential Memorandum to all Special Agents and Employees, 8/12/19.
" Coben, A. Mitchell Palmer (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963),
pp. 130, 207.
* Coben, A. Mitchell Palmer, pp. 210, 215-216; see also Preston, Aliens and
Dissenters, chs. 7-8; Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, ch. 5; Robert K.
Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria (Minneapolis: U. of Minne-
sota Press, 1955).
Investigation and Immigration Bureau agents in thirty-three cities
rounded up some ten thousand persons believed to be members
of the Communist and Communist Labor Parties, including many
citizens and many individuals not members of either party. A sum-
mary of the abuses of due process of law incident to the raids includes
"indiscriminate arrests of the innocent with the guilty, unlawful
seizures by federal detectives, intimidating preliminary interrogations
of aliens held incommunicado, highhanded levying of excessive bail,
and denial of counsel." 29Apart from the unavoidable administrative
confusion in such a large-scale operation, these abuses have been at-
tributed to several crucial decisions by federal officials.
The first was Director Flynn's instruction to Bureau agents that, in
order to preserve "the cover of our confidential informants," they
should "in no case ... rely upon the testimony of such cover inform-
ants during deportation proceedings." 30 Consequently, Flynn's as-
sistant, Frank Burke, advised the Immigration Bureau that inform-
ants should not be called as witnesses and that immigration inspectors
should "make an effort to obtain from the subject a statement as to
his affiliations." The success of eliciting incriminating admissions de-
pended, in turn, upon decisions which made possible the prolonged
detention and interrogation of arrested persons without access to
counsel. In previous deportation proceedings, defense attorneys had
urged aliens to remain silent. Therefore, it was necessary to amend the
immigration regulation which allowed "attorneys employed by ar-
rested persons to participate in the conduct of hearings from their
very commencement." 31 The head of the Justice Department's Gen-
eral Intelligence Division, J. Edgar Hoover, reiterated this request
for a modification of immigration procedures.32 Three days before
the raids the regulation was revised to permit hearings to begin with-
out the presence of counsel.
Another barrier to effective interrogation was the alien's right
to bail. Three weeks after the round-up, J. Edgar Hoover advised the
Immigration Bureau that to allow aliens out on bail to see their lawyers
"defeats the ends of justice" and made the revision of immigration
regulations "virtually of no value." Hoover later told immigration
ocials that since the purpose of the raids was to suppress agitation,
he could not see the sense in letting radicals spread their propaganda
while out on bail.34 He also urged the Immigration Bureau to hold all
aliens against whom there was no proof on the chance that evidence
might be uncovered at some future date "in other sections of the coun-
try." 35 However, despite the Justice Department's pleas, the Secre-
tary of Labor ordered a return to previous policies after the raids,
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once again allowing detained aliens access to legal counsel and admis-
sion to bail if hearings were delayed.36
An advantage of the amended Immigration Act had been that
aliens could be deported simply for membership in a revolutionary
group, without any evidence of their individual activity. J. Edgar
Hoover urged literal application of the law to all members regard-
less of the individual's intent or the circumstances involved in his
joining the organization.3l Nevertheless, the Labor Department re-
fused to deport automatically every Communist Party alien, instead
adopting a policy of differentiating between "conscious" and "uncon-
scious" membership, declining to deport those whose membership in
the Socialist Party had been transferred to the Communist Party
without the member's knowledge and those whose cases were based on
self-incrimination without counsel or illegally seized membership
records. Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post, who strongly
opposed the Justice Department's position, also defied Congressional
threats of impeachment in his vigorous defense of due process of law.38
During the months following the "Palmer raids", a group of dis-
tinguished lawyers and law professors prepared a report denouncing
the violation of law by the Justice Department. They included Dean
Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and Zechariah Chafee, Jr. of the
Harvard Law School, Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago
Law School, and other eminent lawyers and legal scholars. The com-
mittee found federal agents guilty of using third-degree tortures,
making illegal searches and arrests, using agent8 provocateur, and
forcing aliens to incriminate themselves. Its report described federal
intelligence operations in the following terms:
We do not question the right of the Department of Justice to
use its agents in the Bureau of Investigation to ascertain
when the law is being violated. But the American people
have never tolerated the use of undercover provocative agents
or "agents provocateurs" such as have been familiar in old
Russia or Spain. Such agents have been introduced by the
Department of Justice into radical movements, have reached
positions of influence therein, have occupied themselves with
informing upon or instigating acts which might be declared
criminal, and at the express direction of Washington have
brought about meetings of radicals in order to make possible
wholesale arrests at such meetings.39
The initial reaction of the head of the Justice Department's General
Intelligence Division to such criticism was to search the files, includ-
ing military intelligence files, for evidence that critics had radical
associations or beliefs.40
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The work of the General Intelligence Division was summarized by
J. Edgar Hoover in a report prepared later in 1920. Even though fed-
eral criminal statutes were "inadequate to properly handle the radical
situation," Hoover stressed the "need in the absence of legislation to
enable the federal government adequately to defend and protect itself
and its institutions [from] not only aliens within the borders of the
United States, but also American citizens who are engaged in unlawful
agitation." Therefore, -in addition to providing intelligence for use in
the deportation of aliens, the GID supplied information to state au-
thorities for the prosecution of American citizens under the broader
state sedition laws.
The GID also had expanded "to cover more general intelligence
work, including not only the radical activities in the United States and
abroad, but also the studying of matters of an international nature,
as well as economic and industrial disturbances incident thereto."
Hoover described the GID's relationship to the Bureau of
Investigation:
While the General Intelligence Division has not participated
in the investigations of the overt acts of radicals in the United
States, its solo function being that of collecting evidence and
preparing the same for proper presentation to the necessary
authorities, it has however by a careful review system of the
reports received from the field agents of the Bureau of Inves-
tigation, kept in close and intimate touch with the detail of the
investigative work.
The GID developed an elaborate system for recording the results of
Bureau surveillance:
In order that the information which was obtained upon the
radical movements might be readily accessible for use by the
persons charged with the 9upervision of these investigations
and prosecutions, there has been established as a part of this
division a card index system, numbering over 150,000 cards,
giving detailed data not only upon individual agitators con-
nected with the radical movement, but also upon organiza-
tions, associations, societies, publications and social condi-
tions existing in certain localities. This card index makes it
possible to determine and ascertain in a few moments the nu-
merous ramifications of individuals connected with the radical
movement and their activities in the United States, thus
facilitating the investigations considerably. It is so classified
that a card for a particular city will show the various orga-
nizations existing in that city, together with their membership
rolls and the names of the officers thereof.
The report said little about any tangible accomplishments in the
prevention of terrorist violence or the apprehension of persons respon-
sible for specific acts of violence. Instead, groups and individuals were
characterized as having "dedicated themselves to the carrying out of
anarchistic ideas and tactics"; as "urging the workers to rise up against
the Government of the United States"; as having "openly advocated
the overthrow of constitutions, governments and churches"; as
being "the cause of a considerable amount of the industrial and eco-
nomic unrest"; as "openly urging the workers to engage in armed
revolt"; as being "pledged to the tactics of force and violence"; as be-
ing "affiliated with the III International formed at Moscow" and
under "party discipline regulated by Lnin and Trotsky"; and as
"propagandists" appealing directly to "the negro" for support in the
revolutionary movement. I
The only references to particular illegal acts were that bne group
had participated in an "outlawed strike" against the railroads, that
one anarchist group member had assassinated the king of Italy, and
that Communists had smuggled diamonds into the United States to
finance propaganda. The head of the GID did not claim to have
identified terrorists whose bombings had aroused public furor. Instead,
Hoover reported that the mass arrests and deportations "had resulted
in the wrecking of the communist parties in this country" and that
"the radical press, which prior to January 2nd had been so flagrantly
attacking the Government of the United States and advocating its
overthrow by force and violence, ceased its pernicious activities." State
sedition prosecutions had served to protect "against. tl. agitation of
persons having for their intent and purpose the overthrow of the
Government of the United States." Finally, the GID's work had
"enabled the government to study the situation from a more intelli-
gence and broader viewpoint." 4
Parallel to the Justice Department and Immigration Bureau op-
erations, military intelligence continued its wartime surveillance
into the post-war era. After a temporary cut-back in early 1919, the
Military Intelligence Division resumed investigations aimed at strikes,
labor unrest, radicals, and the foreign language press. The American
Protective League disbanded, but its former members still served as
volunteer agents for military intelligence as well as for the Bureau of
Investigation. While the military did not play a significant role in
the "Palmer raids," troops were called upon in 1919 to control race
riots in several cities and to maintain order during a steel strike in
Gary, Indiana, where the city was placed under "modified martial
law." Following the 1920 round-up of aliens, J. Edgar Hoover ar-
ranged for mutual cooperation between the GID and military intelli-
gence. Reports from the Bureau of Investigation would be shared with
the military, and investigations conducted at military request. In
return, military intelligence agreed to provide Hoover with informa-
tion from foreign sources, since the State Department had refused to
do so and Hoover was prohibited from having agents or informants
outside the United States.42
The domestic' intelligence structure as finally established in 1920
remained essentially intact uitil Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone
took office in 1924. Under the Harding Administration and Attorney
General Harry Daugherty, the GID was made a part of the Bureau
of Investigation under Director William J. Burns, with J. Edgar
Hoover becoming an Assistant Director of the Bureau. Although the
deportation program was strictly limited by Labor Department pol-
icies, the Bureau still supplied results of its surveillance operations
to state 'authorities for the prosecution of Communists.43 Hoover also
4 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, re: General Intelligence Division,
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prepared a lengthy report for the Secretary of State on Communist
activities in the United States. The State Department submitted the
information to the Senate to back up its opposition to a resolution to
grant diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union." During this period,
the Bureau spelled out its domestic intelligence activities in annual
reports to Congress, including summaries of investigative findings on
the role of Communists in education, athletic clubs, publications, labor
unions, women's groups, and Negro groups. Radical propaganda was
"being spread in the churches, schools and colleges throughout the
country.' The Bureau also told Congress that it was furnishing in-
formation for prosecutions under state laws punishing "criminal syn-
dicalism and anarchy." 4 5
D. Attorney General Stone's Reformm
In April, 1924, a new Attorney General took charge of a scandal-
ridden Department of Justice. Harlan Fiske Stone, former Dean of
the Columbia Law School, had been appointed by President Calvin
Coolidge to replace the late President Warren Harding's political
crony Harry Daugherty. Stone confronted more than simply corrup-
tion in the Justice Department when he took office. The Department's
Bureau of Investigation had become a secret political police force. As
Stone recalled later, "The organization was lawless, maintaining
many activities which were without any authority in federal statutes,
and engaging in many practices which were brutal and tyrannical in
the extreme." 4 Attorney General Stone asked for the resignation
of the Bureau Director William J. Burns, former head of the Burns
Detective Agency, and directed that the activities of the Bureau "be
limited strictly to investigations of violations of law, under my direc-
tion or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly
conducting the work of the Department of Justice." Stone also ordered
a review of the entire personnel of the Bureau, the removal of "those
who are incompetent and unreliable," and the future selection of "men
of known good character and ability, giving preference to men who
have had some legal training." 4 The Attorney. General chose the
young career Bureau official, J. Edgar Hoover, as Acting Director to
implement these reforms, largely because of Hoover's reputation
within the Justice Department as an honest and efficient admin-
istrator.48
A principal problem Stone faced was the Bureau's domestic in-
telligence operation. He was vividly aware of the violations of individ-
ual rights committed in the name of domestic security at the time of
the 1920 "Palmer raids." He had joined a committee of protest against
Attorney General Palmer's round-up of radical aliens for deportation
and had urged a Congressional investigation. When a Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee began hearings in 1921, its first order of business was a
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letter from Stone calling for "a thoroughgoing investigation of the
conduct of the Department of Justice in connection with the deporta-
tion cases." 4
In considering J. Edgar Hoover for the position of permanent Di-
rector of the Bureau of Investigation, Attorney General Stone was
aware that he had played a major role in the "Palmer raids" as head
of the Justice Department's General Intelligence Division. Roger
Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union told Stone that he
was skeptical of Hoover's ability to reform the Bureau. With the
Attorney General's knowledge, Baldwin met with Hoover to discuss
the future of the Bureau. Hoover assured Baldwin that he had played
an "unwilling part" in the activities of Palmer, Daugherty, and Burns.
He said he regretted their tactics but had not been in a position to
do anything about them. He intended to help Stone build an efficient
law enforcement agency, employing law school graduates, severing
connections with private detective agencies, and not issuing prop-
aganda. Most important from the American Civil Liberties Union's
point of view, the Bureau's "radical division" would be disbanded.
Baldwin wrote Stone, "I think we were wrong in our estimate of his
attitude," and announced to the press that the ACLU believed the
Justice Department's "red-hunting" days were over.5o
When Attorney General Stone arrived in 1924, he requested a
review of the applicability of the federal criminal statutes to Com-
munist activities in the United States. Various patriotic organizations
had urged that Communists be prosecuted under the federal seditious
conspiracy law, but the courts had ruled that this Civil War statute
required proof of a definite plan to use force against the government.5 1
Justice Department lawyers also rejected prosecution under the Logan
Act, enacted in the 1790s to punish hostile communications between
American citizens and a foreign government.5 2 These conclusions
buttressed the Attorney General's decision to abolish the Bureau's
domestic intelligence operations, although Stone told Roger Baldwin
of the ACLU that he had no authority to destroy the Bureau's intel-
ligence files, without an Act of Congress."
Attorney General Stone may also have contemplated the possibility
of future investigations under Congress' prewar revision of the Justice
Department appropriations statute. He asked Acting Director Hoover
whether the Bureau would have the authority to investigate Soviet and
Communist activities within the United States for the State Depart-
ment in connection with the question of recognition of the Soviet
government. Hoover replied that the appropriations act did allow
such investigations, upon formal request by the Secretary of State
and approval of the Attorney General. The Acting Director stressed
that such investigations "should be conducted on an entirely different
line than previously conducted by the Bureau of Investigation" and
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that there should be no publicity "because any publicity would mate-
rially hamper the obtaining of successful results.'
After 1924, the Bureau of Investigation continued to receive infor-
mation volunteered to it about Communist activities, and Bureau field
offices were ordered to forward such data to headquarters. But the
Bureau made "no investigations of such activities, inasmuch as it
does not appear that there is any violation of a Federal Penal Statute
involved." 55 Military intelligence officers still had a duty, under an
Army emergency plan, to gather information "with reference to the
economical, industrial and radical conditions, to observe incidents
and events that may develop into strikes, riots, or other disorders, and
to investigate and report upon the industrial and radical situation."
However, by 1925 the military lacked adequate personnel and requested
the Bureau of Investigation to provide information on "radical condi-
tions." 56 J. Edgar Hoover replied that the Bureau had discontinued
"general investigations into radical activities," but would communi-
cate to the military any information received from specific investiga-
tions of federal violations "which may appear to be of interest" to the
military."7
Despite the curtailment of federal intelligence operations, it would
be misleading to say that domestic intelligence activity ceased in the
United States after 1924. The efforts of state and local authorities to
investigate possible violations of state sedition laws continued in many
parts of the country. Moreover, private industry engaged the services
of detectives and informers to conduct surveillance of labor organiz-
ing activities. These industrial espionage programs reached their peak
in the early 1930s. A Senate committee investigation in 1936 exposed
these tactics and influenced at least one private detective firm, the
Pinkerton Agency, to discontinue its anti-labor spying. The Senate
inquiry documented the efficient techniques developed by labor spies
for destroying unions. They wreaked havoc on union locals, generat-
ing mistrust, inciting violence, and reporting the identities.of union
members to hostile employers.58
On one major occasion early in the Depression, military intelligence
was reactivated temporarily. Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur
ordered corps area commanders in mid-1931 to submit reports on sub-
versive activities in their areas. When the "bonus marchers" began
arriving in Washington in 1932 to demand veteran benefits, military
intelligence agents investigated Communist influence with the help of
American Legion officials, reserve officers, and other volunteers. Mili-
tary intelligence reports exaggerating the threat of "insurrectionists"
among the veteran protesters contributed to the decision to use troops
in a mass assault to clear the demonstrators out of Washington. Criti-
cism of this operation led military authorities to instruct that intel-
ligence officers be more discreet although they continued to gather
intelligence on civilian groups.5"
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Therefore, while Attorney General Stone had stopped the Jus-
tice Department's intelligence efforts in 1924, safeguards did not exist
against state, private or military intelligence operations. Moreover, the
Bureau of Investigation retained its massive domestic intelligence files
from the 1916-1924 period, as well as the vague legal authority under
the appropriations act to conduct investigations going beyond the
detection of federal crimes if a future Attorney General and Secretary
of State should direct it to do so. Nevertheless, when Congressman
Hamilton Fish and members of a Special House Committee to In-
vestigate Communist Activities in the United States proposed legis-
lation authorizing the Bureau of Investigation to investigate "Com-
munist and revolutionary activity" in 1931, Director Hoover opposed
it. He told Congressman Fish that it would be better to enact a criminal
statute and not expand the.Bureau's power beyond criminal investi-
gation, especially since the Bureau had "never been established by
legislation" and operated "solely on an appropriation bill." 6o Hoover
advised the Attorney General a year later,
'The work of the Bureau of Investigatibn at this time is ...
of an open character not in any manner subject to criticism,
and the operations of the Bureau of Investigation may be
given the closest scrutiny at all times. . . . The conditions
will materially differ were the Bureau to embark upon a
policy of investigative activity into conditions which, from a
federal standpoint, have not been declared illegal and in con-
nection with which no prosecution might be instituted. The
Department and the Bureau would undoubtedly be subject to
charges in the matter of alleged seciet and undesirable
methods . . . as well as to allegations involving charges of
the- use of "Agents Provocateur."
Hoover assumed that the Immigration Bureau with jurisdiction to de-
port Communist aliens conducted such investigation and, if it did not,
"would be subject to criticism for its laxity along these lines." Thus,
the Director's position was not based on opposition to the idea of
domestic intelligence itself, but rather on his conceri for possible
criticism of the Bureau if it were to resume "undercover" activities
which would be necessary "to secure a foothold in Communistic inner
circles" and "to keep fully informed as to changing policies and secret
propaganda on the part of Communists." ,"
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
STRUCTURE, 1936-1945
Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home
is to be charged to provisions against danger real or pretended
from abroad.
-James Madison, Letter to
Thomas Jefferson, May 13, 1798
Since 1936 the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been the pri-
mary civilian agency charged with domestic intelligence responsibil-
6 Memorandum of telephone call between J. Edgar Hoover and Congressman
Fish, Jahuary 19, 1931.
6 Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 1/2/32.
ities. However, the origins of this assignment have been clouded be-
cause the memoranda recording President Franklin Roosevelt's first
instructions have not previously been made public. These and other
directives of the President were described generally in the author-
ized history of the FBI.6 2 But the full texts and other materials shed
more light on the circumstances for and consequences of Roosevelt's
decisions. The basic orders and agreements governing the relations
between the FBI and the military intelligence agencies have alsc
been kept confidential until recent years.63 Although President Roose-
velt's 1940 directive authorizing warrantless wiretapping by the FBI
for national security purposes has long been a matter of record, the
FBI's practices for breaking-and-entering and clandestine mail open-
ing were closely held secrets. The scope of prewar domestic intelligence
and the joint plans of the FBI and the Justice Department for com-
piling a Custodial Detention List of American citizens have never
been publicly examined.
A. The 1936 Roosevelt Directive
In August 1936, President Roosevelt issued the first of a series of
instructions establishing the basic domestic intelligence structure and
policies for the federal government. The President used his execu-
tive authority to determine which of the several competing civilian
agencies of the government would carry out domestic intelligence in-
vestigations, to set up machinery for coordination between military
intelligence and the FBI, and to lay down the general objectives of
domestic intelligence going 'beyond criminal investigation. From the
beginning Roosevelt "desired the matter to be handled quite confi-
dentially." 64 When Attorney General Homer Cummings submitted
to the President a joint FBI-military plan for domestic intelligence
in 1938, he advised that additional legislation was not required and
that the plan "should be handled in strictest confidence." The Attorney
General enclosed a memorandum prepared by FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover which stated:
In considering the steps to be taken for the expansion of the
present structure of intelligence work, it is believed impera-
tive that it be proceeded with, with the utmost degree of
secrecy in order to avoid criticism or objections which might
be raised to such an expansion by either ill-informed per-
sons or individuals having some ulterior motive. . . . Conse-
quently, it would seem undesirable to seek any special legis-
lation which would draw attention to the fact that it was
proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any
great magnitude.65
Whitehead, The FBI Story, pp. 157 if.
* The 1949 delimitations agreement between the FBI and the military intel-
ligence agencies was released by the Justice Department in 1974, but an earlier
agreement has not previously been published. See Domestic Intelligence
Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Hearings before the House Commit-
tee on Internal Security, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pp. 3369-3383.
* Confidential Memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover, 8/25/36.
* Letter from Attorney General Homer Cummings to President Roosevelt and
enclosure, 10/20/38.
Thus, the President's orders were kept secret, and Congress was de-
liberately excluded from the policymaking progress until after war
broke out in Europe in 1939. Possibly if President Roosevelt had gone
to Congress with a proposal for domestic intelligence in 1936 or 1938,
legislation might not have been enacted and the nation's security could
have been jeopardized. Perhaps a public announcement of the Presi-
dent's actions would have put the nation's potential adversaries on
notice of his intentions. But these benefits must be weighed against the
cost to constitutional government of unilateral executive actions di-
rectly affecting the rights of citizens.
There were legitimate grounds for concern about the need for
domestic intelligence by 1936. Two years earlier the President had
ordered the FBI to conduct a more limited intelligence investigation
of "the activity of the Nazi movement in this country." The FBI, in
cooperation with the Secret Service and the Immigration Bureau,
conducted a one-time investigation, described by FBI Director Hoover
as "a so-called intelligence investigation." It concentrated on "the
Nazi group, with particular reference to the antiracial activities and
any anti-American activities having any possible connection with
official representatives of the German government in the United
States." 66
In January 1936, the Secretary of War advised the Attorney Gen-
eral that there was "definite indication" of foreign espionage in the
United States and that in an emergency "some organizations . . .
would probably attempt to cripple our war effort through sabotage."
He urged the Justice Department to establish "a counterespionage
service among civilians to prevent foreign espionage in the United
States and to collect information so that in case of an emergency any
persons intending to cripple our war effort by means of espionage or
sabotage may be taken into custody." In addition to these foreign-
related dangers, President Roosevelt was alerted to right-wing do-
mestic threats. The FBI Director met with retired General Smedley
Butler and reported to Roosevelt on "the effort of Father Coughlin to
have General Butler lead an expedition to Mexico." 6*
The nature of the President's interest is also reflected in the informa-
tion FBI Director Hoover provided at their crucial meeting in August
1936. Except for a reference to Hoover's previous report on Father
Coughlin and General Butler, it dealt exclusively with Communist
activities. According to the FBI Director, the West Coast longshore-
men's union headed by Harry Bridges "was practically controlled by
Communists," the Communists "had very definite plans to get control
of" the United Mine Workers -union led by John L. Lewis, and the
8 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Cowley, 5/10/34.
67 Letter from Secretary of War George H. Dern to Attorney General Homer
Cummings 1/6/36. Attorney General Cummings discussed the matter with Secre-
tary Dern, although he gained the impression that "there was no particular
urgency." Memorandum from Attorney General Homer Cummings to J. Edgar
Hoover, 2/19/38.
' Confidential memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36. General Butler also
recounted attempts by right-wing elements to persuade him to join plans for
an anti-New Deal "coup" to a congressional committee. Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 82-85.
Newspaper Guild had "strong Communist leanings." Director
Hoover's memorandum of his conversation with the President con-
tinued:
I told him that my information was that the Communists
had planned to get control of these three groups and by doing
so they would be able at any time to paralyze the country in
that they stop all shipping in and out through the Bridges
organization; stop the operation of industry through the
Mining Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any news-
papers of the country through the Newspaper Guild.
I also related to him the activities which have recently oc-
curred with Governmental service inspired by Communists,
particularly in some of the Departments and in the National
Labor Relations Board.
I likewise informed him that I had received information
to the effect that the Communist Internationale in Moscow
had recently issued instructions for all Communists to vote
for President Roosevelt and against Governor Landon be-
cause of the fact that Governor Landon is opposed to class
warfare.
This memorandum indicates that the FBI was already gathering
domestic intelligence about Communist activities inside and outside
the government. After hearing Director Hoover's report, President
Roosevelt expressed a desire for more systematic intelligence about
"subversive activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and
Communism." He wanted "a broad picture of the general movement
and its activities as may affect the economic and political life of the
country as a whole." 69 Whether ot not the FBI Director exaggerated
the threat, no President could afford to ignore such dire warnings
without some further investigation.
President Roosevelt clearly understood that Communist and Fascist
activities were an international problem tied to potentially hostile for-
eign governments. At Hoover's suggestion, Secretary of State Cordell
Hull met with the President and the FBI Director to review the situa-
tion. Hoover's memorandum of this meeting stated:
The President pointed out that both of these movements were
international in scope and that Communism particularly was
directed from Moscow, and that there had been certain indi-
cations that Oumanski, attached to the Russian Soviet Em-
bassy, was a leading figure in some of the activities in this
country, so consequently, it was a matter which fell within the
scope of foreign affairs over which the State Department
would have a right to request an inquiry to be made.
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull also considered "the making
of a protest, either formally or informally, to the Russian Govern-
ment relative to its interference with affairs in this country." 70 Thus,
it was the international character of Communism and Fascism that
* Hoover memorandum, 8/24/36.
"Hoover memorandum, 8/25/36.
both justified the Secretary of State's request and underlay the Presi-
dent's desire for domestic intelligence.71
B. The Original Legal Authority for Domestic Intelligence
Despite its secrecy, President Roosevelt's initial request for domes-
tic intelligence investigations did have a degree of statutory authori-
zation. The provision in the Justice Department appropriations stat-
ute enacted before World War I allowed the Attorney General to
direct the FBI to conduct investigations for the State Department.
However, it became clear by 1938 that these investigations would not
be terminated; and the President ceased relying on the procedure for
State Department request by mid-1939. Presidential directives issued
in 1939 attempted to link domestic intelligence to the investigation of
espionage and sabotage, even though the FBI's actual mandate ex-
tended beyond the investigation of violations of law to encompass
"subversive activities" generally and "counterespionage" operations.
These directives created legal confusion which has persisted until the
present day. There was no attempt to clarify what domestic intelli-
gence functions were authorized by statute and what functions were
based on an implicit claim of inherent presidential power.
J. Edgar Hoover was particularly sensitive to this issue, since At-
torney General Stone had ordered that the activities of the Bureau
"be limited strictly to investigations of violations of law.".72 President
Roosevelt sought to breach that line in 1936. His desire for "a broad
picture" of the effects of Communism and Fascism on "the economic
and political life of the country as a whole" went far beyond the in-
vestigation of violations of law. Nevertheless, Director Hoover ad-
vised Roosevelt that there was statutory authority for this type of in-
vestigation. Hoover told him that the FBI appropriation contained "a
provision that it might investigate any matters referred to it by the
Department of State and that if the State Department should ask for
us to conduct such an investigation we could do so under our present
authority in the appropriation already granted." 7 The President, in
turn, told Secretary Hull that the FBI could make "a survey" of Com-
munist and Fascist activities because "under the Appropriation Act
this Bureau would have authority to make such investigation if asked
to do so by the Secretary of State." 7
7 Recently, FBI officials have differed in their interpretations of these events.
An FBI study in 1972 concluded that "the concern for national security was
related to two international movements" in the pre-World War II period and
that "there was no national concern for indigenous anarchists or other groups
designing to overthrow the Government." FBI Memorandum, Scope of FBI Au-
thority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations,
7/31/72. However, a later study contends that the Secretary of State's request
was a device to satisfy the provisions of the FBI appropriations statute and did
not set "jurisdictional limits." The State Department's involvement "did not
serve in some way to limit the scope of investigation to foreign or foreign-con-
trolled activities to the exclusion of domestic." FBI Intelligence Division, An
Analysis of FBI Domestic Security Investigation. 10/28/75. Except for the refer-
ence to General Butler and Father Coughlin, FBI records pertaining to the ori-
gins and implementation of President Roosevelt's order tend to support the former
position.
"Memorandum from Attorney General Harlan F. Stone to J. Edgar Hoover,
Acting Director of the Bureau of Investigation, 5/13/24.
Hoover memorandum, 8/24/36.
Hoover memorandum, 8/25/36.
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Director Hoover's reliance on the specific provision of the appro-
priations statute meant that FBI domestic intelligence was not initi-
ated solely through an exercise of the President's independent con-
stitutional power. In fact, Attorney General Stone had been aware of
the implictions of this provision in 1924.75 Although there is no record
that Attorney General Stone ever approved this type of inquiry, he
clearly contemplated the possibility of at least a closed-end investiga-
tion for the State Department.
Thus, in compliance with Hoover's wishes, Secretary Hull "asked
that the investigation be made," and the President asked Hoover to
'speak to the Attorney General." 76 The FBI Director's memorandum
of his conversation with Attorney General Cummings stated:
In talking with the Attorney General today concerning the
radical situation, I informed him of the conference which I
had with the President on September 1, 1936 [sic], at which
time the Secretary of State, at the President's suggestion,
requested of me, the representative of the Department of
Justice, to have investigation made of the subversive activi-
ties in this country, including communism and fascism. I
transmitted this request to the Attorney General, and the
Attorney General verbally directed me to proceed with this
investigation and to coordinate, as the President suggested,
information upon these matters in the possession of the
Military Intelligence Division, the Naval Intelligence Divi-
sion, and the State Department. This, therefore, is the
authority upon which to proceed in the conduct of this
investigation, which should, of course, be handled in a most
discreet and confidential manner.
7 7
These memoranda indicate clearly that Director Hoover was relying
on the specific provisions of the appropriations statute. He followed
almost to the letter the steps he had described to Attorney General
Stone in 1924 as the necessary prerequisites for an investigation of
Communist activities.
C. The FBI Intelligence Program, 1936-1938
Instructions were issued to FBI agents immediately after Director
Hoover's meetings with the President and the Secretary of State.
FBI field offices were ordered "to obtain from all possible sources
information concerning subversive activities being conducted in the
United States by Communists, Fascists, representatives or advocates
of other organizations or groups advocating the overthrow or replace-
ment of the Government of the United States by illegal methods." 78
Theoretically, this directive included purely domestic matters besides
the international Communist and Fascist movements. There is no
indication, however, that the President or the Attorney General were
advised of this order; and the communications between the FBI
Director and his superiors made no mention of advocacy of overthrow
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Harlan F. Stone,
12/13/24.
" Hoover memorandum, 8/25/36.
' Memorandum from Hoover to Tamm, Strictly Confidential, 9/10/36.
" Memorandum from Hoover to Field Offices, 9/5/36.
of the government. Instead, the terms used in 1936 were "general intel-
ligence" and "subversive activities."
Following the Hoover-Roosevelt meetings, FBI officials also began
developing a systematic organization for intelligence information"concerning subversive activities." The following general classifica-
tions were adopted:
Maritime Industry
Activities in Government Affairs
Activities in the Steel Industry
Activities in the Coal Industry
Activities in the Newspaper Field
Activities in the Clothing, Garment and Fur Industries
General Strike Activities
Activities in the Armed Forces of the United States
Activities in Educatioial Institutions
General Activities--Communist Party and Affiliated Orga-
nizations
Activities of the Fascists
Anti-Fascists Movements
Activities in Organized Labor Organizations
Steps were also taken to determine whether certain individuals were"available for service in the capacity of an informant," "to index thematerial previously submitted," and to "'prepare memoranda dealingindividually with those persons whose names appear prominently atthe present time in the subversive circles." The Director was to receive
daily memoranda on "major developments in any field" of subver-
sive activities.79
The President's instructions had dealt with relations between the
FBI and other federal agencies. At -his initial meeting with Hoover,
the President said that the Secret Service "had assured him that
they had informants in every Communist group," but Roosevelt -be-
lieved this "was solely for the purpose of getting any information
upon plots upon his life." He told Hoover that the Secret Service"was not to be brought in on this investigation as they should confine
themselves strictly to the matter of protecting his life and the survey
which he desired to have made was on a much broader field." In
addition, the President suggested that Hoover "endeavor to coordinate
any investigation along similar lines which might be made by the
Military or Naval Intelligence Services." 80 The Director told his
subordinates that he had advised the Attorney General that he would"coordinate, as the President suggested, information upon these mat-
ters in the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval
Intelligence Division, and the State Department." 8
The FBI and military intelligence proceeded along these lines in
1937-1938. The President designated Attorney General Cummings"as Chairman of a Committee to inquire into the so-called espionage
situation" in October 1938, and to report on the need for "an addi-
tional appropriation for domestic intelligence." The Attorney General
" Memorandum from E. A. Tamm to Hoover, 8/28/36.
" Hoover memorandum, 8/24/36.
g' Memorandum from Hoover to Tamm, 9/10/36.
advised the President that a "well defined system" was functioning,
made up of the FBI, the Military Intelligence Division, and the Office
of Naval Intelligence, whose heads were "in frequent contact and are
operating in harmony." He recommended that the appropriations be
increased by $35,000 each for MID and ONI and by $300,000 for the
FBI. He also submitted a plan prepared by Director Hoover in consul-
tation with the military agencies. He observed that "no additional
legislation to accomplish the general objectives seems to be required"
and that "the matter should be handled in strictest confidence." 82
The FBI Director's memorandum spelled out the reasons why leg-
islation was considered undesirable. Hoover believed the FBI's
expansion could "be covered" by the language in the appropriations
statute relating to "other investigations" conducted for the State
Department: 83
Under this provision investigations have been conducted
in years past for the State Department of matters which do
not in themselves constitute a specific violation of a Federal
Criminal Statute, such as subversive activities. Consequently,
this provision is believed to be sufficiently broad to cover any
expansion of the present intelligence and counter-espionage
work which it may be deemed necessary to carry on....
In considering the steps to be taken for the expansion of
the present structure of intelligence work, it is believed im-
perative that it be proceeded with, with the utmost degree of
secrecy in order to avoid criticism or objections which might
be raised to such an expansion by either ill-informed persons
or individuals having some ulterior motive. The word 'es-
pionage' has long been a word that has been repugnant to the
American people and it is believed that the structure which
is already in existence is much broader than espionage or
counterespionage, but covers in a true sense real intelligence
values to the three services interested, namely, the Navy, the
Army, and Justice. Consequently, it would seem undesirable
to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to
the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counter-
espionage drive of any great magnitude."'
Hoover noted that Army and Navy Intelligence did not need addi-
tional le gislation "since their activities . . . are limited to matters con-
cerning their respective services."
The FBI Director reviewed the current and proposed future opera-
tions of each of the three intelligence agencies. The FBI had set up a
General Intelligence Section to investigate and correlate information
dealing with "activities of either a subversive or a so-called intelligence
type." Each FBI field office had "developed contacts with various per-
sons in professional, business, and law enforcement fields" to obtain
this information. The following was a break-down of the subject mat-
ter in the Intelligence Section files: "Maritime; government; industry
* Letter from Cummings to the President, 10/20/38.
*28 U.S.C. 533(3).
* Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President,
10/20/38.
(steel, automobile, coal, mining, and miscellaneous); general strikes;
armed iforces; educational institutions; Fascist; Nazi; organized
labor; Negroes; youth; strikes; newspaper field; and miscellaneous."
All information "of a subversive or general intelligence character per-
taining to any of the above" was reviewed and filed at FBI head-
quarters, with index cards on individuals which made it possible to
identify the persons "engaged in any particular activity, either in any
section of the country or in a particular industry or movement." This
index then included "approximately 2500 names . . . of the various
types of individuals engaged in activities of Communism, Nazism, and
various types of foreign espionage." In addition, the FBI had "de-
veloped a rather extensive library of general intelligence matters, in-
cluding sixty-five daily, weekly, and monthly publications, as well as
many pamphlets and volumes dealing with general intelligence ac-
tivities." From both investigative sources and research, the FBI from
time to time prepared "charts . . . to show the growth and extent of
certain activities." 85
The Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Divi-
sion were concerned with "subversive activities that undermine the
loyalty and efficiency" of Army and Navy personnel or civilians
involved in military construction and maintenance; with sabotage of
military facilities or of "agencies contributing to the efficiency" of the
military; and with "spy activities that may result in divulgence of
information to foreign countries or to persons when such divulgence
is contrary to the interests of our national defense." However, MIDand ONI lacked trained investigators, and they relied on the FBI "to
conduct investigative activity in strictly civilian matters of a domestic
character." The three agencies exchanged information of interest to
one another, both in the field and at headquarters in Washington.
For the future, all three agencies agreed that other federal agencies
should be excluded from intelligence work since others were "less inter-
ested in matters of general intelligence and counter-intelligence" and
because "the more circumscribed this program is, the more effective
it will be and the less danger there is of its becoming a matter of gen-
eral public knowledge." The FBI hoped to expand its personnel so
that it could assign an agent specializing in intelligence to each of its
forty-five field offices and could reopen offices in Hawaii, Alaska, and
Puerto Rico. Additional funds would also be used to expand FBI
facilities for "specialized training in general intelligence work." 8
Director Hoover met with the President in November 1938 and
learned that he had instructed the Budget Bureau "to include in the
Appropriations estimate $50,000 for Military Intelligence, $50,000 for
Naval Intelligence and $150,000 for the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation to handle counter-espionage activities." The President also
said "that he had approved the plan which [Hoover] had prepared
and which had been sent to him by the Attorney General," except for
the revised budget figures.87
" Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President,
10/20/38.--
" Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President,
10/20/38.
Confidential memorandum, by J. Edgar Hoover, 11/7/38.
D. FBI Intelligence Authority and "Subversion"
There is no evidence that either the Congress in 1916 or Attorney
General Stone in 1924 intended the provision of the appropriations
statute to authorize the establishment of a permanent domestic intel-
ligence structure. Yet Director Hoover advised the Attorney General
and the President in 1938 that the statute was "sufficiently broad to
cover any expansion of the present intelligence and counter-espionage
work which it may be deemed necessary to carry on." 8 Because of
their reluctance to seek new legislation in order to keep the program
secret, Attorney General Cummings and President Roosevelt did not
question the FBI Director's interpretation. Nevertheless, the Presi-
dent's approval of Director Hoover's 1938 plan for joint FBI-military
domestic intelligence was a substantial exercise of independent presi-
dential power.
The precise nature of FBI authority to investigate "subversion"
became confusing in 1938-1939. Despite the references in Director
Hoover's 1938 memorandum to "subversion," Attorney General Cum-
mings cited only the President's interest in the "so-called espionage
situation." 881 Cummings' successors, Attorney General Frank
Murphy, appears to have abandoned the term "subversive activities." 89
Moreover, when Director Hoover provided Attorney General Murphy
a copy of his 1938 plan, he described it (without mentioning "sub-
version") as a program "intended to ascertain the identity of persons
engaged in espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage of a nature
not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes." 9"
Moreover, a shift away from the authority of the appropriations
provision, which was linked to the State Department's request, be-
came necessary in 1939 when the FBI resisted an attempt by the State
Department to coordinate domestic intelligence investigations. Di-
rector Hoover urged Attorney General Frank Murphy in March 1939
to discuss the situation with the President and persuade him to "take
appropriate action with reference to other governmental agencies,
including the State Department, which are attempting to literally
chisel into this type of work. . . ." The Director acknowledged that the
FBI required "the specific authorization of the State Department"
where the subject of an investigation "enjoys any diplomatic status,"
but he knew of "no instance in connection with the handling of the
I Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President,
10/20/38.
* Letter from Cummings to the President, 10/20/38.
" On 2/7/39, the Assistant to the Attorney General wrote letters to the Secret
Service, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Narcotics Bureau, the Customs
Service, the Coast Guard, and the Postal Inspection Service stating that the FBI
and military intelligence had "undertaken activities to investigate matters re-
lating to espionage and subversive activities." (Letter from 'J. B. Keenan, As-
sistant to the Attorney General, to F. J. Wilson, Chief, -Secret Service, 2/7/39.) A
letter from Attorney General Murphy to the 'Secretary of the Treasury shortly
thereafter also referred to "subversive activities." (Letter from Attorney General
Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury, 2/16/39.) However, a similar letter
two days later referred only to matters "involving espionage, counterespionage,
and sabotage," without mentioning "subversive activities." (Letter from Attorney
General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury, 2/18/39.) Attorney General
Murphy had abandoned this reference, although there is no record of any rea-
sons for doing so.
a Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 3/16/39.
espionage work in which the State Department has had any occasion
to be in any manner or degree dissatisfied with or apprehensive of the
action taken by Bureau agents." 91
Director Hoover was also concerned that the State Department
would allow other Federal investigative agencies, including the Secret
Service and other Treasury Department units, to conduct domestic in-
telligence investigations.92 The FBI cited the following example in
communications to the Attorney General in 1939:
On the West Coast recently a representative of the Alcohol
Tax Unit of the Treasury Department endeavored to induce
a Corps Area Intelligence Officer of the War Department to
utilize the services of that agency in the handling of all in-
vestigations involving espionage, counter-espionage, and
sabotage....
A case was recently brought to the Bureau's attention in
which a complaint involving potential espionage in a middle
western state was referred through routine channels of a
Treasury Department investigative agency and delayed in
such a manner before reference ultimately in Washington to
the office of Military Intelligence and then to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, that a period of some six weeks
elapsed. .. .93
During a recent investigation ... an attorney and Com-
mander of the American Legion Post .- . . disclosed that a
Committee of that Post of the American Legion is conducting
an investigation relating to un-American activities on behalf
of the Operator in Charge of the Secret Service, New York
City.9*
Consequently, at the FBI Director's request, the Justice Department
asked the Secret Service, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Nar-
cotics Bureau, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Post
Offic Department to instruct their personnel that information "relating
to espionage and subversive activities" should be promptly forwarded
to the FBI.95
The Justice Department letter did not solve the problem, mainly
because of the State Department's continued intervention. Director
Hoover advised Attorney General Frank Murphy "that the Treasury
Department and the State Department were reluctant to concede juris4
diction" to the FBI and that a conference had been held in the office
of an Assistant Secretary of State "at which time subtle protests
against the handling of cases of this type in the Justice Department
were uttered." Hoover protested this "continual bickering" among
Departments, especially "in view of the serious world conditions which
are hourly growing more alarming." 9
" Memorandum from Hoover to Murphy, 3/16/39.
g Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assist-
ant to the Attorney General, 1/18/39.
* Memorandum from Hoover to Murphy, 3/16/39.
Memorandum from Hoover to the Acting Assistant to the Attorney General,
5/5/39.
Letter of J. B. Keenan, Assistant to the Attorney General, 2/7/39. (Compare
the similar letter from Attorney General Murphy, omitting the term "subversive
activities," at p. 401, note-93.)
" Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/39.
Two months later the problem remained unresolved. Assistant See-
retary of State George S. Messersmith took on the role of "coordi-
nator" of a committee composed of representatives of the War, Navy,
Treasury, Post Office, and Justice Departments. The FBI Director
learned that under the proposed procedures, any agency receiving
information would refer it to the State Department which, after
analysis, would transmit the data to that agency which it believed
should conduct the substantive investigation. FBI and Justice Depart-
ment officials prepared a memorandum for possible presentation to
the President, pointing out the disadvantages of this procedure:
The inter-departmental committee by its operations of
necessity causes delay which may be fatal to a successful
investigation. It also results in a duplication of investigative
effort . . . because of the lack of knowledge of one agency
that another agency is working upon the same investigation.
The State department coordinator is not in a position to
evaluate properly the respective investigative ability of the
representatives of particular departments in a manner com-
parable to that which the men actually in charge of an investi-
gative agency may evaluate the proper merit of his own men.97
Endorsing this view, Attorney General Murphy wrote the President
to urge abandonment of this interdepartmental committee and "a
concentration of investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and
sabotage matters" in the FBI, the G-2 section of the War Department,
and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The directors of these agencies
would "function as a committee for the purpose of coordinating the
activities of their subordinates." To buttress his recommendation, the
Attorney General pointed out that the FBI and military intelligence:
... have not only gathered a tremendous reservoir of informa-
tion concerning foreign agencies operating in the United
States, but have also perfected methods of investigation and
have developed channels for the exchange of information,
which are both efficient and so mobile and elastic as to permit
prompt expansion in the event of an emergency.
Murphy stressed that the FBI was "a highly skilled investigative
force supported by the resources of an exceedingly efficient, well equip-
ped, and adequately manned technical laboratory and identification
division." This identification data related "to more than ten million
persons, including a very large number of individuals of foreign ex-
traction." The Attorney General added, "As a result of an exchange
of data between the Departments of Justice, War and Navy, com-
prehensive indices have been prepared." 9
President Roosevelt agreed to the Attorney General's proposal
and sent a confidential directive drafted by FBI and Justice Depart-
ment officials to the heads of the relevant departments. This June
1939 directive was the closest thing to a formal charter for FBI and
military domestic intelligence. It read as follows:
* Memorandum from E. A. Tamm to Hoover, 5/31/39.
Letter from Murphy to the President, 6/17/39.
It is my desire that the, investigation of all espionage, coun-
terespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and han-
dled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War
Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy
Department. The directors of these three agencies are to
function as a committee to coordinate their activities.
No investigations should be conducted by any investigative
agency of the Government into matters involving actually or
potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage,
except by the. three agencies mentioned above.
I shall 'be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other
investigative agencies than the three named, to refer imme-
diately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigationsany data, information, or material that may come to
their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, coun-
terespionage, or sabotage.99 [Emphasis added.]
The legal implications of this directive are clouded by its failure
to use the term "subversive activities" and its references instead to
potential espionage or sabotage and to information bearing indirectly
on espionage or sabotage. This language may have been an effort by
the Justice Department and the FBI to deal with the problem of legal
authority posed by the break with the State Department. Since the
FBI no longer wanted to base its domestic intelligence investigations
on State Department requests, some other way had to be found to re-
tain a semblance of congressional authorization. Yet the scope of the
FBI's assignment made -this a troublesome point. In 1936, President
Roosevelt had wanted intelligence about Communist and Fascist ac-
tivities generally, not just data bearing on potential espionage or
sabotage; and the 1938 plan provided for the FBI to investigate
"activities of either a subversive or a so-called intelligence type." 1oo
There is no indication that the President's June 1939 directive had the
intent or effect of limiting domestic intelligence to the investigation of
violations of law.
Consistent with the FBI Director's earlier desires, these arrange-
ments were kept secret until September 1939 when war broke out in
Europe. At that time Director Hoover decided that secrecy created
more problems than it solved, especially with regard to the activities
of local law enforcement. He learned that the New York City Police
Department had "created a special sabotage squad of fifty detec-
tives . .. and -that this squad will 'be augmented in the rather near
future to comprise 150 men." There had been "considerable publicity"
"Oon'fidential Memorandum of the President, 6/26/39. President Roosevelt
also dictated a separate additional memorandum for Secretary Hull which read,
in part, "This does not mean that the intelligence work of the State Department
should cease in any way. It should be carried on as heretofore but the directors
of the three agencies should be constantly kept in touch by the State Department
with the work it is doing." (Memorandum from the President to the Secretary
of State, 6/26/39.)
" Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President,
10/20/38.
with the result that private citizens were likely to transmit informa-
tion concerning sabotage "to the New York City Police Department
rather than to the FBI." calling this development to the attention of
the Attorney General, the Director strongly urged that the President
"issue a statement or request addressed to all police officials in the
United States" asking them to turn over to the FBI "any information
obtained pertaining to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and
neutrality regulations." o
A document to this effect was immediately drafted in the Attorney
General's office and dispatched by messenger to the White House with
a note from the Attorney General suggesting that it be issued in the
form of "a public statement".-a In recording his discussion that day
with the Attorney General's assistant, Alexander Holtzoff, FBI offi-
cial E. A. Tamm referred to the statement as "an Executive Order".
Tamm also talked with the Attorney General regarding*"the order":
Mr. Murphy stated that when he was preparing this he tried
to make it as strong as possible. He requested that I relay this
to Mr. Hoover as soon as possible and stated he knew the
Director would be very glad to hear this. Mr. Murphy stated
he prepared this on the basis of the memorandum which the
Director forwarded to him.103
The President's statement (or order or Executive Order) read as
follows:
The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of
Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters relat-
ing to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality
regulations.
This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effec-
tive manner on a national basis, and all information must be
carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion
and irresponsibility.
To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs, and other
law enforcement officers in the United -States promptly to
turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation any information obtained by them relating
to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities
and violations of the neutrality laws.104
The statement was widely reported in the press, along with the follow-
ing remarks by Attorney General Murphy at a news conference held
the same day:
Foreign agents and those engaged in espionage will no
longer find this country a happy hunting ground for their
a01 Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/6/39.
m Letter from Murphy to the President, 9/6/39.
"E. A. Tamm, Memoranda for the File, 9/6/39, 11:34 a.m., 12:47 p.m., 2:30
p.m., 6:20 p.m. This memorandum Indicates Tamm was told that the President's
statement would declare that the FBI was authorized to investigate "subver-
sive activities." There is no explanation for the disparity between this message
and the President's actual statement.
1M Statement of the President, 9/6/39.
activities. There will be no repetition of the confusion and
laxity and indifference of twenty years ago.
We have opened many new FBI offices throughout the land.
Our men are well prepared and well trained. At the same time,
if you want this work done in a reasonable and responsible
way it must not turn into a witch hunt. We must do no wrong
to any man.
Your government asks you to cooperate with it. You can
turn in any information to the nearest local representative of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.o5
Three weeks later Murphy reiterated that the government would
"not 'act on the basis of hysteria." He added, "Twenty years ago in-
human and cruel things were done in the name of justice; sometimes
vigilantes and others took over the work. We do not want such things
done today, for the work has now -been localized in the FBI." 106
Two days after issuing the FBI statement, President Roosevelt
proclaimed 'a national emergency "in connection with and to the ex-
tent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding, and enforcing
of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of our
national defense within the limits of 'peacetime authorizations." The
proclamation added, "Specific directions and authorizations will be
given from time to time for carrying out these two purposes." 107
Thereupon, he issued an Executive Order directing the Attorney
General to "increase the personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, Department of Justice, in such number, not exceeding 150, as
he shall find necessary for the proper performance of the additional
duties imposed upon the Department of Justice in connection with
the national emergency." 1o President Roosevelt told a press confer-
ence that the purpose of this order expanding the government's in-
vestigative personnel was to protect the country 'against "some of the
things that happened" before World War I:
There was sabotage; there was a great deal of propaganda by
both belligerents, and a good many definite plans laid in this
country by foreign governments to try to sway American
public opinion. . . . It is to guard against that, and against
the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this coun-
try which would tend to 'be subversive-I believe that is the
word-of our form of government. 109
President Roosevelt never formally authorized the FBI or mili-
tary intelligence to conduct domestic intelligence investigations of
"subversive activities," except for his oral instruction in 1936 and
1938. His written directives were limited to investigations of espionage,
sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations. Nevertheless,
the President clearly knew of and -approved informally the broad
investigations of "subversive activities" carried out by the FBI.
. New York Times, 9/7/39, p. 8, col. 1.
' New York Times, 10/1/39, p. 38, col. 3.
" Proclamation, 9/8/39, 54 Stat. 2643.
s Executive Order No. 8247, 9/8/39, cited in letter from Attorney General
Murphy to sthe President, 9/12/39, Roosevelt lIAbrary, Official File 14--b, Box 14.
.1939 Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 495-496.
President Roosevelt did use the term "subversive activities" in a
directive to Attorney General Robert Jackson on wiretapping in 1940.
This directive referred to the activities of other nations "engaged in
the organization of propaganda of so-called 'fifth columns'" and in
"preparation for sabotage." The Attorney General was directed to
authorize wiretapping "of persons suspected of subversive activities
against the Government of the United States, including suspected
spies." The President also instructed that such wiretaps be limited
"insofar as possible to aliens." "o
With respect to investigations generally, however, the confusion
as to precisely what President Roosevelt authorized is indicated by
Attorney General Francis Biddle's description of FBI jurisdiction in
1942 and by a new Presidential statement in 1943. Biddle issued a
lengthy order defining the duties of the various parts of the Justice
Department in September 1942. The pertinent section relating to the
FBI stated that it had a duty to "investigate" criminal offenses against
the United States and to act as a "clearing house" for the handling of
"espionage, sabotage, -and other subversive matters." I'l This latter
"clearing-house" function was characterized as a duty to "carry out"
the President's directive of September 6, 1939.
Four months later, President Roosevelt renewed his public appeal
for "police cooperation" and added a request that "patriotic organiza-
tions" cooperate with the FBI. This statement described his Septem-
ber 1939 order as granting "investigative" authority to the FBI and
not simply a "clearing-house" function. However, the President de-
fined that authority as limited to "espionage, sabotage, and violatin
of the neutrality regulations" without any mention of "subversion." 11
The statement was consistent with Attorney General Biddle's inter-
nal directive later in 1943 that the Justice Department's "proper func-
tion" was "investigating the activities of persons who may have vio-
lated the law." 114
A similar problem is.involved with the authority for "counteres-
pionage" operations by the FBI and military intelligence. President
Roosevelt's confidential order of June 1939 explicitly authorized the
FBI and military intelligence to handle counterespionage matters,
and the 1938 plan used the terms "counter-espionage" and "counter-
intelligence." However, none of the President's public directives for-
mally authorized counterespionage measures going beyond investiga-
n'Confidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General
Jackson, 5/21/40. In May 1941 the ISecretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy urged "a broadening of the investigative responsibility of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in the fields of subversive control of labor." (Memoran-
dum from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the Presi-
dent, 5/29/41.) The President replied that he was sending their letter to the At-
torney General with my general approval. (Memorandum from President Roose-
velt to the Secretaries of War and Navy, 6/4/41.) Attorney General Biddle's
response cited investigations under the recently enacted Smith Act. (Memoran-
dum from Attorney General Biddle to the President, 6/23/41.)
' Attorney General's Order No. 3732,9/25/42.
m Statement of the President on "Police Cooperation," 1/8/43. A note in
the President's handwriting added that the FBI was to receive information
"relating to espionage and related matters."
I' Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General
Hugh Cox and FBI Director Hoover, 7/16/43.
tion; and the Justice Department's -regulations made no reference to
this responsibility.
E. Congress and FBI Intelligence
Congress accepted this executive action as a necessary and inevitable
measure to cope with the emergency conditions arising from the war
in Europe.
In November 1939, FBI Director Hoover linked FBI intelligence
to both the President's September 6 statement and his September 8
proclamation and order during testimony on an emergency supple-
mental appropriation bill. He told the House Appropriations Com-
mittee that establishment of a General Intelligence Division "was made
necessary by the President's proclamation directing that all com-
plaints of violations of the national defense statutes and proclamations
be reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation." When asked "by
what authority" the FBI was expending funds for intelligence work
beyond its existing appropriation, Hoover replied, "By authority of
the President's proclamation directing the Attorney General to au-
thorize an increase in the staff of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
by 150 special agents and such additional clerical personnel and equip-
ment as would be needed." 5 The following exchange then took place
between Congressman Woodrum and the Director:
Mr. WOODRUM. Will these additional people be kept on
through the next fiscal year?
Mr. HoovER. If the emergency continues.
Mr. WOODRUM. If the emergency does not continue you
anticipate the force will be reduced?
Mr. HoovER. Yes. For instance, we have opened 10 new
field offices to conduct this work in various parts of the coun-
try. We opened another office in Savannah, one in Baltimore,
one at Albany, in manufacturing and shipping centers as well
as points wherein huge naval bases are maintained.
Mr. WOODRUM. And if the emergency ceases the need for the
additional force will cease?
Mr. HoovER. Yes.
Director Hoover also pointed out that this expansion would increase
the number of FBI agents from 797 to 947.116
In his next appearance before the Appropriations Committee, the
Director dropped reference to the President's proclamation of emer-
gency and relied for his "authority" on the "formal statement" of
September 6 which he described as "directing that there be coordinated
under the Federal Bureau of Investigation all the matters of investi-
gative work relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neu-
trality regulations, and any other subversive activities." 117
Six months later the Director told the Appropriations Committee
that the FBI had a National Defense Division to "handle and direct
"4 Hoover did not refer to the provision of the appropriations statute linked
to the State Department which he h'ad relied upon for authority before 1939.
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1940, Hearings before the
House Committee on Appropriations, 11/30/39, pp. 303-307.
' Ju8tice Department Appropriation Bill, 1941, Hearings before the House
Committee on Appropriations, 1/5/40, p. 151.
all investigations dealing with espionage, sabotage, national-defense
matters, and violations of the neutrality statutes." He once again cited
the President's "order of September 6, 1939," saying that it "directed
the Bureau to coordinate the functions on national defense matters in
intelligence work." 118 In early 1941, Director Hoover had this ex-
change with members of the Appropriations Committee:
Mr. LUDLOW. At the close of the present emergency, when
peace comes, it would mean that such of this emergency work
necessarily will be discontinued.
Mr. HOOVER. This is correct.
Mr. TABER. Is your set-up for the national-defense work
separate from the other work?
Mr. HoovER. It is.
Mr. TABRm. Is it operated as a separate division?
Mr. HoovER. Yes. In the field our field offices are under in-
structions to utilize approximately 50 percent of the person-
nel on national defense work and the other 50 percent on the
regular work.
Mr. TABER. But if some rush comes up, you might have to
vary that?
Mr. HoovER. That is correct.
Mr. TABER. According to the situation.
Mr. HoovER. According to the emergency that might arise.
If the national emergency should terminate, the structure
dealing with national defense can immediately be discontin-
ued or very materially curtailed according to the wishes of
Congress.
The FBI was seeking a deficiency appropriation for "700 additional
field agents, 500 of whom would be used on national defense investi-
gations, and 200 on the investigation of violations of the Selective
Service Act." 19
The FBI Director's appropriations testimony in 1939 and 1940
spelled out certain aspects of FBI intelligence programs and policies.
The Director stated in 1939 that the General Intelligence Division had
"compiled extensive indices of individuals, groups, and organizations
engaged in . . . subversive activities, in espionage activities, or any
activities that are possibly detrimental to the internal security of the
United States." Hoover added,
These indexes have been arranged not only alphabetically but
also geographically, so that at any time, should we enter into
the conflict abroad, we would be able to go into any of these
communities and identify individuals and groups who might
be a source of grave danger to the security of this country.
Their backgrounds and activities are known to the Bureau.
These indexes will be extremely important and valuable in
grave emergency.
Supplemental National Defense Appropriations, 1941, Hearings before the
House Committee on Appropriations, 6/6/40, p. 180.
'"First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1941, Hearings before the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 2/19/41, pp. 179, 188-189.
The FBI had established a translation section "to review various
foreign-language material" and a code section for "decoding any mes-
sages which we are able to intercept or obtain." With the agreement
of military intelligence, the FBI also handled the protection of defense
plants and advised industry officials on security measures.120 The FBI
Director reiterated these points in early 1940, adding that military
and naval intelligence were "conducting no investigations in matters
other than those connected with the military forces." He described the
"general index" as being "available .. .so that in the event of any
greater emergency . . . we will be able to locate immediately these
various persons who may need to be the subject of further investigation
by the Federal authorities." 121 Later in 1940 the Director said that the
"general intelligence index" included the names of persons "who may
become potential enemies to our internal security, such as known
espionage agents, known saboteurs, leading members of the Commu-
nist Party, and the bund." The last referred to various pro-Nazi
organizations of German-Americans.122
There was one important side effect of the confused legal basis for
domestic intelligence. It allowed the Attorney General to deflect criti-
cism of the FBI from another congressional source in 1940. Since the
President's formal public directive could be construed as simply des-
ignating the FBI to take charge of the investigation of espionage,
sabotage, and neutrality violations, Attorney General Robert Jackson
was able to respond to criticism from Senator George Norris by
declaring:
Mr. Hoover is in agreement with me that the principles
which Attorney General Stone laid down in 1924 when the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was reorganized and Mr.
Hoover appointed as Director are sound, and that the useful-
ness of the Bureau depends upon a faithful adherence to those
limitations.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation will confine its activ-
ities to the investigation of violation of Federal statutes, the
collecting of evidence in cases in which the United States
is or may be a party in interest, and the service of process
issued by the courts.123
Attorney General Jackson may have hoped to- circumscribe FBI do-
mestic intelligence within these limits, but the program developed in
1936-1939 went far beyond them. Consequently, the Attorney General's
statement was at best a misleading description of executive policy.
Congress did have an opportunity in 1940 to enact a basic legislative
charter for FBI intelligence. Representative Emmanuel Celler intro-
duced a joint resolution which provided:
That the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department
of Justice be authorized and directed to conduct investiga-
1939 Hearings, pp. 304-305.
m January 1940 Hearings, pp. 152-154.
m June 1940 Hearings, p. 181.
'Letter from Attorney General Robert H. Jackson to Senator George Norris,
86 Cong. Rec. 5642-5643, cited in Max Lowenthal, The Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (New York: Sloane, 1950), p. 445.
tions, subject to the direction of the Attorney General, to
ascertain, prevent, and frustrate any interference with the
national defense by sabotage, treason, seditious conspiracy
(as defined in 18 U.S.C. 6), espionage, violations of the neu-
trality laws, or in any other manner.
The resolution would have permitted FBI wiretapping for these
purposes under the specific authorization of the Attorney General.
1 24
The measure was endorsed by Attorney General Robert Jackson, but
it was not passed. Consequently, except for the FBI Director's appro-
priations testimony, Congress played no role in authorizing the estab-
lishment of domestic intelligence operations.
Instead, Congress enacted two general statutes to deal with "subver-
sive activities". The Smith Act of 1940 made it a federal crime to urge
military insubordination or advocate the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment.12 5 And the Voorhis Act of 1941 required the registration of
all "subversive" organizations having foreign links and advocating
the violent overthrow of the government.12 6 The Smith Act has been
described as containing "the most drastic restrictions on freedom of
speech ever enacted in the United States during peace." It was passed
with little publicity and only brief floor debate as part of the Alien
Registration Act of 1940, which appeared to most observers to deal
only with fingerprinting foreigners.'2 7
The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act, along with the previously en-
acted Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, offer an insight into
the way threats to domestic security were perceived before World War
II. The Foreign Agents Registration Act was the product of an investi-
gation of pro-Nazi and Communist activities by the Special House
Committee on Un-American Activities headed by Representatives
John McCormack and Samuel Dickstein in 1935-1936. The Commit-
tee's principal recommendation was legislation requiring the registra-
tion of foreign agents disseminating propaganda in the United
States.128 The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act carried this idea be-
yond "foreign agents". Thus, the Smith Act has been authoritatively
described in the following terms: "From its inception this act was in-
tended to combat and resist the organization of Fascist and Communist
groups owing allegiance to foreign governments whose operations and
activities were clearly contrary and dangerous to the Government of
the United States." 129
In other words, the danger to domestic security was under-
stood as including American citizens whose political activities
might lead them to serve the interests of opposing nations. Attor-
m H.J. Res. 571, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940). See also Permitting Wire Tapping
in Certain Cases, report to accompany H.J. Res. 571, House Committee on the
Judiciary, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 14, 1940).
1 18 U.S.C. 2385, 2387.
m 18 U.S.C. 2386.
" Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1941), pp. 439-441.
12 22 U.S.C. 611-621. See Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda, H. Rept.
153 (February 15,1935).
' Report of the Commission on Government Security (1957), p. 621. The Ad-
ministrative Director of this Commission was D. Milton Ladd, who was Assistant
Director for the FBI Intelligence Division during the 1940s and Assistant to the
Director in charge of all FBI intelligence and criminal investigations until 1954.
ney General Jackson used the term "Fifth Column" in 1940 to charac-
terize "that portion of our population which is ready to give assistance
or encouragement in any form to invading or opposing ideologies." He
told a conference of state officials that the FBI's intelligence mission
involved "steady surveillance over individuals and groups within the
United States who are so sympathetic with the systems or designs of
foreign dictators as to make them a likely source of federal law viola-
tion." 1no
The assumption that such persons and organizations posed a direct
and immediate threat to the nation's security was not seriously ques-
tioned, although there was disagreement over the need for criminal
prosecution or registration of "subversives" because of their political
advocacy. Attorney General Jackson could endorse FBI domestic
intelligence surveillance at the same time as he warned against prosecu-
tion of "subversive activity." It was a dangerous concept, Jackson told
federal prosecutors, because there were "ho definite standards to deter-
mine what constitutes a 'subversive activity,' such as we have for mur-
der or larcency." Attorney General Jackson added,
Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners,
persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the strug-
gle for existence may be regarded as "subversive" by those
whose property interests might be burdened thereby. Those
who are in office are apt to regard as "subversive" the activities
of any of those who would bring about a change of ad-minis-
tration. Some of our soundest constitutional doctrines were
once punished as subversive. We must not forget that it was
not so long ago that both the term "Republican" and the term
"Democrat" were epithets with sinister meaning to denote per-
sons of radical tendencies that were "subversive" of the order
of things then dominant.131
However, political organizations directly controlled by a potential
enemy nation were considered to be different, especially when war was
already underway in Europe. Germany and the Soviet Union (who, it
should be remembered, were allied by treaty in 1939-1941) directed the
international Nazi and Communist movements with well-organized
followings in the United States.
In his effort to discourage prosecutions and to persuade the nation
that FBI intelligence could handle any threats, Attorney General
Jackson failed to acknowledge the risks to individual rights from
unregulated federal surveillance. With no clear legislative or execu-
tive standards to keep it within the intended bounds, the FBI (and
military intelligence in its sphere) had almost complete discretion to
decide how far domestic intelligence investigations would extend. Only
in retrospect as a Justice of the Supreme Court did Robert Jackson rec-
ognize these dangers. Shortly before his death in 1954 he wrote:
I cannot say that our country could have no central police
without becoming totalitarian, but I can say with great con-
1 Proceedings of the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems
of National Defense (August 5-6, 1940).
m Robert H. Jackson, "The Federal Prosecutor," Journal of the American
Judicature Society (June 1940), p. 18.
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viction that it cannot become totalitarian without a central-
ized national police. . . . All that is necessary is to have a
national police competent to investigate all manner of offenses,
'and then, in the parlance of the streets, it will have enough on
enough people, even if it does not elect to prosecute them, so
that it will find no opposition to its policies. Even those who
are supposed to supervise it are likely to fear it. I believe that
the safeguard of our liberty lies in limiting any national polic-
ing or investigative organization, first of all to a small number
of strictly federal offenses, and second to nonpolitical ones.
The fact that we may have confidence in the administration
of a federal investigative agency under its existing head does
not mean that it may not revert again to the days when the
Department of Justice was headed by men to whom the inves-
tigative power was a weapon to be used for their own pur-
poses.132 [Emphasis -added.]
F. The Scope of FBI Domestic Intelligence
A central feature of the FBI domestic intelligence program author-
ized by President Roosevelt was its broad investigative scope. The
breadth of intelligence-gathering most clearly demonstrates why the
program could not have been based on any reasonable interpretation
of the power to investigate violations of law. The investigations were
built upon a theory of "subversive inifiltration" which remained an
essential part of domestic intelligence thereafter. This theory persisted
over the decades in the same way the Roosevelt directives continued in
effect as the basis for legal authority. Moreover, there was a direct
link between the policy of investigating "subversive" influence and
the reliance on inherent executive power. The purpose of such investi-
gations was not to assist in the enforcement of criminal laws, but
rather to supply the President and other executive officials with in-
formation believed to be of value for making decisions and developing
governmental policies. This "pure intelligence" function was precisely
what President Roosevelt meant when he asked for "a broad picture"
of the impact of Communism and Fascism on American life.
A second purpose for broad domestic intelligence investigations
was to compile an extensive body of information for use in the event
of an emergency or actual war. This information would supply the
basis for taking preventive measures against groups or individuals
disposed to interfere with the national defense effort. If such inter-
ference might take the form of sabotage or other illegal disruptions
of defense production and military discipline, the collection of pre-
ventive intelligence was related to law enforcement. But the relation-
ship was often remote and highly speculative, based on political affilia-
tions and group membership rather than any tangible evidence of
preparation to commit criminal acts. As the likelihood of American
involvement in the war moved closer, preventive intelligence investi-
gations focused on whether individuals should be placed on a Custo-
dial Detention List for possible arrest in case of war. This program
" Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Govern-
ment (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963), pp. 70-71.
was developed jointly by the FBI and a special Justice Department
unit in 1940-1941.
These two objectives--"pure intelligence" and preventive intelli-
gence-were closely related to one another. Investigations designed to
produce information about subversive infiltration also identified in-
dividuals thought potentially dangerous to the country's security.
Likewise, investigations of persons alleged to be security threats con-
tributed to the overall domestic intelligence picture.
Internal FBI instructions described the scope of surveillance in
detail. On September 2, 1939, all FBI field offices were ordered to
review their files and secure information from "reliable contacts"
in order to prepare reports- on "persons of German, Italian, and Com-
munist sympathies," -as well as other persons "whose interest may be
directed primarily to the interest of some other nation than the
United States." Such information included "a list of the subscribers"
and officers of all German and Italian language newspapers in the
United States, language newspapers published by the Communist
Party or "its affiliated organizations," and both foreign and English
language newspapers "of pronounced or notorious Nationalistic
sympathies." FBI offices were also instructed to identify members of
all German and Italian societies, "whether they be of a fraternal
character or of some other nature," and of "any other organization,
regardless of nationality, which might have pronounced Nationalistic
tendencies." 13
In October 1939 the FBI was investigating the Communist Party
and the German American Bund, using such techniques as "the em-
ployment of informants," "research into publications," "the soliciting
and obtaining of assistance and information from political emigres,
and organizations which have for their purpose the maintenance of
files of information bearing upon this type of study and inquiry," and
"the attendance of mass meetings and public demonstrations." The
compilation of information on other organizations and groups "ex-
pressing nationalist leanings" continued pursuant to the September
1939 instructions. In addition, the FBI was conducting "confidential
inquiries" regarding "the various so-called radical and fascist orga-
nizations in the United States" for the purpose of identifying their
"leading personnel, purposes and aims, and the part they are likely
to play at a time of national crisis." 134
In November 1939, the FBI began preparing a list of specific in-
dividuals "on whom information is available indicating strongly
that [their] presence at liberty in this country in time of war or
national emergency would constitute a menace to the public peace and
safety of the United States Government." The list comprised
persons "with strong Nazi tendencies" and "with strong Communist
tendencies." The citizenship status of each individual was determined,
and cards prepared summarizing the reasons for placing him on the
list.135
FBI field offices were instructed to obtain information on such per-
sons from "public and private records, confidentia1 sources of infor-
m Memorandum from Hoover to Field Offices, 9/2/39.
m Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to Hoover, 10/30/39.
Memorandum for E. A. Tamm, 11/9/39.
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mation, newspaper morgues, public libraries, employment records,
school records, et cetera." FBI agents were to keep the purpose of
their inquiries "entirely confidential" and to reply to questions by
stating 'as a cover that the investigation was being made in connection
with "the Registration Act requiring agents of foreign principals to
register with the State Department." 136 FBI headquarters super-
visors divided the list into two categories:
Class #1. Those to be apprehended and interned immedi-
ately upon the outbreak of hostilities between the Govern-
ment of the United States and the Government they serve,
support, or owe allegiance to.
Class #2. Those who should be watched carefully at and
subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities because their previous
activities indicate the possibility but not the probability that
they will act in a manner adverse to the best interests of the
Government of the United States.'"'
This program was described as a "custodial detention" list in June
1940, and field offices were again instructed to furnish information on
persons possessing "Communistic, Fascist, Nazi or other nationalistic
background." 138
The primary subjects of FBI intelligence surveillance under this
program in mid-1940 were active Communists (including Communist
candidates for public offices, party officers and organizers, speakers at
Communist rallies, writers of Communist books or articles, individuals
"attending Communistic meetings where revoluationary preachings
are given," Communists in strategic operations "or holding any posi-
tion of potential influence," and Communist agitators who participate
"in meetings or demonstrations accompanied by violence"), all mem-
bers of the German-American Bund and similar organizations, Italian
Fascist organizations, and American Fascist groups such as "Silver
Shirts, Ku Klux Klan, White Camelia, and similar organizations." 139
Director Hoover summarized these "subversive activities" in a memo-
randum to the Justice Department:
the holding of official positions in organizations such as the
German-American Bund and Communist groups; the dis-
tribution of literature and propaganda favorable to a foreign
power and opposed to the American way of life; agitators
who are adherents of foreign ideologies who have for their
purpose the stirring up of internal strike [sic], class hatreds
and the development of activities which in time of war would
be 'a serious handicap in a program of internal security and
national defense . . .1o
Director Hoover claimed publicly in 1940 that advocates of foreign
"isms" had "succeeded in boring into every phase of American life,
I Memorandum from Hoover to Field Offices, 12/6/39.
m Memorandum for E. A. Tamm, 12/2/39.
." Memorandum from Hoover to Field Offices, 6/15/40.
m Memorandum for the Director, 8/19/40.
1 Memorandum from Hoover to M. F. McGuire, the Assistant to the Attorney
General, 8/21/40.
masquerading behind front organizations." 141 Intelligence about
"front" groups was transmitted to the White House. For example, in
1937 the Attorney General had sent an FBI report on a proposed pil-
grimage to Washington to urge passage of legislation to benefit Amer-
ican youth. The report stated that the American Youth Congress,
which sponsored the pilgrimage, was understood to be strongly Com-
munistic.142 Later reports in 1937 described the Communist Party's
role in plans by the Workers Alliance for nationwide demonstrations
protesting the plight of the unemployed, as well as the Alliance's plans
to lobby Congress in support of the federal relief system.' 4 3
FBI investigations and reports (which went into Justice Depart-
ment and FBI permanent files) covered entirely lawful domestic
political activities. For example, one local group checked by the
Bureau was called the League for Fair Play, which furnished "speak-
ers to Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs and to schools and colleges." The
FBI reported in 1941 that:
the organization was formed in 1937, apparently by two Min-
isters and a businessman for the purpose of furthering fair
play, tolerance, adherence to the Constitution, democracy,
liberty, justice, understanding and good will among all creeds,
races and classes of the United States.
A synopsis of the report stated, "No indications of Communist activ-ities." 144 In 1944 the FBI prepared a more extensive intelligence
report on an active political group, the Independent Voters of Illinois,
apparently because it was the target of Communist "infiltration." The
Independent Voters group was reported to have been formed:
for the purpose of developing neighborhood political units
to help in the re-election of President Roosevelt and the elec-
tion of progressive congressmen. Apparently, IVI endorsed
or aided Democrats for the most part, although it was stated
to be "independent". It does not appear that it entered its
own candidates or that it endorsed any Communists. IVI
sought to help elect those candidates who would favor fight-
ing inflation, oppose race and class discrimination, favor in-
ternational cooperation, support a "full-employment pro-
gram," oppose Fascism, etc. 45
Thus, the Bureau gathered data about left-liberal groups in its search
for subversive "influence." At the opposite end of the political spec-
trum, the activities of numerous right-wing groups like the Christian
Front and Christian Mobilizers (followers of Father Coughlin), the
American Destiny Party, the American Nationalist Party, and even
14 Proceedings of the Federal-State conference on Law Enforcement Problems
of National Defense, 8/5-6/40.
'u Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President (and enclosure),
1/30/37. (FDR Library.)
14 Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President (and enclosure)
8/13/37. (FDR Library.)
'"Report of New York City Field Office, 10/22/41, summarized in Justice De-
part memorandum from S. Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn, 10/10/47.
"e Report of Chicago Field Office, 12/29/44, summarized in Justice Department
memorandum from S. Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn, 10/9/47.
the less extreme "America First" movement were reported by the
FBI.146
The Bureau even looked into a Bronx, New York, child care center
which was "apparently dominated and run" by Communists to deter-
mine whether it was being used as a "front" for carrying out the Com-
munist program. 4 7
One example of the nature of continuing intelligence investigations
is the FBI's reports on the NAACP. The Washington, D.C. Field Of-
fice opened the case in 1941 because of a request from the Navy Depaift-
ment for an investigation of protests against racial discrimination in
the Navy by "fifteen colored mess attendants." FBI agents used an in-
formant to determine the NAACP's "connections with the communist
party and other communist controlled organizations." 148
FBI headquarters sent a request to the Oklahoma City Field Office
in August 1941 for an investigation of "Communist Party donina-
tion" of the NAACP in connection with the development of "National-
istic Tendency Charts." The field office report concluded, on the basis
of an informant's reports, "that there is a strong tendency for the
NAACP to steer clear of Communistic activities. Nevertheless, there
is a strong movement on the part of the Communists to attempt to
dominate this group through an infiltration of Communistic doctrines.
Consequently, the activities of the NAACP will be closely observed
and scrutinized in the future."
FBI informants subsequently reported on NAACP conferences at
Hampton, Virginia, in the fall of 1941 and at Los Angeles in the
summer of 1942. These investigations were conducted "to follow the
activities of the NAACP and determine further the advancement of
the Communist group has made into that organization." 10 Similar
reports came to headquarters from field offices in Richmond, Virginia;
Springfield and Chicago, Illinois; Boston, Massachusetts; Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma; Indianapolis, Indiana; Savannah, Georgia; and
Louisville, Kentucky, in 1942-1943. Informants were used to report
on efforts "to place before the NAACP certain policies or ideas which
... may be favorable to the Communist Party." 15 An informant
attended an NAACP convention in South Carolina in June 1943 and
reported on his conversations with NAACP counsel Thurgood Mar-
shall. The informant believed that Marshall was "a loyal American"
and "would not permit anything radical to be done." 152
Informants for the Oklahoma City Field Office reported on Com-
munist efforts to "infiltrate" the NAACP and advised that the Com-
munist Party would "be active" at a forthcoming NAACP confer-
ence." 3 On the other hand, an informant for the Chicago office reported
"no evidence that there is any Communist infiltration in the Chicago
Justice Department memorandum re Christian Front, 10/28/41.
m Report of New York City Field Office, 9/7/45, summarized in Justice Depart-
ment memorandum from S. Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn, 10/9/47.
Report of Washington, D.C. Field Office, 3/11/41.
'4 0Report of Oklahoma City Field Office, 9/19/41.
Report of Los Angeles Field Office, 7/27/42; report of Norfolk, Virginia Field
Office, 4/18/42.
m Report of Louisville, Kentucky Field Office, 2/13/43.
m.. Report of Savannah, Georgia Field Office, 9/9/43.
'w Report of Oklahoma City Field Office, 10/29/43.
branch." 154 And informants for the Detroit office advised that there
were "numerous contacts by the CP members and NAACP members,
some collaboration on issues which affect negroes, presence of CP
members at NAACP meetings, interest of CP in NAACP, but no
evidence of CP control." as5
FBI investigation of the NAACP reflected in these and other reports
to headquarters produced massive information in Bureau files about
the organization, its members, their legitimate activities to oppose
racial discrimination, and internal disputes within some of the chap-
ters. One thirty-five page report contained the names of approximately
250 individuals and groups, all indexed in a table of contents. 56 The
reports and their summaries contained little if any information about
specific activities or planned activities in violation of federal law.
The scope of the information compiled through these investigations
of alleged Communist "infiltration" is indicated by an FBI estimate
that by 1944 "almost 1,000,000 people knowingly or unknowingly had
been drawn into Communist-Front activity." '57
G. The Custodial Detention Program
The epitome of preventive intelligence was the Custodial Deten-
tion Program established by the FBI and the Justice Department in
1940-1941. It should not be confused with the internment of Japanese-
Americans in 1942. Both the FBI and military intelligence opposed
the massive infringement of human rights which -occurred in 1942
when 112,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans were placed in deten-
tion camps-a decision made by President Roosevelt and ratified by
the Congress. The authoritative histories stress the crucial influence of
the Army's Provost Marshal General and his "empire-building" ma-
chinations, especially in reaction to a pre-war decision transferring
responsibility for alien enemy internment to the Justice Department.'"
The mass detention of American citizens solely on the basis of race
was exactly what the Custodial Detention Program was designed to
prevent. Its purpose was to enable the government to make individual
decisions as to the dangerousness of enemy aliens and citizens who
might be arrested in the event of war. Moreover, when the program
was implemented after Pearl Harbor, it was limited to dangerous
enemy aliens; and the plans for internment of potentially dangerous
American citizens were never carried out.
The most significant aspects of the Custodial Detention Program
bear upon the relationship between the FBI and the Attorney General.
Director Hoover opposed Attorney General Robert Jackson's attempt
in 1940 to require Departmental supervision; and when Attorney
General Francis Biddle abolished the Custodial Detention List in
1943, the FBI Director did not comply with his order.
Director Hoover asked Attorney General Jackson in June 1940
for policy guidance "concerning a suspect list of individuals whose
Report of Chicago Field Office, 11/24/43.
Report of Detroit Field Office, 1/15/44.
'" Report of Detroit Field Office, 1/15/44.
m Whitehead, The FBI Story, p. 329.
" See Roger Daniels, concentration Camps USA: Japanese-Americans and
World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971); Stetson Conn,
et al., The United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere:
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts: (1964).
arrest might be considered necessary in the event the United States
becomes involved in war." 159 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson
advised the Attorney General in August that the War Department
had emergency plans providing "for the custody of such alien enemies
as may be ordered interned" and suggested that they be discussed
between military and Justice Department officials.1eo To deal with
these matters, Attorney General Jackson assigned responsibility to
the head of a newly created Neutrality Laws Unit in the Justice
Department. This Unit was later renamed the Special War Policies
Unit and undertook Departmental planning for the war, as well as
analysis and evaluation of FBI intelligence reports and the review
of names placed on the Custodial Detention List.
The FBI Director initially resisted the plan for Justice Department
supervision. He told the head of the Special Unit that the Department's
program created "the very definite possibility of disclosure of certain
counter-espionage activities." '1 Hoover added,
The personnel which would handle this work upon the be-
half of the Department ... should be selected with a great
deal of care. We in the FBI have endeavored to assure the ut-
most secrecy and confidential character of our reports and
records. To turn over to the Department this great collection
of material in toto . . . means that the Department must as-
sume the same responsibility for any leaks or disclosure which
might be prejudicial to the continued internal security of our
country. Obviously, the identity of many of our confidential
informants will become known to such personnel. ... The
life and safety of these informants are at stake if their iden-
tities should become known to any outside persons.
Hoover also feared that if the Department took any overt administra-
tive action or prosecution, "the identity of confidential informants
now used by the Bureau would become known." This would "cut off
that source of information in so far as continued counter-espionage
might be concerned in that case." He claimed that if the Attorney Gen-
eral approved the plan, it would mean the Justice Department was
"ready to abandon its facilities for obtaining information in the sub-
versives field." 162
Attorney General Jackson refused to give in to the FBI Director.
After five months of negotiation, the FBI was ordered to transmit its
"dossiers" to the Justice Department Unit.x3 To satisfy the FBI's
' Cited in memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General,
10/16/40.
"0 Memorandum from Stimson to the Attorney General, 8/26/40.
'It is not clear whether Hoover may have had in mind the secret arrange-
ments with British intelligence established at that time at President Roosevelt's
instructions. These arrangements have recently been made public in a book based
on previously classified British records. [William Stevenson, A man Called In-
trepid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.) ].
'"Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to L. M. C. Smith, Chief Neutrality
Laws Unit, 11/28/40.
10 Memorandum from M. F. McGuire, Assistant to the Attorney General, to
J. Edgar Hoover and L. M. C. Smith, 4/21/41.
concerns, the Department agreed that any formal proceeding would -be
postponed or suspended if the FBI indicated that it "might interfere
with sound investigative techniques." The FBI was assured that the
plan "does not involve any abandonment by the Department of its
present facilities for obtaining information in connection with subver-
sive activities by surveillance or counterespionage." There would be
"no public disclosure of any confidential informants . . . without the
prior approval of the Bureau." 164 Thus, from 1941 until 1943 the Jus-
tice Department had the machinery to oversee at least this aspect of
FBI domestic intelligence.
The wartime detention plans envisioned entirely civilian proceed-
ings for arrest of alien enemies following a Presidential proclamation
pursuant to statutory provisions, and all warrants would be authorized
and issued by the Attorney General.165 Separate instructions stated
that, with respect to American citizens on the list and "not subject to
internment," a Departmental committee would consider whether spe-
cific persons should be prosecuted under the Smith Act of 1940 "or
some other appropriate statute" in the event of war.8 6
FBI instructions to the field reiterated the types of organizations
whose members should be investigated under the Custodial Detention
Program. In addition to the groups listed in 1940, the order included
the Socialist Workers Party (Trotskyite), the Proletarian Party,
Lovestoneites, "or any of the other Communistic organizations, or ...
their numerous 'front' organizations," as well as persons reported as
"pronouncedly pro-Japanese." 167
FBI officials were concerned that the Department plan did not pro-
vide sufficiently for action against citizens. In addition to the Smith
Act of 1940, FBI officials pointed out to the Department "the possibil-
ity of utilizing denaturalization proceedings." At the FBI's request,
the Special Departmental Unit prepared "a study of the control of
citizens suspected of subversive activities." As later summarized by the
FBI, the study stressed:
... the great need for a federal overall plan of legislation to
control suspected citizens, rather than isolated statutes
which would care for particular citizens. . .. It was pointed
out that the British system of defense legislation had been to
enact a general enabling statute under which the executive
authority is permitted to promulgate rules and regulations
having the effect of law, and it was suggested that, if this
country entered the war, a similar type of statute should be
enacted which would enable the President to set up a system
of regulations subject to immediate change and addition as the
need arose. 16 8
Attorney General Francis Biddle did not endorse this position. In-
stead, the Department's Special Unit relied upon recently enacted
'"Memorandum from M. F. McGuire to J. Edgar Hoover, 4/17/41.
Memorandum from M. F. McGuire to Hoover, 4/17/41.
'"Memorandum from McGuire to Hoover, and L. M. C. Smith, 4/21/41.
'" Memorandum from Hoover to Field Offices, 4/30/41.
. Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the Director, 2/27/46.
specific statutes as the basis for its planning. These included the For-
eign Agents Registration Act of 1938, the Smith Act of 1940 making
it a federal crime to urge military insubordination or advocate the vio-
lent overthrow of the government, and the Voorhis Act of 1941 requir-
ing the registration of organizations having foreign ties and advocat-
ing the violent overthrow of the government.
Acting at "the post-investigative level," the Special War Policies
Unit considered these and other statutes as the basis for coordinating
"affirmative action on the internal security front." Its annual report
in 1942 stated:
The Unit deals with new forms of political warfare. As part
of its equipment, it has engaged analysts with special ex-
perience and schooling in the field of political organization
and ideologies. The Unit has not only sought to collate in-
formation regarding dangerous individuals and organiza-
tions; it has sought to bring together a trained staff equipped
to understand the methods, beliefs, relationships and sub-
versive techniques of such individuals and organizations for
the purposes of initiating appropriate action.-"9
During the period 1941-1943 the Special Unit included a Foreign
Agents Registration Section, a Sedition Section, an Organizations and
Propaganda Analysis Section, and a Subversives Administration com-
posed of a Nazi and Fascist Section and a Communist Section. The
pecial Unit initiated such wartime measures as the internment of
several thousand enemy aliens, the denaturalization of members of the
German-American Bund who had become American citizens, sedition
prosecutions, exclusion of publications from the mails, and prosecution
of foreign propaganda agents. The Unit received and analyzed reports
from the FBI, the State Department, the Office of War Information,
and the Office of Strategic Services. Attorney General Biddle abolished
the Special Unit in July 1943 and transferred its prosecutive functions
to the Criminal Division. 7 0
In 1943, Attorney General Francis Biddle also decided that the Cus-
todial Detention List had outlived its usefulness and that it was based
on faulty assumptions. His directive to the FBI and the Departmental
Unit stated:
There is no statutory authorization or other present justifi-
cation for keeping a "custodial detention" list of citizens. The
Department fulfills its proper function by investigating the
activities of persons who may have violated the law. It is not
aided in this work by classifying persons as to dangerous-
ness.
Apart from these general considerations, it is now clear to
me that this classification system is inherently unreliable.
* Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1942, p. 209.
.o Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1944, pp. 17, 234-247.
From 1940 to 1943, a National Defense Section on the Criminal Division had
supervised espionage and Selective Service prosecutions. It was renamed the
Internal Security Section in 1943.
The evidence used for the purpose of making the classifica-
tions was inadequate; the standards applied to the evidence
for the purpose of making the classifications were defective;
and finally, the notion that it is possible to make a valid de-
termination as to how dangerous a person is in the abstract
and without reference to time, environment, and other- rele-
vant circumstances, is impractical, unwise, and dangerous.' 7'
Upon receipt of this order, the FBI Director did not abolish the FBI's
list. Instead, he changed its name from Custodial Detention List to
Security Index."2 The new index continued to be composed of indi-
viduals "who may be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the public
safety or internal security of the United States." Instructions to the
field stated:
The fact that the Security Index and Security Index Cards
are prepared and maintained should be considered strictly
confidential, and should at no time be mentioned or alluded to
in investigative reports, or discussed with agencies or individ-
uals outside the Bureau other than duly qualified representa-
tives of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military In-
telligence Division, and then only on a strictly confidential
basis.7 3
The Attorney General and the Justice Department were apparently
not informed of the FBI's decision to continue the program for dan-
gerousness classification under a different name.
Moreover, FBI investigations did not conform to Attorney General
Biddle's statement that the Justice Department's proper function was
investigation of "the activities of persons who may -have violated the
law." The FBI Director's instructions at the end of the war empha-
sized that the Bureau investigated activities "of prosecutive or intelli-
gence significance." " However, towards the end of the war, the FBI
did limit substantially its investigation of individual Communists.
Orders to the field requiring investigation of every member of the
Communist Political Association (as the Party was named in 1943-
1945) were modified in 1944, when field offices were instructed to con-
fine their ihvestigations to "key figures in the national or regional
units of the CPA." This directive received "widely varying interpre-
tations" in the field, and many offices "continued to open cases on the
basis of membership alone." Further instructions in April 1945 stated
that investigations were restricted to "key figures" or "potential key
figures" rather than on all members as had been the policy before 1944.
1n Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General
Cox and J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, 7/16/43.
"' Director Hoover interpreted the Attorney General's order as applying only
to the list maintained by the Justice Department's special unit. (Memorandum
from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness Classification,
8/14/43.)
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness
Classification, 8/14/43.
'" Bureau Bulletin No. 55, Series 1945, 9/12/45.
Security Index cards were "prepared only on those individuals of the
greatest importance to the Communist movement." 175
At the end of the war the head of the FBI Intelligence Division,
D. M. Ladd, recommended to Director Hoover another cutback in
operations. This proposal was approved by the FBI Executive Con-
ference; and the State Department and the Justice Department's
Criminal Division were advised of the changes. 7 FBI field offices were
. . . instructed to immediately discontinue all general indi-
vidual security matter investigations in all nationalistic cate-
gories with the specific exceptions of cases involving Com-
munists, Russians, individuals whose nationalistic tendencies
result from ideological or organizational affiliation with
Marxist groups such as the Socialist Workers Party, the
Workers Party, the Revolutionary Workers League or other
groups of similar character and members of the Nationalist
Party of Puerto Rico.
The FBI would open "no new general individual security matter in-
vestigations ... unless they fall within the above specific exceptions."
However, the instructions permitted the field to continue investigating
"individuals whose activities are of paramount intelligence importance
such as individuals closely allied with political or other groups abroad,
individuals prominent in organizational activity of significance or in-
dividuals falling within similar categories." The instructions added,
It is realized, of course, that in connection with the intelli-
gence jurisdiction of the Bureau it will be necessary to in-
vestigate the activities and affiliations of certain individuals
considered key figures in nationalistic and related activities
or considered leaders of importance in various foreign nation-
ality groups. ... If in such an instance you have any question
as to the advisability or desirability of instituting such an
investigation in view of the above instructions, you should,
of course, refer the matter to the Bureau for appropriate
decision.
This flexibility specifically allowed for the investigation of "fascist
individuals of prosecutive or intelligence significance." 77
H. FBI Wartime Operationm
A review of FBI intelligence work during World War II would
not be complete without brief mention of several other activities. In
1940 President Roosevelt authorized the FBI with the approval of
the Attorney General to conduct electronic surveillance of "persons
suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United
1 In early 1946 there were 10,763 Security Index cards on "communists and
members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico." (Memorandum from D. M.
Ladd to the Director, R e:Inve8tigations of Communists, 2/27/46.)
.. Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the Director, 8/30/45.
". Bureau Bulletin No. 55, Series 1945, 9/12/45.
States, including suspected spies." '7 The Federal Communications
Commission denied the FBI access before the war to international
communications on the grounds that such intercepts violated the Fed-
eral Communications Act of 1934.179 However, military intelligence
had secretly formed a Signals Intelligence Service to intercept inter-
national radio communications; and Naval intelligence arranged with
RCA to get copies of Japanese cable traffic to and from Hawaii,
although other cable companies used by the Japanese refused to violate
the statute against interception before Pearl Harbor.o80 Moreover, the
FBI developed "champering" or surreptitious mail opening tech-
mques, and the practice of surreptitious entry was used by the FBI in
intelligence operations.',,
Several basic internal memoranda and agreements spelled .out the
policies governing the relationships between FBI and military intel-
ligence in this period. The military concentrated more heavily on what
it perceived as potential threats to the armed forces, while the FBI
developed a wider and more sophisticated approach to the gathering
of intelligence about "subversive activities" generally. An example
of the Army's policy was an intelligence plan approved in 1936 for
the Sixth Corps Area which covered Illinois, Michigan, and Wiscon-
sin. It called for the collection and indexing of the names of several
thousand groups, ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union
to pacifist student groups alleged to be Communist-dominated. Sources
of information were to be the Justice Department, the Treasury De-
partment, the Post Office Department, local state police, and private
intelligence bureaus employed by businessmen to keep track of orga-
nized labor.'m The joint FBI-military intelligence plan prepared in
1938 stated that the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military
Intelligence Division (G-2) were concerned with "subversive activities
that undermine the loyalty and efficiency" of Army and Navy per-
sonnel or civilians involved in military construction and maintenance.
Since ONI and MID lacked trained investigators, they relied before
the war on the FBI "to conduct investigative activity in strictly civilian
matters of a domestic character." The three agencies exchanged infor-
mation of interest to one another, both in the field and at headquarters
in Washington.18 '
The FBI, ONI, and MID entered into a Delimitation Agreement in
June 1940 pursuant to the authority of President Roosevelt's 1939 di-
... Roosevelt to Jackson, 5/21/40. See Report on Warrantless FBI Electronic
Surveillance.
.. Whitehead, The FBI Story, p. 225.
"David Kahn, The Codebreaker8 (New York: Signet Books, 1973) (pb),
pp. 11-16.
2.1 See Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening; Memorandum From FBI to
Select Committee, 9/23/75.
us Sixth Corps Area, Emergency Plan-White, December 1936, AG No. 386,
cited in Military Surveillance, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), p. 174.
" Hoover memorandum. enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President,
10/20/38.
rectives. As revised in February 1942, the Agreement covered "inves-
tigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage,
counterespionage, subversion and sabotage." It provided that the
FBI would be responsible for all investigations "involving civilians in
the United States" and for keeping ONI and MID informed of "im-
portant developments . . . including the names of individuals defi-
nitely known to be connected with subversive activities." 1" As a
result of this Agreement and prior cooperation, military intelligence
could compile extensive files on civilians from the information dis-
seminated to it by the FBI. For example, in May 1939 the MID trans-
mitted a request from the Ninth Corps Area on the West Coast for the
names and locations of "alien and disloyal American sabotage and
espionage organizations," organizations planning to take advantage
of war-time hardships to overthrow the government, "citizens opposed
to our participation in war and conducting anti-war propaganda," and
potential enemy nationals who should be interned in case of an "inter-
national emergency." 11
Moreover, despite the FBI-military agreement, the Counter Intel-
ligence Corps of the Army (CIC) gradually undertook wider investi-
gation of civilian "subversive activity" as part of a preventive security
program which used voluntary informants and investigators to collect
information.18 6
The FBI developed a substantial foreign intelligence operation in
Latin America during the war. On June 24, 1940, President Roosevelt
issued a directive assigning foreign intelligence responsibilities in the
Western Hemisphere to a Special Intelligence Service of the FBI.
SIS furnished the State Department., the military, and other govern-
mental agencies with intelligence regarding "financial, economic, po-
litical and subversive activities detrimental to the security of the United
States." SIS assisted several Latin American countries "in training
police and organizing anti-espionage and anti-sabotage defenses."
When another foreign intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic
Services, was established in 1941, it sought to enter the Latin American
" Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division,
2/9/42.
. Memorandum from Colonel Churchill, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID,
to E. A. Tamm, FBI, 5/16/39, and enclosure, "Subject: Essential Items of
Domestic Intelligence Information."
'8 Victor J. Johanson, "The Role of the Army in the Civilian Arena, 1920-1970."
U.S. Army Intelligence Command Study (1971).
The scope of wartime Army intelligence has been summarized as follows: "It
reported on radical labor groups, communists, Nazi sympathizers, and 'semi-
radical' groups concerned with civil liberties and pacifism. The latter, well in-
tentioned but impractical groups as one corps area intelligence officer labeled
them, were playing into the hands of the more extreme and realistic radical ele-
ments, G-2 still believed that it had a right to investigate 'semi-radicals' because
they undermined adherence to the established order by propaganda through
newspapers, periodicals, schools, and churches." (Joan M. Jensen, "Military
Surveillance of Civilians, 1917-1967," in Military Intelligence, 1974 Hearings,
pp. 174-175.)
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field until President Roosevelt made clear that jurisdiction belonged
to SIS.1'8
There was constant friction throughout the war between the FBI
and the OSS. Despite the President's orders, OSS operatives went
to Latin America. Within the United States OSS officers are reported
to have secretly entered the Spanish embassy in Washington to photo-
"' Whitehead, The FBI Story, pp. 266, 456. President Roosevelt's Directive of
December 1941 on the FBI's SIS read as follows:
"In accordance with previous instructions the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has set up a Special Intelligence Service covering the Western Hemisphere, with
Agents in Mexico, Central America, -South America, the Caribbean, and Canada.
Close contact and liaison have been established with the Intelligence officials of
these countries.
"In order to have all responsibility centered in the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation in this field, I hereby approve this arrangement and request the heads
of all Government Departments and Agencies concerned to clear directly with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with any intelligence work within
the sphere indicated.
"The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized and in-
structed to convene meetings of the chiefs of the various Intelligence Services
operating in the Western Hemisphere and to maintain liaison with Intelligence
Agencies operating in the Western Hemisphere." (Confidential Directive to the
Heads of the Government Departments and Agencies Concerned, 12/41.)
An agreement between the FBI and military intelligence dealing with "Special
Intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere" cited Presidential "instruc-
tions" of June 24, 1940 and January 16, 1942. It described FBI responsibilities as
follows:
"The Special Intelligence Service will obtain, primarily through undercover
operations supplemented when necessary by open operations, economic, political,
industrial, financial and subversive information. The Special Intelligence Service
will obtain information concerning movements, organizations, and individuals
whose activities are prejudicial to the interests of the United 'States." (Agreement
between MID, ONI and FBI for Coordinating Special Intelligence Operations In
the Western Hemisphere, 2/25/42.)
Overlap between FBI and OSS operations is indicated by the following sec-
tions from a Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive on the functions of the Oflce of
Strategic Services In 1943:
"3. Secret Intelligence
"a. The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to: (1) Collect secret intelli-
gence in all areas other than the Western Hemisphere by means of espionage and
counter-espionage, and evaluate and disseminate such intelligence to authorized
agencies. In the Western Hemisphere, bases already established by the Office of
Strategic Services in Santiago, Chile, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, may be used
as ports of exit and of entry for the purpose of facilitating operations in Europe
and Asia, but not for the purpose of conducting operations in South America. The
Office of Strategic Services is authorized to have its transient agents from Europe
or Asia touching points in the Western Hemisphere transmit information through
facilities of the Military Intelligence Service and of the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
"4. Research and Analysis
"The Office of Strategic Services will (1) furnish essential intelligence for the
planning and execution of approved strategic services' operations; and (2)
furnish such intelligence as is requested by agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the armed services, and other authorized Government agencies. To accomplish the
foregoing no geographical restriction is placed on the research and analysis func-
tions of the Office of Strategic Services. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
(JCS Directive: Functions of the Office of Strategic Services, JCS 155/11/D,
10/27/43.)
graph documents. The FBI Director apparently learned of the oper-
ation, but instead of registering a protest he waited until OSS returned
a second time and then had FBI cars outside turn on their sirens.
When OSS protested to the White House, the President's aides re-
portedly ordered the embassy entry project turned over to the FBI. 88
A similar incident occurred in 1945 when OSS security officers il-
legally entered the offices of Amerasia magazine in the search for
confidential government documents.18 9 This illegal entry made it im-
possible for the Justice Department to prosecute vigorously on the
basis of the subsequent FBI investigation, for fear of exposing the
"taint" which started the inquiry.
Director Hoover's most serious conflict with OSS involved a weigh-
ing of the respective needs of foreign intelligence and internal secu-
rity. In 1944, the head of OSS, William Donovan, negotiated an agree-
ment with the Soviet Union for an exchange of missions between OSS
and the NKVD (the Soviet intelligence and secret police organiza-
tion). Both the American military representative in Moscow and
Ambassador Averill Harriman hoped the exchange would improve
Soviet-American relations.190 When Hoover learned of the plan, he
warned Presidential aide Harry Hopkins of the potential danger of
espionage if the NKVD were "officially authorized to operate in the
United States where quite obviously it will be able to function without
any appropriate restraint upon its activities." The Director also ad-
vised Attorney General Biddle that secret NKVD agents were already
"attempting to obtain highly confidential information concerning War
Department secrets." Thus, the exchange of intelligence missions was
blocked.191 The FBI was also greatly concerned about the OSS policy
of employing American Communists to work with the anti-Nazi un-
derground in Europe, although OSS did dismiss some persons sus-
pected of having links with Soviet intelligence.112
The FBI was not withdrawn from the foreign intelligence field
until 1946. At the end of the war President Truman abolished the
Office of Strategic Services and dispersed its functions to the War and
State Departments. The FBI proposed expanding its wartime West-
ern Hemisphere intelligence system to a world-wide basis, with the
Army and Navy handling matters of importance to the military. In-
stead, the President formed a National Intelligence Authority with
representatives of the State, War, and Navy Departments to direct the
foreign intelligence activities of a Central Intelligence Group. The
Central Intelligence Group was authorized to conduct all foreign espi-
onage and counterespionage operations in June 1946. Director Hoover
immediately terminated the operations of the FBI's Special Intelli-
gence Service; and in some countries SIS officers destroyed their files
rather than transfer them to the new agency.
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Downes, The Scarlet Thread, pp. 87-97, cited in Smith, OSS: The Secret
Histor of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, p. 20.
Smith, OS, p. 277.
Smith, OSS, p. 21.
"'Whitehead, The FBI Story, pp. 277-278.
1 Smith, OSS, pp. 10-11.
m Whitehead, The FBI Story, pp. 279-280; Smith, OS, p. 366.
IV. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE IN THE COLD WAR ERA: 1945-1963
If, in the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dic-
tatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces
of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they
should be given their chance and have their way.
-Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Dissenting in
Gitiow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
The situation with which Justices Holmes and Brandeis
were concerned in Gitlow was a comparatively isolated
event. .. . They were not confronted with any situation
comparable to the instant one-the development of an ap-
paratus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the Gov-
ernment, in the context of world crisis after crisis.
-Mr. Chief Justice Fred Vinson, Opinion in Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
A. Thw Anti-comewnist Consensus
During the Cold War period the domestic intelligence activities of
the Federal Government were rooted in a firm national consensus re-
garding the danger to the United States from international Commu-
nism. No distinction was made between the threats posed by the Soviet
Union and by Communists within this country. At the peak of inter-
national tension during the Korean War, the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act for
conspiracy to advocate violent overthrow of the government. The con-
spiratorial nature of the Communist Party and its ideological links
with the Soviet Union at a time of stress in Soviet-American relations
were cited by the Court as the reasons for its decision.11
In the same environment, Congress enacted the Internal Security
Act of 1950 over President Truman's veto. Its two main provisions
were the Subversive Activities Control Act to register Communist and
Communist "front" groups and individual Communists, and the
Emergency Detention Act for the internment in an emergency of
persons who might engage in espionage or sabotage. Congress made
findings that the Communist Party was "a disciplined organization"
operating in this nation "under Soviet Union control" with the aim
of installing "a Soviet style dictatorship." 195 Going even further in
1954, Congress passed the Communist Control Act which provided
' The Court held that the grave and probable danger posed by the Communist
Party justified this restriction on free speech. under the First Amendment: "The
formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly dis-
ciplined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the
time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world condi-
tions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our
relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologi-
cally attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this score."
[Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-511 (1951).]
"5 64 Stat. 987 (1950) The Subversive Activities Control Act's registration pro-
vision was held not to violate the First Amendment in 1961. [Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).] However, registration
of Communists under the Act was later held to violate the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. [Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).] The Emergency Detention Act was repealed in 1971.
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that the Communist Party was "not entitled to any of the rights, priv-
ileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the
jurisdiction of the laws of the United States." 196 These statutes but-
tressed the intelligence authority of the FBI, even though Congress
never enacted legislation directly authorizing FBI domestic intelli-
gence.'9 7
By the mid-1950s, gradual relaxation of international tensions be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with a decline
in domestic Communist influence after the Smith Act prosecutions,
slowed the momentum for suppression. The Supreme Court reversed
Smith Act convictions of second-string Communist leaders in 1957,
holding that the government must show advocacy "of action and not
merely abstract doctrine." "98 However, as late as 1961, the Court sus-
tained the constitutionality under the First Amendment of the require-
ment that the Communist Party register with the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board.199
The degree of consensus in favor of repression of the Communist
Party should not be overstated. In contrast to the Congressional en-
thusiasm, President Truman was concerned about the risks to con-
stitutional government. According to one White House staff mem-
ber's notes during the debate over the Internal Security Act of 1950,
"The President said that the situation ... was the worst it had been
since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798, that a lot of people on the
Hill should know better but had been stampeded into running with
their tails between their legs." Truman said he would veto the bill
"regardless of how politically unpopular it was-election year or no
election year." 200
Throughout the period there was a confusing mixture of secrecy and
disclosure, both within the executive branch and between the executive
and Congress. On matters such as the Emergency Detention Program,
the FBI and the Justice Department joined in disregarding the will of
Congress. Unilateral executive action was frequently substituted for
' 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. 841-844. The constitutionality of the Com-
munist control Act of 1954 has never been tested.
" In light of the facts now known, the Supreme Court overstated the degree
to which Congress had explicitly "charged" the FBI with domestic intelligence
responsibilities: "Congress has devised an all-embracing program for resistance
to the various forms of totalitarian aggression. ... It has charged the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency with responsibility
for intelligence concerning Communist seditious activities against our Govern-
ment, and has denominated such activities as part of a world conspiracy." [Penn-
silvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-505 (1956).] This decision held that the Fed-
eral Government had preempted state sedition laws, citing President Roosevelt's
September 1939 statement on FBI investigations and an address by FBI Director
Hoover to state law enforcement officials in August 1940.
" Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957).
1" Justice Douglas, who dissented on Fifth Amendment grounds, agreed with
the majority on the First Amendment issue:
"The Bill of Rights was designed to give fullest play to the exchange and dis-
semination of ideas that touch the politics, culture, and other aspects of our life.
When an organization is used by a foreign power to make advances here, ques-
tions of security are raised beyond the ken of disputation and debate between
the people resident here." [Gommunist Party v. Subverive Activitie8 Control
Board, 367 U.S. 1, 174 (1961).]
' File memorandum of S.J. Spingarn, assistant counsel to the President,
7/22/50, Spingarn Papers (Harry S. Truman Library).
legislation, sometimes with the full knowledge and consent of Con-
gress and on other occasions without informing Congress or by advis-
ing only a select group of legislators. There is no question that both
Congress and the public expected the FBI to gather domestic intel-
ligence about Communists. But the broad scope of FBI investigations,
its specific programs for achieving "pure intelligence" and preventive
intelligence objectives, and its use of intrusive techniques and disrup-
tive counterintelligence measures against domestic "subversives" were
not fully known by anyone outside the. Bureau.
B. The Post-War Expansion of FBI Domestic Intelligence
In February 1946, Assistant Director Ladd of the FBI Intelligence
Division recommended reconsideration of previous restrictive policies
and the institution of a broader program aimed at the Communist
Party. Ladd advised Director Hoover:
The Soviet Union is obviously endeavoring to extend its
power and influence in every direction and the history of the
Communist movement in this country clearly shows that the
Communist Party, USA has consistently acted as the instru-
mentality in support of the foreign policy of the USSR.
The Communist Party has succeeded in gaining control of,
or extensively infiltrating a large number of trade unions,
many of which operate in industries vital to the national
defense....
In the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union, it would not
be sufficient to disrupt the normal operations of the Communist
Party by apprehending only its leaders or more important
figures. Any members of the Party occupied in any industry
would be in a position to hamper the efforts of the United
States by individual action and undoubtedly the great major-
ity of them would do so....
It is also pointed out that the Russian Government has sent
and is sending to this country a number of individuals with-
out proper credentials or travel documents and that in the
event of a breach of diplomatic relations there would un-
doubtedly be a considerable number of these people in the
United States.
Therefore, Ladd recommended "re-establishing the original policy of
investigating all known members of the Communist Party" and rein-
stating "the policy of preparing security index cards on all members
of the Party."
He observed that "the greatest difficulty" with apprehending all
Communists if war broke out was "the necessity of finding legal
authorization." While enemy aliens could be interned, the only statutes
available for the arrest of citizens were the Smith Act, the rebellion
and insurrection statutes, and the seditious conspiracy law. These laws
were inadequate because "it might be extremely difficult to prove that
members of the Party knew the purpose of the Party to overthrow the
Government by force and violence" under the Smith Act and "some
overt act would be necessary" before the other statutes could be in-
voked. Hence, he proposed advising the Attorney General of the FBI's
plans and the need for "a study as to the action which could be taken
in the event of an emergency." 201
Consequently, Director Hoover informed Attorney General Tom
C. Clark that the FBI had "found it necessary to intensify its inves-
tigation of Communist Party activities and Soviet espionage cases."
The FBI was also "taking steps to list all members of the Communist
Party and any others who would be dangerous in the event of a break
in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, or other serious crisis,
involving the United States and the U.S.S.R." The FBI Director
added that it might be necessary in a crisis "to immediately detain a
large number of American citizens." He suggested that a study be
made "to determine what legislation is available or should be sought
to authorize effective action ... in the event of a serious emergency." 202
Assistant Director Ladd proposed another FBI program which was
not called to the Attorney General's attention. He told the Director,
"Apart from the legal problems involved, another difficulty of con-
siderable proportions which would probably be encountered in the
event of extensive arrests of Communists would be a flood of propa-
ganda from Leftist and so-called Liberal sources." To counteract this
possibility, he made the following recommendation:
It is believed that an effort should be made now to prepare
educational material which can be released through available
channels so that in the event of an emergency we will have
an informed public opinion.
To a large extent the power and influence of the Commu-
nist Party in this country, which is out of all proportion to
the actual size of the Party, derives from the support which
the Party receives from "Liberal" sources and from its con-
nections in the labor unions. The Party earns its support by
championing individual causes which are also sponsored by
the Liberal elements. It is believed, however, that, in truth,
Communism is the most reactionary, intolerant and bigoted
force in existence and that it would be possible to assemble
educational materials which would incontrovertibly establish
the truth.
Therefore, material could be assembled for dissemination to show that
Communists would abolish or subjugate labor unions and churches if
they came to power. Such material would undermine Communist in-
fluence in unions and support for the Party from "persons prominent
in religious circles." Additional material could be assembled "indicat-
ing the basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this coun-
try." Ladd proposed a two-day training conference for "Communist
supervisors" from eighteen or twenty key field offices so that they
might have "a complete understanding . . . of the Bureau's policies
and desires. . . ." These recommendations were approved by the FBI
Executive Conference. 2 03
a Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 2/27/46.
2 Personal and Confidential Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney Gen-
eral, 3/8/46.
m Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 2/27/46.
C. The Federal Loyalty-Security Program
In 1947, President Truman established by executive order a Federal
Employee Loyalty Program. 20 4 Its basic features were retained in the
Federal Employee Security Program authorized by President Eisen-
hower in Executive Order 10450, which is still in effect with some
modifications today.2 05 The program originated out of serious and
well-founded concern that Soviet intelligence was using the Commu-
nist Party as an effective vehicle for the recruitment of espionage
agents. However, from the outset it swept far beyond this counter-
espionage purpose to satisfy more speculative preventive intelligence
objectives. The program was designed as much to protect the govern-
ment from the "subversive" ideas of federal employees as it was to
detect potential espionage agents.
The basic outlines of the employee security program were developed
in 1946-1947 by a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty.
Its understanding of the problem was shaped largely by the report of
a Canadian Royal Commission in June 1946. The Royal Commission
had investigated an extensive Soviet espionage operation in Canada,
which was disclosed by a defector from the Soviet Embassy. Its report
described how employees of the Canadian goverment had communi-
cated secret information to Soviet intelligence. The report concluded
that "membership in Communist organizations or sympathy towards
Communist ideologies was the primary force which caused these
agents" to work for Soviet intelligence. It explained that "secret mem-
bers or adherents of the Communist Party," who were attracted to
Comnmunism by its propaganda for social reform, had been developed
into espionage agents. The Royal Commission recommended addi-
tional security measures "to prevent the infiltration into positions of
trust under the Government of persons likely to commit" such acts of
espionage.206 The impact of the report in the United States was that
"questions of thought and attitudes took on new importance as factors
of safety in the eyes of all those concerned with national security." 20
A subcommittee of the House Civil Service Committee recom-
mended shortly after release of the Canadian commission report that
the President appoint an interdepartmental committee to study em-
ployee security practices. FBI Director Hoover suggested to Attor-
ney General Clark whom he should appoint to such a committee "if it
is set up." 208 When President Truman appointed a Commission on
Employee Loyalty in November 1946, the FBI Director's suggested
Justice Department representative was made chairman, and the other
n Executive Order 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 3/21/47.
m Executive Order 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
' Report of the Royal Commi8sion, 6/27/46, pp. 82-3, 686-689. The re-
port described how "a number of young Canadians, public servants and others
who begin with a desire to advance causes which they, consider worthy, have
been induced into joining study groups of the Communist Party. They are per-
suaded to keep this adherence secret. They have then been led step by step along
the ingenious psychological development course . . . until under the influence
of sophisticated and unscrupulous leaders they have been persuaded to engage
in illegal activities directed against the safety and interests of their own society."
" Eleanor Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1953), p. 22.
"" Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 7/25/46 (Harry S. Truman Library).
members represented the Departments of State, War, Navy, and
Treasury, and the Civil Service Commission.
The President's Commission had less success than its Canadian
counterpart in discovering the dimensions of the problem in the United
States. FBI Assistant Director D. M. Ladd told the Commission
that there were "a substantial number of disloyal persons in govern-
ment service" and that the Communist Party "had established a
separate group for infiltration of the government." He also called
the Commission's attention to "a publication of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce" which had expressed the opinion "that Communists in the
government have reached a serious stage." The War Department
representative on the Commission then stated that it "should have
something more than reports from the Chamber of Commerce, FBI,
and Congress, to determine the size of the problem." However, when
Assistant Director Ladd was asked later "for the approximate number
of names in subversive files ... and whether the Bureau had a file of
names of persons who could be picked up in the event of a war with
Russia," the FBI official "declined to answer because this matter was
not within the scope of the Commission." The meeting ended with
"general agreement that Mr. Hoover should be asked to appear.. ." 209
Thereafter, the Commission prepared a lengthy list of questions for
the FBI; but instead of Director Hoover appearing, Attorney General
Clark testified in a session where no minutes were taken.
The Attorney General supplemented his "informal" appearance
with a memorandum which stated that the num'ber of subversive per-
sons in the government had "not yet reached serious proportions," but
that the possibility of "even one disloyal person" entering government
service constituted a "serious threat." 210 Thus, the President's Com-
mission accepted its foreclosure from conducting any serious evalua-
tion of FBI intelligence operations or FBI intelligence data on the ex-
tent of the danger. One Commission staff member observed that these
were felt to be "matters exclusively for the consideration of the
counterintelligence agencies." 211
It is impossible to determine fully the effect of the autonomy of
FBI counterespionage on the government's ability to formulate appro-
priate security policies. Nevertheless, this record suggests that execu-
tive officials were forced to make decisions without full knowledge.
They had to depend on the FBI's estimate of the problem, rather than
being able to make their own assessment on the basis of complete
information. With respect to the employee loyalty program in 1947,
the FBI's view prevailed on three crucial issues-the broad definition
of the threat of "subversive influence," the secrecy of FBI informants
and electronic surveillance, and the exclusive power of the FBI to
investigate allegations of disloyalty.
Although Director Hoover did not testify before the President's
Commission, he submitted a general memorandum on the types of
2
" Minutes of the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty,
1/17/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
m Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Mr. Vanech, Chairman,
President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 2/14/47. (Harry S.
Truman Library.)
2*Memorandum from S. J. Spingarn to Mr. Foley, 1/19/47. (Harry S.
Truman Library.)
activities of "subversive or disloyal persons" in government service
which would "constitute a threat" to the nation's security. The danger
as he saw it -was not limited to espionage or the recruitment of others
for espionage. It extended to "influencing" the formation and execu-
tion of government policies "so that those policies will either favor
the foreign country of their ideolo gcal choice or will weaken the
United States Government domestically or abroad to the ultimate ad-
vantage of the .. foreign power." Consequently, he urged that atten-
tion be given to the association of government employees with "front"
organizations. These included not only established "fronts" but also
"temporary organizations, 'spontaneous' campaigns, and pressure
movements so frequently used by subversive groups." If a disloyal
employee was affiliated with such "fronts", he could be expected to
influence government policy in the direction taken by the group.2 1 2
The President's Commission accepted Director Hoover's position
on the threat, as well as the view endorsed later by a Presidential Com-
mission on Civil Rights that there also was a danger from "those who
would subvert our democracy by ... destroying the civil rights of some
groups." 21 3 Thus, the standards for determining employee loyalty in-
cluded a criterion based on membership in or association with groups
designated on an "Attorney General's list" as:
totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having
adopted a policy of -advocating or approving the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under
the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter
-the form of government of the United States by unconstitu-
tional means.214
The executive orders provided a substantive legal basis for the FBI's
investigation of allegedly "subversive" organizations which might fall
within these categories. 2 15
The FBI also succeeded in protecting the secrecy of its informants
and electronic surveillance. The Commission initially recommended
that the FBI be required to make available to department heads upon
request "all investigative material and information available to the
investigative agency on any employee of the requesting department."
Director Hoover protested that the FBI had "steadfastly refused to
reveal the identities of its confidential informants." He advised the
Attorney General that the proposal "would also apparently contem-
plate the revealing of our techniques, including among others, tech-
nical surveillances which are authorized by you." The Director
assured the Attorney General that the FBI would make "information
available to other agencies to evaluate the reliability of our infor-
mu Memorandum from the FBI Director to the President's Temporary Com-
mission, 1/3/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
m President's Commission on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (1947),
p. 52.
'Executive Order 9835, part I, section 2; cf. Executive Order 10450, section
8 (a) (5).
* In 1960, for instance, the Justice Department advised the FBI to continue
investigating an organization not on the Attorney General's list in order to secure
"additional information ... relative to the criteria" of the employee security
order. (Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Hoover,
5/17/60.)
mants" without divulging their identities.
216 'The Commission revised
its report to satisfy the FBI.21 7
Director Hoover was still concerned that the Commission (and the
President's executive order) did not give the FBI exclusive power
to investigate allegedly subversive employees.
218 He went so far as to
threaten "to withdraw from this field of investigation rather than
to engage in a tug of war with the Civil Service Commission." 219
According to notes of presidential aide George Elsey, President
Truman felt "very strongly anti-FBI" on the issue and wanted "to
be sure and hold FBI down, afraid of 'Gestapo'." 
2 2 0 Presidential
aide Clark Clifford reviewed the situation and came down on the side
of the FBI as "better qualified" than the Civil Service Commission.
221
Nevertheless, the President insisted on a compromise which gave Civil
Service "discretion" to call on the FBI "if it wishes." 222 The FBI
Director objected to this "confusion" as to the FBI's jurisdiction.
2 3
Justice Department officials warned the White House that Congress
would "find flaws" with this arrangement; and President Truman
noted "J. Edgar will in all probability get this backward looking
Congress to give him what he wants. It's dangerous." 224 President
Truman was correct. The administration's budget request of $16 mil-
lion for Civil Service and $8.7 million for the FBI to conduct loyalty
investigations was revised in Congress to allocate $7.4 million to the
FBI and only $3 million to the Civil Service Commission.
2 2 5 The issue
was finally resolved to the FBI's satisfaction. President Truman issued
a statement to all department heads declaring that there were "to be
2 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, Re:
President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/29/47. (Harry S.
Truman Library.)
m7 Report of the President'8 Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty,
2/20/47, pp. 31-32.
2/ /emoa from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/19/47.
(Harry S. Truman Library.)
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/31/47.
(Harry S. Truman Library.)2 Memorandum of George M. Elsey, 5/2/47. (Harry S. Truman.)
m Clifford advised, "Inasmuch as 'undercover' and 'infiltration' tactics may
become necessary, duplication will be costly and would jeopardize the success of
both FBI and Civil Service." He added that the FBI "has a highly trained, ef-
ficiently organized corps of investigators. There are approximately 4,800 FBI
agents now, 1,600 of whom are investigating Atomic Energy Commission em-
ployees. FBI expects to begin releasing these 1,600 shortly.... Civil Service, on
the other hand, has fewer than 100 investigators, none of whom is especially
trained in the techniques required in loyalty investigations.... It is precisely
because of the dangers that I believe the FBI is a better agency than Civil Service
to conduct loyalty investigations for new employees; the more highly trained,
organized and administered an agency is, the higher should be its standards."
(Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/7/47.) (Harry S. Truman
Library.)
2m Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/9/47. Letter from
President Truman to H. B. Mitchell, United States Civil Service Commission,
5/9/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, Re: Execu-
tive Order 9835, 5/12/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
A Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/23/47. (Harry S. Tru-
man Library.)
" Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program, pp. 33-34.
no exceptions" to the general rule that the FBI would make all loyalty
investigations.2 6
The rationale for investigating groups under the authority of the
loyalty-security program changed over the years.
Such investigations supplied a body of intelligence data against
which to check the names of prospective federal employees. 227 By the
mid-1950s, the Communist Party and other groups fitting the stand-
ards for the Attorney General's list were no longer extensively used
by Soviet intelligence for espionage recruitment.228 Therefore, FBI
investigations of such groups became-in combination with the "name
check" of Bureau files-almost entirely a means for monitoring the
political background of prospective federal employees. They also came
to serve a pure intelligence function of keeping the Attorney General
informed of "subversive" influence and infiltration.2 29
No organizations were formally added to the Attorney General's list
after 1955. Groups designated prior to that time included numerous
defunct German and Japanese societies, Communist and Communist
"front" organizations, the Socialist Workers Party, the Nationalist
Party of Puerto Rico, and several Ku Klux Klan organizations.230
However, the FBI's "name check" reports on prospective employees
were never limited to information about groups on the list. The list's
criteria were independent standards for evaluating an employee's back-
ground, regardless of whether a group was formally designated by the
Attorney General.231
After 1955, a substitute for designation on the Attorney General's
list was the FBI's "characterization" or "thumb-nail sketch" of a
group. Thus, if a "name check" uncovered information about a pro-
spective employee's association with a group which might fall under
the categories for the list, the FBI would report the data and attach a
"characterization" of the organization setting forth pertinent facts
relating to the standards for the list.23? This procedure made it unnec-
essary for the Attorney General to add groups to the formal list, since
FBI "characterizations" served the same purpose within the executive
branch.
* Memorandum from J. R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, to the At-
torney General, 11/3/47.
m FBI "name checks" are authorized as one of the "national agencies checks"
required by Executive Order 10450, section 3(a).
m FBI monograph, "The Menace of Communism in the United States Today"
(1955), pp. iv-v; testimony of former FBI liaison with CIA, 9/22/75, p. 32.
2 The FBI official in charge of the Internal Security Section of the Intelligence
Division in the fifties and early sixties testified that the primary purpose of
FBI investigations of Communist "infiltration" was to advise the Attorney
General so that he could determine whether a group should go on the "Attorney
General's list", and that investigations for this purpose continued after the
Attorney General ceased adding names of groups to the list. (F. J. Baumgardner
testimony, 10/8/75, pp. 48, 49.)
m Memoranda from the Attorney General to Heads of Departments and
Agencies, 4/29/53; 7/15/53; 9/28/53; 1/22/54.
Executive Order 10450, section 8 (a) (5).
m The FBI's field offices were supplied with such "thumb-nail sketches" or
characterizations to supplement the Attorney General's list and the reports of
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. e.g., SAC Letter No. 60-34,
7/12/60. (The SAC Letter is a formal regular communication from the FBI
Director to all Bureau field offices.)
D. The Emergency Detention Program, 1946-1950
The development of plans during this period for emergency deten-
tion of dangerous persons and for intelligence about such persons took
place entirely within the executive branch. In contrast to the employee
security program, these plans were not only withheld from the public
and Congress but were framed in terms which disregarded the legisla-
tion enacted by Congress. Director Hoover's decision to ignore Attor-
ney General Biddle's 1943 directive abolishing the wartime Custodial
Detention List had been an example of the inability of the Attorney
General to control domestic intelligence operations. In the 1950s the
FBI and the Justice Department collaborated in a decision to disre-
gard the attempt by Congress to provide statutory direction for the
Emergency Detention Program. This is not to say that the Justice De-
partment itself was fully aware of the FBI's activities in this area.
The FBI kept secret from the Department its most sweeping list of
potentially dangerous persons, first called the "Communist Index" and
later renamed the "Reserve Index," as well as its targeting programs
for intensive investigation of "key figures" and "top functionaries"
and its own detention priorities labeled "Detcom" and "Comsab".
Director Hoover advised Attorney General Clark in March 1946 of
the existence of its Security Index, although he did not say that it had
existed since Attorney General Biddle's 1943 directive. The Index
listed persons "who would be dangerous or potentially dangerous in
the event of . . . serious crisis, involving the United States and the
U.S.S.R." 233 The Justice Department then prepared a memorandum
concluding that the available options for action in an emergency were a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. 2 34 The FBI Director recommended going to Con-
gress to secure "statutory backing for detention." 2"
After a conference between Department and FBI officials, the FBI
submitted a lengthy analysis of its standards for classifying poten-
tially dangerous persons. The memorandum gave specific examples of
"Communists and Communist sympathizers whose names appear in
the Bureau's Security Index." However, the FBI did not provide any
specific examples in the category "Espionage Suspects and Govern-
ment Employees in Communist Underground." Assistant Director
Ladd advised Director Hoover of the reason for excluding any such
examples:
The Bureau has identified over 100 persons who are logically
suspected of being in the Government Communist Under-
ground; however, at the present time, the Bureau does not
have evidence, whether admissible or otherwise, reflecting
actual membership in the Communist Party. It is believed
that for security reasons, examples of these logical suspects
should not be set forth at this time.
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/8/46.
' Memorandum from T. L. Caudle, Assistant Attorney General, to Attorney
General Clark, Re: Detention of Communists in the event of sudden difficulty
with Russia, 7/11/46.
. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 8/5/46.
The Director noted, "I most certainly agree. There are too many
leaks." 236
The FBI memorandum explained that potentially dangerous per-
sons included not only "every convinced and dependable member of
the Communist Party," but also other individuals "who regard the
Soviet Union as the exponent and champion of a superior. way of
life." The FBI listed:
known members of the Communist Party, USA; strongly
suspected members of the Communist Party, USA; and per-
sons who have given evidence through their activities, utter-
ances and affiliations of their adherence to the aims and ob-
jectives of the Party and the Soviet Union.
The FBI provided a breakdown of the "fields of endeavor not directly
identified with the Communist Party" where Communists on the Se-
curity Index were "promoting Communist Party objectives and prin-
ciples." These included:
A. Organized Labor.-The Bureau has followed closely
Communist infiltration of labor and is continually endeavor-
ing to identify Communists in the labor movement.
B. Commouni&t "Front" Organizations.-There are nu-
merous of these organizations which not only serve as politi-
cal and pressure instruments, but also as media for recruiting
and raising funds for the Communist Party.
C. Exploitation of Racial Groups and Condition.-In
many areas of the country where racial tension has been prev-
alent, conspiratorial activity on the part of Communists could
very easily instigate race riots.
D. Nationality Group.-Communists have worked actively
and intensely among various foreign language groups, en-
deavoring to control their political thinking and attempting
to utilize them as pressure and propaganda media.
E. Youth.-[The leading "front"] organization could be
effectively used, in the event of war with the Soviet Union,
to urge draft evasion, "conscientious" objection and insubor-
dination in the armed forces.
F. Propaganda Activities.-Communists have utilized sev-
eval orgamzations in the United States to propagandize
[for] the Soviet Union.
G. Political Work.-The Communists look upon obtaining
informers in the major political parties or in other political
bodies . . . as an excellent means of obtaining advice, po-
litical appointments, and other political influence.
H. Education and Cultural Work.-In the field of cul-
tural work the Communist penetration of the motion picture
industry is one of the best examples.
I. Science and Research.-In this field it is well established
that the Communists and the Soviets are extremely anxious
and desirous of obtaining the secret of the atomic bomb and
m Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the Director, 9/5/46.
other highly confidential and highly important scientific
developments. Furthermore, existing scientific groups have
been infiltrated by Communists with the view in mind of
propagandizing the relinquishment of the secret of the atomic
bomb by the United States....
In addition, the FBI gave examples from the Security Index of "per-
sons holding important positions who have shown sympathy for Com-
munist objectives and policies" and therefore "might possibly serve
the Community Party and/or the Soviet Union should war break out."
Finally, the FBI pointed out that the Security Index included "Trot-
skyite Communists or members of such non-Stalinist groups as the
Socialist Workers Party .. ." Although such groups were "opposed to
the Stalinist-Communist rule in the Soviet Union," many of them
looked upon the Soviet Union "as the center for world revolution."
Thus it was "entirely possible" in the event of a war that these groups
"would engage in activities aimed at our national security and at
hampering of our war effort." 237
The Justice Department raised no objection to the FBI's standards,
although it ignored the FBI Director's idea for legislation.
The FBI proceeded under this authority until late 1947, when Direc-
tor Hoover objected to the Justice Department's tentative plans (based
on suspension of habeas corpus) and again stressed the need for "ap-
propriate legislation." 238 In response, a "blind memorandum" was
prepared in the Justice Department. As summarized and quoted by the
FBI, it stated, "The present is no time to seek legislation. To ask for it
would only bring on a loud and acrimonious discussion. . . ." In an
emergency the President could issue a proclamation suspending -the
writ of habeas corpus which Congress could ratify later if it "is in a
position to assemble-and if it is not, then the situation has obviously
become so desperate that the President's actions will not be ques-
tioned." What was needed was "sufficient courage to withstand the
courts . .. if they should act" and "a campaign of education directed
to the proposition that Communism is dangerous." This educational
purpose would be served by prosecuting Communist leaders under the
Smith Act.2 3 9
. In view of the Justice Department's position, the FBI Intelligence
Division recommended reviewing the Security Index to keep it up-to-
date, developing a "plan of action" for the apprehension of dangerous
persons, and studying more carefully the information on persons most
likely to be "saboteurs and espionage agents." The Intelligence Divi-
sion also agreed with the Justice Department on the need to prosecute
Communist leaders under the Smith Act so as to "obtain a Federal
adjudication establishing the Communist Party as illegal for advocat-
ing the overthrow of government by force and violence."
. . . it is felt that as a broad but an immediate objective of
the Bureau that it work earnestly to urge prosecution of
important officials and functionaries of the Communist Party,
particularly under Sections 10-13 of Title .18, United States
* Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, 9/5/46.
= Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 10/20/47.
m Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/22/48.
Code. Prosecution of Party officials and responsible func-
tionaries would, in turn, result in a judicial precedent being
set that the Communist Party as an organization is illegal;
that it advocates the overthrow of the government by force
and violence; and finally that the patriotism of Communists
is not directed towards the United States but towards the
Soviet Union and world Communism. Once this precedent is
set then individual members and close adherents or sym-
pathizers can be readily dealt with as substantive violators.
This in turn has an important bearing on the Bureau's posi-
tion should there be no legislative or administrative authority
available at the time of the outbreak of hostilities which
would permit the immediate apprehension of both aliens and
citizens of the dangerous category.
Finally, the Intelligence Division proposed that Bureau inspectors
review "the investigation of Communist activities in all field offices,"
since Bureau headquarters officials had "no way of knowing the con-
tents of field office files concerning all potentially dangerous persons."
The inspectors would make sure that the field was "following those
dangerous and potentially dangerous persons as closely as possible." 240
Thereafter, FBI Director Hoover again advised the Attorney Gen-
eral that he disagreed with the Justice Department's position against
legislation, suggesting that it would "be adopted readily by Congress."
Hoover also observed that the Attorney General "might wish to con-
sider the prosecution well in advance of such an emergency of the
Communist Party under [the Smith Act] . . . thereby obtaining judi-
cial recognition of the aims and purposes of the Communist Party." "
Instructions were issued to FBI field offices setting priorities for an
intensified investigation of "Security Index subjects" and prepara-
tion of "a Communist Index (as distinguished from the Security
Index) which will contain information on all known Communist
Party members." Procedures for handling Security Index data were
revised, and the field offices were asked for suggestions on how best to
implement a detention program.- 2
Numerous draft proclamations and orders were prepared by the
Justice Department and compiled in an "Attorney General's Port-
folio" for use in an emergency. The FBI began using IBM punch cards
for the. storage. and retrieval of its Security Index data.24 3 Lists of the
names of persons on the Security Index were forwarded periodically
to the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department's Criminal
Division, beginning in October 1948.211
The Emergency Detention Plan finally took shape in 1949, pursuant
to an agreement executed on February 11 by Secretary of Defense
James Forrestal and Attorney General Clark. The purpose of the
' Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 1/22/48.
241 Memorandum from FBI Director to the Attorney General, 1/27/48. The
Justice Department secured Smith Act indictments against the Party's national
leaders later in 1948, and they were convicted in 1949.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/15/48, SAC Letter No.
57. Series 1948, 4/10/48.
' Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to D. M. Ladd, 6/28/49.
' Memorandum from H. B. Fletcher to D. M. Ladd, 8/26/49.
agreement was "to provide maximum security with respect to the ap-
prehension and detention of those persons who, in the event of war
or other occasion upon which Presidential Proclamations, Executive
Orders, and applicable statutes come into operation, are to be taken
into custody and held pending further disposition." The agreement
provided "that the entire program of apprehending and detaining
civilians in such an emergency is the responsibility of the Attorney
General. . . ." It also stated that the FBI was "designated by the At-
torney General as the agency charged with the complete responsibility
of investigating and apprehending the persons to be detained." 
24 5
The Assistant to the Attorney General asked the FBI in September
1949 for "the standards upon which decisions are based to incorporate
names in the Security Index list or to remove them." 246 Director
Hoover replied,
The basic qualification required for inclusion of an indi-
vidual in the security index is that such an individual is
potentially dangerous or would be dangerous in the event of
an emergency to the internal security of this country. The
elements going into measuring an individual's potential dan-
gerousness or dangerousness in the event of an emergency con-
sist of two broad elements: (1) membership, affiliation or ac-
tivity indicating sympathy with the principal tenets of the
Communist Party or similar ideological groups and the
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico; and (2) a showing of one
or more of the following:
a. activity in the organization, promoting its aims and pur-
poses;
b. training in the organization, indicating a knowledge of
its ultimate aims and purposes;
c. a position in a mass organization of some kind where his
affiliation or sympathy as set forth in element one will deter-
mine the destiny of the mass organization;
d. employment or connection with an industry or facility
vital to the national defense, health and welfare;
e. possessing a potential for committing espionage or sabo-
tage.
No individual was included on the Index until he had been "investi-
gated by the Bureau"; and deletions were made "when an individual
no longer fits the standards for inclusion. ." 247
These general standards represented several different programs
developed within the FBI in connection with the Security Index.
Field offices were instructed to give special attention to "top function-
aries" and "key figures" in the Communist Party. In addition, a "Com-
sab program" concentrated on Communists with a potential for sabo-
2 Joint Agreement of the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General
Respecting the Temporary Detention of Dangerous Persons in Event of Emer-
gency, 2/11/49, revised by Attorney General Herbert Brownell and Deputy
Secretary of Defense R. B. Robertson, Jr., 9/6/56.
'A Memorandum from Peyton Ford to Hoover, Personal and Confidential,
9/13/49.
* Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral, 9/16/49.
tage "either because of their training or because of their position
relative to vital or strategic installations or industry." Finally, under
the plans for the detention of Communists, the FBI had a "Detcom pro-
gram" which was concerned with the individuals "to be given priority
arrest in the event of . . . an emergency." Priority under the Detcom
program was given to "all top functionaries, all key figures, all indi-
viduals tabbed under the Comsab program," and "any other indi-
vidual who, though he does not fall in the above groups, should be
given priority arrest because of some peculiar circumstances." 248
If an individual did not meet the standards for the Security Index
because investigation failed "to reflect sufficient disloyal information,"
he was considered for the Communist Index which was "a comprehen-
sive compilation of individuals of interest to the internal security."
Names for both the Communist Index and the Security Index would
be produced by "loyalty of government employee investigations" arid
by "espionage and foreign intelligence investigations," as well as by
"all other types of investigations." The reports of any FBI investiga-
tion of persons on the Security or Communist Index, regardless of the
subject, were to be sent to the Security Index Desk at FBI headquar-
ters. Finally, FBI personnel were instructed that "no mention must be
made in any investigative report relating to the classifications of top
functionaries and key figures, nor to the Detcom or Comsab Programs,
nor to the Security Index or the Communist Index. These investigative
procedures and administrative aids are confidential and should not be
known to any outside agency." 249A review of FBI documents indi-
cates that only the Security Index was made known to Justice De-
partment officials.
In July 1950, when the Congress and the President were consider-
ing the Emergency Detention Act, Attorney General McGrath asked
the FBI for an analysis of the Security Index.2 5 0 The FBI provided
the following breakdown of the statistics by "Nationalistic Tendency
or Organizational Affiliation:"
Communist Party, USA ------------------------------------ 11,491
Socialist Workers Party ------------------------------------- 308
Independent Socialist League-------------------------------- 45
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico ------------------------------ 77
Independent Labor League ----------------------------------- 2
Revolutionary Workers League ------------------------------- 1
Proletarian Party of America ----------------------------- 6
Total ---------------------------------------------- 11,930
Of these, 9,258 were native born citizens, 2,281 were naturalized citi-
zens, 296 were aliens, and 95 were of unknown nationality.25s
By early 1951, the total had increased to 13,901 names as the result
of an FBI decision after the outbreak of the Korean War to broaden
"the basis for inclusion in the Security Index to include all active mem-
bers of the Communist Party." The size of the Communist Index,
as contrasted with the Security Index, was indicated by the figures
from the New York field office which had 2,897 names on the Se-
SAC Letter No. 97, Series 1949, 10/19/49.
* SAC Letter No. 97, Series 1949, 10/19/49.
Memorandum from the Attorney General to the FBI Director, 7/25/50.
M emorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, 7/27/50.
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curity Index and 42,000 names on the Communist Index. Since the
Communist Index was based on "allegations of Communist activity,"
it was "a measure of investigations performed." If this proportion
applied "throughout the field," as the FBI memorandum suggested,
then the Communist Indexes in the field offices contained over 200,000
names. 25 2
E. The Energency Detention Act of 1950 and FBI/Justice Depart-
ment Noncompliance
There is no indication that Congress was advised of these plans or
the role of the Smith Act prosecution in them. When Congress was
considering the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, President Truman's
staff advised him that he could safely veto the measure in view of the
government's power to use the Smith Act in an emergency. One of his
aides said the Justice Department could "arrest immediately all prin-
cipal national and local leaders of the Communist Party in the United
States under the Smith Act, and bail could be set sufficiently high so
that they could not be sprung." 253
The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 set forth specific standards
for the apprehension of persons in the event of an "internal security
emergency" declared by the President. The basic criterion was whether
there was "reasonable ground to believe that such person probably
will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts
of espionage and sabotage." The statute provided for hearings after
arrest before presidentially appointed hearing officers, review by an
administrative board, and appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals.2 54
Nevertheless, the FBI and the Justice Department made no changes
in either the Security Index criteria or the previous detention plans
to bring them into conformity with the statute.
Shortly after passage of the Detention Act, according to an FBI
memorandum, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath advised Direc-
tor Hoover to disregard it and "proceed with the program as previ-
ously outlined." Justice Department officials were quoted as recogniz-
ing that the act was "undoubtedly in conflict with the Department's
proposed detention program," but that the act's provisions were "un-
workable." 255
The Justice Department also advised the FBI that it did not have
adequate personnel to review the placement of names on the Security
Index and that in an emergency "all persons now or hereafter included
by the Bureau on the Security Index should be considered subjects for
immediate apprehension, thus resolving any possible doubtful cases in
favor of the Government in the interests of the national security." 256
The FBI continued to furnish Security Index names to the Justice
Department, with one exception. The names of certain espionage sub-
jects were not made available to the Department "for security rea-
Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the FBI Director, 1/12/51.
Memorandum of S. J. Spingarn, 7/21/50. A note on this memorandum indi-
cates that a copy was given to the President by his counsel, Charles Murphy.
a Title II, Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. 811-826.
* Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, 10/15/52.
Memorandum from Peyton Ford, Deputy Attorney General, to the FBI Di-
rector, 12/7/50.
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sons." An internal FBI memorandum stated that apprehension of such
persons in 'an emergency "would destroy chances of penetration and
control of an operating Soviet espionage parallel or would destroy
known chances of penetration and control of a 'sleeper' parallel." 257
These counterespionage-itsvestigations were supervised by the Espio-
nage Section of the FBI Intelligence Division, while all other domes-
tic intelligence investigations under the Security Index program and
related programs-were supervised in the Division's Internal Security
Section.2- There was also a category for "prominent persons" who
were given special review since their apprehension "might cause the
Bureau some embarrassment because these individuals would hold
themselves out as martyrs" and thus "result in considerable adverse
publicity -and criticism of the FBI." 259
By May 1951, the Security Index had grown to 15,390 names, of
which 6ver 14,000 were Communists. FBI officials decided to urge the
Justice Department to pass on each name (except espionage subjects)
so that, among other reasons, "the Bureau would not be open to an alle-
gation of using Police State tactics." 260 FBI Intelligence Division offi-
cials discussed the matter with officials of the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, who -advised that Criminal Division attorneys
would conduct the reviews under the supervision of a former FBI
agent and four other Division officials. FBI Director Hoover noted
after this meeting, "What do our files show on these five? Can't we get
names of the attorneys making the reviews?" 261
The Justice Department also undertook to revise the Security Index
standards "so as to conform more closely" to the provisions of the
Emergency Detention Act of 1950.262 An FBI study of the Depart-
ment's standards concluded that they needed further revision so that
the FBI could continue to list the persons it believed to be dangerous.




The FBI analysis of this problem disclosed how little the Justice
Department knew about the scope and purposes of FBI domestic in-
telligence operations. In at least three areas of vital significance to
the Bureau, the Departmental standards showed almost total igno-
rance of FBI intelligence programs. This lack of knowledge went far
beyond the Department's unawareness of the "top functionaries,"
"key figures," "Comsab," and "Communist Index" programs delib-
erately kept secret by the FBI. The Justice Department failed to
take account of the FBI programs aimed at "Marxist-type or other
revolutionary groups" not controlled by the Communist Party. at
Communist sympathizers who had not positively "discontinued such
associations," and at subjects of "Nationalistic Tendency" or foreign
2 Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, 4/17/51.
' Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to All Supervisors in the Espionage and
Internal Security Sections, 12/5/50.
* Memorandum from Mr. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, 2/7/51.
Memorandum from Mr. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, 5/10/51.
"'Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Ladd, 5/31/51.
m Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford to the FBI Direc-
tor, 6/1/51.
"'Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont, 6/8/51.
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intelligence investigations.64 The FBI informed the Justice Depart-
ment of these disparities. Among the examples of Security Index sub-
jects not covered by the Departmental standards were the following:
Individuals whose party membership or affiliation in a rev-
olutionary group has not been proven, but who have com-
mitted past acts of violence during strikes, riots, or demon-
strations, and, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs,
are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a na-
tional emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare.
A number of individuals are now carried on the Security
Index who were placed thereon several years ago .. . yet con-
cerning whom we have no developed current activity of a
subversive nature. These individuals have not been removed
from the Security Index in the absence of positive indication
of disaffection or cessation of the activities which caused
them to be placed on the index. Bearing in mind the instruc-
tions of the Communist Party relative to "sleepers" and
underground activities . .. we have no assurance that these
individuals are not a continued potential threat . . . and, in-
deed, have strong reason to believe to the contrary.
Individuals ... whose association and activities are closely
affiliated with individuals or organizations having a definite
foreign interest or connection contrary and detrimental to
the interests of the United States. Examples are certain em-
ployees and associates of Aintorg, Tass News Agency, United
Nations, foreign legations, etc.
The FBI Director asked for "a prompt resolution of the problem"
posed by the disparity between FBI and Justice Department crite-
ria.265
It took over a year for the Justice Department to decide that the
proposed standards, based on the act of 1950, would be set aside in
view of the FBI's desires. In discussions between FBI and Justice
Department officials in 1952, the Department officials made clear that
they intended to proceed under pre-1950 plans in the event of an emer-
gency. Criminal Division official Raymond Whearty told FBI intelli-
gence executives in March 1952 that the FBI should operate under the
"Attorney General's Portfolio" rather than the 1950 act because of
the latter's "unworkability." 266 The standards in the "portfolio" used
by Justice Department attorneys in reviewing Security Index names
still differed from the FBI's criteria. Director Hoover noted, "I can't
understand the Department having one set of standards and approv-
ing a different set for FBI." 267
' Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont, 6/8/51.
' Memorandum from the FBI Director to Deputy Attorney General Peyton
Ford, 6/28/51.
" Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Ladd, 3/19/52.
' Note on memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, 7/10/52.
After meeting with Deputy Attorney General Ross Malone, an
Intelligence Division official summarized the differences between the
1950 Act and the "Portfolio":
There are contained among the 19,577 individuals listed
in our Security Index the names of many persons whom we
consider dangerous but who do not fall within the 8tandard8
set forth in the Internal Security Act of 1950....
The fact that the Internal Security Act of 1950 does not
provide for suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus would
prove a definite hindrance to the execution of necessary meas-
ures....
The lack of provision in the act for measures to be taken in
the event of threatened invasion precludes the President from
taking .action against potentially dangerous persons prior to
an actual invasion, insurrection, or declaration of war.
The provision in the Act for apprehension of subjects by
individual warrants is a factor which would be a detrimental,
time-consuming procedure as compared to the use of one
master warrant of arrest for all subjects apprehended as pro-
vided in the Department's Portfolio.
The apparent lack of provision in the Act for searches and
for confiscation of contraband would be a definite deterrent
to our operation. . . . 2 [Emphasis added.]
Director Hoover then repeated his request for "a definite and clear cut
answer" from the Department. 69 Attorney General James McGranery
.replied:
. . . I wish to assure you that it is the Department's intention
to proceed under the program as outlined in the Department's
Portfolio invoking the standards now used. This approval, of
course, indicates agreement with your Bureau's concepts of
the Detention Program and the Security Index standards as
outlined in your memorandum of June 28, 1951 ... .20
This directive was classified "Top Secret". For security reasons there
were only three copies made of the "Portfolio", two kept by the FBI
and one by the Attorney General. 271
FBI records reveal no change in this policy under Attorney General
Herbert Brownell during 1953-1954. In April 1953, Attorney General
Brownell granted authority to the FBI "to implement the apprehen-
sion and search and seizure provisions of this program immediately
upon ascertaining that a major surprise attack upon Washington, D.C.,
has occurred. . . ." The Attorney General also repeated previous in-
structions "to apprehend all individuals listed in the Security Index
in the event that the... program is implemented prior to the completion
of the review of the individual cases by the Criminal Division." 272
m Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the FBI Director, 11/13/52.
. Memorandum from the FBI Director to Deputy Attorney General Ross L.
Malone, Jr., 11/14/52.
"e Memorandum from the Attorney General to the FBI Director, 11/25/52.
m Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the Director, 11/13/52.
= Memorandum from the Attorney General to the FBI Director, 4/27/53.
By the end of 1954, the size of the Security Index had increased to
26,174, of whom 11,033 were designated under the Detcom and Comsab
programs for priority apprehension. At that time the Intelligence
Division decided to revise the Detcom and Comsab standards, reducing
the number by fifty percent to "permit a more efficient handling of the
arrests." 273 Shortly thereafter, in response to a request from Attorney
General Brownell, the FBI Director provided the Department the
"general criteria" used for the Security Index.2 74 After a meeting be-
tween officials of the FBI Intelligence Division and the Justice De-
partment, Director Hoover advised the Assistant Attorney General for
the Internal Security Division "that there was no area of disagree-
ment between the Department and this Bureau on the criteria or con-
cepts regarding dangerousness" and that FBI standards were "not all-
inclusive. " 5
On its own initiative the FBI decided in early 1955 to revise the
Security Index criteria, primarily because all cases were not being
reviewed by Justice Department attorneys and FBI officials wanted to
"minimize the inevitable criticism. of the dual role" the Bureau had in
both investigating and passing on "the soundness of these cases." 276
Soon thereafter the FBI reorganized the work of its Intelligence
Division to create a new Subversives Control Section for the super-
vision of the Security Index and related programs for the investi-
gation of individuals. The Internal Security Section continued to
supervise investigations of subversive organizations and individuals
considered to be "top functionaries" and "key figures" in those orga-
nizations. 7 The result of the revision of Security Index standards was
to reduce its size to 12,870 by mid-1958. The new standards still differed
from the 1950 act and the Department's "Portfolio". To aid in apply-
ing the criteria, FBI agents were instructed frequently to interview the
individual. "Refusal to cooperate" with such an interview was "taken
into consideration along with other facts" in determining his
dangerousness.278
The cancelled Security Index cards on individuals taken off the
Index 'after 1955 were retained in the field offices. This was done
because they remained "potential threats and in case of an all-out
emergency, their identities should be readily accessible to permit re-
study of their cases." These cards would be destroyed only if the
subject agreed to become an FBI source or informant or "otherwise
indicates complete defection from subversive groups." 279
Thus, the cancelled cards served as a supplementary detention list
which remained available despite the new, tighter standards for the
Security Index itself. In 1956, the FBI decided to use these cancelled
'Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 12/8/54.
7 Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, 12/23/54.
m Memorandum from the FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General William
F. Tompkins, 1/27/55. In 1954 the Justice Department had established an Internal
Security Division, replacing the previous Internal Security Section in the Criminal
Division.
' Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, 3/9/55.
27" Staff summary of interview with James F. Bland, former Chief of the FBI
Subversives Control Section (1955-1967), 10/13/75.
" Memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont, 7/30/58.
" Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 4/14/55; SAC Letter
No. 55-31, 4/19/55.
cards as the basis for a revised Communist Index, since this Index
had "grown unwieldy" and was "serving very little purpose." There
is no indication in FBI records that the Justice Department was ever
advised of the existence of the Communist Index. The Communist
Index was reviewed in 1959 and reduced from 17,783 to 12,784 names."so
In mid-1959 the Security Index included 11,982 names.2 81
The Communist Index was renamed the Reserve Index in 1960,
and subdivided into two sections. Section A was to include
... those individuals whose subversive activities do not
bring them within the SI criteria but who, in a time of na-
tional emergency, are in a position to influence others against
the national interests or are likely to furnish financial or
other material aid to subversive elements due to their sub-
versive associations and ideology. Included therein would be
individuals falling within the following categories: (1) Pro-
fessors, teachers and educators; (2) Labor Union organizers
and leaders; (3) Writers, lecturers, newsmen and others in
the mass media field; (4) Lawyers, doctors and scientists;
(5) Other potentially influential persons on a local or na-
tional level; (6) Individuals who could potentially furnish
financial or material aid. This section could well include the
names of such individuals as Norman Mailer, a novelist and
author of "The Naked and the Dead" and an admitted "left-
ist", and -------------------- , a former history teacher
who was recently fired for praising Premier Khrushchev be-
fore his history class and stating that the pilot of the U-2
plane should be executed by the Reds. '
Section B would follow the standards for the Communist Index, with
the additional criterion "membership in the Nation of Islam." The
purpose of the Reserve Index was to "have a special group of individ-
uals listed therein who should receive priority consideration with
respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehen-
sion of our SI subjects." 282 The FBI disseminated investigative re-
ports on Reserve Index subjects to the Justice Department, but.there
is no indication that the Department was advised of the existence of
the Index itself.283
Throughout the 1950s, supervision of the collection of intelligence
information about individuals for the Security Index, the Communist
Index, and the Detcom programs was a major function of the FBI
Intelligence Division. In addition, the "key figure" and "top func-
tionary" programs were operated separately ofrom the Indexes and
Detcom. The purpose of these two programs was "to select for special
attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of out-
standing importance to the effectiveness of the movement." Field of-
fices were instructed to obtain photographs and handwriting speci-
mens, and to maintain intelligence coverage of the subject's activities
through "contact with informants" and "established sources." 284
Memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont, 11/5/59.
m Memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont, 8/18/59.
2m Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 6/3/60.
2 Memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont, 9/9/60.
28 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 66-70.
F. The Scope of FBI "Subversion" Investigations
While the Bureau targeted "key figures" and "top functionaries"
for special attention, the scope of the FBI program for security in-
telligence investigations of individuals was far wider. The FBI Man-
ual stated, "It is not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards
by which the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates of revo-
lutionary organizations may be automatically measured because of
manner revolutionary organizations function and great scope and
variety of activities." Individuals were investigated if they were
"members in basic revolutionary organizations" or were "espousing
the line of revolutionary movements." The Manual added, "Where
there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal
security of the nation, the question should be resolved in the interest
of security and investigation conducted." Anonymous allegations
could start an FBI investigation if they were "sufficiently specific and
of sufficient weight." On the other hand, prior approval from FBI
headquarters was required for investigating students, faculty members,
and U.S. or foreign government officials. Investigations were to be
"thorough and exhaustive," developing "all pertinent information con-
cerning the subject's background and subversive activity."
The FBI took the following steps if it learned that "any individual
on whom we have subversive derogatory information" planned travel
abroad:
Information concerning, these subjects' proposed travel
abroad, including information concerning their subversive ac-
tivities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of
State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and [FBI] legal at-
taches if the proposed travel is in areas covered by such and,
frequently, requests are made of one or all of the above to
place stops with appropriate security services abroad to be
advised of the activities of these subjects. [Emphasis added.1
Domestic investigative techniques included a review of existing FBI
files, coverage by confidential informants, physical surveillance, photo-
graphic surveillance, public source records, records of private firms,
and interviews with the subject. 8 5
In addition to the policies for intelligence investigations of indi-
viduals, the FBI had substantial programs for collecting intelligence
about "Marxist revolutionary-type organizations" including a "Com-
infil" program aimed at groups suspected of being infiltrated by Com-
munists. The purpose of these programs was not only to obtain evi-
dence for possible crosecution, but also "to follow closely the activities
of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day-
to-day appraisal of the strenath, dangerousness, and activities of these
organizations seeking the overthrow of the U.S. Government." 286
The FBI Manual did not define "subversive" groups in terms of
their links to a foreign government. Instead, they were "Marxist revo-
lutionary-type" organizations "seeking the overthrow of the U.S.
'1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 22-38.
1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 5-10.
Government." 287 One purpose of investigation was possible prosecu-
tion under the Smith Act. But no prosecutions were initiated under
that Act after 1957.28 The Justice Department advised the FBI in
1956 that such a prosecution required "an actual plan for a violent
revolution." 289 The Department's position in 1960 was that "incite-
ment to action in the foreseeable future" was needed. 290 The First
Amendment required:
something more than language of prophecy and prediction
and implied threats against the Government to establish the
existence of a clear and present danger to the nation and its
citizens.29 1
Despite the strict requirements for prosecution, the FBI kept on
investigating "subversive" organizations "from an intelligence view-
point" to appraise their "strength" and "dangerousness." 292
The FBI's broadest program for collecting intelligence was carried
out under the heading COMINFIL, for Communist infiltration. 29 3














FBI investigations covered "the entire spectrum of the social and
labor movement in the country." 2" The purpose was pure intelli-
gence-to "fortify" the government against "subversive pressures" 296
or to "strengthen" the government against "subversive campaigns." 297
In other words, the COMINFIL program supplied the Attorney
General and the President with political intelligence about groups
a 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.
The Supreme Court's last decision upholding a Smith Act conviction was
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which reiterated that there must
be "advocacy of action." Cf., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
' Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Director, FBI,
3/15/56.
2 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Director, FBI,
5/17/60.
m Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Director, FBI,
9/23/60.
21960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.
' 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 83-84.
2' 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 5-11.
n Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, p. 195.
Annual Report for 1958, p. 338.
Annual Report for 1964, p. 375.
450.
seeking to influence national policy, so that they might assess whether
Communists were involved.
2 9 8
The FBI said it was not concerned with the "legitimate activities"
of "nonsubversive groups," but only with whether Communists were
"gaining a dominant role." 299 Nevertheless, COMINFIL reports in-
evitably described such "legitimate activities" unrelated whatsoever
to the role of alleged -"subversives." The FBI Manual required prior
approval from FBI headquarters before opening a COMINFIL in-
vestigation. The techniques used included contacting established
sources and informants and pretext interviews with members of the
organization. 00
An example of one such investigation was the FBI's COMINFIL
case on the NAACP. In 1957, the New York Field Office prepared a
137-page report covering the intelligence gathered during the previous
year. Copies were disseminated to the three military intelligence agen-
cies. The report described the national section of the NAACP, its
growth and membership, its officers and directors, its national conven-
tion, its stand on communism and the role in its state and local chapters
of alleged Communists, members of Communist front groups, and
the Socialist Workers Party. A synopsis of the report discussed the
size of the NAACP and added,
NAACP 47th Annual Convention held June 26 to July 1,
1956, in San Francisco, California. Convention reaffirmed and -
extended 1950 resolution against Communism. Resolution
bars NAACP membership to individuals with Communist
affiliations. Informant, who has furnished reliable informa-
tion in the past, advised that there was no activity at the con-
vention which could be termed Communist activity. Inform-
ant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, ad-
vised that two individuals of national CP status would attend
convention. NAACP in letter dated 11/3/55 to branch presi-
dents instructs branches to be alert for Communists in the
organization and see that no persons of questionable reputa-
tions are permitted to obtain positions in NAACP branches.
The CP, USA continued to consider NAACP as main Negro
mass organization and desires program to win leadership
among Negro organizations. September 1956 issue of "Politi-
cal Affairs" carried an article entitled "The NAACP Conven-
tion." Various attempts have been made by the CP to infiltrate
and dominate certain NAACP branches throughout the
United States and its territories. Identities of known CP
members in various branches throughout the United States
set forth.
3 0
2' The Chief of the Internal Security Section of the FBI Intelligence Division
in 1948-1966 testified that the Bureau "had to be certain" that a group's posi-
tion did not coincide with the Communist line "just by accident." The FBI
would not "open a case" until it had "specific information" that "the Commu-
nists were there" and were "influencing" the group to "assist the Communist
movement." (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75, p. 47.)
Annual Report for 1955, p. 195.
1950 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 83-84.
, Memorandum from New York City Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/12/57.
The report was based on information supplied by 151 informants or
confidential sources, including at least four who attended the NAACP
national convention; most of the informants or sources provided data
on individuals with subversive connections who had either joined or
associated with the NAACP.
Other reports from field offices in Boston, Seattle, Philadelphia,
and Milwaukee provide additional examples of the scope of FBI in-
telligence coverage of the NAACP. In Boston, informants provided
membership figures, and the FBI compiled lists of officers from public
sources.30 2 An informant in Seattle obtained a list of officers and re-
ported. on a meeting where signatures were gathered on a "petition
directed to President Eisenhower" and plans announced for two'mem-
bers to go to Washington, D.C., for a "Prayer Pilgrimage.' 33 The
Philadelphia office used an informak to discover the officers and total
membership of the NAACP chapter and to learn its general objec-
tive-"to seek the enactment of new civil rights laws." 304 A Milwaukee
informant also provided a list of officers.3o5 Although these reports
concentrated on information about alleged Communist infiltration,
they all included data on individuals and activities such as the above
having no connection with "subversive activity."
The FBI and the Justice Department both justified the continuation
of COMINFIL investigations, despite the Communist Party's decline
in the fifties and early sixties, on the theory that the Party was "seek-
ing to repair its losses" with the "hope" of being able to "move in" on
movements with "laudable objectives." 306 The FBI reported to the
White House in 1961 that the Communist Party had "attempted" to
take advantage of "racial disturbances" in the South and had "en-
deavored" to bring "pressure to bear" on government officials "through
the press, labor unions, and student groups." At that time the FBI had
under investigation "two hundred known or suspected communist front
and communist-infiltrated organizations." 307 By not stating how effec-
tive the "attempts" and "endeavors" of the Communists were, and b
not indicating whether they were becoming more or less successful
the FBI offered a deficient rationale for its sweeping intelligence
collection policy.305
By 1960 the FBI had opened approximately 432,000 headquarters
files on individuals and groups in the "subversive" intelligence field.
Between 1960 and 1963 an additional 9,000 such files were opened.30 9
Apart from domestic intelligence programs aimed at the Communist
Party, Communist infiltration, and other "revolutionary" groups such
m Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/28/57.
Memorandum from Seattle Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/57.
Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/7/57.
Memorandum from Milwaukee Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/13/57.
Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 247-248.
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelli-
gence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for
National Security, 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report, Status of U.S. Internal 'Secu-
rity Programs.
m A former head of the FBI Intelligence Division has testified that such lan-
guage was deliberately used to exaggerate the threat of Communist influence.
William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 40-41.
"" Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.
as the Socialist Workers Party and the Nationalist Party of Puerto
Rico, the FBI had extensive programs in the foreip intelligence and
counterintelligence areas. Within the FBI Intelligence Division, a
separate Counterintelligence Branch supervised investigations and
other operations directed against hostile foreign intelligence services
and espionage activities. This branch took over supervision of cases of
Communists suspected of being involved in espionage activity. The
Counterintelligence Branch included an Espionage Section, a Liaison
Section, and a Nationalities Section. The Internal Security (or domes-
tic intelligence) Branch included the Internal Security Section for
organizations, the Subversives Control Section for individuals, and a
Research Section.
G. The Justice Department and FBI Intelligence Investigations
The Justice Department supplied only the most general guidance to
the FBI for the investigation of organizations. An example is the
FBI's intelligence investigation of the Nation of Islam. As early as
1952, the Criminal Division advised the FBI that the Nation of Islam
would not then be placed on the "Attorney General's list," but that
available information indicated that the organization "may be a fit
subject for designation . . ." under the employee security program. 10
The following year the Criminal Division told the FBI that "the evi-
dence presently available is insufficient to establish a violation of the
Smith Act," but that the FBI should continue to furnish investigative
reports "with a view to possible future prosecution under the Smith
Act." "1 In 1955, the FBI asked the Department's Internal Security
Division whether it should continue to include leading members of the
Nation of Islam on the Security Index. 31 2 The Internal Security Divi-
sion replied six months later that the evidence did not warrant designa-
tion for the "Attorney General's list," but that "statements and ac-
tivities on the part of individual members of the Cult indicating
anarchistic and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making a
judgment as to whether or not such individual members come within
the revised Security Index criteria." 313 Shortly thereafter, the Internal
Security Division advised that the evidence was still "insufficient to
constitute a violation of the Smith Act," since the statements of group
leaders were "more in the realm of prophecy than of an actual plan
for a violent revolution." 314
Nevertheless, the FBI continued to investigate and supply reports
to the Justice Department under the authority of the employee security
program and the emergency detention program.3 1 5 In June 1959, Di-
rector Hoover noted on an internal FBI memorandum, "Is there no
"Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General James M. McInerney to the
FBI Director, 5/5/52.
" Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III to the FBI
Director, 2/9/53.
3 Memorandum from the FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General William
F. Tompkins, 8/8/55.
31 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to the FBI Direc-
tor. 2/7/56.
n' Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to the FBI Direc-
tor, 3/15/56.
m Memorandum from the FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General Tomp-
kins, 5/11/56; Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to FBI Director, 4/12/57.
action Dept. can take against the NOIT?" Therefore, the FBI asked
the Internal Security Division to review the reports submitted by the
Bureau and "advise whether any type of legal action against the NOI
is feasible in the light of this additional information." 317 The Internal
Security Division replied that the FBI reports "failed to disclose the
type of evidence required" for a Smith Act prosecution, but that des-
ignation for the "Attorney General's list" was "under consideration."
Upon receipt of this memorandum, Director Hoover noted, "They al-
ways come up with more reasons for no positive action and none for
constructive approach." 318
Nearly a year later, the Internal Security Division advised the FBI
that there were "a number of legal problems" with designation of the
Nation of Islam for the "Attorney General's list" because the language
of the group's leaders "concerning the destruction of the government
usually has been couched in terms of prophecy or prediction rather
than in terms of incitement to action in the foreseeable future." Never-
theless, the Division would continue to review any "additional infor-
mation furnished by the Bureau relative to the criteria" of the em-
ployee security program.3 1 9
Director Hoover was still dissatisfied, noting on the FBI's Current
Intelligence Analysis for August 31, 1960, "Has the Department
ruled on the NOI or are they still 'considering' it?" Hoover believed
"nothing would be gained" by writing the Internal Security Di-
vision again, and suggested "an overall memo on NOI be sent A.G.
stressing vicious character and statements of this outfit." 32o Conse-
quently, the FBI sent Attorney General William Rogers a summary
of the most inflammatory rhetoric of the group and asked him to
"consider whether there is any legal action that can be taken or
whether the organization can be designated pursuant to the provisions
of Executive Order 10450." " 
In reply, the Internal Security Division explained again that
"the First Amendment would require something more than lan-
guage of prophecy and prediction and implied threats against the
Government to establish the existence of a clear and present danger to
the nation and its citizens." Moreover, there was insufficient evidence
to meet the criterion of Executive Order 10450 "that it has adopted
a policy of advocating or approving the commission of ... acts of vio-
lence to deny others their constitutional rights." Nevertheless, the
FBI was requested to "continue its investigation . . . because of
the semi-secret and violent nature of this organization, and the
continuing tendency on the part.of some of its leaders to use lan-
" Memorandum from S. B. Donahue to A. H. Belmont, 6/17/59. (The May 27,
1959, issue of the FBI's "Current Intelligence Analysis" had been devoted to
"presentation of picture of growing threat to internal security of Nation of
Islam.")
m Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Assistant 'Attorney General, In-
ternal Security Division, 6/19/59.
s Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley
to the FBI Director, 7/15/59.
"9 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to the FBI Direc-
tor, 5/17/60.
* Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. J. Parsons, 9/1/60.
a" Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, 9/9/60.
guage of implied threats against the Government. . . ." Director
Hoover noted on this memorandum, "Just stalling !" 322
Thus, for a decade the FBI continued to conduct an intelligence
investigation of the Nation of Islam, despite the lack of any evidence
to justify federal prosecution or other legal action by the Justice
Department. Although the Department had an entire division con-
cerned with internal security matters, it failed almost totally to
provide the FBI guidance or direction.
The Internal Security Division contained a Subversive Activities
Section to supervise prosecution of Communists under the Smith Act
and related statutes (over one hundred Party leaders were prosecuted
in the 1950s), a Subversive Organizations Section to enforce the
Subversive Activities Control Act against Communist and Communist-
front groups and to make designations for the Employee Security
Program, an Appeals and Research Section to handle the voluminous
appellate litigation and consider legislation, and a Foreign Agents
Registration Section. In 1955, the Division received 101,470 memo-
randa and reports from the FBI.3 2 3 The Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Internal Security Division from 1958 until 1970,
J. Walter Yeagley, was a former official of the FBI Intelligence Divi-
sion; and his principal deputy, John Doherty, had been FBI Director
Hoover's liaison with the White House in the early 1950s. .
H. FBI Investigations of "Hate Groups" and "Racial Matters"
During the 1950s the FBI also developed investigative programs
in the area of "racial matters," including racial disturbances and
"Klan-type organizations, hate organizations, and associated individ-
uals." As early as 1947, designations for the Attorney General's list
required data on any organization which advocated the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny persons their constitutional
rights.3 24 At that time President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights
endorsed "the principles of disclosure ... to deal with those who would
subvert our democracy by revolution or by encouraging disunity and
destroying the civil rights of some groups." 325 The first "Attorney
General's list" of subversive organizations for the employee loyalty
program included various Ku Klux Klan organizations.
The FBI program for Klan-type and hate organizations required
investigation of "organizations and associated individuals that ...
have adopted a policy or have allegedly adopted a policy of advocat-
ing, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others
their rights under the Constitution." The intelligence sought included
information about the structure, objectives, publications and propa-
ganda, and finances of the organizations, as well as the officers, mem-
bership, recruiting activities, and meetings of each klavern or local
chapter. Hate groups which did not "qualify for investigation" under
" Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the FBI
Director, 9/23/60.
32 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, pp. 44-66.
324 Executive Order 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947), Executive Order 10450,
18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
... President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (1947), p. 52.
these standards were followed ",through public source material and
established sources." 326
FBI field offices were instructed to "conduct no investigation re-
garding individual acts of violence allegedly or actually committed
by an organization in absence of information indicating violation
within Bureau's jurisdiction." Nevertheless, the FBI used its inform-
ants and sources within the groups to determine which group was
involved in "each such incident" and "whether action taken was on
initiative of individual members or with knowledge or aproval of
leadership." Individual investigations were opened "on officers, leaders,
and active workers in these organizations to determine whether they
have been involved in acts of violence or have a definite potential for
future acts of violence." Names of members attending meetings were
"indexed from informants' statements," and names of new members
were furnished to FBI headquarters "for indexing purposes." In-
formants were "developed in all such organizations." However, field
offices were cautioned,
Wholesale investigations of individuals of these organiza-
tions should not be conducted and investigations of individual
members should be initiated only on a most selective basis. In-
dividuals investigated should be those who are key personnel
who actually formulate and carry out the organization's pof-
icy and not those individuals who merely attend meetings on
a regular basis.327
This restriction was imposed in mid-1959, after supervision of Klan-
type and hate matters were transferred from the FBI Intelligence
Division to the General Investigative Division.
Nevertheless, the Bureau used its "established sources" to monitor
the activities of hate groups which did not "qualify" under the violence
standard. 328 Thus, the FBI collected and disseminated intelligence
about the John Birch Society and its founder, Robert Welch, in
1959.329 The activities of another right-wing spokesman, Gerald L. K.
Smith who headed the Christian Nationalist Crusade, were the sub-
ject of FBI reports even after the Justice Department had concluded
that there was no federal law violation and no basis for putting the
group on the "Attorney General's list." 930
' 1960 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 1.
1960 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 2-3.
3 1968 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 1.
m The FBI has denied that it ever conducted a "security-type investigation"
of the Birch Society or Welch, but the Boston Field Office "was instructed in 1959
to obtain background data" on Welch using public sources. (Memorandum from
the FBI to the *Senate Select Committee, 2/10/76.) A 1963 internal FBI memo-
randum stated that the Bureau "checked into the background" of the Birch
Society "because of its scurrilous attack on President Eisenhower and other
high Government officials." (Memorandum from F. J.. Baumgardner to W. C.
Sullivan, 5/29/63.) .
m Letter from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Sherman Adams, As-
sistant to the President, 11/22/54; letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler,
Special Assistant to the President, 10/15/57 and 1/17/58. (Dwight D. Eisen-
hower Library.)
Under the FBI program for "General Racial Matters," the Bureau
gathered intelligence on "race riots, civil demonstrations, and similar
developments." These developments included "proposed or actual
activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organiza-
tions, etc., in the racial field." Although the FBI realized it did not
have "investigative jurisdiction over such general racial matters," the
Manual stated, "As an intelligence function the Bureau does have the
responsibility of advising appropriate Government agencies and offi-
cials on both a national and local level of all pertinent information
obtained concerning such incidents." FBI responsibilities were also
based on the long-standing agreement with military intelligence:
Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial matters is
concerned, U.S. Army regulations place responsibility upon
the Army to keep advised of any developments of a civil dis-
turbance nature which may require the rendering of assist-
ance to civil authorities or the intervention of Federal troops.
OSI and ONI have a collateral responsibility under Army in
such matters and copies of pertinent documents disseminated
to Army concerning such matters should be furnished to OSI
and ONI.31
The need for federal troops to control civil disturbances was vividly
demonstrated in the Little Rock school desegregation events of 1957-
1958.
The President was informed during these years of the FBI's "racial
matters" intelligence activities. At a Cabinet briefing in 1958, Direc-
tor Hoover stated:
. . . we investigate such fanatical and so-called "hate"
groups as the Negro Nation of Islam; the Ku Klux Klan; the
National States Rights Party, an anti-Jewish and anti-Negro
organization; and the "Confederate Underground." The lat-
ter is a name which has been mentioned on a number of occa-
sions in recent bombing threats and other forms of violence.
Since January 1, 1957, there have been over 90 bombings, or
attempted bombings, in the United States. Of these, at least
69 have involved Negro victims and at least eight Jewish re-
ligious and educational facilities. . . .
Recognizing the danger to the national welfare from a gen-
eral pattern of organized terrorism, the FBI has moved in
to expand its assistance to local law enforcement. . . . We are
closely checking the activities of individuals prominently in-
volved in racial incidents, such as [a leader of] the Seaboard
White Citizens Council of Washington. As a further aid to
local law enforcement agencies, the FBI has scheduled a
series of special conferences . . . to discuss our cooperative
services regarding bombings and threats of bombings against
religious and educational institutions.
Our entry into these cases at this new level is not to be
interpreted as an attempt on our part to usurp the jurisdic-
tion of local authorities. To give the FBI this jurisdiction
a 1960 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 5-6.
would relieve local governments of the basic responsibility to
maintain law and order, and the ultimate responsibility right-
fully rests at the local level.332
Director Hoover's sensitivity to possible criticism for exceeding the
FBI's jurisdiction was reflected in a warning to the field offices that
racial matters were "extremely delicate and great care must be exer-
cised in the approach to such matters." 333
There was greater emphasis on right-wing extremism in FBI
domestic intelligence policy during 1960-1963. In January 1963, FBI
field offices received a thirty-two page set of instructions on how to
characterize "Klan-type and hate-type organizations." Field offices
were advised that individual and group activities had to be "specific-
ally identified with the correct Klan organization." 33
Instructions to FBI field offices in June 1963 specifically emphasized
investigations of "rightist or extremist" groups, based not only on the
FBI's criminal investigative jurisdiction and its authority under the
Federal Employee Security Program, but also on a general intelli-
gence premise:
"Rightist or extremist" groups operating in the anticom-
munist field are being formed practically on a daily basis. I
wish to re-emphasize the necessity for the field to be alert to,
and advise the Bureau concerning, the formation and identi-
ties of such groups. The field should also be alert to the activi-
ties of such groups which come within the purview of Execu-
tive Order 10450 or are in violation of Federal statutes over
which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. Investiga-
tions, where warranted, should be initiated and handled pur-
suant to Bureau policy relating to the specific substantive vio-
lation. You are reminded that anticommunism should not
militate against checking on a group if it is engaged in unlaw-
ful activities in violation of Federal statutes over which the
Bureau has investigative jurisdiction.
Investigations of groups in this field whose activities are
not in violation of any statutes over which the Bureau has
jurisdiction are not to be conducted without specific Bureau
authority. A request for authority to investigate such a group
should include the basis for your recommendations regarding
investigation. 33 [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the FBI developed a program for collecting general intelli-
gence on right-wing extremism. There is no further reference to this
program in comparable instructions to the field issued after 1963.
I. Legal Authority for Domestic Intelligence
During the 1945-1963 period, there were two formal presidential
statements '(or directives) on FBI domestic intelligence authority-
one by President Truman in 1950 and the other by President Eisen-
hower in 1953. These statements specifically authorized FBI investiga-
" FBI Director Hoover's Briefing of the President and the Cabinet, 11/6/58.
1960 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 6.
SAC Letter No. 63-4, 1/23/63.
,A (' Tpttr No. 63-27. 6/11/63.
tion of "subversive activities," unlike the more ambiguous Roosevelt
directives. Moreover, a confidential directive of the National Security
Council in 1949 granted authority to the FBI and military intelli-
gence for counterespionage operations and the investigation of "sub-
versive activities." The power of the National Security Council to is-
sue this order was based, in part, on the National Security Act of 1947.
That act also created the Central Intelligence Agency, with a prohibi-
tion against its performance of "law enforcement or internal security
functions" and a limitation on the authority of the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence to inspect FBI intelligence.
The action of the National Security Council in 1949 greatly
strengthened the independence of the FBI. The line of authority for
FBI and military domestic intelligence now flowed from the National
Security Council to an Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
(IIC), composed of the FBI Director (as chairman) and the heads of
the military intelligence agencies. This chain of command bypassed the
Attorney General. A member of the National Security Council staff in
the White House was assigned to serve as the point of contact between
the IIC and the NSC. The Attorney General was, as a practical matter,
regularly involved in major White House decisions.33 6 This arrange-
ment continued until 1962, when President Kennedy placed the Inter-
departmental Intelligence Conference under the direct authority of the
Attorney General.33
The testimony before Congress and the floor debate at the time of
consideration of the National Security Act of 1947 did not clarify the
authority of the FBI. Nevertheless, the legislative history supporting
the intent of Congress to exclude the CIA from domestic intelligence
was extensive. The restriction against "police, law enforcement or in-
ternal security functions" appeared first in President Truman's direc-
tive establishing the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946.338
General Vandenberg, then serving as Director of Central Intelligence,
testified in 1947 that this restriction was intended to "draw the lines
very sharply between the CIG and the FBI" and to "assure that the
Central Intelligence Group can never become a Gestapo or security
police." 33 Proponents of the creation of the Central Intelligence
Agency cited the FBI as a model. For example, Allen Dulles stated:
The success of the FBI has been due not only to the ability
of the director and the high qualities of his chief assistants,
but to the fact that that director has been on that particular
job for a sufficient period of years to build up public con-
fidence, an esprit de corps in his organization, and a high
prestige. We should seek the same results for our intelligence
a The 1950 Truman statement on FBI authority was cleared by Acting Attor-
ney General Peyton Ford; and Attorney General Herbert Brownell took part in
the National Security Council meeting where the 1953 statement was approved.
(Letter from James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC, to Attorney General
J. Howard McGrath, 7/24/50; Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney
General Brownell, 12/29/53.)
m National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
a Presidential Directive, Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities, 1/22/46, 11 Fed. Reg. 1337.
m Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, 80th Cong.
(1947), p. 497.
service, which will operate in the foreign field, and on items
of foreign information.4o
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal testified that the purposes of
the CIA were "limited definitely to purposes outside of this country,
except the collation of information gathered by other Government
agencies." The FBI was relied upon "for domestic activities." 34 In
the House floor debate, Congressman Holifield stressed that the work
of the CIA "is strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence-what
is known as clandestine intelligence. They have no right in the domes-
tic field to collect information of a clandestine military nature. They
can evaluate it; yes." 342
Congressmen were also concerned with a provision of the original
bill establishing the CIA which gave its Director the power to make
inspection" of the intelligence operations of other government agen-
cies. Congressman Busby urgred an amendment "to eliminate the pos-
sibility of its [the CIA's] going into the records and book§ of the FBI
because the FBI does not go outside the United States. It is only con-
cerned, with internal intelligence and investigations in the United
States." 34 Congressman Judd introduced such an amendment "pri-
marily to protect the FBI." He stated:
I do not believe we ought to give this Director of Central In-
telligence power to reach into the operations of J. Edgar
Hoover and the FBI, which are in the domestic field. . . .
All the intelligence the FBI has . . . must be available to
the Director of Central Intelligence if it relates to the na-
tional security. But the Director of Central Intelligence will
not have the right to inspect their operations.
Congressman Judd feared the DCI "coming in and finding out who
their agents are, what and where their nets are, how they operatei
and thus destroy their effectiveness." He believed the FBI was "toovaluable an agency to be tampered with." The amendment was
adopted.344
Consequently, the National Security Act of 1947 contained two sec-
tions specifically applying to domestic intelligence. First, it provided
that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal-security functions." Second, it excluded the FBI from the
" Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, on S. 758 (1947), pp. 525-526.President Truman had rejected a proposal by FBI Director Hoover in 1945 forexpanding the FBI's wartime Special Intelligence Service, which was assignedto the Western Hemisphere, to a world-wide basis. Don Whitehead, The FBIStory (New York, Random House, 1956) p. 279.
a Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the ExecutiveDepartments on H.R. 2319, 80th Cong. (1947), p. 127.
'93 Cong. Rec. 9430 (1947). Fears that a foreign intelligence agency wouldintrude into domestic matters went back to 1944, when General William Dono-van, head of the Office of Strategic Services, proposed that the OSS be trans-formed from a wartime basis to a permanent "central intelligence service." Dono-van's proposal was leaked to the Chicago Tribune, allegedly by FBI DirectorHoover, and it was denounced as a "super-spy system" which would "pry intothe lives of citizens at home." [Corey Ford, Donovan of the 08 (Boston: LittleBrown, 1970), pp. 303-304.]
" 93 Cong. Rec. 9404 (1947).
3" 93 Cong. Rec. 4218-4219 (1947).
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"inspection" powers of the Director of Central Intelligence and pro-
vided only "that upon the written request of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such informa-
tion for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential
to the national security." 36
The only indication of legislative intent regarding the type of
information to be made available by the FBI appeared in the House
debate. Congressman Judd was asked, "If the FBI has information
about fifth-column activities and subversive information affecting the
national defense, would that be open to the Central Intelligence
Agency?". The sponsor of the amendment replied, "Yes." 346
There was no general restatement of the FBI's domestic security
intelligence responsibilities at this time. This issue arose first in 1948,
when the Secretary of Defense recommended to the National Security
Council that it consider how best to coordinate internal security mat-
ters. The NSC directed its executive secretary to conduct an internal
security survey, and a report was submitted in August 1948.34T
In 1948 there were also political developments in Congress and the
forthcoming presidential election campaign, including the allegations
of Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers before the House
Un-American Activities Committee regarding Communists in govern-
ment service and charges that the administration's security procedures
were lax. In this context, Attorney General Clark advised the Pres-
ident that he should make "a statement concerning investigations in
the internal security field." The draft read as follows:
On September 6, 1939, and again on January 8, 1943, a
Presidential directive was issued providing that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation should take charge of investigative
work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive
activities, and similar matters. It was requested that all law
enforcement officers in the United States, and all patriotic
organizations and individuals, promptly turn over to the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation any information concerning
these matters
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has fully carried out
its responsibilities with respect to the internal security of the
United States, under these directives. The cooperation ren-
dered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance
with the directives has been of invaluable assistance to it.
I wish to emphasize at this time that these directives con-
tinue in full force and effect.
"50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) and 403(e).
"93 Cong. Rec. 4219 (1947). The following discussion of FBI Director Hoover
by Congressman John McCormack appears in the floor debate on the tenure of
the CIA Director: "The best we can do is as in the case of J. Edgar Hoover:
A man by his personality, a man who impresses himself so much upon his
fellowmen that permanency accrues by reason of the character of service that
he renders. But J. Edgar Hoover has no tenure for life. He has earned it because
of his unusual capacity." [93 Cong. Rec. 9445 (1947).]
' J. Patrick Coyne, Major Chronological Developments 6n the Subject of Inter-
nal Security, 4/8/49 (Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Stephen J. Spingarn).
Investigations in matters relating to the internal security
of the United States to be effective must be conducted in a
comprehensive manner, on a national basis, and by a single
central agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the
agency designated for this purpose. At this time, I request
that all information concerning any activities within the
United States, its territories or possessions, believed to be of
a subversive nature, be reported promptly to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.348
Attorney General Clark's recommendation of a presidential state-
ment on FBI authority was made the day after he met with White
House aides Clark Clifford, Charles Murphy, and George Elsey to
discuss how the President should handle the Bentley and Chambers
allegations. At that meeting it had been decided that the President
should not make a statement on the espionage allegations and that
consideration would be given to "referring the question of Soviet
espionage in the Federal Government to a bipartisan commission,
such as the Hoover Commission." 3
Upon receiving the Attorney General's proposed statement, presi-
dential aide George Elsey asked Admiral Souers, Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council, "to undertake a review of the state-
ment, with a view to limiting the excessive authority granted to the
FBI, and in such other ways as he finds desirable in the light of his
experience in the National Security Council." 1o However, the re-
vised draft by Admiral Souers made no substantial change except to
include reference to "the intelligence services of the military forces."
Mr. Elsey and Admiral Souers passed the matter on to White House
aide Stephen Spingarn, who met with Assistant Director Ladd of the
FBI. Ladd urged "early issuance of the statement by the President"
and stated that its purpose "was to spike vigilante activity in the inter-
nal security field by private organizations and persons." After this
meeting, Spingarn advised Clark Clifford that "the issuance of such
a statement at this time by the President might give rise to the im-
pression that he was making a rather transparent show of activity on
this matter as a result of needling from Congressional quar-
ters. . . ." 61
Nevertheless, the Justice Department did release a statement criticiz-
ing the "political activity" of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities, and declaring that "all individuals and groups involved
in activities potentially dangerous to the security -of the nation are
subject to the continuous but quiet watchfulness of the Federal Bureau
of investigation." 3
" Memorandum from the Attorney General to the President, 9/17/48. (Harry
S. Truman Library.)
. Memorandum from G. M. Elsey to Clark Clifford, 8/16/48. (Harry S. Tru-
man Library, Papers of George M. Elsey.)
m Memorandum from Elsey to Charles Murphy, 8/26/48. (Harry S. Truman
Library, Elsey Papers.)
m' Memorandum from S. J. Spingarn to Mr. Clifford, 9/21/48. (Harry S. Tru-
man Library, Official File.)
'2 Justice Department Press Release, 9/29/48. (Harry S. Truman Library,
Spingarn Papers.)
After the 1948 presidential election, the National Security Council
addressed formally the problem of coordination in the internal
security field. An understanding was reached by the Secretary of De-
fense, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI on Febru-
ary 1, 1949; and recommendations were submitted thereafter to the
President for the establishment under the NSC of two committees-
the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepart-
mental Committee on Internal Security-and the designation of an
NSC Representative on Internal Security "to perform coordinating
and advisory functions with the IIC and the ICIS. . . ." The
President approved these recommendations and issued a directive on
coordination of internal security.354
The National Security Council then approved charters for the IIC
and the ICIS. They recited the provisions of Section 101 of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, which authorized the NSC to "advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and mili-
tary policies relating to the national security," and also the President's
directive of March 1949. The purpose of the IIC, composed of the
FBI and military intelligence agencies, was to "effect the coordina-
tion of all investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage,
sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting
internal security." The ICIS, made up of representatives from the
Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and the military, was as-
signed responsibility for coordinating all non-investigatory internal
security activities.35
The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the military
intelligence agencies was also revised in 1949. It allocated respon-
sibilities among the agencies for the "investigation of all activities
coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subver-
sion, and sabotage." Each agency was obliged "to exchange freely and
directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of
mutual interest." The FBI had specific responsibility for advising the
military agencies of "developments concerning the strength, composi-
tion, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are
classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the
security of the United States." The military agencies were limited to
investigations. directly involving military personnel, civilian em-
ployees of the military, and areas under military control.356
A supplementary agreement in June 1949 required FBI and mili-
tary intelligence officials in the field to "maintain close personal liai-
son" and to pay "particular attention . . . to avoiding any
duplication in connection with the use of informers." The supplemen-
tary agreement also stated, "Where there is doubt as to whether or not
one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it
.should be transmitted to the other agency." -7
'3 J. P. Coyne, Major Chronological Developments on the Subject of Internal
Security, 4/8/49. (Harry S. Truman Library, SpingarU Papers.)
' NSC Memorandum 17/4, 3/23/49.
' NSC Memorandum 17/5, 6/15/49.
Delimitation of Investigative Dutiep and Agreement for Coordination,
2/23/49.
"Supplemental Agreement No. 1 to the Delimitations Agreement, approved by
HO0, 6/2/49.
After the outbreak of the Korean War and in the midst of congres-
sional consideration of new internal security legislation in 1950, the
IIC under the chairmanship of FBI Director Hoover recommended
to the NSC "that a Presidential statement be issued to bring up to date
and clarify prior Presidential Directives . . . outlining the respon-
sibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with
espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters." At-
torney General McGrath forwarded the draft to the President's
counsel.*5*
The NSC approved a revised version of the draft, and it was made
public on July 24, 1950. There is no record of why it chose the broader
interpretation of the Roosevelt directives and declared that they had
provided that the FBI:
should take charge of investigate work in matters relating to
espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related mat-
ters.5 9 [Emphasis added.]
President Roosevelt's directives had not used this language. (See pp.
above.) Moreover, President Truman's domestic policy aides were
surprised by the release of the statement. One noted, "This is the
most inscrutable Presidential statement I've seen in a long time." An-
other asked, "How in H- did this get out?" A third replied,
"Don't know-I thought you were handling." 360 Even before the state-
ment was issued, one of these aides had warned the President's counsel
that the Justice Department was attempting "an end run."361
Despite this concern among his assistants, President Truman's state-
ment clearly placed him on record as endorsing FBI investigations of
"subversive activities." Neither the President's statement nor the se-
cret NSC charter nor the confidential Delimitations Agreement de-
fined "subversive activities" or "subversion."
The President's announcement gave the FBI an opportunity to
make a statement of its own. The FBI statement denounced "hysteria,
witch-hunts and vigilantes" and affirmed the need for "protecting the
innocent as well as . . . identifying the enemies within our midst."
Nevertheless, the FBI advanced the following view of the threat:
The forces which are most anxious to weaken our internal
security are not always easy to identify. Communists have
been trained in deceit and secretly work toward the day when
they hope to replace our American way of life with a Com-
munist dictatorship. They utilize cleverly camouflaged move-
ments, such as some peace groups and civil rights organi-
zations, to achieve their sinister purposes. While they as in-
dividuals are difficult to identify, the Communist Party line
is clear. Its first concern is the advancement of Soviet Russia
and the godless Communist cause. It is important to learn to
know the enemies of the American way of life. 362
" Letter from Attorney General J. Howard McGrath to Charles S. Murphy,
Counsel to the President, 7/11/50.
" Statement of President Truman, 7/24/50.
3Notes initialed D. Bell, SJS (S. J. Spingarn), and GWE (George W. Elsey)
7/24-25/50. (Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman.Library.)
m Memorandum from G. W. Elsey to Charles S. Murphy, Counsel to the Presi-
dent, 7/12/50. (Murphy Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.)
W2 Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, 7/26/50. (Harry S. Truman Library, Bontecou
Papers.)
Shortly after President Eisenhower took office in 1953, the FBI
advised the White House that its "internal security responsibility"
went -beyond "statutory" authority. The Bureau attached a copy of
the Truman statement, but not the Roosevelt directive. The FBI again
interpreted the Roosevelt directive as saying that it had authorized
"investigative work" related to "subversive activities."1*
In December 1953, President Eisenhower issued a statement reit-
erating President Truman's "directive" (including its interpretation
of Roosevelt's orders) and extending it to matters under the Atomic
Energy Act.364 On the day this statement was released, Director
Hoover and Attorney General Herbert Brownell attended a National
Security Council meeting to discuss "additional funds" for FBI
"counterintelligence coverage." Director Hoover's memorandum after
the meeting stated that the President "wanted to have" the "addi-
tional counterintelligence coverage." 65 There was no reference to
"subversive activities."
President Kennedy issued no public statement comparable to the
Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower "directives." However, in 1962
he did transfer the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference from
under the National Security Council to "the supervision of the Attor-
ney General." 3 6 6 In 1964, Attorney General Robert Kennedy re-issued
the IIC charter, citing as authority the President's 1962 order and
directing the IIC (still composed of the FBI and military intelligence
agencies) to continue:
the coordination of all investigation of domestic espionage,
counterespionage, sabotage and subversion, and other related
intelligence matters affecting internal security.
The charter added that it did not "modify" or "affeet" the previous
"Presidential Directives" relating to the duties of the FBI, and that
the Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and military intelli-
gence "shall remain in full force and efect." 36
Thus, the Kennedy administration made no change in the vague
mandate for domestic intelligence activities, but merely placed formal
control in the hands of the Attorney General.
J. FBI Intelligence and International Tension, 1961-1963
The basic policy theme for the entire 1945-1963 period is stated in
a report for the National Security Council on the "Internal Security
Program" in 1954:
Communist doctrine provides that a period of peace is to be
used to consolidate and strengthen the Communist forces in
the world while at the same time weakening and dividing, the
democratic nations including disruption of the internal life
of these nations economically, politically and socially. Thus
* Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President,
1/28/53, and attached memorandum on "FBI Liaison Activities," 1/26/53.
3" Statement of President Eisenhower, 12/15/53.
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Brownell, 12/29/53.
. National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
" Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to J. Edgar Hoover, Chair-
man, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 3/5/64.
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the present Soviet "peace tactics" emphasize that our internal
security protective -coveraige must be maintained at a high
level. Soviet Russia can continue to increase subversive, dis-
ruptive tactics without risk or cost to herself commensurate
with the potential'beneficial results to the Soviet cause.
The Internal Security Program was formulated on the as-
sumption of a continuance of peacetime "cold war" condi-
tions. However, it includes the elements to be expanded for a
wartime operation.3*
The scope and techniques of domestic security intelligence operations
during this period cannot be fully understood without recognizing
that this assumption prevailed throughout all branches of the United
States government.
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In 1961, Director Hoover submitted a report to President Kennedy's
Special Assistant for National Security, McGeorge Bundy, on the
status of the internal security programs of the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference. It began by reviewing the charter of the IIC
and the Delimitations Agreement among the FBI and military intel-
ligence agencies. The primary objective of the "investigative program"
was "to counter the ever-increasing and continual threat from inter-
national communism and Soviet-bloc espionage and subversion." swo
In addition to reviewing counterespionage operations, the report de-
scribed programs for "identification and investigation of potentially
dangerous persons in the United States" and for "coverage of Com-
munist Party activities." The most significant recent change in opera-
tions was expanded coverage of Cuban groups. The FBI's Security
Index program was explained in the following terms:
The FBI maintains a current list of individuals, both citi-
zens and aliens, to be considered for apprehension and deten-
tion, if necessary, in a period of emergency. Approximately
12,000 individuals are listed at this time. This list is kept cur-
rent on a daily basis by the addition of new individuals whose
activities make them potentially dangerous to the United
States, and by the deletion of individuals who are no longer
engaged in subversive activities. Included on the list of po-
" Report on the Internal Security Program, prepared by the Interdepartmen-
tal Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal
Security, 3/5/54.
" The Justice Department's 1959 annual report stated:
"Despite the 'thaw,' real or apparent, in the Cold War, the [Communist] Party
has continued as an organized force, constantly seeking to repair its losses and
to regain its former position of influence. In a number of fields its activities are
directed ostensibly toward laudable objectives, such as elimination of discrimi-
nation by reason of race, low cost housing for the economically underprivileged,
and so on. These activities are pursued in -large part as a way of extending the
influence of the Party and its contracts with other forces and currents in
American life, and with the hope of being able to "move in" on such movements
when the time is propitious. As a conspiratorial activity the Party is still very
much alive." (Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp.
247-248.) [Emphasis supplied.]
" J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to
McGeorge Bundy, 'Special Assistant to the President, 7/25/61, enclosing IIO Re-
port, Status of U.S. Internal Security Programs, July 1, 1960, Through June 80,
1961.
tentially dangerous individuals are nearly 200 persons who
are engaged in pro-Castro Cuban activities or who sympa-
thize strongly with such activities. In addition to members
of the Communist Party, it also includes certain members of
such organizations as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico,
the Nation of Islam, and the Socialist Workers Party.
The FBI's "intensive coverage" of Cuban activities was required be-
cause of "the close ties between the Castro government of Cuba and
the Soviet bloc." Particular attention was paid to the "July 26 Move-
ment", which had been required to register under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, and to "the Fair Play for Cuba Committee." Re-
garding the latter, the report stated:
The Fair Play for Cuba Committee is the principal outlet
for pro-Castro propaganda and agitation on the part of U.S.
nationals sympathetic to the Castro regime. There are indica-
tions that this organization is receiving funds from the Cuban
Government. In addition, investigation has shown that this
group has been heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party,
USA (CPUSA), and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).
... In fact, some chapters of the group have been directly
organized by and under the complete control of the CPUSA
or the SWP.
Finally, with respect to coverage of the Communist Party and related
groups, the report stated:
The CPUSA is active in agitation and spreading dissension
in the U.S., and during the current racial disturbances in the
South, it has attempted to take full advantage of the situa-
tion. The Party has endeavored to bring pressure to bear on
state and Federal officials through the press, labor unions,
and student groups. ...
At the present time, the FBI has under investigation two
hundred known or suspected communist front and commu-
nist-infiltrated organizations. Many of these organizations
are national in scope with chapters in various cities through-
out the United States. These groups represent transmssion
belts through which the CPUSA can further its line."' [Em-
phasis added.]
The report did not say how effective the "attempts" and "endeavors"
of the Communists were, nor did it indicate Communist success was
increasing or decreasing.
The question of pro-Cuban activities had arisen earlier at a Na-
tional Security Council meeting in May 1961 after the Bay of Pigs
invasion. Director Hoover attended at the request of the Attorney
General. Hoover recorded after the meeting that he had "outlined to
the President the fact that the FBI had intensified its coverage of
Cubans in this country, both anti-Castro groups and pro-Castro
a7IC Report, StatU8 of U.S. Internal Security Program, July 1, 1960 through
June 30. 1961.
groups." He had also "commented briefly upon the activities of the
Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the elements in back of it." 372
An FBI intelligence program aimed at Castro sympathizers had
originally begun in November 1960 when field offices were instructed
to consider "recommending for the Security Index those individuals
who are not now on the Security Index but who . . . would be deemed
dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U.S.
in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U.S." Such indi-
viduals included both Cubans and non-Cubans "who have been en-
gaged in substantial activities in furtherance of the aims and purpose
of the Cuban government, in support of pro-Castro groups or organi-
zations or in furtherance of the communist or subversive infiltration
of pro-Castro groups."33
After the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, FBI field officers were ad-
vised that "increasing anti-United States attitudes and demonstrations
stemming from the Cuban situation and 'cold war' tensions are cause
for concern" and that pro-Castro groups might "react militantly to an
emergency situation." In particular, the activities of the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee revealed "the capacity of a nationality group orga-
nization to mobilize its efforts in such a situation so as to arrange
demonstrations and influence public opinion." Hence, all field offices
were to "be most alert to the possibility of demonstrations by nation-
ality groups which could lead to incidents involving violence." 4
Further instructions covered both pro-Castro and anti-Castro
groups:
The failure of the recent invasion attempt by Cuban rebel
forces has accentuated the problem of investigating anti-
Castro and pro-Castro groups and individuals in the United
States. In addition.to discharging our security and criminal
responsibilities we are faced with the necessity of acquiring
and providing other agencies informative and valid intelli-
gence data relative to the objectives and activities of both fac-
tions as well as data regarding key personalities. . . .
In order to discharge these investigative and intelligence
responsibilities with maximum effectiveness it is essential that
particular attention be afforded the-development on a broadly
expanded basis of sources and informants in a position to pro-
vide knowledgeable data regarding pro-Castro and anti-
Castro activities. 75
At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the FBI intensified its
program for placing pro-Cubans on the Security Index and estab-
lished a special "Cuban Section" of the Index. Among the activities to
be considered in placing Cuban aliens on the Index included:
(1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro
regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in
support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with
a Memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover, 5/11/61.
SAC Letter No. 60-54, i/22/60.
SAC Letter No. 61-24, 4/27/61.
SAC Letter No. 61-28, 5/23/61.
Cuban agents operating in this country on, behalf of
the Cuban Government, or (4) statements or activities on
a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that
his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event
of armed conflict -between the United States and Cuba.
3 7 6
This program would have made it possible for the President, at the
height of the Cuban missile crisis, to declare an "internal security
emergency" and order the arrest and detention of those per-
sons deemed "potentially dangerous" because of their pro-Castro
sympathies.
In 1962 there were 11,165 persons on the Security Index, 969 per-
sons in Section A of the Reserve Index, and approximately 10,000
persons in Section B of the Reserve Index. An internal FBI -memo-
randum stated, "Essentially, all of the individuals included therein
fall within the emergency detention provisions in the Internal Secu-
rity Act of 1950 as well as the emergency detention provisions of the
Attorney General's Portfolio." "" There is no indication that Justice
Department officials under the Kennedy Administration were in-
formed of the existence of the Reserve Index.
In late 1963 the Security Index contained the names of 10,519 indi-
viduals, of whom 1,967 were designated for the Detcom Priority Ap-
prehension Program because "their training, violent tendencies and
prominence in subversive activity represent the greatest threat in time
of a national emergency. . . ." 3 The procedures for Justice Depart-
ment review of the Security Index were described as follows:
The Department does not review individual cases prior to
the time they are placed on the Security Index.... In July
1955 the Department advised that it would engage in review-
ing a "sampling" of our Security Index cases and it has been
so engaged since. We furnish the Department each month a
list of our Security Index subjects for attachment to the Mas-
ter Warrant of Arrest maintained by the Department should
an emergency occur requiring their apprehension and from
this list the Department selects cases for reviewing. For infor-
mation, as of today approximately 59.4 percent of the Security
Index cases have been reviewed and approved by the Depart-
ment.
We request the Department to conduct specific review of a
Security Index case when such a subject becomes (1) a U.S.
Government employee, (2) a foreign government employee,
and (3) an employee of the United Nations. We also request
the Department to specifically review a case previously re-
viewed and approved by it prior to taking action with respect
to removing a subject's name from the Security Index. These
reviews are generally conducted by the Department within
a thirty-day period.3 7 9
m SAC Letter No. 62-55, 10/5/62.
m Memorandum from J. F. Bland to W. C. Sullivan, 6/7/62, 12/11/62.
* Memorandum from W. C.'Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 11/26/63.
m Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 12/9/63.
The date of this December 1963 memorandum, in response to a re-
quest by Director Hoover, indicates high-level concern that Lee
Harvey Oswald was not on the Security Index.
Following the Kennedy assassination, the FBI Intelligence Divi-
sion proposed "a broadening of the factors which must be considered
in evaluating an individual's dangerousness." Six new criteria were
added:
1. Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc establishments (includ-
ing Cuba) where purpose of contact cannot be determined
or contact indicates communist sympathies.
2. Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc, Cuban, or Yugoslav in-
telligence agents where purpose of contact cannot be deter-
mined or contact indicates communist sympathies.
3. Individuals who have defected, revoked or sought revo-
cation of their United States citizenship in favor of a Sino-
Soviet-bloc country, who have returned to the United States,
and who have taken no positive steps to counteract such
action.
4. Statements or activities on a subject's part establishing
reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with
communist nations in the event of armed conflict between
the United States and communist nations.
5. Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or
intelligence activities.
6. A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior
on the part of an individual with a subversive background
whose prior acts depict a propensity for violence and hatred
against organized government.
It was pointed out that such criteria were "sufficiently elastic so that
when applied with the necessary judgment the complex questions
which arise can be resolved." 380
These FBI domestic intelligence policies in 1961-1963 indicated the
central purpose of the Bureau's internal security assignment. Interna-
tional tensions were still sufficiently intense that the FBI could rea-
sonably anticipate the possibility of an "internal security emergency."
The basic assumptions which had prevailed since World War II had
not been seriously questioned, and new events were viewed within that
framework.
V. FBI INTELLIGENCE AND DOMESTIC UNREST, 1964-1974
"Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI had developed into an extraor-
dinarily independent agency within our Government. It is hard to
exaggerate that. Mr. Hoover, in effect, took orders only from himself,
sometimes from an Attorney General, usually from a President, and
that was it. He had created a kind of kingdom of which he was very
jealous. . . . -
"Mr. Hoover built a position which I think is almost unparalleled in
the administrative branch of our Government, a combination of pro-
mo Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 12/11/63; SAC Letter
No. 63-61, 12/17/63.
fessional performance on the job, some element of fear, very astute re-
lations with the Congress, and very effective public relations."
-Testimony of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 23, 1974.
During the tumultuous years of the mid- and late-1960s and early
1970s, the FBI and other executive officials confronted entirely new
domestic security problems which did not fit the assumptions of the
past. Civil rights demonstrations, the violent Klan reaction, urban
ghetto disturbances, and protests against the Vietnam War raised sub-
stantially different concerns for federal executives. They were essen-
tially law enforcement matters, requiring effective criminal investiga-
tion of violent acts, improved police-community relations in the cities,
and careful planning to insure peaceful demonstrations. Nevertheless,
the FBI approached them within the framework of its domestic intel-
ligence operations, based on the concepts of previous decades; and the
Justice Department did not attempt in any significant way to reorient
the Bureau away from its preoccupation with Communist "influence."
Instead, Attorneys General simply added new assignments for FBI
intelligence, in broad requests containing little guidance and even less
control.
A. Klan Intelligence
During the first half of 1964 officials of the Justice Department-
including Attorney General Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall
of the Civil Rights Division-were increasingly concerned about the
spread of Ku Klux Klan activity and violence in Mississippi and parts
of Louisiana and Alabama. Attorney General Kennedy sent a team
of lawyers experienced in organized crime investigations to Missis-
sippi. Based on their report and his own findings, Assistant Attorney
General Marshall prepared a memorandum for the Attorney General
to send to President Johnson in June 1964. Its purpose was to en-
courage the FBI "to develop its own procedures for the collection of
intelligence." The memo to the President stated, in part:
... it seems to me that consideration should be given by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to new procedures for iden-
tification of individuals who may be or have been involved
in acts of terrorism, and to the possible participation in such
acts by law enforcement officials or at least their toleration
of terrorist activity. In the past the procedures used by the
Bureau for gaining information on known, local Klan
groups have been successful in many places, and the informa-
tion gathering techniques used by the Bureau on Communist
or Communist related organizations have of course been
spectacularly efficient.
The unique difficulty that seems to me to be presented by
the situation in Mississippi (which is duplicated in parts of
Alabama and Louisiana at least) is in gathering information
on -fundamentally lawless activities which have the sanction
of local law enforcement agencies, political officials and a
substantial segment of the white population. The techniques
followed in the use of specially trained, special assignment
agents in the infiltration of Communist groups should be of
value. If you approve, it might be desirable to take up with
the Bureau the possibility of developing a similar effort to
meet this new problem.3 8 1
Shortly thereafter, when three civil rights workers disappeared in.
Mississippi, President Johnson called on former CIA Director Allen
Dulles to evaluate the situation. After conferring with the Attorney
General, the FBI Director, and other Justice Department officials,
Dulles flew to Jackson, Mississippi. There he met with the Governor,
the head of the highway patrol, civic business leaders, black and white
religious leaders, and civil rights workers. Upon his return to Wash-
ington, Dulles recommended to the President that a substantial in-
crease be made in the number of FBI agents in Mississippi to help
"control the terrorist activities". He announced publicly that the
President appeared to favor his proposal and had indicated it would
be implemented very shortly.38
According to an account based on FBI sources, President Johnson
directed J. Edgar Hoover "to put people after the Klan and study
it from one county to the next. I want the FBI to have the best in-
telligence system possible to check on the activities of these people." "3
Another account suggests that Hoover initially told the President to
send Federal marshals or troops to Mississippi, but finally agreed that
the FBI would take on the assignment. "4 Consequently, the FBI
opened a new field office in Jackson, Mississippi, in July 1964. In addi-
tion, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division set up a special
unit as "a central clearinghouse for information on Klan and Klan-
type organizations and on acts of violence and intimidation found to
have been encouraged by the Klan." The unit maintained a current
listing of Klan membership; compiled information on the organiza-
tion of Klan federations and Klaverns and the relationship among
different groups; monitored trends toward growth or attrition, recruit-
ing activities, and changes in support for the Klan movement in par-
ticular areas; and reviewed and recommended action against Klan
organizations where members were acting to violate Federal statutes."
At FBI headquarters the supervision of investigations of Klan and
hate groups was transferred from the General Investigative Division
to the Domestic Intelligence Division, where it had been prior to 1958.
The Inspection Division prepared a study of the matter before the
1964 shift occurred. This study recalled that "one of the prime fac-
tors" in the 1958 decision had been "the almost complete absence of
Communist Party activity in the racial area;" another factor had been
the need to "streamline operations." Because the General Investigative
Division handled "the investigation of individual cases, i.e., bombings,
" Quoted in Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New York: Atheneum 1971),
pp. 105-106.
' "Dulles Requests More FBI Agents for Mississippi," New York Time8,
6/27/64; see also Joseph Alsop, "Murder by Night," Wa8hington Post, 6/17/64.
' Don Whitehead, Attack Against Terror: The FBI Against the Ku Klux Klan
in Mississippi (1970), pp. 90-91.
a Joseph Kraft, "J. Edgar Hoover: The Complete Bureaucrat," Commentary
(February 1965), pp. 59-42.
5 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1965, pp. 185-18
murders, police brutality, etc.," there was an advantage in "having the
hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substan-
tive civil rights cases." This argument was repeated by officials opposed
to the transfer in 1964:
[One official] believes the transfer of functions would create
an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that
our best chance to break major civil rights cases such as bomb-
ings, murders, etc., is through information developed from
the inside as a result of coverage established in the com-
munity where the crime occurred; i.e., informants and sources
in the Klan, hate groups, subversive organizations, but also
sources not connected with any group, who will report poten-
tial violence and individuals prone to violence. We are follow-
ing the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to
violence even though they have not violated a federal law as
yet. He feels that the Division that is going to investigate
these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this
purpose.
The contrary argument was based on "the premise that organizations
like the KKK and supporting groups are essentially subversive in
that they hold principles and recommend courses of action that are
inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist
Party." The Domestic Intelligence Division had experienced with
aggressive techniques in the area of "subversion:"
[Another official] feels that the DID over the years has
developed wide experience in the penetration of subversive
organizations through informants, anonymous sources,
sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, inter-
view programs of highly specialized nature, etc., and that
his division could put this experience to excellent use in
penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.
It was also suggested that the Domestic Intelligence Division "would
be in a position to launch a disruptive counterintelligence program
against the Klan and other hate groups with the same effective-
ness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party is
concerned."
The Inspection Division agreed that the Domestic Intelligence
Division had "achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Com-
munist Party and Soviet intelligence operations" and that "this
experience and knowhow could be put to good advantage in pene-
trating the Klan and other hate groups." The Inspection Division also
"felt that a study of counterintelligence and disruption tactics against
the Klan certainly merits further consideration." On the basis of
this recommendation, Director Hoover approved the transfer."'
Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenibach vigorously defended
the FBI's broad intelligence-gathering program against the Klan in
his testimony before the Select Committee:
... Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson, 7/30/64 (See Report on
COINTELPRO).
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The Klan program involved the investigation and prosecu-
tion of persons who engaged in' and who were committed to
the violent deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed rights
of others through murders, kidnappings, beatings and
threats of violence-all in contravention of federal and state
laws. . . . The Bureau was investigating and attempting to
prevent violence. To equate such efforts with surveillance or
harassment of persons exercising constitutionally guaran-
teed rights is in my view unmitigated nonsense....
It is true that the FBI program with respect to the Klan
made extensive use of informers. That is true of virtually
every criminal investigation with which I am familiar. In
an effort to detect, prevent, and prosecute acts of violence,
President Johnson, Attorney General Kennedy, Mr. Allen
Dulles, myself and others urged the Bureau to develop an
effective informant program, similar to that which they had
developed with respect to the Communist Party. It is true
that these techniques did in fact disrupt Klan activities,
sowed deep mistrust among Klan members, and made Klan
members aware of the extensive informant system of the FBI
and the fact that they were under constant observation. Klan
members were interviewed and reinterviewed openly-a fact
which appeared in the public press at the time. They were
openly surveilled. These techniques were designed to deter
violence-to prevent murder, bombings and beatings. In
my judgment they were successful. I was aware of them and
I authorized them. In the same circumstances I would do so
again today. 8 7
Mr. Katzenbach spoke of the FBI's intensive investigation of indi-
viduals and groups with a "propensity for violence." The FBI Manual
did, in fact, attempt to focus Klan intelligence investigations in this
manner. The basic standard for opening an investigation was whether
organizations.or individuals "have adopted a policy or have allegedly
adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of
force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution."
The FBI Manual stressed:
The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be
engaged in or responsible for acts of violence, and care must
be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous
investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at
hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate
and continuous attention until the initial allegation is re-
solved. The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely
determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out . .
above.
. . . wholesale investigations of individuals associated with
these organizations should not be undertaken. Individuals
investigated should be those key personnel who have the pro-
pensity for violence and actually formulate and carry out
"'Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207.
the organization's policies and not those individuals who
merely attend meetings on a regular basis.
However, general intelligence collection did go beyond these limits.
Field officers were instructed to "follow through public source ma-
terial and established sources activities of organizations which do
not qualify for investigation under above standards." 3"8
The Domestic Intelligence Division chafed under these restrictions,
which were held over from when Klan investigations had been under
the General Investigative Division. Assistant Director William C.
Sullivan, head of the Intelligence Division, told the FBI Executives
Conference in 1966 that
. . . in his strong opinion the FBI is not adequately cop-
ing with the problems created by the Ku Klux Klan. He
had in mind bombings, beatings, civil rights violations, etc.
Mr. Sullivan pointed out that there are 14,000 members of the
Klans in the United States today. The FBI's policy calls for
investigating all officers of the Klan and all Klan members
who are violence prone. He said there are 4,500 officers and
to date we have investigated only 1,500 of them, and only 300
violence-prone of whom there are many more.
Sullivan specifically cited the problem in North Carolina where there
were 152 Klaverns and the FBI needed informant coverage of 81.
He urged that the Bureau give "sufficient manpower . .. and direc-
tion to seriously disrupt and reduce their activities and practices." 38'
Thereafter, in 1967 the FBI Manual was revised to direct field of-
fices specifically to furnish "details concerning rallies [and] demon-
strations" by Klan or hate-type organizationso 0 In 1969 these in-
structions were broadened to "include full details concerning the
speeches made at the rallies or demonstrations, as well as the identities
of the speakers." 391
In 1971 the criteria for investigating individuals were widened still
further. 'Special Agents in Charge of field offices were instructed to
investigate not only persbns with "a potential for violence," but also
anyone else "who in judgment of SAC should be subject of investiga-
tion due to extremist activities." 392
Thus, the FBI gradually -expanded its Klan intelligence investiga-
tions, moving beyond information related to possible violence. By 1971
the FBI program for investigating Klan and hate-groups delegated
virtually unlimited discretion to the field and specifically required
FBI agents to report on lawful political speeches.
For example, the FBI's collection of intelligence about "white mili-
tant groups" included groups "known to sponsor demonstrations
against integration and against the bussing of Negro students to white
schools." As soon as a new organization of this sort was formed, the
Bureau used its informers and "established sources" to determine "the
1965 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 1-2.
mExecutives Conference Memorandum, 3/24/66.
m 1967 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 2.
m 1969 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 2.
m 1971 Manual Section 122, p. 2.
aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate mem-
bership" and other "background data" bearing upon "the militancy"
of the group.393
B. FBI Intelligence and the Black Comnvunity
Events in 1964 also led to a substantial change in FBI intelligence
programs dealing with black "extremists" and civil disorders, in addi-
tion to the Klan- During the first urban ghetto riots in the summer of
1964, President Johnson instructed the FBI to investigate their origins
and extent. The Bureau's report was made public in late September.
The FBI had surveyed nine cities where riots had occurred and
gathered information "from public officials, police officers, clergymen,
leaders of responsible organizations and individuals considered to be
reliable." The basis for the inquiry was explained in the most general
terms:
It is a truism that the first duty of all government is to
maintain order, else there is no government. Keeping the peace
in this country is essentially the responsibility of the state gov-
ernment. Where lawless conditions arise, however, with simi-
lar characteristics from coast to coast, the matter is one of na-
tional concern even though there is no direct connection be-
tween the events and even though no federal law is violated.
[Emphasis added.]
The FBI's findings served to reassure the public: there was no evidence
"that the riots were organized on a national basis;" none of the inci-
dents was a "race riot" involving interracial violence; and none was a
"direct outgrowth of conventional civil rights protest." However, the
FBI did report the role of "a Marxist-Leninist group following the
more violent Chinese Communist line" and other individuals "with
histories of Communist affiliation" in alleged attempts to instigate riot
activity. The FBI also called attention to the growth of black mili-
tancy, asserting that "a number of violent agitators" had arisen. With-
out mentioning his name, the FBI report described the activities of
Malcolm X as one example of a leader urging blacks "to abandon the
doctrine of non-violence." 394
These developments in the North and the increasing number of civil.
rights demonstrations in the South were the background for an ex-
pansion of the FBI program for collectingointelligence on "General
Racial Matters" in early 1965. The FBI Manual was revised to cover
demonstrations, racial violence and riots. These revisions included the
following:
In order that the Bureau's information will be complete
regarding planned racial activity, such as demonstrations,
rallies, marches, or threatened opposition to activity of this
kind, each office must assume responsibility for following up
the planned activity and promptly advising the Bureau by
teletype of subsequent developments even though the develop-
SAO Letter 68-25, 4/30/68.
m "Text of FBI Report on Recent Racial Disturbances," New York Time8,
9/27/64.
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ment may be a postponement or cancellation of the planned
activity.
In the event of an outbreak of mob violence or rioting ...
you must: Immediately launch a vigorous investigation to
determine the causes and forces behind the threatened or ac-
tual mob violence or rioting and whether there is an organized
pattern underlying it emanating from subversive or radical
groups or other outside sources . . . [and] afford specific
assignments to informants, and keep them assigned, to deter-
mine the underlying cause of the mob violence or riot. . . . 9
At this time the FBI Director testified before the House Appropria-
tions Committee that the FBI was following "the racial situation
from an intelligence viewpoint." The Justice Department reported
that this intelligence had already made it possible for the Civil Rights
Division to keep "a close and continuing watch on civil rights demon-
strations which totaled 2,422 in almost all states during the year end-
ing April 1964." 396
In late 1966 after two more "long hot summers," including the 1965
Watts riot in Los Angeles and many smaller-scale disorders, the FBI
instituted a program for preparing semi-monthly summaries of pos-
sible racial violence in major urban areas. Field offices were instructed
to conduct "a continuing survey to develop advance information con-
cerning racial developments which clearly point to the possibility of
mob violence and riotous conditions."
This survey should afford the Bureau a realistic, compre-
hensive picture of the existing racial conditions in major urban
areas on a current basis and this can only be accomplished by
maintaining a constant and effective check on existing condi-
tions through racial, criminal, and security informants and
through established logical sources. Information . .. should
cover the following categories:
(1) Name of community. . . .
(2) General racial conditions....
(3) Current evaluation of violence potential....
(4) Identities of organizations involved in local racial
situations. Such organizations may include not only civil
rights organizations but also subversive organizations, black
nationalist organizations, Klan organizations, hate-type
groups, and others. Include a concise summary of the gen-
eral programs of such organizations relating to the racial
issue. In particular include any indications of subversive or
radical infiltration of organizations and any indication that
organizations involved in the racial issue advocate or may
resort to extralegal action or violence.
(5) Identities of leaders and individuals involved. Include
the identity of leaders and individuals in the civil rights
movement as well as readily available personal background
data, any pertinent information contained in office files
1965 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 6-8.
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showing affiliation or association with Klan-type, communist
or related subversive organizations and/or statements made
by such individuals advocating racial violence and/or extra-
legal activity.
(6) Existence of channels of communication between minor-
ity leaders and local officials. . . .
(7) Objectives sought by minority community, and possible
points of contention. . . . Describe the number, character,
and intensity of the techniques used by the minority commu-
nity, such as picketing or sit-in demonstrations, to enforce
their demands.
(8) Reaction of leaders and members of the community to
minority demands . . .3
The Bureau concentrated investigations in this field on "black na-
tionalist groups," described as "hate-type organizations" with a "pro-
pensity for violence and civil disorder." 398 The term "militant black
nationalist" was not defined with any precision. Such "racial militants"
were deemed a "threat to the internal securitv" because of their "an-
archistic tendencies" 399 or their "propensity for fomenting racial dis-
order." 400 Leaders and members of "black nationalist" groups were
investigated under the Emergency Detention Program for placement
on the FBI's Security Index.4ox
The standards were so vague, however, that the FBI included Dr.
Martin Luther King and his nonviolent Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference in the "radical and violence-prone" category, because
Dr. King might "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white, liberal
doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism." 402
Another leading civil riahts group, the Council on Racial Equality
(CORE). which had "negligible" Communist infiltration,. was investi-
gated under the "Racial Matters" Program because the Bureau con-
cluded that it was moving "away from a legitimate civil rights or-
ganization" and was "assuming a militant black nationalist posture."
The FBI reached this conclusion on the grounds that "some leaders in
their public statements" had condoned "violence as a means of attain-
ing Negro rights." The investigation was intensified, even though there
was as yet no information that its members "advocate violence" or
"participate in actual violence." 403
The Justice Department provided little guidance for FBI intelli-
rence investierations. The Nation of Islam again provides an example.
In 1962, the FBI asked if the groun could be crosecuted or designated
for the "Attorney General's list." In revv, the Internal. Security Di-
vision repeated its earlier position that there was not "sufficient evi-
dence to warrant prosecutive action." but that the FBI should "con-
tinue its investigation .. . because of the radical, semi-secret, and vio-
lent nature of this organization, and the continuing tendency on the
FBI Manual Section 122. revised 12/13/66, pp. 8-1.
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part of some of its leaders to use language of implied threats against
the Government." 404 Although the Division did not mention the Secu-
rity Index, the FBI believed that the investigation was conducted
primarily so that leaders and/or active members could be considered
"for apprehension during the period of a national emergency and for
inclusion in the Security Index." 405
The FBI again asked for the Justice Department's opinion in 1963.
An official of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division observed to his
superior, "Inasmuch as the Department is in possession of all pertinent
information regarding the NOI and its teachings, it appears the De-
partment is trying to get the Bureau to do the Department's work." 406
The Internal Security Division replied only that there was "in-
sufficient evidence" for prosecution and said nothing about further
investigation . 0 7
Nevertheless, the FBI did continue investigating "because of the
radical, semisecret and violent nature of the organization." In 1964, it
once again asked for the Department's opinion "as to whether the activ-
ities of the NOI come within the criteria of Executive Order 10450 or
whether its activities are in violation of any other Federal statute." 408
The Internal Security Division's answer reiterated that there was "in-
sufficient evidence" for prosecution, and went into greater detail re-
garding applicability of the criteria for the Employee Security Pro-
gram under Executive Order 10450:
The activities reported must be shown to be more than mere
prophecies or utterances made with the hope of ulti-
mate attainment of their desired aims. For example,
while teaching that the white man must be exterminated
they do not say by whom or how. There should be available
evidence to show that the advocacy or approval of the com-
mission of acts of violence to deny others their Constitu-
tional rights is calculated to incite the members to action
now or in the foreseeable future. Evidence is needed to show
the specific acts taken by particular individual leaders in ad-
vocating or approving acts of force and violence; not that
"heads will roll in the streets", which could be merely a pre-
diction, but rather what specific plan of action, direction or
urging has been made to bring about such an event; not the
abstract teaching that Allah will cause the desired event, but
the concrete steps taken by specific individual leaders to ef-
fectuate their goals. It is fully realized that such evidence
is not easily obtained even if its exists; and finally there seems
to be some indication that the leaders are becoming more
cautious in their utterances.4 0'
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Despite this formal opinion, the FBI continued to investigate and to
furnish the results to the Department in reports and memoranda.
FBI intelligence officials assumed they could go ahead not only be-
cause the Justice Department did not say "stop the investigation,"
but also because the FBI still included "names of appropriate Nation
of Islam officials ... in our Security Index" (which was reviewed by
the Internal Security Division). In mid-1966 an FBI intelligence of-
ficial observed, "The Department apparently has no intention of
authorizing prosecution of the Nation of Islam, in absence of the
Nation of Islam causing large-scale riots, or virtual insurrection. How-
ever, it appears to be in the Bureau's best interests to put the Depart-
ment on record once again as to whether a prosecutable violation
exists. . . . 410
This time the Internal Security Division specifically asked the FBI
to continue "active investigation ... for possible violation of Federal
statutes or for possible designation under the provisions of Executive
Order 10450." This request was made despite the Division's conclusion
that there was still "insufficient evidence" and that in the previous two
years there had "been no sisrnificant changes as to the character and
tactics of the organization." The only reason offered for this Depart-
mental instruction to continue the investigation was that the group's
leaders "advocate disobedience of any law contrary to the beliefs of
Muslims." 411
There were no further FBI requests for Departmental opinion or
instructions provided by the Internal Security Division regarding the
continued intelligence investigation of the Nation of Islam from 1966
until 1973.
C. COMINFIL Investigationes-"Racial Matter8"
In June 1964. the FBI established a "special desk" in the Domestic
Intelligence Division to supervise an "intensification of the investiga-
tion of communist influence in racial matters." 412 The chief of the Divi-
sion's Internal Security Section stressed that civil rights was "the
primary domestic issue on the political front today," and that "both
sides" in the Senate debate on the Civil Rights Bill might "ask the
Bureau" for information about "communist penetration into the racial
movement." Thus, the FBI had to be prepared to make "a proper
presentation of the facts." The Bureau's Inspection Division endorsed
this step, noting that the "urgency" for the FBI to "stay ahead" of
the situation was tied not only to the civil rights bill, but to "the com-
plex political situations in an election year where civil rights and
social disturbances will play a key role in campaign efforts and pos-
sibly election results." 413 Instructions to the field in August 1964
stated:
There are clear and unmistakable signs that we are in the
midst of a social revolution with the racial movement at its
core. The Bureau, in meeting its responsibilities in this area,
is an integral part of this revolution.414
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The part the FBI played in this "revolution" in American race
relations was not a noble one. Director Hoover's formal statement to
the Appropriations Committee, published in April 1964, discussed at
great length the "Communist interest in Negro activities." He con-
cluded that "Communist influence" in the "Negro movement" was
"vitally important" because "it can be the means through which large
masses are caused to ... succumb to the party's propaganda lures."
The number of Negroes recruited by the Communists was "not the im-
portant thing." Rather, Director Hoover said it was "an old Com-
munist principle" that: "Communism must be built with non-Com-
munist hands." 415
Director Hoover's public and private message in 1964, on this and
other occasions, was that the "importance of the Communist influence
in the Negro movement" could not be "ignored or minimized." 416 Most
Americans at that time would not have questioned Hoover's preemi-
nence as an expert on Communism.4'7 Nevertheless, Bureau records in-
dicate that he rejected the findings of the FBI's most experienced in-
telligence officials on this issue,. that he influenced his subordinates to
abandon their own judgments and to exaggerate Communist influence
in the civil rights movement, and that these subordinates then .in-
stituted massive investigative efforts to find every possible bit of
evidence of Communist links in order to substantiate the Director's
preconception.4 1 8
The August 1963 March on Washington had a dramatic impact on
the nation-and devastating consequences within the FBI. Shortly
before the March, Bureau intelligence officials summarized the results
of extensive investigations (initiated a month before the March) .4
There was no evidence that the March was "actually initiated" or
"controlled" by Communists, although they did plan to participate.
There had been "an obvious failure" of the Communists "to appreci-
ably infiltrate, influence, or control large numbers of American
Negroes." The report concluded that "time alone will tell" whether
the Communists would have "great success" in the future.4 2 '
Director Hoover, upon reading the report, sharply rejected its
finding that Communist influence was "infinitessimal." 422 His subor-
dinates got the message. "The Director is correct," wrote the head of
the Domestic Intelligence Division, adding, "We regret greatly that
the memorandum did not measure up to what the Director has a right
to expect from our analysis." 423
The Division head advised another Bureau official: "It is obvious
that we did not put the proper interpretation upon the facts which
we gave to the Director." He promised to "do everything that is
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humanly possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to Com-
munist penetration and influence over Negro leaders and their
organizations."
This exchange set in motion a disastrous series of events. The
Domestic Intelligence Division recommended asking the Attorney
General to approve a wiretap on Dr. Martin Luther King,4 2 inten-
sifying field investigations to uncover "communist influence on the
Negro" using "all possible investigative techniques," and expanding
COINTELPRO operations using "aggressive tactics" to "neutralize
or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field." After a sarcastic
initial rejection of these plans, Director Hoover approved a new
Intelligence Division meinorandum on "Communism and the Negro
Movement-A Current Analysis" and noted, "I am glad that you
recognize at last that there exists such influence." "
Approving a recommendation after a December 1963 conference
that the Bureau take Dr. King "off his pedestal" and promote some-
one else to be his successor as the new "national Negro leader," FBI
Director Hoover observed:
I am glad to see that "light" has finally, though dismally de-
layed, come to the Domestic Int. Div. I struggled for months
to get over the fact that the Communists were taking over the
racial movement but [illegible] couldn't or wouldn't see it.428
Director Hoover's exaggeration of Communist influence in the civil
rights movement (especially his 1964 appropriations testimony)
risked poisoning the political climate in the months before passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.4 2 9 And the investigation of the civil rights
movement to uncover any shred of evidence of Communist influence
added massive reports to the files of the Bureau and other agencies on
lawful political activity and law-abiding Americans.
To achieve this end FBI Manual provisions for internal security
intelligence were revised substantially without any outside super-
vision. New instructions were added to intensify FBI intelligence in-
vestigations of Communist influence in the civil rights movement and
in protest demonstrations. First of all, field offices were to identify all
Negro members of the Communist Party. Second, a new program code-
named CIRM (Communist Influence in Racial Matters) was insti-
tuted. Quarterly reports from the field offices were to include informa-
tion on:
. . . communist infiltration in various organizations, such
as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee, and the like; investigations of sub-
versive individuals active in the racial movements; inves-
tigations of communist fronts and other miscellaneous orga-
nizations; and racial disturbances and other racial matters.
... These reports shall be designed to precisely spell out the
full extent of the communist influence in racial matters. They
'" Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont, 9/25/63.
' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 10/7/63.
'Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 9/16/63.
m-" Note on Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 10/17/63.
4 Note on memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont, 1/8/64.
" "Rights Bill Crippling is Feared," Washington Post, 5/11/64.
should separate words and intentions from actions; mere par-
ticipation from direct influence; and the bona fide communist
from the mere "do-gooder". They should not include informa-
tion concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement
where there is no communist taint.
The FBI Manual also required field office reports on protest activities
where Communists might be involved including:
Information on communist direction and influences of and
participation in racial demonstrations, disturbances, drives,
boycotts, and any other similar activities with racial over-
tones. This part will illustrate how communist activities at-
tempt to exploit radical situations and expand communist in-
fluence, thus furthering communist objectives.'. . . [Emphasis
added.]
Under each subheading include such information as nature
of event; sponsoring and participating groups; total partici-
pants; number and identities of subversives involved; specifies
as to whether subversives directed, controlled, instigated, or
merely participated; whether violence resulted and, if so,
whether subversives involved; arrests of subversives and court
disposition; and any other information believed pertinent
to the over-all picture of communist influence. Efforts by sup-
porting groups to avoid communist involvement should also be
reported. If a particular event had no communist involvement,
it should, of course, not be included in the report.
The last restriction had somewhat less effect, because FBI offices were
advised that "the term 'communist' should be interpreted in its broad
sense as including persons not only adhering to the principles of the
CPUSA itself, but also to such splinter and offshoot groups as the
Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, and the like."
Whenever a group was subject to Communist influence, field offices
had to report:
... pertinent data as to the national headquarters, as well as
any local affiliates.. . . The number of members, nationally
and by locals, should be indicated. Include under each orga-
nization information as to officers and others in positions of
influence who have present or past subversive connections;
information as to other subversives who are merely members;
specific evidence of influence wielded by subversives; policy
concerning communist participation in the organization's ac-
tivities, such as prohibition of communists holding office or
membership (if no such stated policy, so indicate); and use
and distribution of communist propaganda. [Emphasis
added.] 430
These instructions continued in effect until the early 1970's. Their
application to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Chris-
tian Leadership Conference are described elsewhere.3 oa
'3 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 12a-12c, revision of 9/18/64.
4 See Committee Report on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Under this program the FBI also intensified investigations of mod-
erate groups like the NAACP, which had been under investigation
since the 1940's. For example, the Detroit office relied on six informants
to "follow and report on all efforts by the Communist Party to in-
filtrate the NAACP." 431
The New York Field Office used sixteen informants and confidential
sources "to follow CP infiltration of the national organization of the
NAACP and local branches of the NAACP." All the national officers
and board members of the NAACP were listed, and any data in FBI
files on their past associations with subversives were included. Most of
this information went back to the 1940's. Copies of the report were dis-
seminated to local military intelligence officers.432
The FBI's Chicago office prepared a Letterhead Memorandum (a
report designed for dissemination to other Executive Branch agen-
cies) on the plans of Communist leaders to have "the Party forces"
at the NAACP National Convention press for certain policies. The
memorandum did not indicate how extensive or influential these "Party
forces" would be.' 3 The St. Louis office used eleven informants and
confidential sources to "follow and report interest and activity of the
CP and SWP in the NAACP in St. Louis." The New York office
reported changes in the leadership and board of the NAACP in 1966,
once again going back in FBI files to uncover any subversive associa-
tions in the 1940's.3 5The FBI did close cases on specific chapters where
there were very few Communists involved.436 In order to reach the
point of closing a case, however, FBI offices submitted reports listing
all officers of the NAACP chapters and the number of members. Mem-
bership figures were sometimes obtained by "pretext telephone call .. .
utilizing the pretext to being interested in joining that branch of the
NAACP." (Copies of all reports were disseminated to local military
intelligence offices "in view of their interest in matters pertaining to
infiltration of the NAACP.")43
D. COMINFIL Inve8tigatione-The Antiwar Movement and Student
Groups
The scope of FBI intelligence investigations of Communist infiltra-
tion of civil rights groups was matched, if not exceeded, by its investi-
gations of Communist links to the antiwar movement. As early as
1964 the FBI reported publicly that the Communist Party was con-
ducting "an intensive campaign for the withdrawal of American
forces from South Vietnam." 438
In April 1965, President Johnson's Assistant for National Security
Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, asked the FBI for information concerning
the Communist role in criticism of American policy in Vietnam. The
following day Director Hoover met with the President to discuss this
matter. According to Hoover's account:
"'Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.
' Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.Memorandum from Chicago Field Office. to FBI Headquarters, 5/7/65.
' Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/66.
W Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office, 5/4/66." Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/5/65.
MAnnual Report of the Attorney General for fiscal year 1964, pp. 373-376.
The President informed me that he was quite concerned
over the anti-Vietnam situation that has developed in this
country and he appreciated particularly the material that we
sent him yesterday containing clippings from various col-
umnists in the country who had attributed the agitation in
this country to the communists 'as there was no doubt in his
mind but that they were behind the disturbances that have
already occurred. He said he had just received from Mr.
McCone, the outgoing Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, a letter in which the Central Intelligence Agency
stated that their intelligence showed that the Chinese and
North Vietnamese believe that by intensifying the agitation
in this country, particularly on the college campus levels it
would so confuse and divide the Americans that our troops
in South Vietnam would have to be withdrawn in order to
preserve order here and it would enable North Vietnam to
move in 'at once. ... He stated he would like me to take
prompt and immediate steps to brief at least two Senators
and two Congressmen, preferably one of each Party, on the
demonstrations in this country of the anti-Vietnam groups so
that they might in turn not only make speeches upon the
floors of Congress but also publicly....
I informed the President that I had just received word
this morning before coming to the White House that plans
had been made from May 3 to May 9 to demonstrate in 85
cities of this country by the Students for Democratic Society,
which is largely infiltrated by communists and which has
been woven into the civil rights situation which we know has
large communist influence. I told the President we were pre-
paring a memorandum on the Students for Democratic So-
ciety which I would try to get to him by tomorrow....
I also told the President that we were preparing, in response
the request he had made through Honorable McGeorge Bundy
at the White House an over-all memorandum on the Vietnam
demonstrations and communist influence in the same. . . .
Director Hoover issued the following instructions to his subordinates
after his meeting with the President:
. . . I want prepared immediately a memorandum which I
can transmit to the President containing what we know about
the Students for Democratic Society. While I realize we may
not be able to technically state that it is an actual communist
organization, certainly we do know there are communists in it.
It is somewhat similar to the situation we found in the Selma-
to-Birmingham March in which we were able to identify 75
communists from New York City as being in that march even
though there were many others in the march who were not
communists and we could not be certain it was a communist
demonstration. What I want to get to the President is the
background with emphasis upon the communist influence
therein so that he will know exactly what the picture is. [Em-
phasis added.]
I believe we should intensify through all field offices the
instructions to endeavor to penetrate the Students for Dem-
ocratic Society so that we will have proper informant coverage
similar to what we have in the Ku Klux Klan and the Commu-
nist Party itself.
The Director also issued instructions for the overall memorandum on
antiwar demonstrations "so that it can be used publicly by prominent
officials of the Administration whom the President intends to send in
various parts of the country to speak on the Vietnam situation."
I want it prepared in such a manner that there will be nothing
to uncover our informant coverage but be a good, strong
memorandum that will pinpoint that these demonstrations
which have occurred, particularly on the campuses of the
colleges and universities have been largely participated in by
communists even though they may not have initiated them
but they at least have joined and forced the issue such as has
been done at Berkeley, California, and as they are doing at
Ohio State University at the present time. Give this matter
immediate attention and top priority as the President is quite
concerned about the situation and wants prompt and quick
action.439
The resulting report on "Communist Activities Relative to United
States Policy on Vietnam" presented extensive information showing
the Communist Party's desire to influence antiwar activity-by send-
ing letters to the President and Congressmen, issuing press releases,
delivering speeches on campuses and elsewhere, distributing Party
propaganda, and participating in protest demonstrations. Only one
antiwar group other than the Party itself was reported as being sig-
nificantly influenced-the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs allegedly formed in
1964 "as a result of a mandate by the Communist Party." The Party
had instructed its district leaders "to organize activities in the trade-
union movement, in youth groups and in religious organizations until
peace is achieved." The extent or success of this effort was not dis-
cussed. Instead, a recent demonstration of some 15,000 persons in
Washington, D.C., "was not communist instituted, dominated or con-
trolled," although party members participated. Party members also
were "participants" in a "vigil" at the LBJ ranch. 44o
FBI field offices were instructed in 1965 to intensify their investiga-
tion of "subversive activity" among student groups.441 However, in
1967, there was concern that FBI intelligence activity on college cam-
puses might be exposed by the controversy over CIA links with the
National Student Association. Therefore, field offices were advised:
It is possible that this current controversy could focus
attention on the Bureau's investigations of student groups on
college campuses. It is also possible that student groups such
as the Students for a Democratic Society and the W.E.B.
DuBois Clubs of America could use this controversy as a
vehicle to create some incident to embarrass the Bureau by
" Memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover, 4/28/65.
* Letter to McGeorge Bundy, 4/28/65, enclosing FBI memorandum, 4/28/65.
. SAC Letter No. 65-44, 8/17/65.
claiming that we are infringing on academic freedom by in-
vestigating such groups. You should, therefore, bear in mind
that in our continuing investigations to keep abreast of sub-
versive influence on campus groups, in discharging our re-
sponsibilities in the internal security field, such investigations
should be conducted in a most discreet and circumspect man-
ner. Good judgment and common sense must prevail so that
the Bureau is not compromised or placed in an embarrassing
position.
Field offices were reminded that existing FBI policy required ap-
proval from headqparters before investigating individuals or groups
"connected with an institution of learning," before interviewing stu-
dents or faculty members, and before developing a student or faculty
member "as an'informant or source." These interviews or contacts were
also to "be made away from the campus." 442
When the Katzenbach committee issued its report on CIA involve-
ment with student groups, FBI Director Hoover canceled all out-
standing authorizations "to contact students, graduate students, and
professors of educational institutions in security matters . .. [includ-
ing] established sources, informants, and other sources." Field offices
were instructed to request new authority from FBI headquarters
"where contacts with such individuals are particularly important and
necessary." "4
Thus, at least one dimension of the FBI's expanding domestic
intelligence program in the 1960s was temporarily cut back to avoid
criticism. Director Hoover's restrictions imposed in 1966-1967 on the
use of other sensitive techniques, including electronic surveillance
and surreptitious entries, are discussed elsewhere.
4 4 3 a
The FBI's desires for intelligence conflicted directly with its fear
of "embarrassment." Shortly after the cutback in campus coverage, the
FBI formally characterized the Students for a Democratic Society for
the first time. The characterization (or "thumbnail sketch") stressed
the following information on "subversive" connections with SDS.
Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when
interviewed by a representative of United Press Interna-
tional in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, de-
scribed the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the
Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National
Convention, an anticommunist proviso was removed from the
SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966, issue of "New Left
Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman
stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are
welcome. "4
As intelligence investigations of SDS chapters expanded, FBI of-
ficials realized that the restrictions on campus contacts "impose prob-
lemns for the field." Field offices were advised to stress "the develop-
ment of noncampus informants and sources" to maintain intelligence
44 SAC Letter No. 67-13, 2/21/67.
'4 SAC Letter No. 67-20, 4/7/67.
' See Reports on Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance; Warrantless FBI
Surreptitious Entry; and CIA and FBI Mail Opening.
"' SAC Letter No. 67-23, 4/25/67.
coverage of "subversive" activity at educational institutions."4. Short-
ly thereafter, the restriction was lifted for contacts on campuses with
"established sources functioning in an administrative capacity such as
a Registrar, Director of Admissions, Dean of Men, Dean of Women
and Security Officer, and their subordinates." Headquarters approval
was still needed to contact students or professors.446
An example of the scope of these investigations is the coverage of
various antiwar teachins and conferences sponsored by the Universi-
ties Committee on Problems of War and Peace. A forty-one page
report from the Philadelphia office, based on coverage by thirteen
informants and confidential sources, described in complete detail a
"public hearing on Vietnam."
A Communist Party official had "urged all CP members" in the
area to attend, and one of the organizers was alleged to have been a
Communist in the early 1950s. Upon receipt-from an informant of a
list of the speakers, the FBI culled its files for data on their back-
grounds. One was described by a source as a Young Socialist Alliance
"sympathizer." Another was a conscientious objector to military serv-
ice. A third had contributed $5.00 to the National Committee to Abolish
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. A speaker repre-
senting the W.E.B. DuBois Club was identified as a Communist. The
FBI covered the meeting with an informant who reported practically
verbatim the remarks of all the speakers, including the following:
The Chairman of the Philadelphia Ethical Society;
A representative of the American Civil Liberties Union;
A representative of the United Electrical Workers;
A spokesman for the Young Americans for Freedom;
A member of the staff of the "Catholic Worker";
A minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church;
A minister of the Episcopal Church;
A representative of the Philadelphia Area Committee to End
the War in Vietnam;
A professor of industrial economics at Columbia Univer-
sity;
A representative of the Inter-University Committee for
Debate on Foreign Policy;
A member of Women's Strike for Peace who had traveled
to North Vietnam;
A member of Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom who had visited South Vietnam;
A chaplain from Rutgers University;
A professor of political science from Villanova University;
Another member of Young Americans for Freedom;
The former Charge d'Affaires in.the South Vietnaniese Em-
bassy.
This informant's report was so extensive as to be the equivalent of a
tape recording, although the FBI report does not indicate that the in-
"' SAC Letter No. 67-24. 5/2/67.
" SAC Letter No. 67-29, 5/24/67.
formant was "wired." Another informant reported the remarks of
additional participants:
An official of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy;
A minister of the Church of the Brethren;
A Unitarian minister;
A representative of United World Federalists;
A member of Students for a Democratic Society;
A member of the Socialist Workers Party;
A spokesman for the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.
The report was prepared as a Letterhead Memorandum with fourteen
copies for possible dissemination by the FBI to other Executive branch
agencies. Copies were disseminated to military intelligence agencies,
the State Department, and the Internal Security and Civil Rights
Divisions of the Justice. Department. 4 7
Even where there was no specific prior indication of Communist
involvement, the FBI investigated emerging "New Left" groups such
as "Free Universities" attached to various college campuses. For exam-
ple, when an article appeared in a Detroit newspaper stating that a
"Free University" was being formed in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and
that it was "anti-institutional," FBI headquarters instructed the De-
troit Field Office to "ascertain through established sources the origin
of this group and the identity of the individuals who are responsible
for the formation of the group and whether any of these individuals
have subversive backgrounds." A note on the instruction stated.
Several "Free Universities" have been formed in large
cities recently by the Communist Party and other subversive
groups. We are therefore conducting discreet investigations
through established sources regarding all such "Free Univer-
sities" that come to the Bureau's attention to determine
whether they are in any way connected with subversive
groups.4 4 8
The field office contacted five informants and confidential sources,
prepared a ten-page letterhead memorandum describing in detail the
formation, curriculum content, and associates of the group-including
several members of Students for a Democratic Society and the So-
cialist Workers Party. Although no further investigation was recom-
mended, the report was disseminated to local military intelligence and
Secret Service office, military intelligence and Secret Service head-
quarters in Washington, the State Department, and Internal Security
Division of the Justice Department.449
Intelligence developed under what the Bureau called its VIDEM
Program on Vietnam demonstrations was teletyped to headquarters
"for immediate dissemination to the White House and other interested
Government agencies, followed by . . . routine dissemination to the
intelligence community." 450 The White House not only received the
product of FBI intelligence on antiwar demonstrations, but it also
asked the Bureau to conduct "name checks" of its files on dozens of
"' Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66.
". Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
'" SAC Letter No. 68-20, 3/26/68.
persons who signed telegrams critical of U.S. Vietnam policy.451 An
assistant to President Johnson also requested that the FBI monitor
the televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
Vietnam policy and prepare a memorandum comparing statements of
Senators William Fulbright and Wayne Morse with "the Communist
Party line." 452 Another White House aide requested name checks on
persons whose names appeared in the Congressional Record as signers
of letters to Senator Morse expressing support for his criticism of U.S.
Vietnam policy.m3
A similar request was channeled through Attorney General Ramsey
Clark, who supplied a Presidential aide (at the latter's request) with a
summary of information concerning the National Committee for a
Sane Nuclear Policy.4'5 This same aide summarized for the President
an FBI memorandum on "peace" demonstrations, pinpointing those
particular examples which gave evidence that (as quoted from the
Bureau report) :
The Communist Party and other organizations are continu-
ing their efforts to force the United States to change its pres-
ent policy toward Vietnam m
The exaggeration of Communist participation, both by the FBI and
White House staff members, could only have had the effect of reinforc-
ing President Johnson's original tendency to discount dissent against
the Vietnam War as "Communist inspired." It is impossible to measure
the larger impact on the fortunes of the nation from this distorted per-
ception at the very highest policymaking level.
E. Civil Disturbance Intelligence
While no explicit directive from the Attorney General authorized
the FBI's collection of intelligence about protest demonstrations in
the early sixties, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division made
"oral requests" to the FBI for intelligence, including for example a
tape recording of a speech by Governor-elect George Wallace of Ala-
bama in late 1962 456 and "photographic coverage" of a civil rights
demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Procla-
mation.457 The FBI advised the Division of information from a "con-
fidential source" about plans for a demonstration in Virginia, includ-
ing background data on its "sponsor" and the intention to make "a test
case." m The Division prepared regular summaries of information
from the Bureau on "demonstrations and other racial matters." *5
m Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the
President, 6/4/65.
'FBI Summary Memorandum, 1/31/75.
' Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the
President, 7/15/66 (cites request of "Mr. Jake Jacobsen, Legislative Counsel to
the President").
' Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Marvin Watson, 4/8/67,
enclosing memordandum from Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, 4/7/67.
. Memorandum from Marvin (Watson) to the President, 5/16/67.
' Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall (Civil Rights Division), 12/4/62.
117 Memorandum from St. J. B. (St. John Barrett) to Mr. Marshall, 6/18/63.
a Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/11/63.
" Memorandum from Carl W. Gabel to Burke Marshall, 7/19/63. This memo-
randum described 21 such "racial matters" in ten states, including Ohio, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Nevada outside the South. While some of the
(Continued)
The only formal directive on this intelligence activity was sent by
Attorney General Kennedy to U.S. Attorneys throughout the South
in May 1963. It instructed them to "make a survey" to ascertain "any
places where racial demonstrations are expected within the next
30 days" and to make "assessments of situations" in their districts.
The FBI was "asked to cooperate" with the U.S. Attorneys.
6 o
During the first small-scale Northern ghetto disturbances in the
summer of 1964, President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate
their origins and extent.4 6 1 However, after the FBI submitted a re-
port on the Watts riots in Los Angeles in 1965, Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach advised President Johnson that the FBI would
only investigate "directly" the possible "subversive involvement." He
did not believe the FBI should conduct a "general investigation" of
"other aspects of the riot." The President approved this "limited
investigation." 412 As described earlier (at pp. 475-477), internal
Bureau instructions in 1965 and 1966 went far beyond this limitation.
Instructions to all FBI offices in 1966 stressed the neejd for "ex-
panding awareness and alertness" regarding demonstrations against
the Vietnam War. Director Hoover stated:
There are increasing indications that the public is losing
patience with the continued succession of demonstrations
which have been occurring in all parts of the nation. This
rising tide of public indignation is more and more creating
waves of retributive action directed at the demonstrators. In-
creasingly, irate spectators are rejecting their passive roles
and expressing their opposition and indignation toward the
demonstrators by attacking them physically.
On the other hand, leaders of many of the groups involved
in demonstrations have been exhorting their followers to
more "direct action tactics" to gain their ends. Thus, the
demonstrations have been marked by a growing militancy.
Clearly, the situation is one in which the conflict of inter-
ests produces a growing tension. With summer approaching,
the potentialities for violent outbreaks will increase immeas-
urably, whether demonstrations are directed at opposition
toward United 'States foreign policy in Vietnam or protests
involving racial issues.
We must not only intensify and expand our coverage to
insure prompt and accurate reporting of violent outbreaks
of this nature but also to insure that advance signs of such
outbreaks are detected and disseminated to appropriate
authorities.
(Continued)
items in this and later summaries related to violent or potentially violent pro-
test activity, or to the role of alleged "subversives" in the demonstrations, they
went beyond those limits to include entirely peaceful protest activity and group
activities (such as conferences, meetings. leadership changes) unrelated to dem-
onstrations. (Memoranda from Gabel to Marshall, 7/22/63, 8/2/63 and 8/22/63.)
* Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to U.S. Attorneys, 5/27/63.
'a "Text of FBI Report on Recent Racial Disturbances," New York Times,
9/27/64.
"o Memorandum from Attorney General Katzenbach to President Johnson.
8/17/65.
I want to stress to you that the emphasis in these matters
must be on advance detection. Post mortem reporting is of
secondary consequence. We are an intelligence agency and as
such are expected to know what is going to or is likely to
happen. National, state, and local aithorities rely upon us
to obtain this information so they can take appropriate ac-
tion to avert disastrous outbreaks."
The urban riots of the summer of 1967 greatly intensified FBI
domestic intelligence operations. Equally important, the Detroit and
Newark riots brought other agencies of the Federal government into
the picture. A Presidential Commission was established to study civil
disorders, the Attorney General reexamined the intelligence capa-
bilities of the Justice Department, 'and the use of Federal troops in
riot torn cities led to widespread military intelligence surveillance of
civilians. It was a period of intense pressure and little coordination.
Antiwar protests under the banner of "Resistance to Illegitimate
Authority" culminated in a massive march on the Pentagon in October
1967. The combination of ghetto violence, the highly-publicized mili-
tant rhetoric of figures like Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown,
widening protest against the Vietnam war, and increasing acts of civil
disobedience during antiwar demonstrations generated intense de-
mands for domestic intelligence.
In late July 1967 President Johnson created the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders to investigate and make recommenda-
tions with respect to:
(1) The origins of the recent major civil disorders in our
cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such
disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations or indi-
viduals dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of
violence.
(2) The development of methods and techniques for avert-
ing or controlling such disorders . . .
The President directed the FBI, in particular, to "provide investi-
gative information and assistance" to the Commission. The President
stated publicly that the FBI would "continue to exercise its full
authority to investigate these riots, in accordance with my standing
instructions, and continue to search for evidence of conspiracy."4 6 4
Director Hoover appeared before the Commission on August 1, 1967.
He discussed the role in certain disturbances of "rabble-rousers who
initiate action and then disappear;" and he identified Martin Luther
King, Floyd McKissick (of the Congress of Racial Equality), and
Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael (of SNCC) as "vociferous fire-
brands who are very militant in nature and who at times incite great
numbers to activity." When asked about proposed Federal antiriot
legislation, Hoover expressed the "opinion that any law which allowed
law enforcement the opportunity to arrest militant and vicious rabble-
rousers like Carmichael and Brown would be healthy to have on the
" SAC Letter 66-27, 5/3/66.
" Executive Order 11365, 7/29/67; Remarks of the President 7/29/67, in
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), pp. 534-
537 (Bantam Books ed.).
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books." New York Mayor John Lindsay asked the FBI Director "if
it would be possible to total up and fully identify the number of mili-
tant Negroes and whites who were in the same category as Carmichael
and Brown" so that the Commission could learn "just exactly what
the hard core in this country amounted to." Director Hoover replied
"that the FBI, through its intelligence gathering, was of course cap-
able of identifying and totaling up such individuals." Mayor Lindsay
also asked "if the FBI had any intelligence regarding Negroes or
white groups shifting money or firearms to foreign countries." Hoover
answered "that the FBI had no such intelligence," but that Stokely
Carmichael's travel to Cuba and other countries "should not be over-
looked." Lindsay then observed that "such travels were apparently not
widespread."
In his discussion of the riots in Watts, Newark, and Detroit, the FBI
Director pointed out that the FBI "had no intelligence reflecting an
overall organized conspiracy" and "that many of the riots occurred as
the result of an incidental spark." However, he added "that the com-
munist and other subversive forces always, while not initiating the
riots, certainly attempted to exploit them once the riot started." The
chairman, Governor Otto Kerner, asked that FBI reports be made
available to the Commission. Director Hoover replied:
. . . that it should be definitely understood that the FBI
cannot make individual investigations, but that the FBI
would be most willing to make inquiries in communities where
there are allegations of subversive influences, involvement of
out-of-state influences, and the like. . .. [V]olumes on sub-
versive organizations, as well as a rundown on major disorders
and riots of this summer, would be left with the Commission
at this time.
Following his meeting with the Commission, Director Hoover ordered
his subordinates to intensify their collection of intelligence about
"vociferous rabble-rousers." 465
Parallel with the FBI's expansion of domestic intelligence opera-
tions in 1967-1968, the Justice Department developed a mechanism for
the analysis and evaluation of civil disturbance intelligence. Indeed,
one substantial basis for FBI intelligence authority in this period was
a memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Director
Hoover in September 1967:
Although the bulk of criminal offenses occurring in the
course of recent riots have been local rather than federal in
nature, the question as to whether there was an organization
which (a) had made advanced plans for, and (b) was active
during any of the riots in the summer of 1967 is one that can-
not always be readily resolved by local authorities. In view of
the seriousness of the riot activity across the country, it is most
important that you use the maximum resources, investigative
and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon
the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme or
conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness or
affliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.
[Emphasis added.]
Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 8/1/67.
Attorney General Clark listed numerous Federal statutes which "could
be applicable" in a specific situation, including criminal statutes on
rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of violent
overthrow of the government (Smith Act), activities affecting the
armed forces, Selective Service, interstate travel to commit arson or
transport explosives, assault on a Federal officer, destruction of gov-
ernment property, firearms regulation, and crimes on Federal reserva-
tions. The Attorney General added:
I appreciate that the Bureau has constantly been alert to
this problem and is currently submitting intelligence reports
to us about riots and about the activity of certain groups and
individuals before, during and after a riot. Indeed, the Presi-
dent has said both publicly and privately that the FBI is con-
ducting extensive and comprehensive investigations of these
matters.
There persists, however, a widespread belief that there is
more organized activity in the riots than we presently know
about. We must recognize, I believe, that this is a relatively
new area of investigation and intelligence reporting for the
FBI and the Department of Justice. We have not heretofore
had to deal with the possibility of an organized pattern of
violence, constituting a violation of federal law, by a group
of persons who make the urban ghetto their base of operation
and whose activities may not have been regularly monitored
by existing intelligence sources.
In these circumstances, we must make certain that every
attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon
these problems; to take every step possible to determine
whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so,
to determine the identity of the people and interests involved;
and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal ac-
tion.
As a part of the broad investigation which must necessarily
be conducted ... sources or informants in black nationalist
organizations, SNCC and other less publicized groups should
be developed and expanded to determine the size and pur-
pose of these groups and their relationship to other groups,
and also to determine the whereabouts of persons who might
be involved in instigating riot activity in violation of federal
law. Further, we need to investigate fully allegations of con-
spiratorial activity that come to our attention from outside
sources . . . .466 [Emphasis added.]
In furtherance of the Attorney General's instructions, the FBI ad-
vised its field offices in October 1967 that there was "a definite need to
develop additional penetrative coverage of the militant black nation-
alist groups and the ghetto areas immediately to be in a position to
have maximum intelligence in anticipation of another outburst of
racial violence next summer." For this purpose the FBI instituted a
program for "the development of ghetto-type racial informants." In
addition, the FBI intensified its existing "Black Nationalist Groups
" Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the FBI Director,
9/14/67.
TOPLEV Informant Program." Racial informants were to be "di-
rected to obtain information concerning individuals who may be stock-
piling firebombs, Molotov cocktails, weapons, and. to identify any
groups of terrorists who may be planning on carrying out a type of
guerrilla warfare during riotous situations." 467
In contrast to previous policies for centralizing domestic intelli-
gence investigations of "subversives," local police were encouraged
to establish intelligence programs both for their use and to feed into
the Federal intelligence gathering process, thus greatly expanding the
domestic intelligence apparatus and making it harder to control.
In reaction to civil disorders in 1965-1966, Attorney General Nich-
olas Katzenbach had turned to the newly-created President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice for advice.
After holding a conference with police and National Guard officials,
the crime commission urged police not to react with too much force to
disorder "in the course of demonstrations," but to make advance plans
for "a true riot situation." This meant that police should establish
"procedures for the acquisition and channeling of intelligence" for the
use of "those who need it." 468 Former Assistant Attorney General
Vinson recalls the Justice Department's concern that local police did
not have "any useful intelligence or knowledge about ghettos, about
black communities in the big cities." 469
During the winter of 1967-1968, the Justice Department and the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reiterated the
message that local police should set up "intelligence units" to gather
and disseminate information on "potential" civil disorders. These units
would use "undercover police personnel and informants" and draw on
"community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto. 4 7 0
The Commission also urged that these local units be linked to "a na-
tional center and clearinghouse" in the Justice Department.4 1 The un-
stated consequence of these recommendations was that the FBI, having
regular liaison with local police, served as the channel (and supple-
mentary repository) for this intelligence data.
These federal policies led to the proliferation of police intelligence
activities, often without adequate controls. For example, a recent state
grand jury report on the Chicago Police Department's "Security
Section" revealed its "close working relationship" with federal intel-
ligence agencies, including Army intelligence and the FBI. The report
found that the police intelligence system produced "inherently in-
accurate and distortive data" which contaminated Federal intelligence.
For example, one police officer testified that he listed "any person" who
attended two "public meetings" of a group as a "member." This con-
clusion was forwarded "as a fact" to the FBI. Subsequently, an agency
seeking "background information" on that person from the Bureau
would be told that the individual was "a member." The grand jury
stated:
' SAC Letter No. 67-72, 10/17/67.
m President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967), pp. 118-119.
'Fred Vinson testimony, 1/27/76, p. 32.
" Report of the National Advisory COmmi88iOn on Civil Di8orders (1968),
p. 487 (Bantam Books ed.).
n Ibid, p. 490.
Since federal agencies accepted data from the Security Sec-
tion without questioning the procedures followed, or methods
used to gain information, the federal government cannot
escape responsibility for the harm done to untold numbers
of innocent persons.'
Several urban police departments have more recently attempted to
set "guidelines" for their security intelligence activites.4 7 3
F. The Justice Department and the IDIU
Joseph Califano, who was President Johnson's assistant in 1967, has
testified that the Newark and Detroit riots were a "shattering experi-
ence" for Justice Department officials and "for us in the White
House." They were concerned about the "lack of intelligence," since
they "didn't know what the black groups were" in Detroit. Conse-
quently, "there was a desire to have the Justice Department have bet-
ter intelligence, for lack.of a better term, about dissident groups;"
and this 'precipitated the intelligence unit" set up by Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark in late 1967. The President and the White House
staff were saying, "There must be a way to predict violence. We've
got to know more about this." *4
In 1966 the Justice Department had started an informal "Summer
Project," staffed by a handful of law students, to pull together data
from the newspapers, the U.S. Attorneys, and "some Bureau material"
for the purpose, according to former Assistant Attorney General Fred
Vinson, Jr., of finding out "what's going on in the black commu-
nity." 4 Vinson has recalled that many people "jumped to a conspiracy
theory," and the government "would have been remiss" if it had not
investigated.4 7 6
In September 1967 Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked Assistant
Attorney General John Doar to review the Department's "facilities
for keeping abreast of information we receive about organizations and
individuals who may or may not be a force to be taken into account in
evaluating the causes of civil disorder in urban areas." After conferring
with Assistant Attorneys General Fred Vinson of the Criminal Di-
vision and J. Walter Yeagley of the Internal Security Division, Doar
'" "Improper Police Intelligence Activities," A Report by the Extended March
1975 Cook County (Illinois) Grand Jury, 11/10/75. The report also stated:
"Finally, political spying by police lowers the community's respect for law
enforcement. Without the respect and support of the community, law enforcement
agencies cannot operate effectively. The decision by high police officials to indis-
criminately infiltrate community groups makes the difficult job of responsible
law enforcement even more difficult."
'. For example, Procedures: Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Divi-
sion, New York City Police Department, published in "Domestic Intelligence
Operations for Internal Security Purposes," Hearings before the Committee on
Internal Security, House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pp.
3747-3792; and Standards and Procedures: Public Disorder Intelligence Divi-
sion, Los Angeles Police Department, April 10, 1975.
' Joseph Califano testimony, 1/27/76, pp. 6-9. Califano states in retrospect
that the attempt to "predict violence" was "not a successful undertaking," that
"advance intelligence about dissident groups" would not "have been of much
help," and that what is "important" is "physical intelligence" about geography,
hospitals, power stations, etc. (Califano, 1/27/76, pp. 8, 11-12.)
Vinson, 1/27/76, p. 33.
Vinson, 1/27/76, pp. 37-38.
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reported their joint recommendation that the Department establish
"a single intelligence unit to analyze the FBI information we receive
about certain persons and groups who make the urban ghetto their
base of operation." Doar also proposed that other Divisions of the
Justice Department, including the Community Relations Service,
should "funnel information to this unit." He recognized that the Com-
munity Relations Service risked losing "its credibility with people in
the ghetto," but he believed the Department could develop safeguards
to maintain "the confidentiality of the information." In addition, Doar
recommended,
Other agencies of the government might become a source of
intelligence information. This is a sensitive area, but the pov-
erty programs, the Labor Department programs, and the
Neighborhood Legal Services, all have access to facts which
a unit in the Department might find helpful. At the very least
the intelligence unit should know where the poverty programs
are operating, where the Neighborhood Legal Services are
located, who is staffed there so that if there were a need in a
particular area the unit would know where to go to get addi-
tional factual material.
Other investigative agencies of the federal government
might also furnish intelligence information, for example, the
intelligence unit of the Internal Revenue Service. I found
that in Detroit this unit under the direction of John Olszew-
ski, had by far the best knowledge of the Negro areas in De-
troit. According to Olszewski, the Alcohol, Tax and Tobacco
Unit has the best intelligence on the geography of ghetto
areas. The Narcotics Bureau is another possibility, and, fin-
ally, my experience in Detroit suggests that the Post Office
Department might be helpful. Perhaps utilization of other
agencies intelligence potential is too big and difficult a task,
but I raise it for your consideration.
Beyond the FBI and other governmental sources Doar expected
that the unit would become familiar with "the literature"-including
Jack Newfield's The Prophetic Minority, Howard Zinn's The New
Abolitionists, and writings on the "New Left" by Andrew Kopkind
,and Nicholas von Hoffman-and with the work produced by the In-
stitute for Policy Studies and Studies on the Left. The unit would
undertake "critical analysis" of intelligence data and prepare periodic
reports and evaluations for the Attorney General "on the Organiza-
tions, on individuals and on particular urban areas."
It is evident from Assistant Attorney General Doar's memorandum
that the primary purpose was to have a unit that would "include con-
clusions and recommendations" in its civil disturbance intelligence
reports. This was a function the FBI would not perform. Instead,
FBI reports to the Department normally carried the form state-
ment: "This document contains neither recommendations nor con-
clusion- of the FBI." Doar described current procedures for evaluation
of intelligence:
The Internal Security Division has been engaged in evaluat-
ing FBI reports involving several thousand alleged Com-
munists in order to determine their individual dangerousness
(2300 per year). It also reviews FBI reports on more than
125 organizations and their officers. Internal Security says
that it received 16,192 FBI reports and memoranda last
year . . .
I note from Mr. Yeagley's memorandum ... that for the
most part he restricts his lawyers to summarizing the per-
tinent facts in the memorandum and has discouraged them
from injecting personal opinions or indulging any prog-
nostication. He limits analysis to the recognition of whether
particular information represents a fact, a probable fact or
only a possible fact, or is pure fiction in evaluating material
found in FBI reports, publications or other source material. I
am not sure that I understand this distinction.
Doar also presented a sample from the FBI memoranda which came
to the Civil Rights Division and showed the broad range of FBI
intelligence reports. He did not recommend placing any limits on
FBI intelligence collection. Instead, he proposed "that the scope be
very broad initially."
We have not taken a broad spectrum approach to collec-
tion and analysis of intelligence. Rather, we have focused
narrowly on individuals, a limited number of traditional sub-
versive groups, and intelligence information about a suspect
who may have become a subject of a specific statutory vio-
lation. As the unit became knowledgeable and sophisticated
and could make reasonable judgments and could measure the
influence of particular groups or organizations, then it could
narrow its spectrum to a more limited target.
Doar anticipated that the unit would need five or six lawyers and
six to eight college graduate research analysts. The lawyers would
go out in the field to "become familiar with urban areas." "
Attorney General Clark did not implement Doar's plan at once,
but appointed a committee to study the matter further. In the mean-
time the Internal Security Division began "compiling an index and
abstracts on individuals and organizations connected with civil dis-
turbance matters." Approximately 1400 cards were prepared in the
first two months. The Departmental committee made its report in
December 1967. A careful review of the FBI's intelligence reports
to the Internal Security Division disclosed that reports and files were
being maintained on approximately 400 organizations, more than
one-third relating directly "to the civil disturbance problem (due to a
characterization as black power, new left, pacifist, pro-Red Chinese,
anti-Vietnam War, pro-Castro, etc.)." The committee recommended
that the new intelligence unit collate this data so as to develop "a
master index on individuals, or organizations, and by cities." Depart-
mental attorneys would prepare "monographs" on particularly im-
portant organizations, including "a statement of its purposes, its rele-
vant activities within the past few years, the location of the head-
quarters and all branch offices of the organization, activities and sig-
nificant background information concerning its officers and active
a Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General John Doar to the Attorney
General, 9/27/67.
members, etc." The unit would also draw on the Departmental files on
individuals maintained under the Emergency Detention Program,
which contained "brief synopses of approximately 10,000 individuals
who are members of the Communist Party, the SWP, the Nation of
Islam, etc." However, the committee stressed that the unit's "primary
goal . . . must be the meaningful evaluation of information received
rather than preparation of an exhaustive index." There was also a
potential for "computerizing the master index." Possible links to other
government agencies were suggested:
As he becomes familiar with the subjects involved, the head
of the Intelligence Unit should develop contacts with other
intelligence gathering agencies. Since this may represent a
duplication of the liaison established with the FBI, it should
be undertaken with care. Possible sources of outside intelli-
gence include the President's Commission on Civil Disorders,
various corresponding state agencies such as the New Jersey
Blue Ribbon Commission, CIA, State Department, Army
Intelligence, National Security Agency, and Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity. In addition, other federal agencies may
have relevant information. These perhaps would include De-
partment of Labor, Migration and Unemployment studies,
Department of Housing and Urban Development surveys and
Model City applications, the Treasury Department's Alco-
hol and Tobacco Tax Unit and Narcotics Bureau, and the
general background information available from the Post
Office Department Postal Inspector's Branch.
The committee did not seriously consider assigning the unit's analysis
and evaluation functions to the FBI. It was divided as to whether
the unit should be placed in the Internal Security Division or directly
under the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. In
either case, there was a pressing need for "coordination" because of
"the heavy flow of FBI reports to the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, and the Internal Security, Criminal, and Civil
Rights Divisions." On the other hand, it did "not seem wise to estab-
lish an elaborate organizational structure" because it was "impossible
to tell how long the Intelligence Unit will need to exist." 477a
Attorney General Clark adopted the committee's recommendation
and established a permanent Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU).
He noted that it would "take over and extend the activities of the so-
called Summer Project of the past two years" (in the Criminal Di-
vision). The IDIU was placed under the supervision of a Committee
composed of the Director of the Community Relations Services and
the Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the Civil Rights, Crimi-
nal, and Internal Security Divisions. The IDIU "charter" stated:
The Unit shall function for the purposes and within the
guidelines expressed in my memorandum of November 9 and
the report of December 6, 1967. It is enough to state here that,
in the main, it shall be responsible for reviewing and reduc-
ma Memorandum from Kevin T. Maroney, et al., to Attorney General Clark,
12/6/67.
ing to quickly retrievable form all information that may come
to this Department relating to organizations and individuals
throughout the country who may play a role, whether pur-
posefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil dis-
orders, or in preventing or checking them.* [Emphasis
added.]
The memorandum of November 9, appointing the study committee
had also stated:
It is imperative that the Department seek and obtain the
most comprehensive intelligence possible regarding organized
or other purposeful stimulation of domestic dissention, civil
disorders, and riots. To carry out these responsibilities we
must make full use of, and constantly endeavor to increase
and refine, the intelligence available to us, both from internal
and external sources, concerning organizations and individ-
uals throughout the country who may play a role either in
instigating or spreading disorders or in preventing or check-
ing them. However, we do not now adequately use such in-
telligence or develop and implement methods of improving
intelligence. Thus, we do not have any systematic means at
present of compiling and analyzing the voluminous informa-
mation about various persons or organizations furnished to
us by the FBI, and we make very little effort to obtain in-
formation elsewhere.4 7 9 [Emphasis added.]
Finally, the committee report had formally defined the IDIU's re-
sponsibilities as follows:
1. Gathering facts from sources within and without the
Department relating to organizations and individuals whose
activities are or may be related to planning for or participat-
ing in civil disturbances.
2. Systematically collating, evaluating and recording such
information so that it is subject to convenient and expeditious
recalls..
3. Preparing periodic intelligence summaries, from time to
time, or as directed by the Attorney General on persons,
organizations and places including therein estimates and eval-
uations of potential disturbances.
4. Report immediately to the Attorney General the receipt
of information indicating plans or attempts by individuals or
organizations to foster or promote civil disorders, including
therewith an evaluation of the source and pertinent back-
ground material.
5. Recommending to the Attorney General means for ob-
taining additional intelligence.
6. Consulting with the Assistant Attorneys General of In-
ternal Security, Criminal and Civil Rights Divisions and the
47 Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Assistant Attorneys
General John Doar, Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Roger W. Wilkins, and J. Walter
Yeagley, 12/18/67.
'"Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin T. Maroney, et al,
11/9/67.
Director of the Community Relations Service on each of the
above functions.s 0
The IDIU, later renamed the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit,
obtained computer facilities in 1968 and continued to function as the
Attorney General's main source of civil disturbance intelligence analy-
sis until 1971, when the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was cre-
ated in the aftermath of the "Huston Plan." co8 The IDIU and the
IEC both existed from 1970 until 1973, when the IEC was abolished.
The IDIU has been renaned the Civil Disturbance Unit and remains,
on a more limited basis, the Attorney General's principal source for
regular summaries of information about civil disturbances.
The IDIU's work in 1968 was summarized as follows by Assistant
Attorney General Yeagley:
The Unit, immediately upon its establishment, embarked
on an information retrieval system utilizing automatic data
processing, which ... constitutes probably the best informa-
tion retrieval system in the Department. In pursuit of its
duties, the analysts and attorneys during the year 1968 re-
viewed more than 32,000 FBI investigative reports, teletypes,
army intelligence reports and other material concerning indi-
viduals and organizations involved primarily in the area of
racial agitation. In addition, but on a more selective basis,
the Unit has also followed certain other activities, when
related.... Information concerning individuals and organi-
zations who are the subjects of the reports coming into the
Unit is abstracted by the analysts and put on special forms
for automatic data processing. The information input con-
cerns itself with data regarding disturbances and incidents
such as individual fire bombings, gunfire, attacks on police
or other officials, vandalism, etc., which may occur in a par-
ticular locality which appear to be caused by or to contribute
to racial unrest. [Emphasis 'added.]
The computer system could generate reports listing all individuals
"who are members or affiliates of any particular organization," as
well as their location and travel. IDIU also had the capability to pro-
duce reports on:
All incidents relating to specific issues or specific coded events
such as all Black Power activity or all incidents relating to
convention demonstrations or all information to some future
and planned specific demonstration, such 'as we had in con-
nection -with the Chicago Democratic Convention and the
demonstrations on Inaugural weekend in Washington.
48 '
A later review of IDIU operations states that "1968 entries in the
IDIU files include numerous anti-war activists and other
dissidents." 482
'Memorandum from Maroney, et al, to Attorney General Clark, 12/6/67.
"o'See Report on The Huston Plan.
.Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to Deputy
Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst, 2/6/69.
" Satement of Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman, Justice
Department Press Release, 1/14/75.
The IDIU's receipt and use of Army intelligence reports in 1968
had the effect, if perhaps not the full intent, of providing the Attor-
ney General's implicit authorization for a vast expansion of military
surveillance of civilians during this period. At a White House meeting
in January 1968, Attorney General Clark told those present (includ-
ing Defense Department officials) that "every resource" must be used
in the domestic intelligence effort, although he asked the Army to be
more selective in the reports it sent to the Justice Department .4 The
Army's intelligence collection plans of February 1, 1968, and May 2,
1968, were circulated to the Justice Department; and Army intelli-
gence officers received specific oral requests from the Justice Depart-
ment.48 " There was never a formal decision by civilian officials
in the Defense Department or the Justice Department which ex-
plicitly authorized Army surveillance of civilian political activity.
However, the practice was accepted without challenge by those respon-
sible officials who received the intelligence product. For example,
Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher thanked an Army
intelligence officer for the Army's spot reports and daily summaries,
although he explained that the FBI would be in charge of distributing
intelligence to other agencies and that the IDIU provided analyses
for intradepartmental use only.4 8 4
As a result of the long-standing Delimitations Agreement, the FBI
and military intelligence shared their intelligence product. Conse-
quently, FBI reports constituted a substantial part of the information
about civilians stored in the Army's computerized data banks. Like-
wise, the military's surveillance efforts complemented the FBI's in-
telligence coverage, especially with respect to groups which could be
infiltrated by Army intelligence agents more readily than by FBI
agents or FBI-recruited informants. Thus, by the end of 1968 a mas-
sive domestic intelligence apparatus had been established in response
to ghetto riots, militant black rhetoric, antiwar protest activity, and
campus disruptions. To a great extent each component of the struc-
ture--FBI, IDIU, military-set its own generalized standards and
priorities.
In the first year of the Nixon Administration, Attorney General
John Mitchell and Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
sought to bring greater order and coherence to the domestic intelli-
gence operations set in motion by their predecessors. The Attorney
General and the Secretary of Defense developed an "Interdepart-
mental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances" under which the Attorney
General was designated "as the chief civilian officer in charge of
coordinating all Federal Government activities relating to civil dis-
turbances." The plan provided:
Under the supervision of the Attorney General, raw
intelligence data pertaining to civil disturbances will be
acquired from such sources of the Government as may be
available. Such data will be transmitted to the Intelligence
48 Memorandum for the Un'dersecretary df the Army, printed in Federal Data
Banks, Oomater8, and the Bill of Rights, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights (19711), pp. 1278-1281.
4"a!See Report on Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military.
' Letter from Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher to Maj. Gen.
William P. Yarborough, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 5/15/68.
Unit of the Department of Justice, and it will be evaluated
on a continuing basis by representatives from various de-
partments of the Government. After evaluations have been
made, the data will be disseminated to the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Defense, and the White House. [Emphasis
added.]
During the early stages of a crisis in which it appears
that a request for Federal military assistance may be forth-
coming, the intelligence organization of the Department of
Justice will alert the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Defense. It is expected that responsible State and local
officials will promptly inform the Attorney General of the
situation and will thereafter keep him informed of
developments. When advised that a serious disturbance is in
the making, the Attorney General will immediately inform
the President.
If time permits, the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Defense may dispatch their personal representatives to
the disturbance area to appraise the situation before any de-
cision is made to commit Federal forces. Such action can help
to assure that the Federal Government responds in accord-
ance with the realities of the situation as perceived by its
own observers.485
The plan formalized the use of civil disturbance teams to be sent
out from Washington when IDIU evaluations indicated possible
serious disorder. However, it did not clarify which federal agencies
would collect civil disturbance intelligence, thus permitting the
Army to continue its surveillance of civilian activity.. Military in-
telligence operations continued unabated until 1970, when public
exposure and Congressional criticism led to a substantial curtail-
ment.48 6
Pursuant to the plan, the first Intelligence Evaluation Committee
was created to advise the Attorney General as to the steps to be taken
in case of possible serious disorders. Its members included the heads of
the Internal Security and Criminal Divisions, the Community Rela-
tions Service, and the IDIU, as well as representatives from the Civil
Rights Division, the Secret Service, and Army Intelligence. The chair-
man was the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, Cartha DeLoach.
This prominent role for the FBI was a significant departure from pre-
vious practice under Attorney General Clark.487 The head of the IDIU,
James T. Devine, described its functions in 1970:
The Information Unit is responsible for collecting,
analyzing, and computerizing all intelligence information
received by the Department in the area of civil disorders and
campus disturbanees. This intelligence encompasses informa-
*w Memorandum from Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, and John N.
Mitchell, Attorney General to the President, 4/1/60.
* Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military.
* Memorandum from Attorney General John N. Mitchell to Deputy Attorney
General Richard G. Kleindienst, 7/22/69.
tion on both events and individuals past, prior, and during
actual disorders. Intelligence information is received from the
FBI, the U.S. Attorneys, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Military Intelligence, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Division of the Treasury Department and other intelligence
gathering bodies within the Executive Branch. These intel-
ligence reports run in excess of 42,000 a year. [Emphasis
added.]
The Unit produces a daily morning and evening report on
disturbances nation-wide and a summation weekly report. ...
The Unit produces a complete print-out of all intelligence
within the ADP system on a weekly basis for study as to the
degree of civil disturbance intensity throughout various see-
tions of the country. Upon request by concerned citizens, spe-
cial printouts are made on such subjects as BPP [Black
Panther Party] activitie8, foreign travel, assaults on police,
bombings during a given period, high school disorders, etc....
[Emphasis added.]
The Chief . . . is chargeable with the intelligence briefing
of all Civil Disturbance teams prior to their commitment to a
given area. Intelligence briefings are also provided on an in-
termittent basis to senior officials of the Department of De-
fense. This office is further charged with maintaining liasion
with Chiefs of Police, Public Safety Directors and the offices
of Mayors and State Governors as a situation warrants."'
The references to campus disturbances, the Black Panther Party,
and foreign travel indicate some of -the highest priorities for domestic
intelligence in 1969-1970. In addition Assistant Attorney General
Jerris Leonard of the Civil Rights Division, who was assigned as the
Attorney General's Chief of Staff for the Civil Disturbance Group,
arranged in 1970 for the Justice Department "to make available for
examination or copying, to designated officials of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, computerized tapes of information submitted by the
IDIU." An inquiry in 1975 concluded that the Department "initiated
the transaction by requesting the CIA to check against its own sources
whether any of the individuals on the IDIU list were engaged in for-
eign travel, or received foreign assistance or funding. At the time it
was provided to the CIA, the IDIU subject list contained records of
approximately ten to twelve thousand individuals. The records con-
tained identifying information, aliases, brief narratives and file
sources of the data, including FBI inputs.""488
An examination of the IDIU computer printout in 1971 disclosed
such prominent names as Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Cesar Chavez, Bos-
ley Crowther (former New York Time8 film critic), Sammy Davis,
Jr., Charles Evers, James Farmer, Seymour Hersh, Julius Hobson,
and Mrs. Coretta King. Organizations noted in the computer printout
included the NAACP, -the Congress of Racial Equality, the Institute
for Policy Studies, VISTA, United Farm Workers of California, and
' James T. Devine, Interdivisional Information Unit, Civil Disturbance Group,
9/10/70.
4 Statement of Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman, Justice
Department Press Release, 1/14/75.
the Urban League. Many ordinary people who were not prominent
nationally had their names included in the IDIU subject data listing.
One was described as "a local civil rights worker," another as "student
at Merritt College and member of Peace and Freedom Party as of
mid '68," and another as "a breaded militant who writes and recites
poetry." 490
There were some congressional misgivings expressed about the Jus-
tice Department's procedures for handling demonstrations in Wash-
ington, D.C. To allay these concerns, the Department prepared a
report on Demonstration and Dissent in the Nation'8 Capital. With
respect to intelligence, the report stated:
Accurate and complete information is essential for the
planning necessary to achieve peaceful demonstrations and.
for dealing with disorders. It. is not only important to know
how many are coming at a particular time, but who they
might be and why they are coming. This kind of relevant
information is freely available to anyone; it is only necessary
to collect it in one place and, having collected it, to evaluate
it in order to make value judgments and to formulate a plan
of action. To provide the concerned departments and agencies
with reliable information, there has been established within
the Department of Justice an Interdivisional. Information
Unit (IDIU) and an Intelligence Evaluation Committee.
Whenever the information indicates a large -demonstration
may occur, all intelligence concerning that potential demon-
stration is reviewed by the Intelligence Evaluation Commit-
tee. The Intelligence Evaluation Committee is composed of
officials of the Executive Branch experienced with demon-
strations and in assessing the potential for disorders. The
Intelligence Evaluation Committee weighs all of the avail-
able information and reports its conclusions regarding the
potential for disorder to the Attorney General. 491 [Emphasis
added.]
The Justice Department report did not make clear that the IDIU
and the first IEC received and evaluated not only publicly available
information, but also data provided from clandestine intelligence in-
vestigations by the FBI and military intelligence.
In 1971, Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian issued new
"guidelines" for the IDIU, which stated in part:
... IDIU must analyze and monitor all information re-
lating to past civil disorders as well as information relating
to the potential for civil disorder.. .[W]e must identify and
understand the philosophies of organizations and individuals
who have engaged in civil disorder or have demonstrated a
propensity to do so.
In carrying out our purpose, it is imperative that the an-
alysts involved keep clearly in mind that IDIU is not an
investigative agency. Its mission, reduced to its simplest es-
-Staff Memorandum for the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, United
States 'Senate, 9/14/71.
4 Department of Justice Report, Demonstration and Disent in the Nation'a
Capital, in Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure, Federal Handling of Demonstrations (1970), pp. 52-53.
sential, is merely the indexing and filing of information col-
lected by investigatory agencies, principally the FBI, and
information furnished by the news media in a quickly e-
trievable form.
... [W]e must take every reasonable precaution to insure
that the identity of individuals included in our indexes be
protected from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. We
must keep clearly in mind that it is the use to which the infor-
mation is put rather than the collection of the information
itself that gives rise to the greatest possibility of abuse ... 492
These "guidelines" were prepared shortly before Assistant Attorney
General Mardian and other Justice Department officials were called to
testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
which was inquiring into military surveillance and other domestic
intelligence collection programs. At those hearings Mardian did ex-
plain that IDIU relied on FBI reports for most of its information;
but Justice Department officials did not disclose the reorganized IEC,
nor did they provide the Subcommittee with FBI's standards of intelli-
gence collection.-
Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist defended the power
of the executive to collect any information which was "legitimately
related to the statutory or constitutional authority of the executive
branch to enforce the laws." [Emphasis added.] He cited the Su-
preme Court's opinion in In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890), inter-
preting the President's duty to "take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed" under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution. The Court
had construed the word "Laws" to encompass not only statutes enacted
by Congress, but also "the right, duties and obligations growing out
of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the pro-
tection implied by the nature of government under the Constitution."
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist also cited as a basis for gather-
ing intelligence about both protest demonstrations and ghetto unrest
Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution which provides, "The United
States shall guarantee every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Leg-
islature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." This provi-
sion had traditionally been understood as authorizing the President
to dispatch federal troops under implementing statutes passed in 1792
and the 1860's. But the Justice Department now asserted that it was"another basis of the information gathering authority of the Execu-
tive Branch," therefore justifying "investigative activities . . . di-
rected to determine the possibility of domestic violence occurring at
a particular place or at a particular time." 44
G. "New Left" Intelligence
The FBI collected intelligence under its VIDEM (Vietnam Dem-
onstration) and STAG (Student Agitation) programs on "anti-Gov-
ernment demonstrations and protest rallies" which the Bureau con-
" Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian to all
IDIU personnel, 3/5/71.
'" Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights, Hearings before
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1971), pp. 867-877.
'4 Federal Data Banks, 1971 Hearings, pp. 598-01.
sidered "disruptive." Field offices were warned against "incomplete
and nonspecific reporting," which neglected such details as "number
of protesters present, identities of organizations, and identities of
speakers and leading activists." Although every person arrested at a
demonstration was not automatically investigated by the FBI, all that
was needed to open an individual case was some "propensity for vio-
lence" or association with "subversive or revolutionary activity." *4
After the disorders at Columbia University and other campuses,
in 1968, FBI field offices were instructed:
The most recent outbreak of violence on college campuses
represents a direct challenge to law and order and a sub-
stantial threat to the stability of society in general. The Bu-
reau has an urgent and pressing responsibility to keep the in-
telligence comimunity informed of plans of new left groups
and student activists to engage in acts of lawlessness on the
campus. We can only fulfill this responsibility through the
development of high quality informants who are in a posi-
tion to report on the plans of student activists to engage in
disruptive activities on the campus. [Emphasis added.]
In view of the increased agitational activity taking place
on college campuses, each office is instructed to immediately
expand both its coverage and investigation of campus-based
new left groups and black nationalist organizations with the
objective of determining in advance the plans of these ele-
ments to engage in violence or disruptive activities on the
campus. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that all offices
are expected to develop and maintain adequate sources to en-
able the Bureau to determine in advance and promptly re-
port agitational activities being planned by campus-based
groups. In carrying out these instructions, you should, of
course, be guided by existing regulations which require that
Bureau authorization be obtained prior to the development
of informants and sources on college campuses . . . 46
The possibility of "embarrassment" placed some limits on intelligence
operations, especially when there was adverse publicity. The following
is one example:
At a recent antidraft demonstration, a Bureau Agent
posing as a newsman was recognized by a representative of
a newspaper that has been traditionally hostile to the FBI.
The Special Agent involved was attempting to identify the
demonstrators and those who were burning their draft cards,
and to record statements of various individuals participating
in the demonstration. A distorted news item regarding the
Agent's activities appeared in a subsequent issue of that
paper reflecting the Bureau in an unfavorable light.
Consequently, you should instruct your Agent personnel
that, henceforth, no matter what the justification, they are
not to pose as newsmen or representatives of any wire serv-
ice for the purpose of establishing an investigative cover.
4 9 7
" SAC Memorandum 1-72, 5/23/72.
4 SAC Letter No. 68, 5/21/68.
'9 SAC Letter No. 68-38, 6/2/68.
The FBI attempted to define the "New Left," but with little
success. Field offices were told that it was a "subversive force"
dedicated to destroying our "traditional values." Although it had "no
definable ideology," it was seen as having "strong Marxist, existen-
tialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones." Field.offices were instructed
that "proper areas of inquiry" regarding the subjects of "New Left"
investigations were "public statements, the writings and the leader-
ship activities" which might establish their "rejection of law and
order" and thus their "potential threat to the security of the United
States." Such persons would also be placed on the Security Index
because of these "anarchistic tendencies," even if the Bureau could
not prove "membership in a subversive organization." 
49 8
Later instructions to the field stated that the term "New Left" did
not refer to "a definite organization," but to a "loosely-bound, free-
wheeling, college-oriented movement" and to the "more extreme and
militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft protest organizations." These
instructions initiated a "comprehensive study of the whole movement"
for the purpose of assessing its "dangerousness." Quarterly reports
were to be prepared, and "subfiles" opened, under the following
headings:
Organizations ("when organized, objectives, locality in which
active, whether part of a national organization");
Membership (and "sympathizers"-use "best available
informants and sources");
Finances (including identity of "angels" and funds from
"foreign sources");
Communist influence;
Publications ("describe publications, show circulation and
principal members of editorial staff");
Violence;
Religion ("support of movement by religious groups or
individuals")
Race Relations
Political Activities ("details relating to position taken on
political matters including efforts to influence public
opinion, the electorate and Government bodies");
Ideology;
Education ("courses given together with any educational out-
lines and assigned or suggested reading");
Social Reform ("demonstrations aimed at social reform")
Labor ("all activity in the labor field");
Public Appearances of Leaders ("on radio and tele-
vision" and "before groups, such as labor, church and




'. SAC Letter No. 68-21, 4/2/68. This directive did caution that "mere dissent
and opposition to Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner"
was "not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index." Moreover,
"anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments" were not, in themselves, supposed
to "justify an investigation."
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International Relations ("travel in foreign countries,"
"attacks on United States foreign policy");
Mass Media ("indications of support of New Left by mass
media").
Through these massive reports, the FBI hoped to discover "the true
nature of the New Left movement." 49 Few Bureau programs better
reflect "pure intelligence" objectives going far beyond even the most
generous definition of "preventive intelligence."
The FBI prepared a study of "Youth in Rebellion" early in 1969.
This "comprehensive document on new left and black extremist ac-
tivities" was designed to review the "worldwide ramifications of these
movements as well as their impact on the internal security of the
country." 500 When the FBI completed this report, the Internal Secu-
rity Division of the Justice Department specifically authorized the
FBI to conduct investigations "to determine whether there is any
underlying subversive group giving illegal directions and guidance to
the numerous campus disorders throughout the country." The Internal
Security Division also submitted "suggested areas of particular in-
terest for future investigative efforts." 50, These instructions were
generally comparable to Attorney General Clark's September 1967
memorandum regarding ghetto riots and civil disturbance intelligence.
Both were taken by the FBI as broad authorizations for domestic
intelligence investigations. 02
An additional request from the Internal Security Division in March
1969 advised the FBI that the Justice Department was "consider-
ing the possibility of conducting a grand jury investigation of some
future serious campus disorder" with a view towards prosecution
under the antiriot act, the Smith Act, the Voorhis Act, -and statutes
on seditious, conspiracy and insurrection. Consequently, the Internal
Security Division asked the FBI: I
... to secure in advance the names of any persons planning
activities which might fall within the proscription of any of
the foregoing statutes. It would also be important for us to
know the identities of the officials of any participating orga-
nizations who have custody or control of records concerning
the activities of such organizations which we would seek to
obtain by means of subpoenas duces tecum.
It would also be most helpful if you were alble to furnish
us with the names of any individuals who appear at more
than one campus either before, during, or after any active
disorder or riot and the identities of those persons from out-
side the campus who might be instigators of these incidents.
The FBI was asked to use not only its "existing sources" but also "any
other source you may be able to develop. . . . e503
Despite the pressure for greater intelligence about campus groups,
Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 10/28/68, and enclosure.
m SAC Letter No. 69-14, 2/25/69.
m Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the
FBI Director, 2/18/69.
a FBI Intelligence Division, Position Paper on Jurisdiction, 2/13/75.
a Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the
FBI Director, 3/3/69.
be developed." Nevertheless, the FBI field offices were instructed to
intensify their efforts: "It is ... recognized that with the graduation
of senior classes, you will lose a certain percentage of your existing
student informant coverage. This decreasing percent of coverage will
not be accepted as an excuse for not developing the necessary informa-
tion." 5o4 One way to achieve this result without the FBI recruiting
additional student informants was to have local police do so. Thus,
when field offices were reminded of the need for gathering intelligence
so that the Justice Department could provide "data regarding develop-
ing situations having a potential for violence," FBI headquarters
stressed the need for "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement
agencies." 5- The restriction on new campus informants was finally
relaxed, although field officers were still forbidden to develop inform-
ants "under the age of 21" and procedures were instituted "for tight
controls and great selectivity in this most sensitive area."
Upon initial contact with a potential student informant or
source, informant or source should be requested to execute a
brief signed written statement for the field file to the effect
that such individual has voluntarily furnished information
to the FBI because of his concern of individuals and groups
acting against the interests of his government and that he un-
derstands that the FBI is not interested in the legitimate
activities of educational institutions. [Emphasis added.]
Field offices were also to submit quarterly reports assessing the pro-
ductivity of each student informant so as "to justify the continued
utilization of the source." 506 FBI Intelligence Division officials were
greatly dissatisfied with these limits, as became clear in the prepa-
ration of the "Huston Plan" in 1970.07
FBI intelligence surveillance of the New Left was further expanded
in early 1970 after an explosion at a New York City townhouse killed
several youthful bomb-makers and dramatized the violence potential
of the Weatherman faction of SDS. Because members of the Weather-
man faction were believed to live -in communes, all FBI field officers
were instructed:
For the purposes of Bureau investigations, a commune is
defined as a group of individuals residing in one location who
practice communal living, i.e., they share income and adhere
to the philosophy of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-oriented vio-
lent revolution.
A rebuttable presumption exists that persons having a past
history of participation in violent leftist radical activity, or
leftist terrorist activity, living in a communal relationship
constitutes a commune within the above definition.
When information is received by an office that indicates a
commune exists, falling within the above definition, it is in-
cumbent upon that office to conduct sufficient investigation to
determine the identity of all members. Each member must be
a SAC Letter No. 69-16, 3/11/69.
SAC Letter 6%-44, 8/19/69.
N SAC Letter No. 69-55, 9/26/69.
' See Report on the Huston Plan.
investigated as a suspected extremist within the framework
of existing instructions to determine whether they should be
included on the Security Index. Every effort must be made by
the office to obtain informant and/or sophisticated coverage
of the commune and its participants to develop advance
knowledge of any planned violence so that preventative action
can be initiated and prosecutive action brought to bear where
possible.""
To conduct more intensive investigations of "terrorism by New Left
extremists," the FBI Intelligence Division requested that additional
manpower be assigned. Director Hoover noted, "O.K. but it must be
kept in mind that we will get no additional personnel until July 1971
so whatever personnel is needed now will have to come from cutbacks
in other programs." 509 To a significant extent these resources were
drawn away from the FBI's counterintelligence effort against hostile
foreign intelligence operations in the United States.-'
By the time of the widespread disturbances following the Cambodian
invasion and Kent State, the Intelligence Division believed 451 addi-
tional agents were needed for New Left investigations, with an in-
crease to 741 "for peak periods." The Intelligence Division explained
the need for more agents in the following terms:
The tragic, violent aftermath of violence and destruction on
our campuses following the President's speech on Cambodia
is a clear warning of the impact of New Left terrorist philos-
ophy and advocacy of street action. The ability of radical
activists to seize a controversial issue and whip up violent re-
action among large crowds is again demonstrated. The threat
to the Nation's ability to function in a crisis situation posed by
New Left extremists has never been more clearly drawn. This
grave threat requires immediate and positive steps be taken
to fulfill our responsibilities for protection of the internal
security of the Nation.511
Subsequent instructions to the field stressed intensified investigation
of persons adhering to the "Weatherman ideology of violence and revo-
lution", and again observed that "communal living follows Weather-
man lifestyle and is good guide to individual's adherence to Weather-
man ideology." Persons who used "terroristic tactics in furtherance of
revolution" were to be considered "for inclusion in Priority I of Se-
curity Index." Field offices were directed to "begin shifting personnel
to this work from other work areas, except for personnel specifically
designated for organized crime work .1. 512
H. Target Lists and the Security Index
After meeting with the President's Commission on Civil Disorders
in 1967, FBI Director Hoover instructed "that an index be compiled of
racial agitators and individuals who have demonstrated a propensity
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAO's, 4/17/70.
" Note on Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/16/70.
510 C. D. Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 177.
s" Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/11/70.
... Memorandun from Headquarters to all SAC's, 5/13/70
for fomenting racial discord." 513 Standards for the Rabble Rouser
Index were then sent to the field:
The Index will consist of the names, identifying data, and
background information of individuals who are known rabble
rousers and who have demonstrated by their actions and
speeches that they have a propensity for fomenting racial dis-
order. It is desired -that only individuals of prominence who
are of national interest be included on this index. Particular
consideration should be given to recommending those individ-
uals in this category who travel extensively ... The fact that
an individual is on the Security Index or Reserve Index does
not preclude his inclusion on the Rabble Rouser Index.
5 1 4
The initial effect of the Rabble Rouser Index was to collect in files
at FBI headquarters all information from the field offices about per-
sons on the Index. Field offices were also to provide information about
their "possible foreign travel." "5 The first Index contained less than
100 names.516
At the same time as the creation of the Rabble Rouser Index, the
FBI instituted a COINTELPRO program aimed at disrupting and
discrediting black nationalist or black "extremist" groups and in-
dividuals. The Rabble Rouser Index served as a convenient list of
primary targets for OOINTELPRO activity.5' 7 Within the FBI Do-
mestic Intelligence Division, there was a substantial reorganization to
take account of these new functions in 1967. The Subversives Control
Section was abolished and its supervision of investigations of in-
dividual "subversives"7-both "Old Left" and "New Left"-were trans-
ferred back to the Internal Security Section. A new Racial Matters
Section was established to supervise intelligence investigations of black
and white "extremist" groups.
The standards for the Rabble Rouser Index were broadened in No-
vember 1967 to cover persons with a "propensity for fomenting" any
disorders affecting the "internal security," not just racial disorders,
and to include persons of local as well as national interest. A rabble
rouser was defined "as a person who tries to arouse people to violent
action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, et cetera; a dema-
gogue." The purpose of this expansion to develop a nationwide index-
"of agitators of all types whose activities have a bearing on the na-
tional security." This included "black nationalists, white suprema-
cists, Puerto Rican nationalists, anti-Vietnam demonstration leaders,
and other extremists." 518 Standardized forms for automatic data proc-
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Black Panther Party
Communist





National States Rights Party
Progressive Labor Party
Nationalist groups advocating Independence for Puerto Rico
Revolutionary Action Movement
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
Students for a Democratic Society




The overlap with the Security Index is indicated by the inclusion in
1968 of Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee in a list of organizational affiliations for
the Security Index. By 1968 the Security Index also contained persons
without organizational affiliation designated "Anarchist" and "Black
Nationalist." 520
The Rabble Rouser Index was renamed the Agitator Index in
March 1968, and field offices were directed to obtain a photograph of
each person on the Index.5 21
The Domestic Intelligence Division also stressed the dangerousness
of the "New Left" movement and the need to include its "leading
activists" on the Security Index.
The emergence of the new left movement as a subversive
force dedicated to the complete destruction of the traditional
values of our democratic society presents the Bureau with an
unprecedented challenge in the security field. Although the
new left has no definable ideology of its own, it does have
strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist over-
tones. While mere membership in a new left group is not
sufficient to establish that an individual is a potential threat
to the internal security of the United States, it must be
recognized that many individuals affiliated with the new
left movement do, in fact, engage in violence or unlawful
activities, and their potential dangerousness is clearly dem-
onstrated by their statements, conduct and actions.
The Bureau has recently noted that in many instances
security investigations of these individuals are not being
initiated. In some cases, subjects are not being recommended
for inclusion on the Security Index merely because no mem-
bership in a basic revolutionary organization could be estab-
lished. Since the new left is basically anarchist, many of the
* SAC Letter No. 68-5, 1/16/68.
SAC Letter No. 68-14, 2/20/68.
M Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/21/68.
leading activists in it are not members of any basic revolu-
tionary group. It should be borne in mind that even if a
subject's membership in a subversive organization cannot be
proven, his inclusion on the Security Index may often be
justified because of activities which establish his anarchistic
tendencies. In this regard, you should constantly bear in mind
the public statenents, the writings and the leader8hip activ-
ities of subjects of security investigations which establish
them as anarchists are proper areas of inquiry. Such activity
should be actively pursued through investigation with the
ultimate view of including them on the Security Index. It
is entirely possible, therefore, that a subject without any
organizational affiliation can qualify for the Security Index
by virtue of his public pronouncements and activities which
establish his rejection of law and order and reveal him to be
a potential threat to the security of the United States. [Em-
phasis added.]
Field offices were cautioned, however, "that mere dissent and op-
position to the Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional
manner are not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index."
Agents were to report information "to show the potential threat
and not merely show anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments without
also revealing advocacy of violence or unlawful action which would
justify an investigation." 522
At the same time that these instructions were issued, the FBI
instituted a COINTELPRO program against the "New Left." The
Agitator Index and the Security Index served as indicators of the
prime subjects for efforts under COINTELPRO to disrupt groups
and discredit individuals in the "New Left." 523
The FBI did not develop its new Security Index policies alone.
As the Commission on Civil Disorders had encouraged the FBI to
identify "rabble rousers," so President Johnson ordered a compre-
hensive review of the Government's emergency plans after the October
1967 March on the Pentagon against the Vietnam war.
Attorney General Ramsey Clark was appointed chairman of a com-
mittee to review the Presidential Emergency Action Documents
(PEADs) prepared under the Emergency Detention Program. Sub-
sequent decisions were summarized in an FBI memorandum:
After extensive review, in which the FBI participated, 'a
proposal was submitted to the President that certain docu-
ments be revised.. It was proposed that the Emergency De-
tention Program be revised to agree with the provisions of
the Emergency Detention Act [of 1950].
The Internal Security Division (ISD) of the Department
has raised questions as to the ability to discharge the respon-
sibilities of the Attorney General under the Emergency De-
tention Act of 1950. By letter dated 2/26/68 the Department
requested a conference with the FBI for the purpose of
reviewing the implementation of the Emergency Detention
Program...
522 SAC Letter No. 68-21, 4/2/68.
523 See Report on COINTELPRO.
One of the changes in PEAD pertains to the definition of
a "dangerous individual". The document, which has been ap-
proved by the President, now states, "The Attorney General
acting through such officers and agents as he may designate
for the purpose, shall apprehend, and by order detain, pur-
suant to the provisions of the Emergency Detention Act,
each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe
that such person probably will engage in, or probably will
conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage and
sabotage, including acts of terrorism or assassination and
any interference with or threat to the survival and effective
operation of the national, state, and local governments and
of the national defense effort." As used in this section, the
term "person," shall mean any citizen or national of the
United States, or any citizen, subject or national of any for-
eign nation, or any stateless person.
The above is an all encompassing definition of a "dan-
gerous person". This will extend the criteria for the Security
Index.
During the conference of 4/22/68 with ISD, the definition
of a dangerous individual was discussed, and it was decided
that Item D of the SI criteria should be expanded to include
the definition as stated in the new PEAD 6 ...
With the emergence of the New Left and the intensifica-
tion of activities by the racial militants and black national-
ists, who are not affiliated with basic revolutionary organi-
zations but because of their anarchist tendencies do present
a threat to the internal security of the United States, it has
become apparent that these individuals warrant inclusion on
the SI.
Many individuals on the SI, because of their violent ten-
dencies and their representation of top leadership of subver-
sive organizations, are scheduled for priority apprehension.
The administrative procedures developed to make these ap-
prehensions are referred to as the Detcom Program. In an all-
out emergency, all subjects whose names are in the SI will be
considered for immediate apprehension.
The new priorities for apprehension under Detention Program were
described as follows:
Priority I.-Top national and state leadership of basic sub-
versive organizations, leaders of anarchistic groups, individ-
uals who have shown greatest propensity for violence, as well
as those who have special training in sabotage, espionage,
guerrilla warfare, etc....
Priority II.-Second level leadership and individuals who
present significant threat but are in less influential positions
than Priority I . . .
Priority II.-All other individuals on SI. Made up mainly
of rank and file members . . .
Results of FBI investigations would continue to be provided to the
Justice Department "for its concurrence and approval of the persons
listed for apprehension".524
The FBI formally requested Departmental approval for the broader
Security Index criteria and the standards for the Priority Appre-
hension Program.5 2 5 Even though the Department's formal reply was
that the criteria were "under study," the FBI went ahead with Man-
ual revisions. and new instructions to the field.5 2 There was "informal"
Departmental approval for these changes, as noted in a later memo-
randum?.5 "
The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel eventually ap-
proved a modified version of the Security Index criteria in September
1968. Since this was the first time since 1955 that the Department had
fully considered the matter, it.is important to stress that the previous
policy of disregarding the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was now
formally abandoned. If an emergency occurred, the Attorney General
would abide by "the requirement that any person actually detained will
be entitled to a hearing at which time the evidence will have to satisfy
the standards of . . . the Emergency Detention Act". However, the
Security Index criteria themselves could be less precise because of "the
needed flexibility and discretion at the operating level in order to
carry on an effective surveillance program." As revised by the Office
of Legal Counsel, the Security Index criteria read as follows:
A. Membership or participation in the activities of a basic
revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown
by overt acts or statements established through reliable
sources, informants or individuals.
B. Subject has had membership or participation in the
affairs of one or more front organizations which adhere to
the policies and doctrines of a basic revolutionary organiza-
tion, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial par-
ticipation in the furtherance of those aims and purposes of
the front organization which coincide with those of a basic
revolutionary organization, within the last three years as
shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable
sources, informants, or individuals.
C. Investigation has developed information that an indi-
vidual, though not a mwomber of or a participant in the
activities of a basic revolutionary or front organization, has
anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon
the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit
acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism,
assassination, or any interference with or threat to the sur-
vival and effective operation of the national, state and local
governments and of the defense effort. [Emphasis added.]
m Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.
' Memorandum from the FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General J.
Walter Yeagley, 5/1/68.
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D. Although investigation has failed to establish the facts
required by (A), (B) or (C) above, either as to the sub-
stance of those criteria or because there have been no overt
acts or statements within the time limits prescribed, facts
have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict
the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected
to commit acts of the kind described in (C) above.528
The Internal Security Division forwarded the Office of Legal Coun-
sel's memorandum to the FBI, and the Bureau agreed that it would
"be guided by these revised criteria of 1968." The FBI Manual was
changed accordingly.529
Their expanding size made the Agitator Index and the Security
Index less valuable for most efficiently concentrating FBI intelligence
investigations. Consequently, the Domestic Intelligence Division
developed more refined tools for this purpose-including the Key
Activist Program and the Black Nationalist Photograph Album.
Instructions went out to ten major field offices in January 1968 to
designate certain persons as "Key Activists," defined as "individuals
in the Students for a Democratic Society and the anti-Vietnam war
groups [who] are extremely active and most vocal in their statements
denouncing the United States and calling for civil disobedience and
other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts." [Emphasis added.]
There was to be "an intensive investigation" of each Key Activist:
. . . with the objective of developing detailed and complete
information regarding their day-to-day activities and future
plans for staging demonstrations and disruptive acts directed
against the Government. Because of their leadership and
prominence in the 'new left' movement, as well as the growing
militancy of this movement, each office must maintain high-
level informant coverage on these individuals so that the Bu-
reau is kept abreast of their day-to-day activities as well as the
organizations they are affiliated with, to develop informa-
tion regarding their sources of funds, foreign contracts, and
future plans.
In the event adequate live informant coverage is not imme-
diately available on these individuals, other types of coverage
such as technical surveillances and physical surveillances
should be considered as temporary measures to establish the
necessary coverage.5 3 0
In May 1968, the FBI obtained the Federal income tax returns for
Key Activists and, in some instances, used this and other intelligence
information as part of COINTELPRO operations to disrupt an indi-
vidual's activities.531
The Key Activist Program was expanded to virtually all field offices
in October 1968. The offices were instructed to recommend additional
n Memorandum from Wozencraft to Yeagley, 9/9/68.
Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to the FBI Director,
9/19/68; memorandum from FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley,
9/26/68; FBI Manual Section 87, p. 45, revised, 10/14/68.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 1/30/68.
a Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/24/68.
persons for the program and to "consider if the individual was ren-
dered ineffective would it curtail such [disruptive] activity in his area
of influence." The importance of the program was explained by stress-
ing "the shift to violence in the New Left movement."
Sabotage, arson, bombing, and a variety of obstructive tactics
have been openly advocated during the past year. In Septem-
ber, 1968, within a five-day period three ROTC establish-
ments were sabotaged and a fourth threatened. In addition, a
Central Intelligence Agency office at Ann Arbor, Michigan,
was bonibed during that month. These instances of openly
made plans for violence and the brazen follow through of
action are examples of the problems facing the Bureau in this
field and the absolute necessity for intensive investigative ef-
forts in these matters. Successful prosecution is the best deter-
rent to such unlawful activity. Intensive investigations of
Key Activists under this Program are logically expected to
result in prosecutions under substantive violations within the
Bureau's investigative jurisdiction.532
While the FBI considered Federal prosecution a "logical" result, it
should be noted that Key Activists were not chosen because they were
suspected of having committed or planning to commit any specific
Federal crime.
A counterpart to the Key Activist Program for the "New Left" was
the Black Nationalist Photograph Album, which grew out of a con-
ference of FBI agents from forty-two field offices. The conferences
recommended concentrating on no more than fifty prominent "militant
black nationalists" who traveled extensively. Each field office would
have a copy of the Album, including photographs and "biographical
data," so that they could be identified "should they turn up in different
areas of the country." m
The Key Activist Program, the Black Nationalist Photograph Al-
bum, the Agitator Index, and the revised Security Index identified
the prime subjects for -domestic intelligence investigation. However,
the scope of inquiry went far beyond these defined targets. Inflam-
matory reports about possible "catastrophes" intensified headquarters
pressures on the field to produce more intelligence in 1968:
Recently we have been advised by informants that mili-
tant black nationalist organizations, as well as independent
Negro extremists are talking of taking such action as dyna-
miting the Empire State Building in New York City, throw-
ing dynamite on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange
and possibly assassinating some white political candidates as
a means of retaliating for the killing of Martin Luther King,
Jr. We have also received information that militant black
racial extremists feel that all white people should be killed
and one has stated that he believes if the right contact is made
with the White House staff, a plan might be formulated to
poison 500 to 600 people attending functions at the White
House.
5 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters tocall SAC's 10/24/68.
53 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/11/68.
. . . With the increased number of violent statements com-
ing to the attention of the Bureau, you must be alert to
promptly run out all rumors of violence connected with
racial activity for the purpose of either proving or disproving
these rumors.
In addition, our experience in the past has shown that
often when an individual is confronted concerning a violent
statement he is alleged to have made, it will deter him from
taking any such action. In view of this, whenever possible,
interview individuals who are alleged to have made violent
statements. . . .53
This latter form of deterrent "preventive action" proceeded inde-
pendently from FBI COINTELPRO operations.
In early 1969, the FBI stepped up its Key Activist Program.
Reports on Key Activists were to be made every ninety days, and
"particular effort" was to be made "to obtain recordings of or reliable
witnesses to inflammatory speeches or statements made which may
subsequently become subject to criminal proceedings." 5* The FBI
Intelligence Division also compiled a Key Activist Album containing
photographs and biographies of each Key Activist for distrilbution
to all field offices.5 At this time there were 55 individuals covered
by the program. To expand this number, FBI field offices were in-
structed to investigate all persons connected with the regional offices
of Students for a Democratic Society-o determine whether they
should be included in the Security Index or the Key Activist
Program.5 87
The Black Nationalist Photograph Album was also expanded in
early 1969 "to include the photographs of the principal leaders of
any .black extremist organization," not just those specifically known
to travel.5' Later in the year the FBI broadened the scope of its
Racial Calendar, which had been established in 1968 to advise each
field office of "the dates of black nationalist type conferences and
. . . racial events and anniversaries." Because of increasing coopera-
tion between "black extremists and white subversives," the Racial
Calendar would now include demonstrations and conferences "of the
antifascist, antidraft and anti-Vietnam variety" which would "easily
develop into a racial event." 53
In anticipation of possible racial unrest in the summer of 1969,
FBI headquarters reemphasized to the field the need for "developing
a network of ghetto-type informants . .. to enable you to advise
appropriate local and Federal authorities in advance of potential
large scale racial violence." The FBI was particularly concerned that
the "radical Negro students on college campuses" would seek "to
promote racial violence" in the ghettos. Therefore, it was deemed
necessary "to thoroughly saturate every level of activity in the
ghetto." 540
"' SAC Letter No. 68-32. 6/4/68.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/10/69.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 4/2/69.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's. 5/22/69.
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 1/17/69.
* Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 9/2/69.
"o SAC Letter No. 69-30, 5/27/60.
I. Investigations of "Foreign Influence" on Domestic Unrest
The FBI was increasingly interested in possible foreign influence on
domestic violence and protest, partly at the urging of President John-
son. As early as 1963 the FBI Manual had authorized requests for CIA
investigations of Americans abroad for internal security purposes.
Prior thereto the sole purpose of advising the CIA of foreign travel
by domestic "subversives" was "to place stops with appropriate secu-
rity services abroad to be advised of the activities of these subjects." u4
This provision was revised as follows in 1963:
Information concerning these subjects' proposed travel
abroad, including information concerning their subversive
activities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of
State, Central Intelligence Agency, and legal attaches if the
proposed travel is in areas covered by such.... In the cover
letter accompanying the letterhead memorandum, indicate
extent of foreign investigation recommended or whether only
stops should be placed with appropriate security services
abroad. 5 42 [Emphasis added.]
It was through these procedures that the FBI secured the assistance of
the CIA in the investigation of antiwar activists and black militant
leaders who traveled overseas."4 3
In 1966 the FBI and CIA negotiated an informal agreement to regu-
larize their "coordination." This agreement had as its "heart" that the
CIA would "seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI" before
engaging in clandestine activity in the United States, and that the FBI
would "concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict
with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation
[by] the FBI." 5 4 4 Moreover, when an agent recruited by the CIA
abroad arrived in the United States, the FBI would "be advised" and
the two agencies would "confer regarding the handling of the agent in
the United States." The CIA could "continue" its "handling" of the
agent for "foreign intelligence" purposes, and the FBI would also
become involved where there were "internal security factors," 145 al-
though it was recognized that CIA might continue to "handle" the
agent in the United States and provide the Bureau with "information"
bearing on "internal security matters."
The term "internal security factors" used in the agreement meant
that CIA agents were used after 1966 to report on domestic "dissi-
dents" for the FBI. There were instances where, according to the
former FBI liaison with CIA:
CIA had penetrations abroad in radical, revolutionary
organizations and the individual was coming here to attend
a conference, a meeting, and would be associating with lead-
ing dissidents, and the question came up, can he be of any use
to us, can we have access to him during that period.
In most instances, because he was here for a relatively short
period, we would levy the requirement or the request upon the
1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 33.
m FBI Manual Section 87, p. 33a, revised 4/15/63.
See Report on CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans.
m Former FBI liaison with the CIA testimony, 9/22/75, p. 52.
a Liaison testimony, 9/22/75, p. 55.
CIA to find out what was taking place at the meetings to get
his assessment of the individuals that he was meeting, and
any other general intelligence that he could collect from his
associations with the people who were of interest to us. 54 6
The policies embodied in the 1966 agreement and the practice under
it clearly involved the CIA in the performance of "internal security
functions." At no time was Congress asked to amend the 1947 Act to
modify its ban against CIA "internal security functions."
As previously noted (p. 484), President Johnson and Director
Hoover had been seeking proof that Communists were behind the anti-
war movement since 1965. The CIA increasingly was drawn into that
quest, in part in response to Bureau requests. Joseph Califano, a prin-
cipal assistant to President Johnson, testified that high governmental
officials could not believe that
a cause that is so clearly right for the country, as they perceive
it, would be so widely attacked if there were not some [for-
eign] force behind it.54
The same pressures and beliefs led to FBI investigations of possible
"foreign influence" on "militant black nationalists" and radical
students.
Within the United States the FBI established intelligence coverage
on domestic groups if a Communist country appeared interested in ex-
ercising influence. For example, on the basis of information that a
black American fugitive was in the People's Republic of China and
that the Chinese government was making propaganda statements "to
promote and abet racial strife in this country," the FBI instructed
its field offices in 1967 "to be on the alert constantly for information
indicating Chicom attempts to influence groups or individuals
involved in the racial movement and . . . that development of live
formants who can become knowledgeable of such attempts is vital." "I
Similarly, information that Cuba had plans for "the use of American
Negroes, Indians, and Communists to methodically sabotage our in-
stallations throughout the Western Hemisphere" and that Cuban of-
ficials had offered arms and assistance to "Puerto Rican revolutionary
groups" led the FBI to alert its informants in defense plants and to
ask its "trustworthy police contacts .. . to alert their racial and se-
curity informants" so that they would report information about "dis-
sident groups, including 'black nationalist' organizations, which have
potential for carrying out sabotage or other disruptive activities on be-
half of Cuba." 549
In addition to these specific problems, the FBI issued general in-
structions to the field for collecting intelligence on "foreign influences
in the Black Nationalist movement":
The potential for foreign influences in these matters cer-
tainly exists as evidenced by wide travel in communist coun-
tries of such militant black nationalists as Stokely Carmichael
who, within the recent past, has visited, such far-flung places
a Liaison testimony, 9/22/75, pp. 57-58.
w Califano, 1/27/76, p. 70.
a SAC Letter No. 67-56, 9/12/67.
m SAC Letter No. 67-62, 10/17/67.
as Cuba, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Algeria, United
Arab Republic, and other countries abroad. Other individuals
connected with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Com-
mittee as well as individuals affiliated with other black nation-
alist organizations are known to have traveled in communist
countries.
Each office should review its files for the identities of any
known black nationalists who have traveled to Iron Curtain
countries and other communist countries during the past two
years ... [I]n instances in which investigations have not been
conducted, penetrative investigations should be initiated at
this time looking toward developing any information regard-
ing contacts on the part of these individuals with foreign
elements and looking toward developing any additional infor-
mation having a. bearing upon whether the individual
involved is currently subjected to foreign influence or direc-
tion....
During your investigative coverage of all militant black
nationalists, be most alert to any foreign travel. Advise the
Bureau promptly of such in order that appropriate overseas
investigations may be conducted to establish activities and
contacts abroad.
In addition, each office should submit a letterhead memo-
randum . . . to include indications of foreign support, direc-
tion, guidance or influence, as well as a listing of individual
black nationalists . .. who have traveled to communist coun-
tries within the past two years.... 550
The FBI passed such information on to the CIA, which in turn began
to place individual black nationalists on a "watch list" for the inter-
ception of international communications by the National Security
Agency. 55 ' One purpose for the FBI effort to obtain income tax re-
turns of Key Activists was "to determine whether their income
supports their ability to travel throughout this country, and abroad
as part of the New Left revolt." 552
The IDIU's transfer of its computer printout to the CIA was just
one instance of the substantial flow of domestic intelligence to and
from the foreign intelligence agencies. The FBI was the main channel
for mobilizing foreign intelligence resources and techniques against
domestic targets. The FBI began submitting names of citizens engaged
in domestic protest and violence to the CIA not only for investigation
abroad (as had been the case before 1969), but also for placement on a
"watch list" to -be used in conjunction with the CIA's mail opening
project.55 3 Similar lists of names went from the FBI to the National
Security Agency, for use on a "watch list" for monitoring other
channels of international communication."55
In 1970 these agencies attempted to obtain formal authorization to
use these techniques, and to resume previously forbidden methods such
' SAC Letter No. 67-66, 11/7/67.
5 See Report on National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans.
-Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/24/67.
a See Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening.
a See Report on National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans.
as FBI "black bag jobs," for domestic intelligence purposes."* These
efforts to broaden intelligence surveillance resulted largely from in-
tense pressures from the White House to determine whether there was
foreign direction or financing of domestic protest activity. Rather
than relying on intelligence coverage of foreign governments and
their officials or agents, the FBI and the foreign intelligence agencies
targeted American citizens in the hope of finding foreign Influence
even when there was no prior indication of contact with foreign
agents.
A good picture of the FBI's basic approach to the issue of foreign
influence is provided by a memorandum prepared in the Intelligence
Division early in 1969 summarizing its "coverage of the New Left:"
Foreign influence of the New Left movement offers us a
fertile field to develop valuable intelligence data. To date
there is no real cohesiveness between international New Left
groups, but such an effort was initiated in September, 1968,
at an International Student Conference at Columbia Univer-
sity. This conference disclosed that despite the factionalism
and confusion now so prevalent, there is great potential for
the development of an international student revolutionary
movement. We are initiating investigations aimed at identify-
ing prominent foreign New Left leaders and activists and to
increase our reservoir of background information regarding
foreign New Left organizations. This also encompasses travel
on the part of groups or individuals either to or from the
U.S., and will include international conferences....
Furthermore, it is apparent that the old-line communist
groups such as the Communist Party, USA, the Progressive
Labor Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and particularly
its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance are making
a determined effort to move into the New Left movement to
exert a greater influence and control over its future activities.
More and more we see the New Left movement holdinq up as
heros international communists such as Fidel Castro, Ho Chi
Minh, and Mao Tse-tung. More and more we also see old-line
leftist groups influencing the thinking of the New Left along
Marxist lines and giving direction to attacks against the
police in general and the FBI in particular, to drive us off the
campuses; as well as attacks against the new administration
to degrade President Nixon. We can expect this activity to
intensify greatly in the future.5 5 6 [Emphasis added.]
There was no mention of, or apparent concern for, direct influence or
control of the "New Left" by agents of hostile foreign powers. Instead,
the stress was almost entirely upon ideological links and similarities,
and the threat of dangerous ideas.
White House interest in the financing of New Left protest activities
intensified FBI intelligence investigations in early 1970. In response to
a specific request, the FBI furnished the White House "material con-
cerning income sources of revolutionary groups" in February 1970.
r See Report on the Huston Plan.
'Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 2/3/69.
FBI officials observed that this request was "indicative of high-level
interest" in the question. Consequently, the Intelligence Division in-
structed field offices "to develop information indicative of support of
the New Left Movement by tax-exempt charitable foundations or fi-
nancial 'angels' . . . as well as support by politically oriented groups
such as the Vietnam Moratorium Committee to End the War in Viet-
nam." The field was advised that such support might include "furnish-
ing bail money to arrested demonstrators, furnishing printing equip-
ment or office space, and underwriting the cost of conventions or
rallies." FBI officials realized, however, that "direct intensive financial
investigation of large foundations, prominent wealthy individuals,
. . . or politically oriented groups such as the Vietnam Moratorium
Committee" might result in "embarrassment to the bureau." "I
It was in this climate of stress that the Assistant Director in charge
of the Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan, and the chief of
the Internal Security Section, Charles D. Brennan, played influential
roles in the development of the "Huston Plan" in June 1970.558 These
officials saw the threat as essentially domestic in nature. Mr. Brennan
has testified that the FBI "never developed any information to indi-
cate that communist sources abroad were financing the anti-war activ-
ities in the United States." The only significant foreign connections
were that "many activists in the anti-war movement had traveled to
foreign countries, had attended communist conferences in various
countries abroad and appeared to be getting some degree of propa-
ganda, if not indirectly some guidance which they applied in the con-
duct of the anti-war demonstrations here." 559
Mr. Brennan gave one example of this influence:
They attended conferences in various ... countries abroad
which were sponsored by Communists. The peace movement
in the United States was generally discussed and I recall in
one instance, for example, where several of the activists were
involved in the policy committee of the anti-war activities...
and attended conferences where these issues were the subject
of discussion with many .Communist representatives. And at
the time, the general feeling of the anti-war movement here
was that the next step in the stage should be protest demon-
strations around the United States.
It is my recollection that information at the Communist
Conference abroad led to the conclusion that there should be
instead a concentrated demonstration in Washington, D.C.
And following the return of these individuals to this country,
I think they served to project that view and indeed we did
have a concentrated demonstration in Washington, D.C., and
it is my recollection that when that demonstration took place,
there were also concerted demonstrations at American em-
bassies in many foreign countries on the same day.
* Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 3/12/70; Memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/16/70.
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This kind of indirect "guidance" was not matched by financial sup-
port or direct control. Mr. Brennan stated, "I personally held the feel-
ing that we were dealing with what I term credit card revolutionaries,
and that the individuals involved in this type of activity in the United
States had ample resources of their own .. . to finance these activities.
I never saw anything to the contrary." 560 Nevertheless, Brennan
pointed out that the FBI was "constantly being asked by the White
House as to whether or not there was foreign funding ... and in re-
sponse to that, then I felt it was necessary for us to try to respond to
the question." 561
From Brennan's point of view, the problem was much broader
than foreign influence. He explained:
I think you have to look at the social, political, and eco-
nomic complexities that were related, which built tremen-
dous pressures on the White House, and these, I think, stem
from the thousands of bombings, the arsons, the disruptions,
the disorder. Our academic communities were being totally
disrupted, and I think that a vast majority of American peo-
ple were subjecting the representatives of Congress and ...
the White House staff and other people in Government to
a great deal of pressure, as to why these things were taking
place and why something wasn't being done about these, and
I think in a broader context, then, the FBI was getting a
tremendous amount of pressure from the White House, in re-
sponse to the overall problem. 562
In addition to these outside pressures, FBI intelligence officials them-
selves had their own reasons for conducting extensive intelligence in-
vestigations. This view is illustrated in the following testimony when
Brennan was asked about decisions expanding intelligence coverage
in the fall of 1970:
I believe[d] that the leaders of the New Left movement had
publicly professed their determination to act to overthrow
the government of the United States. And I felt that with
them on public record as having this basic objective, anyone
who joined in membership in their cause, possibly should
have their names recorded for future reference in FBI files.
And I was reminded of the circumstances of the 1930's, when
a great deal of individuals, who at that time were involved
and concerned as a result of the economic depression, they
became involved with communist activities.
A great deal of communist cells developed, and many of the
individuals who, at that time, were in colleges, subsequently
were employed in sensitive positions of government, and
government had no record of their previous communist in-
volvement. I did not want to see a repetition of that sort of
circumstances come about.
So that when individuals did profess themselves to be in
adherence to concepts which aimed at, or called for the over-
" C. D. Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 104.
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throw of the government, I did feel that the FBI had the re-
sponsibility to record that type of information so if they ever
obtained sensitive government positions that could be made
known, and known to the agency for which they were going
to go to work.5 6 3
Brennan admitted that this policy meant putting greater emphasis
on FBI domestic intelligence and less on counterintelligence opera-
tions directed at hostile foreign intelligence activities in the United
States. He stated, "I personally felt that the domestic situation had a
higher priority at that particular given time." 64
Brennan advanced one additional reason for domestic intelligence
investigations, completely separate and apart from prevention or
prosecution of violent crime and maintenance of the government's
security against disloyal employees. He stated:
I think that basically intelligence investigations are designed
not specifically for prosecutive intent, but basically to de-
velop intelligence information which will be provided to
officials of the United States Government to enable them to
possibly consider new types of legislation which may be af-
fecting the security of the country. . . ..6 [Emphasis added.]
This "pure intelligence" function meant that even if Congress had not
made an activity a Federal crime, the FBI could be authorized to
investigate it so that the President and Congress could consider making
it a crime.
J. Intensiffcations After the 1970 "Huston Plan."
There are several dimensions to the expansion of FBI domestic
intelligence operations during the fall of 1970, in the aftermath of
the "Huston Plan." Field offices were instructed in mid-September
"to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new
productive informants who can infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organi-
zations, their collectives, communes and staffs of their underground
newspapers." Specifically implementing one of the provisions of the
"Huston Plan," the FBI authorized its field offices "to develop student
security and racial informants who are 18 years of age or older."
This removal of the previous restriction on recruiting informants
under the age of twenty-one presented the field "with a tremendous
opportunity to expand your coverage." 566
Futher intensifications occurred following a series of conferences
held at FBI headquarters for domestic intelligence supervisors from
the field. There is some dispute as to whether the decisions made at
this time were the result of the recommendations made at these con-
ferences, of an attempt by FBI executives to implement certain ele-
ments of the "Huston Plan," or of Director Hoover's desire to increase
caseload statistics in order to justify a larger appropriation for the
FBI. All three factors contributed to some extent.
The head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, William C.
Sullivan, was promoted in the summer of 1970 to be Assistant to the
"' Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 117.
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Director in charge of all investigative and intelligence activities. His
successor as Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence Division
was Charles D. Brennan, previously chief of the Internal Security
Section. Both men had participated in drafting the "Huston Plan"
and were now in positions of greater influence within the Bureau.
Brennan has testified that their success in persuading the FBI
Executives' Conference to expand domestic intelligence coverage was
partly due to "budgetary considerations." He stated:
I believe ... that the Bureau of the Budget had questioned
the Bureau's appropriation request, pointing to a drop in what
was categorized as certain types of security cases, and appar-
ently it involved a practice whereby there were cases listed
which consisted mostly of name checks and the like, and
because of this apparent drop in security cases, the budget
question [was] whether or not the Bureau's request for
appropriations was consistent. And this, as I understand, was
the basis on which they suddenly saw a need to open a
number or more cases.5
6 7
The relationship between the "Huston Plan" and the intensification
programs in the fall of 1970 was described by Mr. Brennan in the fol-
lowing exchange with Committee counsel:
Mr. BRENNAN. The Huston Plan really had nothing to do
with it. What was essential here was the recognition of what
was taking place inside the country and the recognition of
the individuals, whether the Division, whose responsibility it
was to cope with the growing violence, to recommend the types
of action and programs which they thought necessary to cope
with the problem.
Q. Well, let me ask this question another way. Did these
programs emanate from Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, or any other
part of the Bureau, except the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion ?
Mr. BRENNAN. Definitely not. 'They emanated from indi-
viduals within the Domestic Intelligence Division with the
exception of the opening of a number of cases which you men-
tioned, which were the subject of the discussion at the Execu-
tive Conference.
Q. But, on the whole, it represented an effort by intelligence
professionals who recognized what they perceived to be the
extreme nature of the domestic violence in this country.
Mr. BRENNAN. Right, definitely.
Q. And these same individuals would have been much hap-
pier if the Huston Plan had been implemented at the same
time. Is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I think so. The general feeling was that
there was a greater need for the types of sophisticated tech-
niques which had been eliminated. This would have given us
a greater capacity to cope with the problem.
Q. This program was the next best thing. Is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, you did everything that you did con-
Brennan, 9/23/75, pp. 31-32.
sistent with your continuing determination to try to do your
job.
Q. And this was done in spite of Mr. Hoover and some of
the top executives of the FBI.
Mr. BRENNAN. Mostly, I think, it was done over their
grudging acquiescence."68
The decisions of the FBI Executive Conference increasing the
domestic intelligence caseload were recorded in the following mem-
orandum:
Lifting of existing moratorium on report writing and in-
vestigation of Priority II and Priority III, Security Index
Ca8e8.
There are approximately 10,690 individuals currently in-
cluded in Priority II and Priority III of the Security Index.
Virtually no investigation has been conducted regarding ap-
proximately 6,924 of these individuals since the imposition of
the moratorium in February, 1969. Many of these individuals
have changed residence and/or employment and their where-
abouts are unknown. To fulfill our current responsibilities,
we should know where they are. . . .
Black Student Unions and similar groUps on college cam-
puses.
In 1967, black students began forming their own groups to
project their demands, many of which indicate a commitment
to black nationalism. These groups are autonomous and have a
strong sense of common purpose. The Black Panther Party
has made open efforts to organize the Black Student Unions
nationally and other black extremist groups have used these
organizations to project their extremism and separatism.
Campus disorders involving black students increased 23
percent in the 1969-1970 school year over the previous year
indicating that these groups represent a real potential for vio-
lence and disruption. In the past, we have opened cases on
these organizations following evidence of black extremist ac-
tivities; however; in view of the vast increase in violence on
college campuses, it is felt that every Black Student Union
and similar group, regardless of their past or present in-
volvement in di8orders, should be the subject of a discreet
preliminary inquiry through established sources and inform-
ants to determine background, aims and purposes, leaders and
key activists. It is estimated that this would cause the field to
open approximately 4,000 cases involving organizations and
the key activists and leaders connected therewith. [Emphasis
added.]
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and militant
New Left campus organizations.
At the end of the 1969-1970 academic year, the various
factions of the SDS, excluding the Weatherman faction,
which has become an organization in its own right, consisted
of a membership of approximately 2,500 individuals. In addi-
tion to the SDS groups, there are about 252 totally inde-
Brennan, 9/23/75, pp. 29-31.
pendent groups on college campuses which are pro-commu-
nist New Left-type and are followers of the SDS ideology.
It is estimated that the membership of these organizations
consists of about 4,000 members. At the present time, we are
conducting investigations of all these organizations but have
not, in the past, initiated investigations of the individual
members of such organizations, with the exceptions of the
key activists and individuals who are known to be violence
prone.
Major campuses across the nation have been completely
disrupted. by violent demonstrations, bombings, arsons and
other terroristic acts perpetrated by these organizations. It is,
therefore, proposed that cases be opened on all i'udividual8
belonging to such organizations to determine whether they
have a propensity for violence. If this proposal were imple-
mented, it is estimated that the field would be required to
open approximately 6,500 new cases.5 69 [Emphasis added.]
Subsequent instructions to the field regarding Black Student Unions
stressed the need to "target informants and sources to develop infor-
mation regarding these groups on a continuing basis to fulfill our re-
sponsibilities and to develop such coverage where none exists.
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The directive on New Left campus groups stated, in part:
As you are aware, SDS and other similar subversive campus-
oriented groups are clearly symbolic of violence and Marxist-
Leninist revolution on the Nation's campuses. As their intent
has crystallized, the adherence to this philosophy of revolu-
tion and violence is, of necessity, more inherent among
members and followers. These groups are undoubtedly the
breeding ground for revolutionaries, extremists and terrorists.
Logic and good judgment should be used in these investiga-
tions, bearing in mind the objective is to identify potential
and actual extremists, revolutionaries and terrorists and to
assess their threat to the internal security of the Government.
[Emphasis added.]
Field offices were also reminded, "Each individual investigated should
be considered for inclusion on the Security Index." 571
The Domestic Intelligence Division convened a conference of
racial intelligence supervisors from the field in late October 1970. In
preparation for this conference, Division officials and Assistant to the
Director Sullivan proposed that a Justice Department representative
be invited to attend a session on the Black Panther Party. The chief
of the Racial Intelligence Section explained:
One of our primary objectives in the investigation of the
BPP is to develop information which could be used to prose-
cute the Party and its leaders. The Department has had in
operation for little over a year a special task force looking into
all phases of BPP operations and currently is presenting evi-
" Memorandum from Executives Conference to Mr. Tolson, 10/29/70.
5e Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 11/4/70.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 11/4/70.
dence to a Federal Grand Jury looking towards indictments
of BPP leaders on Smith Act violations. We have not received
any concrete information from the Department which would
indicate prosecutions are imminent.
The Section Chief added "that these discussions will impress the
Departmental representative as to our seriousness in our efforts to put
the violent -BPP leaders in jail as quickly as possible." Assistant to the
Director Sullivan appended a note stating, "The Department needs
to be not only educated to some of the ugly realities of the Black
Panthers, but also the Department needs to be pushed into getting
some prosecutive action underway. People about the country are be-
ginning to wonder why something isn't being done." The proposal
was rejected. Associate Director Clyde Tolson wrote, "I doubt the
wisdom of this." And Director Hoover noted, "I agree with Tolson." 572
One of the recommendations growing out of the conference was a
revision of the Agitator Index, which was described as "a ready
reference to individuals who have demonstrated a propensity for
fomenting disorder of racial and/or security nature." The Agitator
Index was viewed as "a valuable and necessary administrative tool,"
although it was observed that the Justice Department had "not been
advised as to the establishment of the AL." Since many of the "ex-
tremist and revolutionary" individuals on the Agitator Index were
now included in the Security Index, however, field offices were in-
structed to delete persons on the Security Index from the Agitator
Index.113
There was serious concern at the conference about the contempo-
raneous events in Canada, where terrorist activities in Quebec had
led the Canadian government to impose a state of emergency and
suspend certain legal guarantees. Of equal concern were the reports
that at least one antiwar group in the United States-the East Coast
Conspiracy to Save Lives, involving Father Philip Berrigan-was
considering the kidnaping of American government officials. Sum-
marizing the conference results, the head of the Racial Intelligence
Section stated,
The conference was most timely and productive in light of
the present terroristic activities in Canada and the imminent
concern of the White House concerning the probability of
extremist groups taking action against Government officials
or their families.
The topics discussed at the conference covered the entire
spectrum of the problems inherent in investigating and devel-
oping informants in the BPP as well as related extremist
matters. These topics included detailed discussion concerning
the need for full penetration of extremist groups to obtain
information concerning terroristic activities which may be
aimed against Government officials. In addition, the confer-
ence took note that maximum attention should be given to the
" Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 9/22/70.
17Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan. 11/3/70; SAC Letter No.
70-64, 11/10/70.
extremist activities in Canada in connection with our investi-
gations as well as intensifying our investigations having
internationa1 ramifications. . . .57
The conference also reviewed COINTELPRO operations directed
against black extremists:
Our experience over the past year and the growth. of our
knowledge regarding black extremist activities have resulted
in utilization of increasing number of sophisticated tech-
niques. . . . Among highly successful tangible results real-
ized during the past year, as a result of this program, were
the disbandment of a Black Panther Party (BPP) front
group in . . . Mississippi; the transfer of an energetic orga-
nizer and key leader of the . .. BPP chapter to a less
influential post ... ; and the complete disruption of a
planned conference of the violence-prone Republic of New
Africa. . . .57
Following the conference, FBI intelligence officials developed
a Key Black Extremist program for concentrated investigation and
COINTELPRO operations. The program was justified in the
following terms:
The information submitted by the field indicates that there
is a need for intensified coverage. on a group of black extrem-
ists who are either key leaders or activists and are particular-
ly extreme, agitative, anti-Governntnt, and vocal in their
calls for terrorism and violence. Leaders of the violence-
prone Black Panther Party have indicated that the "revolu-
tion" is entering the beginning phases of actual armed strug-
gle and our investigations indicate there are certain ex-
tremists more likely to resort to or to order terrorism as a
tactic and therefore require particular attention. [Emphasis
added.]
FBI officials envisioned that about ninety cases would be involved. 5
All field offices were sent a list of Key Black Extremists (KBEs)
and instructed to "remain alert for additions to the KBE list." The
following measures were to be taken:
(1) All KBEs must be included in Priority I of the
Security Index....
(2) All KBE.s must be included in the Black Nationalist
Photograph Album (BNPA)....
(3) All aspects of the finances of a KBE must be deter-
mined. Bank accounts must be monitored. Safe deposit boxes,
investments, and hidden assets must be located and available
information regarding them must be reported.
(4) Continuing consideration must be given by each office
to develop means to neutralize the effectiveness of each KBE.
Any counterintelligence proposal must be approved by the
Bureau prior to implementation.
m Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 10/27/70.
m Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 10/29/70.
"Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 12/22/70.
(5) Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each KBE
to be placed in the National Security File in the Labora-
tory....
(6) Particular efforts should be made to obtain records of
and/or reliable witnesses to, inflammatory statements made
which may subsequently become subject to criminal
proceedings....
(7) Where there appears to be a possible violation of a
statute within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau,
the ... possible violation [should be] vigorously investigated
in accordance with existing instructions.
(8) Particular attention must be paid to travel by a KBE
and every effort made to determine financial arrangements
for such travel....
(9) The Federal income tax returns of all KBEs must
be checked annually in accordance with existing instructions.
Reports on all KBEs were to be submitted every ninety days, and
the field offices were urged to use "initiative and imagination in order
that the desired results are achieved." 57
K. The 1971 Inspection Reports
The annual inspection of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division
in January 1971 reflected the increasing intensification of FBI do-
mestic surveillance programs. The role of the Inspection Division
was to encourage more aggressive measures. One example involved
the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL), the group as-
sociated with Father Philip Berrigan which allegedly had planned to
kidnap government officials. Inspector E. S. Miller advised the Do-
mestic Intelligence Division:
The field should be appropriately instructed to keep the
Bureau fully advised of all demonstrations, vigils, harass-
ment tactics, etc., conducted by sympathetic groups and fol-
lowers of the ECCSL. Such vigils and demonstrations'should
be afforded sufficient appropriate coverage to develop identi-
ties and backgrounds of leading activists and sponsors of such
sympathetic activities.
Field offices should also be alerted to other retaliatory ac-
tions by sympathetic groups attempting to capitalize on the
"persecution" theory thereby exploiting the recent indict-
ments as a sympathetic rallying point for more conspiratorial
activities.57*
The Inspector also recommended using the facilities of the FBI
Identification Division and the computerized National Crime Infor-
mation Center for intelligence purposes in locating members of the
Venceremos Brigade (VB) who had visited Cuba:
While no evidence has been received that those persons who
travel to Cuba received a-terrilla warfare training in Cuba,
they were constantly told that they were the vanguard of the
Revolution in the United States....
5" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 12/23/70.
us Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/8-26/71, p. 7.
Inasmuch as some of the VB members have indicated they
were going underground and the fact that a majority have
not been located for interview, you should consider placing
name stops in the Identification Division so that if these per-
sons are arrested or an inquiry is made by local law enforce-
ment authorities, this fact will be immediately brought to the
attention of the Bureau. In addition, a stop file is now being
set up by the NCIC Unit for persons other than fugitives
concerning whom the Bureau has an interest... . Every effort
should be made to utilize stops with the Identification Di-
vision and the NCIC Unit on these persons.
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This proposal was implemented shortly thereafter and the field ad-
vised "to submit stop notices for Identification Division and NCIC,
concerning Venceremos Brigade (VB) subjects whose whereabout
are not known. ... 580 Although Inspector Miller criticized to
some extent the Domestic Intelligence Division's shortcomings in the
foreign counterintelligence field, he placed great emphasis on the op-
portunities in the domestic area:
You should bear in mind that the attitude and instructions
expressed by the President, the Director, and many of the leg-
islators in Congress, have been to curtail the militant actions
and violent activities on the part of a significant group of
young people in the United States today. The thinking of the
Supreme Court of the United States with its several recent
changes may be along the lines of suppressing the activities of
those who openly espouse the overthrow of all forms of dem-
ocratic authority in the United States. In addition, the Inter-
nal Security Division of the Department of Justice has been
specifically enlarged and strengthened to deal with these
matters. 581
The details of many of the FBI's most disruptive COINTELPRO
operations were set out in the Inspection Report as significant "accom-
plishments" of the Domestic Intelligence Division.
Among additional measures taken in 1971 were the following, as
summarized in the next Inspection Report prepared in August-
September:
In March, 1971, a coalition of leftist individuals including
subversives and extremists under the sponsorship of the
Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, American
Friends Service Committee, and Fellowship of Reconciliation
traveled to Paris, where they were in contact with the North
Vietnamese and other elements antagonistic to the U.S. We
developed two informants to participate in this travel and as
a result, identified all 170 people in attendance, their activities,
contacts, and objectives. All information developed was af-
forded dissemination to appropriate government agencies and
.. Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/8--26/71, pp. 234-236.
" Memorandum from R. L. Shackelford to C. D. Brennan. 3/9/71.
m Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/8-26/71, p. 239.
we were commended by one intelligence agency for the excel-
lent coverage. 68
Through the Key Activist Program, we have focused in-
vestigative attention on the leaders of the New Left Move-
ment with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appro-
priate statutes, federal or local, wherever possible. This pro-
gram has proved successful in that we have been able to follow
closely the activities of these individuals and furnish inter-
ested agencies and high government officials with information
concerning their subversive and agitational activities. Of par-
ticular note is the fact that more than half of the 73 individ-
uals designated as Key Activitists are subjects of some type
of prosecutive action. 53
Extremist intelligence information gathered through our
informants and investigations makes up a major portion of
the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated
to the White House and other high level government agen-
cies. This document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist
Activities" furnishes the White House and other agencies
with a digest of the extremist problem in the United States.'8'
By airtel to all offices dated 6/15/71 the field was advised
that a new "Stop Index" program had been instituted in the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This program
is for Bureau use only and concerns extremists who are in
Priority I of the Security Index and who are not already car-
ried in the NCIC wanted persons file. Through this program,
the field obtains prompt notice from NCIC by telephone
whenever a police agency makes inquiry concerning one of
these extremists, which enables the field to better follow the
activities and movements of extremists.
By SAC Letter 71-37 (E) dated 8/10/71 captioned "Se-
curity Flash Notices Regarding Security Index Subjects'',
the field was advised of new procedures which enable the
Identification Division to better disseminate arrest informa-
tion on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints
are on file in the Identification Division. This is accomplished
by periodic submission by the field of Security Flash No-
tices . .. which determine if fingerprints of a Security Index
subject have been received since the last check and if so, a
stop is placed in the fingerprint record to assure that the field
is advised of all subsequent fingerprint submissions. The Se-
curity Flash Notice is periodically submitted at different in-
tervals depending on the priority of the subject's Security
Index status. 58
" Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 34.
5 Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 56.
M4 Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71. p. 72.
5Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 104.
New University Conference (NUC)
The NUC, composed of radical professors, graduate stu-
dents, and teachers, is committed to the growth of a revolu-
tionary socialist movement in the U.S., with educational insti-
tutions and professional associations being their main targets.
In Bureau airtel 6/4/71, the attention of Chicago Division,
Office of Origin, was directed to the fact that the NUC
claimed 42 national chapters plus 15 pre-chapter groupings,
with 675 national members, and anticipated further expan-
sion. Chicago Division was instructed to ensure appropriate
leads were set out to confirm the existence of all NUC chap-
ters and to conduct appropriate investigations in accordance
with Bureau instructions relating to investigations of organi-
zations connected with institutions of learning. It was further
instructed these investigations should include information
concerning the leaders and leading activists, aims and objec-
tives and the activities of these chapters.18 6
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)
Letter to all offices dated 8/3/71 instructed each office to
initiate a survey to determine existence of VVAW. This
action was necessary in the light of increasing indication that
the VVAW may be a target for infiltration by subversive
groups such as the Communist Party USA and the Socialist
Workers Party and their respective youth groups. VVAW
has also been involved in aiding and financing U.S. deserters,
including false identity papers and reportedly in one area has
a cache of arms. VVAW has become increasingly active in
the antiwar field and must be considered a prime target for
infiltration.
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Computerized Telephone Number File (CTNF) was ex-
panded on 2/26/71, to include telephone numbers of black,
New Left, and other ethnic extremists. As a result, black ex-
tremist groups, black extremist Security Index subjects, and
individuals included in the Black Nationalist Photograph
Album have been entered into the CTNF. This has proven
to be extremely valuable investigative tool and has saved the
field considerable investigative time in ascertaining subscrib-
ers of telephone numbers since "hits" are made on 15.5% of
numbers checked against the file.5 "
During 1971, Assistant to the Director Sullivan and Assistant
Director Brennan made proposals for major reorganization of the
Domestic Intelligence Division, Sullivan suggested that it be divided
into two separate divisions-one for Domestic Intelligence (including
a New Left Section, an Extremist Intelligence Section, and an In-
ternal Security Section) and the other for Counterespionage-Foreign
Intelligence. In addition, Brennan proposed that supervision of spe-
Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division 8/17-9/9/71. p. 107.
' Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 111.
Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 127.
cific antiriot and bombing criminal investigations be transferred from
the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion. These recommendations were examined in the second 1971 In-
spection Report.
Regarding the proposal for two separate divisions, Assistant Direc-
tor Brennan stated that the advantage of having "smaller divisions
thus allowing for tighter and more effective supervision" was out-
weighed by the disadvantages:
(a) The nature of the work of DID does not readily lend
itself to division. The interrelationship of foreign influence in
domestic subversion cases is well established and requires close
coordination within the Division. . . . Our goal should be to
obtain maximum utilization of the knowledge and expertise of
supervisory personnel, and division of DID would obviously
result in diffusion of related talents....
(b) Budgetary considerations and administrative efficiency
would be affected by imposing an additional Divisional su-
perstructure....
Brennan noted that when Sullivan had originally made the proposal
in a memorandum to Associate Director Tolson in June 1971, Director
Hoover had noted, "I do not approve. We do not have any provision
for another Assistant Director and all hearings before Budget Bureau
and Congress have been concluded for Fiscal Year 1972." *5
Assistant Director Brennan's proposal for shifting bombing cases
was not a new one. In 1968, the Inspection Division had conducted a
study of the desirability of transferring antiriot and bombing inves-
tigations from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic In-
telligence Division. The two divisions had jointly proposed the shift
because the specific criminal investigations in these areas were "so
interrelated with the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security
fields that overlap constantly occurs." The Inspection Division had
endorsed the transfer:
The logic of the proposed reassignments, appears unassail-
able. In both categories of cases the principle involved is the
same, namely, that individual violations of applicable stat-
utes arising from the activities of subversive organizations or
groups should be supervised within the same division (DID)
that has the basic and continuing responsibility for supervi-
sion of the overall investigations of these organizations and
groups as well as of the members thereof and the development
of informants within the groups. The obvious benefit . . . is
the avoidance of duplication of supervisory reviews of these
interrelated matters and the ready identification of individ-
uals who may be involved in a specific violation with persons
already under investigation from an intelligence standpoint.
Informants who may be utilized in specific violations or who
are developed in the course of investigation of such violations
must of necessity be closely correlated with the supervision of
these informant programs which now rests with DID. . . .n5o
Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, pp. 216-223.
5-Memorandum from W. M. Felt to Mr. Tolson, Re: Proposed Transfer of
Supervisory Responsibility, 8/30/68.
Despite this general agreement among middle-level FBI executives,
the 1968 recommendation was not implemented. Associate Director
Tolson and Director Hoover were "opposed to this proposed transfer
of duties." One consideration which weighed against the shift was that
the Justice Department divided supervision of these criminal cases:
"antiriot cases are handled in the Criminal Division of the Depart-
ment, racial bombings in the Civil Rights Division and nationalist
bombings in the Internal Security Division." 5
By 1971 the Justice Department had consolidated these responsi-
bilities. Assistant Director Brennan pointed out that the Department
had "moved to invest the Internal Security Division with the overall
responsibility of prosecuting terrorist activities regarding above-men-
tioned matters." Consequently, he contended that "similar reorgamiza-
tion" within the FBI would "enhance more effective supervision."
Assistant Director Rosen of the General Investigative Division
agreed:
As a practical matter substantially all antiriot laws investiga-
tions involve extremists and political terrorists. With regard
to bombings, substantially all investigations deal at the outset
with unknown subjects and it would be most impractical to
attempt to delineate between bombings which do or do not in-
volve terrorists. Since the act of bombing is in itself an act
of terror it is logical to assume at the outset that terrorists are
involved and the types of bombings delegated to the FBI by
the Department's guidelines are limited to those targets most
likely to be selected by political terrorists. (These targets per-
tain to Government property or functions, federally funded
projects, diplomatic establishments, colleges and universities,
and those probably perpetrated by terrorists.) 59 2
The joint recommendation of Assistant Directors Brennan and Rosen
was carried out later in 1971, and the unit in the General Investigative
Division which supervised bombing investigations was transferred to
the Domestic Intelligence Division.
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L. The "New" Internal Security Division and Turmoil in the FBI,
1971.
In late 1970, the Justice Department's Intelligence Evaluation
Committee was secretly reconstituted as a permanent body including
officials from the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Secu-
rity Agency. This reorganization implemented one feature of the
"Huston Plan," and the new IEC assumed broader functions in
preparing regular domestic intelligence evaluations for the White
House.594 The creation of a new IEC was one of several measures
taken in late 1970 and early 1971 by Assistant Attorney General Robert
Mardian, who replaced J. Walter Yeagley as head of the Internal
m Memorandum from W. M. Felt to Mr. Tolson, 9/4/68.
Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, pp. 224-238.
m Assistant Director Rosen's reference to Justice Department guidelines per-
tained to an agreement between the Justice Department and the Bureau of Alco-
hol. Tobacco, and Firearms of the Treasury Department defining their respec-
tive jurisdictions under the antibombing legislation enacted in 1970.
"' See Report on the Huston Plan.
Security Division. Under Mardian the Internal Security Division took
over from the Criminal Division the supervision of prosecutions in
cases of extremist violence and Selective Service violations.
One of Assistant Attorney General Mardian's most significant ac-
tions in 1971, from the viewpoint of domestic intelligence, was the
preparation of a new Executive Order on federal employee security.
Its first purpose was to update the standards for evaluating the "sub-
versive activity" of potential Federal employees. In addition, the
order was designed to reinvigorate the Subversive Activities Control
Board, which had been created by the Internal Security Act of 1950
to register Communist organizations and their members.59 5 The Su-
preme Court had declared the provision for registration of individuals
unconstitutional as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in 1965.596 According to Assistant Attorney General Mardian,
there was a "problem resulting from the fact that the Attorney Gen-
eral's list has not been updated for 17 years-a failure which required
Federal agencies to individually evaluate information regarding
membership in allegedly subversive organizations based on raw data
furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other govern-
mental sources." Mardian expected that the SACB would be able to
"deal specifically with the revolutionary/terrorist organizations which
have recently become a part of our history." 59
FBI intelligence investigations of organizations were based in
part on the standards for the "Attorney General's list" under
Executive Order 10450, issued by President Eisenhower in 1953. Con-
sequently, the new Executive Order 11605 issued by President Nixon
in 1971, amending Executive Order 10450, substantially redefined FBI
authority. The basic definitions of "subversive" organizations in the
two orders compare as follows: .
Executive Order 10450 (1953)
. . . totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or having
adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under
the Constitution of the United States, or seeking to alter
the form of government of the United States by unconstitu-
tional means.
Executive Order 11605 (1071)
. . . totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or which
has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State,
or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United
States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful
means. [Emphasis added.]
m The new order assigned to the Subversive Activities Control Board the func-
tion of designating organizations for what had been the "Attorney General's list,"
to be used in evaluating applicants for Federal employment.
'Albert&on v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
' Robert C. Mardian, Address before the Atomic Energy Commission Security
Conference, Washington, D.C., 10/27/71.
The 1971 order was more restrictive in its requirement of "unlawful"
advocacy, but it was far broader in extending to state and local mat-
ters. The breadth of the order is shown in its more detailed standards
for designation of an organization by the SACB. A group could be
put on the "SACB list" if it:
engages in, unlawfully advocates, or adopts as a means of
obtaining any of its purposes or objectives-
(1) The commission of acts of force or violence or other
unlawful acts to deny others their rights or benefits guar-
anteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
the several States or political subdivisions thereof ; or
(2) The unlawful damage or destruction of property; or
injury to persons; or
(3) The overthrow or destruction of the government of
the United States or the government of any State, Territory,
district, or possession thereof, or the government of any
political subdivision therein, by unlawful means; or
(4) The commission of acts which violate laws pertain-
ing to treason, rebellion, or insurrection, riots or civil dis-
orders, seditious conspiracy, sabotage, trading with the enemy,
obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service of the
United States, impeding officers of the United States, or
related crimes or offenses.5 8
Testifying before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, Assist-
ant Attorney General Mardian linked the new order directly with
FBI investigations: "We have a new brand of radical in this country
and we are trying to address ourselves to the new situation. With
the investigative effort of the FBI we hope to present. petitions to
the Board in accordance with requirements of the Executive Order." "
FBI intelligence officials anticipated that the Executive Order
would have a substantial impact on their operations, as indicated in
the Inspection Report:
The implementation of Executive Order 11605 will affect
primarily the work of the New Left Section, Extremist In-
telligence Section and Internal Security Section. ...
So far, the Department has indicated that it intends to
initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party. Pro-
gressive Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance, and Ku Klux
Klan; however, we have not as yet had any specific require-
ments levied upon by the Department in these cases. Based
on past experience, it can be anticipated the services of one
su'pervisor, full time, will be required to prepare each of these
cases for presentation to the SACB.
The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and
generally coincides with the basis for our investigation of
extremist groups. Conceivably, consistent with manpower
available, proceedings could be initiated on most of the or-
.S Executive Order 11605, 7/2/71.
"Hearings on the Appropriation for the Department of Justice before the
House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 673 (1972).
ganizations we have under investigation although the Depart-
ment has not indicated at this time that they will undertake
any wholesale action.600
From the outset the Executive Order was the subject of serious criti-
cism in the United States Senate, primarily on the ground that the
President did not have the power to assign this new function to a
Board created by statute to perform different duties. Congress ulti-
mately refused to appropriate funds for, the implementation of the
order. Nevertheless, the order's provision broadening the definition
of "subversive"' groups still remained in effect as the standard for
evaluating prospective federal employees and for FBI investigations
conducted for the federal employee security program.
Hearings on Army surveillance before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights in the spring of 1971, and the furor over the
SACB order, marked the beginning of a change in the climate of opin-
ion regarding domestic intelligence. In this environment Director
Hoover and his top associates expressed growing concern over the close
relationship established by Assistant to the Director William C. Sulli-
van and other FBI intelligence officials with Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Mardian in the Justice Department.
A memorandum of an Executives Conference meeting in June
1971 exemplifies the increasing tensions within the FBI. Director
Hoover's "instructions relative to being very careful in our dealings
with Assistant Attorney General Mardian" were pointed out. -It was
made clear that Assistant Director Dwight Dalbey of the Office of
Legal Counsel was to attend "at ahy time officials of the Department
are being contacted on any policy consideration which affects the Bu-
reau." It was specifically noted "that this was not ddne in connection
with a recent conference held between Supervisors of the Domestic In-
telligence Division and,Deputy Assistant. Attorney General A. Wil-
liam Olsen of the Internal Security Division of the-Department at
which time discussion ensued as to proposed changes in procedure
requesting Attorney General authority for electronic surveillance." 601
The conflicts-within the FBI that had been muted at the time of the
"Huston Plan" in 1970 were now coming into the open.
One of the issues which triggered the break between Director
Hoover and Assistant to the Director Sullivan had little to do with
domestic intelligence. Instead, it involved an expansion of the number
of FBI Legal Attache offices abroad. The details of the controversy
need not be reviewed here. What is most significant is that five days
after. the Executives Conference meeting described above, Sul-
livan began expressing strong opposition to the program for ex-
panding Legal Attache offices. 6 02 Director Hoover solicited the views
6: Inspection Report; Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71.
o Executives Conference Memorandum, 6/2/71. The first Assistant Director
for the Office of Legal Counsel was Dwight Dalbey, who had for years been in
charge of the legal training of Bureau agents. Dalbey's elevation early in 1971,
and Hoover's requirement that he review all legal aspects of FBI policy, including
intelligence matters, were major changes in Bureau procedure. (Memorandum
from Hoover to all Bureau Officials and Supervisors, 3/8/71.)
Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson. Re: Estimated Cost of
Proposed Expansion of Foreign Liaison, June 7, 1971.
69-984 0 - 76 - 35
of other FBI officials, who supported the expansion. Sullivan then
replied most forcefully, making the following statements among
others:
I have read the comments of the above-named men. It
was somewhat more than mildly distressing and sadden-
ing to me to observe the lack of objectivity, originality, and
independent thinking in their remarks. The uniformity and
monolithic character of their thinking constitutes its own
rebuttal. While I am certain it was not the intention of these
important Bureau officials, who occupy unique roles, to create
the impression in the reader's mind that they said what they
did because they thought this was what the Director wanted
them to say, nevertheless it seems to me this is the impression
conveyed.
... [T]he evidence points to the fact that, because of
racial conflict, student and academic revolution, and possible
increase in unemployment, this country is heading into ever
more troubled waters, and the Bureau had better be fully pre-
pared to cope with the difficulties which lie ahead. This can-
not be done if we spread ourselves too thin and finance opera-
tions which do not give us proper returns for the dollars
spent. . . .
Lastly, I am not unmindful of the fact that the Director
pointed out that we could get along quite well without an
expensive domestic liaison section and, therefore, he dis-
solved it. Applying the Director's reasoning foreign liaison,
I think certainly the conclusion is valid that we can at least
reduce it, with benefits to the Bureau.603
The final passage had reference to Director Hoover's decisions in 1970,
first, to abolish the position of FBI liaison officer with the CIA,
and then to eliminate the entire FBI Liaison Section dealing with
other federal agencies.60
Upon reviewing Sullivan's second memorandum, one high FBI
official advised Director Hoover that it apoeared "more definite to
me that he is more on the side of CIA, State Department and Military
Intelligence Agencies, than the FBI." This official added. "There has
to be something wrong for him to do such an abrupt about face at this
time, after agreeing with what we have done in the past and now
being unalterably opposed to any further expansion.. .. "
Within less than a month, Director Hoover had appointed W. Mark
Felt, formerly Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division,
to a newly created position as Sullivan's superior. During this period,
Sullivan gave Assistant Attorney General Mardian the FBI's
documents recording the authorization for and dissemination of infor-
mation from certain wiretaps placed on executive officials and journal-
ists during 1969-1971. The absence of these materials was not dis-
" Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to the Director. Re: FBI Foreign Liaison
Program, 6/16/71.
' See report on the Huston Plan.
"R. R. Beaver, Memorandum for the Director's Personal Files, Re: W. C.
Sullivan, 6/18/71.
covered by other FBI officials until after Sullivan was forced to
resign in September 1971.606
Additional friction within the FBI developed in mid-1971 during
the investigation of the "Pentagon Papers" matter and Daniel
Ellsberg.
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan of the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion considered the "Pentagon Papers" case a matter of overriding
importance, especially in view of the White House interest. Brennan's
views were summarized in anInspection Report:
... [H]e commented upon the fact that the Ellsberg case
might be a landmark in historical significance in view of the
long range potential regarding governmental operations and
the FBI's role in relation thereto. He stated that the leak
in this case represented a deliberate and determined effort on
the part of certain individuals to seriously disrupt and de-
stroy the government's capacity to carry out effectively its
foreign policy in various areas. Mr. Brennan noted that the
past 15 to 20 years had witnessed the evolution of a new breed
of fanatics who were determined to disrupt and destroy.
governmental operations and to alter this country's foreign
policy. He further noted that the movement supported by
these fanatics bordered on treason which must be dealt with
if our current form of government is to survive.
In early July 1971 Director Hoover advised his subordinates that
Presidential assistant H. R. Haldeman had called about the Ellsberg
case 'and said that the President wanted regular reports. A month
later, Assistant Director Brennan and other officials met with White
House aide Gordon Liddy, who was "coordinating all White House
interest in this matter." Liddy explained that the White House wanted
the case handled as a "Bureau special". Although the FBI devoted
substantial resources to the investigation, there was resistance to at-
tempts by Assistant Attorney General Mardian and the Internal Se-
curity Division to direct the details of the FBI's inquiry.60'
Moreover, Assistant Director Brennan was removed from his posi-
tion in the course of the investigation. His replacement as Assistant
Director for the Domestic Inteligence Division was Inspector E. S.
Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 5/13/73; FBI Summary of
Interview with Robert Mardian, 5/10/73. William C. Sullivan stated that he
"turned over the material, following a discussion in depth with Mr. Mardian
relative to security and possible abuses of the material." (Memorandum from
V. C. Sullivan to Acting FBI Director Ruckelshaus, 5/11/73.) Robert Mardian
recalled that Sullivan told him Director Hoover "might use these tapes for the
purpose of preserving his position as Director of the FBI." (Mardian testimony,
Senate Watergate Hearings, 7/20/73, p. 2393.)
Former Attorney General John Mitchell recalled that Mardian had indicated
to him "that Sullivan was furious over the way he was being treated by the
Director and that for this reason he disclosed the information concerning the
wiretaps to Mardian." Mitchell also said that Director Hoover had "advised him
of the problems he was having with Sullivan," and Mitchell recalled "telling
Mr. Hoover that he had no choice but to get rid of Mr. Sullivan." (FBI inter-
view with John Mitchell, 5/12/73.)
*' Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, pp. 4-10.
Miller, who had conducted two inspections of the Division during
1971.607.
M. The "Administrative Index"
In the fall of 1971 the FBI confronted the prospect of the first seri-
ous Congressional action which might curtail domestic intelligence
operations-repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950. The In-
spection Report completed in September 1971 viewed the possibility
of repeal without great alarm:
Legislation has been introduced in the 92d Congress to
repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. In the event Title II should
be repealed at a future date under new legislation, the Govern-
ment's inherent right to protect itself internally will continue
to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsibil-
ity for protecting the Nation's internal security. 08 [Emphasis
added.]
Congress passed the repeal measure shortly thereafter. FBI intelli-
gence officials began at once to consider the impact on the Security
Index program. They believed the Security Index should still be main-
tained "since the potential dangerousness of subversives is probably
even greater now than before the repeal of the Act, since they no doubt
feel safer now to conspire in the destruction of this country." However,
they also saw a need to consult the Justice Department "to determine
if there is any manner in which the essence of the Security Index and
emergency detention of dangerous individuals could be utilized under
Presidential powers." 609
The argument for keeping the Security Index in the event of an
emergency was elaborated further:
Those listed now or included under existing criteria in the
future will continue to represent a potential danger to the na-
tional defense. Should this country come under attack from
hostile forces, foreign or domestic, there is nothing to preclude
the President from going before a joint session of Congress
and requesting necessary authority to apprehend and detain
those who would constitute a menace to national defense. At
this point it would be absolutely essential to have an immedi-
ate list, such as the SI, for use in making such apprehensions.
The SI, backed by our investigative files, would provide docu-
mentation of subversive backgrounds during any hearings
which might be required following apprehensions.
607' According to former FBI executive W. Mark Felt, Brennan was replaced as
a matter "of policy." The purpose was "to put someone else into that spot who
was not a protege of Sullivan," as a means of "controlling the Domestic Intel-
ligence Division." It was Felt's "understanding" that Director Hoover "felt
that Sullivan was out of hand."
Brennan was also disciplined for one aspect of his handling of the "Pentagon
Papers" investigation. According to Mark Felt, "Mr. Hoover was convinced that
Mr. Brennan deliberately disregarded his instructions" not to interview Louis
Marx, father-in-law of Daniel Ellsberg. Felt thought Brennan "got a bum rap"
and that "it was an honest error." (Felt, 2/3/76, pp. 67-71.)
" Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 98.
" Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, Re: Emergency Detention
Act, 9/17/71.
The Security Index also served useful purposes in connection with the
FBI's day-to-day intelligence operations:
The SI constitutes an extremely valuable list of subversives
and malcontents who constantly pose a threat to the safety of
the President. Secret Service is provided a constant flow of
data concerning current whereabouts and backgrounds of
individuals on the SI. In addition, the SI would immediately
pinpoint for our own use the identities of subversives who
would require intensified investigative attention to provide
evidence of espionage, sabotage, or the like. . . .
Quarterly we have furnished Passport Office of State
Department a list of those on Priority I (the most potentially
dangerous) so that we can be advised of travel abroad by these
subjects. The list is not identified in any way as SI and since
itis beneficial to us, it is believed we should continue to send it.
Repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was not thought to
affect the basis for FBI investigative authority:
Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which relates
to Subversive Activities Control Board, strengthened by
Executive Order 11605 dated 7/2/71, provides investigative
authority as do Smith Act of 1940, Communist Control Act
of 1954, Fraud Against the Government, Rebellion and Insur-
rection, Sedition and Seditious Conspiracy, among others.
However, FBI intelligence officials believed that the Bureau's "Office
of Legal Counsel should examine this more critically from a legal
standpoint." e6o Assistant Director D. J. Dalbey, head of the Office of
Legal Counsel, agreed that the repeal did not affect the FBI's "basic
investigative authority :"
Our basic investigative authority for this type of case is in
the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, which still
remains in effect, with updatings. In addition to that there is
a host of criminal statutes which are particularly applicable
to the type of action-oriented subversives with Whom -we now
deal. Principal subversives now carry guns, rob banks to get
money, steal arms and ammunition, commit arson, set off
bombs, incite riots, and do many other things which violate
one or more criminal statutes over which this Bureau has
investigative jurisdiction. From a combination of those stat-
utes, plus the original Presidential directive on internal secu-
rity, we have wide investigative authority.
Assistant Director Dalbey also endorsed the position of FBI intelli-
gence officials regarding the Security Index:
. . . [E]limination of the Emergency Detention Act does
not prevent this Bureau from carrying in its files an assess-
ment of each principal subversive which would be sufficient to
mark him for Government attention should a need arise in a
national emergency.
o'0 Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, Re: Emergency Detention
Act, 9/21/71.
Bearing in mind that the Emergency Detention Act could
as easily be put back in force should an emergency convince
Congress of its need, this Bureau would then be expected to
have on hand the necessary action information pertaining to
individuals.
Nevertheless, the FBI's Legal Counsel strongly urged that "a letter
should be written to the Attorney General in which this Bureau asks
for a reassessment of our investigative and record-keeping authority
concerning subversive matters." This would "protect" the FBI in case
"some spokesman of the extreme left" claimed that repeal of the Deten-
tion Act did, in fact, eliminate the Bureau's investigative authority.611
FBI intelligence officials became increasingly concerned about pos-
sible "charges by the Bureau's critics that we are evading the will of
Congress." They believed it was necessary to "get some written author-
ity from the Attorney General, not only to keep records which, in effect,
represent a workable substitute for the Security Index, but also serves
as a mandate for our continued investigation of subversive activity and
related matters." 612
Thereupon, a letter was sent to Attorney General Mitchell soliciting
his views "concerning FBI authority to continue investigations of sub-
versive activity covered, in part, by this [Emergency Detention] Act."
The letter cited as bases for continuing FBI authority the Smith Act,
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, the Communist Control
Act of 1954, statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, rebellion and
insurrection, sedition, and seditious conspiracy, as well as "certain
Presidential Directives." The line of Presidential directives from
!President Roosevelt's order of June 26, 1939, through President
Eisenhower's statement of December 15, 1953, was reviewed. The FBI
Director's letter concluded:
I strongly feel that irrespective of the repeal of the Emer-
gency Detention Act, the Federal Government must take
whatever steps are necessary, within the law, to protect itself
from all hostile forces bent on its destruction. We, therefore,
feel that it is absolutely incumbent upon the FBI to continue
investigations of those who pose a threat to the internal secu-
rity of the country and to maintain an administrative index
of such individuals as an essential part of our investigative
responsibility. Such an index not only enables the FBI to
pinpoint individuals who have exhibited a propensity to con-
duct acts inimical to national security, but also serves as an
extremely valuable list of individuals who pose a continuing
threat to the safety of the President and thereby enables us to
provide current data to U. S. Secret Service concerning back-
grounds and whereabouts of such individuals.6 1 3 [Emphasis
added.]
mMemorandum from D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, Re: Emergency Detention
Act Repeal, 9/24/71.
" Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, Re: Emergency Detention
Act Repeal, 9/29/71.
' Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, Re: Emer-
gency Detention Program, 9/30/71.
The FBI made no mention of the Agitator Index, which had been
abolished earlier in 1971 because "extremist subjects" were now "ade-
quately followed" through the Security Index.614
There was also no allusion to the theory advanced within the FBI
that the new "administrative index" could serve as the basis for a
revived Detention Program in some future emergency.
The Attorney General replied that the FBI's authority to investigate
"subversive activities" on the bases cited by the Bureau was "unaffected
by the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act." With respect to the
Security Index, the Attorney General advised:
. .. [T]he repeal of the aforementioned Act does not alter
or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file
and index information secured pursuant to its statutory. and
Presidential authority. An FBI administrative index com-
piled and maintained to assist the Bureau in making readily
retrievable and available the results of its investigations into
subversive activities and related matters is not prohibited by
repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.
While the Department does not desire a copy of any lists
that you may compile on the basis of such records or indices,
the Internal Security Division should be furnished a monthly
memorandum reflecting the identity of government employees
who by significant acts or membership in subversive organiza-
tions, have demonstrated a propensity to commit acts inimical
to our national security.
The Justice Department was studying what to do with the "Attorney
General's portfolio"-the secret plans for emergency detention.615
Several months later the FBI was instructed to destroy the materials
prepared for the 'Attorney General's- portfolio." 616
Upon receipt of the Attorney General's memorandum, the FBI
reconstituted the Security Index as an Administrative Index
(ADEX) with revised standards. FBI intelligence officials explained
that, since the Justice Department would no longer review the names
on the list, the FBI was "now in a position to make a sole determina-
tion as to which individuals should be included in an index of sub-
versive individuals. Previously, the Justice Department had "fre-
quently removed individuals who in the strictest legal interpretation
should not be considered for arrest and detention." Under the new
procedure the FBI could make its own "determination based not on
arrest and detention but rather on overall potential for committing
acts inimical to the national defense interest." This meant restructur-
ing the Index so that it no longer stressed "membership in or affiliation
with old line revolutionary organizations," such as the Communist
Party. Instead, it would concentrate on the "new breed of subversive
individual":
6" Memorandum from G. C. Moore' to C. D. Brennan, Re: Agitator Indeax,
4/21/71; SAC Letter No. 71-17, 4/27/71.
'" Memorandum from Attorney General John N. Mitchell to the FBI Director,
Re: Emergency Detention Program, 10/22/71.
o" Memorandum from Assistant General Robert C. Mardian to the FBI Direc-
tor, Re: Emergency Detention Program, 2/9/72.
He may adhere to old-line revolutionary concepts but he is
unaffiliated with any organization. He may belong to or fol-
low one New Left-type group today and another tomorrow.
He may simply belong to the loosely knit group of revolution-
aries who have no particular political philosophy but who
continuously plot the overthrow of our Government. He is
the nihilist who seeks only to destroy America.
On the other hand, he may be one of the revolutionary
black extremists who, while perhaps influenced by groups
such as the Black Panther Party, he is 'also unaffiliated either
permanently or temporarily with any black organization but
with a seething hatred of the white establishment will as-
sassinate, explode, or otherwise destroy white America.
The previous Reserve Index, which had never been disclosed to the
Justice Department, would now be incorporated into Category IV of
the new ADEX. It included "teachers, writers, lawyers, etc." who did
not actively participate in subversive activity "but who were neverthe-
less influential in espousing their respective philosophies." It was esti-
mated that the total case load increase under the ADEX would be "in
excess of 23,000 cases the first year," including 17-18,000 individuals
who "are either now being investigated or who have been investigated
in the past." 617
The following standards for placing subjects of "security investi-
gations" on the ADEX were sent out to the field offices:
Category I
(1) All national leaders of revolutionary organizations
whose aims and purposes include the overthrow and destruc-
tion of the Government by force and violence or other un-
constitutional means, and individuals affiliated therewith who
have demonstrated propensity for violence against the per-
son rather than property or have received special training in
sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare or have engaged in
underground-type operations.
(2) Revolutionaries, though unaffiliated with any specific
organization, who have demonstrated by acts or statements a
propensity for violence, including acts of terrorism, assassi-
nation, or any interference with or threat to the survival and
effective operation of national, state, or local Governments
and of the defense efforts.
(3) National leaders of black extremist separatist
organizations.
(4) Any individual who Qualifies for the ADEX should be
included in Category I if he is employed in or has access to
a key facility.
Category II
(1) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and black ex-
tremist separatist organizations. Secondary leadership would
comprise, for example, regional, state, and local leaders who
are involved in policy making in fulfilling anti-U.S. objec-
"' Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, Re: Security Investigations
of Individual8, 11/11/71.
tives of their respective revolutionary organizations and
whose activities do not justify their inclusion in Category I.
(2) Active participants in furthering the aims and pur-
poses of the revolutionary or black extremist separatist orga-
nization with which affiliated.
(3) Other unaffiliated revolutionaries who have demon-
strated by acts or statements a propensity for violence against
property rather than persons.
Category III
(1) Rank-and-file membership in, or participation in ac-
tivities of, revolutionary organizations within the last five
years as evidenced by overt acts or statements established
through-reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
(2) Leadership or activist position in affiliated fronts of
revolutionary organizations within the last three years as
shown by overt acts or statements established through re-
liable sources, informants, or individuals.
(3) An individual who, although not a member of or par-
ticipant in activities of revolutionary organizations or con-
sidered an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revo-
lutionary ideology and'is likely to 8eize upon the opportunity
pre8ented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage
or.sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any
interference with or threat to the survival and effective opera-
tion of national, state, and local Governments and of the
defense efforts. [Emphasis added.]
Category IV
(1) Individuals whose activities do not meet criteria of
Categories I, II, or III but who are in a position to influence
others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or
are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revo-
lutionary elements because of their sympathy, as8ociations,
or ideology. [Emphasis added.]
Field offices were 'also instructed to review 'the cases of persons on
the Reserve Index and, "where .appropriate",, recommend them for
inclusion in the ADEX.618
The assumption that the ADEX could be used as the basis for de-
tention or other action in an emergency was made clear in the stand-
ards for Category III (3). However, when these criteria were sup-
plied to the Justice Department in 1972, the Attorney General did
not question the fact that the ADEX was more than just an admin-
istrative aid for conducting current investigations.619
One Bureau memorandum indicates that "representatives of the
Department" in fact agreed with the view that there might be
"circumstances" where it would be necessary "to quickly identify
persons who were a threat to the national security" and that the
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarterg to all SAC's, Re: Sourity Inves-
tigations of Individuals, 11/15/71.
' Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, Re: Security
Investigation8 of Individual8, 2/10/72.
President could then go to Congress "for emergency legislation per-
mitting apprehension and detention." 620
Thus, although the Attorney General did not formally authorize
the ADEX as a continuation of the previous detention list, there
was informal Departmental knowledge that the FBI would proceed
on that basis. On6 FBI official later recognized that the ADEX
could be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emer-
gency Detention Act." 621
N. Curtailment of FBI Domestic Intelligence
In 1971, the first serious congressional inquiry into domestic in-
telligence policy influenced the Army to curtail its extensive sur-
veillance of civilian political activity and led, after Director Hoover's
death in 1972, to serious reconsideration by the FBI of the legal
basis for its domestic intelligence activities and eventually to a re-
quest for clarification of its authority by the Attorney General.
In February 1971, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Committee began a series of hearings on federal
data banks and the Bill of Rights which marked a crucial turning
point in the development of domestic intelligence policy. The Sub-
committee, chaired by Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina, re-
flected growing concern among Americans for the protection of "the
privacy of the individual against the 'information power' of govern-
ment." 622 Senator Ervin declared that a major objective of the inquiry
was to look into "programs for taking official note of law-abiding
people who are active politically or who participate in community
activities on social and political issues." The problem, as Senator
Ervin saw it, was that there were citizens who felt "intimidated" by
these programs and were "fearful about exercising their rights under
the First Amendment to sign petitions, or to speak and write freely
on current issues of Government policy." The ranking minority mem-
bers of the Subcommittee, Senator Roman Hruska, endorsed the need
for a "penetrating and searching" inquiry.623
Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian testified before the
Constitutional Rights Subcommittee in March 1971. He declared that
the Justice Department's IDIU did not itself collect intelligence, but
rather it relied upon information from "public sources" and from the
FBI. Under questioning, Mardian admitted that neither the Depart-
ment nor the Bureau had "any specific published regulation or guide-
line" for the collection of intelligence about civil disturbances.624
When this statement appeared in the press, Director Hoover asked,
"What about this'?" 625 In response, FBI officials prepared a summary
of the relevant Bureau Manual provisions and submitted it to the Di-
rector as the FBI's "Guidelines." 626
Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/29/72.
en Domestic Intelligence Division, Position Paper: Scope of Authority, Juris-
diction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations, 7/31/72.
Federal Data Banks, 1971 Hearings, p. 1.
Federal Data Banks, 1971 Hearings, pp. 4, 7.
* Federal Data Banks, 1971 Hearings, p. 873.
m Note on news article attached to memorandum from R. D. Cotter to C. D.
Brennan, 3/18/71. Hoover also noted on a column In the Washington Post by
Alan Barth, "We must get together at once all out guidelines." Routing slip,
3/25/71.
"m Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to C. D. Brennan, 3/25/71.
There is no indication that the "guidelines" material or the FBI
Manual provisions themselves were submitted to, or requested by, the
Justice Department in 1971.627 Indeed, when Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Richard Kleindienst testified in February 1972 at the hearings on
his nomination to be Attorney General,.he stated that he was "not
sure" what guidelines were used by the FBI. Kleindieist also stated
that he believed FBI investigations were "restricted to criminal con-
duct or the likelihood of criminal conduct." - Director, Hoover
noted on a newspaper report of the testimony, "Prepare succinct memo
to him on our guidelines.' 629
The FBI's summary of its "guidelines," submitted to the Acting
Attorney General, in.1972, stated that the Bureau investigated "any
individual" who is "affiliated with or adheres to the. principles of"
an organization "which has as an objective" the violent overthrow
of the government or- "other criminal activity detritiental to' the
National defense." 630 The Bureau also made clear that the purpose of
these'investigations was not just to "obtain evidence for prosecution,"
but also
to obtain intelligence data in order to have day-to-day ap-
praisal of strength, dangerousness, and activities of the
organization; and to keep the Department of Justice and
other affected Government agencies advised.
These investigations were partly based on criminal statutes, although
the Bureau admitted that "subversive activity . . . often does not
clearly involve a specific section of a specific statute." They were also
based on the 1939 Roosevelt directives which were said to have been
"reiterated and broadened by subsequent Directives." 631 [Emphasis
added.]
Shortly thereafter (and only two days before Director Hoover's
death), the Bureau advised Kleindienst that it was abandoning the
use of the term "New Left" and substituting "Revolutionary Activi-
ties" so as to more accurately "depict" the "militant, violence-prone
revolutionaries with whom we -are concerned in our current
investigations." 62
After Director Hoover's death in May 1972, FBI intelligence officials
prepared a "position paper" for Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, in
' After repeal of the Emergency Detention Act in the fall of 1971, the FBI's
Assistant Director for Legal Counsel recommended that the Bureau's request for
approval of its new ADEX also include a more general request for reaffirmation
of FBI domestic intelligence authority to investigate "subversive activity."
(Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, 9/24/71) The letter to the
Attorney General reviewed the line of "Presidential directives" from 1939 to
1953. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71) The Attorney General
replied with a general endorsement of FBI authority to investigate "subversive
activities." (Memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover, 10/22/71)
" Richard Kleindienst testimony, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. 2/24/72, p. 64.
* FBI routing slip attached to Washington Post article, 2/24/72.
The summary also stated that "affiliation" with "basic revolutionary front
groups" was not a "prerequisite" for investigation, since "other individuals with
anarchistic, revolutionary or extremist beliefs" were also investigated. (Attach-
ment to Memorandum from Hoover to Kleindienst, 2/25/72.)
m' Memorandum from Hoover to Kleindienst. 2/25/72 (attachment).
Memorandum from the FBI Director to Acting Attorney General Kleindienst,
4/28/72.
response to his request for a review of Bureau "authority" for investi-
gations "where there is no direct violation of law." This paper merely
recited the various Presidential directives, Executive Orders, delimita-
tions agreements, and general authorizations from the Attorney Gen-
eral, with no attempt at analysis. The need for "intelligence collection"
to assure "proper vigilance" was introduced in the following terms:
It is clear that the aspiratiois of most revolutionary groups
far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate objectives.
They are, however, quite capable of eroding the integrity of
the democratic system by lesser acts and, if not discouraged
or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for
more decisive action. The dramatic success of the Castro rev-
olution is a sufficient example. 633
At the same time, the FBI Office of Legal Counsel began its own re-
view of the constitutional issues; and one memorandum, anticipating
the likelihood of further "congressional intervention," recommended
the development of "tight internal controls and carefully developed
guidelines." 634
There was a sharp split within the Domestic Intelligence Division
over whether or not the Bureau should continue to rely on the various
executive orders as a basis for its authority. One official concluded that
the FBI had "overstated our authority supposedly derived from Presi-
dential directives," and that the Attorney General should be called
upon "to provide legal guidance and advice as to just how much
authority we have or need." Other intelligence officials believed that
FBI policies might be "undermined" if it attempted to rely solely on
"statutory authority." 635 Nevertheless, a new Division position paper
concluded that domestic intelligence investigations could practicably
be based on the "concept" that their purpose was "to prevent a viola-
tion of a statute." The paper also indicated that the ADEX would
be revised so that it could not be "interpreted as a means to circum-
vent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act." 636
One of the arguments for not relying on the authority of the Presi-
dential orders was the risk of abuse of the FBI by the White House:
Over the years it became common practice for White House
staff members to telephone requests for information or inves-
tigations to Mr. Hoover's office or the office of one of his
officials. Such requests were usually considered as being
within the constitutional Executive power, and for the most
part such requests were completely legitimate and well
within the recognized scope of the FBI investigative
authority.
Occasionally, however, requests were made-and complied
with-which in retrospect appear to have been beyond any
'FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, Position Paper: Investigations of Sub-
version, 5/19/72. Assistant Director E. S. Miller, head of the Domestic Intelligence
Division, withdrew this paper at a conference with Gray and other top Bureau
officials; Miller then initiated work on a more extensive position paper, which
was completed in July. (T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/1/72)
Memorandum from J. B. Hotis to D. J. Dalbey, 5/18/72.
Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/1/72.
"Domestic Intelligence Division, Position Paper: Scope of Authority, Juris-
diction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations, 7/31/72.
recognized Executive authority. An example is a telephone
request to furnish all available information to the White
House concerning a forthcoming Earth Day rally in 1970.
The rally, which was sponsored by groups concerned with
pollution and ecology, attracted the attention of a few sub-
versive elements, but appeared to be very much under the
control of the sponsors. Senator Edmund S. Muskie spoke at
the rally in Washington, D.C., and Rennie Davis, an anti-
war activist with a subversive background, appeared on the
same platform with Senator Muskie. A few minor disturb-
ances erupted in some areas, but overall the Earth Day rallies
were peaceful and attained their general objective, the calling
of attention to environmental problems. Senator Muskie,
who learned that the FBI covered the rally in Washington,
was incensed that the FBI was involved. We had a poor
defense and in this case, at least, it is doubtful that there was
any'legitimate Executive authority to have the FBI involved.
In any event, it would appear that such requests should flow
through channels, including the Department of Justice where
possible, to assure that unreasonable and improper requests
are [not] made for investigative activity.636a
Acting Director Gray postponed making any formal request for
advice from the Attorney General in 1972.631 Meanwhile, the Domestic
Intelligence Division proceeded on its own to revise the pertinent
Manual sections and the ADEX standard. One official observed that
there were "some individuals now included in ADEX even though
they do not realistically pose a threat to the national security." He
added that this would leave the Bureau "in a vulnerable position if
our guidelines were to be scrutinized by interested Congressional com-
mittees." Thus, it was recommended that the list be trimmed to those
who were "an actual danger now," reducing the number of persons
on the ADEX by two-thirds.6 3 8 The Justice Department was advised
of this change.6 39
The revision of the Manual was completed by May 1973. It was de-
scribed as "a major step" away from "heavy reliance upon Presiden-
tial Directives" to an approach "based on existing Federal statutes."
se Position Paper, 7/31/72. For an examination of other instances of political
abuse of the FBI. see the Final Report on Domestic Intelligence.
v Gray did order that the Bureau should indicate its "jurisdictional author-
ity" to investigate in every case, "by citing the pertinent provision of the U.S.
Code, or other authority," and also that the Bureau should "indicate whether or
not an investigation was directed by DJ (Department of Justice), or we opened
it without any request from DJ." In the latter case, the Bureau was to "cite
our reasons." Note on FBI routing slip, 8/27/72.
" Memorandum from Smith to Miller, 8/29/72. The anticipated reduction was
from 15,259 (the current figure) to 4,786 (the top two priority categories).
' Memorandum from Gray to Kleindienst, 9/18/72. The basic standard for
the revised ADEX read as follows:
"Individuals, whether affiliated with organized groups or not, who have shown
a willingness and capability of engaging in treason, rebellion, or insurrection,
seditious conspiracy, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, assas-
sination of Government officials or leaders, or other such acts which would result
in interference with or a threat to the survival and effective operation of na-
tional, state or local government."
Draft copies were distributed to the field for suggestions.640 The field
was advised that the "chief statutes" upon which the new criteria were
based were those dealing with rebellion or insurrection (18 U.S.C.
2583), seditious conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 2584) and advocating over-
throw of the government (18 U.S.C. 2528). The ADEX was to be
"strictly an administrative device" and should play no part "in inves-
tigative decisions or policies." The revision also eliminated "over-
emphasis" on the Communist Party. Although field offices were
instructed to "close" investigations not meeting the new criteria,
headquarters did not want "a massive review on crash basis" of all
existing cases.6 4 1
A series of regional conferences were held with field office supervi-
sors to discuss the new standards, after which they were revised to al-
low greater flexibility. For example, the supervisors saw the need to
undertake "preliminary inquiries" before it was known "whether
a statutory basis for investigation exists." This specifically applied
where a person had "contact with known subversive groups or sub-
jects," but the Bureau did not know "the purpose of the contact."
These preliminary investigations could go on for 90 days "to deter-
mine whether or not a statutory basis for a full investigation
exists." Moreover, at the urging of the field supervisors, the period
for a preliminary investigation of an allegedly "subversive organiza-
tion" was expanded from 45 to 90 days. 4 2
For the first time in FBI history, a copy of the Manual section for
"domestic subversive investigations" was sent to the Attorney General,
apparently "in connection with" a request made earlier by Senator
Edward M. Kennedy who had asked to see a copy of this section at
the time of the confirmation hearings for Attorney General Klein-
dienst in 1972.43
After Clarence M. Kelley was confirmed as FBI Director, he re-
quested guidance from the Attorney General. In a memorandum to
Attorney General Elliott Richardson, Director Kelley cited Senator
Sam J. Ervin's view that the FBI should be prohibited by statute
"from investigating any person without that individual's consent,
unless the Government has reason to believe that the person has
committed a crime or is about to commit a crime." He then summarized
the position paper prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division and
the Bureau's current policy of attempting to rely on statutory author-
ity. However, lie observed that the statutes upon which the FBI was
relying were either "designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth
Century" (the seditious conspiracy, rebellion and insurrection laws)
or had been "reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court" (the
I Memorandum from E. S. Miller to Felt, 5/22/73. This memorandum also
stated, looking back on past Bureau policy, that since the FBI's authority to
investigate "subversive elements" had never been "seriously challenged until
recently." Bureau personnel (and "the general public") had accepted "the
FBI's right to handle internal security matters and investigate subversive
activities without reference to specific statutes." But the "rationale" based on
"Presidential Directives" was no longer "adequate."
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 6/7/73.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/8/73.
* Kleindienst, Senate Judiciary Committee, 2/24/72, p. 64; memorandum
from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.
Smith Act dealing with advocacy of overthrow). Moreover, it was
difficult to fit into the statutory framework groups "such as the Ku
Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but
nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights."
Kelley stated that, while the FBI had "statutory authority," it still
needed "a definite requirement from the President as to the nature
and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his respon-
sibilities based on our statutory authority." ['Emphasis added.] While
the statutes gave "authority," an Executive Order "would define our
national security objectives." The FBI Director added,
It would appear that the President would rather spell out his
own requirements in an Executive Order instead of having
Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill
his obligations and responsibilities as President.
Kelley concluded that it "would be folly" to limit the Bureau to
investigations only when a crime "has been committed," since the
government has to "defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist
efforts to destroy it." Consequently, he urged that the President exer-
cise his "inherent Executive power to expand by further defining
the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance
information" about the plans of "terrorist and revolutionaries who
seek to overthrow or destroy the Government." 64 [Emphasis added.]
Director Kelley's request initiated, a process of reconsideration of
FBI intelligence authority by the Attorney General. Even before
Kelley's request, Deputy Attorney General-Designate William Ruckel-
shaus (who had served for two months as Acting FBI Director between
Gray and Kelley), sent a list of questions to the Bureau to begin "an
indepth examination of some of the problems facing the Bureau in
the future." 64 The Ruckelshaus study was interrupted by his de-
parture in the "Saturday Night Massacre" of October 1973.
The Ruckelshaus study and Kelley's request were superseded in De-
cember 1973, when Acting Attorney General Robert Bork in consul-
tation with Attorney General-Designate William Saxbe gave higher
priority to a Departmental inquiry into the FBI's COINTELPRO
practices. Responsibility for this inquiry was assigned to a committee
headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.6 4 Even at
this stage, however, the Bureau resisted efforts by the Department to
look too deeply into its operations. Director Kelley advised the Acting
Attorney General that the Department should exclude from its review
the FBI's "extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection tech-
niques," which were handled within the Bureau "on a strictly need-to-
know basis" and thus should not be included in a study "which will be
beyond the control of the FBI." 647
As a result, the Petersen committee's review of COINTELPRO did
not consider anything more than a brief FBI-prepared summary of
" Memorandum from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.
* Memorandum from Ruckelshaus to Kelley, 7/20/73.
Memorandum from Bork to Kelley, 12/5/73.
* Memorandum from Kelley to Bork. 12/11/73.
foreign counterintelligence operations."64 Moreover, the inquiry into
domestic COINTELPRO cases was based mainly on short. summaries
of each incident compiled by FBI agents, with Department attorneys
making only spot-checks of the underlying files to assure the accurate-
ness of the summaries. Thus, the inquiry did not consider the
complete story of COINTELPRO as reflected in the actual memoranda
discussing the reasons for adopting particular tactics and the means
by which they were implemented.649
One Bureau memorandum to the Petersen committee even suggested
that the Attorney General did not have authority over the FBI's for-
eign counterintelligence operations, since the Bureau was accountable
in this area directly to the United States Intelligence Board and the
National Security Council. The Peterson Committee sharply rejected
this view, citing the fact that the ad hoc equivalent of the U.S. Intelli-
gence Board had approved the discredited "Huston plan" in 1970 and
declaring, "There can be no doubt that in the area of foreign counter-
intelligence, as in all its other; functions, the FBI is subject to the
power and authority of the Attorney General.' 650
Thus, while the Bureau was seeking guidance and clarification of
its authority, at the same time vestiges remained of its past resistance
to outside scrutiny and its desire to rely on Executive authority, rather
than statute, for the definition of its intelligence activities.
0. Re-Authorization of FBI Domestic Intelligence
In the absence of any new standards imposed by the Attorney Gen-
eral via "guidelines" or established by statute, the Bureau continued
to conduct domestic intelligence investigations under broad authoriza-
tions issued by the Justice Department in 1974. These authorizations
were explicitly based on conceptions of inherent executive power,
broader in theory than the FBI's own claim, in 1973, that its authority
could be found in the criminal statutes.
(1) Executive Order 10450, as amended
The Federal employee security program continued to be, according
to the Justice Department's 1974 instructions, a substantive basis for
FBI domestic intelligence investigations. An internal Bureau memo-
randum stated that this order:
specifically requires the FBI to check the names of all civil
applicants and incumbents of the Executive branch against
our records. In order to meet this responsibility FBIHQ rec-
ords must contain identities of all persons connected with
subversive or extremist activities, together with necessary
identifying information.651
FBI field offices were instructed in mid-1974 to report to Bureau head-
quarters such data as the following:
Identities of subversive and/or extremist groups or move-
ments (including front groups) with which subject has been
FBI memorandum, "Overall Recommendations-Counterintelligence Activ-
ity."
" Henry Petersen testimony, 12/8/76, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 270-271.
* Petersen Committee Report, p. 35.
"' Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. Wannall, 7/10/74.
identified, period of membership, positions held, and a sum-
mary of the type and extent of subversive or extremist activi-
ties engaged in by subject (e.g., attendance at meetings or
other functions, fund-raising or recruiting activities on behalf
of the organization, contributions, etc.).652
In June 1974 President Nixon formally abolished the "Attorney
General's list," upon the recommendation of Attorney General Saxbe.
However, the President's order retained a revised definition of the
types of organizations, association with which would continue to be
taken into account in evaluating prospective federal employees.- 3 The
Justice Department instructed the FBI that it should undertake to
"detect organizations with a potential" for falling within the terms
of the order and to investigate "individuals who are active either as
members of or as affiliates of" such organizations. The Departmental
instructions added:
It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investiga-
tion is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the
available information suggests that the activities of the orga-
nization may fall within the proscription of the Order....
It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the ini-
tiation of investigations of potential organizations falling
within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage
that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal
in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the inves-
tigation suggests a determination that the organization is
engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it
should continue. [Emphasis added.]
The Department applied "the same yardstick" to investigations of
individuals "when information is received suggesting their involve-
ment.0 5 4
With respect to one organization, the Department advised the Bu-
reau that "despite the abolition" of the Attorney General's list, the
group "would still come within the criteria" of the employee security
program if it "may have engaged in activities" of the sort proscribed
by the revised executive order.(5
(2) Civil Disorders Intelligence
The Justice Department also instructed the FBI in 1974 that it
should not, as the Bureau had suggested, limit its civil disturbance
O 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/16/74.a Executive Order 11785, 6/4/74. The new standard was:
"Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or
adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization,
association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to
as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of
acts of violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Consti-
tuition or lawns of the United States or any State or or of any state, or which
seeks to overthrow the Government of -the United States or subdivision thereof by
unlawful means." [-Emphasis added.]
' Memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for
Administration, to Kelley, 11/17/74.
6 Memorandum from Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Crim-
inal Division, to Kelley, 11/13/74. .
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reporting "to those particular situations which are of such a serious
nature that Federal military personnel may be called upon for assist-
ance." The Department advised that this suggested "guideline" was
"not practical" since it "would place the burden on the Bureau" to
make an initial decision as to "whether military personnel may ulti-
mately be needed," and this responsibility rested "legally" with the
President. Instead, the FBI was ordered to "continue" to report on
all significant incidents of civil unrest and should not be re-
stricted to situations where, in the judgment of the Bureau,
military personnel eventually may be used. 656
Moreover, under this authority the Bureau was also ordered to "con-
tinue" reporting on
all disturbances where there are indications that extremist
organizations such as the Communist Party, Ku Klux Klan,
or Black Panther Party are believed to be involved in efforts
to instigate or exploit them.
The instructions specifically declared that the Bureau "should make
timely reports of significant disturbances, even when no specific
violation of Federal law is indicated." This could be done, at least in
part, through "liaison" with local law enforcement agencies. The FBI
was expected to "be aware of disturbances and patterns of disorder,"
although it was not to report "each and every relatively insignificant
incident of a strictly local nature." 657
The Justice Department abolished the Intelligence Evaluation Com-
mittee, set up in partial implementation of the "Huston Plan," after
its existence was publicized in 1973.658 The IDIU also dismantled
its computerized data bank even though the basic functions of the
IDIU continued to be performed by a Civil Disturbance Unit in the
office of the Deputy Attorney General, and the FBI was under instruc-
tions to disseminate its civil disturbance reports to that Unit.
6 5 9
FBI officials considered these instructions "significant" because
they now gave it "an official, written mandate from the Department."
The Department's desires were viewed as "consistent with what we
have already been doing for the past several years," although the
Bureau Manual was rewritten to "incorporate into it excerpts from
the Department's letter." 60
From a legal point of view, the instructions were significant because
they relied for authority on the President's powers under Article IV,
section 4 of the Constitution to protect the states, upon application of
the legislature or the executive, against "domestic violence," as well
w' "On the other hand," the instructions stated, "the FBI should not report
every minor local disturbance where there is no apparent interest to the Presi-
dent, the Attorney General or other Government officials and agencies." (Memo-
randum from Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
to Kelley, 10/22/74.)
' Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74.
' Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Col. Werner Mi-
chel, 6/11/73.
m Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74;
Frank Nyland testimony, 1/27/76, pp. 46-58.
' Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to W. R. Wannall, 10/30/74.
as upon the statute (10 U.S.C. 331, et seq.) authorizing the use of
troops and upon the Presidential directive of 1969 designating the
Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the Govern-
ment's response to civil disturbances.661
(3) "Potential" Crimws
The FBI has recently abolished completely its ADEX, or admin-
istrative index of persons considered "dangerous now." However,
in 1974, the Justice Department elaborated a theory to support broad
power of the Executive branch to investigate groups which represent
a "potential threat to the public safety," or which have a "potential"
for violating specific statutes. In the case of one group, for example,
the Department advised the FBI that the General Crimes Section of
the Criminal Division had "recommended continued investigation" on
the basis of "potential violations" of the antiriot statutes, 18 U.S.C.
2101-2102. These same instructions added that there need not be a
"potential" for violation of any specific statute:
[W]ithout a broad range of intelligence information, the
President and the departments and agencies of the Executive
branch could not properly and adequately protect our nation's
security and enforce the numerous statutes pertaining there-
to . . . [T]he Department, and in particular the Attorney
General, must continue to be informed of those organizations
that engage in violence which represent a potential threat to
the public safety.663 [Emphasis added.]
The Department's theory of executive power was also spelled out
in 1974 testimony before the House Internal Security Committee.
According to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney,
"the primary basis" for FBI domestic intelligence authority was "the
constitutional powers and responsibilities vested in the President under
Article II of the Constitution." These powers arise from the President's
duty in his oath of office to "preserve, protect, and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States," 664 the Chief Executive's duty to "take
care that the laws be. faithfully executed," 66 the President's responsi-
bilities as Commander-in-Chief, and his "power to conduct our for-
eign relations." The latter power was said to relate "more particularly
to the Executive's power to conduct foreign intelligence activities here
and abroad." Nevertheless, Mr. Maroney added,
We recognize the complexity and difficulty of adequately
spelling out the FBI's authority and responsibility to conduct
* Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74; Directive of 4/1/69, dis-
cussed at pp. 501-502.
m Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Kelley, 11/13/74.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in United State8 v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)-the domestic security wiretapping case-stated, "Im-
plicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who
would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means."
'A 19th century Supreme Court opinion was cited as having interpreted the
word "laws" broadly to encompass not only statutes enacted by Congress, but
also "the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself,
our international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of Gov-
ernment under the Constitution." (In Re Nedgle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).]
domestic intelligence-type investigations. The concept of na-
tional security is admittedly a broad one, while the term sub-
versive activities is even more difficult to define.6 6 6
The chairman of the Internal Security Committee, Rep. Richard
H. Ichord, stated at that time that, except in limited areas, the Con-
gress "has not directly imposed upon the FBI clearly defined duties
in the acquisition, use, or dissemination of domestic or internal security
intelligence.6 6 1 Subsequently, the FBI Intelligence Division revised
its 1972-1973 position on its legal authority, and in a paper completed
in 1975 it returned to the view "that the intelligence-gathering activi-
ties of the FBI have had as their basis the intention of the President
to delegate his Constitutional authority," as well as the statutes "per-
taining to the national security." 668
The generalized instructions issued by the Justice Department in
1974, when viewed in the larger framework of the theory of executive
power upon which they were based, have presented the Congress with
the formidable but essential task of developing statutory standards for
FBI domestic intelligence to replace vague executive mandates. The
record clearly indicates that, even though the Attorney General has
promulgated more precise "guidelines," the broad claims of power in
the hands of the Executive branch could readily permit a return to
the vague and overbroad domestic intelligence policies of the past.669
' Kevin Maroney testimony, Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal
Security Purposes, Hearings before the House Committee on Internal Security,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pp. 3332-3335. Mr. Maroney also cited the following
from the Supreme Court's opinion in the domestic security wiretapping case:
"The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the inter-
relation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such
surveillance may be more difficult to identify .-. . Often, too, the emphasis of
domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the
enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible crisis or emer-
gency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that
directed against more conventional types of crime." (United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).)
7 House Committee on Internal -Security Hearings, (1974) pp. 3330-3331.
" W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director for the Intelligence Division,
unaddressed memorandum re: "Basis for FBI National Intelligence Investi-
gations," 2/13/75.
mo The "guidelines" for FBI domestic security investigations developed by At-
torney General Edward H. Levi and other recent developments are discussed in
the Committee's Final Report on Domestic Intelligence.
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DOMESTIC CIA AND FBI MAIL OPENING.:PROGRAMS
PART I: SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
Between 1940 and 1973, two agencies of the federal government-
the CIA and the FBI-covertly and illegally opened and photo-
graphed first class letter mail within the United States. These agencies
conducted a total of twelve mail opening programs for lengths of
time varying from three weeks to twenty-six years. In a single pro-
gram alone, more than 215,000 communications were intercepted,
opened, and photographed; the photographic copies of these letters,
some dated as early as 1955, were indexed, filed, and are retained
even today. Information from this and other mail opening programs--
"sanitized" to disguise its true source-was disseminated within the
federal establishment to other members of the intelligence community,
the Attorney General, and to the President of the United States.
The stated objective of the CIA programs was the collection of
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information; that of the
FBI programs was the collection of counterespionage information.
In terms of their respective purposes, seven of the twelve mail opening
programs were considered to have been successful by Agency and
Bureau officials. One CIA project and three of the FBI programs
concededly failed to obtain, any significant relevant information.
Another CIA operation-clearly the most massive of all the programs
in terms of numbers of letters opened-was believed to have been of
value to the Agency by some officials, but was criticized by many others
as having produced only minimally useful foreign intelligence.
Despite two unfavorable internal reviews, this program nonetheless
continued unabated for twenty years.
While all of these programs responded to the felt intelligence needs
of the CIA and the FBI during the "cold war" of the 1950's and early
1960's, once in place they could be-and sometimes were-directed
against the citizens of this country for the collection of essentially
domestic intelligence. In the 1960's and early 1970's, large numbers
of American dissidents, including those who challenged the con-
dition of racial minorities and those who opposed the war in Vietnam,
were specifically targeted for mail opening by both agencies. In one
program, selection of mail on the basis of "personal taste" by agents
untrained in foreign intelligence objectives resulted in the inter-
ception and opening of the mail of Senators, Congressmen, journalists,
businessmen, and even a Presidential candidate.
The first mail opening program began shortly before the United
States entered World War II, when representatives of an allied
country's censorship agency taught six FBI agents the techniques
of "chamfering" (mail opening) for use against Axis diplomatic
establishments in Washington, D.C. The program was suspended after
the war but reinstituted during the "cold war" in the early 1950's;
the method was similar but the targets new. Shortly after this program
(561)
was reinstituted, the CIA entered the field with a mail opening project
in New York designed to intercept mail to and from the Soviet Union.
Between 1954 and 1957, the FBI and the CIA each developed second
programs, in response to post-war events in Asia, to monitor mail
entering the United States from that continent; and the CIA briefly
conducted a third operation in New Orleans to intercept Latin and
Central American mail as well. The technique of chamfering was
most widely used by the FBI during the period 1959 to 1966: in these
years the Bureau operated no fewer than six programs in a total of
eight cities in the United States. In July 1966, J. Edgar Hoover
ordered an end to all FBI programs, but the Bureau continued to
cooperate with the CIA, which acted under no such self-restriction, in
connection with the Agency's New York project. In 1969, a fourth
CIA program was established in San Francisco and was conducted
intermittently until 1971. The era of warrantless mail opening was not
ended until 1973, when, in the changed political climate of the times,
the political risk-"flap potential"-of continuing the CIA's New
York project was seen to outweigh its avowed minimal benefit to the
Agency.
All of these mail opening programs were initiated by agency offi-
cials acting without prior authorization from a President, Attorney
General, or Postmaster General; some of them were initiated without
prior authorization by the Directors or other senior officials within
the agencies themselves. Once initiated, they were carefully guarded
and protected from exposure. The record indicates that during the
thirty-three years of mail opening, fewer than seven Cabinet level
officers were briefed about even one of the projects; only one Presi-
dent may have been informed; and there is no conclusive evidence
any Cabinet officer or any President had contemporaneous knowledge
that this coverage involved the actual opening-as opposed to the
exterior examination-of mail. The postal officials whose cooperation
was necessary to implement these programs were purposefully not
informed of the true nature of the programs; in some cases, it appears
that they were deliberately misled. Congressional inquiry was per-
ceived by both CIA and FBI officials as a threat to the security of
'their programs; during one period of active investigation both
agencies contemplated additional security measures to mislead the
investigators and protect their programs against disclosure to Con-
gress. Only in rare cases did the CIA and the FBI even inform one
another about their programs.
Many of the major participants in these mail opening programs,
including senior officials in policy-making positions, believed that their
activities were unlawful. Yet the projects were considered to be so sen-
sitive that no definitive legal opinions were ever sought from either
the -CIA's General Counsel or the Attorney General. The record is
clear, in fact, that the perceived illegality of mail opening was a
primary reason for closely guarding knowledge of the programs from
ranking officials in both the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
The legal fears of CIA and FBI officials were firmly based, for
sanctity of the mail has been a long-established principle in American
jurisprudence. Fourth Amendment restrictions on first class mail
opening were recognized as early as 1878, when the Supreme Court
wrote in Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,733 (1878):
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as
fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to
their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by
the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The con-
stitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure
in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures
extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wher-
ever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened
and examined under like warrant, -issued upon similar oath
or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized,
as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's
own household. No law of Congress can place in the hands of
officials connected with the postal service any authority to
invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the
mail; and all regulations adopted 'as to mail matter of this
kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied
in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.
This principle was re-affirmed as recently as 1970 in United States
v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970) : "It has long been held,"
the Supreme Court there wrote, "that first-class mail such as letters
and sealed packages subject to letter postage-as distinguished from
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and other printed matter-is free
from inspection by postal authorities, except in the manner provided
by the Fourth Amendment."
Not only the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, but First Amendment values of free speech are.
involved in the opening of first class mail. As Justice Holmes stated
in 1921,-in a dissent now embraced by prevailing legal opinion: "The
use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right
to use our tongues." Mikoaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407,
437 (1921). Justice William 0. Douglas quoted this passage with
approval in a 1965 decision which invalidated a procedure whereby
incoming third and fourth class propaganda could be indefinitely
detained by Postal and Customs officials-a procedure, incidentally,
which had provided cover for three CIA-and FBI mail opening pro-
grams.' Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965). In
1974, in a case involving censorship of prisoner mail, the Supreme
Court also noted that "the addressee as well as the sender of direct
personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth
Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interfer-
ence with the intended communication." Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396,408-409 (1974).
Statutory as well as constitutional protection has traditionally been
accorded first class letter mail. Throughout the entire postwar period
in which FBI and CIA mail opening programs were conducted, the
statutory framework of legal prohibitions against the unauthorized
opening of mail have remained essentially constant. The pertinent
statutes, enacted in 1948 and substantially unchanged since then, are
set forth below:
' See pp. 620-623, 643-644.
1. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1701:
Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs or retards the
passage of the mail, or any carrier or conveyance carrying
the mail, shall be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned not
more than six months, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Stat. 778.)
2. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1702:
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of
any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter,
or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any
post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any
letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the per-
son to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the cor-
respondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another,
or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.)
3. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1703 (b) :
Whoever, without authority, opens, or destroys any mail or
ipackage of newspapers not directed to him, shall be fined not
more than $100 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778; May 24, 1949,
ch. 139, 4 37, 63 Stat. 95; Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, § 6 (j)
(16), 84 Stat. 778.)
The issue of proper authority for the opening of mail, which is
raised by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1703(b) above, was, until 1960, dealt with
in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1717(c): "No person other than a duly authorized
employee of the Dead Letter office, or other person upon a search war-
rant authorized by law, shall open any letter not addressed to him-
self." This section was repealed in 1960 and recodified in essentially
similar form at 39 U.S.C. 4057. When the Postal Service was reorga-
nized in 1970, Section 4057 was in turn repealed and substantially
recodified at 39 U.S.C. 3623(d), which provides in part:
No letter of such a class [i.e., first class] of domestic origin
shall be opened except under authority of a search warrant
authorized by law, or by an officer or employee of the Postal
Service for the sole purpose of determining an address at
which the letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the author-
ization of the addressee.
The only persons who can lawfully open first class mail without a
warrant, in short, are employees of the Postal Service for a very
limited purpose-not agents of the CIA or FBI.
In the face of the Constitution and these statutes, mail was sur-
reptitiously opened for more than three decades-without warrant;
without Congressional or clear Presidential authority; frequently
without approval by senior agency officials; and, in the case of the
most massive program, despite critical internal evaluations as well.
Seasoned intelligence officers in both agencies genuinely believed that
this activity was important to safeguard the country from foreign
adversaries. But to defend the national security, they chose to employ
a technique that was neither sanctioned by the laws nor authorized
by the elected leaders of the country they sought to protect. And since
they defined the nature of our enemies, this technique came to be
directed against American dissidents as well as foreigners.
PART II: CIA DoMESTIC MAIL OPENING
I. INTRODUCTION AND MATOR FACTS
The CIA conducted four mail opening programs within the United
States, the longest of which lasted for twenty years. These programs
resulted in the opening and photographing of nearly a quarter of a
million items of correspondence, the vast majority of which were to
or from American residents. While the programs were ostensibly con-
ducted for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes, one
former high-ranking CIA official characterized the Agency's use of
this technique as a "shotgun" approach to intelligence collection; 2
neither Congressmen, journalists, nor businessmen were immune from
mail interception. With cooperation from the FBI, domestic "dissi-
dents" were directly targeted in one of the programs.
The major facts regarding CIA domestic mail opening may be sum-
marized as follows:
a. The CIA conducted four mail opening programs in four cities
within the United States for varying lengths of time between 1953
and 1973: New York (1953-1973); San Francisco (four separate oc-
casions, each of one to three weeks duration, between 1969 and 1971);
New Orleans (three weeks in 1957); and Hawaii (late 1954-late 1955).
The mail of twelve individuals in the United States, some of whom
were American citizens unconnected with the Agency, was also opened
by the CIA in regard to particular cases.
b. The stated purpose of all of the mail opening programs was to
obtain useful foreign intelligence and counterintelligence informa-
tion. At least one of the programs produced no such information, how-
ever, and the continuing value of the major program in New York was
discounted by many Agency officials.
c. Despite the stated purpose of the programs, numerous domestic
dissidents, including peace and civil rights activists, were specifically
targeted for mail opening.
d. The random selection of mail for opening, by CIA employees
untrained in foreign intelligence objectives and without substantial
guidance from their superiors, also resulted in the interception of
communications to or from high-ranking United States government
officials, as well as journalists, authors, educators, and businessmen.
e. All of the mail opening programs were initiated without the prior
approval of any government official outside of the Agency.
f. Only five Cabinet level officialb, and possibly one President, were
briefed in varying degrees of detail about the New York program
during the twenty years it continued, and there is no conclusive evi-
dence that any of these officials ever authorized-or kIew of-the mail
opening aspect of the project. The evidence suggests that in the cases
2James Angleton testimony, 9/17/75, p. 28.
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of some of these officials, their professed lack of knowledge about mail
opening was due to a stated desire to remain ignorant of the details of
the program.
g. No high-ranking government official was ever briefed about three
of the four mail opening programs.
h. Postal officials whose cooperation was necessary to effect the pro-
grams were purposefully misled as to the purpose of the projects, the
question of custody of the letters, and the fact of mail opening itself.
i. One President of the United States, whether through design or
negligence, was given false and misleading information about the
existence of CIA mail opening programs. In 1970, the Director of
Central Intelligence signed a document for submission to the President
which stated thait all mail opening programs by federal agencies had
been discontinued. This Director knew that at that time the most ex-
tensive CIA mail opening program continued to operate in New York.
j. Within the Agency itself, two former Directors of Central Intelli-
gence did not authorize and apparently did not even know about any
of the mail opening programs that were condudted during their tenure.
Another former Director was unaware of at least one mail opening
project during his term.
k. Some senior Agency officials whose approvals were sought in
connection to one mail opening program were apparently deceived as
to its true nature by middle-level officers. The senior officials were
requested 'to authorize a mail cover operation only, but mail opening
was both contemplated at the time of the requests and did in fact occur.
1. None of the programs was ever subjected to formal internal
evaluation. Such review as did occur concluded that the largest of
the programs were poorly administered and without substantial bene-
fit to the CIA. These conclusions were ignored and the project
continued.
m. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the projects and the internal
pattern of compartmentation, many of those CIA components which
could have derived the greatest foreign intelligence value from
the product were not even aware of the mail opening programs.
n. Most of the major participants in the mail opening programs
believed that the Agency's activities in t'his area were unlawful. No
definitive legal opinion was ever sought from the CIA's General Coun-
sel, and the evidence suggests that knowledge of the programs was
purposefully withheld from him for security reasons.
o. The general reaction among Agency officials to the perceived
illegality of mail opening was to fabricate "cover stories" for public
consumption and to agree on a public denial of CIA domestic mail
opening activity in the event such activity were exposed.
p. During periods of active Congressional investigation into inva-
sions of privacy by federal agencies, and when persons knowledgeable
of CIA mail openings were in a position to be called to testify before
Congress, security precautions for mail opening programs were tight-
ened to reduce the risk of exposure.
q. In part because of his "secrecy agreement" with the Agency, a
former CIA employee who was in a position at the Postal Service to
force the termination of a mail opening program was inhibited froni
doing so for several years. His loyalty to the CIA, even after he
left its service, prevented him from informing the Postmaster General
of its existence.
r. The largest of the mail opening projects was not terminauted until
1973, when, in the charged political climate of the times, it was con-
sidered too great a "political risk" to continue. It was not terminated
because it was perceived to be illegal per se.
II. NEW YORK CITY MAIL INTERCEPT PROJECT
The CIA's New York mail intercept project, encrypted HTLIN
GUAL by the Counterintelligence Staff and SRPOINTER by the
Office of Security, was the most extensive of all the CIA's mail inter-
cept programs, both in terms of the volume of mail that was opened
and in terms of duration. Over the twenty year course of mail open-
ings, more than 215,000 letters to and from the Soviet Union were
opened and photographed by CIA-agents in New York. Copies of more
than 57,000 of these letters were also disseminated to the FBI, which
learned of this operation in 1958, levied requirements on it, and re-
ceived the fruits of the coverage until the project was terminated.
Despite the absence of clear authorization outside the CIA, despite
the generally unfavorable internal reviews of the project in 1960 and
1969, and despite the facts that it was generally seen as illegal and that
its primary value was believed by many agency officials to accrue to the
FBI in the area of domestic intelligence, the momentum generated by
this project from its inception in the early 1950's continued unchecked
until February of 1973.
A. Operation of the Program
1. The Initial Phase: Mail Covers
The Original Proposal.-The New York mail project originated in
the spring of 1952 with a proposal by the Soviet (SR) Division, sup-
ported by the Chief of the Operations Staff (now the Deputy Director
for Operations) and the Office of Security, to scan exteriors of all
letters to the Soviet Union and to record, by hand, the names and ad-
dresses of the correspondents. While the original plan did not contem-
plate the opening of mail immediately, it was recognized that " [o]nce
our unit was in position, its activities and influence could be extend'd
gradually, so as to secure from this source every drop of potential in-
telligence information available."' Specifically, it was believed that
such a project could:
-"furnish much live ammunition for psychological warfare;
-"produce subjects, who if proven loyal to the United States, might
be good agent material because of their contacts within the Soviet
Union;
-"offer documentary material for reproduction and subsequent use
by our own agents;
-"produce intelligence information when read in the light of other
known factors and events; and
'Memorandum from Chief, Special Security Division to Security Officer/CIA,
7/1/52. Thus, one can even at the initial stage the desire to exploit the antici-
pated cooperation of the Post Office Department.
-"create a channel for sending communications to American agents
inside the Soviet Union." 4
Feasibility Study.-On July 1, 1952, the Chief of the Special Se-
curity Division recommended that "[a]s an initial step . . . we should
make contact in the Post Office Department at a very high level, plead-
ing relative ignorance of the situation and asking that we, with their
cooperation, make a thorough study of the volume of such mail, the
channels through which it passes and particularly, the bottle necks
within the United States in which we might place our survey teams." 6
He advised against informing Post Office officials about the ultimate
purposes of the project, however, noting that "[a]t the outset . . . as
far as the Post Office Department is concerned, our main target could
be the securing of names and addresses for investigation and possible
future contact."
Two CIA officers from the. Office of Security and the SR Division
met with a representative of the International Division of the Post
Office on the very day the Chief of the Special Security Division suB-
mitted the above recommendation. At this meeting, the Post Office
official agreed to provide the Agency with a complete statement of
"U.S.-U.S.S.R. postal accounting." 8
Clifton C. Garner, then Postal Inspector of the Post Office Depart-
ment, was subsequently contacted by Agency personnel in the Offices
of Operations and Security. It had been determined that most mail
between the United States and the Soviet Union passed through the
Port of New York, and on November 6, 1952, Garner was requested
in writing to make arrangements for "one or two designated employees
of this- organization [i.e., CIA] to work with an inspector of your
Department, under conditions determined by you to examine a, portion
of this mail traffic." 9 While Garner cannot recall receiving this
letter,"o he apparently agreed to make the necessary arrangments: one
month later, Henry Montague, then Postal Inspector in Charge of the
New York Division, approved the implementation of such an
examination."
Commnweement of the Project.-The results of the initial survey
were felt to be positive, and the project commenced on a full-time
basis in February 1953. Henry Montague recalls that shortly prior
to the commencement of the project, he had received a telephone
call from David Stephens, who replaced Garner as Chief Postal
Inspector under President Eisenhower, informing him that CIA
agents would come to his office within the next few days to request
his cooperation.12 According to Montague, Stephens instructed him
to assist the Agency but warned him that there was to be no tampering
with the mail beyond the minimum handling necessary for an ex-
terior examination. When the agents visited Montague shortly there-
'Memorandum from Chief, Special Security Division to Security Officer/CIA,
7/1/52.
' Ibid.
" Memorandum "for the record" from Edward E. Smith, 7/14/52.
* Letter from George C. Carey, Assistant Director, Office of Operations to
Clifton Garner, Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Department, 11/6/52.
" Staff summary of Clifton Garner interview, 8/22/75.
n Blind CIA memorandum, 12/18/52.
" Henry Montague testimony, 6/12/75, pp. 13, 14.
after, he specifically told the agents-and, according to Montague,
the agents agreed-that mail should not be opened. 3 Montague then
requested a subordinate in the New York Division to make the neces-
sary arrangements and the CIA representatives were installed in a
room in the New York General Post Office.
Briefing the Postmaster General.-By September 1953, after
seven months of operation, the project was considered to be sufficiently
productive to merit expansion beyond hand-copying information from
the outside of envelopes. A CIA officer of the Soviet Division pro-
posed "the complete photographic coverage of the cover information
on all letters posted from the Soviet Union to the U.S. and vice
versa." 14 Plans were made within the Agency to effect this type
of coverage, but the postal officials who had cooperated thus far balked.
It was noted in a January 4, 1954 internal CIA memorandum that
"[flor understandable reasons, postal authorities, at the level of our
present dealings, are reluctant to extend that degree of cooperation
without orders from above." 15 This memorandum recommended that
the Director of Central Intelligence brief both Postmaster General
Arthur E. Summerfield and President Eisenhower on the project, and
secure the oral approval of the President for photographing the
exteriors of letters.
Director Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, then Chief of Operations
in the Plans Directorate, met with the Postmaster General and the
Chief Postal Inspector, David Stephens, on May 17, 1954. Dulles told
Summerfield that the New York project had proven to be very valuable
and that the Agency now desired to photograph the exteriors of letter
mail from the Soviet Union. No mention was apparently made of mail
opening. According to Helms' notes of the meeting, the Postmaster
General "did not comment specifically" on the project but seemed re-
ceptive.'" Helms continued: "When the conference broke up, I spoke
to David Stevens [sic] privately and asked him if he now had all the
authorization he felt he needed. He replied in the affirmative." 1 The
second phase of the New York operation-photographing the exteriors
of letters between the United States and the Soviet Union-began
shortly after the Dulles-Summerfield meeting.' 8
2. Subsequent Evolution of the Project
The CI Staff Take-Over: "More" Mail Opening.---In November
1955, James Angleton, the Chief of the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff,
submitted a proposal to Richard Helms for the further expansion of
the New York mail intercept project. Until then, the CIA was only
receiving access to a portion of the United States-Soviet Union mail in
its New York facility; Angleton recommended that "we gain access
to all mail traffic to and from the U.S.S.R. which enters, departs, or
" Montague, 6/12/75, p. 15.
" Memorandum from CIA officer, SR/OPS to Chief, I&S, 9/23/53.
'5 Memorandum from Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, to Director of
Central Intelligence, 1/4/54.
" Memorandum from Richard Helms, Chief of Operations, DD/P to Director
of Security, 5/17/54.
17 Ibid.
' There is no clear evidence that President Eisenhower's approval was ever
sought for photographing envelope exteriors. See pp. 594-595.
transits the United States through the Port of New York." " He also
suggested that the "raw information acquired be recorded, indexed and
analyzed and various components of the Agency furnished items of
information which would appear to be helpful to their respective
missions." 20 Perhaps most significantly, he recommended a shift in
the focus of the project from photographing the mail to opening it.
Even prior to the date this proposal was submitted, some mail open-
ing had occurred "without the knowledge of the Post Office Depart-
ment on a completely surreptitious basis . . . [by] swiping a letter,
processing it at night and returning it the next day." 21 This method,
however, permitted agents to open a very limited number of items.
Angleton proposed that "more [letters] could be opened" 21a if the
Agency acquired a separate room which would be off limits to postal
employees and which would house special processing equipment. Be-
cause he realized that the Office of Security, which had been running
the program to date, did not have sufficient manpower for the proposed
expansion, Angleton also recommended that primary responsibility for
the project be transferred within the Plans Directorate from 0/S to
the CI Staff.
This proposal was approved by Helms on December 7,22 and funds
were authorized by the Acting Deputy Director for Plans on March 3,
1956.23 They were implemented later in 1956 when the intercept loca-
tion was moved from the General Post Office in Manhattan to a secure
room at LaGuardia Airport. While postal officials cooperated to the
extent of providing the CIA with the room, their approval was ap-
parently not sought for the opening of mail.24
FBI "Discovery" of the Project.-The next significant expansion of
the program occurred in January 1958 when the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation learned of its existence and shortly thereafter began to
share in the fruits of the coverage. As early as Janutry 1954 the CIA
had contemplated informing the FBI about the project, because it was
recognized that "outside of its definite foreign intelligence value . . .
there will be produced information affecting Internal Security." 25
Possibly because relations between the CIA and the FBI were
strained during the mid-1950's,2 6 however, the Bureau was not offi-
cially informed about the project until Bureau inquiries relative to a
proposed mail intercept program of its own uncovered the existence of
the CIA project. Although the FBI never contributed any resources,
either human or financial, to the operation of HTLINGUAL, it did
levy requirements on the project and received copies of intercepted
e Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief
of Operations, 11/21/55 (Attachment).
* Ibid.
21 Ibid.
" Letter from CIA to the Rockefeller Commission, attachment entitled "New
York Mail Intercept Program," 4/10/75.
" Memorandum from James Angelton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Act-
ing Deputy Director (Plans), 3/3/56.
2 lhe CIA makes no claim that Post Office approval for mail opening was
secured at this stage of the project.
'5 Memorandum from Edwards to DCI, 1/4/54.
2 According to James Angleton, former Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff,
the FBI participation was not sought prior to 1958 because the CIA's "relations
with the FBI were very spotty . . . [I]t wasn't the best of relations." (Angleton,
9/17/75, p. 27.)
letters on a regular basis until the project was terminated in 1973. This
aspect of the New York mail intercept project is treated in greater
detail in Part III below.
The TSD Laboratory.-The final stage in the evolution of the proj-
ect occurred in 1960 and 1961. By memorandum of February 25, 1960,
James Angleton advised Richard Helms, now Acting Deputy Director
for Plans, that the project would benefit from the establishment of a
laboratory to examine a selected portion of the opened letters.2 7 He
noted that at the present time there is no capability for "searching for
secret writing and/or microdots; determination as to whether items
have been previously opened and technically examined . . . , [or]
opening items sealed with the more difficult and sophisticated ad-
hesives." 2 A laboratory, he argued, would make these activities feasi-
ble as well as enable the project staff "to increase our production about
20 percent." Helms approved the establishment of the laboratory,"
and it opened, under the direction of the Technical Services Division
(TSD), about one year later in March 1961.
3. Full Operation of the Program
Volume of Mail Intercepted.-According to CIA records, a total of
28,322,796 letters were made available to CIA agents in New York
during the twenty year course of the project.3 0 Of these, the exteriors of
2,705,706. letters were photographed, and 215,82( letters were actually
opened.31 Mail opening had beguff on: a relatively small scale. In 1956,
for example, only 832 letters were opened. But momentum developed
quickly: two years later more than 8,000 letters were opened and by
1961, when the TSD laboratory was established, in excess of 14,000
letters were being opened annually. The height of the project in terms
of volume was 1967, when a total of 23,617 letters were opened and
analyzed.
Mechamnics.-Mail was physically intercepted at LaGuardia Air-
port from 1956 until 1962, when the project moved to Idlewild (Ken-
nedy) Airport. At both locations, the mechanics were essentially the
same: mail to and from the Soviet Union was delivered each day by
a postal clerk to a secure room in which the agents worked. Five, days
a week, a team of about four Office of Security personnel screened and
photographed this mail. The clerk, who received an annual bonus of
$500 from the Agency for his efforts, 32 also helped to sort the mail
according to region within the Soviet Union, but he was never in-
formed that selected items would be opened. According to one of the
agents who processed the mail, approximately two to six bags, con-
taining a total of 5,000 to 15,000 items of correspondence, would be
delivered and sorted each day. 2 The exteriors of as many of these
' Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Act-
ing Deputy Director (Plans), 2/25/60.
28 Ibid.
* Ibid.
'Blind memorandum "for the record", Subject: "Approximate Statistics on
CI Staff Project/HTLINGUAL Material", 1/23/75.
Ibid.
Agency records show that the clerk received this bonus for six of the years
he was involved with the projects. (Letter from CIA Review Staff to Senate
Select Committee, 3/3/76.)
' CIA officer testimony, 9/30/75, pp. 39,40.
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items as possible were photographed with a Diebold machine, and
from 35 to 75 letters would be selected for opening daily.33a Prior to
1969, the agents "swiped" the letters that had been selected for open-
ing from the room by placing them in their pockets or an attache
case, and hand carried them to the Office of Security's Manhattan
Field Office for opening and photographing. From 1969 to 1973, open-
ing and photographing were conducted at the intercept location itself.
The agents who opened the mail all attended a one-week course
called "flaps and seals" (mail opening techniques), which was run by
TSD at CIA Headquarters. The basic method of opening the mail was
extremely simple, however: the glue on the envelopes was softened by
steam from a kettle, and with the aid of a narrow stick the flap was
pried open and the letter removed. One of the agents who opened the
mail testified that "[y]ou could do it with your own teapot at home." "
It took approximately five to fifteen seconds to open a single letter.
At one point in the 1960's, the CIA developed a type of steam "oven"
that was capable of handling about one hundred letters simultane-
ously, but its performance was judged inadequate and the agents
soon returned to the kettle and stick method.
The TSD laboratory, which became operative in 1961, was originally
located in the Office of Security's Manhattan Field Office and sub-
sequently transferred to Kennedy Airport. The Office of Security
personnel who opened the mail brought it to this laboratory where it
was subjected to further chemical and other technical examination
for secret writing and censorship techniques by the two or three TSD
agents permanently assigned to the project. Because examination was
time consuming, it was only possible to test a small portion of those
letters which had been opened and photographed.
The original letters, which had been opened, photographed. and
possibly subjected to the TSD examination, were re-sealed and re-
turned the next morning to the airport, at which point they would be
re-inserted into the mail stream. Total delay time, therefore, averaged
one day. The photographic copies were then bundled and sent by
registered mail or courier on a near daily basis from the Manhattan
Field Office to the Office of Security at CIA Headquarters, which
would forward them to CI Staff analysts. These analysts, whose
number varied from a minimum of two to a maximum of six, reviewed
the contents of the letters and, on the basis of their knowledge of
the requirements levied by various CIA components and the FBI,
either fully translated or summarized each item of correspondence.
The copies of the letters were indexed and retained in the CI Staff
project room at Headquarters (where they are still on file), and
appropriate translations and summaries were disseminated within
the Agency to the SR Division, the Office of Security, and the CI
Staff itself, as well as to the FBI.
B. Nature and Value of the Product
1. Selection Criteria
Letters were selected for opening by two basic methods: (1) on the
basis of a list of names known as the "Watch List," and (2) randomly,
' CIA officer testimony, 9/30/75, p. 40.
* Memorandum from Angleton to Chief of Operations, 11/21/55.
* CIA officer, 9/30/75, p. 40
By one CIA estimate, the "Watch List" accounted for approximately
25% of the total volume of mail that was opened; random selection
for 751/o.3
The Watch List.-The Watch List originated in the mid-1950's, at
which time it consisted of only ten to twenty names. With the SR
Division, the CI Staff, the Office of Security, and the FBI all con-
tributing names to the list it grew rapidly, however: by the end of
the project the Watch List totaled about 600 names. One reason for
the growth of the Watch List is that the categories into which these
individuals or organizations fell were progressively broadened over
the years. In April 1957, for example, a CIA memorandum suggested
five narrow categories of names:
(1) former agents or covert contract personnel who origi-
nally came from "the Denied Area" in Europe, were utilized
by the Agency, and have now been resettled in the United
States or Canada;
(2) defectors from "the Denied Area" in Europe who were
under the control or auspices of the Agency and who have
now been resettled in the United States or Canada;
(3) repatriates from the United States or Canada who were
originally brought to the United States or Canada under the
auspices of the Agency and who have now returned or will
return to the USSR;
(4) suspected Soviet agents or other individuals either tem-
porarily or permanently residing in the United States, who
are known or suspected of being engaged in counterespionage
or counterintelligence activities on behalf of the USSR; and
(5) foreign nationals, originally from the USSR and satel-
lite countries, now residing in the United States and presently
being utilized by the Agency in any capacity.37
Within a short time, the Watch List had expanded far beyond these
relatively narrow and well-defined categories. The names of individ-
uals who were in contact with Watch Listed persons and organizations
were frequently added to the list themselves," and, as an August 1961
memorandum points out, a very large percentage of the names on the
list were placed there because of "leads which came about through the
random selection." 3
The focus of the Watch List also changed as it grew. In the early
years of the project the names on the list might reasonably have been
expected to lead to genuine foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
information, but as the project evolved many of the names that were
added-to the list were far more likely to generate essentially domestic,
rather than foreign, intelligence information. In 1969, for example,
Richard Ober of the CIA solicited the FBI for names of domestic polit-
ical radicals and black militants to include on the list. An FBI memo-
randum states that he "suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau
should not overlook the utilization of the agency's Hunter [New York
mail opening] project for the development of leads in the New Left
' Memorandum from Thomas B. Abernathy "for the record", 8/21/61.
' Memorandum from Chief CI/SIU/PROJECT to Deputy Chief, CI Staff,
4/24/57.
' Staff summary of briefing by CIA Officers, 6/4/75.
s Memorandum from Abernathy for the record, 8/21/61.
and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted that traffic involving
individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might
wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personali-
ties." 4 A handwritten notation at the bottom of this memorandum
indicated that "stops . . . on black extremists" were not felt to be
"warranted .. . at this time" by the Bureau, but the names of a sig-
nificant number of anti-war activists and groups were submitted to
the CIA, as were the names of several "black extremists" at a later
date.41 From 1958 to 1973, in fact, the FBI alone contributed a total
of 286 names to the Watch List.42
While Bureau requirements clearly augmented the emerging
"domestic intelligence" nature of the Watch List, CIA components
also contributed generously to this trend. Among the individuals and
organizations who came to be placed on the Watch List by the CIA
were numerous domestic peace organizations, such as the American
Friends Service Committee; political activists; scientists and scientific
organizations, such as the Federation of American Scientists; aca-
demics with a special interest in the Soviet Union; authors, such as
Edward Albee and John Steinbeck; businesses, such as Fred A.
Praeger Publishers; and Americans who frequently travelled to or
corresponded with the Soviet Union, including one member of the
Rockefeller family."3
The Watch List, in short, originated with a relatively few names
which might reasonably be expected to lead to genuine foreign in-
telligence or counterintelligence information, but soon expanded well
beyond the initial guidelines into the area of essentially domestic in-
telligence.
Random Selection.-The documentary record of the CIA suggests
that a very large percentage of the letters that were opened in the
course of the New York project were to or from individuals who were
not on the Watch List at all. One CIA memorandum points out that
the "New York Security officers who opened the mail selected about 75
percent at random, and the remaining 25 percent was on the basis of
a watchlist compiled by the CI Staff." 44 While there is some evidence
that the percentage of random openings may have decreased in the
later years of the project, it always represented a significant propor-
tion of the mail that was opened.
The CIA mail "intercentors" were not foreign intelligence or coun-
terintelligence experts. One of the CTA agents who ovened the mail
in this project testified that other than memorizing the Watch List,
he received no instruction at all as to what categories of mail to se-
lect.41 When asked the basis for onening mail to or from people who
were not on the Watch List. this agent renlied: "It might be according
to individual taste, if vou will, your own read ink about current events.
I personally used to like to do Central and South America items
Memorandum from S. J. Papich to Mr. D. .T. Brennan, 1/16/69.
'Staff summary of HTLINGUAL file review, 9/5/75; Staff summary of Project
Hunter file review. 10/21/75. See p. 631 for a description of the FBI's con-
tributions to the Watch List.
42 See p. 631.
" Staff summary of "Watch List" review, 9/5/75. At least one attorney spe-
ciglizinz in civil liberties litigation-Leonard Boudin-was also placed on the
Wntch List by the CIA.
*Memorandum from Abernathy for the record, 8/21/61.
a CIA Officer, 9/30/75, p. 9.
[that were missent by the Post Office]. . . . [Y]ou never knew what
you would hit." " He added: "We would try to get a smattering of
everything, maybe the academic field or travel agencies or something.
. . . I don't recall a specific instruction. I kind of place that under
our individual tastes." 4 7
Indeed, this lack of instruction appears to have been a conscious
policy of the Office of Security. A CIA memorandum states that the
Inspector General's Office, in its review of the New York project in the
early 1960's,'s "took the position that the security officers who were
selecting the mail to be opened should have some understanding of
headquarters requirements so that their selection could be halfway
informed on the basis .of areas of interest. . . . [But the Office of Se-
curity] had a paper by [a CIA officer] which said, in effect, that the
present system of purely random selection was best and that it wasn't
necessary to develop any sort of coordinated approach. . . . The Office
of Security apparently sees no reason why they should have their
personnel trained in intelligence objectives." 48
The large random element in the selection process and the lack of
formal intelligence training on the part of the agen.ts who opened the
mail combined with the "domestic" evolution of the Watch List to
push the project even further from the original foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence goals articulated in 1952. Over the twenty-
year course of mail opening, the mail that was intercepted included
that of many prominent Americans, including at least three United
States Senators and a Congressman, one Presidential candidate and
numerous educational, business, and civil rights leaders. 4 9
The "Special-Category Items" File.-The occasional random inter-
ception of politicians' mail created a situation for the CIA which was
potentially very embarrassing. In August 1971, the selection and open-
ing of a letter from United States Senator Frank Church so con-
cerned a new chief of the CI Staff "Project" that he wrote the Deputy
Chief of Counterintelligence, Raymond Rocca: "In order to avoid
possible accusations that the CIA engages in the monitoring of the mail
of members of the U.S. government, the C/CI may wish to consider
the advisability of (a) purging such mail from the files and machine
records of the Project, and (b) authorizing the issuance of instruc-
tions to the 'collectors' to cease the acquisition of such materials." 50
He added: "Instructions would have to define in specific terms what
categories of elected or appointed personnel were to be encompassed,
and whether they extended to private mail communications." " Sev-
eral months later, in December 1971, a new policy for the handling of
such mail was confirmed. An internal CIA memorandum dated De-
cember 22, 1971, reads in part:
In accordance with a new policy confirmed yesterday ... ,
Project HTLINGUAL will handle henceforth as follows
items originated by or addressed to Elected or Appointed
"CIA Officer, 9/30/75, pp. 9, 14-15.
"CIA Officer, 9/30/75, p. 15.
"' This review did not constitute a formal project evaluation. See pp. 582-583.
aMemorandum from Abernathy for "the record," 8/21/61.
"Staff summary of "Master Index" review, 9/5/75.
* Memorandum from Chief, CI/Project to DC/Cl, 8/30/71.
" Ibid.
Federal and Senior State Officials (e.g. Governor, Lt. Gover-
nor, etc) :
a. No officials in above categories are to be watchlisted;
b. No instructions to be issued to interceptors specifically
requesting or forbidding the acquisition of items in cited
categories; thus acquisition will be. left entirely to chance;
d. No special-category items shall be carded for inclusion
in the HTLINGUAL Machine Records System;
e. Dissemination of special-category items will be at the
discretion of DC/Cl (and/or C/CI) only;
f. All special-category items will be filed in a separate file
titled "SPECIAL-CATEGORY ITEMS", which will be
kept in C/CI/Project's safe. . .52 (emphasis in original)
The new policy, therefore, did not prohibit the opening of letters
to or from political figures; it simply created a special filing system
for their mail. By the end of the project in 1973, the "Special-Category
Items" file contained approximately ten photographs or sum-
maries of correspondence to or froim Senators Church and Edward
M. Kennedy, one Congressman, and one Governor of an American
territory. 5 Because the master index was on microfilm, the analysts
were unable to purge all references to those politicians whose corre-
spondence had been opened prior to December 1971.
2. Value of the Product
Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence.-There has been con-
siderable debate among CIA officials over the value of the product
from the New York operation to the Agency's foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence mission.53a James Angleton, who as Chief of
the CI Staff was in charge of the project, was one of its most vocal
supporters. He has testified that the New York project "was probably
the most important overview [of Soviet intelligence activities] that
counterintelligence had." -5 In a February 1973 memorandum for Di-
rector Schlesinger, Angleton, contending against termination, sum-
marized some of the benefits to the CIA which resulted from the New
York project as follows:
A. The mail intercept Project . . . provides information
about Soviet-American contacts and insight into Soviet reali-
ties and the scope of Soviet interests in the academic, eco-
nomic, scientific and governmental fields unavailable from
any other source. The Project adds a dimension and a perspec-
tive to Soviet interests and activities which cannot be obtained
from the limited resources available to this Agency and the
FBI.
B. The Project is particularly productive in supporting
both the Agency and the FBI in pursuing investigative and
' Memorandum from Chief/Cl/Project "for the record", 12/22/71.
" Letter from CIA to Senate Select Committee (Attachment), 9/23/75.
"' The discussion in this sub-section relates only to the primary intelligence and
counterintelligence value of the contents of the letters. As a by-product of the
operation, TSD received a technical benefit from the opportunity to observe for-
eign censorship rates. (Letter from CIA to Senate Select Committee, 3/3/76.)
" Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 45.
operational leads to visiting Soviet students, exchange scien-
tists, academicians and intellectuals, trade specialists and ex-
perts from organizations such as . . .
C. In many instances the Project provides the only means
of detecting continuing contact between [Soviet] controlled
exchange students and Americans.
D. The Project provides information otherwise unavailable
about the Soviet contacts and travel .of Americans to the
Soviet Union. . . .
E. Project material recorded for 18 years gives basic infor-
mation about Soviet individuals and institutions useful to the
analyst looking for specific leads and in gauging trends in
Soviet interests and policies.55
This highly favorable assessment of the value of the product from
HTLINGUAL contrasts sharply with the views of many other CIA
officers. In a 1961 review of the project by the Inspector General's
Office, for example it was written:
The SR (Soviet Union) Division is the project's largest
customer in the Agency. Information from the CI Staff flows
to the SR Support Branch and from there to the operational
branches. It may include operational leads, such as the iden-
tities of individuals planning to work or reside in the USSR,
or items of interest on conditions inside the country.In our
interviews we received the impression that few of the opera-
tional leads have ever been converted into operations, and that
no tangible operational benefits had accrued to SR Division
as a result of this project. We have noted elsewhere that the
project should be carefully evaluated, and the value of the
product to SR Division should be one of the primary
considerations. 56
A second internal review eight years later, in 1969 was no more
enthusiastic. John Glennon, a former member of the inspector Gen-
eral's staff which conducted this review, wrote:
. Although at one time this material was useful in Soviet
legal travel operations and as positive information on Soviet
internal economic and political matters, we find that the
Clandestine Service has little interest in it now. Most of the
officers we spoke to find it occasionally helpful, but there is no
recent evidence of it having provided significant leads or in-
formation which have had positive operational results. The
Office of Security has found the material to be of very little
value. The positive intelligence from this source is meager.5 7
In general, he noted that "the take from this program . . . is of little
value to this Agency . . ." 57a When Mr. Glennon was asked in recent
public hearings whether he still agreed with this basic conclusion, he
responded that, if anything, the product was probably even less valu-
a Memorandum from William E. Colby "for the record" (Attachment), 2/15/73.
* Memorandum from L. K. White, Deputy Director (Support) to Acting Inspec-
tor General (IG) (Attachment), 3/9/62.
" Blind memorandum, Subject: "Special Investigations Group/Project,"
undated.5
7 Ibid.
able than he indicated in 1969.58 Howard Osborn, who was Director of
Security from 1964 to 1974, and therefore responsible for the role
played by the Office of Security during those years, agreed that his
office received no value from the product. He publicly testified that
"[w]e got no benefit from it at all.. . . The product was worthless." 59
Even Richard Helms, who was personally involved with the New
York mail project on a decisional level from mid-1954 through the
days immediately prior to the 1973 termination, was tepid in his evalu-
ation of the project's value to the Agency. Of the product from
215,820 opened letters and nearly three million photographed enve-
lopes, he said: ". . . I thought from time to time that the Agency got
useful information out of it." 6o
Domestic Intelligence.-Given the nature of the selection criteria, it
is not surprising that a significant-perhaps the primary-portion of
the product related to domestic, rather than foreign, intelligence con-
cerns. The 1961 review of the project, for example, characterized -the
product as "largely domestic CI/CE [counterintelligence and counter-
espionage]." 61 This representation was repeated in the 1969 Inspector
General's report 62 and, as developed more fully below, by numerous
senior Agency officials in the early 1970's.63
Only to the extent that the CIA's mission was perceived as encom-
passing "domestic CI/CE" matters could the Agency itself benefit
from this type of information. Thus, Gordon Stewart, the Inspector
General whose staff reviewed the New York project and found its posi-
tive intelligence value "meager," conceded that the project in 1969 may
logically have been valuable in terms of the domestic surveillance
activities the Agency was then conducting. He testified that in the late
1960's and early 1970's:
... we were involved in compiling files on subversives in this
country, the youth, and so on. And there was an enormous
amount of pressure being placed on the Agency by the White
House to develop, if possible, a connection between subversive
organizations in this country and some external groups, say
the Communists or Moscow or something of that sort. It
would seem to me to be logical that if that is what you were
doing, maybe at one phase this project had been regarded as
useful to the Agency. 4
But it is questionable whether analysis of foreign influence on domestic
political activity is within the CIA's mandate at all. Such domestic
counterintelligence concerns are an aspect of internal security, which
is -the responsibility of the FBI, not the CIA.6 4 a
" John Glennon, 10/21/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 20.
Howard J. Osborn, 10/21/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 30, 31.
Richard Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 102, 103.
6 1Memorandum from L. K. White, Deputy Director (Support) to Acting
Inspector General (Attachment), 3/9/62.
' Blind memorandum, Subject: "Special Investigations Group/Project,"
undated.
See e.g., p. 601.
4 Gordon Stewart testimony, 9/30/75, pp. 45, 46.
"* There is no documentary or testimonial evidence by OIA personnel connected
with the New York project, moreover, that the project did in fact establish any
significant pattern of foreign influence in domestic "subversive organizations."
Value to the FBI.-The Bureau did in fact receive a great deal of
product from the New York operation: for all but three years between
1958 and 1973 the FBI actually received more copies or summaries of
opened letters than did any single component of the CIA.' In view of
the large quantity of disseminations to the Bureau and the largely
domestic nature of the product generally, it is understandable that CIA
officials assumed that the Bureau benefited significantly from the
Agency's coverage. Angleton stressed the importance of this project to
the Bureau's operations when he summarized its value for Director
Schlesinger in 1973; " this point was noted in both of the Inspector
General staff's reviews ' and in the testimony of Howard. Osborn I
and Richard Helms.' Several CIA officials, convinced that the project
was more valuable to the FBI than to the Agency itself, even recom-
mended that the Bureau should assume operational responsibility for
it.70
Ironically, however, the testimony of Bureau officials suggests that
the CIA may have mistaken quantity of product for quality. It is un-
deniable that the FBI received some benefit from HTLINGUAL.7oa
But one senior Bureau official declared that any benefit received by the
FBI had to be evaluated in light of the fact that the product was
received gratuitously, with the expenditure of neither money nor man-
power.7 1 He stated that the project did not provide leads to the iden-
tification of a single foreign illegal agent and that much of the product
received by the FBI was worthless.72
In short, it is not clear that HTLINGUAL made any substantial
contribution to the CIA's legitimate foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence mission or even to its questionable domestic intelligence
activities; and while Agency officials assumed that the FBI benefitted
greatly from their coverage, this assumption probably overestimated
the actual value to the Bureau.
C. Internal Authorization and Controls
Unlike the FBI mail opening programs, .the CIA's New York
project was extremely de-centralized. It germinated and evolved with-
out the prior approval of the Director of Central Intelligence at criti-
cal stages.72 a It continued through the tenure of at least two Directors
who were apparently not even informed of its existence. Because
it had been exempted from the usual approval system, many of the
division heads who would normally have to approve any proposed
project of this scope were also never briefed and consequently had no
opportunity to challenge the necessity or wisdom of the project. It was
".See table, p. 632.
" Memorandum from Colby "for the record" (attachment), 2/15/73.
' Memorandum from L. K. White to Acting Inspector General (attachment),
3/9/62; Blind memorandum, Subject: "Special Investigations Group/Project",
undated.
6 Howard J. Osborn testimony, 8/28/75, p. 33.
Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, vol. 4, pp. 102, 103.
See pp. 601, 603.
wa See pp. 632-634.
* Staff summary of William A. Branigan interview, 9/11/75.
* William A. Branigan, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 168.
na Allen Dulles, who was Director when the project was initiated, apparently
did know about it. But there is no indication that he was informed about its mail
opening aspect until May 1956, well after openings began. See pp. 580-581.
reviewed by disinterested agency components only twice during its
twenty year history, in neither case extensively, and although both
these reviews concluded that the operation was seriously flawed it con-
tinued until 1973, when largely external events forced its continuance.
1. Authorizations by Directors of Central Intelligence
Allen Dulles.-The New York mail project was initiated, and the
first contact with the Post Office made, without the apparent authoriza-
tion-or even the knowledge-of Director Allen Dulles. As noted
above, two CIA officers of the Office of Security and the SR Division
met with a representative of the International Division of the Post
Office in July 1952 to secure statistics on the mail flow between the
United States and the Soviet Union. It was largely on the basis of this
overview that the Office of Security and the SR Division determined
that further contact with Postal officials were desirable. CIA docu-
ments relating to the early stages of the project, however, make no
reference to informing Director Dulles until September 30 of that
year. In a memorandum on that date, the Chief of the SR Division
wrote the Deputy Director for Plans that "[i]t is requested . .. that
DCI be informed of I&S and SR Division intention to initiate action
looking toward the most expeditious accumulation of information on
all letter envelopes or covers passing through the New York City Post
Office originating in the Soviet Union or destined for the Soviet
Union." "
While subsequent documents reflect no explicit authorization from
the DCI-nor even whether or not the DCI was informed of the mail
cover operation as per the September 30 request of the Chief of the SR
Division-further contacts were made with the Post Office and the first
phase of the project became operational in February 1953.
The first unambiguous documentary indication that the DCI was
advised of what was then referred to as SRPOINTER is not found
until January 4, 1954. On that date Sheffield Edwards, the Director of
Security, wrote to Director Dulles to summarize the anticipated value
of the project, to explain the problem regarding the reluctance of
postal officials to cooperate with the planned expansion of the project,
and to request the Director to meet with the Postmaster General and
the President to secure their approval for photographing the exteriors
of the envelopes.' 4 At this stage, the project was essentially a mail cover
operation. No reference was made in that or a subsequent January 1954
memorandum ' to Director Dulles to the possibility of actually open-
in the mail.
he only written approvals for the project as it subsequently devel-
oped during Dulles' tenure appear to be those of Richard Helms
and the Acting Deputy Director for Plans. In December 1955, Helms
approved the concept as outlined by James Angleton; " in February
1960, he approved establishment of the TSD laboratory.
7 7 The ap-
" Memorandum from Chief, SR to Deputy Director, Plans, 9/30/52.
Memorandum from Edwards to DCI, 1/4/54.
"Memorandum from Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security of Central In-
telligence, (DCI, 1/12/54.
" Letter from CIA to the Rockefeller Commission, Attachment entitled "New
York Mail Intercept Program," 4/10/75.
" Memorandum from Angleton to Acting Deputy Director (Plans), 2/25/60.
proval of the Acting Deputy Director for Plans was obtained for fund-
ing in March 1956.'
While it is unclear whether Dulles was ever informed about the
laboratory, he was apparently at least made aware of the fact that
mail was being opened. In May 1956, he received a memorandum
from James Angleton in which Angleton noted that "for some time
selected openings have been conducted and the contents examined." 79
John McCone.-CIA documents do not show that Director John
McCone was ever informed about the project. McCone himself testi-
fied that he was unaware of it,so and his testimony is consistent with
that of James Angleton 81 and Howard Osborn.82
Admiral Raborn.-There is no evidence that indicates Director Ad-
miral Raborn was ever made aware of the New York project.
Richard Helms.-The next Director who clearly knew about the
New York mail opening project was Richard Helms, who became
Acting Director in 1965 and Director in 1966. Helms had been involved
with the project since 1954, and, as noted above, had personally
approved the expansion of the project to include larger scale mail
openings in December 1955 and a laboratory in February 1960. Numer-
ous CIA documents reflect his continuing knowledge of and concern
about the project during his tenure as Director.
James Schlesinger.-James Schlesinger, who succeeded Helms as
Director in 1973, also was aware of the project. It was his order in
February 1973 that led to its termination after two decades of opera-
tion.82a
2. Exemption from Normal Approval System
The New York mail opening project was initially approved by
Helms and the ADD/P outside-and it remained outside-the normal
channels for approval and review of CIA projects. As stated in the
1961 Inspector General's report:
The activity cannot be called a "project" in the usual sense,
because it was never processed through the approval system
and has no separate funds. The various components involved
have been carrying out their responsibilities as part of their
normal staff functions. Specific DD/P approval was obtained
for certain budgetary practices in 1956 and for the establish-
ment of a TSD lab in 1960, but the normal programming
procedures have not been followed for the project as a
whole. .3
When the first request for formal approval had been submitted to
Helms in November 1955, a branch chief of the CI staff suggested to
James Angleton that "in view of the sensitivity of this project, steps
should be taken to have this proposed project approved by the Direc-
" Memorandum from Angleton to Acting Deputy Director (Plans), 3/3/56.
" Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, DD/P
to Director of Central Intelligence, 5/4/56.
" John A. McCone testimony, 10/9/75, pp. 3, 4.
" Angelton, 9/17/75, p. 20.
8 Osborn, 10/21/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 38.
"' See pp. 603-604.
* Memorandum from L. K. White to Acting Inspector General (attachment),
3/9/62.
tor without recourse to the normal channels for presentation of proj-
ects." 84 The Director himself apparently never formally authorized
the project,84a but the thrust of the branch chief's recommendation
was followed. As Angleton later explained, when a typical project "is
conceived, it might cut across many jurisdictions to begin with,...
different geographic divisions and so on, so there would have to be a
signoff by the various components, and then it would go before a
project review board [whose] members would be drawn from many
parts of the clandestine services, and . . . you would have this tre-
mendous opening up of the activity to a great number of people. . . .
That is the reason why I think it was excepted from [the usual ap-
proval system], and that way it shortcircuited the normal project
approval process." 85
Because of the perceived sensitivity of the project, in short, the CI
Staff did not want those Agency components with no "need to know"
to become aware of it. The security of the operation was enhanced
by this exemption 'but the opportunity for critical evaluation by dis-
interested division heads was lost.
3. Administrative Controls
Internal Review and Evaluation.-In part because of its exemption
from the normal approval system, administrative control over the
New York project was lax. It was not a project at all in the formal
sense, so there was no mechanism for periodic internal review to deter-
mine whether or not its goals were being achieved. During its twenty-
year history, the project was reviewed by disinterested Agency com-
ponents only twice-in 1961, and again in 1969. Both of these reviews
were limited: the first review was part of an evaluation of Office of
Security Operations, and so did not encompass the roles played by the
CI Staff and TSD; the second review encompassed only the role of
the CI Staff.
The Inspector General's staff, which conducted both reviews,
concluded that if the project was to continue at all, a more complete
evaluation or a mechanism for periodic evaluation of the project was
crucial. Specifically, the 1961 study recommended that: "The DD/P
and the DD/S direct a coordinated evaluation of this project, with
particular emphasis on costs, potential and substantive contributions
to the Agency's mission." 86 And in 1969 the Inspector General's staff
wrote that "[flinally-and most important-a schedule for regular
re-examination and re-evaluation of the product of the project and of
its management, especially with respect to its security, should be estab-
lished and adhered to." 87
" Memorandum from Branch Chief to Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, 11/4/55.
S As noted above, there is no clear evidence that Dulles learned about the
mail opening aspects of the project until May 1956. Even after he learned of it,
he apparently never gave formal authorization but his "approval [was] inferred"
from his knowledge of it. (Memorandum from L. K. White to Acting Inspector
General, 3/9/62.)
* Angleton, 9/17/75, pp. 53, 54.
"Memorandum from L. K. White to Acting Inspector General (attachment),
3/9/62.
"' Blind memorandum, Subject: "Special Investigations Group/Project",
undated.
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Neither of these recommendations was implemented. The only re-
sponse to the 1961 recommendation was a five-page summary of the
project's mechanics and results by the Director of Security." This
summary was apparently felt to constitute a sufficient evaluation, al-
though there is no evidence that the Soviet Division or the FBI-the
entities that were the primary recipients of the project's product-
were ever asked to contribute their respective evaluations. In the case
of the 1969 review, the Inspector General did discuss the study's major
findings with then-Director Richard Helms, who, according to the
Inspector General, "listened intently, as I recall, and that was it." "
The system of regular re-evaluation which had been recommended was
not adopted.
Adamnistrative Problen.-The primary reason that these two
studies concluded that an improved system for evaluation of the proj-
ect was so essential was their common finding that, in the words of the
Inspector General's staff member who conducted the 1969 review, the
project "was poorly handled ... administratively and operationally." "
The 1961 study determined, for example, that it was impossible to
analyze the project in terms of costs versus benefits to the Agency
because costs were unknown: "The annual cost of this activity cannot
be estimated accurately because both administration and operations
have always been decentralized. The costs are budgeted by the con-
tributing components as a part of their regular operating pro-
grams." 1 It therefore recommended "that exact cost figures be devel-
oped to permit the Agency management to evaluate the activity."
In addition, these studies found that the decentralization and lim-
ited knowledge of the project within the Agency inhibited maximum
exploitation of the product that was generated. The 1961 study noted
that "[t] here is no coordinated procedure for processing information
received through the program; each component has its own sys-
tem. . . . The same material could thus be recorded in several differ-
ent indices, but there is no assurance that specific items would be
caught in ordinary name traces." 92 In the 1969 review, it was sug-
gested that the product might be useful to some Agency components
that did not even know about the project.
Even among those components that did receive product from the
New York project, there was no procedure for regular feedback to
the CI Staff analysts as to what types of product were considered
to be valuable.92a The CI Staff project chief has testified that he may
have received a "chance comment" from people in consumer com-
ponents, but he was not regularly informed about which kinds of
material were or were not useful.93
" Memorandum from Director of Security to Deputy' Director of Support,
12/20/62.
9 Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 34.
9 John Glennon, 9/25/75, p. 59.
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"2 Ibid.
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from CIA Review Staff to Senate Select Committee, 3/3/76.)
" CIA Officer deposition, 9/16/75, p. 47. The member of the Inspector General's
staff who conducted the 1969 review testified that he believed the analysts "prob-
ably did not get any feedback because there was not any value." (Glennon depo-
sition, 9/25/75, p. 59.)
One of the most serious administrative problems was that no single
person with a knowledge of the CIA's intelligence and counterintelli-
gence requirements was in direct control of the project. As the Inspec-
tor General's staff wrote in 1961:
Probably the most obvious characteristic of the project is
the diffusion of authority. Each unit is responsible for its
own interests and in some areas there is little coordination.
... There is no single point in the Agency to which one
might look for policy and operational guidance on the proj-
ect as a whole. Contributing to this situation is the fact that
all of the units involved are basically staff rather than com-
mand units, and they are accustomed to working in environ-
ments somewhat detached from the operational front lines.
. . . The greatest disadvantages are (a) there can be no ef-
fective evaluation of the project if no officer is concerned
with all its aspects, and (b) there is no central source of pol-
icy guidance in a potentially embarrassing situation. 94
This theme was reiterated in the 1969 report:
If it is decided that CIA should continue to operate the
mail intercept project, we believe that several steps should be
taken to improve the management of the program and its
effectiveness. Among these is the eventual 'assignment of a
chief to the project who has some depth of experience in
operations, especially counterintelligence operations, in order
to bring to bear on the analysis of the material more seasoned
judgment of its intelligence and counterintelligence value.95
Despite these recommendations for more centralized control over the
project by more experienced personnel, the project remained diffuse
and informed guidance was almost non-existent.
Mail was opened and the contents analyzed and disseminated, five
days a week for nearly twenty years, without a structure for the sys-
tematic evaluation of the project, without its true cost being known,
without the effective exploitation of potential intelligence and coun-
terintelligence benefits, and without any centralized coordination or
guidance by a single officer trained in intelligence and counterintelli-
gence operations. It is at least reasonable to suggest that if prior
approval-and periodic reapproval-at the highest level of the Agency
had been required, its defects would have been recognized and its
momentum checked before 1973.
D. External Authorizations
The New York project lacked a formal structure for authorization
by government officials outside as well as inside the CIA: it was never
authorized in writing by any such official and the pattern of oral ap-
proval is both capricious and obscure. Placed in the light most fa-
vorable to the Agency, the CIA obtained the prior oral approval of a
Postmaster General for the photographing of envelope exteriors in
* Memorandum from L. K. White to Acting Inspector General (Attachments),
3/9/62.
' Blind memorandum, Subject: "Special Investigative Group/Project",
undated.
1954, and the implied, post facto permission of two Postmasters Gen-
eral, one Attorney General, and one President for both the mail open-
ing and the mail cover aspects of the operation.5a But the Cabinet
officers who were allegedly informed of the mail openings deny such
knowledge-in one case because the official acknowledged that he did
not want to know and did not believe that he could or should control
Agency projects that affected his own Department. In the case of the
President, no documentary record of the briefing exists and the CIA
official who allegedly informed him concedes that there is only a "pos-
sibility" that he "mentioned" it.
Even by its own accounting, the CIA supplied no information about
this project to four Postmasters General, seven Attorneys General,
and three Presidents under whom it continued. In at least one instance,
knowledge of the project was consciously withheld from a Postmaster
General; in another instance, a President, whether knowingly or negli-
gently, was misled about the Agency's mail opening activities, and his
apparent refusal to authorize use of this technique went unheeded.
1. Postmasters General
Arthur F. Summerfield.-Arthur Summerfield, Postmaster General
during the Eisenhower Administration, was informed of the New
York mail project in 1954, and, according to CIA memoranda, assented
to the photographing of mail by CIA agents in connection with this
project. There is no indication, however, that he approved, or was
even advised of, the actual opening of mail by the Agency after that
became the primary objective of the project in 1955.
As discussed in the project summary above, the first phase of the
mail opening program-hand-copying information from envelope ex-
teriors-had begun in February 1953 with cooperation from two Chief
Postal Inspectors, Clifton Garner and David Stephens. But when
Agency officials recommended in late 1953 that the use of photography
rather than hand-copying would enable a greater volume of mail to
be covered, postal authorities refused to cooperate without the express
approval of the Postmaster General. A January 1954 memorandum,
from Director of Security Sheffield Edwards to DCI Dulles, suggested
that a meeting between Director Dulles and Summerfield was neces-
sary to resolve the problem.96 ,
The meeting between Dulles and Postmaster General Summerfield
finally occurred about five months later, on May 17, 1954. Richard
Helms, then Chief of Operations in the Plans Directorate, as well as
Chief Postal Inspector Stephens and two other postal officials, were
also in attendance. The only record of this meeting, a contemporaneous
memorandum to Sheffield Edwards from Helms, reads in part:
... As regards SRPOINTER, the Director told the group
how valuable we had found efforts in this field. He then went
on to say that we would like to photograph the backs and
fronts of first-class mail from the Soviet and satellite areas.
Another President stated that he was "generally aware" that the CIA con-
ducted "mail covers" of mail to the Soviet Union or Asia, but that he was un-
aware of CIA mail openings. Neither the documentary record nor the testimony of
CIA officials suggests that Agency officers informed him of the covers or that he
ever indicated his approval of the covers to them. See pp. 597-598.
* Memorandum from Edwards to DCI, 1/4/54.
. . . (When he had finished his exposition, the Postmaster
General did not comment specifically but it was clear that
he was in favor of giving us any assistance which he
could) . . .97
The Postmaster General's implied approval was apparently for photo-
giaphing mail only. Richard Helms, moreover, has recently testified
that: "It is my opinion today from reading the records that [Summer-
field] was not told the mail was being opened or would be opened." "
Nor is there any documentary or testimonial evidence that suggests
that Summerfield was ever advised of mail openings at any time
after that became the primary objective of the project in late 1955.
J. Edward Day.-J. Edward Day, who was Postmaster General
under President Kennedy, from January 1961 to August 1963, also
met with Director Dulles and others in regard to the New York mail
intercept project. The evidence as to whether or not he was informed
that mail was actually opened, however, tends to be contradictory.
In January 1961 a new administration was installed in Washington.
As Mr. Helms explained:
President Kennedy had just been sworn in. It was also a new
party. The Republicans had had the White House and the
executive branch before, and now the Democratic Party had
it, and I think Mr. Dulles felt under the circumstances that
it was desirable to speak to the Postmaster General because
if [the New York project] was to go forward, we needed
some support for it."
On January 27, 1961, less than one week after Day assumed the posi-
tion of Postmaster General, the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelli-
gence Staff wrote to Richard Helms to give him general background
information for a proposed briefing of the Postmaster General and
to advise him that:
There is no record in any conversation with any official of
the Post Office Department that we have admitted opening
mail. All conversations have involved examination of exte-
riors. It seems to us quite apparent that they must feel sure
that we are opening mail. . . .
It is suggested that if the new Postmaster General asks if
we open any mail, we confirm that some mail is opened. He
should be informed, however, that no other person in the Post
Office Department has been so informed. The reasons for this
suggestion are (a) Despite all of our care in the selection
and clearance of personnel for a knowledge of this project,
at some point, someone is likely to blow it. (b) The Post-
master General will have a better understanding of the im-
portance of the project in the event we desire to expand
it....
On February 15, 1961, Director Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and
Cornelius Roosevelt, then Chief of TSD, met with the new Postmaster
" Memorandum from Helms to Director of Security, 5/17/54.
" Helms. 10/22/75, Hearings. Vol. 4. p. 84.
" Helms, 10/22/75. Hearings. Vol. 4, p. 91.
'r Memorandum from Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of
Operations, DD/P, 1/27/61.
General in his office. What transpired at that meeting is a subject
of controversy. The only contemporaneous written record is a memo-
randum dated February 16, one day after the meeting, from Richard
Helms back to the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff.
Helms wrote:
We gave huin [Day] the background, development, and
current status, withholding no relevant details.
After we had made our presentation, the Postmaster Gen-
eral requested that we be joined by the Chief Postal Inspec-
tor, Mr. Henry Montague. This gentleman confirmed what
we had had to say about the project and assured the Postmas-
ter General that the matter had been handled securely,
quietly, and that there had been no "reverberations." The
meeting ended with the Postmaster General expressing the
opinion that the project should be allowed to continue and
that he did not want to be informed in any greater detail on
its handling. He agreed that the fewer people who knew
about it, the better.101
While Helms cannot specifically recall now whether Day was informed
of the fact of mail openings, he strongly suggests that Day must have
been so informed. Helms recently testified as follows:
As I say, "withholding no relevant details." I assume when I
wrote that I meant 'What I wrote. . . . I cannot imagine what
the point of holding it back from him would have been. We
were going down to get his permission to continue the opera-
tion, and after all, it was his Post Office, if we had lied to him,
aid then he had discovered through his Chief Postal Inspec-
tor that something else was going on, that would not have
been a very wise way to behave, it seems to me.102
Day's version of these events differs from Helms. Apparently Day
did not believe that it was entirely "his Post Office," for in regard to
sensitive CIA operations, even those that touched on postal matters, he
testified: "It wasn't my responsibility. The CIA had an entirely differ-
ent kind of responsibility than I did. And what they had to do, they
had to do. And I had no control over them." 103 Because of this percep-
tion of the role of the Postmaster General vis-a-vis the Agency, he did
not wish to know the details of the New York project. According to his
account of the meeting, he interrupted Mr. Dulles before being in-
formed that the project involved the opening of mail. Day stated:
. . . Mr. Dulles, after some preliminary visiting and so on,
said that he wanted to tell me something very secret, and I
said, "do I have to know about it?" And lie said, "No."
I said, "My experience is that where there is something that
is very secret, it is likely to leak out, and anybody that knew
about it is likely to be suspected of having been part of leak-
ing it out, so I would rather not know anything about it."
"'Memorandum from Helms -to Deputy Chief, CI, re: HTLINGUAL, 2/16/61.
Henry Montague was aware of the New York operation but did not believe that
it involved the opening of mail. See p. 592.
1o. Richard Helms, 9/10/75, pp. 101-102.
'xo J. Edward Day, 10/22/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 49.
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What 'additional things were said in connection with him
building up to that, I don't know. But I am sure ... that I
was not told anything about opening mail.1o4
Day's general recollection is given some support by an internal CIA
memorandum written more than a decade later by the Chief of the CI
Staff Project (HTLINGUAL). This memorandum, written in August
1971 'and attached to Helms' February 16, 1961 summary, reads:
The wording of this memo leaves some doubt as to the degree
to which Day was made witting. I tend to feel that he was
briefed on the "mail surveillance" aspect and NOT the
clandestine opening. I find some confirmation in the sentence
in para. 2 "This gentleman (i.e. the Inspector Montague)
confirmed what we had to say about the Project . . ." Mon-
tague was NOTWITTING [sic] OF THE clandestine open-
ing and therefore the subject of the briefing of Day must have
been mail surveillance only.0 5 [Emphasis in original.]
Thus, it cannot be definitely said that Day knew-or did not know-
of the mail openings. All that is clear is that an Agency memorandum
suggests that the CIA was prepared to inform the Postmaster General
of this activity; that Helms at the time believed Day had been provided
with enough of the "relevant details" to interpret his reaction as gen-
erally approving the continuance of the project; and that Day's gen-
eral belief was that the Postmaster General had no control over and
should defer to the Agency's covert operations, even those which
might involve the United States mails-he "would rather not know
anything about it." 1o5
John A. Gronouki.-There is no claim by the CIA that Mr. Gronou-
ski, who was Postmaster General from August 1963 until November
1965, was ever informed of the CIA's New York mail intercept project.
According to one internal CIA document, consideration was given to
the idea of informing him in 1965 at the time of the hearings of the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure. This subcommittee, chaired by Senator Edward V. Long of
Missouri, was investigating the use of mail covers and various other
techniques by federal agencies, and CIA officials were seriously con-
cerned about "the dangers inherent in Long's subcommittee activities
to the security of the Project's operations ... " e10 The idea of inform-
ing Gronouski was quickly rejected, however, "in view of various state-
ments by Gronouski Before the Long subcommittee." '1 0 7 Since
Gronouski had agreed with the Subcommittee that tighter administra-
tive controls on mail covers were necessary and generally supported
the principle of the sanctity of the mail, it is reasonable to infer that
CIA officials assumed he would not be sympathetic to the technique
of mail opening. Such an inference is supported by the next sentence
in the memorandum which reflects this conversation: "[Thomas]
Karamessines agreed with this thought and suggested that, in his
opinion, the President would be more inclined to go along with the
idea of the operation."
' J. Edward Day, 10/22/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 45.
0 Unaddressed memorandum from the C/Cl/Project, dated "August 1970."
10' J. Edward Day, 10/25/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 45.
'Memorandum from "CIA Officer" to "the Files," 4/23/65.
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Lawrence F. O'Brien.-There is no claim by the CIA that Mr.
O'Brien, who was Postmaster General from 1965 to 1968, was ever
informed of the project.
W. Marvin Watson.-Similarly, there is no suggestion that Mr.
Watson, who held the office of Postmaster General in 1968 and 1969,
was ever told of the project. Richard Helms has testified that he "never
felt any need or compulsion to talk to Gronouski or O'Brien or Wat-
son.'" 108
Winton M. Blount.-The next Postmaster General briefed about the
New York mail intercept project was Winton Blount, who served in
that office from the first days of the Nixon Administration in 1969
until October 1971. As with the CIA's briefing of Edward Day, how-
ever, it is not clear whether Blount was specifically informed about
the mail opening aspect of the operation.
At least two reasons appear to have motivated Richard Helms, now
Director of Central Intelligence, to seek a meeting with Postmaster
General Blount about the New York project. First, he was strongly
urged to do so by William Cotter, a former CIA employee who had
been appointed Chief Postal Inspector in April 1969. In Cotter's
capacity as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Office of Secu-
rity's Manhattan Field Office during the mid-1950's, he had become
aware of the Agency's mail opening project, and although he had no
direct connection with the project he knew it continued during the
1960's. As Chief Postal Inspector, he was the only postal official who
was aware of the CIA's mail openings, and since his responsibilities
included guaranteeing the sanctity of the mail, he was uncomfortable
with his knowledge.osa Partly because Cotter felt bound by his secrecy
agreement with the Agency,109 however, he did not inform the Post-
master General about HTLINGUAL, nor did he initially take any
steps to terminate the project.0e.
Cotter's discomfort increased in January 1971 when he received a
letter from Dr. Jeremy Stone, Director of the Federation of American
Scientists, in which Stone inquired whether the Post Office ever
permitted any federal agency to open first class letter mail."10 Recog-
nizing one of the names on the association's letterhead to be another
former CIA employee who was also knowledgeable about the proj-
ect, Cotter feared that Stone's inquiry may have been based on in-
formation supplied by this former agent. He forwarded a copy of the
letter to Howard Osborn, then the CIA's Director of Security, and
requested a meeting with Helms to discuss his concern about embarrass-
ment to the Agency and to himself if the project were publicly re-
vealed. Helms subsequently did meet with Cotter, who urged him
to discuss the project with the Postmaster General. As Cotter later
testified:
I felt . . . by getting the Postmaster General briefed by the
CIA, the most senior people in the project, appropriate legal
guidance could be obtained from the chief law officer, the At-
'" Richard Helms testimony, 10/23/75, p. 28.
oa See p. 602.
See p. 602.
'09' See pp. 601-603.
no Letter from Jeremy J. Stone to Mr. W. J. Cotter, 1/31/71.
torney General, and by pushing up to that arena if the proj-
ect were unlawful I presumed it would have been stopped.
But my concern was to get the top people aware of the
proj ect.111
In addition to pressure from Cotter, the imminent reorganization of
the Post Office also motivated Helms to arrange a briefing of Post-
master General Blount. In mid-1971, the Post Office was to become the
Postal Service, and he felt that the consequent organization changes
might have an adverse effect on the security of the New York
operation.112
Before meeting with the Postmaster General, Helms first spoke with
Attorney General Mitchell. At this meeting, which is discussed in
greater detail below, Helms recalls that he requested Mitchell's advice
"as to whether this thing should be taken up with Mr. Blount because
of [the Post Office reorganization]." 113 According to Helms, Mitchell
encouraged him to :brief the Postmaster General, and a meeting was
set up between Mr. Blount and Mr. Helms for June 2, 1971.
The written record of the Blount-Helms meeting on June 2 consists
of a "Memorandum for the Record" written -by James Angleton which
described Helms' comments to top level CIA officials, including Angle-
ton, about his recent briefings of the Attorney General and the Post-
master General. In regard to the Blount briefing, this memorandum
reads as follows:
The DCI then indicated that yesterday, 2 June 1971, he had
seen Postmaster General Blount. Mr. Blount's reaction ...
was entirely positive regarding the operation and its con-
tinuation. He opined that "nothing needed to be done," and
rejected a momentarily held thought of his to have someone
review the legality of the operation as such a review would,
of necessity, widen the circle of witting persons. Mr. Helms
explained to the PMG that Mr. Cotter, then Chief Postal
Inspector, has been aware of the operation for a considerable
period of time by virtue of having been on the staff of CIA's
New York Field Office. Mr. Helms showed the Postmaster
General a few selected examples of the operation's product,
including an item relating to Eldridge Cleaver, which at-
tracted the PM's special interest. 14
Helms' subsequent testimony generally supports the accuracy of this
memorandum. On the question of whether or not Blount was informed
that the New York project involved mail opening, he testified that
"[i] t is my recollection that I told him we were opening mail in New
York." "15
nX William J. Cotter testimony, 8/7/75, pp. 51-52.
Helms, 9/10/75, pp. 117-118.
Helms, 9/10/75, pp. 118-119.
m Blind memorandum "for the record," 6/3/71.
' Helms, 9/10/75, p. 120.
Blount recalls the meeting with Helms, but does not believe that he
was informed about the mail opening aspects of the project. In public
session, Mr. Blount testified:
Well, as I recall, Mr. Helms explained to me about a project
that he told me had been going on for a great number of years.
I don't know whether he said 15 years or what, but there was
some indication in my mind that this had been going on for
at least 15 years, that it was an ongoing project. It was a
project of great sensitivity and great importance to the na-
tional security of this country and that he wanted to inform
me about it.
... [M]y 'best recollection is, he told me this was a project
in which the Post Office was cooperating with the CIA, that
there were a couple of postal employees in New York City
that I believe he told 'me were the only ones who really were
involved or knew about this project, that the way in which
it operated was that the postal employee would remove from
the mail stream letters going to the Soviet Union and give it
to two or three CIA employees, and whatever they did with
it, it was reintroduced into the -mail stream the next day.
That's about the ending of my recollection. *1
He added that he did not recall either asking Helms what was done
with the mail or being informed by him that the mail was opened
by CIA agents.117 While he did recall that Eldridge Cleaver's name
was "mentioned," he did not believe that he was shown samples of
Cleaver's opened mail or that Helms indicated in any way that
Cleaver's mail had been opened." 8
On the statement in Angleton's memorandum that he "rejected a
momentarily held thought of his to have someone review the legality
of the operation", Blount agreed that he considered asking the Gen-
eral Counsel of that Post Office for a legal opinion, but insisted that
this consideration was not based on his knowledge or assumption
that mail was being opened."' Whatever doubts he had about the le-
gality of the operation described by Helms were assuaged when Helms
informed him that he had seen or was about to see the Attorney General
on this matter.12 0 Blount does not recall, however, ever discussing the
legality-or any other aspect of the project-with the Attorney Gen-
eral personally; he accepted Helms' statement that Mitchell
was knowledgeable about the project and "decided to let the Attorney
General handle the legality of it." 121
Blount does not recall taking any action on the basis of his briefing
by Helms; he made no further inquiries of the CIA or within his own
Department about the conduct of the mail project and did not raise
the matter with any other Cabinet officer or the President. As he later
testified, "[M]y attitude was that if it is legal, I wanted to do what
we could do to cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency on a
"uWinton M. Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 46, 47.
"1 Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 47.
Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 49.
Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 47.
Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 50.
m'Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 50.
matter they considered of highest priority to this country and that
dealt with national security." 122
Elmer T. Klamsen.-There is no evidence that Elmer Klassen, who
succeeded Blount as Postmaster General in 1971 and remained in that
position through the termination of the project in 1973, was ever
briefed on any aspect of the New York project.
2. Chief Postal Inspectors
The various roles of the Chief Postal Inspectors in regard to the New
York mail intercept operation have been alluded to above. It is suf-
ficient here to note that while all of the men who held this office during
the course of the project-Clifton Garner (until 1953); David
Stephens (1953 to 1961) ; Henry Montague (1961 to 1969) ; William
Cotter (1969 to 1975)-were apparently aware of the mail cover as-
pects, only one-William Cotter-clearly knew that mail was also
being opened by the CIA.
Garner had initially been contacted in November 1952 by CIA of-
ficials in the Offices of Operations and Security and apparently con-
sented to the first survey of mail between the United States and the So-
viet Union in New York.122a Montague helped implement this survey
and the early operation of the project in 1953 in his position as Postal
Inspector in Charge of the New York Region. 1 22 b As Chief Postal In-
pector in 1961, he also attended part of the briefing of Edward Day by
Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and Cornelius Roosevelt.122c Stephens in-
structed Montague to cooperate with the CIA in regard to the proj-
ect in 1953 and was present at the Summerfield briefing in May 1954.122d
There is no evidence (or claim by the CIA) that any of these three
men knew that the CIA project involved the opening of mail, how-
ever. As noted above, Montague has also testified that Stephens in-
structed him, and he in turn instructed the CIA agents who visited
him in 1953, that mail opening would not be permitted.
William Cotter was therefore the first Chief Postal Inspector who
was clearly aware of all aspects of the mail project. Despite his initial
reluctance to take any action on the basis of his knowledge, Cotter
was instrumental in arranging the Helms-Blount briefing in 1971 and
ultimately in the termination of the project in 1973. His role in the
project's termination is discussed below. 1 22 e
3. Attorneys General
There is no evidence in the record that any Attorney General
before or after John Mitchell was ever informed about the CIA's
New York project. At a minimum, Mitchell was briefed about cer-
tain CIA mail covers by Richard Helms on June 1, 1971, but as with
the Day and Blount briefings, the evidence about Mitchell's knowledge
of mail opening and the New York project specifically, tends to be
contradictory.
m Winton M. Blount, 8/13/75, p. 24.
' See p. 568.
12b See pp. 568-569.
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The background for the Mitchell briefing has been described above:
William Cotter, concerned about the letter he had received from
Jeremy Stone and uncomfortable with his knowledge of the mail
openings in New York, urged Richard Helms to discuss the operation
with the Postmaster General; in addition, the imminent reorganization
of the Post Office cast the future security of the project in doubt.
Rather than go to the Postmaster General directly, Helms chose to
consult first with the Attorney General, in part to seek Mitchell's
opinion as to whether or not Mr. Blount should be informed. As
Mr. Helms publicly explained, .
... it was quite clear that [Mitchell] had a particular role
for the President in sort of keeping an eye on intelligence
matters and on covert action matters. . . . He was sort of, I
think, a watchdog for the President, so I have consulted with
Mr. Mitchell on a variety of the problems affecting the Agency
over time that I would not have gone to the normal Attorney
General about, nor would the normal Attorney General have
been necessarily privy to these things.n"s
According to a CIA memorandum dated June 3, 1971, two days
after the June 1 meeting between the Director and the Attorney
General, Helms told a group of ranking CIA officials that he had
briefed Mitchell about the operation and "Mr. Mitchell fully con-
curred in the value of the operation and had no 'hang-ups' concerning
it." 124 Helms elaborated on this meeting with Mitchell in his recent
public testimony, stating that he
told him [Mitchell] about this operation, what it was doing
for us, that it had been producing some information on for-
eign connections, dissidents, and terrorists, a subject in which
he was intensely interested, and that we might have a problem
when the U.S. Postal Service was founded. And I asked if it
wouldn't be a good idea that I go and see the Postmaster
General, Mr. Blount, and talk with him about this and see
how he felt about it and to get some advice from him. And, it
was my recollection that Mr. Mitchell acquiesced in this and
said, "Go ahead and talk to Mr. Blount.25
When asked whether or not he told Mitchell that the project involved
the opening of mail, Helms replied: ". . . I don't recall whether I said
specifically we are opening X numbers of letters. But the burden of
my discussion with him, I don't see how it could have left any alter-
native. in his mind because how do you Aind out what somebody is say-
ing to another correspondent unless you have opened the letter?" 126
John Mitchell has acknowledged meeting with Helms on June 1,
1971, and recalls a discussion of "mail covers," but on the basis of his
recollection denies that Helms told him mail was opened.127 He does
not remember being informed of any of the details of the New York
operation, and believes that even the discussion of mail covers was in
a Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 87.
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relation to an intelligence operation distinct from one that would
fit the description of the New York project.128 The former At-
torney General testified that, as he recalled, "the discussion of the
mail was ancillary to another discussion that was not extensive, and
* . it had to do with mail covers, or at least I assumed it [did]
. 129 He added that he had no recollection of Helms' asking his
advice as to whether or not the Postmaster General should be briefed
on any CIA project,"as and that the first time he became aware that
the CIA had opened mail in the United States was when these opera-
tions were publicly revealed in 1974 and 1975.131
James Angelton testified that he also met with John Mitchell dur-
ing Mitchell's tenure as Attorney General, described the New York
project to him, and showed him some samples of the product, specific-
ally, a copy of a letter from Kathy Boudin.' Angelton does not recall
the possible date of such a meeting, however.
Mitchell does not recall ever having met with Angelton, or even hav-
ing heard his name until recently."'*
4. Presidents
There is no documentary evidence that any President ever authorized
the CIA's New York mail opening project. With the possible excep-
tion of Lyndon Johnson in 1967 or 1968, there is no CIA claim that
any President was even informed of it."'"* While proposals were made
by CIA officials in 1954 and again in 1965 to advise the President of
the existence of HTLINGUAL, it does not appear that these pro-
posals were implemented. In the context of the so-called "Huston
Plan" deliberations, moreover, CIA officials actually withheld knowl-
edge of the ongoing New York project from the President's repre-
sentative and from President Nixon himself. And despite President
Nixon's eventual refusal to authorize the use of "covert mail coverage"
(mail opening) as an intelligence collection technique (after a brief
period of approval), the CIA project continued without interruption
for another two years.
1954 Proposals to Seek the Approval of President Eisenhower.-
In a January 4, 1954 memorandum from Sheffield Edwards, then Di-
rector of Security, to Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, it
Mitchell, 10/2/75, p. 12.
Mitchell, 10/2/75, p. 12.
Mitchell, 10/2/75, p. 13.
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CIA mail opening programs. It did, however, state that federal agencies
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a description which accurately fit only the FBI mail opening programs. When
Mitchell learned of the proposal to sanction mail opening on a Presidential
level, he urged President Nixon to withdraw his support for the plan. See
Senate Select Committee Report on the Huston Plan.
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was recommended that the Director and the Postmaster General (after
having been himself briefed) meet with "and then seek oral approval
of [the] President." 134 This recommendation was reiterated in a sec-
ond memorandum from Edwards to Dulles eight days later'1
In later years, it was assumed by some CIA officers that
Dulles had -in fact briefed President Eisenhower on the program. The
1969 review of the project 'by the Inspector General's staff, simply
states, without citation: "It is believed that Mr. Dulles briefed Presi-
dent Eisenhower on this subject." 136 Richard Helms has also testified
that "I always assumed that Mr. Dulles, before we went to see Mr.
Summerfield, had checked this out with President Eisenhower. I do
not recall his ever specifically saying [that] to me, that was sort of an
assumption on my part, that something of this importance he would
have checked out and he would have proceeded on to his appointed
task of speaking to the Postmaster General." 13
Summerfield himself had only been informed of the 'mail cover
aspects of the project in 1954, however; the Agency apparently never
returned to inform him that mail opening later became the primary
program objetive. Helms -added, moreover, that he had never seen
any documentary confirmation of a meeting between Director Dulles
and the President in regard to the project.138 Beyond the proposals
themselves and the later undocumented assumptions 'by CIA officials,
there is no evidence that President Eisenhower was ever informed
about any 'aspect of the New York operation.
1965 Propo8al to Inform Pre8ident Johnson.-In 1965, the Long
Subcommittee hearings on the use of mail covers -and other investiga-
tive techniques by federal agencies caused the Agency serious concern
about possible Congressional discovery and revelation of the project.
It is noted above that in September 1965, as a result of this concern,
CIA officials briefly considered informing 'Postmaster General
Gronouski of the project. When this proposal was rejected, presum-
ably because Gronouski had cooperated extensively with the Sub-
committee, Thomas Karamessines, then Acting Deputy Director for
Plans, "suggested that, in his opinion, the President would be more
inclined to go along with the idea of the operation." 139 Karamessines
"gave instructions that steps should be taken to arrange to pass
through McGeorge Bundy to the President after the subcommittee has
completed its investigation." 140 Apparently, however, this was not
done. Mr. Bundy does not recall ever having been informed of the
project; 1oa neither Thomas Karamessines nor Richard Helms knew
of any attempt to inform Bundy so that he could in turn inform the
President; 141 and there is no documentary record of such an attempt.
2M emorandum from Edwards to DCI, 1/4/54.
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The Helm8-Johoson Meeting: 1967-1968.-Although it does not
appear that President Johnson was contemporaneously informed
about the mail project after the 1965 recommendation to do so, Richard
Helms claims that he may have advised him about it in 1967 or
1968. Toward the end of President Johnson's term in office, the Presi-
dent instructed Helms to prepare a report detailing the truth or falsity
pf columnist Drew Pearson's allegation about CIA assassination
attempts. Helms recalls that the President also asked him whether the
CIA was engaged in any other operations that "might be regarded as
sensitive." 142 It is Helms' belief that they then "discussed two or three
items,.. . [and] it was at that time that I think I mentioned [the New
York project]." 143 When asked whether or not he indicated to the
President that mail was opened in connection with the project, Helms
said that "[i]f I discussed this with President Johnson I would not
have deluded him by using one terminology to convey something else. I
would have said, 'We are getting into Russian mail,' or something.
I was not that kind of fellow with people." 144 There are no CIA docu-
ments relating to this discussion, however, and Helms himself is not
positive that it in fact occurred, only that "there was a p6ssibility that
I discussed ... this letter opening thing on that occasion." 145
Huston Plan: 1970.-During the summer of 1970, the so-called
"Huston Plan" meetings and report presented the CIA with a clear
opportunity to inform the President of their mail opening project. 48
But this opportunity was apparently never taken.
As a result of his perceived need for more effective domestic intelli-
gence, Richard Nixon instructed representatives of the major federal
intelligence agencies to meet under the guidance of Tom Charles Hus-
ton and to prepare a series of options designed to achieve this goal.
One of the options subsequently discussed at the four meetings that
summer was the use of "covert mail coverage" (i.e. mail opening)
directed against both foreign and domestic targets. Although the
CIA's New York project was ongoing at the time, the CIA represent-
atives at these meetings, James Angleton and Richard Ober, did not
advise this group of intelligence experts about its existence, and the
final report-to which Angleton and Ober contributed and which
Richard Helms signed-was submitted to the President containing
the statement that "covert coverage has been discontinued." 147 At no
time was either Huston, the President's representative, or the Presi-
dent himself informed that the CIA was then opening mail.
According to Angleton, the New York project was not revealed to
the group because it was considered to be compartmented knowledge
and such a revelation would serve "no useful purpose," especially in
light of the security considerations which had been articulated by the
National Security Agency's representative.'4 s But he also conceded
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that neither Huston nor the President himself were told about the
project in private. 49
Of the statement in the final report that all covert mail coverage
had been discontinued, Richard Helms said:
. . . the only explanation I have for it was that this applied
entirely to the FBI and had nothing to do with the CIA, that
we never advertised to this Committee or told this Committee
that this mail operation was going on, and there was no inten-
tion of attesting to a lie . . .
And if I signed this thing, then maybe I didn't read it
carefully enough.
There was no intention to mislead or lie to the President.5 0
Helms agreed, however, that on the face of the report the President
could not have known that covert mail coverage in fact continued,'5
and he stated that at no time did he personally ever inform President
Nixon about the CIA's use of this technique in the New York proj-
ect.lsla The President, in short, was given a report-signed by Helms-
which explicitly said mail opening had been discontinued when it had
not.
On July 23, 1970, Tom Charles Huston wrote Director Helms that
the President had approved the relaxation of restrictions on a number
of the investigative techniques discussed in the final report."2 For the
first time in the history of the CIA's mail project, the Agency had what
appeared to be Presidential authorization for "covert mail coverage,"
although not specifically for the New York program, about which the
President remained ignorant.152 a But five days after Huston informed
Helms of the President's approval, the authorization was withdrawn
and Helms was asked to return the memorandum reflecting the original
approval.153 Now the situation was reversed: a President had
addressed the issue of the use of mail opening as an investigative tech-
nique and ultimately refused to endorse it. Despite the withdrawal of
Presidential approval, however, the CIA did not terminate the New
York project. The project continued for nearly three years after these
events, and the CIA continued to open mail within the United States
in the face of an apparent Presidential prohibition of this technique.
President Nixon's "General Awoareneas" of CIA Mail Covers but
Not of Mail Openings.-Former President Nixon recently stated that
he was aware of the CIA's use of mail covers but not of its mail open-
ing operations. He explained:
While President, I remember being generally aware of the
fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, acting without a
warrant, both during and prior to my Administration, con-
ducted mail covers of mail sent from within the United States
to:
A. The Soviet Union; or
..o Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 114.
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B. The People's Republic of China.
However, I do not remember being informed that such mail
covers included unauthorized mail openings.L5s
He also noted that he did "not recall receiving information, while
President, that any agency or employee of the United States Govern-
ment, acting without a warrant, opened mail" in any program that
would fit the description of the CIA's New York mail opening proj-
ect or any other CIA or FBI mail opening project.l153b
There is no claim in the documentary record or in the testimony of
any CIA official that the Agency ever informed President Nixon about
any aspect of the New York project. Nor is there any claim that the
President ever indicated to the CIA his approval of any aspect of this
particular project, even the use of mail covers. Richard Helms, for
example, testified in 1975 that he "never recall[ed] discussing
[the New York mail opening project] with President Nixon," 153c and
added (before the former President made the comments quoted above)
that "What President Nixon knew about it, I don't know to this
day." 1153d
bissemination of Information to the White House.-According to
a March 1971 CIA memorandum, sanitized information generated by
the New York mail opening project was disseminated to the White
House even after the President's July 1970 rejection of the use of this
technique. This memorandum lists the types of information accumu-
lated through the project, including data about "peace activists, anti-
government groups, black radicals and other militant dissidents." 154
It continues: "In all the above, HTLINGUAL provides the White
House ... coverage of overseas contacts and activity of persons with-
in the United States who are of critical concern from the viewpoint
of internal national security, including bombing and terrorism." 5 5
At least one former White House official-John D. Ehrlichman-
has testified that from his reading of the intelligence reports provided
to the White House he was able to determine that mail was being in-
tercepted. When asked whether he knew of a program of intercepting
mail between the United States and Communist countries, Ehrlich-
man replied: "I knew that was going on because I had seen reports
that cited those kinds of sources in connection with this, the bombings,
the dissident activities" 156 He stated that he "assumed," 157 but was not
positive, that this was a CIA operation: "Maybe the way the things
is [sic] couched, it is always obscurely put as to what the sources are,
but it could have been the FBI for all I know." 158 He did not know
a3s Responses of Richard Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories,
3/9/76, pp. 4, 5. Neither the documentary nor the testimonial record provide a
clear explanation of how Mr. Nixon learned of CIA mail covers.
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whether the President was aware of this program,159 however, and
could not recall ever personally discussing the matter with him.8 0
Ehrlichman added that he did not know of any conversation within
the White House about the legality or propriety of such a program nor
of any inquiry made by the White House.~*
The lack of a formal approval structure for HTLINGUAL outside,
as well as inside the CIA, is plain: Cabinet officers were sometimes
briefed, but much more frequently ignored (sometimes 'consciously
so); no documentary record reflects the one possible "mention" of the
project to a President; another President was misled; and the
closest resemblance to a Presidential policy directive prohibiting mail
opening went unheeded.
It is difficult to generalize from an inconsistent record, but these are
among the conclusions that may be tentatively offered in regard to
external authorization for the project: the agency desired external
authority but was reluctant to ask for it, either for fear of refusal, out
of concern with security, or simply because it was less complicated to
maintain the status quo. If Cabinet officers were informed of mail
openings, it was done so circuitously; only the minimum knowledge
necessary to secure their approval was imparted. The officers who were
briefed, for their part, apparently did not want to know the details, did
not want to be held accountable, and deferred to the Agency on na-
tional security matters.
E. Termination of the Project
1. Proposed Termination: The 1969 Inspector General's Report
Four years before the actual termination of the project, the Inspec-
tor General's staff formally recommended that consideration be given
to discontinuance. Its 1969 survey of HTLINGUAL had revealed that:
The principal customer is and has been the FBI . . . [which]
several years ago initiated a similar program to cover mail to
and from Bloc countries. It discontinued the program because
of the inherent sensitivity, but would dislike having us dis-
continue a similar one. We are sympathetic to the Bureau's
position, but question whether their interest is sufficient justi-
fication for our assuming risk of most serious embarras-
ment.163
" Ehrlichman deposition, 4/17/75, p. 98.
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This finding, coupled with the conclusion that the project was "of little
value to this Agency," 164 led the Inspector General's staff to recom-
mend that the Director should negotiate with the FBI to take over the
project or, in the event that the FBI should decline to assume responsi-
bility, he should discontinue it.
Informally, the author of the 1969 report, John Glennon, had al-
ready discussed the possibility of an FBI takeover of the project with
Sam Papich, Bureau liaison to the FBI, and he knew that there was
virtually no chance the FBI would assume responsibility for it. Ac-
cording to Glennon, Papich told him "that the Bureau would not run
it . . . and he implied that they just would not want to be involved in
opening mail. I suppose because of the flap potential." 11* Glennon was
not surprised by the Bureau's attitude. He testified:
[I]t was fine of the Bureau not to take it over because we
should not be doing it in the first place. If somebody else is
foolish enough to do it, I can see the Bureau wanting to take
advantage of it . . . [and] if the Agency got egg on its face,
the Bureau would not get egg on its face." "1
Because he knew the FBI would not take over the project, Glennon
acknowledged that the recommendation in the 1969 report was, in
effect, a straight recommendation to abandon HTLINGUAL. 6 7
When the 1969 report was presented to the Director, however, Helms
did not attempt to engage the FBI in negotiations over responsibility
for the project. Rather, he "asked to have the FBI contacted to find out
their feeling about the value of this operation [and was] told that they
thought it was valuable and would hate to see it terminated." 168 In bal-
ancing the perceived value to the FBI on the one hand, and the stated
lack of value to several Agency components on the other, Helms
decided in favor of continuing the project.1 6 9
2. Inreasing Security Risk8: 1971
The question of terminating or turning over the project to the FBI
came to the fore again in the spring of 1971, after Chief Postal Inspec-
tor William Cotter had received the letter from Dr. Jeremy Stone on
behalf of the Federation of American Scientists inquiring whether the
Post Office permitted any federal agencies to open mail. For reasons
described above, Cotter viewed the letter as a genuine threat to the
security of the New York project and believed his own position as
Chief Postal Inspector would be seriously compromised if knowledge
of the project were publicized. When he communicated his concern to
Director of Security Howard Osborn, Osborn relayed it to Helms.
Prompted by this new security risk, and possibly by additional security
problems inherent in the imminent reorganization of the Post Office,
Helms convened a meeting of top CIA officials on May 19, 1971, to
discuss the future of HTLINGUAL.
On the agenda were such security problems as the Stone letter, the
postal clerk who brought the mail to the CIA's "interceptors" at JFK
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Airport, and Cotter's inability to testify truthfully before a Congres-
sional committee that he had no knowledge of CIA mail opening. The
subject of FBI exploitation of the project was also discussed.17 0
Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, forcefully
argued that in light of these security risks CIA involvement in the
project should cease, and the FBT should assume responsibility for it.
According to the minutes of the meeting:
On the question of continuance, the DDP [Karamessines]
stated that he is gravely concerned, for any flap would cause
the CIA the worst possible publicity and embarrassment. He
opined that the operation should be done by the FBI because
they could better withstand such publicity, inasmuch as it is a
type of domestic surveillance. The D/S [Howard Osborn]
stated that he thought the operation served mainly a Bureau
requirement.171
James Angleton contended that the project should be continued by the
Agency: "The C/CI [Angleton] countered that the Bureau would not
take over the operation now, and could not serve essential CIA require-
ments as we have served theirs; that, moreover, CI Staff sees this
operation as foreign surveillance." 172 When Helms asked whether or
not the project should be continued "in view of the known, risks,"
Angleton replied "that we can and should continue to live with
them." 73
Apparently Helms was not entirely convinced by Angleton's argu-
ments. At one point during the meeting, according to Howard Osborn,
he turned to Angleton and asked, "If this project is so . . . important
to the FBI, why ... don't they take it over?" 174 Osborn testified that
Angleton responded by noting that the FBI could not do so under the
stringent limitations on investigative techniques imposed by J. Edgar
Hoover.175
The course of action that Helms finally decided upon has been
recited above: he met with Cotter personally and was urged to
inform the Postmaster General; before informing Mr. Blount, he
also called on Attorney General Mitchell. Since Helms believed that
both of these Cabinet officers had assented to the mail opening opera-
tion, he again supported its continuance. When he reported the favor-
able results of these briefings to the same group of CIA officials at a
subsequent meeting on June 3, the minutes of that meeting show that
"all present were gratified"1.176 The only instruction Helms gave to
those in charge of the project was to tighten security measures, and
the project continued.
3. William Cotter's Continuing Concern
The Secrecy Agreement and Cotter's Dilem/ma.-After Helms
briefed Blount on the New York project, William Cotter recalls that
'" Blind memorandum, "for the Record," Subject: "DCI's Meeting Concerning
HTLINGUAL," 5/19/71.
"Blind memorandum, "for the Record," Subject: "DOI's Meeting Concerning
HTLINGUAL," 5/19/71.
"' Ibid. [Emphasis in original].
.. Ibid.
"'4 Osborn, 8/28/75, p. 69.
"' Ibid.
1Blind memorandum "for the Record", Subject: "Meeting at DOI's Office
Concerning HTLINGUAL", 6/3/71.
he received a telephone call from Blount, who informed him that the
briefing had occurred and instructed him, in effect, to "carry on with
the project." 1r7 He was informed that the Attorney General had been
advised of the project as well. Cotter's anxiety decreased with the
knowledge that Blount and Mitchell had been briefed and apparently
supported the project,s78 but his peace of mind proved to be short-
lived: in the latter part of 1971, Blount resigned as Postmaster
General, and Mitchell stepped down as Attorney General shortly
thereafter. Cotter was again the highest ranking Government official
outside of the CIA and FBI who knew of the CIA's mail opening
project.
From the first days of his tenure as Chief Postal Inspector, Cotter
had been concerned about the New York mail project. He testified:
I was aware that when I assumed the capacity of Chief Postal
Inspector I became responsible for enforcing the Postal laws,
[and I also] became aware of the high, high sensitivity of
Postal Inspectors with regard to violations of Section 1702
[of Title 18 of the United States Code, which prohibits
tampering with the mail]. We arrest people every day for ...
opening mail, stealing, and so forth, and so I was very, very
uncomfortable with [knowledge of this] project.179
Entrusted with this responsibility, Cotter had felt constrained by the
letter and the spirit of the secrecy oath, which he had signed when
he left the CIA in 1969, "attesting to the fact that I would not divulge
secret information that came into my possession during the time that
I was with the CIA." 180 "After-coming from eighteen years in the
CIA," Cotter said, "I was hypersensitive, perhaps, to the protection of
what I believed to be a most sensitive project .. 1" For this rea-
son, he had written a response to the Jeremy Stone letter that by his
own admission was untrue, explaining later that, "If I responded . . .
accurately to Mr. Stone, it would have blown the whole operation for
the CIA . . ." 182 For the same reason, he had never informed Post-
master General Blount about the project, although, as noted above,
he encouraged Helms to do so after he had been Chief Postal Inspec-
tor for two years. The minutes of the May 19, 1971, meeting in Direc-
tor Helms' office aptly summarized Cotter's situation: ". . . in an ex-
change between the DCI and the DDP it was observed that while Mr.
Cotter's loyalty to the CIA could be assumed, his dilemma is that he
owes loyalty now to the Postmaster General." 
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When Blount resigned, Cotter did not know whether the project
had ever been described to Blount's former deputy and successor as
Postmaster General, Elmer Klassen. He again chose not to raise the
matter with the new Postmaster General directly, but began communi-
cating his concern to Howard Osborn and Thomas Karamessines at
the Agency.184
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Cotter's Ultimatum.-Although Osborn and Karamessines were
sympathetic to his position and were themselves convinced that the
project should be stopped. Cotter's periodic expressions of concern re-
suited in neither a briefing of Postmaster General Kkssen nor a termi-
nation of HTLINGUAL. "Since I wasn't getting any action on the
part of the CIA," Cotter testified, "I suggested to Mr. Osborn that
unless I received some indication that this project had been approved
at an exceedingly high level in the United States Government, I was
going to withdraw the Postal Service support." 185 Osborn recalls that
otter specifically referred to authorization at the Presidential level-
he would no longer be satisfied by the Postmaster General's approval-
and that he set a deadline of February 15, 1973.18
Effect of Watergate.-By the time Cotter presented the CIA with
his ultimatum, the Watergate revelations had contributed to the cre-
ation of a national political climate vastly different from that
during the project's infancy and growth. An increasing number
of CIA officials connected with the New York operation believed that
the time was ripe for its termination and welcomed Cotter's position
as an opportunity to force the reexamination of its relative advantages
and disadvantages. Howard Osborn testified that he "shared [Cot-
ter's] concern. I thought it was illegal and in the Watergate climate we
had absolutely no business doing this." 187 He discussed the matter
with William Colby, newly appointed DDP, who, according to Os-
born, agreed that the project was illegal and should not be continued,
"particularly in a climate of that type." 188
4. Schlesinger's Decision to Suspend the Project
When James Schlesinger, who had succeeded Richard Helms as
Director of Intelligence, learned of Cotter's ultimatum, he scheduled
briefings by Colby and James Angleton about the future of HTLIN
GUAL. Colby argued that the "substantial ... political risk [of reve-
lation was] not justified by the operation's contribution to foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence collection." 189 Angleton, a strong
supporter of the project in the past, attempted to persuade the new
Director that the operation was valuable and still merited continu-
ance.190
According to a contemporaneous memorandum by William Colby,
Schlesinger was unconvinced that "the product to the CIA [was]
worth the risk of CIA involvement." 191 The Director decided on a
two-pronged course of action. First, he "directed the DDCI [Deputy
Director Vernon Walters] to discuss the activity with the Acting
Director, FBI [L. Patrick Gray], with a view to offering the FBI
the opportunity to take over the project, including the offer to detail-
ing the CIA personnel involved to the FBI to implement it under
FBI direction and responsibility." 192 Second, Schlesinger agreed, in
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light of Cotter's ultimatum, to suspend the operation "unless Mr.
Cotter would accept its continuance for the time being under our
assurances that the matter is being prosecuted at a very high level." "
Cotter refused to extend his deadline, and William Colby author-
ized the suspension of the project on February 15, 1973. Colby notified
Howard Osborn of the suspension and Osborn instructed the Office of
Security's Manhattan Field Office to shut down the operation that
afternoon. There is no evidence that any attempt was subsequently
made to secure Presidential approval, and when the FBI refused to
assume operational responsibility (for reasons discussed below), the
suspension proved to be permanent.
F. Legal Considerations and the "Flap Potential"
Within the Agency, the legality of the New York mail opening
project was perceived to be dubious at best. Among those agents and
officers connected with it who considered it legal implications at all,
some believed that the project would have been illegal but for the
internal and external approvals which they assumed-sometimes erro-
neously-had been granted. Most simply recognized HTLINGUAL to
be illegal but rationalized it nonetheless. The general reaction to the
questionable legality of the project was neither to stop it nor to seek
a definitive opinion as to its legal status; it was to tighten security
in order to reduce the risk of exposure to Congress and the general
public. The evidence regarding its termination, moreover, suggests
that it was finally discontinued not so much because it was thought to
be illegal per se, as because the so-called "flap potential"-the risk of
embarrassment to the CIA that stemmed from its dubious legality-
was seen to outweigh its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
value to the Agency.
1. Perceptions of Legal Issues Within the Agency
Generally, those agents who served on the "front lines" of the New
York project, the interceptors and the analysts, did not concern them-
selves with legal issues at all; they did not ask if what they were
doing was within or outside the law, -and they were not told. As one
of the agents who opened the mail in the New York facility said, "We
would speculate when an Attorney General or a Postmaster would
change, or even a President, if they would be briefed, [but] this would
be knowledge which would never concern us. We would never be
told ... [Our work] was something that one entered into and did." 
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Among those Agency officials in a policymaking position, a few
have testified that while they knew the legality of the project to be
questionable, they believed that prior approvals internally and extern-
ally made it at least arguably lawful. Thomas Karamessines, former
Deputy Director for Plans, for example, stated that because he believed
the project had been discussed with a Postmaster General and Chief
Postal Inspector, both of whom, he understood, had approved of it,
the project must have fallen within an exception of the general statu-
tory prohibition against mail opening.'- His belief was buttressed by
the participation of the FBI, the chief law enforcement agency in
the country, and by the fact that he was told-erroneously-that Post
13 Ibid.
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Office Department lawyers had participated in the briefings of Postal
officials and that at least one President had approved it.-* Richard
Helms also testified that he did not assume the project was necessarily
illegal. Since Allen Dulles, a former Director and eminent lawyer,
knew of the project and presumably had "made his legal peace with
[it]," Helms said that he never seriously questioned its legal status
while it continued under his own tenure.197 This testimony is partially
contradicted, however, by the fact that in 1970 Helms signed the Hus-
ton Report, in which covert mail coverage (mail opening) was specifi-
cally described as illegal and without the "sanction of law." 198 Helms
and the other signers of -the Report presented the President of the
United States with the option of authorizing a technique which they
themselves characterized as unlawful.
Most of the Agency officials who have testified on this subject
simply assumed that mail opening was illegal. Gordon Stewart, who
was appointed Inspector General by Richard Helms in 1968 and re-
viewed the Staff's role in the project in 1969, said flatly, "[O]f course
we knew that this was illegal." 199 When he discussed the 1969 report
with Helms, he believed it was "unnecessary" to raise the matter of its
illegality "since everybody knew that it was [illegal] and it didn't seem
to me that I would be telling Mr. Helms anything that he didn't
know." 200 Howard Osborn agreed with this characterization of the
project's legal status. He testified that at one point in the early 1970's,
he approached Karamessines and "said this thing is illegal as hell." 201
Even James Angleton, the project's strongest supporter and, as Chief
of the CI Staff, the official most directly responsible for its operation,
testified that his understanding of its legality was simply: "That it
was illegal." 202 When asked how he could rationalize conducting a
program he believed to be illegal, he answered that in his opinion, the
project's benefit to the national security outweighed legal consider-
ations.203
The documentary record of the project supports the views of
those officials who testified that within the Agency the project was
perceived as illegal. References to the lack of legal authority for mail
opening in peacetime are found in internal memoranda written as
early as 1955 204 and 1962.205 An interal document dated September 26,
1963, explicitly states: "There is no legal basis for monitoring postal
communications in the United States except during time of war or na-
tional emergency when the President creates an independent gover-
ment agency called the Office of Censorship . . ." 206 It notes that "for
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. I have gathered since that this may have been erroneous information
given to me or a misunderstanding on my part." (Karamessines, 10/8/75, p. 23.)
m Richard Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 94.
"'Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June
1970, p. 30.
'"Gordon Stewart testimony, 9/30/75, p. 28.
N Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 32.
Osborn, 8/28/75, p. 39.
Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, vol. 2, p. 88.1 Ibid.
Blind memorandum "for the Record", Subject: "HTLINGUAL," 11/7/55.
Memorandum from Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Director,
Office of Security, 2/1/62; Memorandum from Sheffield Edwards, Director of
Security to Deputy Director (Support), 2/21/62.
the purposes of the above statement, the word monitoring is given the
meaning of examining the contents of postal communications without
necessarily notifying addressee or sender that this is being done."
During the course of the project, there was only one documented
attempt to develop a legal theory on which mail opening could be
predicated; paradoxically, it was presented in the context of an argu-
ment for terminating, not continuing, the project. In the paper which
William Colby used to brief James Schlesinger about the project in its
final days, Colby wrote:
While the recording of the addresses and return address is
totally legal, the opening of first-class mail is in conflict with
39 U.S. Code Section 4057. A contention can be made that
the operation is nonetheless within the Constitutional powers
of the President to obtain foreign intelligence information or
to protect against foreign intelligence activities (powers
statutorily recognized in 18 U.S.C. Section 119 [sic], with
respect to bugging and wiretapping).207
Two Postmasters General who were briefed on at least some aspects of
the New York project-Edward Day and Winton Blount-testified
that such an argument may have merit; for this reason, neither was
certain that the CIA's New York project was plainly illegal.2 0
The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), however, that the statutory
section to which Colby apparently referred does not represent an af-
firmative recognition by Congress of Presidential power with regard
to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; it is, in effect, a state-
ment of Congressional neutrality and deference to the judiciary in
defining the scope of the President's power if any in this area. This sec-
tion, moreover, relates to electronic surveillance only; those statutes
which prohibit warrantless mail opening 209 contain no analogous "ex-
" Memorandum from Chief, CI Project to Chief, Division 9/26/63.
Blind memorandum, Subject: "Mail Intercept Program," 2/14/73. From the
context of the second sentence, it appears that the correct statutory citation
should be Title 18, Chapter 119, Sections 2510-20, rather that 18 U.-S.C. Section
119. The specific section to which Mr. Colby apparently refers is 18 U.S.C.
2511(3).
" Edward Day, 10/22/75, Hearings, p. 53; Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, p. 52.
Day added that:
"If the CIA lawyers concluded that the CIA could not open mail to and from
Communist countries in the early 1960's without violating the law, I think the
CIA needs better lawyers.
"One can't answer such a unique legal question merely by reading from various
postal statutes and citing court decisions relating to warrantless mail openings
from the 19th century, which did not involve spying, cold war or subversive
activities. A less simplistic approach to the problem is required.
"For example, statutes clearly say it is a crime to kill or attempt to kill some-
one with premeditation. These statutes, and others making felonies of arson,
kidnapping, etc., do not say 'except in time of war.' But we -all know that excep-
tion is read into these laws (even if the killing or arson was in a 'war' of doubtful
legality ordered by Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon).
"In my opinion, the statutes relating to opening of mail must similarly have
read into them an exception for opening mail to and from Communist countries
by the CIA in time of cold war."
(Letter from J. Edward Day to the Chief Counsel, Senate Select Committee,
10/24/75.)
2 See p. 564.
ception." Furthermore, even if the President may constitutionally au-
thorize warrantless mail opening for national security reasons, no
President ever clearly authorized this program specifically or (with
one five-day exception in 1970 209a) the use of mail opening as an in-
vestigative technique generally.
Regardless of its merits, this first attempt at developing a legal
theory to justify HTLINGUAL was not even set forth until Feb-
ruary 14, 1973-one day before the suspension of the project. For
twenty years prior to this date, the New York project had continued
without the benefit of any perceived legal support.
2. Role of the General Cownsel
The CIA's General Counsel was not asked for a legal opinion on
Colby's theory. At no time, in fact, was the General Counsel ever
requested to evaluate the legal aspects of the New York project; all
the evidence, including the statement of the holder of this office him-
self,209b suggests that the General Counsel was never even aware of the
project's existence.
Thomas Abernathy, who, as a member of the Inspector General's
staff in the early 1960s had been in charge of the first review of the
New York project, conceded that his review did not include consulta-
tions with the General Counsel, because legal matters were a matter
for "top management." 210 The 1969 review, headed by Inspector Gen-
eral Gordon Stewart, also bypassed the Office of the General Counsel.
Stewart testified to at least two reasons why the General Counsel had
no input into the project evaluation. First, the Inspector General's
line of authority ran only to the Director of Central Intelligence; he
had no independent authority to consult the General Counsel di-
rectly. 211 Second, he believed that the security of the project precluded
his broadening the circle of witting persons, even when the person to be
included would be the Agency's own General Counsel. 2 0 He testified:
Well, I am sure that it was held back from him [the General
Counsel] on purpose. An operation of this sort in the CIA is
run-if it is closely held, it is run by those people immediately
concerned, and to the extent that it is really possible, accord-
ing to the practices that we had in the fifties and sixties, those
persons not immediately concerned were supposed to be igno-
rant of it.213
Richard Helms also testified that he never consulted the General
Counsel with regard to the legality of the operation, nor did he know
of any attempt by anyone else to do so.n4 He stated that in general,
"sometimes we did [consult the General Counsel for statutory inter-
pretations]; sometimes we did not. I think the record on that is rather
spotty, quite frankly." 215
0 See p. 597.
20 0b.Staff summary of Lawrence Houston interview, 10/15/75.
noThomas Abernathy testimony, 9/29/75, p. 47.
Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 30.
212Ibid.
mStewart, 9/30/75, p. 29.
Helms, 9/10/75, p. 58.
21 Helms, 9/10/75, p. 59.
3. The "Flap Potential"
Because many Agency officials connected with the project viewed it
as illegal, and because many of these officials also saw it as essentially
domestic surveillance and therefore outside the CIA's jurisdiction in
any event, there was general concern over the project's so-called "flap
potential." This term was used by Agency officials to describe the risk
of embarrassment to the CIA that would result from the revelation of
such a project to the general public and to Congress. It was this con-
cern over the project's flap potential that led to a general tightening of
security, to the creation of "cover stories," and other strategies in case
of exposure, and, ultimately, to the termination of the project.
In the CI Staff's original proposal in November 1955 to expand the
New York project to include large-scale mail opening, James Angle-
ton recognized that "[t] here is no overt, authorized or legal censorship
or monitoring of first class mails which enter, depart or transit the
United States at the present time." 216 He noted, therefore, that "[i]n
the event of compromise of the aspect of the project involving inter-
nal monitoring of the mails, serious public reaction in the United
States would probably occur. Conceivably, pressures would be placed
on Congress to inquire into such allegation . . ." At this point, how-
ever, he was confident that such inquiries could be thwarted. He con-
tinued: "...but it is believed that any problems arising could be sat-
isfactorily handled." 217 He wrote that the "cover story" was that the
CIA interceptors were in fact "doing certain research work on foreign
mail. ." 218
The review of the Office of Security's role in the project in the early
1960s raised the "flap potential" problem again. The Inspector Gen-
eral's report formally recommended that: 'An emergency plan and
cover story be prepared for the possibility that the operation might
be blown." 219 In response to this recommendation, the Deputy Di-
rector of Security suggested that in case of a local compromise in New
York, the "Office of Security would utilize its official cover to explain
any difficulties," and noted that "high-level police contacts with the
New York City Police Department are enjoyed, which would pre-
clude any uncontrolled inquiry in the event police action was indi-
cated." 220 If citizens complained about lost mail, he suggested that
the proper course should be "referral to the Post Office Department
for a normal official inquiry into lost registered mail." 221 Finally, if
the project was revealed by a disgruntled Agency employee, the
Deputy Director of Security wrote that the charge "may be answered
by complete denial of the activity." 222
The Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff also responded to
the Inspector General's recommendation for a cover story. He wrote
that "a 'flap' will put us 'out of business' immediately and may give
2Blind memorandum "for the Record", Subject: "HTLINGUAL," 11/7/55.
2 Ibid.
m Ibid.
2 Memorandum from L. K. White to Acting Inspector General (Attachment),
3/9/62.
m2 Memorandum from Deputy Director of Security to Chief, CI Staff, 1/11/62.
Memorandum from Deputy Director of Security to Chief, CI Staff, 1/11/62.
Ibid.
rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by government
agencies," 223 and argued:
Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission
of the violation, and existing Federal statutes preclude the
concoction of any legal excuse for the violation, it must be
recognized that no cover story is available to any Government
Agency. Therefore, it is important that all Federal law en-
forcement and U.S. Intelligence Agencies vigorously deny
any association, direct or indirect, with any such activity as
charged .. .
. . . Unless the charge is supported by the presentation of
interior items from the Project, it should be relatively easy to
"hush up" the entire affair, or to explain that it consists of
legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the
request of authorized Federal agencies. Under the most un-
favorable circumstances, . . . it might be necessary after the
matter has cooled off during an extended period of investi-
gation, to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tamper-
ing with the mails. Such cases by their very nature do not
have much appeal to the imagination of the public, and this
would be an effective way to resolve the initial charge of
censorship of the mails. 224
The views of the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff were adopted by the
Director of Security Sheffield Edwards in February 1962.225
Three years later, the Long Subcommittee's investigation was be-
lieved to increase the risk of project exposure. An internal CIA
memorandum dated April 23, 1965, states:
Mr. Karamessines [Assistant Deputy Director for Plans] felt
that the dangers inherent in Long's subcommittee activities
to the security of the Project's operations in New York should
be thoroughly studied in order that a determination can be
made as to whether these operations should be partially or
fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations are
completed. 22 6
When it was learned that Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague
had been contacted about the Long investigation and believed that
it would "soon cool off," however, it was decided to continue the
operation.227 No security changes were made, but Karamessines
recommended that the program should be brought to the attention
of President Johnson.
Although the Long subcommittee investigation did indeed "cool
off" in 1966, the elevation of William Cotter to the posi-
tion of Chief Postal Inspector in 1969 again raised the specter of
discovery by Congress. A CIA internal memorandum written on
the day that Cotter was sworn in shows that both Agency officials
" Memorandum from Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, to Director,
Office of Security, 2/1/62.
4 Ibid.
' Memorandum from Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, to Deputy
Director (Support), 2/21/62.
Memorandum from "CIA Officer" to "the Files", 4/23/65.
m Ibid.
and Cotter himself recognized that whereas Henry Montague did
not know of the mail opening aspects of the project and, therefore,
could "testify under oath on the Hill in such a way as to-in effect-
protect HTLINGUAL[,] Cotter will not be in such a position and
will be particularly vulnerable in the event of a flap in view of his own
past affiliation with the Agency." 228 The minutes of the meeting of top
Agency officials in the Director's office on May 19, 1971, also make
clear that their concern over the Jeremy Stone letter focused largely
on the fact that Cotter "would be unable to [deny knowledge of mail
opening] under oath" 229 before a congressional committee, as Mr.
Montague had been able to do, if the letter created adverse publicity.
The various recommendations for terminating the project before
1973 were predicated not on the perceived illegality of the operation
per 8e; but, to the extent legal factors were present at all, they were
based on the "flap potential" stemming from its questionable legal
status. The 1969 Inspector General's report, for example, cited lack
of value to the Agency and "the continued flap potential inherent in
this program" 230 as grounds for its formal recommendation to request
the FBI to assume responsibility for the project or, if the Bureau
refused, to consider its discontinuance. The report did not raise legal
questions directly, even though the then-Inspector General testified
that he believed the project to be illegal at the time. At the May 1971
meeting of Agency officials concerning the security of HTLINGUAL,
Deputy Director for Plans Thomas Karamessines also recommended
that CIA involvement be discontinued because "any flap would cause
the CIA the worst possible publicity and embarrassment" 2 3 1-not
because of the illegality of the project itself.
When the project was finally terminated in 1973, the evidence
suggests that the decision did not turn on a determination that it
was illegal-indeed, for the first time it was suggested that it might
be legal. Rather, Director James Schlesinger accepted William
Colby's evaluation that "[t]he political risk of revelation of CIA's
involvement in this project is in any case substantial . . . [and] is not
justified by the operation's contribution to foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence collection." 232
In short, many of its major participants saw the New York project
as illegal. While a few CIA officials believed that it was lawful, neither
the General Counsel nor the Attorney General 232a was ever consulted
for a legal opinion. Agency officials reacted to the project's generally
a2 Memorandum from SA/C/CI "for the Record," 4/7/69.
' Blind memorandum, Subject: "DCI's Meeting Concerning HTLINGUAL,"
5/19/71.
' Blind memorandum, Subject: "Special Investigations Group Project,"
undated.
2 Blind memorandum, Subject: "DCI's Meeting Concerning HTLINGUAL,"
5/19/71.
m Blind memorandum, Subject: "Mail Intercept Program", 2/14/73.
ma When Richard Helms was asked in public session whether, during his meet-
ing with Attorney General John Mitchell in 1971, Mr. Mitchell expressed an
opinion as to the legality of the project, he replied that Mitchell had not, and
added, "I went to see him for a purpose ... [a]nd my purpose .s to get his
advice as to whether it was desirable to see Mr. Blount, the Postmaster General,
on this mail operation." (Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 99). As noted
above, Mr. Mitchell does not recall being Informed of the New York mail opening
project at all and there is no indication in the record that any other Attorney
General was ever so informed.
perceived illegality, especially when it was threatened by congres-
sional investigations, by focusing even more closely on the security
precautions necessary to prevent exposure. Cover stories, designed to
obscure the CIA's true activities, were fabricated, and, in recognition
of the absence of any "legal excuse," it was ultimately agreed that the
project's very existence should -be flatly denied in the event of a serious
"flap." "Admission" was a strategy that apparently was never consid-
ered. The project was finally terminated when, in a new 'political cli-
mate created by Watergate, it was decided that the political risk
inherent in conducting such an operation clearly outweighed the proj-
ect's minimal value to the Agency.
III. OTHER CIA DOMESTIC MAIL OPENING PROJECTS
While the New York project was clearly the most massive one, the
CIA also conducted at least three other domestic mail opening proj-
ects: in San Francisco, on four separate occasions between 1969 and
1971; in New Oreans, for three weeks in 1957; and in Hawaii, for
approximately one year in 1954 'and 1955. In addition, the domestic
mail of twelve foreign nationals, CIA employees, and American
citizens unconnected with the Agency was also opened during
particular investigations.
These mail opening projects present many of the major themes of
the New York project: the lack of authorization, both internal and
external; the deception of postal officials; the random selection of
mail for opening; the attention to the correspondence of American
"dissidents", despite the stated foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence purposes; and the lack of formal review and evaluation.
Some of these other programs were more tightly administered than
the New York projects, and others more successful in achieving their
goals, but taken as a whole the same patterns emerge. In several cases-
such as the San Francisco mail project, for which internal approvals
were secured through misrepresentation of its true nature; and the
Hawaiian project, which was initiated by a sole field agent without
any authorization from Headquarters-these themes are even more
clearly defined.
A. The San Francico Mail Intercept Project
The San Francisco mail intercept project, known as WEST-
POINTER by the Office of Security and KMSOURDOUGH within
the Plans Directorate, involved the exterior examination and opening
of mail from an East Asian country to the United States. It was con-
ducted jointly by the Far East Division (FE) and TSD, with the
Office of Security providing cover and support. While referred to as
a single project, it actually involved four separate trips, each of one to
three weeks duration, by CIA personnel from Headquarters to the San
Francisco area, in September 1969, February and May 1970, and
October 1971. Only envelope exteriors were inspected on the first trip,
but mail was both opened and subjected to chemical tests on the latter
three. Although authorizations were obtained from the Director and
from the Deputy Director of Plans and the Director of Security, the
record suggests that these authorizations were for a mail cover opera-
tion only-not for mail opening. There is no evidence that any ap-
proval by Cabinet level officials or the President was ever secured for
this project.
1. Operation of the Project
The Initial Phase.-In mid-1969, TSD personnel requested the
Asian operations unit to assist them in determining the validity of
TSD's assumption that mail from an East Asian country to the United
States was subjected to intensive censorship. Originally, the mail
stream was to be intercepted abroad: the CIA's East Asian stations
undertook a survey of mail from the Asian country to the United States
and conducted "dry runs" of possibilities for its interception. Because
of the inherent risk and expense of an operation in Asia, however, and
in light of TSD's experience with the New York project, it was de-
cided that the project should be conducted in the United States after
the mail had arrived but prior to its sorting and delivery.
In late August 1969, two TSD officers met with James Conway,
Deputy Chief Postal Inspector in Washington, for the dual purpose
of requesting information on mail entering the United States from
this Asian country and to secure his permission for the exterior exam-
ination of such mail by CIA agents. Conway's response was favor-
able,23 3 and, at a subsequent meeting in September, the mechanical
details for the operation were arranged.
In late September, two agents from TSD traveled to California for
a visual examination of incoming mail from this Asian country in the
air mail facility at the San Francisco International Airport. In the
company of a Postal Inspector, they received access to and examined
approximately 1,600 letters in five days before returning to Washing-
ton. This trip constituted only a feasibility study to assess the poten-
tial of a full-scale operation prior to the commitment of Agency funds
and personnel; no mail was opened.
The Second Trip.-The results of the first trip were apparently
successful, and in early October the Chief of TSD approved a second,
larger scale survey of mail for the purpose of examining it for censor-
ship techniques. 2 34 The Far East Division, recognizing the foreign in-
telligence potential of the project, also became involved in order to
collect postal intelligence and positive intelligence. During the next
two months, approvals for a joint TSD/FE operation in San Fran-
cisco were obtained from the Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas
Karamessines; the Director of Security, Howard Osborn; and the Di-
rector, Richard Helms. 235
The Deputy Chief Postal Inspector was again contacted and, in
January 1970, granted his permission for a second session of CIA
access to incoming Asian mail. 2 3 6 Two TSD and two FE officers then
flew to San Francisco and met with the Regional Postal Inspector m
Charge, who had been notified of their appearance by Conway, to
arrange for the mechanical details. Mail processing on this trip com-
menced on February 5, 1970, and continued for one week only, until
" See pp. 618-619.
23 Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR
DOUGH", undated.
Ibi.
231 See pp. 618-619.
Februariy 12. The mail was picked up by a Postal Inspector at the San
Francisco airport and delivered-in the company of an armed
Office of Security agent-to a second Postal Inspector and the
four TSD and FE personnel at a local Post Office. It was screened
and the exteriors photographed during non-working hours at the
Post Office, in the presence of the Postal Inspector. From 5 to 80
letters per day were -selected for opening by the CIA agents and
"lifted" 237 by surreptitiously placing them in their pockets while the
Inspector was temporarily out of the room or had his back turned.
These letters were taken, at the end of each day, to a TSD laboratory
in a CIA facility nearby for opening and chemical testing. The opened
letters would then be resealed and returned by the CIA agents to the
mail stream within 48 hours. During the one week of operation, a
total of 7,014 letters-were screened and 133 opened. 2 3 The majority of
these letters were incoming from the Asian country to the United
States, but a CIA memorandum indicates that at least one bag of out-
going mail to that country was also made available to the agents. 3 9
The Third Trip.-CIA records pertaining to the third trip to San
Francisco are fragmentary. A handwritten "dairy" of a TSD officer,
however, contains an entry on April 4, 1970, to the effect that a memo-
randum written (for planned destruction) about the second trip "jus-
tifies further such trips, both on FI [foreign intelligence] and CI
[counterintelligence] grounds as well as TSD technical needs." 240 On
April 28, this officer noted that the "next phase will include re-run of
phase two, presumably in the same format. . . ." 24 He also noted that
the random selection of a female TSD agent for the project was the
"only significant flaw" of the planned trip, since some of the other
agents felt that "the presence [of a female] on the team is inappro-
priate and that things of this sort have caused trouble in the past. . . ."
James Conway was contacted and approved the operation for a
third time in early May 1970,242 and TSD and FE representatives again
traveled to San Francisco to process-mail between May 4 and May 27.
During these three weeks, a total of 2,800 letters were screened. While
Agency memoranda show that a portion of these letters were surrep-
titiously removed "to the TSD laboratory for opening and testing
(with the assistance of a large handbag of the female team mem-
ber",243 who apparently did make the trip), there are no precise figures
as to the number of letters opened. In addition to airmail, some surface
mail was also made available to CIA agents on this trip.
The Fourth Trip.-A fourth trip was proposed in August 1971,
in part "to take advantage of the impending visit of the President
of the United States to Asia." 244 In addition to examination for
2 Memorandum form "Identity #4", Subject: Sourdough Capsule Summary,
10/15/71.
' Blind memorandum, Subject: "Summary of the February 1970 San Fran-
cisco Mail Intercept Operation," undated.
2 Memorandum from Identity #4, Identity #5, and Identity #6 "for the
Record," 2/20/75.
2o Blind "notes by CIA ofieer", undated.
'Ibid.
242 See pp. 618-619.
2"Memorandum from Identity #4, Identity #5 and Identity #6, "for the
Record", 2/20/75.
2 Memorandum from CIA officer to Chief, Technical Services Division,
8/17/71.
censorship techniques and the collection of positive intelligence, which
had been the purpose of the last two trips, it was anticipated that this
fourth operation could also determine the "attitudes of Asians toward
the present discussion between Mao and Nixon as expressed to close
friends and relatives." " Internal authorizations were obtained in
September from the Deputy Director for Plans, the Chief of the Far
East Division, the Director of Security, and the Director, although
Helms noted that the operation should be limited to two weeks.
William Cotter, the Chief Postal Inspector, was contacted about
the project but he referred the Agency to Conway, who was now the
Regional Inspector in Charge in San Francisco. Conway approved
the San Francisco operation for a fourth time 246 and screening and
opening commenced on October 1, 1971. Between October 1 and
October 15, when the fourth trip was terminated, three FE and two
TSD agents processed a total of 4,500 items.
Although Agency documents state that mail opening did occur, it
cannot be determined how many of the processed letters were actually
opened.
2. Nature and Value of the Product
Selection Criteria.-According to an internal CIA memorandum,
letters were selected for opening and testing on the basis of indications
of censorship or operational interest: "Some [letters] would be chosen
by the TSD team chief based upon heavy censorship or indicators
that the letter should be more thoroughly examined at the Lab. Some
would be chosen by CIA officers based on certain locations of mailings
or possibly the individual to whom the letter was addressed or the
kind of stationery that had been used." 2 As was the case in New York,
there was a Watch List for the San Francisco project. While this list
was destroyed after the fourth and final trip, it is possible to partially
reconstruct the categories of persons of interest from the project jus-
tification sent to Thomas Karamessines in September 1971 and from
the "Sourdough Capsule Summary" prepared after the last trip.
The former memorandum refers to the goal of intercepting mail
from former residents of the United States who had been approached
by the Agency while residing in the United States and who had since
returned to Asia.2 48 The "Sourdough Capsule Summary" reveals that
among the persons whose mail was intercepted were many Americans
living in an Asian country, including expatriots and former mission-
aries. It was also stated that the agents "saw several items" from a
member of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and noted,
"Black Panthers-we saw nothing from this group." 2
Foreign Intelligence and Technical Value.-The documentary
record suggests that the San Francisco project was considered to be
successful in achieving its foreign intelligence and technical objectives.
The 1971 project justification sent to Thomas Karamessines by FE,
for example, noted that "[t]he primary purpose of previous . . .
' Memorandum from Acting Chief FE/DPA to Chief, FE Division, 9/13/71.
2M See pp. 618-619.
.. Memorandum from Identity #4, Identity #5, and Identity #6, "for the
Record", 2/20/75.
m Memorandum from Acting Chief, FE/DTA to Chief, Far East Division
(approved by Thomas Karamessines), 9/13/71.
' Memorandum from "Identity #4," Subject: "SOURDOUGH CAPSULE
SUMMARY," 10/15/71.
SOURDOUGH efforts was the collection of [the Asian country's]
postal intelligence but each effort produced useful positive intelligence
[such as] background information used as a basis for recruitment
attem ts and risk assessment of using U.S. letter drops for [foreign-
based agents." 250 The subsequent report on the fourth trip to San
Francisco described it as a "highly successful mission" also.251
According to the "Sourdough Capsule Summary," the positive intel-
ligence collected during the final trip included information on such
topics as the health and activities of the Asian country's leaders and its
internal events.252 TSD also considered the technical results of their ex-
amination for censorship techniques to be valuable because, as stated in
a 1970 memorandum, "this was the first time it was possible to exert
some measure of scientific control" in testing for the presence of censor-
ship techniques. 253
Domestic Intelligence Value.-In contrast to the New.York project,
the primary value of the San Francisco project does not appear to have
been in the area of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence. Some
essentially domestic intelligence information was nonetheless collected,
however, as evidenced by the reference in the project summary to the
"several items" of correspondence from a member of SCLC that the
Agency personnel "saw." The project justification for the fourth trip
also noted that the two SOURDOUGH operations in 1970 had pro-
vided "leads for domestic operations (Asian operations) and the
FBI." 254
There is no evidence that the FBI levied any requests on-or even
knew of-the San Francisco project. The Bureau apparently received
sanitized domestic intelligence leads from Sourdough, but there was
no formalized procedure for requesting or receiving such information
from it. One of the tagents involved in the project speculated that the
strained relations between the FBI and the Agency during this period
may have inhibited the CIA from advising the Bureau of SOUR
DOUGH's existence.255
3. Termination of the Project
The fourth trip to San Francisco in October 1971 proved to be the
final visit, but exactly how the project was formally terminated is un-
clear. A December 1974 memorandum reads in part: "There is no
information in the Office of Security's file on Project WESTPOINT
ER concerning when or by whom the decision was made to terminate
the project." 256 No other memoranda regarding the project shed any
light on this question.
2 Memorandum from Acting Chief, FE/DTA to Chief, Far East Division,
9/13/71.
m Memorandum from "Identity # 15," "for the Record," 10/19/71.
2m Memorandum from "Identity #4, "for the Record," Subject: SOURDOUGH
CAPSULE SUMMARY," 10/15/71.
r Blind memorandum, Subject: "Summary of the February 1970 San Francisco
Mail Intercept Operations," undated.
' Memorandum from Acting Chief, FE/DTA to Chief, Far East Division,
9/13/71.
m President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, staff
summary of CIA officer interview, 3/17/75.
' Memorandum from Deputy Chief, Security Support Division to Deputy
Director of Security, 12/24/74.
The reason for the termination is more apparent, however. Accord-
ing to a June 1973 memorandum to the Chief, East Asia Division
(formerly the Far East Division) :
The operation achieved the objectives of (a) determining the
extent of [an Asian country'sl censorship of mail to the USA
and (b) the nature of the mail itself. It was terminated since
the risk factor outweighed continuing an activity which had
already achieved its objectives.
Thus, the "risk factor" or "flap potential" was again a crucial factor
in the decision to terminate a mail opening program.
4. Internal Authorizations and Controls
Authorizations.-The lax pattern of internal authorization that
characterized the New York mail project was repeated in the San
Francisco project. There is no documentary evidence of any author-
ization-even by the Chief of TSD-prior to the initial contact with
the Post Office in August 1969 or the first San Francisco trip in Sep-
tember. On October 6, 1969, the TSD Chief gave his approval for the
formalized institution of the project, but according to the handwritten
"diary" of a TSD agent, the Chief of TSD insisted that at least
Thomas Karamessines, and "possibly [the] Attorney General or even
the President," must concur before the project could be fully imple-
mented.258
Superficially, the subsequent internal chain of oral approvals was
complete, if somewhat complex. The TSD Chief personally contacted
Karamessines, who "agreed in principle" but requested TSD to secure
concurrences from the CI Staff and Howard Osborn (Director of Secu-
rity) before he would approach the Director on this matter. The Dep-
uty Chief of the CI Staff was briefed and concurred. (Despite a state-
ment in the "dairy" that the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff "will clear
with C/CI [the Chief of the CI Staff]," this apparently was never
done: James Angleton cannot recall ever having been informed about
this project.259 ) On October 23, Osborn was also briefed by TSD and
FE personnel; he approved, but conditioned his approval on clearance
from the Director. Karamessines was told of Osborn's position on Oc-
tober 27, and together they briefed the Director. Helms reacted favor-
ably and, on November 4, 1969, TSD was advised to proceed with the
project.26 0
The record does not reveal any specific authorization for the third
trip, but a project justification memorandum for the fourth trip was
signed by Thomas Karamessines on September 20, 1971. He recalled
that this written 'authorization-unique for SOURDOUGH-was nec-
essary to except the project from the suspension of certain types of
Agency activities with respect to an Asian country during the Presi-
dent's Asian trip, which had been requested by the State Department
to avoid possible embarrassment to the United States.26* According to
" Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR
DOUGH," undated.
Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 101.
mBlind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR
DOUGH", undated.
m Thomas Karamessines testimony, 10/8/75, pp. 14-16; OIA officer, (President's
Commission staff summary), 8/17/75.
617
an October 1971 memorandum written shortly after the final trip,
approvals had also been secured from Howard Osborn and Richard
Hehns.262
Although the authorization chain appears to be relatively complete,
the testimonial evidence suggests that in 1969, when Karamessines,
Osborn, and Helms approved phase two of the project, all three
of these officials believed they were approving a mail cover-not a mail
opening-operation. Osborn testified that the TSD and FE personnel
who briefed him on the project presented it as an operation "whereby
they could inspect the exterior of envelopes to and from [an Asian
country]. " 263 He continued: ". . . I did not know that they were going
to open it; I had no idea they opened the mail. And I found out soci-
ally and personally from one of the people involved about a year ago
[i.e., 1974] that they opened the mail." 264
When asked whether or not he was misled in order to secure his ap-
proval, Osborn stated:
Yes, indeed-I wasn't misled but perhaps it seemed when
[they] got out there and found out how easy it was to get
it-but I don't know, I wasn't told that they were to open
mail. That isn't the circumstances under which I briefed Mr.
Helms.... [If I had known it involved mail opening] I would
not have approved it. The Director might have approved it,
but it wasn't the way I briefed it. . . .215
Karamessines stated that the first time he can recall knowing that the
project involved mail opening rather than a mail cover was in Septem-
ber 1971, when he signed the written authorization for the fourth San
Francisco trip. He testified that when he approved the project in 1969
he, too, had been led to believe that it was simply a mail cover
operation.266
Richard Helms cannot recall whether he understood the project to
involve mail opening or not, but stated that it is probable, in light of
the testimony of Osborn and Karamessines, who were his only sources
of information about SOURDOUGH, that he was unaware of its mail
opening aspects.2 6
Thus, after the initial phase of the operation was completed, ap-
provals were secured from the Deputy Director of Plans, the
Director of Security, and the Director, but it appears that these
approvals, whether purposefully or inadvertently, were based on a
fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the project.
Administrative Controls.-The documentary record reveals that five
justification or summary memoranda were written for the project,
four of which pertained to the last trip only. It is possible that more
would have been written but for Howard Osborn's October 1969 ad-
monition, reflected in the TSD agent's "diary," "to avoid preparing
or exchanging any formal communications in writing re project." 268
M emoranklum from Identity No. 15 "for the record," 10/19/71.
a Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 58, 59.
2 Osborn, 8/28/75, p. 59.
2 Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 60, 64-65.
2 Karamessines, 10/8/75, p. 12.
2 Helms, 9/10/75, p. 127.
m Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR
DOUGH," undated.
There is no indication in the record that the San Francisco project
was ever evaluated by the Inspector General's office.
5. External Authorizations
The pattern of external authorizations, or, more accurately, of the
relative absence of external authorizations, also parallels that of
the New York project. Those postal officials whose cooperation
was necessary to implement SOURDOUGH were briefed, but none
was told the true nature of the project. Although there are some sug-
gestions in the record that the Attorney General and the President
should be informed, and that the Postmaster General had been
informed, there is no direct evidence that any of these briefings ever
occurred.
Postal Of)icials.-James Conway, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector
during the first three trips and Regional Postal Inspector in Char e
during the fourth trip, was contacted by CIA agents about, and sub-
sequently approved, all four of these operations. His uncontradicted
testimony, however, is that he was never informed that the project
involved mail opening and, in fact, that he explicitly instructed the
agents not to open mail or remove it from postal facilities. 26 9
At the first meeting between TSD personnel and Conway about the
project on August 26, 1969, the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector was
told that the CIA's "interest lay in the possible use of international
mail channels from [an Asian country] for private correspondence in-
volving secret writing." 270 According to an internal Agency memo-
randum prepared shortly after this meeting, however, it had been ex-
plained to him that "the survey we hoped to be able to conduct did
not involve opening envelopes or photographing letters, but the possi-
bility that this might become desirable in the future, though not men-
tioned, was not foreclosed." 2 At the subsequent meeting in September
between Conway and these officers, one of the officers "brought up the
question of broadening the scope of the survey to be performed in San
Francisco to include chemical testing of the mail . . ." 272 The memo-
randum on this meeting reads in part: ". . . he [Conway] acquiesced
after brief deliberation when [the CIA officer] asked whether we could
include this testing as part of the survey without going out of bounds.
It was clear that the key factor in this decision was the fact that
the envelopes would not be opened." 2 73 Conway agrees with this
characterization of the basis of his decision, and testified that he ex-
plicitly instructed these agents that no mail should be opened.2 74
Conway approved the second stage of the project on January 13,
1970, after another meeting with Agency officials. In order to ensure
his approval, these officials presented him with "an imaginative cover
story" 271 to the effect that the project was necessary for certain
scientific reasons.2 7 6 Conway nonetheless conditioned his approval on
James Conway testimony, 8/8/75, p. 30.
o Memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to "the File," 8/26/69.
2mIbid.
Memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB "for the File," 9/15/69.
273Ibid.
m Conway, 8/8/75, p. 30.
Deputy Chief, Security Support Division memorandum, 12/24/74.
Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR
DOUGH," undated.
total Post Office control of the operations. According to the Janu-
ary 13 entry in the TSD "diary," Conway "approved in principal
'processing' of material but on P. 0. premises and under P. 0.
control . . . Opening has not been mentioned." 277 In fact, the cover
story was inaccurate, letters were surreptitiously removed from
postal premises, and mail was opened. While Conway's approval
was sought and received for the final two operations as well, all of the
evidence, including his own testimony, suggests that he never learned
of the mail opening aspect of the project.
It is also the claim of the Regional Postal Inspector in Charge who
worked out the local arrangements for the first three trips, that he
was informed neither of the purpose of the project nor of the planned
or actual mail openings.278 This claim is supported by the agency's
own documents. 278a
Chief Postal Inspector William Cotter, who played a central role
in the story of the New York project, was also aware of SOUR
DOUGH, but, like Conway and the Regional Inspector, he has testi-
fied that he had no knowledge that it involved mail opening.278b
In November 1969, Howard Osborn spoke to Cotter about the San
Francisco project. Osborn, who stated that he did not know that mail
opening was contemplated himself, assured the Chief Postal Inspector
that for the Agency's purposes exterior testing and surveying was suf-
ficient and that mail would not be opened.27 8 0 Cotter was not un-
receptive but, according to an agency document explained that he
wanted the project "to go slowly and develop gradually." 279 Because
of his past CIA affiliation, Cotter also insisted that his assistant,
Conway, should ultimately determine the degree of Postal Service
Cooperation.2 80 He testified that he did not alert Conway to the
possibility that the CIA agents may attempt- to open the mail be-
cause mail opening was not an aspect of the project as he understood
it and because "one doesn't have to tell or admonish a seasoned Postal
Inspector what his responsibilities are..." 281
Cotter apparently had no further contact with the San Francisco
project until the fall of 1971, when he was contacted about the planned
fourth trip. According to an Office of Security trip report prepared in
October 1971:
The Assistant Postmaster General for Inspection [Cotter]
was contacted for his approval. He firmly indicated he did not
know anything about the project, nor did he want to know.
He stated, however, that he would advise James Conway,
[now the] Regional Inspector in San Francisco, that I would
be in touch with him on 27 September 1971, and that we should
be guided by Conway's decision.282
" Ibid.
" Staff summary of Earl Ingebright interview, 5/30/75.
278. Blind notes by CIA officer, undated, "Feb. 2" entry.
Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 113.
Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 60,61, 65.
'o Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR
DOUGH," undated.
m Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 70.
28e Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 72.
m Memorandum from Identity No. 15, "for the Record," 10/19/71.
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There is no evidence that Postmaster General Winton Blount, the
only Postmaster General under whom the project was conducted,
ever knew of or approved SOURDOUGH. A 1973 CIA document
addressed to Howard Osborn stated that "TSD understands (but
has no evidence) that Mr. Helms briefed Postmaster Blount. Is this
so, do you know?" 283 But Helms has made no claim that he did brief
Mr. Blount about this project,28 4 and there is no testimonial or docu-
mentary indication that TSD's understanding on this matter was
correct.
A ttorney General and President.-As noted above, when the Chief
of TSD approved the formal institution of Sourdough on October 6,
1969, he stated that concurrences from the Deputy Director for Plans
and "possibly [the] Attorney General or even the President" would
be necessary prior to implementation. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that either Attorney General Mitchell or President Nixon, the
only holders of these offices during the course of the project, were
briefed about the San Francisco mail openings either before or
after they occurred. President Nixon did state that he was "generally
aware" of CIA mail covers "of mail sent from within the United
States to . . . the Soviet Union . . . or the People's Republic of
China," 284a but he disclaimed knowledge of any CIA mail opening
program.284 b
Sourdough's record on external authorizations, in short, is even less
complete than that of the New York project. Those postal officials who
learned of the project in general terms were misled on the subject of
opening and deceived on the subject of custody, and no Cabinet level
official-or the President of the United States-apparently knew of
the project at all.
B. The New Orleans Mail Intercept Project
A third CIA mail intercept project, encrypted "Project SETTER,"
was conducted in New Orleans for two and one-half weeks during
1957. This project, which was conducted by the CI Staff with cover
and support functions provided by the Office of Security, involved the
screening and opening of first class international surface mail transit-
ing New Orleans enroute to and from South and Central America.
Unlike the New York and the San Francisco projects, SETTER was
operated with the cooperation of the United States Customs Service.
There is no record of any internal authorization above the level of
Deputy Director of Security and Deputy Chief of the CI Staff, and
the only apparent external approval was by a Division head in the
Customs Service, who stated that he was unaware the project involved
the opening of mail. According to Agency documents, the project
generated no useful intelligence information.
1. Operation of the Project
At the time of the New Orleans project, the Customs Service had
Congressional authority under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
m Transmittal slip from CH/OCOR to Mr. Osborne (sic), 6/7/73.
m Helms, 9/10/75, p. 119.
214 Response of Richard Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories,
3/9/76, pp. 4, 5.
24b Response of Richard Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories,
3/9/76, pp. 1, 5.
as amended by the Cunningham Act, to intercept and examine third
and fourth class incoming mail from abroad which was suspected to
contain Communist propaganda. In the early 1950's, Customs had
established its first "control unit" designed to accomplish that purpose;
additional "control units" were subsequently set up in at least nine
other cities in the United States. Under pressure from certain members
of Congress who were outraged at the "venomous propaganda" 285
passing through New Orleans, the Customs Service planned a feasi-
bility survey in August 1957 to determine whether or not it would be
possible to establish a "control unit" in that city as well.
The Agency learned of the planned survey and in mid-July a meet-
ing, attended by the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff, the Deputy Director
of Security, and Soviet Bloc Division personnel, was called to discuss
its possible exploitation by the CIA. "Based on experience with
SRPOINTER [the New York project]," an Agency document reads,
"CI Staff and O/S personnel ... agreed that CIA personnel would
participate in the survey at New Orleans." 286
Even prior to this meeting, Irving Fishman, the head of the Cus-
toms Service's Restricted Merchandise Division, which maintained the
"control units", had apparently agreed in principle to CIA participa-
tion in the survey. He was contacted in New York by the Assistant
Special Agent in Charge of the Office of Security's Manhattan field
office on July 18 "to discuss details of the operation." 287
Fishman and two of his associates left New York for New Orleans
at the end of July to work out the arrangements for the Customs sur-
vey with the local postmaster. They were joined by four CIA agents
during the first week of August, and the operation began on August 6.
Each working day for the -next two and one-half weeks, one of the
Customs personnel went to the New Orleans mail dock to select ap-
proximately 25 bags of surface mail from various Central and South
American locations that had been unloaded in New Orleans for trans-
shipment to other points in Central and South America. These bags
were brought 'to an office in the Parcel Post Annex of the Federal
Building each morning for Customs and CIA scrutiny. While Fish-
man and the other Customs Service employees searched for communist
propaganda by opening third and fourth class mail in the office itself,
the CIA agents screened, opened, and photographed first class mail in
an adjacent walk-in vault. The agents' CIA affiliation was known to at
least two of the Customs officials; postal employees who worked in the
building, however, were informed that they were Customs Service
personnel. At the end of each day, the mail would be re-sealed, re-
bagged, and returned to the mail dock.
Between August 6 and August 23, when the project was terminated,
a total of 700 items were photographed and 60 items, mainly first class
letters, were opened for examination and photographic reproduc-
tion of the contents.2 88
Staff summary of Customs Agent interview, 8/19/75.
mBlind memorandum. Subject: "Project SETTER," undated.
m Memorandum from "Identity #13" to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.
.Blind memorandum, Subject: "Project SETTER," undated; Memorandum
from Identity #13, to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.
2. Nature and Value of the Product
Selection Criteria.-The agents who participated in the New Orleans
project were furnished a "Watch List" of names by the CI Staff to
aid in the selection of items for opening.289
Beyond the Watch List itself, however, it appears that the members
of the interception team were given little guidance by their superiors.
One member of this group stated that at no time was he instructed
what types of items to select.290
According to a project summary prepared in October 1957, ". . . an
effort (was) made to obtain a representative sampling from the various
countries available. Both business and personal mail was exam-
ined. . . ." 291
Value of the Proiduct.-Agency memoranda indicate that SETTER
resulted in the collection of no useful intelligence information. The
project summary, for example, states: "On-the-spot check of items
examined against CI Staff Watch List, and subsequent CI Staff exam-
ination of the material processed to date has developed no 'hits' on
Watch List names, and, other than propaganda, no material having
an intelligence value." 292
3. Termination
The lack of any significant intelligence value, coupled with the
stated impossibility of examining a representative sample of the 20,-
000 bags of mail that transited New Orleans weekly.29a apparently led
to the termination of Project SETTER. No formal termination of the
project is recorded, however.
4. Authorizations
Internal Authorization.-Both the Deputy Director of Security
and the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff attended the July 1957 meeting
at which CIA participation in the New Orleans survey was agreed
upon. There is no evidence, however, of any internal authorization
above the level of these officials. Although the CI Staff had sole opera-
tional responsibility for the project, James Angleton, the Chief of the
CI Staff at the time, testified that he had no contemporaneous
knowledge of it.293
External Authorizations.-The only documented approval by a
government official outside the CIA was that of Irving Fishman, the
head of the Restricted Merchandise Division of the Customs Service.
Only through his cooperation, both before and during the period of
activity, was the implementation of the project possible at all. Ac-
cording to the October 1957 project summary, Fishman and one
of his two associates "were aware, prior to the inception of the opera-
tion, of the nature of the BANJO [mail opening] operation." 294
Both Fishman and the associate referred to in the memorandum, how-
"Memorandum from Identity #13 to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.
' Staff summary of "OIA officer" interview. 6/19/75.
m lemorandum from Identity #13 to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.
m Memorandum from Identity #13 to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.
ma Blind memorandum, subject: "Project SETTER," undated.
m Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 101.
m Memorandum from Identity #13, to the Deputy Director of Security,
10/4/75.
ever, have stated that they cannot recall any opening of first class
mail by the CIA agents. 295
There is no evidence that the Postmaster of New Orleans, who ar-
ranged for the Customs survey, knew of any mail opening by the CIA
in connection with the project. The Customs survey itself, of which he
was evidently aware, was entirely legal at the time.
C. The Hawaiian Mail Intercept Project
A fourth CIA mail intercept project was conducted in the Territory
of Hawaii for about one year during the mid-1950's.9"6 It was ini-
tiated, without prior authorization from Headquarters, by the
Agency's sole representative in Honolulu. Like the New Orleans proj-
ect, it involved the cooperation of the Customs Service.
According to the agent who conducted the Hawaiian project, local
personnel of the Customs Service approached him in late 1954 to
request his assistance in identifying incoming political propaganda
from Asia that had been intercepted by Customs officials acting
under the Cunningham Act."' The CIA officer agreed and, after a
short period of time, noticed the presence of censorship chemicals on a
portion of the mail from one of the country's being covered. Less than a
week after he began to assist the Customs personnel, he started sur-
reptitiously removing packets of mail for further exterior examina-
tion. By early 1955, without the knowledge of Customs officials, the
agent was both opening and photographing items he had removed
from the Customs facility.
In March 1955, he sent a formal report of these activities to CIA
headquarters, noting that he had photographed the contents of ap-
proximately six hundred communications and tested four hundred.
Included in the report was an evaluation of the results to date; spe-
cifically, an analysis of the Asian country's censorship techniques and
other postal and positive intelligence information he had collected.
According to the CIA officer, his report was very favorably received
and he was encouraged to continue.
The CIA officer stated that for approximately two months in early
1955, he was joined by an FBI agent as well. A local FBI agent in
Honolulu, who had received instructions to concentrate on Asian
counterintelligence matters, apparently learned from Customs officials
that the CIA officer participated in their examination of incoming
propaganda. He contacted the CIA officer, was informed of the project,
and notified Bureau Headquarters. The CIA officer stated that with
his concurrence, an FBI agent trained in mail opening techniques was
assigned the task of assisting him in his interception effort. The
Bureau can locate no documents pertaining to this operation, however.
The CIA officer continued the project on his own after FBI par-
ticipation ceased. In November 1955, he was transferred to a station
in the continental United States. and the Hawaiian project was
terminated.
' Staff summary of Irving Fishman interview, 8/12/75; staff summary of
Customs agent interview, 8/9/75.
'Phe description that follows is based on an interview of the participating
agent by the Rockefeller Commission staff.
' President's Commission on CIA Activities Within The United States' staff
summary of a CIA officer interview, 3/18/75.
D. Isolated Instances of CIA Mail Opening
In addition to generalized mail intercept projects, the CIA has also
targeted the mail of particular individuals within the United States.
At least twelve such instances of mail opening, directed against
foreign nationals, Agency employees, and American citizens uncon-
nected with the CIA are recorded in Agency filesY2 7
PART III: PROJECT HUNTER
I. INTRODUCTION AND MAJOR FACTS
"Project Hunter" was the cryptonym given by the FBI to the receipt
of information from the CIA's New York mail intercept program.
The FBI first became aware of this operation in January 1958, ap-
proximately three and one-half years after the CIA began opening
mail between the Soviet Union and the United States. In February
1958, the Bureau began to levy requirements on the CIA's project and
received product from it continually from that time until the dis-
continuance of the project. In total, copies or summaries of more than
57,000 items of intercepted correspondence were disseminated by the
CIA to the FBI, either on the basis of general guidelines established
by the Bureau or on the basis of particular names of individuals and
organizations for which the Bureau desired coverage. While most of
these names and categories could reasonably be expected to generate
counterespionage information-which was the stated purpose of the
FBI's collaboration on the project-Bureau targets also included peace
organizations, antiwar leaders, black activists, and women's groups.
When the New York mail intercept project was terminated in 1973
and the FBI declined the opportunity to assume responsibility for it,
Project Hunter ceased after fifteen years of operation.
The most pertinent facts about Project Hunter may be summarized
as follows:
(a) The FBI knew of and levied requirements on the CIA's New
York mail intercept project from 1958 until the project was terminated
in 1973.
(b) Although the collection of counterespionage information was the
stated purpose of Project Hunter, the Bureau specifically requested in-
formation on numerous individuals and organizations in the antiwar,
civil rights, and women's movements, and on such general categories
as ''government employees" and "protest organizations."
(c) The FBI received copies or summaries of more than 57,000 in-
tercepted communications between 1958 and 1973. At the height of the
project in 1966, the CIA disseminated 5,984 of the 15,499 items that
had been opened to the Bureau-more than were disseminated to any
one customer component of the CIA itself.
(d) The product was moderately valuable in terms of the FBI's
counterespionage mission, but much of the correspondence has been
characterized as "junk" by FBI personnel familiar with the program.
It provided no leads to the identification of foreign illegal agents.
(e) No consideration was given to terminating FBI involvement in
the CIA's New York intercept program when the Bureau's own proj-
"' Blind memorandum, Subject: "Domestic Surveillance," undated.
ects were terminated in 1966 because information from the project
was received at no expense or risk to the FBI.
(f) FBI officials decided against assuming responsibility for the
CIA's New York mail intercept project in 1958 and again in 1973 be-
cause of its complexity, expense, and the inherent security risks, not
primarily because of legal considerations.
II. FBI "DISCOVERY" OF THE CIA'S NEW YORK MAIL INTERCEPT
PROJECT: 1958
A. A Proposed FBI Mail Opening Program for United States-Soviet
Union Mail
In 1957, FBI officials were extremely concerned about the presence
of Soviet and other hostile illegal intelligence agents in the United
States.298 The FBI had recently uncovered Rudolph Abel and at least
three other illegal agents, yet no effective methods of locating and
identifying illegal agents generally were then known. Bureau officials
did not feel that they had been entirely successful in their attempts
in the past, and searched for a means by which the communication
links between the illegal agents and their principals could be
intercepted. 29 9
On January 10, 1958, an allied nation's counterintelligence agency
informed the FBI that when Soviet illegal agents throughout the
world wished to meet with their principals, they were under instruc-
tions to send a communication to a particular address in the Soviet
Union.300 Against the background of the Bureau's concern for locating
and identifying illegal agents, the significance of this information was
readily apparent: if the FBI could screen mail between the United
States and the Soviet Union, it would be possible to intercept com-
munications bearing this particular address and, it was hoped, trace
the letter back to the illegal agent.
In 1958, mail between the United States and the Soviet Union
was routed through air mail facilities in New York City and Wash-
ington, D.C. On the basis of its newly-acquired information, therefore,
FBI Headquarters immediately instructed the New York and Wash-
ington Field Offices "to institute confidential inquiries with appro-
priate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering
outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., looking to-
ward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned
address." 3o1 On January 21, 1958, the Special Agent in Charge of
the New York Field Office, notified Headquarters that his preliminary
inquiries indicated that covert mail coverage would be possible at
LaGuardia airport.
This was not the FBI's first attempt to utilize mail opening as an
investigative technique in the counterintelligence field: at the time
these inquiries were being made, the Bureau was conducting two mail
oDening programs of its own in the cities of Washington, D.C. and
San Francisco (see Part IV, p. 636), and in the case of the Washing-
ton, D.C. program, the cooperation of the Post Office Department had
been enlisted in delivering mail to Bureau agents.
- Donald E. Moore testimony, 10/1/75, p. 9.
20 Ibid.
" Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 1/22/58.
I1 bidZ.
B. Referral to Post Office Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
After the SAC in New York had made his preliminary inquiries,
which made the prospects for successful implementation of the project
appear favorable, he received a telephone call from the Chief Postal
Inspector, David Stephens, in Washington, D.C., who informed him
that he could not authorize Post Office cooperation after all because
"something had happened in Washington on a similar matter." 302
He advised that FBI Headquarters should discuss the matter fur-
ther with his office in Washington.
C. James Angleton's Initial Contact with Sam Papich Regarding
HTLINGUAL
The SAC in New York relayed the Chief Postal Inspector's advice
to FBI Headquarters, but before Headquarters was able to initiate a
meeting with Postal officials in Washington, James Angleton, then
Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff of the CIA, contacted Sam J.
Papich, FBI Liaison to the CIA, on the matter to which Stephens had
apparently referred.o3 Angleton stated that it had come to his atten-
tion, through the Post Office, that the FBI was making inquiries into
the possibility of covering mail between the United States and the
Soviet Union, and that the CIA expected to be contacted by the FBI
concerning this possibility. He then informed Papich "on a personal
basis" 304 that the CIA was already conducting an extensive operation,
based in New York, which involved the opening of mail to and from
the Soviet Union. He stated that this project was one of the largest and
most sensitive of all CIA covert operations, and that "the sole purpose
for the coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who
might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in their
countries as contacts and sources for the CIA." 305
Alan Belmont, then Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division, was informed of this operation by Papich and noted
in a memorandum to Mr. Boardman, then Assistant to the Director,
that "[i]t would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in
New York have flushed out a most secret operation of the CIA." 306
D. Decision Not to Challenge CIA Jurisdiction
Papich testified that FBI officials were greatly concerned over what
was viewed as a possible intrusion by the CIA into the counterintelli-
gence jurisdiction of the FBI, and he stated that he "anticipated all
hell was going to break loose." 307 In fact, however, the jurisdictional
dispute which Papich anticipated never occurred. Rather, the FBI de-
cided to capitalize on the situation by receiving the benefits of the pro-
gram without the expense and manpower requirements which would
accompany a more active role in its operation. Belmont wrote to
Boardman:
The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in
effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our juris-
"Ibid.
m Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58; Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 42.
'Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58.
Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58: This was clearly not the
sole purpose of the New York Project even in the 1950's. See pp. 567-568.
" Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58.
30 Papich, 9/22/75, p. 67.
diction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legiti-
mate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set
up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of infor-
mation behind the Iron Curtain. . .. At the same time, there
is an internal security objective here in which, because of our
responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identi-
fication of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United
States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that
the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inher-
ent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size,
and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this cov-
erage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives
and holding them responsible to share their coverage with
us.308
This memorandum was routed to the Director, and Hoover's ap-
proval-the phrase "OK. H."-appears on the last page.
E. FBI Briefing at CIA
On January 24, 1958, Sam Papich met with James Angleton, Shef-
field Edwards, and a third CIA officer at the Agency.309 Papich told
the group that he had reason to believe, from the FBI inquiries of Post
Office officials in New York (and without mentioning Angleton's ad-
mission two or three days earlier), that the CIA had a mail coverage
project in New York. The CIA representatives then proceeded to give
Papich a full briefing on the CIA's mail intercept program, and agreed
to "handle leads" for the Bureau.3 1 0 Papich was also told that Post-
master General Summerfield had approved the photographing of
mail by the CIA but that the CIA did not have permission of the
Post Office Department to open mail.a" In addition, the address given
the Bureau by the allied counterintelligence agency was supplied to
the CIA for use in the New York project.
Neither Angleton- nor anyone else in the CIA was told at this time
of either of the FBI's own on-going mail opening programs. According
to the testimony of William Branigan, former FBI Section Chief of a
section dealing with espionage matters, there was no reason to inform
CIA about the Bureau's own mail opening programs since both of the
programs then involved "strictly a domestic situation involving per-
sons in the United States . . . [and] solely within the jurisdiction of
the FBI." 312
III. REQUESTS LEVIED BY THE FBI ON THE CIA S NEW YORK MAIL INTERCEPT
PROJECT
A. The Procedure Established
The "Hunter" procedure for requesting and receiving information
was established in early February 1958. On February 6, James Angle-
ton wrote the FBI Director to advise the Bureau of the form in which
_ Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58.
"Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 2/6/58.
310 Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 2/6/58.
su Papieb, 9/22/75, p. 37.
12 William A. Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 11.
requests should be made and information would be disseminated. 31 3
Designating correspondence between the two agencies which related
to the New York project as "Project Hunter", Angleton suggested
that the Bureau number all requests for placing particular persons on
the Watch List in consecutive order as "Hunter Request Number -. "
Identifying data about the requested person should be placed on a three
by five card, with instructions as to the duration of the person's name
on the Watch List and the type of treatment desired ("e.g., photograph
exterior only; open and photograph contents as well, etc."). General
requirements based on letter content or the class of the sender or ad-
dressee, could also be accommodated by the CI Staff project analysts.
Correspondence from the CIA to the FBI which contained infor-
mation derived from the project was to be labeled consecutively,
"Hunter Report Number -. ".
B. Categories of Correspondenwe for Requested Coverage
At least five sets of categories of correspondence for which the
Bureau desired coverage were transmitted to the CIA between 1958
and 1973. The focus of the original categories was clearly counter-
espionage, but subsequent general requirements became progressively
more domestic in their focus and progressively broader in their scope.
By the end of the project, one requirement simply asked for the inter-
cepted correspondence of "New Left activists, extremists and other
subversives." 314
The first set of categories of correspondence for which the FBI
desired coverage was set forth in a memorandum from Alan Belmont
to Mr. Boardman dated February 6, 1958.315 This memorandum was
approved by Hoover, and Sam Papich advised the CIA of the
Bureau's interest in these categories on February 11. They were:
(1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, et cetera.
2) All correspondence indicating that the Soviets may
be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating
pressure being exerted on Soviet citizens who have close rela-
tives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals
in U.S.
(3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicat-
ing weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet
presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give
consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals
for defection or double agent purposes.
(4) Any information appearing in correspondence indicat-
ing Soviet control of direction of the CPUSA. [Communist
Party, USA.] 316
If the CI Staff analysts were not certain whether a particular letter
fit into one of these four categories, they clearly gave the Bureau the
benefit of their doubt. In August 1961, these categories had to be
refined because of the large percentage of valueless letters (95% by
one informed estimate) 317 which the CIA disseminated to the Bureau
s Memorandum from James Angleton to Director, FBI, 2/6/58.
.. See p. 630.
m Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 2/6/58.
noIbid.
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in the first three and one-half years of the Hunter operation."'8 The
FBI informed the CIA that it was not interested in correspondence
involving general travel arrangements. of Americans travelling to
Russia, personal letters with no intelligence value, letters to and from
exchange students, and "holiday greeting" traffic.319 The Bureau
stated, however, that it was specifically interested in receiving any
correspondence in the following categories:
(1) Any traffic in the above-mentioned non-desired cate-
gories wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence
significance....
(2) Any traffic wherein it is revealed U.S. addressee or
addressor is a U.S. Government employee or is employed in
a sensitive industry, i.e., missile field.
(3) Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence
interest such as an open offer by an individual to assist Sovi-
ets, an indication an individual is going to Russia and wants
to become a citizen or wherein an individual professes pro-
Soviet or pro-communist sympathies.n0
Other categories relating to particular espionage cases were also set
forth.
The reference to "U.S. Government employee[s]" in category (2)
was intended to be limited to employees in sensitive positions, accord-
ing to one of the Bureau officials who formulated these categories."
But such limitation is not evident on the face of the request. The
Bureau literally requested all intercepted correspondence to or from
all federal employees, from the lowest Civil Service level to, pre-
sumably, the level of the Cabinet, the Congress, and the President.
On February 13, 1962, an additional category was requested by the
FBI.m This request was for any correspondence from the United
States to the Soviet Union which contained any of the "indicators"
on the outside of the envelope which suggested that the correspond-
ence was from an illegal agent to his principal. The Bureau had
acquired knowledge of these indicators in 1959 and used this knowl-
edge in connection with several of its own mail opening programs
in the period 1959 through 1966. Dissemination by the CIA to the
FBI of correspondence which was opened on the basis of these indi-
cators was code-named "Hunter-Don."
The categories were enlarged again on October 31, 1962. Among
the new categories of correspondence desired by the FBI were the
following:
(1) All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an anti-
U.S. nature and pro-Soviet.
(2) Data re U.S. peace groups going to Russia and while in
Russia.
(3) Data indicating death of any U.S. Communist abroad.
(4) Any traffic from or to U.S. students in Moscow or to
U.S. persons who were former students in Moscow.
'" Project Supervisor #1 testimony, 10/1/75, p. 60; Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 81.
. Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan (attachment), 8/21/61.
m Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, (attachment), 8/21/61.
n Branigan testimony, 10/9/75, p. 70.
Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 2/15/62.
(5) Any traffic between U.S. persons who are with a cur-
rent exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR. 32 3
In addition, the CIA was informed that the FBI had no interest in
the correspondence of Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate
to the Soviet Union, legitimate American tourists in the Soviet Union,
and American professors in academic research who corresponded with
their counterparts in the Soviet Union.
A final revision of the guidelines occurred in March 1972, when
James Angleton was told that the following were among the types of
traffic -which continues to ;be of interest to the FBI:
1. Current and former Soviet exchange students, visitors,
researchers and scientists.
2. Current and former Soviet official visitors.
4. U.S. exchange students, researchers, and persons who
have been in the USSR with American exhibitions and
delegations.
6. . . . [Plersons on the Watch List; known communists,
New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; sus-
pected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be
of interest to the Soviets because of their specialized knowl-
edge or work on classified matters . . .
7. Communist party and front organizations . . . extrem-
ist and New Left organizations.
8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coali-
tion for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee,
and Women's Strike for Peace.
9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-
Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black
Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalists and Liberation
groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos organization,
Weathermen, Progressive Labor Party, Worker's Student
Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolu-
tionary Union, and other New Left groups. This would
include persons sympathetic to the Soviet Union, North
Korea, North Vietnam and Red China.
10. Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the U.S.
11. Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies. 2 4
This final set of requirements clearly reflected the domestic turmoil of
the late 1960's and early 1970's. The process that began fourteen years
earlier as a means of discovering Soviet intelligence efforts in the
United States had expanded to encompass detection of the activities of
a Ibid.
"' Routing slip from J. Edgar Hoover to James Angleton (atttachment),
3/10/72.
domestic dissidents of all types. Even those merely "sympathetic"-in
the opinion of CI Staff analysts-to selected communist nations fell
within the scope of the requirements.
C. Individuals and Organization Placed on the Watch Li8t
In addition to the general categories set forth above for which the
FBI desired CIA mail coverage, the Bureau also submitted the names
of particular individuals and organizations for inclusion on the CIA's
Watch List. According to existing FBI records, "Hunter Request"
numbers reached 286 by 1973, that is, the names of 286 individuals and
organizations were submitted by the Bureau during the course of the
Hunter Project.325
The majority of these names were clearly in the counterespionage
area, but the specific requests also included: The National Guardian,
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, National Mobiliza-
tion Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Students for a Democratic
Society, Ramparts, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, the
Liberation News Service, Jeremy J. Stone (Director of the Federation
of American Scientists), Center for the Study of Public Policy,
Linus Pauling, and the Institute for Policy Studies.326
Aside from the 286 "Hunter Request" names submitted by the FBI
for inclusion on the Watch List, about 180 more names were provided
to the CIA for use in the special Latin America mail screening opera-
tion, known as Hunter-Vince, which was run in conjunction with
Hunter and which lasted for approximately one month in 1963.32m On
December 12, 1962, Liaison Agent Sam Papich had been informed by
the CIA that because mail from the United States to a Latin America
country was temporarily discontinued, all such mail would be shipped
to that country from New York City, and the CIA intended to expand
their coverage to include the screening and opening of a portion of
this mail.328 The FBI expressed an interest in sharing the benefits of
this coverage and submitted approximately 180 names of American and
foreign citizens who were on the Security Index.328a
This aspect of the program, which commenced on February 21, 1963,
was suspended on March 19, less than one month later.
IV. PRODUCT RECEIVED BY THE FBI FROM THE CIA'S NEW YORK MAIL
INTERCEPT PROJECT
A. Volume
According to a CIA document dated January 23, 1975, a total of
57,846 separate items were disseminated to the FBI from the CIA
project.32 9 The yearly figures, from 1958 when the first product was
as Staff summary or Project Hunter index file review, 10/20/75.
'" Staff summary of Project Hunter file review, 10/20/75: Staff summary of
HTLINGUAL file review, 9/5/75.
m Memorandum from S. J. Papich to D. J. Brennan, 12/13/62.
' Memorandum from S. J. Papich to D. J. Brennan, 12/13/62.
'" The Security Index was a list of people to be detained in time of war or
national emergency.
" Blind CIA "Memorandum for the Record," Subject: "Approximate Statistics
on CI Staff Project, HTLINGUAL Material," 1/23/75.
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Year opened to FBI
1958 . ..-- _--__------------------------------------------------------------ 8,633 666
1959 -__-____------------------------------------------------------------ 1 299 1,964
1960 .__. ___------------------------------------------------------------ 12,725 2,342
1961 -- 1------------------------------------------------------------ 4,025 3,520
1962 ---- ___--_------------------------------------------------------------ 13,932 3,017
1963 ----- _ __------------------------------------------------------------ 16, 748 4, 167
1964 -. ..- ____------------------------------------------------------------ 14,904 5,396
1965 --. __-------------------- ----- --------------------- 13,309 4,503
1966 .. . __-_ ___------------------------------------------------------------ 15,499 5,984
1967 ------------------------------------------------------------ 23,617 5,863
1968 ------------------------------------------------------------ 12,288 5,322
1969 ------------------------------------------------------------- 9,821 5,384
1970 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 10,207 4,975
1971--------------1------- ---- -- - - - 8 2,701
1972 ----------------------------------------------- 8,060 1,400
1973------------------------------------------------------ .2.273 642
Total (entire duration) ------------------------------------------- 215, 820 a-o 57, 846
as3 Blind CIA memorandum "for the Record," 1/23/75.
B. Administrative Processing of the Product Received
After the FBI liaison agent picked up the Hunter reports at CIA
Headquarters, he would bring them to a single desk within the Soviet
Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division. The person in charge of
this desk was responsible for reviewing all of the correspondence and
routing it to interested supervisors in the Division. Copies of the cor-
respondence would then be returned to the control desk and either
destroyed, if deemed to be of no value, or filed in a secure area, sep-
arated from the rest of the FBI files. Due to the sensitivity of the
project, copies of the correspondence never went into a case file directly,
although a cross-reference in the case file allowed the retrieval of any
relevant correspondence.
Knowledge of the project was limited to the operational sections
within the Domestic Intelligence Division at Headquarters. Neither
the Criminal Division nor any of the field officers were ever advised
of the nature of the source. When significant information was devel-
oped from Hunter, it would be paraphrased to disguise the true source
prior to dissemination to the field officers or other divisions: an in-
formant symbol replaced the term "Project Hunter" on all such cor-
respondence. Field offices would be informed that "[Informant sym-
bol], a most sensitive and reliable source, advised that (individual or
organization) of (address) was in contact with (individual or orga-
nization; address) during (month, year). . . . According to the inform-
ant. . . ." 332 The field offices were also warned that information
from this source should not be disseminated outside the Bureau
nor set out in any investigative report, and that information from the
informant should be utilized for lead purposes only.33
C. Nature and Value of the Product Received
Durina the fifteen years of Hunter's operation, the Bureau received
information which was considered valuable in both its counterintel-
Memorandum from FBI SA #4 to W. A. Branigan, 11/26/62.
* Ibid.
ligence and its domestic intelligence efforts; it also received a signifi-
cant volume of material that was valueless. Project Hunter revealed,
for example, the location and future plans of a large number of indi-
viduals of investigative interest to the FBI, and the "pro-communist
sympathies" of numerous American citizens, 'but it did not lead to
the identification of any foreign illegal agents.33 4
Typical counterintelligence information generated from the pro-
gram, as stated in the annual FBI evaluation reports, included: "travel
plans to the USSR of numerous Communist Party subjects; . . . data
indicating pro-Soviet sympathies of U.S. individuals; . . . data indi-
cating a U.S. person may be serving as a Soviet courier; . . . data
indicating the existence of particular Russian social and art clubs in
the U.S.; . . . data indicating a desire of U.S. students to study in
USSR; . . . contacts in this country of Security Index (SI) sub-
jects vacationing and studying abroad; . . . [d]ata regarding current
and former U.S. exchange students show[ing] Soviet and U.S. con-
tacts before and after return, romantic involvements, sympathies and
difficulties encountered in Russia; . . . plans of seven individuals to
repatriate to the USSR; . . . U.S. contacts with current and former
known and suspected Soviet agents now in the USSR . . ." "
In addition, essentially domestic intelligence was received "regard-
ing persons involved in the peace movements, anti-Vietnam demon-
strations, women's organizations, 'teach-ins' . . ., racial matters, Pro-
gressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, DuBois
Clubs, Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and other
organizations." Il The fact that an aide to a United States Senator re-
quested a Moscow dance company to perform in the United States
was discovered through Hunter.and duly filed,"3 7 as was the fact that
the foreign-born wife of a man who would shortly become an aide
to Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman expected to be in a posi-
tion to become friendly with President Kennedy.3 38
Information such as that listed above was considered to be valuable
by the Bureau.3 39 A 1966 evaluation of Hunter by the FBI's Domestic
Intelligence Division stated that "[t]he value of this material is
shown by the fact that there was an increase of 53% in the number of
new cases opened on the basis of information furnished by the
source. . . . More than 260 new cases were opened and 96 cases were
reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the basis of travel
to the USSR and contacts of U.S. citizens, Latin Americans, and
Branigan, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 168. The FBI defines "illegal agent"
as "a highly trained specialist in espionage tradecraft. He may be a [foreign]
national and/or a professional intelligence officer dispatched to the United
States under a false identity. Some illegals are trained in the scientific and
technical field to permit easy access to sensitive areas of employment". (FBI
Monograph, "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by Foreign Gov-
ernments," 3/20/75.)
* Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 12/5/60; memoran-
dum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 6/9/61: memorandum from W. A.
Branigan to W. C. Sullivan 12/5/61; memorandum from Supervisor #1 to W.
A. Branigan, 10/29/62; memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan,
11/2/62; memorandum from Project Supervisor #2 to W. A. Branigan, 8/21/64,
8/30/65, 8/24/66, and 8/28/69.
' Memorandum from Project Supervisor #2 to W. A. Branigan, 8/24/66.
"' Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 6/9/61.
*iid.
* Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 73.
Cubans in the U.S. with individuals in the USSR." 340 A 1973 informa-
tional memorandum routed to Acting Director Patrick Gray noted
that "[w]e have always considered the product from Project Hunter
as valuable to our investigative interests." 34
As discussed in Part II above, however, this project was not as
valuable to the FBI's counterespionage mission as CIA officials
assumed it to be. Large numbers of intercepted communications were
received from the Agency, but many of them-95 percent according to
the FBI Special Agent 342 who was in charge of the administrative
aspects of Hunter for five years-were considered valueless, either be-
cause they contained nothing of counterintelligence value or because
the information supplied merely duplicated information already in
the Bureau case files.3 43 William A. Branigan agreed that much of the
product could be characterized as "junk," 3" and asserted that the rela-
tive value of this project must be evaluated in light of the fact that
this source cost the Bureau nothing, either in terms of dollars or in
terms of manpower.34
V. TERMINATION OF THE PROJECT
All of the FBI's own mail opening programs were discontinued in
mid-1966,9" yet Bureau officials gave no thought at that time to termi-
nating the Hunter Project. As explained by Mr. Branigan, Hunter
was considered to be a CIA operation. It was operated at no cost or
risk to the Bureau. There was therefore no reason to cut off this source
when the Bureau's own programs were terminated. 34T Thus, the FBI
continued to receive the fruits of mail opening long after its own agents
were prohibited from opening the mail themselves.
Project Hunter was also not terminated for approximately three
years after J. Edgar Hoover wrote a footnote in the 1970 "Huston
Report" which contained this language: "The FBI is opposed to imple-
menting any covert mail coverage [i.e., mail opening] because it is
clearly illegal and it is likely that, if done, information would leak
out of the Post Office to the press and serious damage would be done
to the intelligence community." *34 The FBI Director, therefore, was
apparently willing to allow the Bureau to receive information from
a source that he himself described as "clearly illegal" and which
he believed could seriously jeopardize the American intelligence
community.
Project Hunter was only terminated when the CIA itself suspended
the New York operation in mid-Felbruary 1973, for reasons which are
discussed in Part II above. At that time, the FBI was approached by
Agency representatives to determine whether or not the Bureau wished
to assume responsibility for the project, since the Bureau had 'been
Memorandum from Project Supervisor #2 to Branigan, 8/24/66.
34 Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to E. S. Miller, 2/15/73.
3 " Project Supervisor #1, 10/1/75, p. 60.
m Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 81; Project Supervisor #1, 10/1/75, p. 60.
* Branigan, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 168.
m Staff summary of W. A. Branigan interview, 9/11/75.
3" See pp. 668-670.
A Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 89.
'" Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoe), June 1970.
p. 31.
the largest consumer of information developed from this source."'
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA,
scheduled a meeting with Acting FBI Director Gray on February 16,
1973 to discuss this possibility.3so The Bureau, however, declined to
assume responsibility for the project, primarily because of the at-
tendant expense, manpower requirements, and security problems. Ac-
cording to William Branigan, legal considerations were not a factor
in this decision; it was simply thought to be too large and risky an
operation to be undertaken by Bureau agents."' The suspension of
operations therefore proved to be permanent.
VI. INTERNAL AUTHORIZATION AND CONTROLS
A. Initial Approval by and Continuing Knowledge of the Director
It is clear that FBI Director Hoover personally approved Project
Hunter from its inception. Hoover's initial and his written "OK" are
signed on the first document in the Project Hunter policy file, the
January 22, 1958, memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Board-
man, which sets out the basic facts regarding CIA coverage and pos-
sible use of such coverage. 3 5 2 He also personally approved the first
(1958) and the final (1972) guidelines that went to the Agency,353 the
initial policy memorandum dealing with the handling of Hunter
material,354 and informational memoranda regarding the "Hunter-
Vince" (Latin American mail) aspect of the program.355
In March 1961, the FBI was informed by James Angleton that
the CIA had developed a laboratory capability in New York City to
test intercepted correspondence for microdots and other secret writing
techniques.56 The CIA offered the use of this laboratory to the
Bureau if Bureau agents should ever want to use it. (Apparently this
was never used by the FBI.) 35 Hoover was informed of the laboratory
and the CIA offer in a March 10, 1961, memorandum, on which he
penned the phrase "Another inroad !" 35
Acting Director 1L. Patrick Gray was also made aware of Project
Hunter by at least February 16, 1973, the date he initialed the
February 15, 1973, memorandum from W. A. Branigan to E. S. Miller
and was scheduled to meet with Lt. General Walters regarding the
possible take-over of the project by the FBI.359 This, however, was one
day after the project was actually terminated.
B. Internal Controls
Several of the internal controls which were developed for Project
Hunter have already been noted. Knowledge of the true nature of
" Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 42; Papich, 9/22/75, p. 79.
a Memorandum from Branigan to Miller, 2/15/73.
m Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 89.
Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58.
Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 2/6/58; J. Edgar Hoover rout-
ing slip (attachment), 3/10/72.
' Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 4/21/58.
3 Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 3/27/63.
' Memorandum from D. E. Moore to A. H. Belmont, 3/10/61.
7 Moore, 10/1/75, p. 15.
* Memorandum from Moore to Belmont, 3/10/61.
5 Memorandum from Branigan to Miller, 2/15/73.
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this source was closely held to those sections within the Domestic
Intelligence Division which had a need-to-know; dissemination of
information outside Headquarters was always disguised and Field
Offices were cautioned that the information could be used for lead
purposes only. In addition, the project was evaluated at least annually
by the Project Supervisor. These evaluations, which summarized the
information received from the project during the previous year, were
passed up through channels and generally were reviewed by at least
an Assistant to the Director.6 s
VII. EXTERNAL AUTHORIZATION
A. Attorneys General
There is no evidence that any Attorney General was ever informed
by Bureau officials about the existence of Project Hunter. It was
explained by one Bureau official that since the project was a CIA
rather than an FBI project, there was no need to seek Justice Depart-
ment approval or even to inform Justice Department officials about the
fact that mail was being opened in the project. 6 '
B. Postmasters General
There is also no evidence that any FBI official ever informed any
Postmaster General or Chief Postal Inspector about Project Hunter.
The February 15, 1973 memorandum from W. A. Branigan to E. S.
Miller states that "[a]rrangements for the [CIA project] were obvi-
ously worked out between the Agency and Post Office officials and we
are not privy to the details". 3 62
C. Presidents
There is similarly no evidence that any President was aware of
Project Hunter.
PART IV: FBI MAIL OPENING
I. INTRODUCTION AND MAJOR FACTS
The FBI, like the CIA, conducted several mail opening programs
of its own within the United States. Eight programs were conducted
in as many cities between the years 1940 and 1966; the longest was
operated, with one period of suspension, throughout this entire twenty-
six year period; the shortest ran for less than six weeks. FBI use
of this technique was initially directed against the Axis powers immedi-.
ately before and during World War II, but during the decade of
the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's all of the programs responded
to the Bureau's concern with communism.
At least three more limited instances of FBI mail opening also
occurred in relation to particular espionage cases in the early 1960's.
Significant differences may be found between the FBI mail opening
programs and those of the CIA. First, the stated purposes of the two
sets of program generally reflects the agencies' differing intelligence
Project Supervisor #1, 10/1/75, p. 38.
Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 90.
Memorandum from Branigan to Miller, 2/15/73.
jurisdiction: the FBI programs were, in the main, fairly narrowly
directed 'at the detection and identification of foreign illegal agents
rather than the collection of foreign positive intelligence. Thus, no
premium was placed on the large-scale collection of foreign intelli-
gence information per 8e; in theory (if not always in practice), only
information that might reasonably be expected to provide leads in
counterespionage cases was sought. Because of this, the total volume
of mail opened in Bureau programs was less than that in the CIA
programs. An equally important factor contributing to the smaller
volume of opened mail lay in the selection criteria used in several of
the FBI's programs. These criteria were more sophisticated than the
random and Watch List methods used by the CIA; they enabled
trained Bureau agents to make more reasoned determinations, on the
basis of exterior examinations of the envelopes, as to whether or not
the communications might be in some sense "suspect." Third, the FBI
mail opening programs were much more centralized and tightly ad-
ministered than the CIA programs. All but one (which resulted in a
reprimand from the Director) received prior approval at the highest
levels of the Bureau. They were evaluated and had to be reapproved at
least annually. Several of them-unlike the CIA's New York project-
were discontinued on the basis of unfavorable internal evaluations.
This high degree of central control clearly mirrored the organiza-
tional differences between the FBI and the CIA, and is not limited to
mail opening operations alone. Finally, there is less evidence that FBI
officials considered their programs to be illegal or attempted to fab-
ricate "cover stories" in the event of exposure. Bureau officials, for the
most part, apparently did not focus on questions of legality or "flap
potential" strategies; they did not necessarily consider them to be
legal or without the potential for adverse public reaction, they simply
did not dwell on legal issues or alternative strategies at all.
In some respects, the Bureau's mail opening programs were even
more.intrusive than the CIA's. At least three of them, for example,
involved the interception and opening of entirely domestic mail-
that is, mail sent from one point within the United States to another
point within the Uiited States. All of the CIA programs, by contrast,
involved at least one foreign "terminal". The Bureau programs also
highlight the problems inherent in combining criminal and intelli-
gence functions within a single agency: the irony of the nation's chief
law enforcement agency conducting systematic campaigns of mail
opening is readily apparent.
Despite their differences, however, the FBI mail opening programs
illustrate many of the same themes of the CIA programs. Like the
CIA, the FBI did not secure the approval of any senior official out-
side its own organization prior to the implementation of -its pro-
grams. While these programs, like the CIA's, involved the coopera-
tion of the Post Office Department and the United States Customs
Service, there is no evidence that any ranking official of either agency
was ever aware that mail was actually opened by the FBI. Similarly,
there is no substantial evidence that any President or Attorney Gen-
eral, under whose office the FBI operates, was contemporaneously in-
formed of the programs' existence. As in the case of the CIA, efforts
were also made to prevent word of the programs from reaching the
ears of Congressmen investigating possible privacy violations by
federal agencies. The record, therefore, again suggests that these pro-
grams were operated covertly, by virtue of deception, or, at a minimum,
lack of candor on the part of intelligence officials.
Although the FBI relied on m6re sophisticated selection criteria
in some of their programs, morover, one again sees the same type of
"overkill" which is inherent in any mail opening operation. These
criteria, while more precise than the methods used by the CIA, were
never sufficiently accurate to result in the opening of correspondence
to or from illegal agents alone. Indeed, even by the Bureau's own ac-
counting of its most successful program, the mail of hundreds of
American citizens was opened for every one communication that led
to an illegal agent. And several of the FBI programs did not employ
these refined criteria: mail in these programs was opened on the basis
of methods much more reminiscent of the CIA's random and Watch
List criteria.
In the FBI programs one again sees the tendency of this technique,
once in place, to be used for purposes outside the agency's institu-
tional jurisdiction. While the Bureau has no mandate to collect for-
eign positive intelligence, for example, several of the programs did in
fact result in the gathering of this type of information. More seriously,
the record reveals for a second time the ease with which these pro-
grams can be directed inward against American citizens: the Bureau
programs, despite their counterespionage purpose, generated at least
some information of a strictly domestic nature, about criminal ac-
tivity outside the national security area, and, significantly, about
antiwar organizations and their leaders.
Perhaps the most fundamental theme illustrated by both the FBI's
and the CIA's programs is this: that trained intelligence officers in
both agencies, honestly perceiving a foreign and domestic threat to
the security of the country, believed that this threat sanctioned-
even necessitated-their use of a technique that was not authorized by
any President and was contrary to law. They acted to protect a country
whose laws and traditions gave every indication that it was not to be
"protected" in such a fashion.
The most pertinent facts regarding FBI mail opening may be
summarized as follows:
(a) The FBI conducted eight mail opening programs in a total
of eight cities in the United States for varying lengths of time between
1940 and 1966.
(b) The primary purpose of most of the FBI mail opening pro-
grams was the identification of foreign illegal agents; all of the pro-
grams were established to gather foreign counterintelligence informa-
tion deemed by FBI officials to be important to the security of the
United States.
(c) Several of these programs were successful in the identification
of illegal agents and were considered by FBI officials to be one of
the most effective means of locating such agents. Several of the pro-
grams also generated other types of useful counterintelligence
information.
(d) In general, the administrative controls were tight. The pro-
grams were all subject to review by Headquarters semiannually or
annually and some of the programs were terminated because they
were not achieving the desired results in the counterintelligence field.
(e) Despite the internal FBI policy which required prior approval
by Headquarters for the institution of these programs, however, at
least one of them was initiated by a field office without such approval.
(f) Some of the fruits of mail openings were used for other
than legitimate foreign counterintelligence purposes. For example,
information about individuals who received pornographic material
and about drug addicts was forwarded to appropriate FBI field
offices and possibly to other federal agencies.
(g) Although on the whole these programs did not stray far from
their counterespionage goals, they also generated substantial positive
foreign intelligence and some essentially domestic intelligence about
United States citizens. For example, information was obtained re-
garding two domestic anti-war organizations and government em-
ployees and other American citizens who expressed "pro-communist"
sympathies.
(h) A significant proportion of the mail that was opened was
entirely domestic mail, i.e., the points of origin and destination were
both within the United States.
(i) Some of the mail that was intercepted was entirely foreign
mail, i.e., it originated in a foreign country and was destined to a
foreign country, and was simply routed through the United States.
(j) FBI agents opened mail in regard to particular espionage cases
(as opposed to general programs) in at least three instances in the
early 1960's.
(k) The legal issues raised by the use of mail opening as an in-
vestigative technique were apparently not seriously considered by
FBI officials while the programs continued. In 1970, however, after the
FBI mail opening programs had been terminated, J. Edgar Hoover
wrote that mail opening was "clearly illegal".
(1) At least as recently as 1972, senior officials recommended the
reinstitution of mail opening as an investigative technique.
(in) No attempt was made to inform any Postmaster General of
the mail openings.
(n) The Post Office officials who were contacted about these pro-
grams, including the Chief Postal Inspector, were not informed of
the true nature of the FBI mail surveys, i.e., they were not told that
the Bureau contemplated the actual opening of mail.
(o) The FBI neither sought nor received the approval of the Attor-
ney General or the President of the United States for its mail opening
programs or for the use of this technique generally.
(p) Although FBI officials might have informed Justice Depart-
ment attorneys that mail was opened in two or three particular espio-
nage cases and might have informed an Attorney General of some mail
screening operations by the Bureau, no attempt was made to inform
the Justice Department, incuding the Attorney General, of the full
extentor true nature of these operations.
(q) There is no evidence that any President of the United States
ever knew of any ongoing FBI mail opening program.
II. DESORIPTION OF FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS
The eight FBI mail opening programs are summarized below.
A. Z-Coverage
Z-Coverage, the first and the longest-running FBI mail opening
program, originally involved the opening of mail addressed to the
diplomatic establishments of Axis powers in Washingon, D.C.; in
later years, mail coming to similar establishments of several com-
munist nations was targeted. The stated purpose of the program was
"to detect individuals in contact with these establishments who might
be attempting to make contact for espionage reasons, for purposes of
defecting or who might be illegal agents." "I
This program was initiated in 1940, before the United States
entry into 'World War II, with FBI agents who had been trained in
the technique of "chamfering" (mail opening by representatives of
an allied country's censorship agency. 64 It was suspended after the
war but reinstituted in Washington, D.C. in the early or mid-1950's on
the recommendation of the local FBI field office.365 For more than a
decade, mail from both foreign and domestic points of origin was
intercepted at the Main Post Office, brought to the FBI Laboratory
for opening and photographing, and returned to the Post Office prior
to delivery. In 1959, Z-Coverage was extended to New York City as
well. As implemented in New York, about 30 to 60 letters addressed to
various diplomatic establishments in that city were intercepted at the
Grand Central and Lenox Hill Post Offices each day for opening and
photographing at the New York Field Office.366 Some registered mail
sent to these establishments was opened as well.3 67
Despite its perceived success at both locations, Z-Coverage was ter-
minated in July 1966.
B. Survey No. 1
Survey No. 1 operated in a total of six cities for varying lengths of
time between 1959 and 1966. It involved the opening of certain out-
going mail to selected cities in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, and
was considered to be the most successful of all the FBI's mail open-
ing programs. Its purposes, as summarized in a 1961 FBI memo-
randum, were two: " (1) to identify persons corresponding with known
espionage mail drops in Europe, and (2) to identify persons in the
United States who are directing letters to possible mail drops in Europe
and whose letters appear to be the product of an illegal agent." 368
Survey No. 1 was first instituted in New York City on October 1,
1959, as a direct result of knowledge the FBI had recently acquired
about the means by which foreign illegal agents communicated to their
principals abroad. Once in operation, Bureau agents, in a secure room
.. Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/75.
"' Memorandum from C. E. Heunrich to A. H. Belmont, 9/7/51.
"oMemorandum from E. T. Turner to C. E. Hennrich, 6/25/51; FBI SA #5
testimony, 10/10/75, pp. 4, 5.
'"FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75. p. 23.
... FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, pp. 38, 39.
'Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 5/25/61.
at Idlewild Airport's Airmail Facility screened more than 425,000 let-
ters from the United States to points in Western Europe each week.36
Selected items-a total of 1,011 in seven years-o 70 were returned to
the New York Field Office for opening and photographing prior to
reinsertion into the mailstream. In August 1961, after nearly two years
of operation in New York, FBI officials believed that Survey No. 1 was
so successful that it was extended to four additional cities-Boston,
Los Angeles, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. 37 1-where coverage in-
cluded mail not only to European cities but to Asia and the Americas
as well. Survey No. 1 was also extended to Detroit on a sixty-day trial
basis in April 1962.372
The expanded coverage in all cities but Washington did not prove
to be as successful as the original effort in New York, however. After
thirteen months of operation in Los Angeles, seventeen months in
Seattle, one year in Boston, and four months in Detroit, a decision was
made at Headquarters to terminate the program in these cities be-
cause of "unproductivity and manpower needs."3 7 3 After February
1963, therefore, Survey No. 1 operated only in New York and Wash-
ington. In these two cities the annual evaluations374 continued to praise
the effectiveness of Survey No. 1 and it was continued to operate at both
locations until all of the mail opening programs were terminated in
mid-1966.
C. Survey No. 2
Survey No. 2 operated in New York City, Detroit, and San Fran-
cisco for varying lengths of time between March 1961 and March 1962;
its purpose was again the location and identification of illegal
agents.17 5 No. 2 was, in essence, an inverse No. 1: incoming mail to
urban postal zones in which illegal agents were believed likely to
reside was screened and opened, on the basis of the same criteria used
.in Survey No. 1, in an attempt to intercept the other half of the com-
munication link between illegal agents and their principals. Since mail
coming into these postal zones was screened irrespective of the point of
origin, much of the mail that was opened was entirely domestic
mail.376
Survey No. 2 originated as an outgrowth of No. 1. It was first im-
plemented on March 8, 1961, in postal zones 23, 24, and 25 in New
York City, with Post Office employees rather than Bureau agents
screening the in-coming mail.3 7" The Post Office personnel were briefed
by the FBI as to the selection criteria but were not informed of the
true nature of the program. When they discovered a suspect commu-
" Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 8/31/61.
* W. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/22/75, p. 5.
m Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/4/61.
3 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 4/13/62;
Serious consideration was given by FBI officials to extending this program to five
other American cities as well. Such an extension was rejected largely for security
reasons. (Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/4/61.)
Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/8/64.
m E.g., Memorandum from New York Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 4/5/66.
* Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/75.
m Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 5.
m Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 8/31/61.
nication, it was turned over to the FBI and, without their knowledge,
opened and photographed at the field office before being returned to
the mailstream. On the basis of "test" letters sent by the Bureau, how-
ever, their performance was judged inadequate and, in September
1961, FBI agents replaced the postal workers in screening the mail."*
In October 1961, the program was also extended to both Detroit
(zone 31 and the Hamtramck area) 37 and San Francisco (all mail
sent to that city from New York and Washington) on a trial basis.s 0
Survey No. 2 was considered unsuccessful in all of these cities
and was consequently discontinued in Detroit and San Francisco in
February 1962, and in New York-after a total of approximately
2,350 letters had been opened- 3 8 1 on March 9, 1962.3sa
D. Survey No. 3
Survey No. 3 was conducted in New York City from June 1963
to June 1964, and involved the opening of mail (irrespective of point
of origin) addressed to known or suspected intelligence agents em-
ployed at a diplomatic establishment. The purpose of Survey No. 3
was to detect contacts of an intelligence nature with these agents, who,
FBI officials believed, received such mail using the secure cover of
their diplomatic employment.3 82
This program was apparently an outgrowth of the Bureau's cover-
age of mail to various other diplomatic establishments in New York
(Z-Coverage). Although its precise genesis is undocumented, one of
the participants in the program recalled that the idea originated with
another agent, then involved with Z-Coverage, who felt that existing
coverage was inadequate and should be expanded.3 3 Headquarters
subsequently approved the idea, and, on June 25, 1963, Survey No. 3
was instituted in New York.
Each working day for the next year, a single agent from the New
York office went to the Grand Central Post Office where a postal clerk
brought him all the mail that was addressed to the Post Office box of
the targeted diplomatic establishment-approximately 200 letters per
day, according to the agent who was assigned to this task.31 On the
basis of a list of about thirty diplomatic officials, which was com-
piled from public source information, the agent segregated the mail
addressed to these officials and carried the letters-estimated by him
to average five or six per day-38 * to the New York office for opening
and photographing.
Survey No. 3 was not considered to be successful by the Bureau
and was discontinued on June 26, 1964.
37s Ibid.
" Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 10/2/61.
o Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
10/18/61.
" Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 8/31/61; memorandum from Mr.
Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 12/21/61; memorandum from New York Field Office to
FBI Headquarters, 3/5/62.
a Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/3/62.
' Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/75.




E. Survey No. 4
Survey No. 4 was conducted in Miami, Florida, between January 1963
and July 1966. It involved the screening and opening of certain airmail
from Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico, to two Latin American
countries for the purpose of locating clandestine communications in
particular espionage cases.3 86
Survey No. 4 developed from an espionage case in which the Bureau
had learned that a Latin American intelligence agent who op-
erated in the United States but whose true identity was unknown, was
under instructions to transmit material to his country's intelligence
service by mail. In order to intercept this agent's written communica-
tions, Bureau officials at Headquarters formulated a plan to screen
and selectively open mail from San Juan and Miami to that country
utilizing their knowledge of its intelligence correspondence, and on
December 21, 1962, they authorized the Miami Field Office to imple-
ment the program. 7 ,
While the program was initially instituted as a response to a single
espionage case, it soon developed into a more generalized survey to
detect clandestine communications from any suspected espionage agent
working for the same country. Its scope was further broadened on
December 9, 1963, when the Miami office was instructed to cover mail
from that city to another Latin American country as well. *8
Bureau agents in Survey No. 4 screened between 12,000 and. 20,000
letters per day at the Biscayne Annex Post Office in Miami.8 9 A total
of 400 letters were opened,3 90 either in the Post Office itself, or, when
secret writing or microdots were suspected, in the FBI Laboratory in
Washington, to which they were flown for more sophisticated examina-
tion before reinsertion into the mailstream.391
Survey No. 4 was considered to be successful but was terminated
along with other FBI mail opening programs, in July 1966.
F. 'Survey No. 5
Survey No. 5 was the first of three FBI mail opening programs
which were conducted in San Francisco and directed against Asian
communists and their sympathizers. It began in September 1954 and
continued until January 1966. This survey originally involved the
physical inspection of third and fourth class propaganda from a Far
East Asian country; after August 1956, incoming first class letter
mail was selectively opened and photographed as well. The stated
purpose of this program was to identify individuals in the United
States who, because of the nature of their foreign contacts, were be-
lieved to constitute a threat to the internal security of the United
States.311
Like the CIA's New Orleans and Hawaiian mail intercept projects,
Survey No. 5 was initially an extension of the Customs Service exami-
nation of propaganda material entering the United States from abroad.
W. R. Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 21.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/21/62.
*" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/9/63.
Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 36.
Wannall, 10/22/75, p. 12.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/21/62.
" Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan, 9/15/61.
Customs Service cooperation ceased, however, on May 26, 1965, as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in Lamont v. Postmaster
General of the United States, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), which invalidated
the statutory authority under which Customs conducted its propa-
ganda inspection.,,, Contact was subsequently made with officials of
the Post Office and, with their assistance, No. 5 Survey recommenced
at the Rincon Annex Post Office on July 7, 1965.
Approximatey 13,500 items of mail were screened in two hour
periods each day by Bureau agents who participated in this pro-
gram.3 9 4 A daily average of 50 to 100 of these letters were returned
to the San Francisco Field Office for opening and photographing prior
to their reinsertion into the mailstream.""1
Survey No. 5 was terminated on January 24, 1966, "for security
reasons involving local changes in postal personnel." 396
G. Survey No. 6
Survey No. 6 was also conducted in San Francisco, operating from
January 1964 until January 1966. This program involved the screening
and opening of outgoing mail from the United States to the same Far
East Asian country; it was essentially an inverse Survey No. 5. The
stated purposes of Survey No. 6 were to obtain foreign counter-
intelligence information concerning Americans residing in the Far
East Asian country; to detect efforts to persuade scientists and other
persons of Asian descent residing in the United States to return to
that country; to develop information concerning economic and social
conditions there; and to secure information concerning subjects in
the United States of a security interest to the Bureau who were
corresponding with individuals in that Asian country.39
In June 1963, the-New York Field Office had extended its Survey
No. 1 coverage to include airmail destined for Asia, which was then
handled at the same location where European mail was processed.
When Post Office procedures changed a few months later, and the
Asian mail was routed through San Francisco rather than New York,
Headquarters instructed the San Francisco office to assume responsi-
bility for this coverage. The program operated, with one period of
suspension, for two years until January 24, 1966, when it was termi-
nated for the same security reasons as the Survey No. 5.398 Figures as
to the volume of mail screened and opened cannot be reconstructed.
H. Survey No. 7
Survey No. 7 was conducted in San Francisco from January to
November 1961. It involved the screening and opening of mail be-
'm See p. 563, W. Raymond Wannall testified: "I don't think [this] decision
made any difference with regard to the legality or illegality of that operation
which we were conducting or the illegality of the operation which was beyond
the interception of the propaganda starting in 1956." W. Raymond Wannall
10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 169, 1970.
" Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to A. H. Belmont, 2/23/61.
m Memorandum from Donahoe to Belmont, 2/23/61; memorandum from
San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60.
3 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/19/66.
m Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/75.
Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/66.
tween North Americans of Asian descent for the purpose of detecting
Communist intelligence efforts directed against this country.399
Survey No. 7 evolved from the Survey No. 5 and particular espio-
nage cases handled by the San Francisco Field Office. Without instruc-
tions from Headquarters, that office initiated a survey of mail between
North Americans of Asian descent in January 1961, and informed
Headquarters of the program shortly after it was implemented. On
February 28, 1961. Headquarters officials instructed San Francisco to
terminate the program because the expected benefits were not believed
to justify the additional manpower required by the FBI Laboratory
to translate the intercepted letters.400 The San Francisco Field Office
was permitted to use this source when it was deemed necessary in con-
nection with particular espionage cases, but even this limited use
proved -unproductive. It was terminated on November 20, 1961, after
a total of 83 letters had been opened.4 0 1
I. Typical Operational Details
The specific operational details of the eight programs described
above obviously varied from program to program. The New York
Field Office's conduct of Survey No. 1 represented a pattern that typi-
fied these programs, however, in terms of mechanical aspects such as
the physical handling of the mail itself. In August 1961, before the
extension of Survey No. I to Boston, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Wash-
ington, D.C., the New York Office was instructed to describe the opera-
tional details of -this Survey as implemented in that city for the bene-
fit of field offices in the four additional cities. A memorandum was
subsequently prepared for distribution to these cities, pertinent por-
tions of which are reproduced below:
[Survey No. 1] in New York is located in a secure room
at the U.S. Post Office Airmail Facility, New York Inter-
national Airport, Idlewild, New York. . . . This room
. . . measures approximately 9 feet wide by 12 feet long
and . . . is locked at all times, whether or not the room is in
use . . . Postal employees have no access to this room which
is known to them as the Inspector's Room.
Seven Special Agents are assigned to [Survey No. 1] on a
full-time basis. The survey operates 7 days a week and per-
sonnel work on rotating 8-hour shifts . .. Personnel assigned
to the survey work under the guise of Postal Inspectors and
are known to Post Office personnel as Postal Inspectors work-
ing on a special assignment....
[B]y arrangement with the postal officials, [mail]
pouches to destinations in which we have indicated interest
are not sealed but are placed in front of the [Survey No. 1]
room. The [Survey No. 1] personnel then take the bag into
the room, open the pouch, untie the bundles, and review the
.". Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/61;
Memorandum from San Franciso Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/27/61.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarter to San Francisco Field Office 2/28/61.
Wannall, 10/22/75, p. 16; Memorandum from San Franciso Field Office to
FBI Headquarters, 11/27/61.
mail. Any suspect letters are held aside and the rest are re-
bundled and returned to the pouch. The pouch is then closed
and placed outside the door to the room on a mail skid. Postal
employees then take that pouch, seal it with a lead seal and
place it aside for, or turn it over to, the carrier. ...
It should be noted that the mail must be turned over by the
the Post Office Department to the carrier one hour before de-
parture time...
... Each day, one of the Agents is selected as a courier,
and when the opportunity presents itself, he returns to the
Field Office with the suspected communications. At the Field
Office, he or another Agent who has been trained by the Bu-
reau in certain techniques opens the communications. The
envelope and its contents are photographed . . . There will
be instances where the Field Office, upon opening the com-
munication, may deem it advisable to immediately notify
the Bureau and possibly fly it by courier to the Bureau for
examination by the Laboratory. Before making any arrange-
ments to fly the communication to the Bureau, the Field 6f-
fice should consider the time the examination will take and
the time the suspected communication may be placed back
in the mail without arousing any suspicion on the part of the
addressee.
After the communication has been photographed and re-
sealed, the courier returns to the airport and places the sus-
pected communication in the next appropriate outgoing
pouch examined in the [Survey No. 1] Room. If time permits,
the pouch is held in the room until the suspected communica-
tion is returned.4 0
A device developed by the FBI Laboratory and maintained at partic-
ipating field offices facilitated the opening process. While this device
was relatively simple, it was not as primitive as the kettle and stick
method utilized by the CIA agents who opened mail in the New York
project and allowed for greater efficiency: the FBI's opening process
was reported to take only a second or two for a single letter,
403 in con-
trast to five to fifteen seconds for the CIA. According to one of the
agents involved, special training in the use of this device was given
at the field office rather than at Headcuarters, and was only of one
or two days duration,"o4 in contrast to the week-long training sessions
required of CIA mail openers.
Filing and internal dissemination procedures also varied somewhat
from program to program. In Z-Coverage, the negatives of the photo-
graphic copies were filed at the field offices in New York and Wash-
ington for approximately one year after interception, after which time
they were destroyed.4 0 5 If the developed prints were believed to con-
tain valuable counterintelligence information, they would be dissemi-
nated to appropriate supervisors within the field office for placement in
a confidential central file or a particular case file. In the latter case.
4" Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/29/61.
03 FBI Special Agent 1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 14.
* FBI Special Agent I statement, 9/10/75, pp. 11, 12.
40 Staff summary of FBI Special Agent 7 interview, 9/15/75.
the true source would be disguised by an informant symbol, although,
as one supervisor in the New York office noted, the nature of the source
would be clear to those familiar with Bureau operations.4 0 6
No index was maintained of the names of all senders and/or
addressees whose mail was intercepted, as was maintained by the
CIA in the New York project. In rare cases when a letter was con-
sidered to be of exceptional counterintelligence value, a photograph
would be sent to Headquarters as well. As a general rule, however,
there was no dissemination, either of the photographs themselves or
of abstracts of the letters, to other field offices. 40 7
These procedures generally applied to Survey No. 1 and Survey No.
2 as well, but in these two surveys the photographs of intercepted
letters were dated and numbered, and one copy or abstract was placed
in a control file maintained by each participating field office.
In Surveys No. 5 and No. 6, the San Francisco Field Office was
responsible for conducting "name checks" on all individuals sending,
or receiving mail that had been opened. If, on the basis of the name
check or the text of the letter itself, it was determined that the inter-
cepted letter had intelligence value, a copy of the letter (if written
in English) or of the translation (if written in a foreign language)
was placed in the main files of the San Francisco office. That office was
also responsible for paraphrasing the contents of letters in which
other field offices may have had an intelligence interest, and dissemi-
nating the information to them in a manner which would not reveal
the true source of the information. Except for letters written in a
foreign language, photographs of which were sent to Washington for
translation, copies were not sent to Headquarters unless the letter
was of particularly great intelligence value.
J. Other Instances of FBI Mail Opening
In addition to the eight mail surveys described in sections A through
H above, it has also been alleged that a Bureau agent actively partici-
pated in the CIA's Hawaiian mail intercept project during the
mid-1950s. The CIA representative in Honolulu who conducted this
operation stated that an FBI agent assisted him in opening and photo-
graphing incoming mail from Asia for a period of two months in
early 1955.40s No supporting Bureau documents could be located to
confirm this participation, however.
Aside from generalized surveys of mail, several isolated instances
of mail opening by FBI agents occurred in connection with particular
espionage cases. It was, in fact, a standard practice to attempt to open
the mail of any known illegal agent. As stated by one former Bureau
intelligence officer: ". . . anytime . . . we identified an illegal agent
. . I we would try to obtain their mail." so0 FBI agents were successful
in this endeavor in at least three cases, described below.
1. Waslhington, D.C. (1961)
One isolated instance of mail opening by FBI agents occurred in
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Survey No. 1. This case involved the opening of several items of cor-
respondence from a known illegal agent residing in the Washington
area to a mail drop in Europe. The letters, which were returned to
the FBI Laboratory for opening, were intercepted over a period in
excess of six months.4 1 0
2. Washington, D.C. (1963-64)
A second mail opening project in regard to a particular espionage
case occurred for approximately one and one-half years in Wash-
ington, D.C., in 1963 and 1964, in connection with the FBI's investi-
gation of known Soviet illegal agents Robert and Joy Ann Baltch.
This case was subsequently prosecuted, but the prosecution was ulti-
mately dropped, in part, according to FBI officials, because some of
the evidence was tainted by use of this technique."'
3. Southern California
A third isolated instance of mail opening occurred in a southern
California city for a one to two-month period in 1962. This project
involved the opening of approximately one to six letters received each
day by a suspected illegal agent who resided nearby. The suspected
agent's mail was delivered on a daily basis to three FBI agents who
worked out of the local resident FBI office, and was opened in a back
room in that office.412
III. NATURE AND VALUE OF THE PRODUCT
A. Selection Criteria
Those FBI mail opening programs which were designed to cover
mail to or from foreign illegal agents utilized selection criteria that
were more refined than the "shotgun" method 411 used by the CIA
in the New York intercept project. Mail was opened on the basis of cer-
tain "indicators" on the outside of the envelopes that suggested that
the communication might be to or from an illegal agent. The record
reveals, however, that despite the claimed success of these "indicators"
in locating such agents, they were not so precise as to eliminate indi-
vidual discretion on the part of the agents who opened the mail, nor
could they prevent the opening of significant volumes of mail to or
from entirely innocent American citizens. Mail in those programs
which were designed for purposes other than locating illegal agents,
moreover, was generally opened on the basis of criteria far less nar-
row and even more intrusive than these "indicators."
1. The Programs Based on Indicators
Before 1959, the FBI had developed no effective means to intercept
the communication link between illegal agents and their principals. In
Z-Coverage, selection was originally left to the complete discretion of
4o Moore, 10/1/74, pp. 72-74; Branigan 10/9/75, pp. 33, 34; memorandum
from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/4/61.
"I Moore, 10/1/75, p. 38; Branigan. 10/9/75, pp. 34, 35. Justice Department offi-
cials have testified that the prosecution was dropped for other reasons. See
pp. 664-665.
" Postal Inspector #1 deposition, 9/16/75, pp. 23, 46; Branigan, 10/9/75,
pp. 30-32.
41 Angleton 9/17/75, p. 28.
the agents who screened the mail based on their knowledge and train-
ing in the espionage field. The focus was apparently on mail from
individuals rather than organizations, and typewritten letters were
considered more likely to be from foreign agents than handwritten
letters.'1 In March 1959, however, the FBI was able to develop much
more precise selection criteria through the identification and subse-
quent incommunicado interrogation of an illegal agent. During the
course of his interrogation by Bureau agents, he informed the FBI of
the instructions he and other illegal agents were given when corre-
sponding with their principals.416 Particular characteristics on the out-
side of the envelope, he advised them, indicated that the letter may be
from such an agent.
Armed with a knowledge of these "indicators," the FBI agents
involved in Z-Coverage were capable of a more selective and accurate
means of identifying suspect communications. Survey No. 1 and Sur-
vey No. 2 were expressly developed to exploit this knowledge.4 1 6 While
Survey No. 1 also utilized a Watch List which consisted of the ad-
dresses of known or suspected mail drops abroad, as well as the (gen-
erally fictitious) names of known or suspected foreign intelligence
agents, 4 1 the primary selection criteria in both Surveys No. 1 and No.
2 were the "indicators" about which the Bureau learned in early
1959.418
By means of the "indicators," the Bureau did, in fact, identify three
illegal agents through these programs." But even by the Bureau's own
accounting of the number of letters that were opened in the programs,
it is clear that the mail of hundreds of innocent American citizens was
opened and read for every successful lead obtained.420 The random ele-
ment in the selection process was never eliminated: although FBI
officials at Headquarters instructed agents in the field to select only
letters with multiple "indicators" on their face,4 2 1 the field agents fre-
quently opened letters with but one "indicator", which could often be
of such a common nature that it could be found on most letters mailed in
the United States.423
One of the FBI agents who opened mail stated that he was trained
in counterespionage work generally, and in the identification of the
indicators specifically, but he conceded that in the final analysis "it was
strictly my own judgment" as to which items would be selected for
opening.424 Perhaps as a result of such personal discretion on the part
41 FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 20.
Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 3.
1 Staff Summary of Branigan interview, 9/11/75.
Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/27/63.
a Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 3.
Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 5.
M In Z-Coverage, one participating agent testified that he opened 30 to 60 let-
ters each day. (Note 366, supra.) In Survey No. 1, a total of 1,011 were opened
in New York City alone; statistics on the number of letters opened in the five
other cities in which this survey operated cannot be reconstructed. (Note 370,
supra.) In Survey No. 2, 2.350 letters were opened by the New York office; sta-
tistics for the Detroit and San Francisco offices are unavailable. (Note 381,
supra.)
' Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 21, 22.
4 FBI special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 25.
FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 19.
of participating agents, Survey No. 1 generated essentially domestic




In short, knowledge of the indicators did enable the- Bureau to be
more precise in the selection of mail than was previously possible,
but this knowledge was not so precise as to totally eliminate the dis-
cretion-or bias-of the agents involved.
2. The Latin American-Oriented Program
In Survey No. 4, which involved the interception of mail to two
Latin American nations, letters were selected for opening on the basis
of lists of (a) known fictitious names used by illegal agents to address
correspondence to their principals, and (b) accommodation addresses
used by a foreign intelligence service for receiving clandestine
communications.426 The "indicators" discussed above were not utilized
in this or the Asian-oriented mail opening programs.
3. The Asian-Oriented Programs
Survey No. 5 and Survey No. 6 both employed seven general cate-
gories as selection criteria:
(a) Letters to or from a university, scientific, or technical
facility;
(b) Letters to or from a doctor;
(c) Letters to or from selected Security Index subjects re-
siding in the United States;
(d) Letters to or from an Asian country where certain
scientific activities were reportedly taking place;
(e) Letters to or from individuals who were known to be
"turncoats" from the Korean conflict;
(f) Letters believed to emanate from an Asian Communist
intelligence service based on covers of which the FBI was
aware; and
(g) Letters indicating illegal travel of Americans to denied
areas in Asia.4 2 7
Even if one assumes that these guidelines were strictly observed by
the agents opening the mail, (which, given some of the results of these
programs as set forth below, 4 2 8 is not necessarily as accurate assump-
tion) there was obviously ample room for the capture of large num-
bers of entirely personal communications with no counterintelligence
value at all.
The selection criteria utilized in Survey No. 7 cannot be recon-
structed.
B. Requests by Other Intelligence Agencies
No large-scale requirements were levied upon the FBI's mail open-
ing programs by any other intelligence agency. Bureau officials, in
fact, severely restricted knowledge of their programs within the in-
42 See p. 655.
' Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 22.
.. Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 10/29/75. This letter also stated
that no "Watch List" was maintained because "the limitations involved in re-
viewing over 13,000 letters a day within a two-hour period did not allow suffi-
cient time to compare these letters with a list of names."
4* See pp. 654-655.
telligence community; only the CIA knew of any of the Bureau's
programs, and officers of that. agency were formally advised about the
existence of only one of the eight, Survey No. 1.
In July 1960, Bureau Headquarters originally rejected the recom-
mendation of the New York Field Office to inform the CIA of Survey
No. 1 in order to obtain from it a list of known mail drops in Europe
for use in the program.4 9 Headquarters then wrote: "Due to the ex-
tremely sensitive nature of the source . . ., the Bureau is very reluc-
tant to make any contacts which could possibly jeopardize that source.
Therefore, the Bureau will not make any contact with CIA to request
from it [such a] list . . . The Bureau will, however, continue to exert
every effort to obtain from CIA the identities of all such mail drops in
the normal course of operations." 
4 30
Within six months of this rejection, however, Headquarters officers
changed their minds: Donald Moore, head of the Espionage Research
Branch and Sam Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, met with CIA rep-
resentatives in January 1961 to inform them of Survey No. 1 and to
exchange lists of known or suspected mail drops.
431 CIA provided the
Bureau with a list of 16 mail drops and accommodation addresses and
the name and address of one Communist Party member in Western
Europe,432 all of which were subsequently furnished the New York
office for inclusion in Survey No. 1 coverage. The exchange of this
information did not evolve into a reverse Project Hunter, however.
While the Agency may have contributed a small number of addi-
tional addresses or names during the next five years, no large-scale
levy of general categories or specific names was ever made by the
CIA or solicited by the FBI. According to Donald Moore, the par-
ticularized nature and objectives of Survey No. 1, especially when
contrasted with the CIA's New York project, precluded active CIA
participation in the program."'
While there is no other evidence that any members of the intelli-
gence community knew of or ever levied requests on the Bureau's mail
opening programs, they did receive sanitized information from these
programs when deemed relevant to their respective needs by the
Bureau.4 3 4
C. Result8 of the Prograre
In terms of their counterespionage and counterintelligence raison
d'etre, several of the Bureau's programs were considered to be
successful by FBI officials; others were concededly ineffective and
were consequently discontinued before the termination of all remain-
ing FBI surveys in 1966. Significantly, some of the surveys
also generated large amounts of "positive" foreign intelligence-
the collection of which is outside the Bureau's mandate-and infor-
mation regarding the domestic activities and personal beliefs of
American citizens, -at least some of which was disseminated within and
outside the FBI. The Bureau surveys did remain more focused on their
Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, New York, 7/11/60.
Ibid.
m Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 2/28/61.
' Ibid.
's Moore, 10/1/75, p. 55.
41See p. 654.
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original goal than did the CIA programs. But in them-whether be-
cause the selection criteria were overbroad, or because these criteria
were not scrupulously adhered to, or both-one again sees the tendency
of mail opening programs to produce information well beyond the
type originally sought.
1. Counterintelligemwe Results
Five of the eight FBI mail openings prograis-Z-Coverage, Sur-
veys 1, 4, 5, and 6-were clearly seen to have contributed to the FBI's
efforts in the area of counterintelligence. The relative success of these
programs, in fact, led many Bureau officials to conclude that mail open-
ing-despite its legal status-was one of the most effective counter-
espionage weapons in their arsenal.4 3 The primary value of these five
programs to the Bureau is summarized below:
Z-Coverage.-A lack of pertinent documentary and testimonal evi-
dence prevents a meaningful evaluation of Z-Coverage during World
War II, but a 1951 memorandum reflecting the Washington Field Of-
fice's recommendation for its reinstitution noted that "while Z-Cover-
age was utilized valuable information of an intelligence nature was
obtained . . ." 436
In evaluating the program during the 1950s and 1960s, Bureau
officials have rated it highly in terms of the counterintelligence results
it produced. W. Raymond Wannall, former Assistant Director in
charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, testified about two spe-
cific examples of mail intercepted in Z-Coverage which revealed at-
tempts on the part of individuals in this country to offer military
secrets to foreign governments.," In the first case, the FBI intercepted
a letter in July 1964, which was sent by an employee of an American
intelligence agency to a foreign diplomatic establishment in the United
States. In the letter, the employee offered to sell information relating
to weapons systems to the foreign government and also expressed an
interest in defecting. The Defense Department was notified, conducted
a potential damage evaluation, and concluded that the potential dam-
age could represent a cost to the United States Government of tens of
millions of dollars. In the second case, which occurred in mid-1964, an
individual on the West Coast offered to sell a foreign government
tactical military information for $60,000.
Survey No. J.-Survey No. 1 was considered to be one of the most
successful of all the Bureau mail opening programs. In New York
and Washington, a total of three illegal agents-the identification of
which has been described by one senior FBI official as the most dif-
ficult task in counterintelligence work 4 3 -were located through No.
1.41 In addition. numerous letters were discovered which contained se-
cret writing and/or were addressed to mail drops in Western Europe.
Survey No. 1 in Boston, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Detroit was not suc-
cessful, however, and as noted above, was discontinued in those cities on
the basis of "unproductivity and manpower needs." 440
E.g., FBI Special Agent #2 deposition, 9/16/75, pp. 61, 62.
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Survey No. 4.-Survey No. 4 resulted in the identification of the il-
legal agent whose presence in the United States had originally
motivated development of the survey. In addition, this program led
to the detection of a second intelligence agent operating in this coun-
try and to the discovery of approximately 60 items of correspondence
which contained secret writing either on the letter itself or on the
envelope containing the letter.441
Survey No. 5.-FBI officials have testified that Survey No. 5 was a
very valuable source of counterintelligence (and interrelated positive
intelligence) information about an Asian country. W. Raymond Wan-
nall stated that its "principal value probably related to the identifica-
tion of U.S. trained scientists of [Asian] descent who were recalled or
who went voluntarily back to [an Asian country]."442 Because of this,
lie continued, the FBI was able to learn vital information about the
progress of weapons research abroad." 3
Survey No. 6.-Survey No. 6 was also believed to be a valuable
program from the perspective of counterintelligence, although it was
suspended for a nine-month period because the manpower require-
ments were not considered to outweigh the benefits it produced.
Through this survey the FBI identified numerous American sub-
scribers to Asian communist publications; determined instances of the
collection of scientific and technical information from the United
States by a foreign country; and recorded contacts between approxi-
mately fifteen Security Index subjects in the United States and Com-
munists abroad. 4 4 4
The Other Progran.-Three of the FBI's programs were not
believed to have produced any significant amount of counterintelli-
gence information. Bureau officials testified that they "had very little
success in connection with [Survey No. 3]," " and it was consequently
discontinued after one year of operation. Similarly, no positive results
were obtained through Survey No. 2 in any of the three cities in which
it operated. Although the San Francisco office, for example, opened
approximately 85 new cases as a result of Survey No. 2, all of these
cases were resolved without the identification of any illegal agents,
which was the goal of the program.4" As one Bureau official stated in
regard to Survey No. 2: "The indicators were good, but the results
were not that good." " It, too, was terminated after approximately
one year of operation.
Finally, the results of Survey No. 7, which was initiated without
prior approval by Headquarters, were also considered to be valueless.
Of the 83 letters intercepted in the program, 79 were merely ex-
changes of personal news between North Americans of Asian descent.
The other four were letters from individuals in Asia to individuals in
the United States, routed through contacts in North America, but were
41 Wannall, 10/22/75, p. 12.
Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 77.
"" Wannall, 10/13/75, pp. 77-78.
**Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/64.
'"Wannall, 10/22/75, p. 11.
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solely devoted to personal information."' As noted above, Headquar-
ters did not believe that this coverage justified the additional man-
power necessary to translate the items and the San Francisco Field
Office was so advised.
2. "Positive" Foreign Intelligence Results
Although the FBI has no statutory mandate to gather positive for-
eign intelligence, a great deal of this type of intelligence was gener-
ated as a byproduct of several of the mail opening programs and dis-
seminated in sanitized form to interested government agencies. In an
annual evaluation of Survey No. 3, for example, it was written:
This source furnishes a, magnitude of vital information per-
taining to activities within [an Asian country] ; including its
economical [sic] and industrial achievements . . . A true
picture of life in that country today is also related by the in-
formation which this source furnishes reflecting life in gen-
eral to be horrible due to the lack of proper food, housing,
clothes, equipment, and the complete disregard for a human
person's individual rights."9
Another evaluation stated that this program had developed informa-
tion about such matters as the "plans and progress made in construc-
tion in railways, locations of oil deposits, as well as the location of
chemical plants and hydraulic works."4 5 0 It continued: "While this is
of no interest to the Bureau, the information has been disseminated to
interested agencies." Survey No. 6 even identified, through the
interception of South American mail routed through San Francisco
to an Asian country, numerous "[Asian] Communist sympathizers" in
Latin America. 411
W. Raymond Wannall, former head of the Bureau's Domestic Intel-
ligence Division, explained.that "as a member of the intelligence coin-
munity, the FBI [was aware] of the positive intelligence requirements
[which were] secularized within the community in the form of what
was known as a current requirements list, delineating specific areas with
regard to such countries that were needed, or information concerning
which was needed by the community. So we contributed to the overall
community need." 452 He conceded, however, that the FBI itself had no
independent need for or requirement to collect such positive intelli-
gence."' 3 Just as the CIA mail opening programs infringed on the
intelligence jurisdiction of the FBI, therefore, so the FBI programs
gathered information which was without value to the Bureau itself
and of a variety that was properly within the CIA's mandate.
3. Domestic Intelligence Results
In addition to counterespionage information and positive foreign
intelligence, the FBI mail opening programs also developed at least
some information of an essentially domestic nature. The collection of
"" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/28/61.
"* Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60.
* Memorandum from S. B. Donahue to A. H. Belmont, 2/23/61.
m Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 4/29/64.
4 Wannall, 10/13/75, pp. 59, 60.
a Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 60.
this type of information was on a smaller scale and less direct than
was the case in the CIA's New York project, for none of the FBI pro-
grams involved the wholesale targeting of large numbers of domestic
political activists or the purposefully indiscriminate interception of
mail. Nonetheless, the Bureau programs did produce domestic intel-
ligence. An April 1966 evaluation of Survey No. 1, for example, noted
that "organizations in the United States concerning whom informant
[the survey] has furnished information include . . . [the] Lawyers
Committee on American Policy towards Vietnam, Youth Against War
and Fascism. . . and others."4 5 4
An evaluation of the Survey No. 5 stated that that program had
developed "considerable data" about government employees and other
American citizens who expressed pro-Communists sympathies, as well
as information about individuals, including American citizens, who
were specifically targeted as a consequence of their being on the FBI's
Security Index.4 5 5 Examples of the latter type of information include
their current residence and employment and "anti-U.S. statements
which they have made." 456
Another evaluation of a Bureau program noted that that program
had identified American recipients of pornographic material and an
American citizen abroad who was a drug addict in correspondence
with other addicts in the New York City area; "I it indicated that
information about the recipients of pornographic material -was trans-
mitted to other field offices and stated that "pertinent" information
was also forwarded to other Federal agencies.4**
Given the ready access which Bureau agents had to the mail for a
period of years, it is hardly surprising that some domestic intelligence
was collected. Indeed, both logic and the evidence support the conclu-
sion that if any intelligence agency undertakes a program of mail
opening within the United States for whatever purpose, the gathering
of such information cannot be avoided.
IV. INTERNAL AUTHORIZATION AND CONTROLS
While the FBI and the CIA mail opening programs were similar in
many respects, the issues of authorization and control within these
agencies highlight their differences. The pattern of internal ap-
proval for the CIA mail opening programs was inconsistent at
best: the New York project began without the approval of the
Director of Central Intelligence; at least two Directors were appar-
ently not even advised of its existence; and it is unclear whether any
Director knew the details of the other mail opening programs."'9 Ad-
ministrative controls in most of the CIA projects, especially the
twenty-year New York operation, were clearly lax: periodic reevalua-
tion was non-existent and operational responsibility was diffused.460
" Memorandum from New York Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 4/4/66.
Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
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Probably as a function of the FBI's contrasting organizational struc-
ture, the mail opening programs conducted by the Bureau were far
more centrally controlled by senior officials at Headquarters. With one
significant exception, the FBI mail programs all received prior ap-
proval from the highest levels of the Bureau, up to and including J.
Edgar Hoover, and the major aspects of their subsequent operation
were strictly regulated by officials at or near the top of an integrated
chain of command.
A. Internal Authorization
While the documentary record of FBI mail opening programs is
incomplete, that evidence which does exist reveals J. Edgar Hoover's
explicit authorization for the following surveys:
-The extension of Survey No. 1 to Los Angeles, Boston,
Seattle, and Washington, D.C., on August 4, 1961; 461
-The re-authorization of Survey No. 1 in New York, on
December 22, 1961; 462
-The re-authorization of Survey No. 1 in New York and
Washington, D.C., on April 15, 1966; 463
-The extension of Survey No. 2 to three additional postal
zones in New York and its implementation with FBI rather
than Post Office employees, on August 31, 1961; 464 and
-The institution of Survey No. 6 in San Francisco, on No-
vember 20, 1963.46
The documentary evidence also reveals authorizations from former
Associate Director Clyde Tolson and/or the former Assistant Director
in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan,
for the following surveys:
-The extension of Survey No. 1 to Detroit on April 13,
1962;466
The extension of Survey No. 2 to Detroit on October 4,
1961 ;46
-The re-authorization of Survey No. 2 in New York on
December 26, 1961; 461 and
-Administrative changes in the filing procedures for the
Survey No. 5 on June 28, 1963.469
Further, unsigned memoranda and airtels from Headquarters, "Direc-
tor, FBI," authorized the extension of Survey No. 2 to San Francisco
on October 18, 1961,470 and the institution of Survey No. 4 on De-
cember 21, 1962.47 Bureau procedures normally require that such
memoranda and airtels must be seen and approved by at least an
' Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/4/61.
- Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/61.
'. Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/15/66.
* Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/31/61.
Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/31/61.
Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 4/13/62.
. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/4/61.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 12/26/61.
" Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 6/28/63.
4o Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
10/18/61.
"' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/21/62.
Assistant Director, and there is no reason to assume that this did not
occur in these instances.
Despite the absence of some authorizing documents, witness testi-
mony is consistent-and often emphatic-on the point that unwritten
Bureau policy required J. Edgar Hoover's personal approval before
the institution of a new mail opening program or even the initial
use of mail opening as a technique in specific espionage cases.
472 The
approval of at least the Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division, moreover, was required for the periodic re-authoriza-
tion or the extensions of existing mail surveys to additional cities, as
well as for their termination, upon the recommendation of the field
office involved. The only surveys for which this policy was apparently
violated were Survey No. 7 and possibly-though this is unclear-
Survey No. 1.
The testimony of senior FBI officials conflicts on whether Hoover
actually authorized the formal institution of Survey No. 1 in New
York in 1959, or whether he merely approved the general concept of
a mail opening program utilizing the recently acquired knowledge of
the "indicators," but not Survey No. 1 in particular. The former heads
of the Espionage Research Branch at Headquarters and of the Espio-
nage Division at the New York Field Office both believe the former
to be the case; "I the Section Chief of the section at Headquarters out
of which the program was run testified to the latter.74 Even if Hoover
only approved the general concept of such a project, however, he was
soon aware of the program, and, as noted above, authorized its ex-
tension to four additional cities in August 1961.
Survey No. 7 was initiated by the San Francisco Field Office on
its own motion without prior approval from Washington. When
Headquarters was advised of the implementation of this program,'
4 7 5
ranking FBI officials immediately demanded justification for it from
the Field Office,476 subsequently determined the justification to be
inadequate, and ordered its termination as a generalized survey.477
The last sentence of the instruction to end the program warns: "Do
not initiate such general coverage without first obtaining specific
Bureau authority.47 8
Unlike most of their CIA counterparts, then, it appears that the
Bureau's mail opening programs were-with.one clear exception-
personally approved by the Director before their iniplementation, and
at the highest levels of the organization before major changes in
their operation. In the one certain case where prior Headquarters ap-
proval was not secured, the field office which implemented the programs
was reprimanded.
B. Administrative Controls by Headquarters
FBI Headquarters exerted tight, centralized control over the mail
opening programs in other ways as well. One manifestation of this
control was found in the periodic evaluations of each program re-
quired of every participating field office for the benefit of Head-
41 For example, Moore, 10/1/75, p. 60; Wannall, 10/13/75, pp. 70, 71.
4 Moore, 10/1/75, pp. 58-60; FBI Special Agent #2 testimony, 9/16/75, p. 18.
4 Branigan, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 152.
-5 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/61.
41 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/3/61.
4 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/28/61.
4.. Ibid.
quarters. In general, written evaluations were submitted semiannually
,for the first few years of the operation of a program in a city; and
annually thereafter.479 These evaluations frequently contained such
headings as: "Origin;" "Purpose;" "Scope;" "Cost;" "Overall Value;"
and "Operation of Source." Every field office was also obligated to
determine whether the counterintelligence benefits from each program
justified its continuation in light of manpower and security considera-
tions; on the basis of this recommendation and other information
supplied, Headquarters then decided whether to re-authorize the
program until the next evaluation period or order its termination.
The net effect of this system of periodic reexamination was that FBI
officials were far better informed than were CIA officials of the true
value of the programs to their organization. It was difficult for a
program to continue unproductively without the knowledge of the
highest ranking officials of the Bureau: as noted above, several pro-
grams-Surveys No. 2, 3, and 7-were in fact discontinued by Head-
quarters before 1966 because the results as set forth in the evalua-
tions were felt to be outweighted by other factors.
Also in contrast to the CIA mail opening programs, the Bureau
programs were conducted at the field level with Special Agents who
were experienced in intelligence work and given detailed instructions
regarding the "indicators" and other selection criteria.48 0 No control
procedure could ever eliminate the individual discretion of these
agents-ultimately, selection was based on their personal judgment.
But Headquarters ensured through the training of these agents that
their judgment was at least more informed than that of the Office of
Security "interceptors" in the CIA's New York project, who were
neither foreign intelligence experts nor given guidance beyond the
Watch List itself as to which items to select.41 At both the Field
Office and the Headquarters levels, moreover, responsibility for the
operation of the programs was not diffused, as it was in the CIA's
New York project but was centralized in the hands of experienced
senior officials within a single chain of command.
C. Knowledge of the Mail Opening Programs Within the FBI
Officials of the Domestic Intelligence Division at Headquarters
carefully controlled knowledge and dissemination procedures of
their mail opening programs within the FBI itself. Knowledge of
the operations was strictly limited to the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion. The Criminal Division, for example, was never advised of the
existence of (and so never levied requests on) any of these programs,
but an internal memorandum indicates that it may have received
information generated by the programs without being advised of the
true source.4 8 2 Some FBI witnesses assigned to espionage squads which
were engaged in mail opening even testified that they were unaware
of other mail opening programs being conducted simultaneously by
other espionage squads in the same field office.4 83
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The direct dissemination of the photographic copies of letters or
abstracts between field offices was prohibited, but Headquarters
avoided some of the problems caused by restricted knowledge in the
CIA programs by requiring these offices to paraphrase the contents
of letters in which other field offices might have an intelligence interest
and disseminate the information to them in sanitized form.
Thus, control over the major aspects of the programs was concen-
trated at the top of the FBI hierarchy to a degree far greater than
that which characterized the CIA programs. With few exceptions,
senior officials at Headquarters initially authorized the programs,
maximized central influence over their actual operation, restricted
knowledge of their existence within the Bureau, and regulated the
form in which information from them should be disseminated.
V. EXTERNAL AUTHORIZATIONS
Despite the differences between the FBI's and the CIA's mail open-
ing programs with regard to internal authorization, the respective
patterns of authorization outside the agencies were clearly parallel.
There is no direct evidence that any President or Postmaster General
was ever informed about any of the FBI mail opening programs until
four years after they ceased. While two Attorneys General may have
known about some aspect of the Bureau's mail interceptions-and the
record is not even clear on this point-it does not appear that any
Attorney General was ever briefed on the full scope of the programs.
Thus, like the CIA mail opening programs, the Bureau programs
were isolated even within the executive department. They were initi-
ated and operated by Bureau officials alone, without the knowledge,
approval, or control of the President or his cabinet.
A. Post Office Department
The FBI mail opening programs, like those of the CIA, necessitated
the cooperation of the Post Office Department. But the record shows
that the Bureau officials who secured this cooperation intended to and
did in fact accomplish their task without revealing the FBI's true
interest in obtaining access to the mail; no high ranking Postal official
was apparently made aware that the FBI actually opened first class
mail.
1. Postmasters General
There is no evidence that any Postmaster General was ever briefed
about any of the FBI mail opening programs, either by the FBI
directly or by a Chief Postal Inspector. Henry Montague, who as Chief
Postal Inspector was aware of the mail cover (as opposed to the mail
opening) aspect of several Bureau programs, stated that he never in-
formed the Postmaster General because he "thought it was our duty
to cooperate in this interest, and really, I did not see any reason to
run to the Postmaster General with the problem. It was not through
design that I kept it away from . . . the Postmaster General. . . . It
was just that I did not see any reason to run to [him] because he had
so many other problems." 485
2. Chief Postal Inspectors
It is certain that at least one and probably two Chief Postal Inspec-
tors were aware of the fact that Bureau agents received direct access
' Henry Montague testimony, 10/2/75, p. 31.
to mail, and in one case permission may have been given to physically
remove letters from the mailstream as well, but there is no direct
evidence that any Chief Postal Inspector was ever informed that FBI
agents actually opened any mail.
Clifton Garner.-Clifton Garner was Chief Postal Inspector under
the Truman administration during the period when Z-Coverage may
have been reinstituted in Washington, D.C. No FBI testimony or docu-
ments, however, suggest that his approval was sought prior to this
reinstitution, nor can he recall being contacted by Bureau officials
about such a program.4 86
David Stephens.-Henry Montague testified that prior to the 1959
implementation of Z-Coverage in New York, when he was Postal
Inspector in Charge of that region, he was instructed by Chief Postal
Inspector David Stephens to cooperate with Bureau agents in their
proposed program of special "mail covers." 47 As Montague recalls,
Stephens approved the "mail cover" operation and left the mechanical
arrangements up to him. Donald Moore has also testified that Stephens
must have been contacted by Bureau officials in Washington prior to
the implementation of Survey No. 1 in the same year,497a although he
did not participate in any such meeting himself, and no other FBI
official who testified could shed any light on who might have made
such contact. There is no evidence, however, that Stephens was ever
informed that mail would actually be opened by Bureau agents in
either program.
Henry Montague.-As Postal Inspector in Charge of the New York
Region, Montague followed David Stephens' instructions to cooper-
ate with the FBI regarding Z-Coverage and made the necessary
mechanical arrangements within his office. He stated, however, that
he was told by the Bureau representatives who came to see him, includ-
ing Donald Moore (whose testimony is consistent) '4* that this was a
mail cover rather than a mail opening operation.4 9 He was simply
informed that the Bureau had an interest in obtaining direct access to
particular mail for national security reasons and that his cooperation
would be appreciated. While he realized that even this type of access
was highly unusual, he agreed because ". .. they knew what they
were looking for; we did not. . . . [T]hey could not give any names
to the Postal Service, as far as I knew, for mail to look for....
[P]erhaps they knew who the agent might be, or something of this
sort, which knowledge was not ours and which, at that time, I did not
feel was in our province to question." 49o Montague also acknowledged
that during his tenure as Postal Inspector in Charge of the New York
Region, he may have known of an FBI operation at Idlewild Airport
(Survey No. 1) as well, but stated that he had no "positive recollection"
of it.491
As Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to 1969, Montague personally
authorized Postal Service cooperation with the Bureau's programs in
' Staff summary of Clifton Garner interview, 8/22/75.
* Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 6, 8.
4' Moore, 10/1/75, p. 62.
4 Moore, 10/1/75, p. 70.
* Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 13, 15.
" Montague, 10/2/75, p. 11.
"'Montague, 10/2/75, p. 17.
at least two instances, and in one case possibly approved the removal
of selected letters by Bureau agents to a point outside the postal facil-
ity in which they worked. According to a 1961 FBI memorandum,
it was recommended by Bureau officials and approved by Director
Hoover that Postal officials in Washington should be contacted "to
explore the possibility of instituting" Survey No. 2.492 In February of
that year, Donald Moore met with Montague about this matter, ex-
plaining only-according to both Moore and Montague-that the pro-
gram would involve screening the mail and that it was vital to the
security of the country.13 The fact that the FBI intended to open
selected items was apparently not mentioned. Because he "felt it was
our duty to cooperate with the Agency which was responsible for the
national security in espionage cases," 494 Montague agreed to assist the
Bureau. On this occasion, however, he indicated that he would prefer
to have postal employees rather than FBI agents conduct the "cover"
since "it was our position that whenever possible . .. the mail should
remain in the possession of the Postal Service." 45
Less than two years later, Montague did allow Bureau agents to
screen mail directly in Survey No. 4. A 1962 FBI memorandum noted
that the FBI liaison to the Post Office approached him on December 19
to secure his approval for the Bureau's plan to cover mail from
Miami to a Latin American country.9 " According to this memo-
randum, Montague did approve and authorized the removal of selected
letters to the FBI laboratory as well. The former Chief Postal Inspec-
tor remembers approving the screening aspects of the project and
knowing that mail left the custody of postal employees,'4 9 but cannot
recall whether or not he specifically granted his permission for flying
certain letters to Washington. 98 He testified, in any event, that he was
not informed that mail would be opened.4 9 9
In June 1965, Montague reconsidered his original approval of the
project, possibly in light of Senator Edward Long's investigation into
the use of mail covers and other techniques by federal agencies. A
June 25, 1965. FBI airtel from the Miami office to Headquarters reads
in part: "[The Assistant Postal Inspector in Charge of the Atlanta
Region] said that due to investigations by Senate and Congressional
committees, Mr. Montague requested he be advised of the procedures
used in this operation." 5oo Montague had appeared before the Lon
Subcommittee and had testified on the subject of mail covers several
times earlier that year, but he recalls that his concern in determining
the procedures used in Survey No. 4 in June focused more on the new
Postal regulations regarding mail covers that were issued about that
time than on the Senate hearings. 0 1 Regardless of his motivation,
Montague asked the Assistant Postal Inspector in Charge to ascertain
the details of the Miami operation; the procedures were described
. Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 8/31/61.
4" Montague, 10/2/75, p. 25; Moore, 10/1/74, p. 66.
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to this postal official by representatives of the Miami Field Office, ap-
parently without mention of the fact that mail was actually opened;
and the Assistant Postal Inspector reported back to Montague, who
found them to be acceptable and did not withdraw his support for the
survey. 02
Montague has stated that he was never informed that FBI agents
in Survey No. 4 or in any of the other Bureau programs intended to or
actually did open first class mail. This testimony is supported by that
of Donald Moore, who on at least two occasions was the Bureau rep-
resentative who sought Montague's cooperation for the programs.
Moore does not believe that he ever told Montague that mail would
be opened; 504 he said, moreover, that it was "understood" within the
Bureau that Postal officials should not be informed.50 5 Of his meeting
with Montague about Z-Coverage, for example, Moore stated: "I am
sure I didn't volunteer it to him and, in fact, would not volunteer it to
him" because of the belief that such information should be closely held
within the Bureau. 06 He added that it was a general, though unwrit-
ten, policy that whenever Bureau agents contacted Postal officials
concerning the mail programs "it was understood that they would not
be told [that mail opening was contemplated]." 507
Montague, for his part, did not specifically warn FBI agents against
tampering with the mail because they were Federal officers and he
trusted them not to do so. He stated:
I do not recall that I asked [if they intended to open mail],
because I never thought that would be necessary. I knew that
we never opened mail in connection with a mail cover. I knew
that we could not approve it, that we would not approve any
opening of any mail by anybody else. Both the CIA and the
FBI were Government employees the same as we were, had
taken the same oath of office, so that question was really not
discussed by me....
With regard to the CIA when they first started [in 1953],
we did put more emphasis on that point that mail could not
be tampered with, that it could not be delayed, because, ac-
cording to my recollection, this was the first time that we
had had any working relationship with the CIA at all. With
the FBI, I just did not consider that it was necessary to em-
phasize that point. I trusted them the same as I would trust
another Inspector. I would never feel that I would have
to tell a Postal person that you cannot open mail. By the
same token, I would not consider it necessary to emphasize
it to any great degree with the FBI.5 0 8
In short, it does not appear that any senior postal official knew
that the FBI opened mail. Postal officials did cooperate extensively
A Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 6/25/65; Mon-
tague, 10/2/75, p. 71.
Moore, 10/1/75, pp. 65, 66, 70.
Moore, 10/1/75, p. 79.
Moore, 10/1/75, p. 70.
Moore, 10/1/75, p. 79.
5 Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 15, 16.
with the Bureau, but out of trust did not ask whether mail would be
opened and because of a concern for security they were not told.
B. Department of Justice
The record presents no conclusive evidence that any Attorney Gen-
eral ever knew of any of the FBI mail opening programs. The evidence
summarized below, does suggest that one and possibly two Attorneys
General may have been informed of selected aspects of the Bureau's
mail operations, but generally supports the view that no Attorney
General was ever briefed on their full scope.
1. Robert F. Kennedy
New York Field Offce Briefings.-On April 5, 1962, and again
on November 4, 1963, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy visited
the FBI's New York field office was briefed in foreign espionage
matters. The person who briefed him on these occasions, the Assistant
Special Agent in Charge for the Espionage Division, testified that
he may have mentioned the mail intercept projects then being con-
ducted by the New York field office to the Attorney General, but has
no definite recollection whether he did or not.'0 Other participants at
these briefings could not recall the technique of mail opening being
discussed,5'o nor do the internal FBI memoranda relating to the brief-
ings indicate that the topic arose. 11
The Baltch Case.-It is also possible, though again the evidence is
far from conclusive, that Robert Kennedy learned that mail opening
was utilized in the Baltch investigation, which is described on page
648. On July 2, 1963, FBI agents arrested two alleged Soviet illegal
agents who used the names Robert and Joy Ann Baltch; they were
indicted for espionage on July 15. Several conferences were held be-
tween FBI representatives and Assistant Attorney General for In-
ternal Security, J. Walter Yeagley, regarding this case and the possi-
bility that some of the evidence was tainted.51 2 Yeagley subsequently
briefed Kennedy on the problems involved in prosecuting the
Baltchs.13 Donald E. Moore, who was one of the FBI representatives
who discussed the Baltch case with Yeagley, testified that he believed,
though he had no direct knowledge, that the fact of mail opening did
come to the attention of the Attorney General in this context.514 Yeag-
ley, however, cannot recall being specifically advised that mail was
opened (although he knew that a "mail intercept or cover" had oc-
curred) and stated that he did not inform Kennedy about any mail
openings.5'"
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Other Espionage Cases.-Internal FBI memoranda concerning
at least two other espionage cases that were considered for prosecution
while Kennedy was Attorney General, also raise the possibility that
Justice Department attorneys, including Yeagley, may have been ad-
vised of mail openings that occurred.16 Yeagley cannot recall being
so advised, however, and, as noted above, stated that he never informed
the Attorney General of any mail openings.5 1 7 There is no indication
in the memoranda, moreover, that these matters were ever raised with
Kennedy.
2. Ni, holas deB. Katzenbach
The Baitch Case.-The Baltch case did not come to trial until early
October 1964, when Nicholas deB. Katzenbach was Acting Attorney
General. At the time the trial commenced, FBI representatives, in-
cluding Donald Moore, conferred with Thomas K. Hall, a Justice De-
partment attorney who was assigned to the case, again on the subject
of tainted evidence.518 Hall then discussed the case with Katzenbach
and, according to an FBI internal memorandum, "Katzenbach recog-
nized the problems, but felt in view of the value of the case, an effort
should be made to go ahead with the trial even if it might be necessary
to drop the overt act where our tainted source is involved.. . ."' 519 Be-
cause he subsequently determined that the case "could not be further
prosecuted without revealing national security information," 520 how-
ever, Katzenbach ordered the prosecution to be dropped entirely.
In fact, there were at least two sources of tainted evidence other
than mail opening involved in the Baltch case-a surreptitious entry
'and a microphone installation-and it is only these which Katzenbach
recalls. 521 He testified that although he did discuss the taint issues
with both Hall and Joseph Hoey, the United States Attorney who
originally presented the government's case, neither of them brought
to his attention the fact of mail opening.522 Hoey's recollection sup-
ports this contention: a Bureau memorandum suggests that Hoey may
have learned of a "mail intercept" in the case, 5 2 3 but he recalls neither
being informed of an actual opening nor conferring with the Acting
Attorney General about any issue related to mail.' Assistant Attor-
ney General Yeagley recalls discussing the case generally with Katzen-
bach also, and "may have informed him of the mail intercept or cover
which had occurred," but Yeagley stated that he had no definite
knowledge himself that the "intercept or cover" involved the actual
opening of mail, and so would not have been in a position to advise
him that it did.5 25
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Katzenbach has testified that he was never aware of the Bureau's
use of mail opening in any espionage investigation. 26 He added:
Even if one were to conclude that the Bureau did in fact
reveal that mail had been opened and that this fact was
relayed by lawyers in the [Baltch] case to me, I am certain
that that fact would have been revealed by the FBI-and I
would have accepted it-as an unfortunate aberration, just
then discovered in the context of a Soviet espionage investiga-
tion, not a massive mail-opening program. In that event,
nothing would have led me to deduce that the Bureau was, as
a matter of policy and practice, opening letters. 52 7
The Long Subcommittee Hearings.-According to Donald Moore,
he and Assistant Director Alan H. Belmont did inform Mr. Katzen-
bach at the time of the 1965 Long Subcommittee hearings that Bureau
agents screened mail both inside and outside postal facilities as a
matter of practice, although he does not claim that the subject of ac-
tual opening arose.
In February of that year, the Long Subcommittee directed Chief
Postal Inspector Montague to provide it with a list of all mail
covers, including those in the areas of organized crime and national
security, by federal agencies within the previous two years. As a re-
sult of this and other inquiries by the Subcommittee, especially re-
garding electronic surveillance practices, President Johnson requested
Katzenbach to coordinate all executive department matters under his
investigation.528
In executing this responsibility, Katzenbach met with Moore, Bel-
mont, and Courtney Evans, a former FBI Assistant Director who had
retired from the Bureau but was then working as a special assistant
to the Attorney General, on February 27, 1965, to discuss problems
raised by the Subcommittee which affected the FBI.' 2 9 One of the sub-
jects discussed at that meeting was the question of Bureau access to
the mail. Four days earlier, the Chief Postal Inspector had testified
before the Subcommittee that he had no knowledge of any case in
which mail left the custody of Postal employees during the course of
a mail cover.o3 0 At the time, Montague did know that this practice had
occurred 53 -indeed, as Chief Postal Inspector he had approved the
direct screening of mail by FBI agents in Survey No. 4 1"3-but he
believed that "there was an understanding . . . that national security
cases were not included within this particular part of the hearing." 533
According to Moore, Katzenbach had been made aware of the possible
" Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testimony, 10/11/75, p. 35.
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inaccuracy of Montague's testimony, and the Bureau officials conse-
quently "pointed out [to the Attorney General] that we do receive
mail from the Post Office in certain sensitive areas. . . ." 61 Moore be-
lieves moreover, that they informed him that this custody was granted
in on-going projects rather than isolated instances. 535
Katzenbach acknowledged that he was aware, while Attorney Gen-
eral, that "in some cases the outside of mail might have been exam-
ined or even photographed by persons other than Post Office em-
ployees," 536 but he stated that he never knew the FBI gained custody
to mail on a regular basis in large-scale operations.1" He also testified
that the time of the February meeting he considered Montague's testi-
money to be "essentially truthful." - While the record shows that he
spoke to Senator Long less than a week after this meeting,3 9 Katzen-
bach stated that this was in regard to the requested list of all mail
covers by federal agencies rather than the issue of mail custody.5 4 0 The
testimony of Courtney Evans, who was also present at the February 27
meeting, supports that of Katzenbach: at no time, Evans said, was he
personally ever made aware that FBI agents received direct access to
mail on an on-going basis.541
Moore does not claim that he told Katzenbach that mail was actually
opened by Bureau agents. According to him, this information was
volunteered by neither Belmont nor himself and Katzenbach did not
inquire whether opening was involved.54 2 When asked if he felt any
need to hold back from Katzenbach the fact of mail openings as op-
posed to the fact that Bureau agents received direct access to the mail,
Moore replied: "It is perhaps difficult to answer. Perhaps I could
liken it to ... a defector in place in the KGB. You don't want to tell
anybody his name, the location, the title, or anything like that. Not
that you don't trust them completely, but the fact is that anytime one
additional person becomes aware of it, there is a potential for the in-
formation to . .. go further." 543
Probably the strongest suggestion in the documentary evidence that
Katzenbach may have been made aware of actual FBI mail openings
at the time of the Long Subcommittee hearings is found in a memoran-
dum from Hoover to ranking Bureau officials, dated March 2, 1965.
This memorandum reads, in part:
The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked
to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is look-
ing into mail covers, et cetera. The Attorney General stated
he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as
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he said he did not want to get into any national security area
and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney
General stated that Mr. Fensterwald [Chief counsel to the
Subcommittee] was present for part of the meeting and Fen-
sterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are
former Bureau agents and if they were asked if mail was
opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney
General stated that before they are called, he would like to
know who they are and whether they were ever involved in
any program touching on national security and if not, it is
their own business, but if they were, we would want to know.
The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he
would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, per-
sonally and confidentially, and the list would have any names
involving national security deleted and he would tell the
Senator how many but no more.54 4
Katzenbach testified as follows concerning his passage:
[Even] assuming the accuracy of the memo, it is not con-
sistent with my being aware of the Bureau's mail opening
program. Had I been aware of that program, r naturally
would have assumed that the agents had been involved in
that program, and I would scarcely have been content to leave
them to their own devices before Senator Long's committee.
Moreover, it would have been extremely unusual for ex-FBI
agents to be interviewed by the Senate committee staff with-
out revealing that fact to the Bureau. In those circumstances
both the Director and I would have been concerned as to the
scope of their knowledge with respect to the very informa-
tion about mail covers which the Senator was demanding and
which we were refusing, as well as about any other matters of
of a national security nature. If the witnesses in fact existed
(which I doubted strongly), then both the Director and I
wanted to know the extent of their knowledge about Bureau
programs, and the extent of their hostility toward the FBI.
That is a normal concern that we would have had anytime
any ex-FBI agent testified before any Congressional commit-
tee on any subject."4
The most that can reasonably be inferred from the record on pos-
sible knowledge of FBI mail opening by Attorneys General is this:
one or two Attorneys General may have known that mail was opened
in connection with particular espionage investigations, and one At-
torney General may have learned that the FBI regularly received mail
from the Post Office and that five former FBI agents possibly opened
mail. Evidence exists which casts doubt on the reasonableness of even
these inferences, however. More significantly, there is no indication in
either the documents or the testimony that the approval of any At-
torney General was ever sought prior to the institution of any Bureau
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen,
Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/2/65.
6Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 205, 206.
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program, and despite a clear opportunity to inform Attorney General
Katzenbach of the full scope and true nature of these operations in
1965, he was intentionally not told. In the name of security, the Bureau
neither sought the approval of nor even shared knowledge of its pro-
grams with the Cabinet officer who was charged with the responsibility
of controlling and regulating the FBI's conduct.
The first uncontroverted evidence that any Attorney General knew
of the FBI mail opening programs is not found until 1970, four
years after the programs were terminated. John Mitchell, upon read-
ing the 1970 "Huston Report", learned that the Bureau had engaged
in "covert mail coverage" in the past, but that this practice had "been
discontinued." -6 While the report itself stated that mail opening
was unlawful,5 4 7 however, Mitchell did not initiate any investigation,
nor did he show much interest in the matter. He testified:
I had no consideration of that subject matter at the time. I
did not focus on it and I was very happy that the plan was
thrown out the window, without pursuing any of its provi-
sions further.... I think if I had focused on it I might have
considered [an investigation into these acts] more than I
did. 54 8
C. Presidents
There is no evidence that any President was ever contemporaneous-
ly informed about any of the FBI mail opening programs. In 1970,
Bureau officials who were involved in the preparation of the "Huston
Report" apparently advised Tom Charles Huston that mail opening
as an investigative technique had been utilized in the past, for this
fact was reflected in the report which was sent to President Nixon.
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VI. TERMINATION OF THE FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS
A. Hoover's Decision to Terminate the Programs in 1966
1. Timing
By mid-1966 only three FBI mail opening programs continued
to operate: Z-Coverage in New York and Washington, Survey No. 1
in those same cities, and Survey No. 4 in Miami. Three of the pro-
grams-No. 2, No. 3, and No. 7-and the extensions of Survey No. 1 to
four cities other than New York and Washington had all been
terminated prior to 1966 because they had produced no valuable
counterintelligence information while tying up manpower needed
in other areas.5 5' Two of the programs-Surveys No. 5 and 6-had
been suspended in January 1966 for security reasons involving
changes in local postal personnel and never reinstituted. As the San
"See Senate Select Committee Report on the Huston Plan, p. 61; Special
Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970, p. 29.
' Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June
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Francisco Field office informed Headquarters in May of that year
in regard to both programs: "While it is realized that these sources
furnished valuable information to the Federal Government, it is not
believed the value justifies the risk involved. It is not recommended that
contact with sources be re-instituted." 552
The remaining three programs were all terminated in July 1966
at the direct instruction of J. Edgar Hoover. Apparently this in-
struction was delivered telephonically to the field offices; ** no memo-
randa explicitly reflect the order to terminate the programs. There
is no evidence that the FBI has employed the technique of mail open-
ing in any of its investigations since that time, although the FBI
continued to receive the fruits of the CIA's mail opening program
until 1973.
2. Reason
Given the perceived success of these three programs the rea-
sons for their termination are not entirely clear. While all FBI
officials who testified on the subject were unanimous in their conclu-
sion that the decision was Hoover's alone, none could testify as to the
precise reasons for his decision.
At least three possible reasons are presented by the record. First, the
Director may have believed that the benefits derived from mail open-
ing were outweighed by the need to present espionage cases for prosecu-
tion which were untainted by use of this technique. Regardless of
whether or not the mail opening in the Baltch case was actually a fac-
tor in Acting Attorney General Katzenbach's decision to, drop the
prosecution, for example, Bureau officials believed that their use of the
technique in that case did in fact preclude prosecution.554 On a memo-
randum dealing with the evidentiary issues in the Baltch case, Hoover
wrote the following notation: "We must immediately and materially
reduce the use of techniques which 'taint' cases." -5
Second, Hoover may have believed that the Attorney General and
other high government officials would not support him in the FBI's
use of questionable investigative practices. It is known that Hoover
cut back on a number of other techniques in the mid-1960's: the use of
mail covers by the FBI was suspended in 1964,56" and in July 1966-
the same month which saw the end of the mail opening programs-
Hoover terminated the technique of surreptitious entries by Bureau
agents.557 In a revealing comment on a 1965 memorandum regarding
the Long Subcommittee's investigation of such techniques as mail
covers and electronic surveillance, Hoover wrote:
I don't see what all the excitement is about. I would have no
hesitance in discontinuing all techniques-technical coverage
[i.e. wiretapping], microphones, trash covers, mail covers,
etc. While it might handicap us I doubt they are as valuable
a Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/66.
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as some believe and none warrant FBI being used to justify
them.558
His lack of support from above had been tentatively suggested by
some witnesses as a reason for this general retrenchment. Donald
Moore, for example, surmised that:
There had been several questions raised on various techniques,
and some procedures had changed, and I feel that Mr. Hoover
in conversation with other people, of which I am not aware,
decided that he did not or would not receive backing in these
procedures and he did not want them to continue until the
policy question was decided at a higher level.5*9
While former Attorney General Katzenbach testified that he was un-
aware of the FBI mail openings, his views on this subject tend to sup-
port Moore's. He speculated that the reason the programs were termi-
nated in 1966 may have related to the then-strained relations between
Mr. Hoover and the Justice Department stemming from the case of
Black v. United States 559a and the issue of warrantless electronic
surveillance.6 0 Hoover had wanted the Justice Department to inform
the Supreme Court, in response to an order by the Court that
the type of warrantless microphone surveillance that occurred
in that case had been authorized by every Attorney General since
Herbert Brownell. Katzenbach, not believing this to be so, ap-
proved a Supplemental Memorandum to the Court which simply
stated that microphone installations had been authorized by long-
standing "practice." According to Katzenbach, "this infuriated
Hoover. . . . He was very angry, [and] that may have caused him to
stop everything of this kind." 561
A third, related reason was suggested by W. Raymond Wannall,
former Assistant Director in charge of the FBI's Domestic
Intelligence Division. Wannall believed that there was a genuine
"question in [Hoover's] mind about the legality" of mail opening, and
noted that by at least 1970, as expressed in one of the Director's foot-
notes in the Huston Report, Hoover clearly considered mail opening to
be outside the framework of the law. 56 2 This footnote also suggests
that; like CIA officials, Hoover was concerned that the perceived
illegality of the technique would lead to an adverse public reaction
damaging to the FBI and other intelligence agencies if its use were
made known. His note to President Nixon read:
The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail cov-
erage [i.e., mail opening] because it is clearly illegal and it is
likely that, if done, information would leak out of the Post
Office to the press and serious damage would be done to the
intelligence community.563
Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 2/27/65.
Moore, 10/1/75, p. 29.
e 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
n Katzenbach, 10/11/75, p. 58.
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" Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 79.
'Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June
1970, p. 31. Hoover permitted the Bureau to receive the fruits of illegal mail
opening by the OIA, however.
B. Recommended Reinatitution
1. Within the Bureau
Whatever the reasons for it, the FBI Director's decision to termi-
nate all mail opening programs in 1966 was not favorably received by
many of the participating agents in the field. As one official of the
New York Field Office at the time of the termination testified:
... the inability of the government to pursue this type of
investigative technique meant that we would no longer be
able to achieve the results that I felt were necessary to protect
the national security, and I did not feel that I wanted to
continue in any job where you are unable to achieve the
results that really your job calls for.... That was a big influ-
ence on my taking retirement from the FBI.564
Several recommendations came in from the field to consider the rein-
stitution of the mail opening programs between 1966 and the time of
Hoover's death in 1972.564' None of them'was successful. A 1970 inter-
nal FBI memorandum, for example, reflects the recommendation of
the New York office that the programs be reinstituted,565 but Head-
quarters suggested that this course was "not advisable at this time." 66
Underlining the words "not advisable," Hoover noted: "Absolutely
right."
There is no evidence that any recommendation to reinstitute these
programs ever reached the desk of an Acting Director or Director of
the Bureau after Hoover's death.
2. Huston Plan
The only known attempt to recommend reinstitution of FBI mail
opening by officials outside the FBI is found in the Huston Report
in 1970.567 The Report itself stated that mail opening did not have the
"sanction of law,"*56 but proceeded to note several advantages of re-
laxing restrictions an this technique, among them:
1. High-level postal authorities have, in the past, provided
complete cooperation and have maintained full security of
this program.
2. This technique involves negligible risk of compromise.
Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence,
and personnel involved are highly trained, trustworthy, and
under complete control of the intelligence agency.
3. This coverage has been extremely successful in produc-
ing hard-core and authentic intelligence which is not obtain-
able from any other source . . .569
FBI Special Agent #2, 9/16/7,, pp. 61, 62. It should be noted that this view
ignores the availability of the warrant procedure for opening mail when there is
probable cause to believe that a crime-including espionage-has occurred or is
about to occur.
5a Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 54.
* Ibid.
'4 Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 3/31/70.
' See generally, Senate Select Committee Report on the Huston Plan.
Special report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970,
p. 30.
58Ibid.
Primarily because of the objections Hoover expressed in the footnote
he added, which are discussed above, this aspect of the Huston Plan
was never implemented, however.
VII. LEGAL AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WITHIN THE FBI
During the years that the FBI mail opening programs operated,
Bureau officials attempted only once, in 1951, to formulate a legal
theory to justify warrantless mail opening, and the evidence suggests
that they never relied upon even this theory. At the same time, there
is little in the record (until Hoover's comment in the 1970 Huston Re-
port) to indicate that Bureau officials perceived mail opening to be
illegal, as many CIA officials did. The FBI officials who directed the
programs apparently gave little consideration to factors of law at
all; ironically, it appears that of the two agencies which opened first
class mail without warrants, that agency with law enforcement re-
sponsibilities and which was a part of the Justice Department gave
less thought to the legal ramifications of the technique. Despite its
inattentive attitude toward legal issues, the Bureau was at least as
concerned as the CIA that disclosure of their programs outside the
FBI-even to its own overseer, the Attorney General, and especially
to Congress-would, as Hoover wrote in 1970, "leak . . . to the press
and serious[ly] damage" the FBI.5 7 4 To avoid such exposure, the
Bureau, like the CIA, took measures to prevent knowledge of their
programs from reaching this country's elected leadership.
A. Consideration of Legal Factors by the FBI
1. Prior to the Commencement of Mail Opening Program In
the Post-War Period
In June 1951, when the Washington Field Office recommended to
Headquarters that consideration should be given to the reinstitution of
Z-Coverage, it was specifically suggested that Bureau officials deter-
mine-whether or not Postal Inspectors have the authority to order
the opening of first class mail in espionage cases. 75 Headquarters
conducted research on this possible legal predicate to the peacetime
reinstitution of the program, and the results were summarized in a
second memorandum on Z-Coverage in September 1951.576 The basic
conclusion was that Postal Inspectors lad no authority to open mail;
only employees of the Dead Letter Office and other persons with legal
search warrants had such power. It was argued, however, that Postal
Inspectors may have sufficient legal authority to open even first class
mail whose contents were legally non-mailable under 18 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1717. This class of non-mailable items included, and includes
today, "[e]very letter . . . in violation of sections . . . 793, 794 [the
espionage statutes] . . . of this title . . ." Since it was a crime to mail
letters whose contents violated the espionage statutes, it was reasoned,
it may not be unlawful to intercept and open such letters, despite the
general prohibition against mail opening found in 18 U.S.C. Sections
1701, 1702, and 1703. The study concluded:
... it is believed that appropriate arrangements might be
worked out on a high level between the Department and the
" See p. 670.
* Memorandum from E. T. Turner to C. E. Hennrich, 6/25/51.
we Memorandum from C. E. Hennrich to A. H. Belmont, 9/7/51.
Postmaster General or between the Bureau and the appro-
priate Post Office officials whereby the mail of interest to
the Bureau could be checked for items in violation of the
espionage and other security statutes which are itemized in
Title 18, U.S. Code Section. ... It is respectfully suggested
that appropriate discussions be held on this matter.""
This theory ignores the fact that the warrant procedure itself re-
sponds to the problem of non-mailable items. If, on the basis of an
exterior examination of the envelope or on the basis of facts surround-
ing its mailing, there exists probable cause for a court to beleive that
the espionage statutes have been violated, a warrant may be obtained to
open the correspondence. If the evidence does not rise to the level of
probable cause, the law does not permit the mail to be opened. There is
no indication, in any event, that discussions were ever held with any
Postmaster General or Attorney General in an attempt to either test
or implement this theory. While Z-Coverage was in fact reinstituted
after this study was made, it was conducted with FBI personnel rather
than Postal Inspectors, and its mail opening aspect was apparently
unknown to any high-ranking Postal officials. In regard to the recom-
mendation that "appropriate discussions be held on this matter,"
Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont penned the notation, "No ac-
tion at this time. File for future reference." 5"
2. Post-1951 -
After the mail opening programs were underway, there was ap-
parently no further consideration by FBI officials of the legal factors
involved in the operations. Unlike that regarding CIA mail opening,
the documentary record on the FBI programs does not contain refer-
ences (until 1970, four years after the programs ceased) to the illegality
of mail opening; nor does it suggest that mail opening was considered
legal. At most, the record reveals the recognition by Bureau officials
that evidence obtained from their surveys was tainted and, hence,
inadmissible in court,5 79 but not the recognition that the technique was
invalid per se. Indeed, after the Supreme Court decisions in Nardone
v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) and 308 U.S. 338 (199), this
distinction was explicitly made in the area of electronic surveillance:
while the Nardone decisions prohibited the admission in court of evi-
dence obtained from wiretapping, the cases were not interpreted by the
Bureau to preclude use of the technique itself, and the practice
continued.s 0
The testimonial record, moreover, clearly suggests that legal con-
siderations were simply not raised in contemporaneous policy decisions
affecting the various mail surveys: W. Raymond Wannall, William
Branigan, and others have all so testified.
581 None of these officials has
any knowledge that any legal theory-either the one which was filed for
"future reference" in 1951 or one based on a possible "national secu-
rity" exception to the general prohibition against mail opening-was
ever developed by Bureau officials after 1951 to justify their programs
5 Ibid.
Ibid.
- Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 9/29/64; memorandum from Moore
to Sullivan, 10/2/64.
See Senate Select Committee Report on FBI Electronic Surveillance.
m Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 13, 39, 40; Wannall, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 149.
legally, or that a legal opinion from the Attorney General was ever
sought. To these officials, such justification as existed stemmed not from
legal reasoning but from the end they sought to achieve and an
amorphous, albeit honestly held, concept of the "greater good." As
William Branigan stated: "It was my assumption that what we were
doing was justified by what we had to do." 582 He added that he be-
lieved "the national security" impelled reliance on such techniques:
The greater good, the national security, this is correct. This
is what I believed in. Why I thought these programs were
good, it was that the national security required this, this is
correct.58
At least some of the agents who participated in the mail opening
program have testified that they believed the surveys were legal because
they assumed (without being told) that the programs had been au-
thorized by the President or Attorney General, or because they assumed
(again without being told) that there was a "national security" excep-
tion to the las prohibiting mail opening.-8 4 Those officials in a policy-
making position, however, apparently did not focus on the legal
questions sufficiently to state an opinion regarding the legality or
illegality of tle programs. nor did they advise the field offices or parti-
cipating agents about these matters.
Only in the 1970's, at least four years after the FBI mail opening
programs ceased, is there any clear indication that Bureau officials,
like those of the CIA, believed their programs to be illegal. As noted
above, Hoover's footnote to the 1970 Huston Report described the
technique as "clearly illegal;" and in the recent public hearings on
FBI mail opening, W. Raymond Wannall testified that, as of 1975, "I
cannot justify what happened...." 585
In light of the Bureau's major responsibilities in the area of law
enforcement and the likelihood that some of the espionage cases in
which mail opening was utilized would be prosecuted, it is ironic
that FBI officials focused on these legal issues to a lesser degree
than did their CIA counterparts. But the Bureau's Domestic Intelli-
gence Division made a clear distinction between law enforcement and
counterintelligence matters; what was -appropriate in one area was not
necessarily appropriate in the other. As William Branigan again
testified:
In consideration of prosecuting a case, quite obviously [legal
factors] would be of vital concern. In discharging counter-
intelligence responsibilities, namely to identify agents in the
United States to determine the extent of damage that they are
causing to the United States ... we would not necessarily go
into the legality or illegality. . . . We were trying to identify
agents and we were trying to find out how this country was
being hurt, and [mail opening] was a means of doing it, and
it was a successful means.5 86
m Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 41.
Ibid.
m FBI Special Agent #2 statement, 9/10/75, p. 10; Staff Summary of FBI
Special Agent #7 interview, 9/15/75, Vincent E. Ruehl; 10/14/75, pp. 70, 72.
Wannall, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 170.
Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 40-41.
B. Concern with Ewposure
Although Bureau officials apparently did not articulate the view
prior to 1970 that mail opening was necessarily illegal, they did believe
that their use of this technique was so sensitive that its exposure to
other officials within the executive branch, the courts, Congress, and the
American public generally should be effectively prevented. This fear of
exposure may have resulted from a perceived though unexpressed sense
that its legality was at least questionable; it was almost certainly a con-
sequence of a very restricted, even arrogant, view of who had a "need to
know" about the Bureau's operations. But whatever its source,
this concern with security clearly paralleled the CIA's con-
cern with the "flap potential" of their projects and resulted in similar
efforts to block knowledge of their use of this technique from reaching
the general public and its leaders.
The reluctance of FBI officials to disclose the details of their pro-
grams to other officials within the executive branch itself has been de-
scribed above: there is no clear evidence that any Bureau official ever
revealed the complete nature and scope of the mail surveys to any
officer of the Post Office Department or Justice Department, or to any
President of the United States. It was apparently a Bureau policy not
to inform the Postal officials with whom they dealt of the actual inten-
tion of FBI agents in receiving the mail, and there is no indication
that this policy was ever violated.8 7 When Attorney General Katzen-
bach met with Donald Moore and Alan Belmont on the subject of
Bureau custody of mail, Moore testified that he did not inform the
Attorney General about the mail opening aspect of the projects be-
cause of security reasons: "anytime one additional person becomes
aware of it, there is a potential for the information to . . . go fur-
ther." 588 One Bureau agent at Headquarters who was familiar with the
mail programs (but not in a policy-making position) also speculated
that the questionable legal status of this technique may have been an
additional reason for not seeking. the Attorney General's legal advice.
He testified as follows:
Q. Do you know why the opinion of the Attorney General
was apparently or probably not sought?
A. Because of the security of the operation. I would imagine
that would be the main reason. It was a program we were op-
erating. We wanted to keep it within the Bureau itself-and
the fact that it involved opening mail.
Q. What do you mean by the last statement, ... the fact
that it involved opening mail"?
A. That was not legal, as far as I knew. 589
With respect to the Justice Department generally, only the minimum
knowledge necessary to resolve a specific prosecutive problem was
imparted. Donald Moore said of his meeting with Assistant Attorney
General Yeagley about the Baltch case, for example, that he did not
disclose to him the FBI's general use of this technique: "I am sure
it was confined to the issue at hand, which was anything at all which
" See p. 662.
Moore 10/1/75, p. 4&
m FBI Special Agent #5, 10/10/75, p. 30.
involved the prosecution of Baltch." 500 Even the term "mail opening"
was avoided, and the more ambiguous term "mail intercept" was
used: 5" while susceptible of only one meaning within the FBI, the
latter term was apparently misinterpreted by Yeagley and other
Justice Department officials with different assumptions about Bureau
operations. 59 2
The FBI's concern with exposure extended to the courts as well.
In an internal memorandum regarding the Baltch case, it was writ-
ten that "under no circumstances is the Bureau willing to admit [to
the court] that a mail intercept was utilized. . . ."59
Similarly, FBI officials, like their counterparts in the CIA, did
not want their use of this technique known to Congress. One senior
Bureau official testified that the FBI feared that the Long Subcommit-
tee's 1965 investigation could publicly expose the mail programs; 594
another that such Congressional exposure could "wrack u " the
Bureau.595 Attorney General Katzenbach had been requested y the
President to coordinate executive branch responses to inquiries by
the Subcommittee, but the FBI was apparently not content with his
efforts in preventing the disclosure of "national security" information
generally. To ensure that their mail surveys, as well as certain practices
in the area of electronic surveillance, remained unstudied, Bureau
officials themselves directly attempted to steer the Subcommittee away
from probing these subjects.
Alan Belmont's February 27, 1965, memorandum reflecting his meet-
ing with the Attorney General about Henry Montague's testimony
on mail custody, reads in part: "I told Mr. Katzenbach that I cer-
tainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee
level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the
personal interest of Senator [Edward] Long became involved rather
than on any ideological basis." 596 The memorandum continues: "I
called Mr. DeLoach [an Assistant Director of the FBI] and briefed
him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator [James 0.]
Eastland in an effort to warn the Long committee away from those
areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of course,
I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney General.)" Ac-
cording to an FBI memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover himself subse-
quently contacted Senator Eastland, who, he reported, "is going to
see Senator Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him
that [the chief counsel] must not go into the kind of questioning he
made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department." "9
The strategy worked. The Subcommittee never learned of the FBI's
use of mail opening as an investigative technique. Despite the fact that
in 1965 the FBI conducted a total of five mail opening programs in
59 Moore, 10/1/75, p. 49.
5 Moore, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 160.
0s Staff summary of Yeagley interview, 10/10/75; Yeagley statement,
10/15/75; Staff Summary of Hoey interview, 11/24/75.
5 Memorandum from Moore to Sullivan, 10/2/64.
m Moore, 10/24/75, hearings, Vol. 4, p. 162.
"' Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 50.
s" Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 2/27/65.
.. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale,
Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/1/65.
the United States-and despite the fact that in that year alone more
than 13,300 letters were opened by CIA agents in New York-the
Subcommittee, the general public, the Attorney General, and ap-
parently even Henry Montague himself accepted as true Montague's
testimony that year that:
The seal on a first-class piece of mail is sacred. When a person
puts first-class postage on a piece of mail. and seals it, he can
be sure that the contents of that piece of mail are secure
against illegal search and seizure.9
Statement of Henry B. Montague before the Senate Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure, 2/23/66, p. 3.
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CIA INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ABOUT AMERICANS:
CHAOS AND THE OFFICE OF SECURITY
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main controversies raised by recent practices of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency is the question of intelligence collection about
Americans. Unlike the FBI, the CIA was intended to focus on foreign
intelligence matters. Charges have been made, however, suggesting
that the CIA spied on thousands of Americans and maintained files on
many more, all in violation of its statutory charter.
Senate Resolution 21, establishing the Select Committee, authorized
inquiry into the extent ' of covert intelligence efforts against Amer-
icans and their legality under CIA's charter. It specifically authorized
review of the need for new legislation to protect American citizens
and to clarify the authority of CIA. This included the tension under
present law between the authority of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to protect sources and methods of intelligence, on the one hand,
and the prohibition on CIA exercising police powers and internal
security functions, on the other.
This report discusses the results of a staff inquiry into the major
CIA programs which involved collection of information about Amer-
icans: the CHAOS, MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE programs
and the special security investigations undertaken by the Office of
Security.
A. Chao8
The most extensive program of alleged "domestic spying" by CIA
on Americans was the "CHAOS" program. CHAOS was the center-
piece of a major CIA effort begun in 1967 in response to White House
pressure for intelligence about foreign influence upon American dis-
sent. The CHAOS mission was to gather and evaluate all available
information about foreign links to racial, antiwar and other protest
activity in the United States. CHAOS was terminated in 1974.
The CHAOS office participated in the preparation of some half
dozen major reports for higher authorities, all of which concluded that
no significant role was being played by foreign elements in the various
protest movements. This repeatedly negative finding met with con-
tinued skepticism from the White House under two administrations
and pressures for further inquiry. In response to this skepticism
CHAOS continued to expand its coverage of Americans in order to
increase White House confidence in the accuracy of its findings.
A second major element of the CHAOS operation was to pursue
specific inquiries from the FBI about the activity of particular Amer-
icans traveling abroad.
(681)
CHAOS received a great deal of information regarding Americans
from CIA stations abroad, as well as from the FBI itself. In addition,
CHAOS eventually received such information from its own agents
who participated in domestic dissident activity in America in order
to develop radical "credentials" as cover for overseas assignment.
CHAOS also obtained information about Americans from other do-
mestic CIA components, from the CIA mail opening project and from
a National Security Agency international communications intercept
program.'
In the process, the CHAOS project amassed thousands of files on
Americans, indexed hundreds of thousands of Americans into its com-
puter records, and disseminated thousands of reports about Americans
to the FBI and other government offices. Some of the information
concerned the domestic activity of those Americans.
B. Merrimac and Resistawe
The MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE programs were both run
by the CIA Office of Security, a support unit of the CIA charged
with safeguarding its personnel, facilities and information.
Project MERRIMAC involved the infiltration by CIA agents of
Washington-based peace groups and black activist groups. The stated
purpose of that program was simply to obtain early warning of dem-
onstrations and other physical threats to the CIA. The collection re-
quirements, however, were broadened to include general information
about the leadership, funding and activities and policies of the tar-
geted groups.
Proiect RESISTANCE was a broad effort to obtain general back-
ground information for predicting violence which might create threats
to CIA installations, recruiters or contractors and for security evalua-
tion of CIA applicants. From 1967 until 1973, the program com-
piled information about radical groups around the country, parti-
cularly on campuses. Much of the reporting to headquarters by field
offices was from open sources such as newspapers. But additional in-
formation was obtained from cooperating police departments, campus
officials and other local authorities, some of whom, in turn, were
using more active collection techniques such as informants.
In addition, both MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE supplied in-
formation for the CHAOS program.
C. Special Security Investigations
Finally, there was a group of specific security investigations under-
taken either to find the source of newsleaks, or to determine whether
government employees were involved in espionage or otherwise con-
stituted security risks. Investigations were made of former CIA
employees, employees of other government agencies, newsmen and
other private individuals in this country. Physical surveillance, elec-
tronic surveillance, mail and tax return inspection, and surrepti-
tious entry have been used on various occasions.
1 These last two are the subjects of separate Committee reports.
They were not part of a particularly organized program, and were
conducted on a case-by-case basis. But they raise questions about
what kinds of security investigations are within the CIA's lawful au-
thoritv, and also about what kinds of techniques are permissible, even
when such investigations are authorized.
D. The Investigation
The Committee staff investigation of each of these areas has in-
cluded interviews, depositions, and documentary review of available
files.
Each of these areas had been examined intensively by the Rockefeller
Commission on CIA Activities within the United States before the
Select Committee was given access to the files and to some of the
persons involved.2
The Committee staff conducted an independent review of these
programs. At the same time, an effort was made to avoid duplica-
tion of the extensive testimonial record already made by the Com-
mission, and to take additional testimony only when necessary to
clarify the record or to explore additional issues which arose. Hence,
this report includes citation to both testimony given to the Select
Committee and the Rockefeller Commission.
Part Two of this report reviews the evolution and operation of the
CHAOS program. Part Three considers the questions which the
history of CHAOS raises about future CIA programs. Part Four
reviews more briefly the Office of Security programs and considers
the questions which they raise.
E. Summary of the Imsues
Before turning to the description of these programs, the remainder
of this introduction summarizes the issues which these programs pre-
sent for congressional decision.
Three themes are fundamental. First, to what extent did any of
these activities exceed the lawful authority of the CIA under its char-
ter in the 1947 National Security Act? The answer is not always clear;
the statute's legislative history is often obscure t best.
Second, what should be the extent of the CIA's authority in the fu-
ture? Whatever the limits of present law, now is the time to reassess
which intelligence operations impinging upon Americans are appro-
priate for the CIA, and which best left to others.
Finally, in reviewing the CHAOS program, particularly, the Con-
gress must look beyond judging past legality or reallocating functions
among Federal agencies. For the American citizen, the fact that his
Government keeps a file on his associations, or monitors his travel
and his advocacy of dissent, is far more important than the question
of which office in the bureaucracy is doing it. Ultimately the activity
discussed in this report bears on the question of what kinds of intelli-
gence operations are proper undertakings for any part of the
Government.
s See generally, Report of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United
States, June 1975.
69-984 0 - 76 - 44
1. Statutory Authority
The legality of the CIA activity involves, first, the general positive
statutory authority on which it can be based, and second, specific
prohibitions which might supersede or limit the affirmative authority
and responsibilities of the CIA.
(a) counterintetligence.-CIA's charter in the 1947 National
Security Act speaks of "intelligence." The legislative history estab-
lishes that this means "foreign intelligence" in the case of the CIA.
The only explicitly specified duties of the CIA are to "correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." However, the
CIA's role as an intelligence gatherer was understood at the time of
enactment; the provision that the National Security Council may
assign CIA "other functions and duties" has been accepted as implied
authority for clandestine foreign intelligence collection. In addition,
the legislative history of the 1947 Act and the 1949 Central Intelli-
gence Act recognize that the CIA would perform training and other
functions in the United States in support of its overseas intelligence
efforts.2a
Like foreign intelligence, the term "counterintelligence" is not dealt
with explicitly in the 1947 Act. In the broad sense, however, counter-
intelligence may be viewed as one facet of "foreign intelligence activi-
ties." Counterintelligence is the effort to learn about foreign intelli-
gence activities and to thwart hostile attempts to penetrate our own
intelligence activity or to conduct operations against us.
Organizationally, the CIA and other intelligence agencies distin-
guish positive intelligence collection from counterintelligence. It has
long been assumed, however, that CIA's general charter in foreign
intelligence, includes authority for counterintelligence activity abroad.
Although it was not expressly addressed by Congress during the
passage of the 1947 Act, it is hard to imagine, for example, that foreign
intelligence collection was implicitly authorized, but that Congress
precluded CIA efforts abroad to ascertain hostile threats to the secu-
rity of its own operations or to learn about enemy espionage.
Treating counterintelligence as part of "foreign intelligence" within
the meaning of the 1947 Act, the Executive branch has viewed CIA
as having statutory authority for the collection, collation and evalua-
tion of counterintelligence. Pursuant to this authority National Secu-
rity Intelligence Directive 5 designated the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to coordinate all counterintelligence abroad.3 The Directive
defines counterintelligence comprehensively:
b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activ-
ity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the
effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and
undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its per-
sonnel, information and installations against espionage, sabo-
2a See "The Central Intelligence Agency: Statutory Authority," in the Com-
mittee's Final Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence.
'The National Security Intelligence Directives, or so-called "NSCIDS" have
been promulgated by the National Security Council to provide the basic organiza-
tion and direction of the intelligence agencies within their statutory framework.
tage and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process
of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating in-
formation concerning hostile clandestine activity and of pene-
trating, manipulating or repressiig individuals, groups or
organizations conducting such activity. [Emphasis added.] 4
Under this directive the CIA was given primary responsibility for
the conduct of counterintelligence operations abroad, and is also tasked
with maintaining central counterintelligence files for the entire intel-
ligence community. All agencies are directed to provide the CIA with
any information appropriate for such a central file and such material
maintained by the CIA is to be "collated and analyzed for appro-
priate dissemination." NSCID 5 does not purport to give the CIA
authority to conduct counterintelligence activities in the United
States.5
It is this directive regarding CIA's counterintelligence responsi-
bility that the director of CHAOS testified was the authority for the
program. He claimed that the mission of determining and reporting
on the extent and nature of foreign links to American dissident pro-
test activity was an assignment within the CIA's counterintelligence
responsibility.6
(b) Protecting Sources and Methods of Intelligerwe.-The MER-
RIMAC and RESISTANCE programs were premised on a more
explicit provision of authority under the 1947 Act. The Act provides
that:
The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthor-
ized disclosure.,
The responsibility is given to the Director of Central Intelligence,
rather than to the Central Intelligence Agency. However, the Office of
Security within the Agency has been the administrative arm to imple-
ment the Director's duty in this regard.
This authority has been read by the CIA to authorize protection of
CIA personnel and facilities against any kind of "security threat"
including the possibility of violent demonstrations by the public. That
was the stated basis for undertaking the MERRIMAC and RE-
SISTANCE programs.8 The legislative history of this provision sug-
gests it was included essentially to allay the concern of the military
services that the new civilian agency would not itself operate with
adequate safeguards to protect the services' intelligence secrets to
which the CIA gained access.9
The individual special security investigations examined in this re-
port were also justified by a claim of authority derived from the Direc-
tor's responsibility to protect intelligence "sources and methods."
'National Security Intelligence Directive Number 5.
Ibid.
"Richard Ober testimony, 10/28/75, pp. 53-54.
'50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3).
'See pp. 84.
'Lawrence Houston testimony, Commission on CIA Activities Within the
United States, hereinafter cited as the Rockefeller Commission, 3/17/75, p. 1654-
55.
2. Statutory Prohibitions
Juxtaposed to CIA's counterintelligence authority and the Direc-
tor's charge to protect sources and methods, are specific constraints on
the activity in which CIA may engage. The 1947 Act provides in Sec-
tion 403(d) (3) :
That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforce-
ment powers or internal security functions.
Neither "internal security functions" nor "law enforcement powers"
are defined in the statute. Nor is the scope of "internal security" for
purposes of this ban directly discussed within the legislative history.
The legislative history, however, does reflect the public concern at the
time that the CIA might become a secret police agency, an American
"Gestapo," spying on opponents of the government in power.10 More-
over, "internal security functions" are distinguished in the statutory
prohibition from law enforcement and police powers, suggesting that
the "functions" limitation covered intelligence investigation and not
merely arrest or prosecution.
Thus, one purpose of the section was to prevent this new foreign
intelligence organization from investigating American citizens.
3. Questions Raised by CHAOS
When does CIA collection and use of information about Americans
exceed its authority to engage in foreign intelligence work, including
counterintelligence? And when does it violate the specific ban on the
CIA performing internal security functions?
A review of CHAOS reveals the blurred line between permissible
foreign counterintelligence and prohibited internal security. Tradi-
tionally, the concept of internal security has not been confined to
groups which were considered purely domestic. It has included in-
quiry into the foreign connections of domestic groups considered to
pose an internal security threat.
1o General Vandenberg, who was then head of the Central Intelligence Group,
the CIA's predecessor, testified as one of the main witnesses for the legislation.
In the Senate hearings, he commented on the directive setting up the Group,
from which the prohibition was taken:
"One final thought in connection with the President's directive: It includes an
express provision that no police, law enforcement, or internal security functions
shall be exercised. These provisions are imporant, for they draw the lines very
sharply between the CIG and the FBI. In addition, the prohibition against police
powers or internal security functions will assure that the Central Intelligence
Group can never become a Gestapo or security police." (Hoyt Vandenberg tes-
timony, Armed Services Committee, Hearings on S. 758, Pt. 3, 1947, p. 497.)
Another witness for the bill, Dr. Vanneyar Bush, was asked during the House
hearings to comment on the concern the new agency might become a "Gestapo."
Dr. Bush testified:
"I think there is no danger of that. The bill provides clearly that it is con-
cerned with intelligence outside of this country, that it is not concerned with
intelligence on internal affairs....
"We already have, of course, the FBI in this country, concerned with internal
matters, and the collection of intelligence in connection with law enforcement in-
ternally."
(Vannevar Bush testimony, House Committee on Expenditures in the Execu-
tive Departments, Hearings on H.R. 2319, 1947, p. 559.)
Indeed, the preeminent "internal security" concern of the late 1940s
was Communist subversion of the Government aided or directed from
abroad."
Therefore, if the CIA's counterintelligence authority is broadly
construed to include examining ties between domestic groups and
foreign elements, there is a question whether such authority is con-
sistent with the specific prohibition on internal security functions.
The CHAOS program presents these questions with respect to both
the overall mission undertaken by the CIA, and the specific tasks which
the CIA performed:
-CIA received and maintained considerable information
about the domestic activities and relationships of American
individuals and organizations. Much of that material was col-
lected in the first instance by the FBI, police or other confi-
dential sources, who turned it over to the CIA. The Agency
maintained it in files on those persons and groups and made
use of it the CHAOS operation.
-The CIA prepared several analyses of student dissent in
America and other reports which included material of domes-
tic protest activities.
-Undercover agents of the CHAOS program, while in the
United States in preparation for overseas assignment or be-
tween assignments, provided substantial information about
domestic activities of dissident groups, as well as informa-
tion providing leads about possible foreign ties.
-In a few instances the CIA agents appear to have been en-
couraged to participate in specific protest activity or to ob-
tain particular domestic information.
Even if the basic mission of CHAOS was appropriate for the CIA, the
question remains whether the way in which the CIA implemented that
mission should be permitted.
Another aspect of this issue is the degree to which the CIA assisted
the internal security operations of the FBI. Much of the CHAOS
arrangements for coverage of Americans abroad was in response to
specific FBI requests. The CIA also gave the FBI considerable infor-
mation about the activities of Americans here, not limited to evidence
of crimes, which had been developed in the course of the CHAOS
operation.
Thus, a separate question is the point -at which CIA assistance to
the FBI's internal security investigations may constitute participa-
tion in a forbidden function.
Finally CHAOS raises a fundamental question about the kind of
intelligence investigations, by any Government agency, which are ac-
ceptable to a free society. Should investigating foreign control of
domestic dissent be done through screening Americans to see if their
international travel or contacts reflect hostile foreign direction'? Or
" The concern about wholely "domestic" internal security threats from groups
deemed completely independent of any foreign influence is a fairly recent develop-
ment.
should the Government be able to investigate the "foreign connec-
tions" of Americans only when substantial indication of illegal con-
spiracy is acquired in the course of counterintelligence work against
the hostile foreign elements themselves?
4. Questions Raised by the Office of Security Progranm
The questions raised by the Office of Security activities are the scope
and limits of the Director's authority to protect intelligence sources
and methods.
Does that 'authority include a general mission to protect the physical
security of the CIA against violent domestic disorder?
What are the Director's responsibilities and legal authority to safe-
guard intelligence activities through investigations of personnel from
other government agencies, or private citizens? What is his proper
role with respect to CIA employees? And what techniques may he
employ to detect and counter those threats which are within that
authority ?
In addition, the "sources and methods" authority under the 1947
Act must be considered in conjunction with the restraints expressly
imposed on the CIA. Is the Director's power to protect sources and
methods limited by the denial to the CIA of law enforcement and
police powers and internal security functions?
The MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE programs also raise the
question of the relationship between the Director's authority to pro-
tect sources and the prohibition on internal security functions. Neither
were limited to gathering information of imminent demonstrations
which threatened the CIA. Both programs involved collection of intel-
ligence on dissident activity generally and both suggest that the "pro-
tection of sources and methods," read broadly, can become a mandate
to scour the society for possible threats to the CIA, thereby rendering
meaningless the ban on performing internal security functions.
PART II: HISTORY AND OPERATION OF CHAOS
A. Background
Operation CHAOS was not an intelligence mission sought by the
CIA. Presidents Johnson and Nixon pressed the Director of CIA,
Richard Helms, to determine the extent of hostile foreign influence on
domestic unrest among students, opponents of the Vietnam war, minor-
ities and the "New Left." By all the testimony and available evidence,
it was this pressure which led to the creation and expansion of a
special office in the CIA to coordinate the efforts to respond.
The decisions to initiate the CHAOS program and, subsequently,
to expand the effort, were made in the context of increasing domestic
unrest in the United States.
The nonviolent policy of civil rights efforts in the first half of the
Sixties was being challenged by militant "Black Power" advocates
urging confrontation with the white majority. On July 29, 1967, fol-
lowing serious disturbances in the Nation's cities, which comprised
the worst period of racial riots in American history, President John-
son had established the National Commission on Civil Disorders (the
"Kerner Commission") to investigate their origins.12
'2 Executive Order No. 11365, 7/29/67.
Organized demonstrations and international conferences protest-
ing America's role in the Vietnamese war also became an increasing
concern to the Government.
In April 1967, there were large antiwar demonstrations in San
Francisco and New York. In May the International War Crimes
Trials, sponsored by Bertrand Russell in regard to U.S. activity in
Vietnam, began in Stockholm. In July 1967, there was a major inter-
national conference of peace groups in Stockholm. In September, a
wide range of American activists in domestic peace groups, student
and black organizations met with groups from other countries who
were opposed to American involvement in Vietnam, including North
Vietnam, in Bratislavia, Czechoslovakia. Finally, on October 21, 1967,
there were large scale protest activities in Wasington, including a
march on the Pentagon, and worldwide demonstrations of support
for opposition to continued American involvement in Vietnam.
Government concern about domestic unrest continued throughout
1968, with riots following the death of Martin Luther King in April,
continuing student violence at campuses from coast to coast, stepped-
up antiwar protest activity, and violence at the National Democratic
Party Convention in Chicago.
During the remaining five years for which the CHAOS program
lasted, 1969-1974, racial disorders diminished but the intensity of
antiwar demonstration and student violence increased and then sub-
sided after 1972.
B. Authorization of CHAOS
Against this backdrop of unrest, the CIA's systematic investigation
of possible foreign involvement began with two assignments made
by Director Richard Helms in the late summer and fall of 1967.
In August, Helms established a program to coordinate and improve
the CIA's coverage abroad of American dissidents. Helms does not
claim a specific presidential request for a new CIA program in this
area. Rather, Helms testified that he was acting in general response to
President Johnson's insistent interest in the extent of foreign influence
on domestic dissidents. Helms testified that:
President Johnson was after this all the time. I don't recall
any specific instructions in writing from his staff, particu-
larly, but this was something that came up almost daily and
weekly.13
Helms summarized his response to the presidential overtures:
But what I am attempting to say is that when a President
keeps asking if there is any information, "how are you getting
along with your examination," "have you picked up any more
information on these subjects," it isn't a direct order to do
something, but it seems to me it behooves the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence to find some way to improve his perform-
ance, or improve his Agency's performance. And the setting
up of this unit was what I conceived to be a proper action in
an effort to see if we couldn't improve the Agency's perform-
ance in this general field.14
n Richard Helms testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 1/13/75, p. 163.
1 Helms, Rockefeller Oommission, 4/28/75, pp. 2434-5.
The Deputy Director of Plans, Thomas Karamessines also testified
to his understanding of the White House pressures precipitating
CHAOS.'
As a result, Helms sought to have the CIA try to pull together all
the pertinent information already being received and to use the re-
sources available for better intelligence coverage.
Within CIA, there is no written directive from Helms to Karames-
sines, his deputy for the Plans Directorate, to establish the CHAOS,
program.16 The first recorded authorization is an August 15, 1967,
memorandum from Karamessines to James Angelton, Chief of the
Counterintelligence Staff.
Karamessines' memorandum refers to discussions earlier that day
among himself, Angelton and Helms and asks Angelton to designate a
staff officer to run the program. The memorandum contemplated the
conduct of operations to collect intelligence. It also acknowledged the
program's "domestic counterintelligence aspects," and the need for
dissemination of the information obtained to domestic agencies. The
memorandum requested:
b. The exclusive briefing of specific division chiefs and cer-
tain selected officers in each division, on the aims and objec-
tives of this intelligence collection program with definite
domestic counterintelligence aspects.
c. The establishment of some sort of system by Dick Ober
(or whatever officer you select) for the orderly coordination
of the operations to be conducted, with the responsibility for
the actual conduct of the operations vested in the specific area
divisions.
d. The identification of a limited dissemination procedure
which will afford these activities high operational security
while at the same time getting the information to the appro-
priate departments and agencies which have the responsibil-
ity domestically."
Angleton chose Richard Ober to head what became the Special
Operations Group within the Counterintelligence Staff. Ober had
already been involved in a more limited inquiry into possible foreign
links to American dissidents.
In the beginning of 1967, Ramparts magazine had published an
expose of various CIA activities and relationships with private in-
stitutions in America. Ober had been investigating the possibility of
ties between foreign intelligence services and persons associated with
the magazine, or their friends. He had begun to build a computer-
ized file on dissident activists in America with some connection to the
Ramparts organization. By the time he was given the more general
CHAOS assignment in August 1967. Ober estimates he had indexed
several hundred Americans and had created perhaps fifty actual files.
However, there was no indication that the Ramparts inquiry was ex-
pected to lead to a larger investigation of American protest."
Thomas Karamessines testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 2/24/75, p. 1001-2.
'6 The program did not become known as "CHAOS" until a year after its incep-
tion infra, pp. 27-28, but, for continuity, it is so referred to throughout this
report.
" Memorandum from Thomas Kqramessines to James Angelton, 8/15/67, p. 1.
' Richard Ober testimony, 10/28/75, pp. 4-5; Ober, Rockefeller Commission,
3/28/75, pp. 57.
Ober first sought to pull together the Agency's holdings and infor-
mation readily available here and abroad which would be pertinent
to his assigned inquiry.
The scope of that inquiry had not been defined in Karamessines'
August 15 memorandum, which was simply entitled: "Overseas Cover-
age of Subversive Student and Related Matters." The first direct state-
ment of the target was included in an August 31 cable to the field
describing the collection requirement:
In light of recent and current events which of major interest
and deep concern to highest levels here, Headquarters has es-
tablished program for keeping tabs on radical students and
U.S. Negro expatriates as well as travelers passing through
certain select areas abroad. Objective is to find out extent to
which Soviets, Chicoms and Cubans are exploiting our domes-
tic problems in terms of espionage and subversion. High sen-
sitivity is obvious.19
The cable also advised that a special reporting channel had been es-
tablished with a cryptonym limiting distribution at Headquarters of
any traffic. The recipient chiefs of station were told to control knowl-
edge of the program and the information collected and to destroy the
cable itself after reading. Cable distribution was to be limited at
Headquarters to the Division Chiefs controlling the station or base
involved, Angelton and Karamessines or his deputy.20
C. The November 1967 Peace Movement Study
CIA's inquiry into foreign ties of American dissidents intensified
at the end of October 1967. This time, responding to a specific White
House request, Helms directed CIA to produce a study on the "Inter-
national Connections of the U.S. Peace Movement." 21 Presumably,
this request was precipitated by the October 21 demonstrations and
arrests at the Pentag'on and the worldwide antiwar demonstrations on
the same day.
Ober testified that the scope of his own operation soon came to in-
clude antiwar activists, as well as student radicals and black national-
ists. But it was his participation in the October CIA study for the
President which firmly set Vietnam protest as a major target of the
CHAOS office's efforts.22
The study was written by the Intelligence Directorate of the
Agency.23 Ober coordinated the Plans Directorate contribution and
the receipt of material from the FBI and other Federal agencies. 24
" CIA Headquarters cable to several field stations, August 1967, p. 1.
2 Memorandum from Deputy Chief Counterintelligence Staff to Cable Secre-
tary, 8/17/75.
" There is no written record of this request, but Helms' transmittal note to
President Johnson states, "here is the Study of the U.S. Peace Movement you re-
quested." (Cover Memorandum from Richard Helms to President Johnson,
11/15/67.)
Ober, 10/28/75, pp. 10-17.
2 The Intelligence Directorate is the component with the primary analytical and
evaluation remnonsibilities in the CIA.
" Richard Ober, Memorandum for the Record: "International Connections of
the U.S. Peace Movement." 10/31/67, p. 1.
Both the "peace movement" and "foreign connections" were broadly
defined. According to Ober's memorandum of his meeting with the
Directorate of Intelligence officers in charge of the study, American
organizations "affiliated with the overall Peace Movement" as well as
peace organizations themselves, were to be included. "Foreign con-
nections" were defined to include associations with the American Com-
munist Party.25
With the approval of Angleton. Karamessines and Helms, Ober
sent a second reporting requirement to the stations, this time asking
for information on foreign connections to the peace movement. The
information was to be handled in another restricted channel separate
from the one provided for responses to the August inquiry on radical
students and black activists. The November 1967, cable to multiple
addresses told the stations:
Headquarters is participating in high level interdepartmental
survey of international connections of anti-Vietnam war-
movement in U.S. For purposes this study, we are attempting
to establish nature and extent of illegal and subversive con-
nections that may exist between US organizations or activists
involved and communist, communist front or other anti-
American and foreign elements abroad. Such connections
might range from casual contacts based merely on mutual
interest to closely controlled channels for party directives.
[Emphasis added.] 26
Since Director Helms had asked for the report within two weeks, the
stations were asked only to furnish information on hand or readily
available.27
The conclusions of the review were essentially negative. The study
noted that the diversity and loose structure of the peace movement in
America permitted the more active leaders to coordinate some of the
activities on an international scale and it cited the simultaneous dem-
onstrations on October 21, both here and abroad. But the CIA found
little evidence of actual foreign direction or control, or evidence that
any international dialogue went beyond consultation and coordi-
nation."'
However, these conclusions were explicitly tentative. Director
Helms' letter of transmittal to the President states reservations about
the adequacy of the intelligence community's coverage of the target:
From this intimate review of the bulk of the material on
hand in Washington, we conclude that there are significant
holes in the story. We lack information on certain aspects of
the movement which could only be met by levying require-
ments on the FBI.
'Richard Ober, Memorandum for the Record, "International Connections of
the U.S. Peace Movement", 11/1/67, p. 1.
2 CIA book cable from Acting Deputy Director for Plans to various field sta-
tions, November 1967, pp. 1-2.
2 CIA book cable from Acting Deputy Director for plans to various field sta-
tions, November 1967, p. 2.
" "International Connections of the U.S. Peace Movement," CIA study prepared
by the Office of Current Intelligence, 11/15/67, Summary, pp. 2-3.
First we found little or no information on the financing of
the principal peace movement groups. Specifically, we were
unable to uncover any sources of funds for the costly travel
schedules of prominent peace movement coordinators, many
of whom are on the wing almost constantly.
Second we could find no evidence of any contact between the
most prominent peace movement leaders and foreign embas-
sies, either in the U.S. or abroad. Of course, there may not be
any such contact, but on the other hand, we are woefully short
of information on the day-to-day activities and itineraries of
these men.
Finally, there is little information available about radical
peace movement groups on U.S. college campuses. These
groups are, of course, highly mobile and sometimes even
difficult to identify, but their more prominent leaders are
certainly visible and active enough for monitoring."2
D. Operation of the CHAOS Program and Related CIA Projects
The assignment of responsibility to Ober in August 1967 and the
CIA's study of the peace movement in November, set the initial pat-
tern of the Agency's inquiry into foreign powers and American dissi-
dents.
Ober's office served as the focal point and clearinghouse for Agency
efforts on this question, and along with the analysts in the Intelligence
Directorate, provided the expertise for Director Helms to respond to
the White House interest.
As it developed, the CHAOS mission included three related tasks:
(1) to coordinate and expand CIA's own collection of rele-
vant information and to obtain pertinent material from other
government agencies;
(2) to process, control and retain the information as it
became available;
(3) to provide the results for dissemination by CIA to the
White House, other high level offices and interested agencies.
At the same time, CHAOS performed a second role. It serviced the
FBI's own requirements for information about foreign contacts and
travel of Americans. Ober regarded responding to the Bureau's re-
quests for coverage of Americans abroad as an accepted part of his
responsibilities. 30
1. Gathering Information
The two main sources of information received by CHAOS were the
CIA's stations abroad, and the FBI at home.
For example, the CIA received all of the FBI's reports on the
American peace movement.3 '
The material received from the FBI included information about
foreign travel, contacts, and communications of Americans. Much of
a Memorandum from Richard Helms to President. Johnson, 11/15/67, p. 1.
3 Ober, 10/28/75, pp. 9, 22.
' Richard Ober memorandum for the record, "Daily Progress Report,"
11/1/67, p. 1.
it was simply information about individual activists or groups and
their domestic activities. In many instances, FBI reports would con-
tain both kinds of information.32
By June 1970, these FBI reports were pouring into CHAOS at the
rate of over 1,000 a month.3 3
The background information on individuals provided by the FBI
served as a "data base" of names, and intelligence about the associa-
tions between different dissident elements. This background informa-
tion could be used to develop leads, and to understand the significance
of reports directly relating to foreign contacts.34
The other basic source of information was the reporting from the
CIA's overseas stations. Using the special reporting channel, the sta-
tions supplied reports from their own assets and also supplied what-
ever CHAOS information was obtained from the liaison with local
intelligence services.
On June 25, 1968, a message was sent to various European stations
advising that recent high level discussions had underscored the need
for increasing the coverage of American black, student and antiwar
dissidents abroad. The stations were asked to engage friendly foreign
intelligence services more fully in that effort. Headquarters said that
foreign intelligence services covering their own dissidents might be
able to provide more information on the foreign contacts of American
citizens.35
This cable was followed shortly by another multi-station message
which repeated the general reporting requirement as follows:
As many of you know, Headquarters is engaged in a sensi-
tive high priority program concerning foreign contacts with
US individuals and organizations of the "Radical Left." In-
cluded in this category are radical students, antiwar activists,
draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists
and assorted "New Leftists." The objective is to discover the
extent to which Soviets, ChiComs, Cubans and other Com-
munist countries are exploiting our domestic problems in
terms of subversion and espionage. Of particular interest is
any evidence of foreign direction, control, training or
funding."6
The cable also directed even tighter control over the reporting pro-
cedures. The two previously separate channels for reporting infor-
mation on antiwar and on black or student activists were combined
into the single restricted handling cryptonym "CHAOS." 3
Information supplied CHAOS by the stations was of two types.
First there was the general outstanding requirement for any intelli-
" Committee staff review of CHAOS individual and organization files.
* Memorandum from Richard Ober to James Angelton re CHAOS, 6/9/70, p. 9.
3 James Eatinger testimony, 10/14/75, pp. 10, 12-13. "James Eatinger," (Ober's
deputy at CHAOS) testified under alias.
5 CIA cable from Thomas Karamessines to various European stations, June
1968, p. 1.
" CIA cable from Thomas Karamessines to various field stations, July 1968,
p. 1.
" CIA cable from Thomas Karamesieres to various field stations, July 1968,
pp. 1-3.
gence pertinent to the CHAOS mission as defined in the basic cable
instructions. Second, the stations were asked to respond to specific
inquiries. Such requests from Ober might relate to an upcoming in-
ternational conference or the activities of particular foreign person
suspected of being involved in efforts to influence American unrest.
Frequently these special inquiries were triggered by travel of par-
ticular Americans to the area and a CHAOS request for coverage of
their activities and contacts.38
2. Processing, Storage and Control of CHAOS Information
As the material flowed into CHAOS from stations, domestic CIA
components, and the FBI, it was analyzed, indexed and filed. Every
name of individuals and organizations was extracted and referenced
in the central CHAOS computer system known as "HYDRA." This
system served as the reference index to all of the office's holdings.39
If a report on one individual referred to others, their names would
be indexed also. Any information which was received about an in-
dividual for whom CHAOS maintained a file, went into his file.40
There was no winnowing of the material before its entry into the
permanent record system of CHAOS.4 1
Once the information was indexed and filed, the HYDRA com-
puter system permitted its prompt retrieval. By checking a name in
HYDRA, one could find all the cables, memoranda or other docu-
ments referring to that individual, whether he was the subject of the
material or merely mentioned in passing.42 It should be emphasized,
however, that CHAOS did not maintain a separate file on every
American whose name was indexed in the computer. In many in-
stances the computer would refer a searcher to the file of another
person, or some other CHAOS holdings in which the subject individ-
ual was mentioned, but there was not enough material to open a file.
Thus, there were an estimated 300,000 Americans indexed in HYDRA,
but only an estimated 7,500 Americans for whom actual files were
maintained.-
The tight control maintained over communication of CHAOS in-
formation from the CIA's stations was continued at Headquarters.
The special reporting channel and restricted handling assured
that the cable traffic would be seen only by a few high-level officials in
* Staff reveiw of CHAOS files.
* Testimony of Chief, International Terrorism Group, CIA, Rockefeller Com-
mission. 3/10/75. pp. 1484-1489.
' Chief, International Terrorism Group, CIA, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75,
pp. 1488-1489.
" Eatinger testimony, 10/14/75, pp. 11-12.
4 Chief, International Terrorism Group, CIA, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75,
pp. 1485-1489.
a Chief, International Terrorism Group, CIA, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75,
pp. 1488-90.
In addition to the distinction between files and names indexed, the varying
figures as to the number of CHAOS files reflect other ambiguities. For example,
the "file" on many individuals and groups ran several volumes, sometimes ten or
more for the active leaders and organizations. Thus the Rockefeller Commission
cites 1,000 "files" on private organizations, while the CIA notes that these mul-
tiple files actually were maintained on only 107 groups. (Letter from Director
William Colby to Vice President Rockefeller with attachment of CIA comments
on the Rockefeller Commission Report, 6/25/75, attachment, p. 8.)
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the area divisions of the Plans Directorate, Karamessines, Angleton
and their deputies or designees."
Tight security was maintained over the information deemed most
sensitive, even within the CHAOS office itself. The information in
the HYDRA computer system was compartmented into several layers
of increasing sensitivity and correspondingly more restricted access.
Only CHAOS officers cleared for access to the more restricted streams
of information could retrieve the items on an individual which in-
volved sensitive sources and methods or other tightly held intelli-
gence.45
3. Reporting by CIA
CIA disseminated the information gathered on foreign ties of Amer-
ican dissidents in three forms: major studies prepared for the Presi-
dent; special reports for the White House and other senior officials
on individual items of information; and routine reporting to the
FBI.
(a) Studie.-On November 20, 1967, at the request of Director
Helms, the CIA began an investigation of "Demonstration Tech-
mq ues" both here and abroad.46
On December 21, 1967, Helms sent President Johnson a followup
review of the November Study on the United States Peace Movement."
On January 5, 1968, Helms sent to the White House an interim
study of "Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the U.S.," "which is
part of our continuing examination of this general matter. It is an
effort to identify the locus of student dissent and how widespread it
is." " The forty-page paper dealt exclusively with American student
activists and the bulk of it contained much the same kind of material
on the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) that formed the
chapter of "Restless Youth," CIA produced a year later.
"Student Dissent" briefly noted that Communist front groups did
not control the student. organizations, and that American student
groups had not forged significant links with foreign radicals.49 The
report concentrated on domestic matters and analyzed the makeup,
strength, motivation, strategy and views of the American students. It
concluded, for example, that
Except on the issue of selective service, the student commu-
nity appears generally to support the Administration more
strongly than the population as a whole.50
"Richard Ober, Memorandum for the Record, re CHAOS Traffic Distribution.
5/29/69.
" Chief, International Terrorism Group, CIA, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75,
pp. 1505-1506.
" Richard Ober Memorandum for the Record: "Demonstration Techniques,"
11/20/67.
' "The Peace Movement: A Review of Developments Since 15 November,"
12/21/67.
"Letter from Richard Helms to President Johnson, 1/5/68, with attached
study "Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the U.S."
aStudent Dissent and Its Techniques in the U.S., 1/5/68, Summary p. ii.
"Student Dissent and Its Techniques In the U.S., 1/5/68, Summary, p. i.
The last analytical study prepared for President Johnson, "Rest-
less Youth," was finished in the fall of 1968. "Restless Youth" is a
detailed sociological and political analysis of student unrest through-
out the world."' It found common sources of alienation and hostility
to established institutions in many countries, but concluded that, in
each nation, student dissent was essentially homegrown and not stimu-
lated by an international conspiracy.52
The version sent to the White House included a section on the SDS
in the United States. Helms cover memorandum to the President
stated:
Some time ago you requested that I make occasional round-
up reports on youth and student movements worldwide. Re-
sponding to this request and guided by comments and sug-
gestions from Walt Rostow, we have prepared the attached
study. You will, of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitiv-
ity which attached to the fact that CIA has prepared a report
on student activities both here and abroad.58
Helms did not testify that the White House had requested the sec-
tion on domestic student protest. Rather, he said that since the White
House had wanted a study of possible international orchestration of
protest activity, it did not seem sensible to leave out the American
scene, so it was included.54
The section on the United States was drawn largely from public
sources. An updated, unabridged version was sent to Henry Kissinger
for President Nixon in February of the following year. Helms stated
his concern more explicitly in the transmittal letter for that version:
Herewith is a survey of student dissidence worldwide as re-
quested by the President. In an effort to round out our discus-
sion of this subject, we have included a section on American
students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency,
so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes
the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence, it would prove
most embarrassing for all concerned.55
This first series of studies for the White House were all prepared
by the CIA's Intelligence Directorate, with continuing assistance from
CHAOS in providing material from overseas stations, other CIA com-
ponents, and the FBI. 6 The CHAOS office, itself, only began to pro-
duce the studies itself following further White House requests in the
summer of 1969, discussed below. Copies of the material collected for
the 1967 and 1968 studies on the Peace movement and on student dis-
sent, however, were also indexed and retained by the CHAOS opera-
tion for its own files.
n "Restless Youth," 9/4/68.
" "Restless Youth," conclusions, p. 1, 9/4/68.
' Memorandum from Richard Helms to President Johnson, 9/4/68.
"Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 4/28/75, p. 244.
" Letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, 2/18/69.
5 In other words, the procedures used in the first Peace Movement study were
continued in this period. See p. 169, wpra.
(b) Special Report.-In addition to the formal studies CIA pre-
pared for the President, Ober prepared occasional reports, so-called
"M," memoranda, of particularly sensitive or timely intelligence items
for high level distribution to the White Housej the Attorney General,
Secretary of State, and similar officials. During the entire history of
CHAOS there were 34 such M memoranda.
The content of M memoranda varied. They included, for example,
information that a foreign government was making a grant to a
dissident protest group in America, information regarding a reported
kidnapping and murder plot against high government officials; and
information about speeches made by radical leaders while abroad.
Essentially these were one-shot reports about some contact or co-
operation between foreign elements and American radicals, rather
than an analysis of such links.57
One or two of the earliest memoranda did deal with plans for do-
mestic protests.
In connection with the anticipated demonstrations in Washington
at the end of October 1967, Helms had requested all available infor-
mation to be furnished the administration:
In any event, I want to be sure that any information you
gentlemen acquire through whatever channels, is promptly
passed to appropriate Federal authorities, including the
White House, the Secret Service, the FBI, and anyone else
who counts. I am under the impression that this "do" may
turn out to be a humdinger, and I want to insure that we have
clean hands in passing along any information that we turn up
in the normal course of business. [Emphasis added.] 5I
On October 10, the CIA distributed a memorandum to the White
House, recounting "unevaluated information" about alleged plans
for racial disturbances at the time of the October 21 demonstrations
and the alleged involvement of a particular black leader."
Richard Ober, at the request of Director Helms, also provided the
Kerner Commission with a series of 26 reports. The Executive Order
establishing the Commission had directed all agencies, to the extent
permitted by law, to provide information and otherwise assist its
efforts. 0 The material supplied by the CIA primarily consisted of
reports on overseas travel and statements by American black leaders
and allegations of foreign efforts to exacerbate racial unrest in Amer-
ica. However, they included some of the early memoranda on reported
plans for domestic disorders, which appear to be from domestic
sources and to have little relevance to the question of foreign links.61
(c) Dissemination to the FBI.-By far the main tangible product
of CHAOS was extensive dissemination of raw reports to the FBI.
Information deemed of interest to the Bureau was put in memoran-
dum form and sent through special channels directly from the
" Staff review of M memoranda.
6 Memorandum from Richard Helms to Deputy Directors for Plans and In-
telligence, and Director of Security, 9/26/67.
" M Memorandum No. 10, 10/9/67.
* Exec. Order No. 11365, 7/29/67, p. 2.
a Committee Staff review of memoranda provided to the Kerner Commission.
CHAOS office to the FBI. In many instances it was information about
Americans which CHAOS had sought in response to a specific FBI
request. Most typically, the Bureau would notify Ober that it wished
coverage of Americans whose overseas travel it had learned about in
advance."
In addition, CHAOS obtained information pursuant to its general
collection requirements from stations abroad, and wholly domestic
information about dissident activities obtained in the course of its
operations. This, too, was disseminated to the FBI, if it was deemed
pertinent to the Bureau's concerns about such Americans. Ober testi-
fied that he regarded any names in reports sent to CHAOS by the
FBI a§ a standing requirement from the FBI for information which
CHAOS obtained about those persons.63
F. 1969 Expansion of Chao8
The CHAOS operation was expanded and given renewed impetus in
1969, when the new Nixon administration expressed the same concern
about foreign influence on domestic unrest as had its predecessors.
1. The Review of CHAOS for the President
On June 20, 1969, Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to the President,
asked the CIA for a review of its progress:
The President has directed that a report on foreign Com-
munist support of revolutionary protest movements in this
country be prepared for his study. ... "Support" should be
liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Com-
munists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest
movements in the United States.
On the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on
a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our
present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be
madequate."
Huston asked for both a substantive review and a survey of the effec-
tiveness of resources the CIA was employing, and what gaps might
exist "because of either inadequate resources or a low priority of atten-
tion."6 5 This study was the first one actually produced by the CHAOS
office.
The review was completed within 10 days. Deputy Director Cush-
man summarized the results in his letter of transmittal:
2. The information collected by this Agency provides evi-
dence of only a very limited amount of foreign Communist
assistance to revolutionary protest movements in the United
States. There is very little reporting on Communist assistance
in the form of funding or training and no evidence of Com-
munist direction or control of any United States revolution-
ary protest movement. The bulk of our information illustrates
Ober, 10/30/75, p. 88.
* Ober, 10/28/75, p. 45.
" Memorandum from Tom Huston to the Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69, p. 1.
* Memorandum from Tom Huston to the Deputy Director of the CIA, 6/20/69,
p. 1.
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Communist encouragement of these movements through
propaganda methods.
3. Since the summer of 1967, this Agency has been attempt-
ing to determine through its sources abroad, whether or not
there is any significant Communist direction or assistance to
revolutionary groups in the United States. We have been col-
laborating closely in this effort with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and disseminating information to it. Existing
Agency collection resources are being employed wherever
feasible and new sources are being sought through independ-
ent means as well as with the assistance of foreign intelligence
services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Of course,
the Katzenbach guidelines have inhibited our access to certain
persons who might have information on efforts by Communist
intelligence services to exploit revolutionary groups in the
United States. 6
Two additional studies were prepared by CHAOS, which were essen-
tially revisions of this 1969 review. In 1970, as part of the CIA contri-
bution to the work of the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelli-
gence which led to the so-called "Huston Plan," CHAOS prepared an
update of the 1969 study.6 7 A similar revised version was prepared
in 1971.
The 1971 report, "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal
Security Threat-Foreign," concluded that hostile foreign govern-
ments were committed to exploiting United States unrest as much as
possible. But, apart from a few isolated instances, the study concluded
that the main "assistance" was still in the form of exhortation and
encouragement through international conferences and statements of
support by foreign figures. The summary of foreign Communist
influence on the New Left and radical student groups stated:
There is no evidence, based on available information and
sources, that foreign governments, organizations, or intelli-
gence services now control U.S. New Left movements and/or
are capable at the present time of directing these movements
for the purpose of instigating open insurrection or disorders;
for initiating and supporting terrorist or sabotage activities;
or for fomenting unrest and subversion in the United States
Armed Forces, among government employees, or in labor
unions, colleges and universities, and mass media.
In summary, foreign funding, training, propaganda, and
other support does not now play a major role in the U.S. New
Left. International fronts and conferences help to promote
New Left causes, but at present the U.S. New Left is basically
self-sufficient and moves under its own impetus.
68
"Memorandum from Gen. Robert Cushman to Tom Charles Huston, 6/30/69,
transmitting "Special Report on Foreign Communist Support to Revolutionary
Protest Movements in the U.S.," p. 1.
*See Huston Plan Report.
*Report, "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal Security Threat-
Foreign," 1/5/71, pp. 1-3. Thereafter, Richard Ober also used the .CHAOS office
to prepare the CIA contributions on foreign aspects of domestic unrest for the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee established in the wake of the aborted Huston
Plan. See Huston Plan Report.
The conclusions with regard to black activists were the same.
Following the Huston memorandum of June 1969, questioning
the adequacy of the CIA's efforts, the CHAOS program was ex-
panded to develop better sources of information, and an improved
capability to process it.
In September, Helms issued a memorandum regarding CHAOS to
the heads of the Directorates. Helms told the Deputy Directors that
he had:
recently reviewed the Agency's efforts to monitor those inter-
national activities of radicals and black militants which may
affect the national security. I believe that we have the
proper approach in discharging this sensitive responsibility,
While strictly observing the statutory and de facto proscrip-
tions on Agency domestic involvements. 9
The memo acknowledged overlapping interests of several CIA com-
ponents in this area but made clear that Ober had the principal
operational responsibility for coordinating collection efforts. Helms
specifically requested that Ober be provided with trained analysts to
process.a large backlog of undigested data and skilled operations
officers.70
In the fall of 1969, CHAOS began to develop two additional pro-
grams to increase its sources of information. The first was a domestic
collection program undertaken by the Domestic Contact Service.
7 In
the second, CHAOS developed its own agents, who were trained in
the United States and then sent on reporting missions abroad.
2. Domestic Contract Service
In early 1969, Domestic Contact Service (DCS) - was receiving
an increasing volume of field reports on Black militant activity. Sie
of the material related to possible foreign association and had been
.routinely sent in by the field offices. Qn March 10, 1969,- in order to
channel and control this material, DCS opened a new i.ase onI "Activi-
ties of Black Militants" here and abroad.7?
Because of references to foreign contacts,- DCS sent some. of the
reports to the Counterintelligence Staff and they' were routed to
Ober, who sought additional material."
in October 1969, Ober formally briefed DSC officials. A subsequent
memorandum to DCS field offices, j6intly drafted by ICS and
CHAOS representatives, expanded projects to the same five subject
categories used -by CHAOS: black. militants; radical youth groups;
* Memorandum from Richard. Ilelms to the Deputy Directors for Support,
Plans, Intelligence and Science and Technology, September 1969, p. 1.
" Id., p. 2.
7 At that time in the Intelligence Directorate, the unit has since been re-
named Domestic Contact Division and returned to the Operations Directorate.
Its main mission is the collection of foreign intelligence information In the
United States from witting Americans. In connection with that role and other
tasks which support CTA's foreign operations many DOS field offices have de-
veloped a network of confidential sources and contacts with local authorities.
They are also openly listed in the phone book and would receive any walk-ins
or phone calls from citizens to the CIA.
" Deposition of Deputy Chief, Operational Support Branch, DOS, Rockefeller
Commission, 4/11/75, pp. 32-36.
" Ibid.
radical underground press; antiwar groups; and deserter/draft re-
sister movements. The directive advised that:
CI's interest is primarily to ascertain the details, if any, of
any foreign involvement/support/guidance/training/fund-
ing/or exploitation of above groups and movements, parti-
cularly through coverage of foreign travel, contacts and
activities of the Americans involved.7 4
Over 200 reports and other items were supplied by DCS to CHAOS
between 1969 and 1973. Much of the material included information
relating to foreign contacts of Americans; some contained "opera-
tional leads" to potential sources who might be willing to collect in-
formation when they went overseas. Other items consisted largely of
information about domestic organization and activity.
5
DCS officials thought they were expected to supply domestic in-
formation about dissidents for use as background data, as well as any
leads to foreign connections. 76
There was no express reference to a domestic information collection
requirement in the directive sent to DCS field offices in December
1969. But the Deputy Chief of CHAOS testified that his office had
indicated their appreciation to DCS for such material, which helped
build the CHAOS data base.7 7
Moreover, whatever the formal written requirements, CHAOS made
specific requests for domestic materials and, in other instances, made
follow up requests based on items which DCS field offices had sent in.
For example, CHAOS asked the Chicago Field Office for informa-
tion on the "28 co-conspirators" of 12 SDS members who had been
locally indicted for the Weathermen riots in Chicago the previous fall.
This was supplied, as well as subsequent coverage of the legal
proceedings.7 8
Another CHAOS request resulted in a DCS field office obtaining
from confidential sources a large report prepared by a state investigat-
ing commission on radical demonstrations in that state.'
9
The CHAOS office thanked DCS for one early report on the domestic
political activities of a black leader and asked for any additional
information available.8 0
In the beginning of 1971, however, after expressions of uncertainty
about the program from the field, DCS officials sought a revised writ-
ten requirement stating both a primary interest in foreign-related
information and a secondary CHAOS interest in background infor-
mation of a domestic nature.
DCS claimed this was merely intended to confirm the prior practice
based on oral requests from CHAOS.81
" DOS Memorandum to Field Offices: Case 52722, 12/19/64, p. 1.
7 Deputy Chief, Operational Support Branch, DOS, Deposition, Rockefeller
Commission, 4/11/75, pp. 47, 43-44.
* Chief Support Branch, DOS, Deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/11/75,
pp. 56, 61. -
7' Eatinger, 10/14/75, pp. 36-37.
" Field Office Reports to DCS, 4/16/70, 6/1/70.
7 Field Office Report to DCS, 5/14/70.
* Undated memorandum from Richard Ober to DCS: re DCS Field Report
LA-654--69 of 9/14/69.
8 Chief Support Branch, DOS, Rockefeller Commission, 4/11/75, pp. 53-56.
The draft directive stated that: ... The second type of
information concerns the activities of US radical groups but
does not contain any obvious foreign implications. Such infor-
mation is considered of primary interest to the FBI under its
domestic security charter. DCS however has been directed to
collect both types of information, with the emphasis on that
pertaining to foreign involvement.2
Ober refused to approve the new directive. As a result, DCS closed
the old case, and opened a new one under a narrower directive. DOS
reporting was to be "focused exclusively upon the collection of infor-
mation suggesting foreign involvement in U.S. radical activities."
[Emphasis in original.] Purely domestic information was to be passed
locally to the FBI. 3
Though nowhere near as voluminous as domestic reports received
by CHAOS from the FBI, the DCS material was one of the main
additional sources of "domestic intelligence" in the CHAOS files.
3. CHAOS Agents
The other main source of "domestic intelligence" about Americans
which went into CHAOS' files came from agents being run by the
CHAOS project and a few from a related foreign intelligence opera-
tion run in close coordination with CHAOS.
The effort to develop assets targeted fully on CHAOS information
began right after the White House review of the Agency's CHAOS
effort in the fall of 1969. Previously, overseas reporting had come from
assets already working for the various stations on other assignments.
Those station assets continued to. supply CHAOS information even
after Ober obtained his own agent program.
Over 40 potential recruits were evaluated. About half of these
were referred by the FBI, for whom they had already worked. Most of
those referred by the FBI ultimately were used on a single assignment.
Seven recruits developed unilaterally by the CIA also were used as
CHAOS agents.8 4
CHAOS agents participated in radical activity here as part of their
preparation for assignment overseas. In the process, they supplied
detailed information on domestic activities of Americans.
While here, the agents spent at least several weeks, and, in some
cases, much longer, immersed in the radical community. This not only
enhanced their radical credentials and increased their familiarity with
persons and groups they might 'be reporting on from abroad. It also
afforded -their case officer with an opportunity to train them, assess
their progress, test the possibility they were a plant, and evaluate how
CHAOS could best use them abroad.15 This was done by extensive
debriefing of the agents on a periodic basis. 86
" Draft memorandum from Director, DCS, to Field Offices, 1/6/71.
a Memorandum from Director, DCS, to Field Offices, 3/23/71.
" Charles Marcules testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75, pp. 1538-1545.
(For security reasons, the CHAOS agent case officer testified as "Charles
Marcules.")
Ibid., pp. 1545-1547; 1566-1667; Ober 9/24/75, p. 46.
" Staff Review of CHAOS Agent Files.
According to Marcules, the agents in training were asked to report
to him in detail on their activities, persons with whom they had been
meeting and so forth. 7
In all of these instances, the information about individuals in dissi-
dent groups, the plans and policies of the organizations and other
domestic information, as well as any leads to possible foreign connec-
tions went not only into the case file of the agent in training but also
into the general CHAOS files on those individuals and groups.
4. Project 2
A separate intelligence project which also involved the use of radi-
cal credentials by American agents, furnished CHAOS with addi-
tional information about American dissidents. "Project 2" was devel-
oped in 1969 and implemented in 1970, by a particular area division at
CIA.8 8 It was designed ultimately to penetrate certain foreign intelli-
gence targets through these agents, or to have them spot others who
could accomplish such infiltration.
Most of the assets developed their leftist coloration by entering uni-
versities in the United States after an initial period of basic agent
training. When in school, they participated in the radical community.
While preparing for their future assignments, the agents filed de-
tailed reports and were also debriefed by their case officer. In the
process, they provided considerable information on their associates,
dissident organizations, demonstration plans and sometimes personal
information. 9 One asset submitted a 60 page report for a three week
period which included detailed information on demonstrations, group
meetings, and general accounts of such activity as Women's Libera-
tion efforts in the area.90
From the outset, the project's potential usefulness to CHAOS was
recognized. All of the agent reports and debriefing contact reports
were provided to CHAOS for its files.91
Once abroad on their basic intelligence mission, moreover, the Proj-
ect 2 agents were explicitly directed to acquire CHAOS information
as well. One memorandum regarding the overseas assignment of a
Project 2 agent, stated:
His mission will be to spot, assess and develop leftists in the
Maoist spectrum.. . . He will also report on CHAOS devel-
opments in [the target country] .2
One Project 2 agent became affiliated with an American dissident
group in the foreign country which was directing its activities at per-
sonnel of American bases in that area. He began to report on both
the native "radical left and the American radical left." 93
Marcules testimony, 3/10/75, Rockefeller Commission, p. 1567.
* The Rockefeller Commission refers to this project in its Report as "Project
2." For continuity, the same reference is used here.
" Staff review of Project 2 agent files.
* Agent 1, contact report, Vol. 11, Agent 1 file.
" Earl Williams testimony. 10/14/75. p. 10. (For security reasons, one of the
Project 2 case officers testified as "Earl Williams.")
" Memorandum from Chairman, CS Agent Panel to DDP: "Request for Ap-
proval for Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay," 8/4/70.
9 Project 2 Progress Report, August-September 1971, p. 201.
5. Provision to CHAOS of NSA and Mail Intercepts
When CHAOS was in full scale operation, it also was receiving in.
formation from the CIA's mail intercept program and the intercep-
tion of international communications by the National Security Agency.
The CIA mail project was run by another unit within the Counter-
intelligence Staff. CHAOS supplied that office with a list of 41 in-
dividuals and organizations for specific inclusion in the so-called
"watch list" used as one basis for intercepting international mail.9 4
The names provided by CHAOS were to be sent to the point of inter-
ception in the field, and not merely to be used to screen mail which
had independently been selected and had already arrived at the project
office in Headquarters.9 5
CHAOS also sup plied lists of individuals and organizations to the
National Security Agency for inclusion in its "watch list." In addi-
tion, CHAOS had access to more general distributions of communica-
tions intelligence involving Americans which were received by the
CIA from NSA.99
F. Reduction, Limitation and Termination of CHAOS
1. Reduced Reporting Priority
With the decline of student demonstrations and antiwar activity in
the latter part of 1972, the intensity of the CHAOS effort declined.
A cable to several stations advised that general reporting of informa-
tion regarding foreign contacts of the New Left was no longer a high
priority, although routine coverage was to be maintained in order to
preserve a "residual counteraction capability for possible future use."
The cable noted that a high priority would continue with regard to
foreign connections of New Left individuals or groups advocating or
engaging in violence.
2. Reaction to Inspector General's Survey
At the end of 1972, the CHAOS program was subject to a high level
review. In the fall of 1972, an Inspector General survey of overseas
stations for a particular region raised questions about CHAOS. The
survey team was not permitted to review specific CHAOS files and
operations, either in the field or at Headquarters. However, questions
voiced to the team by station personnel in several countries resulted in a
separate memorandum from the Inspector General, William Broe to
the Executive Director. Broe summarized the policy concerns expressed
about CHAOS:
Even though there is a general belief that CIA involvement
is directed primarily at foreign manipulation and subversive
exploitation of U.S. citizens, we also encountered general con-
cern over what appeared to constitute a monitoring of the
political views and activities of Americans not known to be
or suspected of being involved in espionage. Occasionally,
" Memorandum from Richard Ober to Chief, CI Project, 2/15/72.9' James Eatinger, Memorandum for the Record: CI Project Material Handling,
10/7/71.
Ober, 10/30/75, p. 16-17.
* CIA Headquarters Cable to several Stations, July 1972.
stations were asked to report on the whereabouts and activities
of prominent persons ... whose comings and goings were not
only in the public domain but for whom allegations of sub-
version seemed sufflciently nebulous to raise renewed doubts
as to the nature and legitimacy of the MHCHA OS program."
[Emphasis added.]
On a practical level, the stations had complained about the burden
of seeking information from the liaison service on behalf of the FBI
when the local or nearby FBI representative had also requested the
same information from the liaison directly."
Broe's memorandum caused a review of the CHAOS operation by
Karamessines, Helms, William Colby, who was then the Executive
Director/Comptroller of the CIA, and other senior officials. In addi-
tion to improving coordination with the FBI and briefing overseas
officers with a misunderstanding of CHAOS, Helms also directed that
thereafter:
A clear priority is to be given in this general field to the subject
of terrorism. This should bring about a reduction in the in-
tensity of attention to political dissidents in the United States
not, or not apt to be, involved in terrorism. On a secondary
level, continued discreet coverage will be maintained of coun-
terintelligence matters, including the possible manipulation
of American citizens by foreign intelligence services or their
actions abroad of counterintelligence interest.100
Ober had already taken on the additional duties of coordinating the
CIA's efforts to combat international terrorism the previous summer."o'
In 1973, the CHAOS program was transferred from the Counter-
intelligence Staff to the newly formed Operations Staff within the
Plans Directorate.
On May 9, 1973, CIA Director James Schlesinger requested an in-
ventory of all "questionable activities" in which the CIA might have en-
gaged. One such activity on which reports were sent to the Director
was CHAOS. On August 29, 1973, William Colby, who had succeeded
Schlesinger as Director, issued a series of instructions regarding the
questioned programs and activities. His directive in regard to CHAOS
limited the CIA's own operations to focus more narrowly on collecting
information about foreign nationals and organizations, rather than the
Americans with whom they might be in contact:
MEMORANDUM
Subject: CHAOS
CHAOS is restricted to the collection abroad of infor-
mation on foreign activities related to domestic matters. CIA
will focus clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals
involved and only incidentally on their American contacts.
* Memorandum from Inspector General to Executive Director-Comptroller,
11/9/72, p. 1.
9 Memorandum from Inspector General to Executive Director-Comptroller,
11/9/72, p. 2.
1" Memorandum from Executive Director-Comptroller to DDP, 12/20/72, p. 7.
101 Clandestine Service Notice-Establishment of International Terrorist In-
formation Program, from Thomas Karamessines, 7/19/72.
As a consequence, CIA will not take on the primary 7responsi-
bility for following Americans abroad, although CIA can
accept a request by the FBI to be passed to an appropriate
liaison service in a foreign country for the surveillance of
such an American and the transmission of the resulta back to
the FBI. It must be plainly demonstrated in each such trans-
mission that the CIA is merely a channel of communication
between the FBI and the appropriate foreign service and is
not to be directly engaged in the surveillance or other
action against the American involved. [Emphasis added.]102
3. Termination of CHAOS
CHAOS was terminated as a specified collection program m
March 5, 1974, by order of Director Colby. The cable announcing this
to the stations also stated guidelines for future activity involvmg
Americans:
1. This message is to notify you of the termination of the
CHAOS program and to provide guidelines under which
HQS has been operating for some time on certain activities
formerly included in CHAOS.
2. Guidelines: All collection takes place abroad. Collection
is restricted to information on foreign activities related to
domestic matters. CIA will focus clearly on the foreign orga-
nizations and individuals involved and only incidentally on
their American contacts. In doing this, following will apply:
A. Whenever information is uncovered as a byproduct
result of CIA foreign-targeted intelligence or counterintelli-
gence operations abroad which makes Americans abroad sus-
pect for security or counterintelligence reasons, the informa-
tion will be reported by CIA in the following manner.
(1) With respect to private American citizens abroad, such
information will be reported to the FBI.
(2) With respect to official U.S. personnel abroad, such
information will be reported to their parent agency's security
authorities, and to the FBI if appropriate.
In both such cases, under this sub-paragraph, specific CIA
operations will not be mounted against such individuals;
CIA responsibilities thereafter will be restricted to reporting
any further intelligence or counterintelligence aspects of the
specific case which come to CIA attention as a by-product of
its continuing foreign targeted operational activity. If the
FBI, on the basis of the receipt of the CIA information,
however, specifically requests further information on terrorist
or counterintelligence matters relating to the private Ameri-
can citizens involved in the specific case, CIA will respond
according to the guidance in subparagraph B below. In per-
forming these functions CIA will be discharging its responsi-
bilities for primary foreign counterintelligence collection
abroad, particularly as assigned it under paragraphs IB
and 3B of NSCID 5.
102 Memorandum from William Colby to Deputy Director for Operation, At-
tachment "Memorandum: CHAOS." 8/29/73.
B. CIA may respond to written requests by the FBI for
clandestine collection abroad by CIA of information on for-
eign terrorist or counterintelligence matters involving pri-
vate American citizens. Such collection activity may involve
both liaison services and unilateral operations. In the case
of liaison services, whenever feasible it should be plainly
demonstrated in the transmission of the request to such liaison
services that CIA is acting as a channel of communication
between the FBI and the appropriate foreign service. Any
unilateral operational activity will require specific prior ap-
proval of the DDO and the DCI will be advised thereof.
Pertinent information obtained will be provided by CIA to
the FBI.0 3
A new restricted channel cryptonym was provided for the controlled
reporting and handling of information relating to Americans which
was furnished pursuant to these guidelines. 1o4
At the same time, domestic offices of the CIA were sent a copy of
the cable to stations with the additional guidance that the cable was
specifically restricted to information obtained abroad:
If as a byproduct of ongoing activities, incidental informa-
tion is received on U.S. citizens and it is determined that
such information is inimical to U.S. interests or the Base-feels
that the incidental information should be reported to Head-
quarters, they should do so via appropriate staff channels
with [a priority] indicator. Headquarters will make the final
determination as to disposition of any information which is
received.10e
PART III. ISSUES RAISED BY CHAOS AND RELATED PROJECTS
CHAOS and the related studies undertaken by the CIA for the
White House sought to determine the role played by hostile foreign
involvement in domestic unrest. Was that an appropriate task for the
CIA under its charter?
A. The Propriety of the CHAOS Mission
The history of CHAOS raises a serious question whether the
entire mission was a proper one for CIA. The inquiry into links be-
tween American dissidents and foreign elements inevitably involved
the Agency not only in "foreign intelligence" but also in examining
domestic affairs outside of its foreign intelligence jurisdiction, and,
at the least, treading close to prohibited internal security functions.
Of course, the mission required "foreign intelligence" about the
efforts of hostile governments or foreign groups. But it also involved
acquiring and using information about the American dissidents and
their activities. In order to detect and understand connections between
'"Cable from William Colby to Field Stations, 3/5/74.
'"Cable from William Colby to Field Stations, 3/5/74, p. 5.
'CIA Headquarters Cable to Domestic Bases, March 1974.
foreign elements and the Americans, the CIA felt that it had to
examine both sides of the connection-the foreign and the domestic.
As Ober put it:
Obviously, if you're talking about links between the foreign
individuals or groups or people or groups in the United
States, to understand any link you need some information on
either end. So that a degree of information would have to be
maintained against which you could measure your foreign
information and understand whether it is relevant or not. 06
The inevitable involvement in the activities of Americans was in-
creased by the fact that the scope of CIA's interest in domestic dissi-
dents was sometimes defined in broad terms. While the emphasis was
clearly placed on evidence of direct foreign funding or control, both
the requested reporting and the studies provided for the President
covered a much broader range of "foreign connections." As a result,
CHAOS screened a wide range of individuals and groups.
For example, the CIA asked stations providing information for the
1967 study of the peace movement to report on "subversive connec-
tions" between Americans and foreign elements, but then explained
that "such connections might range from casual contacts based merely
on mutual interest to closely controlled channels for party direc-
tives." 107 [Emphasis added.] In that context, "subversive connections"
to be reported meant no more than a possible basis for foreign powers
to develop actual control or direction at some point in the future.
Similarly, the White House request in the summer of 1969 for a
study of foreign communist support to American protest groups
directed that "support should be liberally construed to include" encour-
agement by Communist countries, as well as assistance.108 Thus, mere
expressions of sympathy and approval conveyed to an American group
would constitute a "foreign link" and make the group a subject of
the CHAOS examination of foreign influence.
In the fall of 1969, anticipating a new worldwide "peace offensive,"
CHAOS asked stations to report on "any foreign support, inspiration,
and/or guidance" to such activities in the United States. 09
The studies produced by CIA on the peace movement, black activist
groups, and the New Left included the efforts of foreign governments
to exploit or stimulate unrest through propaganda and expressions
of support. In the case of the peace movement, they also discussed
international coordination of antiwar activity in various countries.
The attempt to ascertain and evaluate "foreign links" so broadly
defined required more than background information on a few indi-
viduals suspected of actually being agents directed by a hostile power.
In a period when there was considerable international communication
and travel involving American dissidents, a study of "foreign links"
which included expressions of common concern, contact at conferences,
or encouragement came necessarily to include a substantial segment
of the more militant protest groups in America.
* Ober, 10/28/75, p. 44.
10 CIA Headquarters cable to several field stations, November 1967, pp. 1-2.
Memorandum from Tom Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69.
iCIA cable from headquarters to stations, November, 1969..
Moreover, the CIA examined domestic dissident activity not only to
determine the extent of foreign contracts, but also to evaluate the im-
pact they had in the domestic arena.
Isolated reports of training, directions, and limited financial assist-
ance provided to American dissidents by hostile foreign governments
were found. Instances of mutual encouragement and international
coordination were far more numerous. The studies prepared by the
CIA sought to weigh the significance of such instances in the context of
the domestic sources of support for the American dissident move-
ments, in order to portray accurately the role played by foreign in-
fluence.
This was the theory on which Helms and the Directorate of In-
telligence justified including the study by CIA of American stu-
dent protest. Acknowledging that analysis of American student groups
was sensitive, they felt that one could not test the proposition that there
was an underlying international conspiracy manipulating the students
in each country, without examining the origins and nature of the stu-
dent protests here.110
Yet Helms contemporaneously indicated his understanding that
the section of the "Restless Youth" report by CIA analyzing Amer-
ican student unrest was beyond the CIA's authority.''
Thus, whether or not the primary interest of the CHAOS mission
is characterized as "foreign intelligence," the very nature of the inquiry
can be said to have taken the Agency into domestic matters as well.
The ultimate objective transcended any effort to limit CIA's role to
"foreign intelligence." As Director Helms testified:
The jurisdiction is divided at the water's edge. When you
are dealing with something that has both foreign and domes-
tic aspects to it, I don't recall anybody having come down, I
mean any President come down hard and say, all of this is for
the FBI and all of this is for the agency. I mean the line has
to be wavy. There is no other way to do it that I know of. It is
like cutting a man down the middle."12
Did the overall CHAOS program also inherently involve the CIA
in prohibited internal security functions?
If the intent of the statutory prohibition is considered to limit
active investigation of Americans by the CIA only in this country,
then the answer is no. The specific ways in which CHAOS was im-
plemented still raise a problem, but the task of determining the extent
and impact of foreign links to domestic unrest did not inevitably
require that the CIA do such investigation itself.
On the other hand, the general thrust of the statutory prohibition
can be read as a more rigid limit to the CIA's entry into the internal
security field at all-not merely a geographical limitation on domes-
tic CIA investigations. If the proscription is read that broadly, then
the basic mission of CHAOS to determine the role played by foreign
influence in domestic dissent violated the statutory charter.
110 Drexel Godfrey deposition, Rockefeller Commission, January 1975, p. 9.
m See supra, pp. 33-34.
m Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, p. 222.
This ambiguity was reflected in the study prepared for the White
House by CHAOS in June 1971 on the extent of foreign links." 3 It was
entitled:
Definition and Assessment of the Internal Security Threat_
Foreign. [Emphasis added.] 114
Interestingly, the Rockefeller Commission concluded that with the
exception of several particulars, the CHAOS mission undertaken by
CIA was a proper foreign intelligence mission. But in its basic recom-
mendation on the CHAOS program, immediately following that con-
clusion, the Commission advised that the President in the future not
direct "the CIA to perform what are essentially internal security
tasks." 11' [Emphasis added.]
Both the 1971 study title and the Rockefeller Commission recom-
mendation implicitly recognize that the question of foreign influence
on domestic unrest or subversion is an aspect of "internal security".
Ober suggested that CHAOS could be viewed as the foreign collec-
tion, collation, analysis, and dissemination of counterintelligence. In
short, he justified CHAOS as a "vertical slice" of the CIA's counter-
intelligence responsibilities under NSCID 5.11r But as the history of
CHAOS shows, the inclusion of "subversion" in the definition of
threats covered by "counterintelligence" under NSCID 5, meant that
.the effort by CIA to perform foreign collection of counterintelligence
information and to produce analyses of foreign counterintelligence
questions would involve it in internal security matters. Therefore, to
the extent the specific prohibition of the statute applied, it superceded
any general implied authority for counterintelligence work upon
which NSCID 5 was predicated.
Whether or not the overall CHAOS program was proper under the
CIA charter, the ways in which the project was implemented raise
further questions about the limits of the CIA's authority to gather
information about Americans.
B. Domestic Intelligence Collection
To what extent was the CIA involved in improper domestic intelli-
gence collection?
In any ordinary sense of the word, the CIA had "collected" a great
deal of information in the United States about Americans, which was
systematically maintained in files on those persons and used in the
CHAOS program.
The manner in which the CIA had acquired that information, how-
ever, varied considerably. Most of it was received from the FBI,
partly in response to traces and general requests from the CIA, and
partly through disseminations made routinely by the Bureau.
The CIA's own acquisition of information about dissident Ameri-
cans in this country involved the reports by the Domestic Contacts
See supra, pp. 39-40.
n' Report, "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal Security Threat-
Foreign", 1/5/71.
us Rockefeller Commission Report, pp. 149-150.
nOber, 10/28/75, p. 53, and see supra, pp. 8-9.
Services, the CHAOS and Project 2 agents, and by the Office of Secu-
rity sources in the MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE programs.
1. Domestic Contact Service
The basic formal policy of the DOS aid to CHAOS precluded active
collection efforts by the field offices. Information was to be accepted
if volunteered in the course of other duties, or sent in if it was avail-
able in the local public media. 17
As a practical matter, however, information was provided by local
officials or other "confidential sources" who became alerted to the field
offices' interest in such material. And some of that information was
obtained through local informants or undercover agents of police
intelligence units.
In one city, for example, the DCS field office was obtaining from
local authorities the coverage by informants of the meetings of local
chapters of New Left dissident groups. 8 Another confidential report
dealt with local funding sources for the Black Panther Party.""
Thus, CIA's "passive" receipt sometimes was simply one step removed
from active covert collection efforts by other public agencies.n'o
The DCS involvement in CHAOS was questionable, even as to leads
about foreign travel or possible contacts of Americans. The essential
aspect was the intentional acquisition here by CIA of information
about the political activities and associations of Americans. The argu-
ment such material was useful background for a "foreign intelligence"
project does not answer the basic question of whether the CIA should
leave such intelligence gathering here about Americans to other fed-
eral agencies, if, indeed, such information should be collected at all.
2. Domestic Reporting by CIA Agents
The CIA was most directly involved in clandestine gathering of
domestic intelligence as a result of the reporting by CHAOS and
Project 2 agents while they were in the United States. Both sets of
agents participated in the radical milieu here in order to develop or
improve their leftist credentials and, consequently, their access to in-
formation in their overseas assignments.
The CHAOS case officer who debriefed the CHAOS agents in this
country sought a complete account of the agents' activities and as-
sociates. He frequently amazed the FBI in the degree of information
he could extract from the agents' experience; he was "like a vacuum
cleaner." 121
Since the extensive debriefings about their associates in the United
States served a variety of training, assessment, and counterintelligence
purposes, any information reported to the CIA in the process can be
viewed as the byproduct of overseas operations. At times, however,
the CHAOS agent program and, to a lesser extent, Project 2 went
beyond incidental collection.
m Deputy Chief, Support Branch, DOS, Deposition, 4/11/75, Rockefeller Com-
mission, p. 45.
mu Memorandum from DCS to CHAOS with attached field office reports,
11/15/68.
'"Report from field office to DCS, 8/14/70.
m In addition, as already noted, DCS pursued follow-up requests from CHAOS
for specific information with its local sources. See supra, p. 44.
1 Ober, 10/30/75, p. 56.
(a) CHAOS Agents.-Generally, the CHAOS agents under de-
velopment were not directed to acquire information about particular
targets. But the case officer would sometimes put specific. questions to
them, asking what they had learned about particular persons or events.
Sometimes the questions had been provided by the FBI.12 2 Ober agreed
that an agent trying to perform well would thereby be sensitized and
implicitly directed toward obtaining information on those subjects or
persons when he returned to the radical community.123
In addition, not all of the CHAOS agent debriefings on domestic
matters was tied to their preparation and development. When agents
returned to America and reentered the radical community here pending
reassignment, they continued to report on the activities of their domes-
tic associates.124 According to Ober, agents were sometimes expressly
brought back from their overseas assignment to cover a target in the
United States of particular interest to the FBI.125
Three cases illustrate this range of circumstances in which domestic
information was collected by CHAOS agents.
The first instance involved a recruit who was under assessment
and not formally hired for over half a year, during which time he was
debriefed on his knowledge of domestic radical activity.'6
In April 1971, after consultation with the case officer and at the
time he was formally recruited as a CHAOS agent, he attended the
spring demonstrations against the Vietnam war in Washington. 2 7
Prior to this time, the agent had not been directed to try to acquire
information about domestic radicals, but had done so as a result of his
continuing association with them. In the case of the Washington dem-
onstrations, however, he was briefed in advance by the case officer,
Marcules, on a number of individuals in whom the FBI was interested,
as well as being asked to report any advance information about plans
for the demonstrations. 128 Marcules testified it was not practical to
turn Finch over to the Bureau during this period because of problems
with compartmenting his identity. He also said it provided a good
training opportunity.129
10 Ober. 10/30/75, p. 47.
'*Ober, 10/30/75, p. 60.
12 Staff Interview of Chief, International Terrorism Group, Rockefeller Com-
mission, 2/24/75, p. 3.
Memorandum from Richard Ober to James Angelton, 6/9/70, p. 9.
Bob Finch deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/16/75, pp. 5-6. (For secu-
rity reasons, this agent testified under the alias "Bob Finch".)
1 The case officer testified that Finch had raised the possibility and that from
a security viewpoint, it would have seemed suspicious if Finch had not come.
(Marcules, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75, p. 1550), Finch testified he could
not recall whether he or Marcules first suggested his participation at the demon-
strations. (Finch, Rockefeller Commission, 4/16/75, pp. 14-15.) However, a mem-
orandum prepared by the case officer states that Finch was "willing to go" to
D.C. (Marcules contact report, 4/5/71). In addition, the circumstances of his being
formally recruited just in time for the assignment, and the juggling of his train-
ing schedule, strongly suggest the reporting was more planned as a collection
opportunity than it was merely a fortuitous coincidence.
a Marcules contact report, 4/17/71.
m Marcules, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75, p. 1552.
The second instance of intensive domestic reporting involved an-
other CHAOS agent with particularly good entree into the highest
levels of a segment of the domestic radical community. He made sev-
eral trips abroad and reported CHAOS information obtained over-
seas. 30 In addition, both during his preparation period and in between
his overseas assignments, this asset reported a great deal of detailed
information, some extremely personal, about individuals in this seg-
ment of the radical community and about their personal relation-
ships.131 In the fall of 1969 it was determined that he would not be
used on an overseas assignment for many months and, in the mean-
time, would continue to be debriefed as a source of information about
his associates, in part because he did not wish to deal with the FBI.132
But there is no indication in the file that the personal information of
an intimate nature was requested by CIA or was disseminated to the
Bureau.
A third CHAOS asset had already been working for the CIA
abroad. At the time he was recruited for the CHAOS effort, the agent
had an opportunity to attend antiwar demonstrations in this country.
He was encouraged to attend by CHAOS, which assisted his arrange-
ments.s3 3 The agent attended a series of activities in the United States
and was debriefed extensively. The information was the basis for
numerous reports to the FBI on domestic antiwar efforts and plans.34
(b) Project 2 Agents.-The Project 2 agents developing their cre-
dentials in this country were not directed to participate in particular
dissident activities. But the principal case officer for the agents' prep-
aration stated there was a sense of urgency to get the maximum
amount of information for CHAOS from the credential building
process in the United States. 135
The Deputy Chief of CHAOS testified that he briefed Project 2
agents while they were in this country. He could not recall asking the
agents to collect any specific information. But he testified that the
CHAOS office had requested the Project 2 case officers to ask their
agents specific questions about the persons and activities they were
reporting upon.13 aa
A cover memorandum written by the Project 2 case officer attached
to a debriefing report of an agent prior to his departure overseas read:
A part of the substance herein is in response to questions
posed by CHAOS before I went to the West Coast. Especially
the part on factionalism in the New Left and the organi-
zational activity. Am sending a copy of this to CHAOS as
per usual practice. (The attachments were collected by the
asset for CHAOS at our request.) 3
'a The agent had been a CIA source for a number of years.
13 Staff review of CHAOS agent file.
" Memorandum for the Record from Charles Marcules, 10/21/70. (in agent
file.)
13 Marcules, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75, pp. 1556-1558; staff review of
CHAOS agent file.
"' Staff review of agent file.
Williams, 10/14/75, pp. 8, 23.
Eatinger, 10/14/75, pp. 50-51.
" Cover memorandum from Earl Williams to Acting Chief of Operations of
the Project 2 area division, 7/28/70.
3. Propriety of Domestic Reports by Agents During
Preparation
In those situations when CHAOS agents were directed to cover
specific activity in the United States or to find out about a particular
person, CIA was engaged in domestic clandestine intelligence col-
lection about Americans.
Whether the information was sought for CHAOS' own use or at
the request of the FBI, should the CIA ever be involved in domestic
collection targeted against United States citizens?
It can be argued, for example, that where CHAOS and Project 2
agents were not directed to collect specific information, and were
reporting domestic intelligence as a by-product of their preparation
for overseas operations, that CIA was not involved in improper
domestic operations.
Thus, Deputy Director Karamessines felt that the general prep-
aration of agents through participation in domestic dissident ac-
tivity, and their debriefing by CIA, was consistent with his policy
that CHAOS would not engage in domestic intelligence operations.
Karamessines understood that the agents would report to their case
officer information which included domestic matters which would
be available to CHAOS and which might be disseminated to the
FBI. But he explained that CHAOS was not to conduct operations
"for the purpose" of acquiring domestic information about targeted
groups.137
Such narrow definitions of the intelligence trade differ from the
general public understanding of what constitutes "domestic intelli-
gence collection" by CIA. Under this narrow definition of "domestic
operations," if the ultimate purpose of the covert reporting is prep-
aration for a foreign operation, then even the conscious acquisition
of detailed domestic intelligence in the process, its systematic reten-
tion and dissemination, would be appropriate for CIA. That standard
poses a potential loophole in any guidelines which purport to restrict
the CIA's collection of information about Americans here in the
United States. It is particularly dangerous when, as was true for
CHAOS, the overseas mission itself includes reporting on Americans
abroad.
If it is to be continued, does CIA use of such credential build-
ing and training techniques require strict controls on the use of any in-
formation acquired during such preparation?
0. Assistance to FBI Internal Security Investigations
A third issue is raised by the extensive pattern of assistance CHAOS
provided to the FBI. Apart from the mission Helms had the CIA
undertake for the White House, and the specific ways in which
CHAOS sought to implement that mission, a major focus of the
actual CHAOS operation became its servicing of the FBI's internal
security investigations. Did the extent of that assistance bring the
CIA into the realm of forbidden internal security work?
m Thomas Karamessines testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 2/24/75, pp. 1018-
1020. A similar analysis was offered by the Chief of Counterintelligence, Ober's
immediate superior. (James Angleton testimony, Rockefeller Commission,
2/10/75, p. 699.)
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As just noted, the most directed use of CHAOS agents to collect
domestic information in the United States was done on behalf of the
FBI.
Abroad, the bulk of the CHAOS requests for coverage of specific
Americans by CIA stations, foreign liaison services, or both, also re-
sulted from FBI requests.
Both Karamessines and Ober acknowledged that the CIA through
CHAOS was assisting the FBI in its performance of internal security
functions.a3s
They characterized that assistance as a proper part of the CIA's
counterintelligence responsibility.
Karamessines testified that, as the foreign operational arm of the
American counterintelligence effort, CIA has always accepted the
responsibility to meet the FBI's collection requirements abroad. 39 But,
collection of intelligence about Americans abroad, whether the CIA's
own agents or from liaison services, can be done for internal security
purposes, just as much as can intelligence operations at home.
This issue was reviewed in a different context by the Rockefeller
Commission when it considered the propriety of the CIA's mail inter-
ception program. The Commission found that it exceeded CIA au-
thority wholly apart from the statutory ban on any government
agency opening mail without a warrant. The Commission concluded
that:
The nature and degree of assistance given by the CIA to the
FBI in the New York mail project indicate that the pri-
mary purpose eventually became participating with the FBI
in internal 8ecurity function. Accordingly, the CIA's partici-
pation was prohibited under the National Security Act. [Em-
phasis added.] 140
In contrast to the relatively small number of formal studies and spe-
cial memoranda CIA provided the White House, the CHAOS office
disseminated thousands of reports to the FBI.
All told, in its seven years of operation, CHAOS sent well over
5,000 reports to the Bureau; approximately 4,400 memoranda, and
some 1,000 cable disseminations.' 41
Reviewing the degree to which the product of the CHAOS opera-
tion was internal security intelligence sent to the FBI, as well as the
testimony that targeted operations abroad against Americans were
largely the result of specific FBI requests, one can draw a similar
conclusion paralleling that analysis of the mail project: a major pur-
pose of CHAOS activity in actual practice became its participation
with the FBI in the Bureau's internal security work.
On the other hand, because CHAOS generated information of in-
terest to the FBI in the course of pursuing its own mission, the dissem-
ination figures combine production requested by the Bureau and
also the byproduct of CHAOS which was made available to the FBI.
*'Ober, 10/30/75, pp. 74-76; Karamessines, 10/24/75, p. 29.
. Karamessines, Rockefeller Commission, 2/18/75, pp. 995-996.
14 Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 115.
" Letter from Director William Colby to the Vice President, 7/8/75, p. 6 of
Attachment.
Moreover, insofar as CHAOS watched Americans abroad at the
FBI's request, CIA participation in the Bureau's internal security
work, unlike the mail program, did not involve domestic CIA opera-
tions, the primary concern underlying the prohibition of international
security functions to the CIA.
For the future, the question remains which intelligence. agency will
be the operational arm for the United States to collect information
about Americans outside the country. Even if all collection of infor-
mation about Americans undertaken in the United States were re-
served to the FBI, there might be situations in which surveillance
of Americans abroad was sought as part of an internal security or
counterterrorism investigation initiated pursuant to approved criteria.
In such cases, unless the FBI or some new agency had adequate ca-
pability to cover the subject's activities abroad, it would be necessary
either to permit the CIA to do it, or to request coverage by the local
intelligence service through an FBI legal attache or a State Depart-
ment representative. And, of course, the second course would not be
open unless America had a cooperative relationship with the liaison
service in the foreign country.
The solution of this issue may lie less in determining what to deem
the performance abroad of internal security functions than in setting
restraints on the investigation of Americans by the FBI and applying
those restraints to surveillance of Americans overseas, by any arm of
the government.
D. Maintenance of Files on Americans
The mechanics of the CHAOS operation, both in performing the
mission undertaken by the CIA and in servicing the FBI's needs,
involved the establishment of files and retention of information on
thousands of Americans.
To the extent that information related to domestic activity, its main-
tenance by the CIA, although perhaps not itself the performance of
an internal security function, is a step toward the dangers of a do-
mestic secret police against which the prohibition of the charter
sought to guard. Specific standards are required for the retention of
such material when its direct availability in the CIA's own files is
necessary for legitimate foreign intelligence purposes and the Agency
has acquired it properly. In addition, the CIA can be required to purge
existing files in conformity with the new standards, and where appro-
priate, to purge name indexes as well.
E. Approaches to Determining Foreign Direction of Domestic Dissent
Beyond the questions CHAOS raises about the scope of CIA's au-
thority under its charter, CHAOS also suggests the more general
problems of controlling efforts by any intelligence agency to deter-
mine the nature of foreign connections to domestic unrest.
The most systematic and the quickest way to look for foreign direc-
tion of domestic unrest is to start at both ends of the suspected
connection. One tries to learn what hostile intelligence services are
doing, by coverage of them. But one can also begin to investigate
those Americans thought most likely to have such ties. Thus, CHAOS
sought to sift through the leaders and more active segments of do-
mestic protest movements in order to learn of travel and other foreign
contacts and then to investigate the possibility that those Americans
were supported or controlled by foreign powers.
The more traditional CIA policy has been to monitor hostile intel-
ligence services and then, only if it thereby learns of their involvement
with particular Americans, to investigate those Americans abroad or
request an inquiry here. Generally, CIA has not tried to work back-
ward from a surveillance of traveling Americans who seemed likely
prospects in order to see what kinds of connections could be found.
The present Assistant Deputy Director of CIA for Operations,
David Blee, summarized the distinction:
We have always said that we did not operate that way, but
that we went about it much more inefficiently, which is by
penetrating the foreign government or foreign subversive
operation and finding if that led us to an American, rather
than trying to see what Americans were doing, and seeing if
they were in touch with those groups.
In this, we operate very differently from practically all
of the other security and intelligence services, which typically
watch their own citizens to see what they are doing.14 2
The CHAOS program took the more "efficient" approach; it acquired
information from coverage of foreign elements, but also worked back
from the American end by screening foreign contacts of dissidents. As
Ober testified:
At some point perhaps it should be explained that one of
the reasons for having so many files on so many people was
that the estimates and assessments required of the Agency in
terms of possible foreign involvement with domestic activi-
ties were such that one could only give a responsible answer
if one knew, of this group of people, how many had any sort
of connectiop of significance abroad. What I am getting at
indirectly, I think, is that to respond with any degree of
knowledge as to whether there is significant foreign involve-
ment in a group, a large number of people, one has to know
whether each and every one of those persons has any such con-
nection. And having checked many, many names and coming
up with no significant connections, one can say with some de-
gree of confidence that there is no significant involvement,
foreign involvement with that group of individuals. But if
one does not check the names, one has no way of evaluating
that, without a controlled penetration agent of the FBI by
that group, or a control penetration agent of the KGB abroad
who works on the desk which deals with these matters through
us. [Emphasis added.] 143
The former Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, testi-
fied that, in this regard, CHAOS reflected a general increase through-
"42 David Blee deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/18/75, p. 15.
"a Ober, Rockefeller Commission, 3/28/75, pp. 88-89.
out the intelligence community in the use of such a screening approach
on American dissidents as opposed to more traditional counterintel-
ligence efforts targeted directly at hostile foreign elements.-"
CHAOS suggests the dangers of any intelligence agency starting
from such an investigation of Americans to find illegal or subversive
foreign ties. It particularly shows how the broad impact of that ap-
proach is amplified by the dynamics of counterintelligence work, and
the likely national setting of such efforts.
1. The Nature of Counterintelligence Work
Counterintelligence investigations of this type start from a data base
of background information necessarily broader than the ultimate tar-
get of the inquiry. The foundation of such counterintelligence efforts
is to build up a reference collection of names and organizations against
which one can check information reported about possible ties between
foreign elements and Americans.'"' Hence, the extraction of every
name from materials received about domestic dissidence.
Along with the identities, the data base requires developing back-
ground information about the individuals and groups-their rela-
tionships, the status of particular individuals, their views and policies.
The Deputy Chief of CHAOS testified that such background informa-
tion was needed to understand the significance of the "tidbits," i.e.,
specific items relating to foreign connections which came to CHAOS.14 6
As Ober explained:
I think that is significant in any counterintelligence opera-
tion, that the meaning of information in the abstract, it is very
difficult to determine. You have to measure it against other
information and put it into context. 4 1
Moreover, in counterintelligence work, the credo is that every bit of
information about associations and activities might prove relevant-
a piece of the puzzle. Thus, when CIA responded to the Rockefeller
Commission's conclusions that too much information was maintained
by CHAOS on wholly domestic activity, it stated:
this was due in part to the paucity of information pertinent to
its foreign intelligence objectives which the operation had
been able to collect and also to the uwertainty over how much
of the accumulated data might not eventually prove relevant
to these objectives. [Emphasis added.] 148
The bias is toward inclusion, not selectivity, in collecting informa-
tion and maintaining files. Other agencies and components of the CIA,
alike, were not encouraged to be selective in their provision of material
to CHAOS.
The request to NSA for materials on persons CHAOS sought to
have watchlisted indicated the widest possible scope. In a memorandum
'" Karamessines, 10/24/75, p. 44.
"'Ober, 10/28/75, p. 42.
'"Ober, 10/28/75, p. 44.
m Ober, 10/28/75, p. 45.
14 Letter from William Colby to Vice President Rockefeller, July 1975.
to NSA, Ober indicated that he should be sent any material obtained
on those targets "regardless of how innocuous the information may
appear." 149 Ober. testified this was not indicative of his pursuit of
domestic intelligence, but rather his view that NSA was not competent
to judge what bits of seemingly irrelevant information might be
meaningful to CHAOS. Therefore, he wanted NSA to turn every-
thing over and let CHAOS personnel sift through it for whatever
might prove fruitful to their interests.-s
The Director of the Office of Security, Howard Osborn, testified
that Ober requested he provide all information about dissident groups
obtained through Projects MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE, and
not merely specific items suggesting foreign connections. According
to Osborn, Ober explained that only the CHAOS office, not the Office
of Security, was competent to judge what might be relevant to the
CHAOS mission.'"'
2. Political Setting of Investigation
The other main source of expansive pressures on intelligence opera-
tions such as CHAOS is the political setting in which they are under-
taken. Such inquiries are most likely to be pursued in, times of
turbulent protest and dissent from official policy. Intense Government
concern about the source of that opposition is inevitable and the possi-
bility of foreign involvement is ever present. Moreover, the admin-
istration in power may find it difficult to accept the fact that domestic
opposition to policy is really indigenous.'52
In the case of CHAOS, two successive presidents were reluctant to
accept the CIA's conclusions that the dissident activity against the
Government was indigenous.
Director Helms testified that the White House was dissatisfied with
these reports and studies because they did not show "enough foreign
money and foreign influence in these dissident movements.. .. They
just said you aren't doing your job, you aren't finding it out, its got to
be there." m*
Ober testified that Helms never pressured him as to the findings
reported by the CIA. But a steadfast determination to provide un-
biased analyses, itself, creates pressure to expand an operation such
as CHAOS. The dynamic is present in any effort to establish the
validity of a negative finding-no 8ubstantial foreign influence-to
the satisfaction of skeptical Government leaders. Only by increasing
the coverage of American dissidents with any kind of foreign contact
could the CIA hope to satisfy the White House that if there were
significant links of direction and support, CHAOS would find them.
14 Memorandum from Richard Ober to Office of Customer Relations, NSA,
9/14/71.
' Ober, 10/30/75, p. 16-17.
Howard Osborn testimony, 10/3/75, p. 12-14.
m As Joseph Califano, a principal assistant to President Johnson put it, high
government officials sometimes cannot believe that: "a cause that is so clearly
right for the country, as they perceive it, would be so widely attacked if there
were not some [foreign] force behind it." (Joseph Califano, 1/27/76, p. 70.)
'm Richard Helms deposition, Rockfeller Commission, 4/24/75, p. 223.
Both Helms and Ober testified that the White House pressure for
redoubled efforts was a significant factor in the continued expansion
of CHAOS.1 4
The expansive pressures created by the nature of counterintelli-
gence work and by the difficulty of "proving a negative" to the White
House, of course, are not peculiar to the CIA. They increase the dan-
ger that any intelligence agency's effort to find hostile foreign ties to
domestic dissent by working back from surveillance of Americans will
sweep within its scope many citizens engaged only in lawful activity.
The alternative would be to prohibit such investigations of the
activity of an American dissident unless, in the course of counter-
intelligence efforts against hostile foreign elements, a reasonable basis
was established for suspecting the American was acting illegally on
behalf of the foreign power.
PART IV. OFFICE OF SECURITY PROGRAMS
The concerns about domestic unrest which led to the CHAOS
program, also caused the CIA to undertake other programs through
the Office of Security, the support unit of the CIA charged with pro-
tecting its personnel, facilities and operations. The Office of Security
has responsibility for. both physical security measures and questions
of personnel security.
The Office conducts routine background investigations of prospec-
tive personnel. It has also developed files on individuals and organiza-
tions in the course of investigating individual security cases of alleged
penetration or attempted penetration of CIA employees.
In 1967, the Office began two efforts which were not focused on
particular security cases. Rather, they were designed to collect in-
formation about groups which might pose a threat to the Agency's
physical security through violent demonstrations or other disruptive
activities.
By the mid-1960s, student unrest had led to increased harassment
of government recruiters, including those of CIA, at campuses
throughout the country. In the fall of 1968, the CIA recruiting office
at the University of Michigan was destroyed by a bomb.
A. Project Resistance
Project RESISTANCE developed out of a narrower program
designed to provide direct support to CIA recruiters visiting college
campuses. In February 1967, the Office of Security had directed its
field offices to report on the possibilities of violence or harassment at
those schools which CIA recruiters planned to visit. Subsequently,
pursuant to this directive, the field offices provided information on
'" Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, p. 234; Ober deposition,
Rockefeller Commission, 3/28/75, pp. 137-38. Ober also noted his independent
professional judgment that In the beginning CHAOS sources were insufficient to
afford confidence in its findings. Ober, 10/30/75, p. 32. Nevertheless, his and
Helms' acknowledgments, as well as the circumstances of CHAOS' evolution,
indicate the role played by White House dissatisfaction with the results in the
program's expansion.
expected opposition to government recruiting, or to CIA in particu-
lar, and made appropriate security arrangements with campus offi-
cials if the recruitment effort took place.
The broader RESISTANCE program was initiated by the Deputy
Director of the CIA for support, whose directorate included the Office
of Security and who previously had been a Director of Security, him-
self. In December 1967, he requested the Office of Security to study
campus dissidence on a systematic basis. The Deputy Director sug-
gested that there was an increased pattern of similar activity among
student protest movements and directed the Office to examine their
aims, causes, attitudes and the extent of their support among the
Nation's students.15' The collection requirement sent to the field offi-
cers in a telegram from headquarters asked for local news clippings
about campus demonstrations related both to local grievances or to
national issues such as the Vietnam War." 6
Because of the volume of material reported by the field offices, a
special unit, the Targets Analysis Branch, was established in May
1968, to process and digest the information.
The testimony and the files indicate no use of infiltrations by CIA
in connection with this program. The overwhelming bulk of the
information continued to be press clippings passed on to headquarters.
However, the field offices also obtained information from confidential
sources in the local community such as campus officials and police
authorities.
For example, one field office indicated that it had already obtained
information from the local law enforcement authorities and advised
of additional opportunities to obtain from other police departments
reports of their informants with local dissident groups.'
57 Headquar-
ters advised the office to utilize such sources when the information was
offered to CIA.",
On some occasions, the field offices were specifically requested to
obtain information about particular activities or individuals, through
information obtained directly by CIA personnel and material devel-
oped through confidential sources.1' 9
The analyses provided by the RESISTANCE project were criti-
cized at one point by the Office of Security analyst who had initiated
the program for primarily focusing on publicly available information:
The RESISTANCE output should not attempt to duplicate
or compete with the media on such reporting. Rather it should
draw on such open sources for material needed to link to-
gether the data acquired from other sources.o60
By the end of 1970, the Director of the Office of Security felt that
some of the field offices might be going too far in developing informa-
' Memo for the Record from Security Research Staff Project Officer, 12/8/67.
. Telegram from CIA Headquarters to Office of Security Field Offices, 12/11/67.
m Memorandum from Field Office to CIA Headquarters, 5/23/68.
m Memorandum from CIA Headquarters to Field Office. 6/11/68.
m Memorandum from CIA Headquarters to Washington, D.C. Field Office,
5/11/68; Memorandum from CIA Headquarters to Washington, D.O., Field
Office, 11/10/69.
' Memorandum from Security Research Staff analyst on Project RESISTANCE
to Chief, Special Activities Division, 5/13/68.
tion from cooperating confidential sources.' 6 1 At the beginning of
1971, limiting instructions to the field offices directed restraint in the
development of information:
No attempts should be made to recruit new informants or
sources such as campus or police officials for the express
purpose of obtaining information regarding dissident groups,
individuals, or activities. No new requirements for informa-
tion should be levied on existing sources.
The above limitations do not preclude acceptance of in-
formation gratuitously offered by informants or sources and
field personnel should continue to be on the alert for non-
solicited information which might contribute to the protection
of the Agency personnel, projects or installations.'62
The Targets Analysis Branch also received FBI reports.163
Although the initial impetus for RESISTANCE was an effort
to evaluate campus activities, the Targets Analysis Branch broadened
its inquiry to include analyses of protest activities in Washington
and other centers of protest.
The incoming material was digested and indexed. Eventually the
project developed an estimated 600-700 files and indexed an estimated
12,000 to 16,000 names.6 4 Apart from specific spot reports and evalu-
ations of particular groups requested by other components of the
Office of Security, the main product of the operation was weekly Situa-
tion Reports, summarizing and analyzing past events and projecting a
calendar of upcoming events which might involve violence or dis-
ruption directed at government facilities.165
The knowledge of organizations was also made available to the
Personnel Office for purposes of evaluating membership in such groups
by prospective employees.166
The project was terminated at the end of June 1973.167
B. Project Merrimac
The second general effort by the Office of Security to protect the CIA
from threats posed by domestic disorder was Project MERRIMAC.
MERRIMAC involved the participation of CIA assets in dissident
groups in the Washington metropolitan area in order to obtain advance
warning of demonstrations which posed a threat to CIA facilities and
also to collect other intelligence about the groups and their members.
There is no record of MERRIMAC having been authorizd at
the outset by Director Helms. The Director of the Office of Security,
Howard Osborn, testified that Helms had indicated his concern about
the security of the CIA facilities in the face of dissident activities in
the period prior to the formal commencement of MERRIMAC in
a Howard Osborn testimony, 10/3/75, pp. 19-20.
m Memorandum from CIA Headquarters to all field offices, 1/6/71.
m6 Chief, Targets Analysis Branch OS (1970-1973), testimony, Rockefeller
Commission, 3/3/75, p. 1277.
"Chief, Targets Analysis Branch OS (1970-193), Rockefeller Commission,
3/3/75, pp. 1296, 1314.
'MId. at 1279.
Id. at 1291-1292.
" Memorandum from CIA Headquarters to New York Field Office, 6/28/73.
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early 1967.168 And Helms believes that he approved the project at
some point.e1 6
In February 1967, Osborn inquired whether a proprietary company
used by the Office of Security could monitor the activity of certain
groups in Washington in order to provide advance information about
demonstrations directed against CIA properties.7o
Shortly thereafter, the proprietary was directed to obtain such in-
formation. At the beginning of April, it was specifically asked to have
its assets collect intelligence on the April antiwar demonstrations in
Washington, D.C. 7 '
The Office of Security initially chose four "indicator organiza-
tions"-the Women's Strike for Peace, the Washington Peace Center,
the Congress of Racial Equality, and the Student Nonviolent Coordi-
nating Committee-deemed to be bellweathers of the likely nature of
protest activity and the potential threat it might pose to the CIA.172
The proprietary used only a few assets at first, including one reg-
ular employee and several others hired on a part-time basis. None of
the assets were sophisticated agents, although they eventually re-
ceived some training. They were construction workers or persons in
similar trades and their relatives. Most of their work continued on a
part-time basis, in addition to their regular employment, throughout
the duration of MERRIMAC."'
Initially, the assets were asked to monitor the organizations in order
to report information only about planned demonstrations which might
threaten the Agency. In June, however, the collection requirement was
expanded to include information about the organizations' financial op-
erations and sources of support.14
In the fall of 1967, in anticipation of the peace demonstrations in
Washington, MERRIMAC sought to obtain information about the
leadership and plans of organizations participating in the National
Mobilization Committee to End the War, as well as information about
all the participant organizations. 75
The scope of the information requested continued to increase. The
assets were asked to report any information about the plans and atti-
tudes of groups revealed at meetings, their associations with other
groups, sources of support, and an account of -what was said at the
meetings, in addition to information specifically relating to threatened
action -against the CIA.17 6 In addition, other organizations were added
... Howard Osborn testimony, 10/3/75, p. 6.
" Richard Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 4/28/75, p. 2472.
..o Memorandum from Deputy Director of Security to Howard Osborn, 2/20/67.
The proprietary company was engaged in commercial security business as a cover
operation. It was used by the Office of Security where no government identifica-
tion was permissible, or where other considerations required "deep cover" for
the CIA's security work. (Osborn, Rockefeller Commission, 2/17/75, p. 837; Gen.
Manager of the proprietary testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/3/75, pp. 1372-
1379.)
'nMemorandum from Headquarters to proprietary Gen. Manager, 4/17/67.
"'Ibid.
17 Proprietary, General Manager, Rockefeller Commission, 3/3/75, pp. 1378-
1379.
1" Memorandum from Headquarters to Proprietary Gen. Manager, 6/29/67.
13 Memorandum from Headquarters to Proprietary Gen. Manager, 9/14/67.
noMemorandum from Headquarters to Proprietary Gen. Manager, 8/15/68.
to the list of covered groups. By August 1968, ten groups were tar-
geted by MERRIMAC for such coverage."' Thus, although the
primary purpose remained advance warning of threats to the Agency,
the program expanded into a general collection effort whose results
were made available to other components in the CIA, and in many
instances, to the FBI. As Osborn put it:
Now I would be less than candid and less than honest with
you to say that over the course of this project we reported
pretty much of everything we got. [sic] I am not going to
try to kid you. But the primary purpose of the project was
self-protection physical security and I think we probably ex-
ceeded that.78
In some insbances the agents conducted surveillance of particular
dissident leaders and 'activists of special interest to the CIA. Photo-
graphs were taken of persons attending meeting, or license plates, and
persons were trailed home in order to identify them. Some of the assets
also made contributions to the organizations at a low level necessary
for credible participation. 179
Information obtained from MERRIMAC agents was made avail-
able to CHAOS. Osborn testified that the broadening scope of MER-
RIMAC was due in part to the requests from the CHAOS office to
the Office of Security for general information about dissident groups.
I think it started out legitimately concerned with the physical
security of installations and I think it expanded 'as these
things often do, in light of the intense interest in the require-
ments by Mr. Ober and by a lot of other people. I think it
just kind of grew in areas that it perhaps shouldn't have.8 0
Osborn testified that most of the requests for specific information
beyond the'threat of immediate situations, came from inquiries by the
CHAOS. office."8 '
The list reports from MERRIMAC agents found in CIA files
were gathered in late 1968. However, CIA has confirmed that the pro-
gram lasted until September 1970.182
In August 1973, Director Colby issued a directive as part of the
Agency's review of "questionable activities" regarding the activity
which had involved MERRIMAC. The Directive stated:
It is appropriate for the Office of Security to develop private
sources among CIA employees. It is not appropriate for CIA
to penetrate domestic groups external to CIA, even for the
purpose of locating threats to the Agency. Notice of such
threats should be reported to the appropriate law enforce-
ment bodies and CIA will cooperate with them in any action
required which does not involve direct CIA participation in
"7 bid.
"8 Osborn, Rockefeller Commission, 2/17/75, p. 836.17. Examination of MERRIMAC Report files.
"s Osborn, Rockefeller Commission, 2/17/75, p. 844.
... Testimony of MERRIMAC Agent A, 8/14/75 pp. 19-20; Osborn, 10/3/75.
p. 16.
'" Letter from William Colby to Vice President Rockefeller with CIA comments
on Rockefeller Commission Report, 8/8/75, p. 8 of attachment.
covert clandestine operations against U.S. citizens in the
United States.'
C. Special Security Investigations
Since the inception of the CIA, the Office of Security has conducted
routine background investigations of prospective CIA employees and
agents, as well as employees of contractors and other persons being
considered as cooperative sources of information.or assistance. Periodic
reinvestigation of CIA employees is also performed.
In addition, the Office of Security has conducted numerous special
investigations of persons affiliated with the CIA and others who were
the subject of a particular security case. In some instances the in-
vestigations involved efforts to determine the source of news leaks
thought to compromise the security of intelligence sources and meth-
ods, including news leaks for which there was no particular reason to
suspect that CIA personnel were responsible, as opposed to other gov-
ernment employees with access to intelligence material.
More frequently, however, the investigations involving Americans
were conducted as a result of allegations or suspicions that individuals
had become the target of an effort to penetrate the CIA, or had become
involved in espionage, or had .developed personal difficulties which
created risks that intelligence sources and methods might be com-
promised. The subjects of these investigations have included former
and present CIA employees, employees of other government agencies,
and private citizens who were in contact with the subject of an
investigation.
In the course of these investigations, various covert techniques have
been employed, singly and in combination, against American citizens
in this country: physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, unau-
thorized entry, inspection of mail and of income tax records.
In January 1975, the Inspector General of the CIA initiated a
survey of all special security investigations and other activity under-
taken by the Office of Security since the inception of the CIA in 1947
which involved the use of any such special investigative techniques
against persons in the United States.
A team of officers from the Inspector General's staff and the Office
of Security conducted such an examination, with complete access to
all records in the Office of Security and in other source records through-
out the CIA which might reflect such use of these investigative
techniques. Knowledgeable personnel were interviewed as well.1
8 *
The examination resulted in a compendium of every identifiable
instance in which physical surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic
surveillance, mail cover and opening, access to tax information, un-
authorized entry and other special investigative procedures had been
employed against persons in the United States.18 5
.. Memorandum from William Colby to Deputy Director for Administration,
Attachment, "Memorandum: MERRIMAC," 8/29/73.
m" Affidavit of staff officers from Inspector General's Office and Office of
Security responsible for investigation of domestic surveillance, 5/27/75.
* Ibid, p. 7.
Each instance was analyzed in terms of the techniques, the target
and the circumstances involved in the investigation. Specifically, the
survey detailed whatever information was available concerning:
-the background of the investigation.
-the level and nature of authorization within the CIA.
-coordination with other agencies.
-the methods used to implement the surveillance.
-reporting and the results of the operation.
-and the authority and reasons for terminating the operations.1
8 6
The Committee staff reviewed the methods and results of this survey
of domestic surveillance compiled by the Inspector General's office. In
addition, the Committee staff reviewed in their entirety the original
files of selected cases involving physical surveillance, electronic sur-
veillance and unauthorized entry which occurred within the last ten
years, and has also taken testimony regarding the use of such tech-
niques in America from present and former officials of the Office of
Security and other CIA components.
The result of this review by the Committee essentially confirms the
summary of the Inspector General's survey provided in the Rockefeller
Commission Report. 8 7
However, the records of authorization, scope and results of these
investigations are sometimes incomplete. This is particularly true for
the earlier history of the CIA, at a time when the use of covert investi-
gative techniques against Americans affiliated with the CIA or other
persons in the United States was more widespread than it has been in
the past decade.
Even in recent years, however, most authorizations and approvals at
the highest levels within the CIA have not been accompanied by a writ-
ten record.
Howard Osborn testified that during his ten year service as Director
of the Office of Security he regularly sought approval from Helms for
physical surveillance or -any more intrusive technique, with the excep-
tion of two minor instances of brief physical surveillance of CIA per-
sonnel allegedly involved in irregular personal activities or financial
difficulties. In those instances, Osborn testified, approval was obtained
from the Deputy Director of CIA for Support. However, Osborn
added that such authorizations from the CIA Director were handled
orally with a minimum of paperwork because of the sensitivity of the
allegations. 88
D. Issues Raised by the Office of Security Programs and Ivestigations
1. Protecting CIA from Potential Violence
The MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE programs represent an
overly ambitious view of the CIA's authority to act on behalf of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods.
Ibid.
m Rockefeller Commission Report, June 1975, Chapter 13.
m Osborn, 10/3/75, pp. 45-46.
While the special security investigations raise questions about the
propriety of targets and techniques in some cases, they reflected a
common concern-the threat of unauthorized disclosure by CIA per-
sonnel, or in a few instances other government employees with access
to intelligence material. This common denominator was present
whether the particular case involved news leaks, suspected penetra-
tion by hostile intelligence services or simply personal situations mak-
ing employees vulnerable, and thus security risks. The possibility of
such security problems developing within the CIA's own organization
was at least the basic concern expressed when the Director of Central
Intelligence was charged with protection of intelligence sources and
methods.
MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE, however, take the concept of
such protection a step further. They were premised on the assumption
that the responsibility for protecting sources and methods includes the
general mission of safeguarding CIA-its personnel, facilities and
operations-from domestic unrest in the larger society.
Is the protection of the CIA from disruption by domestic violence
part of the intended responsibility to protect sources and methods?
And if it is, how far would that authority extend?
Presumably all government agencies, but particularly those doing
sensitive tasks, may undertake measures at their installations to pre-
vent physical disruption by outsiders, for example by maintaining a
guard force at entrances.
Beyond this, does the "sources and methods" mandate authorize the
CIA to go out into the community and covertly investigate protest
activity in order to detect potential threats, rather than relying on the
FBI and local police for advance warning? Little in the legislative
history suggests such an open-ended reading of that provision. But
even if the mandate is presently so vague that it might be read that
broadly, the programs would be questionable under the prohibition on
CIA exercising law enforcement powers or performing internal secu-
rity functions.
Both programs involved the CIA in examining domestic dissident
activity, which, insofar as it actually threatened the government or
particular agencies was a matter of internal security or law enforce-
mnent.
In RESISTANCE, the collection technique was less intrusive; even
where covert sources supplied information, no CIA personnel became
involved with the domestic groups. Its scope, however, was broad and
the in depth analysis of political organizations and their leaders went
beyond indications of specific threats to the CIA.
MERRIMAC, while more narrowly focused, took the CIA into
actual penetration with the dissident groups. And to the extent the
collection requirement was broadened from warning of imminent at-
tacks on CIA to general information about the groups' finances and
policies, it brought the Office of Security even closer to performing
essentially internal security functions.
In addition, a common theme running through the explanation of
the MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE programs is the claim that
local police and federal law enforcement agencies were unwilling or
unable to provide adequate warning to permit safeguarding CIA
facilities and personnel. 89 If the CIA, therefore, took on what would
normally be responsibilities of law enforcement agencies, did it vio-
late the letter, or the spirit, of the 1947 Act?
The CIA did undertake to supplement the public safety work of law
enforcement agencies, whatever the CIA's parochial purpose for such
activity.
Moreover, the FBI was providing the entire government with both
intelligence about expected demonstrations, and information about
the propensity of particular groups and individuals toward vio-
lence. The FBI did not assess the threat posed to each particular
agency by every group or expected activity. But to let each agency
run its own investigation of how domestic unrest might threaten its
operations would be a dangerous invitation to multiply the oppor-
tunity for excessive surveillance of protest activity.
In any event, the CIA's perception, whether correct or not, that law
enforcement agencies were incapable of providing adequate warning
and countering any threat did not increase the CIA's authority to
take action inconsistent with its own statutory limitations. To what
extent should the CIA be permitted to engage in such activity in
the future?
Director Colby's regulations on MERRIMAC-type activity indi-
cated his view that the CIA should not be involved in any clandestine
operations directed against domestic groups which might threaten
the CIA. If the CIA is forbidden to infiltrate such groups, should it
still be permitted to monitor public rallies and demonstrations, or
should that, too, be reserved to law enforcement authorities? Al-
though such monitoring is less intrusive on the participants' expecta-
tions of privacy, the general purpose of minimizing the CIA's in-
volvement in domestic affairs suggests that the CIA should engage
in no investigations beyond its own premises which are directed at
domestic dissidents.
What, then, could the CIA do, short of such efforts, to help pro-
tect itself from external threats of public disorder? Anticipated
violence would justify analysis of information received from the
FBI or local police with direct responsibility for the jurisdiction
in which CIA facilities are located. Such information and analysis
would permit the CIA to take security precautions, such as notifica-
tions to employees and disposition of its own security forces, without
engaging in covert operations like MERRIMAC or RESISTANCE.
Finally, if the CIA requires some information about dissident
organizations in order to assess the significance of membership in
them for security clearance of CIA applicants, should it rely on the
FBI and the Civil Service Commission for such information? It
might be argued that the CIA would undertae a more sophisticated
analysis, and, in fact, hold mere membership less a disqualification
than might some other government agencies. But that small benefit
must be.weighed against the risk of providing license for a foreign
intelligence agency to scrutinize domestic political activity.
'"Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/12/75, pp. 315--316.
2. Sensitive Security Investigations
The power of the Director of Central Intelligence to take action
to protect intelligence sources and methods in particular security cases
has been viewed differently by recent directors.
Richard Helms testified that, in his view, the CIA could be asked
to take any reasonable investigative steps, with no covert technique
precluded, in order to protect sources and methods.190
While Helms explained that the FBI had been unwilling to under-
take many of the investigations which the CIA performed, he testi-
fied that, independent of the Bureau's availability, he regarded those
investigations as a legitimate exercise of his responsibility as di-
rector to protect intelligence sources and methods.191
Helms did recommend that the charge to protect sources and methods
which he termed an "albatross" around the neck of the Director, be
removed from the statute and given to the FBI, at least with regard
to investigation of any Americans who were not affiliated with the
CIA. 92
William Colby, on the other hand, did not view the statutory
mandate to be accompanied by actual extraordinary investigative
authority:
It gives me the job of identifying any problem of protecting
sources and methods, but in the event I identify one it gives
me the responsibility to go to the appropriate authorities
with that information and it does not give me any authority
to act on my own. So I really see less of a gray area in that
regard. I believe that there is really no authority under that
act that can be used.193
His directives in response to the CIA's review of questionable prac-
tices reflect this position. Thus, the directive addressing past in-
stances of investigating newsmen to determine the source of intelli-
gence leaks stated:
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: [Cases Involving Investigation of Newsmen]
No surveillance, telephone tap, surreptitious entry or other
action will be taken by Agency personnel in the United States
against United States citizens not connected with CIA, under
the claimed authority of "protection of intelligence sources
and methods." This provision of the law lays a charge and
duty on the Director and the Agency to act so as to protect
intelligence sources and methods. It does not give it author-
ity to take action with respect to other American citizens. If
a threat or exposure of intelligence sources and methods oc-
curs, the Agency can appropriately assemble its information
on the topic and conduct such steps within its organization
" Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, pp. 333-334.
" Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 1/20/75, p. 288.
12 Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, pp. 353-354.
" William Colby testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings,
7/2/73, p. 25.
as may be appropriate. With respect to outsiders, the appro-
priate lawful authorities must be approached for assistance
on the matter, e.g., the FBI or local police.194
In addition, Colby's directive concerning the use of covert investi-
gative techniques against the CIA's own employees off the Agency's
own premises stated:
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: [Cases Involving Surveillance of CIA Em-
. ployees and Ex-employees]
No surveillance, telephone tap, or surreptitious entry will
be conducted against employees or ex-employees of the Agency
outside Agency property. In the event that threats to intelli-
gence sources and methods appear from Agency employees
or ex-employees, the appropriate authorities will be advised,
and the Agency will cooperate with the appropriate authori-
ties in the investigation of possible violation of law.
19 5
On its face, the director's statutory charge to protect sources and
methods does not authorize the use of the CIA, as opposed to other
agencies, for active investigation in the United States. The legisla-
tive history is also unclear in this regard.
An additional ambiguity is the tension between this responsibility,
if it is deemed to authorize implementation by the CIA, and the re-
striction upon the CIA's exercising law enforcement or police powers.
Not all of the special security investigations undertaken in the past
involve suspected criminal violations. For example, not all news leaks
may be subject to prosecution. Yet if surveillance reveals the source,
then he would be subject to administrative sanction or loss of clear-
ances. Similarly, when investigations are in response to allegations
that the subject's personal situation makes him a bad security risk,
there may be no suggestion that he is yet involved in any unauthorized
disclosure of information. It is merely a question of whether the sub-
ject should continue to have access to sensitive information or be
given assistance in regard to his problems.
On the other hand, the more intrusive investigation techniques, at
least in recent years, have usually been employed by the CIA only
when there was a significant possibility of illegal activity, at which
point there is a law enforcement aspect to -the investigation.
Moreover, some of -the investigative techniques, such as electronic
surveillance and unauthorized entry, are tools which normally require
warrants as an exercise of the police power. And to the extent their
future use in national security matters is regulated by Congress under
warrant procedures, CIA participation in such activity would present
an even sharper question under the charter prohibition.
Most important, whatever the propriety of these special investiga-
tions has been under the 1947 charter, the ultimate question before the
' Memorandum from William Colby to Deputy Director for Administration,
Attachment "Memorandum: [News Leak Investigations]", 8/29/73.
'Ibid. Attachment "Memorandum: [Investigation of CIA Employees and Ex-
employees]."
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Congress is the degree to which a secret foreign intelligence agency
should conduct clandestine operations in the United States directed
at Americans.
Centralizing these special security investigations (as opposed to
routine background investigations) as much as possible within one
agency under tight controls would not only minimize the potential
opportunities for misuse of the more intrusive techniques. It would
also enable the CIA to reduce its own involvement in any covert ac-
tivity in the United States. The CIA's security role outside of its own
premises would be held to -the minimum, with respect to both the per-
missible subjects of such investigations and the techniques employed.
In the case of investigating newsmen to uncover intelligence leaks,
Helms and Howard Osborn both agreed that the responsibility should
be given to the FBI. Such a restriction on the CIA could be extended
to any American not employed by the Agency. If the subject was
suspected of being involved in efforts to procure improper disclosure
of sources and methods, the same consideration of avoiding CIA in-
volvement with private citizens suggests that the subject be investi-
gated by the FBI.
What should the CIA's role be with respect to its own employees?
The CIA could be permitted to conduct some preliminary investiga-
tions of its own employees outside of CIA premises, including inter-
views and other routine checks, before calling the FBI into every case
in which a question of security risk has arisen. If some physical sur-
veillance is also permitted as part of this preliminary investigation,
it might be limited in duration and, more importantly, careful guide-
lines provided concerning the authority of the CIA to investigate other
persons with whom the CIA employee comes in contact.
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SURVEILLANCE
AFFECTING AMERICANS
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This report describes the Committee's investigation into certain
questionable activities of the National Security Agency (NSA).' The
Committee's primary focus in this phase of its investigation was on
NSA's electronic surveillance practices and capabilities, especially
those involving American citizens, groups, and organizations.
NSA has intercepted and disseminated international communica-
tions of American citizens whose privacy ought to be protected under
our Constitution. For example, from August 1945 to May 1975, NSA
obtained copies of many international telegrams sent to, from, or
through the United States from three telegraph companies. In addi-
tion, from the early 1960s until 1973, NSA targeted the international
communications of certain American citizens by placing their names
on a "watch list." Intercepted messages were disseminated to the FBI,
CIA, Secret Service, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD), and the Department of Defense. In neither program were
warrants obtained.2
With one exception,' NSA contends that its interceptions of Ameri-
cans' private messages were part of monitoring programs already be-
ing conducted against various international communications channels
for "foreign intelligence" purposes. This contention is borne out by
the record. Yet to those Americans who have had their communica-
tions-sent with the expectation that they were private-intentionally
intercepted and disseminated by their Government, the knowledge that
NSA did not monitor specific communications channels solely to ac-
quire their messages is of little comfort.
In general, NSA's surveillance of Americans was in response to
requests from other Government agencies. Internal NSA directives
now forbid the targeting of American citizens' communications. None-
theless, NSA may still acquire communications of American citizens
as part of its foreign intelligence mission, and information derived
from these intercepted messages may.be used to satisfy foreign intel-
ligence requirements.
NSA's current surveillance capabilities and past surveillance prac-
tices were both examined in our investigation. The Committee recog-
' See the Committee's Foreign Intelligence Report for an overview of NSA's
legal authority, organization and functions, and size and capabilities.
2 Since the NSA programs involving American citizens have never been chal-
lenged in court, the necessity of obtaining a warrant has not yet been determined.
Although there have been court cases that involved NSA Intercepts, NSA's ac-
tivities have never been disclosed in open court. See pp. 765-766 of this Report
and the Committee's Report on Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance for a
discussion of warrant requirements for electronic surveillance.
a Between 1970 and 1973, NSA intercepted telephone calls between the United
States and various locations in South America to aid the BNDD (now the Drug
Enforcement Administration) in executing its responsibilitiees. See pp. 752-756.
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nizes that NSA's vast technological capability is a sensitive national
asset which ought to be zealously protected for its value to our common
defense. If not properly controlled, however, this same technological
capability could be turned against the American people, at great cost
to liberty. This concern is compounded by the knowledge that the pro-
portion of telephone calls and telegrams being sent through the air is
still increasing.
In addition to reviewing facts and issues relating to electronic sur-
veillance, the Committee also examined certain questionable activities
of the NSA's Office of Security. See pp. 777-783.
A. NSA's Origins and Off)cial Responsibilitie8
NSA does not have a statutory charter; its operational responsi-
bilities are set forth exclusively in executive directives first issued in
the 1950s. One of the questions which the Senate asked the Commit-
tee to consider was the "need for specific legislative authority to gov-
ern the operations of ... the National Security Agency."'
According to NSA's General Counsel, no existing statutes control,
limit, or define the signals intelligence activities of NSA. Further, the
General Counsel asserts that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to NSA's interception of Americans' international communications for
foreign intelligence purposes.'
1. Origins
NSA was established in 1952 by a Top Secret directive issued by
President Truman.! Under this directive, NSA assumed the respon-
sibilities of the Armed Forces Security Agency, which had been
created after World War II to integrate American cryptologic ef-
forts.' These efforts had expanded rapidly after World War II as a
result of the demonstrated wartime value of breaking enemy codes,
particularly those of the Japanese.
2. Responsibilities
(a) Subject Matter Re8ponsibilities.-The executive branch ex-
pects NSA to collect political, economic, and military information as
part of its "foreign intelligence" mission.! "Foreign intelligence" is
an ambiguous term. Its meaning changes, depending upon the pre-
'Senate Resolution 21, Section 2(8).
* Roy Banner deposition, 2/4/76, pp. 13, 16, 39.
Banner stated that signals intelligence activities are authorized by the Presi-
dent under Article II of the Constitution and "the Fourth Amendment does
not restrict these signals intelligence activities" if the "purpose is solely to
obtain foreign intelligence." (Ibid., p. 39.)
8 Memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to Secretary of State
and Secretary of Defense, "Communications Intelligence Activities," 10/24/52.
' NSA exercises technical control over the three Service Cryptologic Agen-
cies: the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group Command, and Air Force
Security Service. NSA's Director is always a military officer of at least three-star
rank. He reports to the Secretary of Defense, but responds to requests from
other intelligence agencies for intelligence information.
"The purpose [of forming NSA] was to maintain and improve this source
of intelligence which was considered of vital importance to the national se-
curity, to our ability to wage war, and to the conduct of foreign affairs. This
mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence, obtained from foreign elec-
trical communications and also from other foreign signals such as radars."
[Emphasis added.] Lew Allen, Jr. testimony, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 6.
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vailing needs and views of policymakers, and the current world situ-
ation. The internal politics of a nation also play a role in setting re-
quirements for foreign intelligence; the domestic economic situation,
an upcoming political campaign, and internal unrest can all affect
the kind of foreign intelligence that a political leader desires. Thus,
the definition constantly expands and contracts to satisfy the chang-
ing needs of American policymakers for information. This flexibility
was illustrated in the late 1960s, when NSA and other intelligence
agencies were asked to produce "foreign intelligence" on domestic
activists in the wake of major civil disturbances and increasing anti-
war activities.
NSA's authority to collect foreign intelligence is derived from a
Top Secret National Security Council directive which is implemented
by directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence! These
directives give NSA the responsibility for "Signals Intelligence"
(SIGINT) and "Communications Security" (COMSEC). SIGINT
is subdivided into "Communications Intelligence" (COMINT) and
"Electronics Intelligence" (ELINT). COMINT entails the inter-
ception of foreign communications and ELINT involves the inter-
ception of electronic signals from radars, missiles, and the like. The
COMSEC mission includes the protection of .United States Govern-
ment communications by providing the means for enciphering mes-
sages and by establishing procedures for maintaining the security of
equipment used to transmit them.
NSA's interception of communications-the area on which the
Committee focused-arises under the COMINT program. The con-
trolling NSCID defines COMINT in broad terms as ''technical and in-
telligence information derived from foreign communications by other
than the intended recipients." 10 The same NSC directive also states
that COMINT "shall not include (a) any intercept and processing
of unencrypted. written communications, press and propaganda broad-
casts, or censorship." 'I
The specific exclusion of unencrypted written communications from
NSA's mandate would appear to prohibit NSA's interception of
telegrams. NSA contends that this exclusion is and always has been
limited to mail and communications other than those sent electroni-
cally.1 2
9 These are referred to as NSCIDs (National Security Council Intelligence
Directives) and DCIDs (Director of Central Intelligence Directives).
"GThe effect of the "other than intended recipients" language is to make clear
that the communication is intercepted by someone other than a party to the
communication-in this case, the Government.
n The relevant DCID contains the same definition. The exclusion is the same,
except that after "communications" the words "except written plaintext ver-
sions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for sub-
sequent encryption" have been added.
" Banner disposition, 2/4/76, p. 71.
The "written communications exclusion was added in 1958; the CIA's New
York mail opening project had been underway since the early 1950s. See the
Committee's Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening Programs. The exclusion
of "press and propaganda broadcasts" may reflect the fact that CIA had
been granted responsibility for intercepting, analyzing, and disseminating
such foreign press broadcasts under its Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBI-S) program. In support of NSA's contention that "unencrypted written
communications" refers to mail, it might be argued that the exclusion was
designed to ensure that NSA would not engage in mail opening, which was under
the CIA's jurisdiction.
The same NSCID which discusses foreign communications also
states that NSA is to produce intelligence "in accordance with objec-
tives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence with the advice of the United States Intelligence
Board." USIB was composed of representatives from the FBI, CIA,
Treasury Department, Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration, State Department, and Defense Department.1 Since 1966,
NSA annually received general requirements from USIB for the col-
lection of foreign intelligence. These requirements ordinarily identified
broad areas of interest, such as combating international terrorism, and
were supplemented by more specific "amplifying requirements"
periodically submitted to NSA by other USIB members.
(b) Geographic Responsibilitie.-Although none of the applicable
executive directives explicitly prohibit. NSA from intercepting com-
munications which occur wholly within the United States, internal
NSA policy has always prohibited such interceptions. In practice,
NSA limits itself to communications where at least one of the ter-
minals is in a foreign country. This means that when Americans use
a telephone or other communications link between this country and
overseas, their words may be intercepted by NSA.
(c) Jurisdiction with Respect to Nationality.-Although the con-
trolling NSCID contains no limitation relating to the citizenship of
persons whose "foreign communications" may be intercepted, the rele-
vant DCID does exclude messages "exchanged among private orga-
nizations and nationals, acting in a private capacity, of the U.S."
This restriction is designed to prevent NSA from processing com-
muncations between two Americans, regardless of their location.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, NSA did intercept and
disseminate some messages exchanged between two Americans where
one of the terminals was foreign. NSA does not now knowingly process
or disseminate messages where both the sender and recipient are
American citizens, groups, or organizations.
B. Summary of Interception Programs
The Committee's hearings disclosed three NSA interception pro-
grams: the "watch lists" containing names of American citizens;
"Operation SHAMROCK," whereby NSA received copies of millions
of telegrams leaving or transiting the United States: and the moni-
toring of certain telephone links between the United States and South
America at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs. In addition, the Committee's investigation revealed that al-
though NSA no longer includes the names of specific citizens in its
selection criteria, it still intercepts international communications of
Americans as part of its foreign intelligence collection activity. In-
formation derived from such communications is disseminated by
NSA to other intelligence agencies to satisfy foreign intelligence
requirements.
1 USIB was formally abolished by Presidential directive of February 18,
1976. No comparable group was established to replace it, but the directive
authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to create such a body.
1. Watch Lists Containing Names of American8
From the early 1960s until 1973, NSA intercepted and disseminated
international communications of selected American citizens and groups
on the basis of lists of names supplied by other Government agencies.
In 1967, as part of a general concern within the intelligence commu-
nity over civil disturbances and peace demonstrations, NSA responded
to Defense Department requests by expanding its watch list program.
Watch lists came to include the names of individuals, groups, and
organizations involved in domestic antiwar and civil rights activities
in an attempt to discover if there was "foreign influence" on them.1 4
In 1969, NSA formalized the watch list program under the codename
MINARET. The program applied not only to alleged foreign influence
on domestic dissent, but also to American groups and individuals
whose activities "may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert
the national security of the U.S." 6 At the same time, NSA instructed
its personnel to "restrict the knowledge" that NSA was collecting such
information and to keep its name off the disseminated "product." 16
Prior to 1973, NSA generally relied on the agencies requesting infor-
mation to determine the propriety and legality of their actions in sub-
mitting names to NSA.17 NSA's new director, General Lew Allen, Ji.,
indicated some concern about Project MINARET in August 1973,
and suspended the dissemination of messages under the program. In
September 1973, Allen wrote the agencies involved in the watch
lists, requesting a recertification of their requirements, particularly
as to the appropriateness of their requests.
In October 1973, Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen and
Attorney General Elliot Richardson concluded that the watch lists
were of "questionable legality" and so advised NSA.18 In response,
NSA took the position that although specific names had been targeted,
the communications of particular Americans included on the watch
lists had been collected "as an incidental and unintended act in the
conduct of the interception of foreign communications." Allen
concluded:
[NSA's] current practice conforms with your guidance that
"relevant information acquired [by NSA] in the routine pur-
n Although the agencies submitting names to NSA were members of the United
States Intelligence Board, USIB never approved a watch list requirement
on civil disturbances, or discussed the monitoring of American citizens'
communications.
* MINARET Charter, 7/1/69, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 3, pp. 149-150.
"Ibid.
"Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 31-32.
"Letter from Elliot Richardson to Lew Allen, Jr., 10/1/73, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No. 7, pp. 160-161.
Petersen reported to Richardson that he had discovered the watch list pro-
gram ("of which we had no previous knowledge") as a result of inquiries made
to the FBI and other intelligence agencies with respect to possible electronic
surveillance undertaken by such agencies in connection with a criminal prosecu-
tion. In one case in which NSA reported that it had conducted such surveillance,
the Government elected to drop the prosecution. See pp. 757-758, 761. Memoran-
dum from Henry Petersen to Elliot Richardson, 9/4/73.
suit of the collection of foreign intelligence information may
continue to be furnished to appropriate government
agencies. 19
2. Obtaining Copies of Me8sages from International Telegraph
Companies: Operation SHAMROCK
From August 1945 until May 1975, NSA received copies of millions
of international telegrams sent to, from, or transiting the United
States. Codenamed Operation SHAMROCK, this was the largest
governmental interception program affecting Americans, dwarfing
CIA's mail opening program by comparison. Of the messages pro-
vided to NSA by the three major international telegraph companies,
it is estimated that in later years approximately 150,000 per month
were reviewed by NSA analysts.
NSA states that the original purpose of the program was to obtain
the enciphered telegrams of certain foreign targets. Nevertheless,
NSA had access to virtually all the international telegrams of Ameri-
cans carried by RCA Global and ITT World Communications.o Once
obtained, these telegrams were available for analysis and dissemina-
tion according to NSA's selection criteria, which included the watch
lists.
The SHAMROCK program began in August 1945, when represen-
tatives of the Army Signals Security Agency approached the commer-
cial telegraph compaies to seek post-war access to foreign govern-
mental traffic passing over the facilities of the companies. Despite ad-
vice from their attorneys that the contemplated intercept operation
would be illegal in peacetime, the companies agreed to participate,
provided they received the personal assurance of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States that he would protect them from suit, and
that efforts be immediately undertaken to legalize the intercept opera-
tion. Apparently these assurances were forthcoming, because the in-
tercept program began shortly thereafter.2oa
In 1947, representatives of the companies met with Secretary of De-
fense Forrestal to discuss their continued participation in SHAM-
ROCK. Forrestal told them that the program was "in the highest
interests of national security" and urged them to continue.2' The com-
panies were told that President Truman and Attorney General Tom C.
Clark approved and that they would not suffer criminal liability, at
least while the current Administration was in office. Those assurances
were renewed in 1949, when it was again emphasized that future ad-
ministrations could not be bound. There is no evidence that the com-
panies ever sought such assurances again.
" Letter from Lew Allen, Jr. to Elliot Richardson, 10/4/73, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No. 8, pp. 162-163.
* Western Union International provided NSA only with copies of the messages
of the foreign targets, except for messages to one country, where It provided
everything.
"' A letter, dated August 24, 1945, from the Army officer responsible for mak-
ing the arrangements with the companies states that ITT would begin partici-
pation in SHAMROCK the last week in August. Another letter, dated October 9,
1945, from RCA to the Army states that it would begin participation immedi-
ately. See pp. 768-769.
' Testimony of Robert Andrews, Special Assistant to the General Counsel,
Department of Defense, 9/23/75, p. 34.
Throughout the operation NSA never informed the companies that
it was analyzing and disseminating telegrams of Americans. Yet the
companies, who had feared in 1945 that their conduct might be illegal,
apparently never sought assurances that NSA was limiting its use to
the messages of the foreign targets once the intercept program had
begun.
3. Monitoring of South American Links for Drug Traffic Con-
trol Purposes
From 1970 to 1973, at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, NSA monitored selected telephone circuits between
the United States and certain countries in South America to obtain
information relating to drug trafficking.
The BNDD was initially concerned about drug deals that were being
arranged in calls to a South American city from public telephone
booths in New York City. The Bureau determined that it could not
legally tap the public telephones and enlisted NSA's help to monitor
international communications links that carried these telephone calls.
Thus, instead of intercepting calls from a few telephone booths, as
the BNDD would have done with a wiretap, NSA had access to in-
ternational calls placed from, or received in, cities all over the United
States that were switched through New York."
In addition, BNDD submitted the names of 450 Americans to NSA
for a "drug" watch list. This list resulted in the dissemination of about
1,900 reports on drug traffickers to BNDD and CIA.
The CIA began to assist NSA's monitoring effort in late 1972, but
later determined that the program served a law enforcement function
and terminated its participation in February 1973.23 NSA was affected
by the CIA decision, as it had come to view this program as possibly
serving a law enforcement function and thus beyond the scope of its
proper mission. NSA terminated this activity in June 1973, but con-
tinued to monitor some of the same United States-South American
links for foreign intelligence purposes until July 1975.
4. "Incidental" Intercepts of Americans' Communications
Although NSA does not now target communications of American
citizens, groups, or organizations for interception by placing their
names on watch lists, other selection criteria are used which result
in NSA's reviewing many communications to, from, or about an Amer-
ican. The initial interception of a stream of communications is anal-
ogous to a vacuum cleaner: NSA picks up all communications car-
ried over a specific link that it is monitoring. The combination of this
technology and the use of words to select communications of interest
results in NSA analysts reviewing the international messages of Amer-
ican citizens, groups, and organizations for foreign intelligence.
The interception and subsequent processing of communications are
conducted in a manner that minimizes the number of unwanted mes-
" According to the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, calls
from American cities to South America are routinely switched through New
York.
* CIA's participation in this activity violated provisions of its charter, the
National Security Act of 1947, which prohibit the Agency from exercising law
enforcement powers. NSA does not have a charter prohibiting such activity, but
recognizes that it has no law enforcement function.
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sages. Only after an analyst determines that the content of a message
meets a legitimate requirement will it be disseminated to the inter-
ested intelligence agencies. In practically all cases, the name of an
American citizen, group, or organization is deleted by NSA before
a message is disseminated.
Internal NSA guidelines ensure that the decision to disseminate an
intercepted communication is now made on the basis of the impor-
tance of the foreign intelligence it contains, not because a United
States citizen, group, or organization is involved. This procedure is,
of course, subject to change by internal NSA directives.
In short, NSA's pursuit of international communications does re-
sult in the incidental interception and dissemination of communica-
tions which the American sender or receiver expected to be kept pri-
vate. This issue of the latitude NSA should be given in disseminating
incidental intercepts must be dealt with if we are to resolve the di-
lemma between the need for effective foreign intelligence and the need
to protect the rights of American citizens.24
C. 8ue8 and Que8tion8
Pursuant to its mandate, the Committee has studied whether NSA's
jurisdiction and operations should be governed and controlled by a
legislative charter. The facts discovered by the Committee with respect
to NSA's programs and capabilities suggest that the following ques-
tions should be posed for legislative resolution:
1. Should NSA, which like the CIA has vast powers in-
tended for "foreign" purposes, be barred from using those
powers domestically?
2. Should NSA, like the CIA, be prohibited from exercising
"law enforcement powers" or "internal security functions"?
3. Should NSA be permitted specifically to target the inter-
national communications of Americans? If so, for what pur-
poses and should a warrant be required?
4. Should NSA be permitted to disseminate information de-
rived from the "incidental" interception of Americans' mes-
" The establishment of guidelines relating directly to this issue poses an on-
going problem. Some may argue that NSA's current policy to disguise the iden-
tity of an American corporation in a communication is misguided. It could be
held that, in the case of companies, their right to privacy does not extend as far
as with individual citizens. For example, if an intercepted communication indi-
cates that an American company executive is negotiating with a foreign govern-
ment for the sale of large quantities of a crucial material, should the Federal
Government be entitled to know the. identity of the company? If NSA discovered
that an American firm is exporting material to a foreign country that is pro-
hibited by law, should the Government be allowed to know the name of that
company? Or, does NSA violate the Fourth Amendment rights which protect
Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures by disseminating such mes-
sages without deleting the names? Should special procedures be instituted-such
as approval of the Attorney General or acquisition of a warrant-before mes-
sages containing U.S. names can be disseminated?
A discussion of these issues of interception and dissemination occurred in an
open session of the Committee between Attorney General Edward H. Levi and
Professor Philip B. Heymann. Levi supported the dissemination by NSA of inci-
dentally intercepted foreign intelligence information involving Americans with-
out a warrant; Heymann maintained that dissemination should require a war-
rant. See Edward H. Levi and Philip B. Heymann testimonies, 11/6/75, Hearings,
Vol. 5, pp. 66-143.
sages obtained by monitoring an international communica-
tions link for foreign intelligence purposes? If so, to whom,
for what use, and under what controls?
II. NSA'S MONITORING OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
A. Summary of the Watch List Activity
Lists of words and phrases, including the names of individuals and
groups, have long been used by the National Security Agency to select
information of intelligence value from intercepted communications.
These lists are referred to as "watch lists" by NSA and the agencies
requesting intelligence information from them, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs, Secret Service, and Department of De-
fense. The great majority of names on watch lists have always been
foreign citizens and organizations.
The Committee examined two types of watch lists which included
Americans. One focused on domestic civil disturbances, the other on
drug trafficking. Messages selected on the basis of these watch lists
were analyzed and forwarded to other Federal agencies, including the
FBI, CIA, BNDD, and DOD. The Secret Service also received infor-
mation from NSA regarding potential threats to persons under its
protection.
Between 1967 and 1973, NSA received watch lists from these agen-
cies which included the names of Americans as well as foreign citi-
zens and organizations. These lists were used to select messages from
intercepted traffic and to discover whether there was foreign influence
on, or support of, domestic antiwar and civil rights activities. From
1970 until 1973, similar lists were used to gather intelligence on inter-
national drug traffic.
NSA itself added names to the watch lists to enhance the selection
criteria used to support the requirements levied by other agencies.25
NSA's Office of Security also added names to the lists for counterin-
telligence and counterespionage purposes. 26
Between 1969 and 1973, NSA disseminated approximately 2,000 re-
ports (e.g., the text or summaries of intercepted messages) to the vari-
ous requesting agencies as a result of the inclusion of American names
on the watch lists.27 No evidence was found, however, of any significant
foreign support or control of domstic dissidents.
* General Lew Allen, Jr. said this process "was a matter of adding aliases ...
of adding addresses in some cases where an organization had been specified, and
it would assist picking up messages of that organization, the names of officials
of the organizations [were thus] added to enhance the selection process." Allen,
10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 27.
Another NSA official later advised the Committee that names were added by
NSA in its amplification of watch lists and that this "was usually done either by
adding the name of an executive officer of an organization, or by adding the or-
ganization name associated with a person who was placed on the watch list by
another agency." (Letter from NSA to Senate Select Committee, 11/6/75.)
' NSA response to Senate Select Committee interrogatories, 8/22/75, pp. 3-6.
(Cited hereinafter as NSA Response, 8/22/75.) See pp. 781-782.
" The material collected between 1967 and the fall of 1969 was destroyed by
NSA which only retains documents less than five years old. The approximately
2,000 reports are only for the post-1969 period.
Information generated by the watch list activity was the product of
collection conducted against channels of international communications
("links") with at least one terminal in a foreign country. Neverthe-
less, the messages NSA intercepted and disseminated were sometimes
between two American citizens, one in the United States and one
abroad. With one exception, NSA intercepted messages only from
"links" it was already monitoring as part of its foreign intelligence
mission.
This exception occurred in 1970, when the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs asked NSA to provide intelligence on international
drug trafficking. NSA began to monitor certain international commu-
nications links between the United States and South America to
acquire intelligence on drugs entering the United States. The BNDD
also supplied NSA with the names of Americans suspected of drug
trafficking for inclusion on a watch list. Reports on drug-related activ-
ities of American citizens were disseminated to both the BNDD and
CIA.
Both the drug and "nondrug" watch lists of United States citizens
were discontinued in 1973 as a result of questions concerning their le-
gality and propriety, raised by the Justice Department and by NSA
itself.
B. History
1. Early Period: 1960-1967
The exact details of the origin of the watch list activity are unclear.
Testimony from NSA employees indicates that the early 1960s marked
the beginning of watch lists and the inclusion of names of American
citizens. According to a senior NSA official, "the term watch list had
to do with a list of names of people, places or events that a customer
would ask us to have our analysts keep in mind as they scan large
volumes of material." 28
Originally these lists were used for two purposes: (1) monitoring
travel to Cuba and other communist countries; and (2) protecting the
President and other high Government officials. According to NSA,
neither of these tasks involved a regular program for including
American names on the lists: requests from other agencies were
infrequent and generally ad hoo.9 Prior to 1962, NSA did not have an
office specifically in charge of interagency dealings, which also limited
the number of requests for information from other agencies.
In the early 1960s requesting agencies, usually the FBI, submitted
names of United States citizens and business firms having dealings
with Cuba to NSA. In turn, NSA provided the FBI with intelligence
on American commercial and personal communications with Cuba.
A May 18, 1962, internal FBI memorandum from Raymond Wannall,
Chief of the Nationalities Intelliaence Section of the Domestic In-
telligence Division, to Assistant Director William Sullivan reported
on a meeting with NSA officials concerning Cuba. The purpose of the
meeting was to devise a way for the FBI to make better use of NSA
intercepts relating to "commercial and personal communications be-
2 Senior NSA official No. 1 testimony, 9/16/75, p. 47.
'Ibid., pp. 47-49; senior NSA official No. 2 testimony, 9/18/75, p. 13.
tween persons in Cuba and in the United States." 'o The memorandum
stated:
of the raw traffic now available, the material which would be
most helpful to us would conisist of periodic listing of firms in
the U.S. which are doing business with individuals in Cuba
and the Cuban government.... With regard to personal mes-
sages, we feel that those relating to individuals travelling be-
tween Cuba and the. U.S. would be the most significant....
We will furnish NSA a list of persons in whom we have an
inve8tigative or an intelligence interest. [IEmphasis added.]"
The second area of concern in the early 1960s was protection of the
President. According to NSA, the Secret Service submitted the names
of the Presidents and others under its protection, possibly as early as
1962.32 This activity, however, was not instituted for the purpose of
acquiring the communications of the protectees, but to determine pos-
sible threats to their well-being. After President Kennedy was assassi-
nated in November 1963, interest in presidential protection naturally
intensified, and NSA's joint efforts with the Secret Service were ex-
panded.
This early activity was not directed against American citizens; no
intelligence program called for the systematic inclusion of American
citizens on a watch list. The evidence indicates, however, that NSA
did intentionally monitor certain international activities of some
American citizens as early as 1962. These objectives, which began as
legitimate concerns for the life of the President, expanded when the
watch list activity intensified in 1967.
2. Systematic Inclusion of American Names: 1967
The major watch list effort against American citizens began in the
fall of 1967. In response to pressures from the White House, FBI,
and Attorney General, the Department of the Army established a civil
disturbance unit. An area of special interest was possible foreign in-
volvement in American civil rights and antiwar groups. General Wil-
liam Yarborough, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ACSI), directed the operations of this unit."3
MMemorandum from Raymond Wannall to William Sullivan, 5/18/62.
31ibid.
Wannall testified that names were, in fact, sent to NSA by the FBI in the early
1960s. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/3/75, p. 18.
'NSA Response 8/22/75, p. 12.
* William Yarborough testimony, 9/10/75, p. 8.
"Question: Did you ever have the feeling that these instructions were coming
from the President or somebody else in the White House?
"General YARBOROUGH: There was a lot of evidence to indicate that , the
President was deeply interested, as were the Attorney General and the Director
of the FBI. There was a great deal of public interest. In other words, the interest
was not just within the military at all.
"Question: But you don't have any evidence or knowledge of a direct order
from the President to the Secretary of Defense with regard to setting up a civil
disturbance unit within the Department of the Army?
"General YARBOROUGH: I would not have a way to know about that direct
relationship unless I found it out by chance. I did not know.
A complete examination of the U.S. military's participation in collecting in-
telligence on domestic dissidents is contained in the Committee's Report: "Im-
proper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military."
On October 20, 1967, Yarborough sent a message to the Director
of NSA, General Marshall Carter, requesting that NSA provide any
available information concerning possible foreign influence on civil
disturbances in the United States. Yarborough specifically asked
for "any information on a continuing basis" concerning:
A. Indications that foreign governments or individuals or
organizations acting as agents of foreign governments are
controlling or attempting to control or influence the activi-
ties of U.S. "peace" groups and "Black Power" organiza-
tions.
B. Identities of foreign agencies exerting control or influ-
ence on U.S. organizations.
C. Identities of individuals and organizations in U.S. in
contact with agents of foreign governments.
D. Instructions or advice being given to U.S. groups by
agents of foreign governments.34
A senior NSA official knowledgeable in this area testified that such
a request for information on civil disturbances or political activities
was "unprecedented. . . . It is kind of a landmark in my memory;
it stands out as a first." 65 The initial request was also vague; it did
not discuss the targeting of American citizens, or what specific organi-
zations or groups were of interest. The Army was "interested in de-
termining whether or not there is evidence of any foreign action to de-
velop or control these anti-Vietnam and other domestic demonstra-
tions." 36
The following day, Carter sent a cable to Yarborough, Director of
Central Intelligence Richard Helms, and each member of the United
States Intelligence Board, informing them that NSA was "concen-
trating additional and continuing effort to obtain SIGINT" in sup-
port of the Army request.37 Although USIB members were notified of
this new requirement, there is no record of discussion at USIB meet-
ings of the watch list, nor did USIB ever validate a requirement for
monitoring in support of the civil disturbance unit. 8
Watch list names were submitted directly to NSA by the
FBI, Secret Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, the military
services, and the CIA. These same agencies received reports of inter-
cepted communications pertaining to their areas of interest. The State
Department also received some reports on international terrorism and
drug activities, but it is unclear whether they submitted any American
names."9
Between 1967 and 1973, a cumulative total of about 1.200 American
names appeared on the civil disturbance watch list. The FBT sub-
mitted the largest proportion, approximately 950. The Secret Serv-
" Cable from Yarborough to Carter, 10/20/67, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 1,
pp. 145-146.
* Senior official No. 1, 9/16/75, pp. 57. 54.
Cable from Yarborough to Carter, 10/20/67; Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 1,
pp. 145-146.
' Cable from Carter to Yarborough, 10/21/67, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 2,
pp. 147-148.
*Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 28.
* Senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75, p. 76.
ice's list included about 180 American individuals and groups active
in civil rights and antiwar activities. The DIA submitted the names
of 20 American citizens who traveled to North Vietnam, and the CIA
submitted approximately 30 names of alleged American radicals. The
Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the Naval Investigative
Service, and the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence all
submitted a small number of names to NSA. In addition, NSA contrib-
uted about 50-75 names to support the watch list activity.
At its height in early 1973, there were 600 American names and
6,000 foreign names on the watch lists.4o According to NSA, these
lists produced about 2,000 reports that were disseminated to
other agencies between 1967 and 1973. NSA estimates 10 percent of
these reports were derived from communications between two Ameri-
can citizens.41
3. Increasing Security and Concealment of Programs Involving
American Citizens
The watch list activity was always a highly sensitive, compart-
mented operation.42 The secrecy was not due to the nature of the com-
munications intercepted (most were personal and innocuous) but to
the fact that American citizens were involved. NSA requested that
some of the agencies receiving watch list product either destroy the
material or return it within two weeks.43 This procedure was not fol-
lowed with even the most sensitive of NSA's legitimate foreign intelli-
gence product.
When NSA intercepts, analyzes, and disseminates a foreign com-
munication, the regular procedure is for the communication to be
classified, given a serial number, and filed. From 1967-1969, much of
the watch list material was treated in this manner, and given the same
classification as the most sensitive NSA intercepts. As a senior NSA
official testified:
During the 1967-1969 period, communications that had a
U.S. citizen on one end and a foreigner on the other were
given [a high level security classification] . .. and went out
as serialized product, through a limited by name only distri-
bution.44
Other material was even more highly classified. Whenever com-
munications between two Americans were intercepted, they were classi-
fied Top Secret, prepared with no mention of NSA as the source, and
disseminated "For Background Use Only." " No serial number was
assigned to them, and they were not filed with regular communications
Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 12.
a Ibid.
* In an effort to prevent disclosure of the program, NSA "compartmented" the
activity by restricting the number of officials within the agencies who had access
to the material. General Allen stated: "in my judgment the controls which were
placed on the handling of the intelligence were so restrictive that the
value was significantly diminished." Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 13.
* Staff summaries of Michael Mastrovito (Secret Service) interview, 10/17/75;
and of Philip Smith and Gerald Strickler (Drug Enforcement Administration)
interviews, 10/7/75.
" Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, pp. 39-40.
'5 Ibid., p. 40.
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intelligence intercepts. This effectively limited access to the material
and prevented its use in any official study or report. As Benson Buff-
ham, Deputy Director of NSA, testified:
first it is true that we maintain permanent type records of
all of our product. However, it is my understanding that this
material was dealt with separately. It was not serialized and
put out in regular distribution lists. These items were pro-
duced as display items, show-to items and thus the normal
procedures that would be followed for our serialized product
were not followed. So as best as I know, there would not be
any record of this material held in other places within the
Agency in the permanent files. 6
The project's sensitivity was due to a number of factors. The re-
quirements-protection of the President, terrorism, civil disturbances,
drug activities-involved sensitive subjects. NSA also wanted to en-
sure protection of the SIGINT source and of other intercept opera-
tions, which could be jeopardized by unauthorized release of the
watch list material.47 Finally, American citizens, firms, and groups
were involved, and this was "different from the normal mission of
the National Security Agency." 48
The fact that NSA did not serialize and file the intercepted com-
munications between Americans indicates they did not view this ac-
tivity as part of their "normal" mission. Buffham stated that he be-
lieved the interception and dissemination of communications between
American citizens to be outside NSA's mission, as defined in ap-
plicable executive directives."
4. Project MINARET: Further Expansion and Increa8ed
Secrecy
The civil disturbance watch list program became even more com-
partmented in July 1969, when NSA issued a charter to establish
Project MINARET.
MINARET established more stringent controls over the in-
formation collected on American citizens and groups involved in civil
disturbances. To enhance security, MINARET effectively classified
all of this information as Top Secret, "For Background Use Only," and
stipulated that the material was not to be serialized or identified with
the National Security Agency. Prior to 1969, only communications be-
tween two Americans were classified in this manner; with the adop-
tion of MINARET, communications to, from, or mentioning United
States citizens were so classified.
The MINARET charter established tighter security procedures
for intercepted messages which contained:
a. information on foreign governments, organizations, or
individuals who are attempting to influence, coordinate or
control U.S. organizations or individuals who may foment
civil disturbance or otherwise undermine the national secur-
ity of the U.S.;
Benson Buffham testimony, 9/12/75, p. 34.
' Senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75, p. 69.
* Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 38.
Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 73.
749
b. information on U.S. organizations or individuals who
are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances
or otherwise subvert the national security of the U.S. An
equally important aspect of MINARET will be to restrict the
knowledge that such information is being collected and proc-
essed by the National Security Agency. [Emphasis added.] 5o
This charter was prepared within NSA and issued by an
NSA Assistant Director. According to testimony given the Commit-
tee, the charter was discussed with NSA Deputy Director Louis Tor-
della and probably with the Director, but other agencies involved
in the watch list activity were not informed of the new procedures
until the charter had been adopted."
In addition to regulating the distribution and format of watch
list product, MINARET also initiated a more formal procedure for
submission of names. No longer were names accepted over the tele-
phone or by word of mouth.52 According to NSA, the watch list "was
handled less systematically prior to 1969 . . . some watch lists entered
NSA during that time via direct channels, including secure tele-
phone." 53NSA maintains, however, that the regular procedure was
for agencies submitting names by secure telephone or in person to
confirm them with written requests. A senior NSA official testified:
"From 169 on [the watch list] was handled in a very careful, re-
viewed and systematic way." .
The MINARET charter was an effort both to restrict knowledge
of the watch list program and to disguise NSA's participation in it.
NSA maintains that its concern for the security of SIGINT sources,
i.e., NSA's intercept operations, was the primary reason for initiat-
ing these measures.5 5 NSA further maintains that it was concerned
with the privacy of U.S. communications and, by imposing the MIN-
ARET restrictions, sought to ensure that dissemination was made
exclusively to those outside NSA w%'ho had a legitimate need for
the information. It is apparent that the MINARET restric-
tions also protected NSA's role from exposure. Dissemination of
foreign communications to domestic agencies was obviously a sensitive
matter. It involved considerable risk of exposure which would increase
if the number of people within the intelligence community who were
aware of the activity grew. Therefore, NSA placed more restrictive
security controls on MINARET material than it placed on other highly
classified foreign intercepts in order to conceal its involvement in
activities which were beyond its regular mission.
C. Types of Names on Watch Lists
The names of Americans submitted to NSA for the watch lists
ranged from members of radical political groups, to celebrities, to
"MINARET Charter, 7/1/69. Hearings. Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 3, pp. 149-150.
1 1Buffham, 9/12/75, pp. 50, 49; senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75, p. 68.
" Senior NSA official No. 9/16/75, p. 78.
'NSA Response, 8/22/75, p. 12.
In this written response, NSA confirmed reports the Committee had received
from other agencies that prior to 1969 watch list requests were occasionally
communicated to NSA by telephone or in person. See Mastrovito (staff sum-
mary), 10/17/75; Wannall, 10/3/75, p. 32; Smith and Strickler (staff summary),
10/7/75.
"Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 19.
Senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75, p. 69.
ordinary citizens involved in protests against their Government.
Names of organizations were also included; some were communist-
front groups, others were nonviolent and peaceful in nature.
The use of names, particularly those of groups and organizations, to
select international communications results in NSA unnecessarily re-
viewing many messages. There is a multiplier effect: if an
organization is targeted. all i'ts member's communications may be
intercepted; if an individual is on the watch list, all communications
to, from, or mentioning that individual may be intercepted. These com-
munications may also contain the names of other "innocent" parties.
For example, a communication mentioning the wife of a U.S. Senator
was intercepted by NSA, as were communications discussing a peace
concert, a correspondent's report from Southeast Asia to his magazine
in New York, and a pro-Vietnam war activist's invitations to speakers
for a rally. According to testimony before the Committee, the material
that resulted from the watch lists was not very valuable; most com-
munications were of a private and personal nature, or involved rallies
and demonstrations that were public knowledge.-6
D. Overlapping Nature of Intelligence Community Requests
As noted above, the primary purpose of the watch lists on Americans
from 1967-1973 was to collect intelligence on civil disturbances. NSA
also responded to a requirement from BNDD to monitor for illegal
drug trafficking from 1970-1973. In addition, NSA supplied informa-
tion to Federal agencies (FBI, CIA, Secret Service, and Department
of Defense) on possible terrorist activity, and disseminated reports to
the Secret Service which related to the protection of the President. The
demarcations between these categories, however, was not always clear.
Secret Service officials, for example, have told the Committee that
presidential and executive protection includes "providing a secure
environment" for the White House for foreign embassies within the
United States and in areas where high Government officials travel.
According to the Secret Service,, this requires "information regarding
civil disturbances and anti-American or anti-U.S. Government demon-
strations in the U.S. or overseas, as these demonstrations may affect
the Secret Service's mission of protecting U.S. and foreign officials." 7
After the October 20, 1967, Yarborough cable, the Secret Service began
submitting names of individuals and organizations active in the anti-
war and civil rights movements to NSA. Although these individuals
and groups were not considered a direct threat to protectees, it was
believed they might participate in demonstrations against United
States policy which would endanger the physical well-being of Govern-
ment officials.68 Intercepted communications to, from, or mentioning
these individuals and groups were always disseminated by NSA to
the Secret Service and the CIA, and often to the FBI.
" Wannall, 10/3/75, p. 13. He stated: "the feeling is that there was very little
in the way of good product as a result of our having supplied names to NSA."
General Allen, however, told the Committee in public session: "we are aware
that a major terrorist act in the U.S. was prevented. In addition, some large drug
shipments were prevented from entering the U.S. beeause of our efforts on inter-
national narcotics trafficking." Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 12-13.
"NSA response, 8/22/75.
a Secret Service response to Senate Select Committee. 10/12/75.
There was considerable overlap among various agencies in submis-
sions for watch list coverage and requests for material. For example,
the CIA was interested in:
The activities of U.S. individuals involved in either civil
disorders, radical student or youth activitie8, racial militant
activities, radical antiwar activities, draft evasion/de8erter
support activities, or in radical related media activities, where
such individuals have some foreign connection by virtue of:
foreign residence, foreign travel, attendance at international
conferences or meetings and/or involvement or contact with
foreign governments, organizations, political parties or indi-
viduals; or with Communist front organizations. [Emphasis
added.] 59
The FBI was interested in similar kinds of information, as illustrated
by excerpts of two memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Director,
NSA:
This is to advise you that this Bureau has a continuing
interest in receiving intelligence information obtained under
MINARET regarding the targets previously furnished
you. . . . Information derived from this coverage has been
helpful in determining the extent of international coopera-
tion among New Leftists and has been used. for lead
purposes.c0
The purpose of this communication is to advise of general
areas of interest to this Bureau in connection with racial
extremist matters and to request your assistance in such
matters.
There are both white and black racial extremists in the
United States advocating and participating in illegal and
violent activities for the purpose of destroying our present
form of government. Because of this goal, such racial extrem-
ists are natural allies of foreign enemies of the United States.
Both material and propaganda support is being given to
United States racial extremists by foreign elements. The
Bureau is most interested in all information showing ties be-
tween United States racial extremists and such foreign
elements. [Emphasis added.] 61
These requests reflect an underlying similarity of interests among
agencies, despite the differing needs which are expressed in their re-
quirements. To some extent the DIA, FBI, CIA, and the Secret
Service received information on Black activists and groups, and on
the antiwar movement. All were concerned with how civil dis-
turbances and antiwar demonstration were affecting the internal
security of the United States. Although their general area of con-
cern was the same, each agency used the information for its own par-
ticular purposes. The DIA was interested in travel to North Vietnam;
the CIA kept files on alleged antiwar radicals for its Project CHAOS;
NSA Response, 8/22/75, p. 17.
* Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Director. NSA 6/3/70.
'Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Director, NSA, 11/6/70.
the FBI used the information to develop "leads" on new left activists,
at the same time it was conducting COINTELPRO efforts against
alleged radicals; 62 and the Secret Service was concerned with pro-
tecting the President. Despite slight variations in focus, the different
agencies' requests reflected the overriding fear that the nation was
being undermined internally and externally. It was this perception
which produced the watch list program directed against Americans.
F. Drug Watch Lists: United States-South American Intercepts
1. Initial Monitoring: 1970
An unofficial requirement to collect and disseminate international
communications concerning drug trafficking was levied on NSA by
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs on April 10, 1970.
BNDD Director John Ingersoll sent a memorandum to NSA Director
Noel Gayler requesting "any and all COMINT information which re-
flects illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs." NSA initi-
ated its monitoring in June 1970, but a general requirement to ob-
tain foreign intelligence on drug trafficking was not validated by the
United States Intelligence Board until August 1971.
The Ingersoll memorandum specified that BNDD was interested in
individuals and organizations involved in illegal drug activities, in-
formation on production centers, and all violations of United States
laws pertaining to narcotics and dangerous drugs. In order to assist
NSA in fulfilling the requirement, BNDD stated that they would pro-
vide NSA lists of individuals and organizations which had a history of
involvement with illegal drug activities. According to the Ingersoll
memorandum, "this watch list will be updated on a monthly basis and
and additions/deletions will be forwarded to NSA." 63
NSA implemented this request by monitoring international com-
munications traffic. The first intercepts began in June 1970?' Tele-
phone traffic carried on circuits between the United States and certain
South American cities was first monitored in September 1970. Unlike
other watch list monitoring, the United States-South American effort
required NSA to devote additional resources to intercepting communi-
cations over this specifically targeted link.6
This link included the telephone circuits between New York City
and a South American city. BNDD was initially concerned about drug
deals that were being arranged in calls from public telephone booths
62 For a detailed discussion of the Bureau's program against the New Left,
see the Committee's report on COINTELPRO.
' Memorandum from John Ingersoll to Noel Gaylor, 4/10/70, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No. 4, pp. 153, 154.
6 NSA was covering links for international traffic prior to and during
the drug watch list activity. However, the monitoring of certain United States-
South American circuits for telephone traffic was initiated in September solely
to cover drug traffickers. Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, pp. 107, 108.
Although NSA collected intelligence from communications intercepted in other
areas of the world to support the drug watch list, the Committee's investigation
centered on the United States-South American monitoring due to the specific
targeting of American citizens.
I Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 99.
in New York City to South America. According to a senior NSA
official:
BNDD had some information that led them to believe that
arrangements were being made by telephone from New York
City, a Grand Central Station telephone booth, to some indi-
viduals in [a South American city].66
BNDD felt that it could not legally tap the public telephones and
thus enlisted NSA's help to cover the international link that carried
these telephone calls. At BNDD's request, NSA began to intercept
telephone conversations carried over this link in September 1970.
Additional United States-South American links were soon added.
BNDD also supplied NSA with code names for drugs and names of
individuals, including American citizens.
The telephone monitoring was conducted from one NSA site until
December 1970, when that intercept station was closed. An NSA East
Coast facility, operated by the military, began monitoring United
States-South American links in March 1971. According to NSA, 19
United States-South American links were monitored for voice traffic
at the two sites between 1970 and 1973.67 Six South American cities
were of primary interest, in addition to New York and Miami.6 8
During this period, BNDD submitted 450 American names to NSA
for inclusion on the drug watch list. At the high point, in early 1973,
250 Americans were on the active list.
Of the calls intercepted at the East Coast site, less than 10 percent
were sent to NSA headquarters, and less than 10 percent of these were
disseminated." Yet it is clear that many personal and business calls
of Americans were reviewed during this operation. This results from
the lack of an effective method for avoiding the incidental interception
of calls involving American citizens when a link with one terminal in
the United States in monitored.
2. CIA/NSA Drug Activity
In October 1972, NSA requested CIA assistance in monitoring
United States-South American communication links to collect intel-
ligence on illicit drug traffic. According to Buffham, NSA made this
request
because we felt that this was a sensitive matter, and that
greater security would be achieved by utilizing the career
intercept operator8 of the CIA to perform, the activity, and,
Ibid.
a Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 106.
'According to ITT, many of these cities are transit points--calls are routed
through them to other cities. For example, by monitoring one New York-South
American city link, NSA could pick up calls originating in other South American
cities to other cities in the United States. The call would simply be routed
through New York and the South American city. Senior NSA official No. 2,
9/18/75, pp. 108-109.
Most telephone calls from the United States to South America are, in fact,
routed through New York City.
0 Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 113; senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75,
p. 33.
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in addition, they could be more selective in providing items
because we would be able to give the CIA operators the
specific names on the watch list, and we did not feel that we
could or should provide those names to the [East Coast mili-
tary station]. [Emphasis added.] 70
NSA's concern about the security of American names being provided
to the East Coast station stemmed from the fact that the operators
were young military personnel on short tours of duty. They were not
professional intelligence officers, and NSA felt that monitoring Amer-
ican citizens was too sensitive a task for them. The use of CIA career
operators satisfied NSA that targeting of American citizens would
not be disclosed.
The Rockefeller Commission also investigated this activity, but
found no evidence that the CIA directly targeted American citizens.
The Rockefeller Commission report stated:
For a period of approximately six months, commencing
in the fall of 1973 [sic], the Directorate monitored telephone
conversations between the United States and Latin America
in an effort to identify foreign drug traffickers. . . .
A CIA intercept crew stationed at an East Coast site moni-
tored calls to and from certain Latin American telephone
numbers contained on a "watch list" provided by NSA.
While the intercept was focused on foreign nationals, it is
clear that American citizens were parties to many of the
monitored calls. . . .
The Commission's investigation disclosed that, from the
outset of the Agency's involvement in the narcotics control
program, the Director and other CIA officials instructed in-
volved personnel to collect only foreign intelligence and to
make no attempt-either within the United States or abroad-
to gather information on American citizens allegedly traffick-
ing in narcotics. [Emphasis added.] 71
The evidence examined by the Select Committee directly contradicts
this finding. An internal CIA memorandum of November 17, 1972,
to the Director of Communications from the Chief. Special Programs
Division, reveals that the CIA was receiving the names of U.S.
citizens.
NSA had tasked [the East Coast site] with this require-
ment [to monitor for drug traffic] but were unwilling to pro-
vide the site with the specific names and U.S. telephone
numbers of interest on security/sensitivity grounds . . . to
get around the problems mentioned above NSA requested
the Agency undertake intercept of the long lines circuits
of interest. They have provided us with all information
available (including the "sensitive") and the [CIA] facil-
ity is working on the requirement. [Emphasis added.] 72
"Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 20.
7 Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the
United States (Rockefeller Commission Report), June 1975, pp. 222-223.
" Memorandum from Chief, Special Programs Divisions (CIA) to the Director
of Communications, 11/17/72.
This memorandum and subsequent testimony by NSA officials re-
vealed that the CIA was monitoring these circuits to intercept the
calls of American citizens suspected of illegal drug trafficking. During
this period, NSA continued to monitor the same circuits at its East
Coast site, but that site did not have the specific BNDD "sensitive"
watch lists of American names which were supplied to the CIA. Thus,
the conclusion reached by the Rockefeller Commission-that CIA
intercepts were not undertaken for the purpose of gathering intelli-
gence on American citizens-is not supported by the evidence.
3. Termination of Drug Activity
Three months after the CIA monitoring was initiated, CIA Gen-
eral Counsel Lawrence Houston issued an opinion which stated
that the intercepts may violate Section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934.7- This law, as amended in 1968, prohibits the unauthor-
ized disclosure of any private communication of an American citizen
to another party, unless undertaken pursuant to the President's con-
stitutional authority to collect foreign intelligence which is crucial
to the security of the United States.74 Since intercepted messages
were provided to BNDD, Houston concluded that the activity was
for law enforcement purposes, which is also outside the CIA's charter.
As a result of this memorandum, the CIA suspended its collection.
NSA, which has no charter, continued to monitor these links for drug
information.
NSA officials have testified that they were told in early 1973 that
the CIA was terminating collection because it was concerned about
operating an intercept station within the United States. This concern
is completely different from the one expressed in Houston's memoran-
dum. NSA officials have told the Committee that questions concern-
ing the legality of the activity were either not mentioned by
the CIA,75 or else mentioned secondarily.76
NSA Deputy Director Buffham testified that after the CIA decided
to stop the United States-South American drug monitoring, NSA
began to review the legality and appropriateness of its efforts in sup-
port of BNDD. Although NSA is not prohibited by statute or execu-
tive directive from disseminating information that may pertain to
law enforcement, it has always viewed its sole mission as the collection
and dissemination of foreign intelligence. A senior NSA official testi-
* Memorandum from Houston to Acting Chief, Division D, 1/29/73.
"18 U.S.C. 2511 (Omnibus Act, 1968) states: "nothing contained in .*. . Section
605 . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such meas-
ures as he deems necessary to protect the nation against actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence
information deemed essential to the security of the United States. . . ."
However, the Keith case (407 U.S. 297 (1972)) held that the Omnibus Act
was simply a congressional recognition of the President's constitutional powers
to protect the nation's security and did not grant the Executive additional
powers. The Act did not further define the 1934 statute or provide the Executive
with any additional authority to conduct foreign intelligence.
' Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 117.
' Buffham, 9/12/75, pp. 23, 71.
See also former NSA Deputy Director Louis Tordella's testimony of 9/21/75, p.
77: "It was in their General Counsel's opinion beyond CIA's charter to monitor
radio communications on U.S. soil and I was told that if -they could move a
group of Cubans up to Canada it would be quite all right, but they would not
do it in the United States."
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fled: "We do not understand our mission to be one of supporting an
agency with a law enforcement responsibility." '7
Although BNDD clearly was a law enforcement agency, NSA ini-
tially held that the intelligence it was supplying BNDD was a part
of a legitimate USIB-approved effort to prevent drugs from entering
the United States."8 This international aspect of the requirement was
interpreted by NSA as sufficient justification for classifying the activ-
ity as part of its "foreign intelligence" mission.
After discussions with the General Counsel's office at NSA and
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of NSA
terminated the activity in June 1973.71 All of NSA's drug materials-
product, internal memoranda, and administrative documents-were
destroyed in late August or early September 1973. Ordinarily, NSA
keeps material for five years or more. According to a senior NSA
official: "it wasn't thought we would get back into the narcotics
effort anytime soon. There didn't seem to be any point in keeping
them." 80
4. Continuation of NSA's United States-South American
Monitoring
In June 1975 the Committee received information that NSA con-
tinued to monitor United States-South American telephone calls
after the June 1973 termination of the drug watch list activity. NSA
officials confirmed that the same links targeted for the purpose of
curbing illegal drug traffic were monitored by NSA for foreign intel-
ligence after June 1973. Certain of these links were monitored until
July 9, 1975.1
According to NSA, this activity was terminated when "it did not
prove productive." 8 2 While this effort was underway, NSA states that
it did not collect or disseminate any information on narcotics traffic
from the United States-South American links. A senior NSA official
stated: "Nothing ever came. No by-product. The problem was dead." 8 3
5. Current Internal Policy Concerning Telephone Monitoring
No statute or executive directive prohibits NSA's monitoring a tele-
phone circuit with one terminal in the United States. 4 An internal
NSA instruction was issued on August 7, 1975, that requires the per-
sonal approval of the chief of a major element within the Agency
before monitoring of voice communications with a terminal in the
United States is initiated. According to Deputy Director Buffham,
"It is obvious that no such collection will be undertaken unless it is
extremely important and is properly reviewed within the Agency." 4
F. Termination of the Civil Disturbance Watch List Activity
The watch list activity involving civil disturbances was officially
terminated in the fall of 1973. This was due to a combination of fac-
" Senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75, p. 10.
"Senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75, p. 10; Banner, 9/15/75, pp. 49-50.
"Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 14-15.
* Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 91.
s1 Ibid., p. 125.
82 Ibid; Buffham, 9/12/75. p. 26.
* Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, p. 126.
*Ibid., pp. 127-128.
aBuffham, 9/12/75, p. 30.
tors: growing concern within NSA regarding the program's vulner-
ability and propriety; the fact that courts were beginning to require
the Government to reveal electronic surveillance conducted against
particular crijinal defendants; and the questions, raised by the drug
watch list activity, about NSA's authority to engage in monitoring
for law enfor ement purposes. What follows is a description of events
leading to the termination of the watch lists.
The only Supreme Court case addressing the issue of electronic sur-
veillance purportedly undertaken for national security purposes is
United States v. United States District Court, commonly referred to
as the Keith case.a The Supreme Court's decision was handed down
on June 19, 1972, over a year before the watch list activity was
terminated.
The case involved warrantless wiretaps on three U.S. citizens who
were subsequently indicted for conspiracy to destroy Government
property. There was no evidence of foreign participation in the alleged
conspiracy.
After examining logs of the wiretaps in camera, the District Court
judge had held that the surveillance on the defendants was unlawful
and required that the overheard conversations be disclosed. 5b The Su-
preme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling.
While recognizing the President's constitutional duty to "protect
our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by
unlawful means," 85c the Court held that the power inherent in such
a duty does not extend to the authorization of warrantless electronic
surveillance deemed necessary to protect the nation from subversion by
domestic organizations. The Court declared that the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement for electronic surveillance developed in two
1967 cases 86 applied, and that the electronic surveillances employed
in the instant case were found to be unlawful. The Court did not
reach the issue of whether the Executive has the constitutional power
to authorize electronic surveillance without a warrant in cases involv-
ing the activities of foreign powers or agents.
Although the Keith ruling involved wiretaps and did not apply
specifically to NSA, it did have a bearing on NSA's activities. Opera-
tion MINARET did entail warrantless electronic surveillance against
certain domestic organizations. If there was no evidence to show that
these domestic organizations were acting in concert with a foreign
power, the Keith case would seem to cast doubts upon the legality of
intercepting their messages without a warrant.
The watch list activity was never disclosed in a court proceeding;
thus its legality has never been judicially determined. A 1973 criminal
case did result in the Government's disclosure that some of a defend-
ant's communications had been subject to a "foreign intelligence inter-
cept." Some of the defendants in this 1973 case were members of a
group which had been included on an NSA watch list by the Secret
a 407 U.S. 297 (1972).6b 444 F. 2d 651 (1971).
"1 407 U.S. at 310.
0 Katz v. United State8, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
347 (1967). These two decisions deal with wiretaps, not with activities involv-
ing NSA. For further discussion, see the Committee's report on Warrantless
Electronic Surveillance.
Service and FBI in mid-1971, and NSA had distributed some of their
international communications to these agencies. 87 The propriety of
these actions was never considered by the court, because the Govern-
ment moved to dismiss the case rather than reveal the specifies of the
watch list activity.
General Lew Allen, Jr. became the Director of NSA on August 15,
1973. In the course of familiarizing himself with his new responsibili-
ties, he was fully briefed on the watch list activity.
According to Allen, the BNDD watch list activity had been termi-
nated just prior to his arrival at NSA because the Agency feared "that
it might not be possible to make a clear separation between requests for
information submitted by BNDD as it pertained to legitimate foreign
intelligence requirements and the law enforcement responsibility of
BNDD." He also stated that the 'activity in support of the FBI, CIA,
and Secret Service was suspended when NSA "stopped the distribu-
tion of information in the summer [August] of 1973." 88 Deputy Di-
rector Buffham told the Committee this dissemination was termi-
nated due to three concerns: (1) NSA could not be certain as to what
uses were 'being made of the information it was providing other
agencies; (2) it feared that broad judicial discovery procedures might
lead to the disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and methods;
and (3) NSA wanted to be "absolutely certain that we are providing
information only for lawful purposes and in accordance with our for-
eign intelligence charter." 9
During July and August 1973, meetings were held between NSA
and Justice Department representatives. According to NSA, these dis-
cussions influenced the Agency's decision to suspend the dissemina-
tion of watch list material.o As Buffham testified:
I believe although I am not positive, that Dr. Tordella, the
Deputy Director, had discussions with people at Justice re-
garding the legality of our activities, and that these could
have influenced then the determination in NSA to cease the
activities in August, even though we had not yet received any
formal statements from Justice.9 1
At a meeting on August 28, 1973, NSA officials informed Assistant
Attorney General Henry Petersen that communications involving
the defendants in the 1973 criminal case had been intercepted and that
NSA opposed "any disclosure of this technique and program." 92 Peter-
sen apprised Attorney General Richardson of these events in a mem-
orandum of September 4, 1973. On September 7, 1973, Petersen sent
a memorandum to FBI Director Clarence Kelley, requesting to be
advised by September 10 of:
the extent of the FBI's practice of requesting information
intercepted by the NSA concerning domestic organizations
a Memorandum from Henry Petersen to Elliot Richardson, 9/4/73, p. 6.
Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 15.
Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 67.
* Lew Allen, .Tr., testimony, 9/15/75, p. 55.
9 Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 67.
.Petersen to Richardson memorandum, 9/4/73, p. 6.
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or persons for intelligence, prosecutorial, or any other pur-
poses . . . [and] any comments which you may desire to
make concerning the impact of the Keith, case upon such in-
terceptions. . . 93
Kelley responded three days later that the FBI had requested
intelligence from NSA "concerning organizations and individuals who
are known to be involved in illegal and violent activities aimed at the
destruction and overthrow of the United States Government." 94 He
continued that the FBI did not view the materials supplied it by
NSA, or the watch list activity in general, as inconsistent with the
Keith decision: the information "cannot possibly be used for any
prosecutive purpose" and "we do not consider the NSA information
as electronic surveillance information in the sense that was the heart
of the Keith decision." The FBIs position was that the information
supplied by NSA did not result from specific targeting of an indi-
vidual's communications in the same sense as a wiretap; therefore, it
was not "electronic surveillance." Kelley maintained:
We do not believe that the NSA actually participated in any
electronic surveillance, per se of the defendants for any other
agency of the government, since under the procedures used by
that agency they are unaware of the identity of any group or
individual which might be included in the recovery of na-
tional security intelligence information.95 [Emphasis added.]
This position is difficult to defend since intelligence agencies, includ-
ing the FBI, submitted specific American names for watch lists which
resulted in the interception of Americans' international com-
munications.
On September 17, Allen wrote FBI Director Kelley and the heads
of other agencies receiving information from NSA regarding contin-
uation of the watch list activity. Noting that "the need for proper
handling of the list and related information has intensified, along
with ever-increasing pressures for disclosure of sources by the Con-
gress, the courts, and the press," Allen requested, "at the earliest possi-
ble date," that Kelley and the other agency heads "review the current
list your agency has filed with us in order to satisfy yourself regarding
the appropriateness of its contents. . . . 6
After receiving Kelley's September 10 memorandum, Petersen ad-
vised the Attorney General that the current number of individuals
Memorandum from Henry Petersen to Clarence Kelley, 9/7/73, p. 1.
" Memorandum from Clarence Kelley to Henry Petersen, 9/10/73, p. 2.
Kelley is clearly overstating his case when he says Americans are "known" to
be involved in illegal activities. Many of the individuals were protesters speaking
out against the Government's policies, not urging the overthrow of the
Government.
J. Edgar Hoover discusses the necessity of obtaining information "determining
the extent of international cooperation among New Leftists" in a memorandum
to NSA of June 5, 1970, which is much broader than targeting individuals who
are attempting the violent overthrow of the Government.
Kelley memorandum, 9/10/73, pp. 3-5.
* Letter from Lew Allen, Jr. to Clarence Kelley, 9/17/73, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No. 6, pp. 158-159.
and organizations on NSA watch lists submitted by the FBI was "in
excess of 600." 9 Petersen pointed out many legal problems arising
from this program and recommended that
the FBI and Secret Service be immediately advised to cease
and desist requesting NSA to disseminate to them informa-
tion concerning individuals and organizations obtained
through NSA electronic coverage and that NSA should be
informed not to disclose voluntarily such information to
Secret Service or the FBI unless NSA has picked up the
information on its own initiative in pursuit of its foreign
intelligence mission.98
He also recommended that the standards and procedures which ap-
plied to "cases where the FBI seeks to acquire foreign intelligence
or counterespionage information by means of its own listening de-
vices" be extended to apply to the watch list activity.98a These proce-
dures included obtaining prior written approval by the Attorney
General.
On October 1, Richardson sent memoranda to FBI Director Kelley
and the Director of the Secret Service, instructing them to cease re-
questing information obtained by NSA "by means of electronic sur-
veillance." " The Attorney General also requested that his approval
be sought prior to either agency's renewing requests to NSA for
foreign intelligence or counterespionage information.
On the same day, Richardson sent a letter to Allen, stating that he
found the watch list activity to be of questionable legality in view
of the Keith decision, and requesting that NSA "immediately curtail
the further dissemination" of watch list information to the FBI and
Secret Service. Although Richardson specified that NSA was not to
respond to "a request from another agency to monitor in connection
with a matter that can only be considered one of domestic intelligence,"
he stated that "relevant information acquired by you in the routine
pursuit of the collection of foreign intelligence information may con-
tinue to be furnished to appropriate Government agenices." 1oo
Kelley responded to Richardson's memorandum on October 3 and
agreed to comply with the Attorney General's "instructions to dis-
continue requests to NSA for electronic surveillance information and
to obtain approval prior to any future inquires to NSA for such
information." 101 There was apparently some confusion at this point
whether Richardson's instructions meant that NSA was prohibited
from disseminating any information to FBI. After further consulta-
tions. it was determined that the caveats Richardson placed on dis-
semination applied only to information on American citizens and
organizations, and not to foreign intelligence and counterespionage
matters.
Allen replied to Richardson's letter on October 4, stating that he
had "directed that no further information be disseminated to the
98Memorandum from Henry Petersen to Elliot Richarson, 9/21/73, p. 1.
"Petersen to Richardson memorandum, 9/21/73, p. 3.
8a Ibid.
*Memorandum from Elliot Richardson to Clarence Kelley, 10/1/73.
Letter from Elliot Richardson to Lew Allen, Jr., 10/1/73, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No. 7, pp. 160, 161.
"I Memorandum from Clarence Kelley to Elliot Richardson, 10/3/73.
FBI and Secret Service, pending advice on regal issues." 102 Although
Allen had agreed to suspend-dissemination, NSA's position remained
that these communications had always been collected "as an incidental
and unintended act in the conduct of the interception of foreign
communications." Allen thus asserted that NSA's "current practice
conforms with your [Richardson's] guidance that, 'relevant informa-
tion acquired [by NSA] in the routine pursuit of the collection of
foreign intelligence information may continue to be furnished to
appropriate government agencies.' "103
As a result of these and other exchanges between officials at NSA
and Justice, the Agency officially terminated its watch list activity
involving American citizens and organizations in the fall of 1973.
It would no longer accept such names from other agencies for the
purpose of monitoring their international communications.
To a substantial degree, this decision was prompted by the legal
implications of the Keith case and by NSA's fear that criminal prose-
cutions of persons on the watch lists would inevitably lead to dis-
closure of its intelligence sources and methods. Indeed, the 1973
criminal case referred to above posed the threat that the watch list
activity might have to be disclosed for the first time in a public forum.
It is important to note that the decision to terminate the watch list
was ultimately the administrative decision of an executive agency.
There is no statute which expressly forbids such activity, and no
court case where it has been squarely at issue. Without legislative con-
trols, NSA could resume the watch list activity at any time upon
order of the Executive.
G. Authorization
Authorization of the watch list activity must be viewed in the con-
text of how NSA operates. It is a service agency which provides for-
eign intelligence information at the request of consumer agencies.
Specific requirements are levied on USA, although the Agency also
engages in collection activities that are not responsive to specific
tasking. For example, many USIB requirements-such as those aimed
at terrorist activities, gathering economic intelligence, or discover-
ing foreign links to civil disturbances-were so broad that NSA was
given wide discretion for selecting not only the communications chan-
nels to be monitored, but also what information was disseminated.10
While this is often appropriate because only NSA has the knowledge
and expertise to make these decisions, it also allows NSA considerable
flexibility in carrying out its mission.
NSA also responds to specific requests from other Federal agencies.
hideed, it is no exaggeration to state that NSA's operations are under-
taken almost entirely to satisfy the intelligence needs of other agencies.
The watch list activity was no exception.
luLetter from Lew Allen, Jr. to Elliot Richardson, October 4, 1973, Hearings,
Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 8, p. 163.
'" Allen letter, October 4, 1973, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 8, pp. 162, 163.
'o' Wannall (FBI), October 3, 1975, p. 12: "I would say that by far the majority
of the product that I saw would have been information that would have been
disseminated to us by NSA, based upon the knowledge of that Agency of our
responsibilities, as opposed to a specific request for any information that might
come to NSA's attention, that we ourselves initiated."
1. Knowledge and Authorization Outside NSA
In the case of the 1967-1973 watch list activity, NSA clearly re-
ceived instructions from the Army in 1967 to look for possible for-
eign influence on, or control of, American peace and Black power
activists. NSA subsequently received the names of American and
foreign citizens and groups from other intelligence agencies.
This activity was not formally approved by USIB. Although NSA
notified USIB members that it was responding to the Army's re-
quest, the inclusion of American names on an NSA watch list was
never discussed at subsequent USIB meetings. Although there were
official USIB requirements for information concerning international
drug activity, presidential protection, and terrorism, there was no ap-
proval or discussion of targeting American citizens. NSA officials
contend that the submission of American names by USIB members
constituted approval.105
The desire for tight security over the watch list program resulted
in limiting participation to those "with a need to know." Therefore,
it was not in NSAs best interests to have formal USIB approval
of a requirement since knowledge would have been more widely spread.
According to documents supplied to the Committee and testimony
of NSA officials, Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird and James Schles-
inger, as well as Attorneys General John Mitchell and Richard Klein-
dienst, were informed that NSA was monitoring Americans. Former
NSA Director, Admiral Noel Gayler sent a Top Secret "Eyes Only"
memorandum to Laird and Mitchell on January 26, 1971, which out-
lined ground rules for "NSA's Contribution to Domestic Intelli-
gence." In this memorandum, Gayler refers to a discussion he had
earlier that day with -both men on how NSA could assist them with
"intelligence bearing on domestic problems." The memorandum men-
tioned the monitoring for drug trafficking and foreign support of
subversive activities, but did not discuss "watch lists" specifically.108
NSA Deputy Director Buffham supplied the Committee with a
Memorandum for Record which indicated that he had personally
shown the Gayler memorandum to Mitchell and had been told by the
Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Laird that the Secretary
had read and agreed to the memorandum. 1 0 7 In a handwritten note
'o Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 28.
' Memorandum from NSA Director Noel Gayler to the Secretary of Defense
and the Attorney General, "NSA Contribution to Domestic Intelligence,"
1/26/71, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 5, pp. 156-157.
This memorandum responded to the interests of the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee (TEC), a Justice Department working group set up to carry out
domestic intelligence-gathering activities. The IEC was an outgrowth of the
Huston Plan and is detailed in the Committee's report on the Huston Plan.
Suffice it to say that NSA sent a representative to that group and Gayler
was providing them with a statement of NSA's capabilities and procedures
for supplying intelligence.
' Memorandum for the Record, Benson K. Buffham, 2/3/71.
When questioned by the Committee, neither Mitchell. Laird. nor Kleindienst
recalled the watch list activity. Mitchell does not recall NSA's involvement in
monitoring the communications of American citizens or the meeting with
Buffham. He stated, however, that "he may have" had such a meeting, but can-
not recall. John Mitchell testimony, 10/2/75, pp. 47-48.
made available to the Committee, Gayler recalls that he personally
showed the January 26, 1971, memorandum to Kleindienst on July 1,
1972.
Finally, former NSA Deputy Director Tordella testified that he
accompanied General Samuel C. Phillips, Gayler's successor as Direc-
tor of NSA, to brief Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on the watch
list in the summer of 1973.10s
In summary, a number of Federal agencies were aware. of NSA's
watch lists and used them. It is clear that the United States Intel-
ligence Board, which ordinarily set the intelligence requirements to
which NSA responded, never gave its formal approval for the watch
list activity. It also appears that at least two Attorneys General and
two Secretaries of Defense were generally aware that NSA was
monitoring the international communications of American citizens, but
none took measures to halt the practice.
2. Knowledge and Approval Within NSA
There is a discrepancy in the testimony of knowledgeable NSA staff
members and a former NSA Director with regard to his knowledge
of the watch list activity. When asked whether NSA had included
the names of American citizens or organizations on its watch lists,
Admiral Noel Gayler (who was Director of NSA during the height of
the activity) responded:
I don't know that I even .knew that in that specific way. I
knew that communications of one foreign terminal some-
times concerned doings of interest of people, including Amer-
ican citizens, yes. And when I became aware of that, I can't
tell. you, I guess it was a year or so after I got there. 09
Gayler became NSA Director in August 1969. He maintains that
he first became aware of the watch list activity about the time of
the June 1970 Huston plan for domestic surveillance, ten months
after his arrival and eleven months after the MINARET Charter
was issued.
Gayler was one of the original participants in the Huston plan
deliberations and in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (early
1971). Both. of these efforts were designed to use the resources of
NSA and other intelligence agencies to gather information on internal
security. matters. In fact, part of the Huston plan called for the
expansion of the watch list activity. Buffham told the Committee that
if the plan had been implemented he assumed "other intelligence
agencies would then increase the numbers of names on their lists"
and NSA would possibly target specific communications channels to
obtain the international traffic of American citizens."x0 NSA was par-
"0 Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 74.
'x Noel Gayler testimony, 6/19/75, p. 64.
no Buffham, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 45.
In addition, the Huston Plan report sent to the participants was classified
"Top Secret, Handle Via COMINT Channels Only," the classification placed
on NSA intercept information. This. caveat was designed to limit the distri-
bution of the report and prevent disclosure of the illegal activities suggested
by Tom Charles Huston. For a further explanation, see the Committee's re-
port, "National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence: A
Report on the Huston Plan."
69-984 0 - 76 ; 49
ticularly concerned that the executive branch directives would have
had to be changed to permit such an expansion. The alternatives out-
lined in the Huston plan included the recommendation that the con-
troling NSCID and the relevant DCID be changed to allow NSA
to target international communications links carrying the messages
of American citizens.
NSA was already engaged in watch list activity which although
it did not involve targeting of specific communications links, did in-
volve targeting Americans by name. The Huston Plan states:
NSA is currently doing so on a restricted basis, and the
information it has provided has been most helpful. Much
of this information is particularly useful to the White
House .... .ill
As discussed earlier, the July 1, 1969, MINARET charter was
designed to restrict knowledge of the watch list activity. It was re-
leased about a month before Gayler arrived at NSA and, according
to a senior NSA official, Gayler "knew everything that was in it, what
was going on, and endorsed it." 112 Gayler recalls that his first knowl-
edge of the watch list came during the Huston Plan deliberations,
almost a year later. Another senior NSA official testified that Gayler
"review every piece of MINARET product" and maintained that "the
Director kept a close eye on this activity and reviewed the require-
ments." [Emphasis added.] 113 This employee also testified that Gayler
was shown the product of the watch list activity and was kept fully
informed.
H. Conclusion
NSA's monitoring of international communications comprises only
a portion of its total mission, but the examination of this capability
to intrude on the telephone calls and telegrams of Americans repre-
sents a major part of the Committee's work on NSA. The watch list
activities and the sophisticated technological capabilities that they
highlight present some of the most crucial privacy issues facing this
nation. Space age technology has outpaced the law. The secrecy that
has surrounded much of NSA's activities and the lack of Congres-
sional oversight have prevented, in the past, bringing statutes in line
with NSA's capabilities. Neither the courts nor Congress have dealt
with the interception of communications using NSA's highly sensitive
and complex technology.
The analysis presented here of the deliberate targeting of American
citizens and the associated incidental interception of their communica-
tions demonstrates the need for a legislative charter that will define,
limit, and control the signals intelligence activities of the National
Security Agency. This should be accomplished both to preserve and
protect the Government's legitimate foreign intelligence operations,
and to ensure that the constitutional rights of Americans are
safeguarded.
m Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7/7 "Opera-
tional Restraints on Intelligence Collection," p. 1, Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit No.
2, p. 193.
' Senior NSA official No. 2, 9/18/75, pp. 43-44.
' Senior NSA official No. 1, 9/16/75, pp. 63, 62.
The next section describes a recently terminated NSA collection
program which also involved United States citizens-Operation
SHAMROCK. This program did not require any special technology;
international telegrams were simply turned over to NSA at the offices
of three cable companies.
III. A SPECIAL NSA COLLECTION PROGRAM: SHAMROCK
SHAMROCK is the codename for a special program in which NSA
received copies of most international telegrams leaving the United
States between August 1945 and May 1975. Two of the participating
international telegraph companies RCA Global and ITT World
Communications-provided virtually all their international message
traffic to NSA. The third, Western Union International, only pro-
vided copies of certain foreign traffic from 1945 until 1972. SHAM
ROCK was probably the largest governmental interception program
affecting Americans ever undertaken. Although the total number of
telegrams read during its course is not available, NSA estimates that in
the last two or three years of SHAMROCK's existence, about 150,000
telegrams per month were reviewed by NSA analysts."'
Initially, NSA received copies of international telegrams in the
form of microfilm or paper tapes. These were sorted manually to ob-
tain foreign messages. When RCA Global and ITT World Commu-
nications switched to magnetic tapes in the 1960s, NSA made copies
of these tapes and subjected them to an electronic sorting process.
This means that the international telegrams of American citizens on
the "watch lists" could be selected out and disseminated.
A. Legal Restrictions
1. The Fourth Amendent to the Constitution of the United
States
Obtaining the international telegrams of American citizens by NSA
at the offices of the telegraph companies appears to violate the privacy
of these citizens, as protected by the Fourth Amendment. That Amend-
ment guarantees to the people the right to be "secure . . . in their
papers . .. against unreasonable searches and seizures." It also pro-
vides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." In no
case did NSA obtain a search warrant prior to obtaining a telegram.
2. Section 605 of the Communication Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.
605)
As enacted in 1934, eleven years before SHAMROCK began, sec-
tion 605 of the Communications Act provided:
No person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting,
or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign commu-
nication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the exist-
ence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof. . ..
Section 605 was amended in 1968 by the addition of the phrase:
"Except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 18, no person . . ."
n Staff summary of interview with senior NSA official No. 3, 9/17/75, p. 3.
The import of this 1968 addition, however, is not clear, and the Su-
preme Court has yet to rule on the point."'
The relevant provision in chapter 119, section 2511(3), provides that
"nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 . .. shall limit the constitutional power of the Presi-
dent . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States. .. ." 117 Yet the Supreme Court,
in the Keith decision (1972), held that this section "confers no power"
and "merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or
disturb such power as the President may have under the Constitu-
tion." 118
It is thus uncertain what the phrase in the 1968 amendment to
section 6Q5-"except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18" [Emphasis
added.]-means. The Supreme Court has held that the relevant section
of chapter 119 does not authorize any activity. The applicability of
section 605 to the interception of international telegrams for foreign
intelligence purposes is therefore unclear. It would appear that where
such telegrams are intercepted for other than foreign intelligence pur-
poses (e.g., the watch list activity), section 605 would be violated.
3. The Controlling National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective
Since 1958, this executive directive has authorized NSA to conduct
communications intelligence activities.119 These have been defined as
excluding "the intercept and processing of unencrypted written com-
munications." It would appear that if copies of international tele-
grams are "written communications," NSA has exceeded its authority
under the executive's own internal directives.
B. The Comomittee's Investigation
The SHAMROCK operation was alluded to in documents furnished
to the Committee by the Rockefeller Commission in May 1975. They
indicated that CIA had provided "cover" for an NSA operation in
New York where international telegrams had been copied.12 0
In early June 1975, an oral inquiry regarding the operation was
made to NSA officials, but no confirmation of the project was forth-
coming. In July, the Committee sent written interrogatories to NSA,
and was told that this subject was so sensitive that it would be dis-
closed only to Senators Church and Tower. No such briefing was im-
mediately arranged, however.
In July and August, news stories were published which appeared to
reveal small parts of the SHAMROCK operation.1 2 1
The Committee continued to press the matter with NSA, and in
early September the agency gave the Committee its first detailed
nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did rule, in U.S. V.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United
States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974), that section 605 did not render unlawful electronic
surveillance conducted solely for foreign intelligence purposes.
m18 U.S.C. 2511(3).
United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, et al., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See pp. 757, 759-760.
u1 See pp. 737-738.
' Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, interview with
senior CIA officials, 3/11/75, pp. 14-16, in Select Committee files.
' See Frank Van Riper, "Find U.S. Agents Spy on Embassies' Cables," New
York Daily News, 7/22/75; idem., "FCC Terms Cable-Tapping Illegal, Will
Investigate FBI," New York Daily News, 7/23/75; Nicholas Horrock. "National
Security Agency Reported Eavesdropping on Most Private Cables," New York
Times, 8/1/75, p. 1.
information. This briefing was followed by interviews with present
and former NSA employees who had been responsible for the program
and by examinations of documents at NSA and the Department of
Defense. NSA assured the Committee at the time that it had examined
all NSA documents which pertained to SHAMROCK. On Septem-
ber 23, the full Committee was briefed by an NSA official in executive
session. Following this briefing, the Committee interviewed officials in
the telegraph companies which had participated inthe SHAMROCK
program.
On the basis of this investigation, the Committee prepared a report
which it submitted to NSA for review. NSA had no specific comments
regarding the accuracy of the report, but expressed its general objec-
tion to public disclosure of the operation on the grounds that the
report was based on classified information."2
On November 6, 1975, in a public session of the Committee, Chair-
man Frank Church read the report on SHAMROCK into the record.
Due to the refusal of the executive branch of provide witnesses in
public session, no other public record was made."2
At this point, the Committee's active investigation ceased. The Com-
mittee presumed that it had exhausted all sources of information about
SHAMROCK.
On March 25,1976 as the Committee was about to send this report
to press, it was informed by the Department of Defense that NSA had
"discovered" a file containing various documents and memoranda
about SHAMROCK. An NSA official explained that the file had been
held by a lower-level employee at NSA until around March 1, 1976,
when he brought it to -the attention of his superiors. Since this oc-
curred several months after the Committee's public report, and, in the
opinion of NSA, did not substantially alter the Committee's findings,
it was not immediately reported to the Committee.
After examining the documents, the Committee decided that the
final NSA report should incorporate this new information. Although
it does not alter the basic findings reported in November 1975, it does
change some of the details."'
C. The Origins of SHAMROCK
During World War [I, under the wartime.- censorship laws,124 all
international message traffic was made available to military censors.1 2 1
Copies of pertinent foreign traffic were turned over to military intel-
ligence. With the cessation of the War in 1945, this practice was to end.
In August 1945, the Army sought to continue that part of the war-
time arrangement which had allowed military intelligence access to
certain foreign traffic." At that time, most of this traffic was still con-
veyed via the facilities of three carriers.127
On August 18, 1945, two representatives of the Army Signal Se-
curity Agency were sent to New York
to make the necessary contacts with the heads of the Commer-
cial Communications Companies in New York, secure their
'" Letter from NSA to the Select Committee, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 51.
"' Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 57-60.
1'Ibid.
'447 U.S.C. 606.
1s See the testimonies of: Senior NSA official No. 4, 9/23/75, pp. 45-46;
Tordella, 99/21/75, pp. 6-7; senior officer, ITT World Communications, Inc.,
10/15/75, p. 4.
'"Letter from an Army intelligence officer to the Commanding General, Signals
Security Agency, Army Service Forces, "Report on New York Trip," 8/24/45.
12" Staff summary of an interview with Senior NSA official No. 3, 9/17/75, p. 3.
approval of the interception of all Governmental traffic enter-
ing the United States, leaving the United States, or transiting
the United States, and make the necessary arrangements for
this photographic intercept work.128
They first approached an official at ITT, who "very definitely and fi-
nally refused" to agree to any of the Army proposals. The Army rep-
resentatives then approached a vice president of Western Union Tele-
graph Company, who agreed to cooperate unless the Attorney General
of the United States ruled that such intercepts were illegal.1
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Having succeeded with Western Union, the Army representatives
returned to ITT on August 21, 1945, and suggested to an ITT vice
president that "his company would not desire to be the only non-co-
operative company on this project." The vice president decided to re-
consider and broached the matter the same day with the president of
the company. The ITT president agreed to cooperate with the Army,
provided that the Attorney General decided that the program was not
illegal .1 o
These Army representatives also met with the president of RCA on
August 21, 1945. The RCA president indicated his willingness to coop-
erate, but withheld final approval until he, too, had heard from the
Attorney General.' 3'
After their trip, the Army representatives reported to their superiors
that the companies were worried about the illegality of their participa-
tion in the program:
Two very evident fears existed in the minds of the heads of
each of these communications companies. One was the fear of
the illegality of the procedure according to present FCC regu-
lations. In spite of the fact that favorable opinions have been
received from the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
the Judge Advocate General of the Army, it was feared that
these opinions would not hold in civil court and, as a conse-
quence, the companies would not be protected. If a favorable
opinion is handed down by the Attorney General, this fear
will be completely allayed, and cooperation may be expected
for the complete intercept coverage of this material. The sec-
ond fear uppermost in the minds of these executives is the fear
of the AC]A which is the communications union. This union
has reported on many occasions minor infractions of FCC
regulations and it is feared that a major infraction, such as
the proposed intercept coverage, if disclosed by the Union,
might cause severe repercussions.1 3 3
Later memoranda by another Army representative who was present
indicate that the companies had consulted their corporate attorneys
during these three days of discussions, and that their attorneys uni-
formly advised against participation in the proposed intercept pro-
gram.3 4 The company executives were apparently willing to ignore
this advice if they received assurances from the Attorney General that
he would protect them from any consequences.1 3 5









The new documentary evidence made available to the Committee did
not reveal that the Attorney General at that time, Tom C. Clark, ac-
tually made the assurances that the companies desired. It is clear, how-
ever, that the program began shortly after the August meetings: ITT
and Western Union began their participation by September 1,"* and
RCA by October 9, 1945.".w
In a letter from the Army Signals Security Agency to the Army
Chief of Staff on March 19, 1946, the writer indicates that SHAM-
ROCK was well underway, but that concerns about its legality had
not vanished:
It can be stated that both [Western Union and RCA] have
placed themselves in precarious positions since the legality of
such operations has not been established and has necessitated
the utmost secrecy on their part in making these arrange-
ments. Through their efforts, only two or three individuals in
the respective companies are aware of the operation.138
April 26, 1976, while this report was being printed, DOD informed
the Committee that nine additional documents relating to SHAM-
ROCK had been found -in the National Archives. The documents re-
vealed that the Office of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal at-
tempted unsuccessfully in June 1948 to have Congress pass an amend-
ment to relax the disclosure restrictions of Section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. Agencies designated by the President
would have been allowed to obtain the radio and wire communications
of foreign governments. If the amendment had passed, the SHAM-
ROCK program, as it was originally conceived, would have been au-
thorized by law.
The proposed amendment sought to allay concerns of the companies
on the legality of their participation in SHAMROCK. The companies
were demanding assurances in 1947 not only from the Secretary of
Defense and the Attorney General, but also from the President that
their participation was essential to the national interest and that they
would not be subject to prosecution in the Federal Courts. Secretary
Forrestal, who stated he was speaking for the President, gave ITT and
RCA representatives these assurances at a December 16, 1947, meeting
in Washington, D.C.1a9 Forrestal warned, however, that the assurances
he was making could not bind his successors in office.140
Representatives of Western Union were not present at this meeting.
Documents made available to the Committee indicate that the Presi-
dent and Operating Vice President of Western Union were briefed
in January 1948 on the earlier meeting with RCA and ITT.4 4
In early June 1948, the Chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary
'm Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45. The arm-
istice ending hostilities between the United States and Japan was signed in
Japan on September 2, 1945 (September 1 in the United States).
' Letter from a senior official at RCA Global, Inc., to the Army Signal Se-
curity Agency, 10/9/45.
.. Letter from Assistant Chief of Staff, Army Signals Security Agency, to the
Army Chief of Staff, "Letters of Appreciation," 3/19/46. This letter transmitted
letters fof appreciation that were to be forwarded to two of the participating
companies..
Aidrews, 9/23/75, p. 34 (referring to documents in his possession). These
documlents were examined by the Committe-e. Select Committee memorandum,
9/17/75, "Review of Documents at DoD Regarding LPMEIDLEY."
'0 Andrews, 9/23/75, p. 40.
"'Select Committee memorandum, 11/5/75, "Persons at 1947 and 1949 SHAM-
ROCK Meetings" (describing a handwritten note to this effect).
Committees were informed of the Government's need for a relaxation
of Section 605 and of its position with the telegraph companies. The
delicacy of the problem and the top secret nature of the information
were made clear to these two Chairmen. The amendment was considered
in an executive session of the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 16,
1948, and approved. Since support for the bill was not unanimous, how-
ever, the Committee voted to leave it to the Chairman's discretion
whether or not to release the bill to the Senate floor. The representative
of the Secretary of Defense then told the Senate Judiciary Chairman
that "we did not desire an airing of the whole matter on the Floor of
the Senate at this late date in the session." The bill apparently was not
reported out.
A Defense Department official expressed the view that the thought
a great deal had already been accomplished and that the administration
had sufficient ammunition to be able to effect a continuation of the pres-
ent practices with the companies. Apparently no other statutory at-
tempts were made to authorize the companies' participation in
SHAMROCK.
The companies sought renewed assurances from Forrestal's successor,
Louis Johnson, in 1949. Johnson told them that the President and At-
torney General had been consulted and had given their approval.'" To
the knowledge of those interviewed by the Committee, this was the last
instance in which the companies such assurances from the Department
of Defense."
Dr. Louis Tordella, who was NSA Deputy Director from 1958 until
1974 and the NSA official with chief administrative responsibility for
SHAMROCK, testified that to the best of his knowledge, no Presi-
dent since Truman knew of the program. He "was not sure" whether
any Attorney General since Tom Clark had been informed of it, or if
succeeding Secretaries of Defense were aware of it. Tordella stated
he briefed former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger about the SHAM
ROCK operation in the summer of 1973.146
The Army Signals Security Agency controlled the collection pro-
gram until 1949, when the Armed Forces Security Agency was formed.
Responsibility for the program passed from AFSA to the National
Security Agency when it was created in 1952.14
D. The Participation of the Companies
None of the telegraph companies could find any record of an agree-
ment with NSA or its predecessors wherein the companies would pro-
vide copies of telegrams to the Government,1s or which reflected any-
thing about arrangements with NSA. No one interviewed by the Com-
mittee had any recollection or knowledge that the Government had
'" Andrews, 9/23/75, p. 34.
1
4
3 Ibid., p. 40.
'
4 4 Ibid., p. 34.
' Andrews, 9/23/75, p. 40; Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 12.
4 Tordella, 9/21/75, pp. 32-34. Tordella did state that -he thought former NSA
Director Noel Gayler had informed Attorney General John Mitchell about
SHAMROCK in 1970 (Ibid., p. 33) ; Mitchell, however, did not recall being
informed about the operation (Mitchell, 10/2/75, pp. 47-48). Tordella stated that
he was "quite sure" former Secretary of Defense Laird had known of the
SHAMROCK program (Tordella, 9/21/75, pp. 33-34).
o Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 34; senior NSA official No. 4, 9/23/75, p. 47.
1o Staff summaries of interviews with Counsel, RCA Global, Inc., 10/9/75,
p. 3; Counsel, YIT World Communications, Inc., 10/9/75, p. 1; Counsel, Western
Union International, Inc., 10/10/75, p. 1.
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given the companies specific assurances to ensure their cooperation in
1945, 1947, 1949, or at any time thereafter. 4 9
Apparently only a few people in each company-apart from those
who physically turned over the materials-had any knowledge of the
NSA arrangement. 50 These were primarily mid-level executives
charged with the operational aspects of the companies' business. All
assumed that the arrangement was valid when it was made and thus
continued it. No witness from the telegraph companies recalled that
there had ever been a review of the arrangements at the executive
levels of their respective companies.
Furthermore, none of the participating companies was apparently
aware that information other than foreign traffic was extracted from
the messages they were providing.1'5 Yet no official at any of the
three companies could recall his company asking NSA what it was
doing with the information it was furnished and, specifically, whether
NSA was reading the telegrams of the companies' American
customers.'15
Finally, both the telegraph companies and NSA deny that the
companies ever received anything for their cooperation in SHAM
ROCK, whether in the form of compensation or favoritism from the
Government. All claim they were motivated by purqly patriotic
c6nsiderations.1sa
If there were similarities as to their involvement in SHAM
ROCK, the participation of each company varied in practice.
1. RCA Global
According to a memorandum prepared by Army representatives,
RCA (the parent company of RCA Global) agreed in August 1945 to
allow Army personnel, who were to be dressed in civilian clothes, to
photograph foreign traffic passing over its facilities in New York,
Washington, and San Francisco. The memorandum further provided
that "only the desired traffic will be filmed." '_14
*The company official at RCA Global who was charged with imple-
menting the SHAMROCK program testified that several alternatives
were discussed with Army representatives. He stated that the Army
had first proposed tapping into the company's overseas lines, but the
official rejected this idea as unfeasible. The Army representatives then
proposed that company employees sort out pertinent traffic and turn it
over to them; the official rejected this because he did not want com-
pany employees involved. The RCA official finally agreed to provide
paper tapes of all international message traffic. It was understood that
these messages would be sorted manually by persons from the Army
Signals Security Agency on the company's premises, and that only
noTestimonies. of former vice president, RCA Global, 10/9/75, pp. 17-18, and
senior officer, ITT World Communications, Inc., 10/15/75, p.,6; and affidavit of
senior officer, Western Union International, 10/19/75, p. 1.
WO Counsel, RCA Global, 10/9/75, p. 2; counsel, ITT World Communications,
10/9/75, pp. 1-2; and counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 3 (staff
summaries).
m Former vice president, RCA Global, 10/17/75, p. 13; senior officer, ITT
World Communications, 10/15/75, p. 12.
m Senior officer, ITT World Communications, 10/15/75, p. 12. See also testi-
mony of senior officer, RCA Global, Inc., 10/19/75, p. 19. RCA Global and ITT
World Communications were, by the mid-1960s, providing NSA all of their out-
going telegraph traffic on magnetic tapes. .
- Senior officer, RCA Global, 10/19/75, p. 23; senior officer, ITT World Com-
munications, 10/15/75, p. 14; counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75,
p. 2 (staff summary).
'" Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45.
certain foreign traffic would be selected. There was never a written
agreement to this effect, however, according to the former official.'"
In New York, Army representatives were given office space in the
area where the paper tapes of RCA Global's international message
traffic were sorted manually for foreign traffic. Messages of interest
were transmitted over teletype machines located in that office space.
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In Washington and San Francisco, Army agents were permitted
to pick up.copies of foreign messages, which they took to another office
for microfilming."' By 1950, a Recordak (microfilm) machine was
placed in the New York office and was used to film messages of intel-
ligence interest.58
This arrangement continued without substantial disruption until
1963, when RCA Global began to store its message traffic on magnetic
tapes. NSA made arrangements to obtain copies of these tapes from
the RCA Global facilities in New York-they were taken "on loan,"
copied, and returned, the same day if possible. Gradually, magnetic
tapes began to supercede paper tapes and microfilm as a means of
storing messages. By 1966, the New York office was turning over only
magnetic tapes to NSA.159 The offices in Washington and San Fran-
cisco, however, continued to furnish copies of international message
traffic for microfilming by NSA. RCA Global employees in Wash-
ington, D.C. were under the impression they were providing informa-
tion only to the FBI.60
2. ITT World Commuications
In August 1945, ITT agreed to allow the Army access to all incom-
ing, outgoing, and transiting messages passing over the facilities of
its subsidaries involved in international communications. It was agreed
that "all traffic will be recorded on microfilm, that all Governmental
traffic will be recorded on a second microfilm in addition to the original
one, that these films will be developed by the SSA [Signals Security
Agency], and the complete traffic will be returned to ITT." 
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It is not clear whether these arrangements, agreed to at the outset,
were actually implemented in the manner described. The ITT official
with the earliest recollections of the program could recall only that by
the early 1950s, ITT World Communications was providing NSA
representatives with copies of the company's international message
traffic, which NSA then sorted and microfilmed.162
When ITT World Communications began to use paper tapes to
transmit its messages, these were turned over to NSA as well.16 3 It is
not clear whether these tapes were transmitted from the premises of
" Former vice president, RCA Global, 10/17/75, pp. 5-7.
'MIbid., pp. 7-8, 11.
'mTelegram from an AFSA officer to an AFSA officer, "RCA SHAMROCK,"
6/24/51.
a Senior officer, RCA Global, 10/19/75, p. 4.
' Ibid.
'Van Riper, "Find U.S. Agents Spy on Embassies' Cables," New York Daily
New8, 7/22/75.
2" Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45.
Senior officer, ITT World Communications, 10/15/75, pp. 7-8.
m Ibid., p. 8. A senior officer of ITT World Communications stated that he
had no personal knowledge that paper tapes had been turned over to NSA; how-
ever, NSA confirmed that it had received paper tapes from ITT (testimony of
Senior NSA official No. 4, 9/23/75, pp. 49-51). Counsel for ITT World Com-
munications also told the Committee that his investigation had revealed that the
company was providing paper tapes to NSA. (Counsel, ITT World Communica-
tions. 10/9/75, P. 1 (staff summary).)
ITT World Communications to another location (as with RCA
Global) or whether they were simply transported to NSA for sorting.
When ITT World Communications began to use magnetic tapes to
store its incoming and outgoing messages-the best recollection of
this change places it around 1965 ' 6*-the magnetic tapes were turned
over to NSA for duplication. They were returned to the company
on the same day. By 1968, ITT World Communications was turning
over only its magnetic tapes to NSA.16
The Washington and San Francisco offices of ITT World Com-
munications participated in a similar fashion. In Washington, how-
ever, company officials believed that they were providing the telegrams
to the FBI, rather than NSA. 166 It is clear from the information
made available to the Committee that the Washington messages ivere
sent to NSA. 
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3. Westem Union International
* At the August 1945 meeting between Army representatives and the
Western Union Telegraph Company (the parent company of Western
Union International) , the company stated that it
desired that Western Union personnel operate the [micro-
film] camera and do all the actual handling of the messages.
It was agreed that [the Army Signal Security Agency] would
furnish the necessary cameras and film for the complete inter-
cept coverage of Western Union traffic outlets. The film, after
exposure, will be delivered [to the office of a company vice-
president], at which place an officer from the Signal Security
Agency, in civilian clothes, will pick it up.168
The company agreed to implement this arrangement at its New
York, San Francisco, Washington, and San Antonio facilities.8 9
This arrangement was apparently implemented as originally
agreed. In New York, at least, company employees segregated such
messages and processed them through a microfilm machine on the
transmission room floor.7 0 At approximately 4:00 each morning, an
NSA courier would come to the floor to pick up the microfilm cart-
ridge. In San Antonio, an Army signal officer from Ft. Sam Houston
was tasked with picking up the microfilm each day.'7 '
It appears that Western Union turned over to NSA only its tele-
graph traffic to one foreign country. Approached in 1959 by persons
who identified themselves as being from Ft. Holabird, Maryland
(Army intelligence), Western Union agreed to allow them to dupli-
cate the traffic going to a particular country.172 In 1970, the company
also began to provide copies of messages going to a particular city
within that country which were not being duplicated as part of the
previous arrangement. 17 These messages were apparently sorted by
m Senior officer, ITT World Communications, 10/15/75, p. 8.
MLetter from an NSA courier to an NSA official, 1/23/68.
'"Counsel, ITT World Communications, 10/9/75, p. 2 (staff summary).
' Tordella, 9/21/75, pp. 36-37.
* Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45.
*Ibid.
'" Counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 1 (staff summary).
"" Memorandum for Record, Armed Forces Security Agency, "SHAMROCK
Operations," 8/25/50.
1"Counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 2 (staff summary).
NSA personnel in space provided by Western Union at its New
York offices. 74
Western Union International (which was formed in 1963) con-
tinued to microfilm certain foreign traffic for NSA until about 1965,
when a company executive discovered the existence of the microfilm
machine on the transmission room floor. After ascertaining its pur-
pose, he demanded that NSA renew its request to have this informa-
tion in writing. He recalled that instead of submitting such a request,
NSA simply had the machine removed.' 75 This recollection, however,
was not borne out by documents furnished by NSA. The documents
showed that on February 2, 1968, a company vice president (not the
one referred to above) had discovered the existence of NSA's Re-
cordak (microfilm) machine in the Western Union transmission room.
The machine was reported to the company president, who directed
his employees to find out to whom the machine belonged and what
the basis for the arrangement was. The NSA courier, when asked
these questions by a Western Union International official on Febru-
ary 9, 1968, replied that he was from the Department of Defense and
did not know what the basis for the arrangement was or what was
being done with the microfilm being furnished. 7 6 Yet the documents
do not reflect whether the Recordak machine was removed, either in
1965 or in 1968.
It is clear that NSA continued to receive duplicates of all messages to
the foreign country referred to above until 1972; when again as a result
of "discovery" by company officials, this procedure was halted. Al-
though the original request for this intercept procedure had been
made by "Holabird people" (Army intelligence), when the company
attempted to contact someone regarding its termination, it was ulti-
mately referred to NSA. 7 7
Finally, Western Union International, unlike its competitors, never
utilized magnetic tapes to store its message traffic. Accordingly, none
was ever provided NSA.178
In effect, Western Union International's participation in SHAM
ROCK ended by 1972.17
E. NSA's Participation
1. Originw and Early Development
From 1952 (when NSA first inherited the SHAMROCK sources)
until 1963, microfilm and paper tapes originating with the sources
were brought to NSA's headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland several
times a week. 0 As noted above, some of these had undergone initial
screening, either by NSA operatives or company employees. Even
with this preliminary screening, however, the volume of messages
which reached NSA daily was apparently quite large.18'
'17 Ibid.
" Affidavit of senior officer, Western Union International, Inc., 10/16/75, p. 1.
" Letter from an NSA courier to an NSA official, 2/9/68.
1 Counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 2 (staff summary).
" Ibid., p. 3.
Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 53.
Tordella, 10/21/75, p. 17.
mA former NSA official testified that NSA had received "literally miles and
miles and miles of punched tape." 10/23/75, p. 49.
Several witnesses have told the Committee that during this period
the sheer volume of traffic would have likely prohibited the selection
of messages on the basis of content. 82 Messages which were selected
out were passed on to NSA analysts, who screened them further.
2. The Switch to Magnetic Tape
The character of the SHAMROCK operation changed markedly
with the use of magnetic tape. RCA Global was the first company
to begin using such tape in the early 1960s.183 NSA was notified of
the changeover in early 1963 and, by 1964, was able to sort elec-
tronically the information provided by RCA Global against its selec-
tion criteriA. This is significant because it meant that the telegrams
of citizens whose names were on NSA's "watch list" could be selected
for processing by NSA analysts.
From 1964 until 1966, magnetic tapes from RCA Global were
brought to Ft. Meade daily and returned to New York the same day.'8 '
By 1965, ITT World Communications had also begun its changeover to
magnetic tapes and was beginning to provide traffic in this form to
NSA messengers.185
3. CIA Cover Support
To alleviate the administrative burden entailed by these daily round-
trips, NSA in 1966 sought to find a place in New York City where the
tapes could be duplicated.'?" NSA Deputy Director Tordella requested
that the CIA provide "safe" space where this operation could be con-
ducted. The CIA agreed to rent office space in lower Manhattan, under
the guise of a television tape processing company, where the tape dupli-
cation process could be carried out.'8 7 CIA designated this project
"LPMEDLEY."
The cover support began in November 1966 and lasted until August
1973, when CIA terminated its part of the program."8 Tordella was
told that the CIA General Counsel was "concerned about any kind of
operation in which the CIA was engaged in the continental United
States., Regardless of whether CIA was doing anything so small as
renting an office, he said 'get out of it.' " 189 NSA subsequently moved its
duplicating operation to new office space in Manhattan, where it re-
mained until SHAMROCK was terminated in 1975.190
4. Control of the Program
Numerous NSA employees weie aware of SHAMROCK, but re-
sponsibility for its conduct rested only with the Director, Deputy
Director, and one lower-level managerial employee.' 9' Throughout the
program's existence, only two individuals occupied this lower-level
mSee Tordella, 10/21/75, p. 20; testimony of former NSA official, 10/23/75,
pp. 49-50.
m Staff summary of interview with NSA official No. 5, 10/24/75, p. 1.
Ibid.
* Ibid.
' Tordella, 10/21/75, pp. 23-24; Senate Select Committee memorandum, "Re-
view of CIA Documents re LPMEDLEY," 9/17/75.
17Ibid.
m Letter from an NSA courier to an NSA official, 11/27/66.
Tordella, 10/21/75, p. 38.
no Ibid.
"'I1bid, p. 41.-
managerial position: the first between 1952-1970; the other from 1970-
1975.192
The manager was instructed to report directly to the Deputy Direc-
tor of NSA regarding any problems with the companies. As a routine
matter, this individual was in charge of the NSA couriers who traveled
between New York and Ft. Meade; he usually received information
regarding the SHAMROCK operation from these couriers rather
than from the companies. The individual who held this position be-
tween 1952-1970 told the Committee that he met with company officials
on only two occasions during this time, and both meetings were per-
functory.19 3
Both of the NSA employees who acted as liaison with the com-
panies confirmed to the Committee that the companies had never asked
what NSA was extracting from the materials provided, and that NSA
had never volunteered this information. Neither of the lower-level
employees knew what NSA did with the materials; they stated that
the messengers who worked under them also had no knowledge of
what was sorted from the telegrams.9 4 It seems clear, therefore, that
the companies never learned that NSA sorted anything except foreign
traffic from the telegrams that the companies provided. NSA.
Since none of the companies (treating them as separate from their
parent corporations) engage in domestic communications, they could
not have provided NSA with domestic traffic. The Committee has no,
evidence to show that NSA has ever received domestic telegrams from
any source.
5. Consideration of SHAMROCK in Connection with the
Hueton Plan
Former NSA Deputy Director Tordella told the Committee that in
1970, in connection with the Huston plan, 95 the principals involved
in this project-Helms of CIA, Sullivan of the FBI, Bennett of DIA,
and Gayler of NSA-discussed the feasibility of the FBI's taking over
the SHAMROCK program in order to obtain more information on
internal unrest. The FBI did not want the responsibility, according to
Tordella, and NSA did not want to jeopardize its own working rela-
tionship with the companies.196 The idea was therefore dropped.
F. Termination of SHAMROCK
Operation SHAMROCK terminated on May 15, 1975, by order of
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. '9 NSA claims that the pro-
gram was terminated because (1) it was no longer a valuable source of
foreign intelligence, and (2) the risk of its exposure had increased. 98
'" Staff summaries of interviews with NSA official No. 5, 10/24/75, p. 1; and
former NSA employee, 10/24/75, p. 1.
'"Former NSA employee, 10/24/75, pp. 1-2 (staff summary).
1 Ibid. See also NSA official No. 5, 10/24/75, p. 2 (staff summary).
* The formulation and content of the Huston Plan are described in the Com-
mittee's report: "National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of In-
telligence: A Report on the Huston Plan."
m Tordella, 10/21/75, pp. 34-35, 47-49.
m Staff summary of interview with senior NSA officilal No. 3, 9/17/75, p. 1.
The Committee also reviewed a handwritten memorandum from the Director
of NSA, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., dated May 12, 1975, which stated that the Secre-
tary of Defense had decided that SHAMROCK should be terminated, effective
May 15, 1975.
m Senior NSA official No. 3, 9/17/75, p. 3.
IV. NSA PERSONNEL SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS
The Committee investigated the NSA Office of Security to examine
personnel security activities which may have been conducted in an
overzealous and, possibly, unlawful manner. These activities are
not part of NSA's two primary missions-the collection of signals
intelligence and the protection of United States communications. Al-
though this subject area is more narrow than others investigated by
the Committee, there are similiarities involving the protection of both
the rights of citizens and the national security.
A. Background
The NSA Office of Security is responsible for safeguarding the
security -of NSA facilities, operations, and personnel, and for protect-
ing classified materials from unauthorized disclosure. This Office also
administers NSA's security clearance program and investigates sus-
pected breaches of security by NSA employees. The CIA's Office of
Security performs the same functions for that Agency.
Personnel in the NSA Office of Security are quick to point out that
substantial intangible differences exist between the role of the CIA
and NSA Offices of Security. In recent years, the NSA Office has not
enjoyed the same high status within NSA that the CIA Office has had
within its own organization. At least two factors appear to contribute
to this difference. First, the work of an Office of Security investigator
bears no similarity to that performed by the professionals conducting
signals intelligence and communications security activities, which
comprise the heart of NSA. Second, during the 1950s and 1960s, per-
sonnel security programs at NSA suffered some widely publicized
failures, resulting in both prosecutions for espionage and actual de-
fections to the Soviet Union by NSA employees.
These factors have impelled the Office in conflicting directions. On
the one hand, its personnel are not expected, and ordinarily do
not tend, to take actions on their own initiative that would
exceed the normal bounds of keeping the Agency reasonably secure.
On the other hand, failures in personnel security have occasionally
generated intense public pressure (especially from the House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities) to take extraordinary measures to
protect that security.
A fair analysis of the incidents listed below, all of which are of
dubious legality or propriety, requires an awareness of these dynamics.
Like other Government officials, personnel in the Office of Security
must be held responsible for their actions. Yet, like most people in
the United States, they have been greatly sensitized by the Watergate
scandal and the recent congressional investigations of the intelligence
community to the need to protect civil liberties against dangerous en-
croachments in the name of "national security." In this section we
disclose certain aberrations from that sensitivity, in the confidence
that this disclosure will encourage its growth.
B. Questionable Activities
1. NSA Of)ice of Security: Access to Files on American Citizens
From NSA's inception in 1952 until October 1974, a unit of the
Agency outsidethe Office of Security maintained a large number of
files on American citizens. At the time of the destruction of these
records, approximately 75,000 United States citizens were included.
Unlike CIA's Operatons CHAOS, these files were not created for the
purpose of monitoring the activities of Americans, but for carrying
out NSA's legitimate foreign intelligence mission.'"9
Many circumstances could contribute to the creation of such a file,
perhaps the most frequent being the mere mention of an American
citizen's name in a communication intercepted by NSA. The files also
included reports from other intelligence agencies, such as the CIA
and military intelligence units, which mentioned the name of the citi-
zen and were routinely forwarded to NSA. Materials from open
sources, such as newspapers, were also in the files.
Until the files were destroyed, the Office of Security was often sup-
plied with information from them when it was conducting background
investigations on applicants for employment at NSA or when other
persons were being considered for clearances to receive intelligence
gathered by NSA. In effect, this meant that the Office of Security
was a beneficiary of the vast communications intelligence apparatus
of the entire Agency, a resource which is on an entirely different order
of sophistication than the wiretapping capability of any police or
security force in the nation.
(a) CIA Access to NSA Files.-The NSA files contained entries
on many prominent Americans in business, the performing arts, and
politics, including members of Congress. Althouzh the Com-
mittee has no reason to believe that any person at NSA used them
improperly, it has learned that for at least 13 years, one or more em-
ployees of the CIA worked full-time in these files, retrieving informa-
tion for the CIA without any supervision from NSA. One of these
CIA employees recalled, with varying degrees of certainty, checking
in these files for the names of various well-known civil rights, antiwar,
and political leaders.
It is likely, although the Committee is not in a position to so state,
that some of the information obtained from NSA found its way into
Operation CHAOS.2 00
NSA did not develop these files for any sinister reason. They were
useful in many ways to conducting successfully NSA's legitimate
communications intelligence functions. Nevertheless, the fact that CIA
personnel used the files without NSA supervision to gather informa-
tion on American citizens-during a period when the CIA was engaged
in unlawful domestic activities aimed against many of those same
citizens--illustrates the danger of maintaining such files. The massive
centralization of this information creates a temptation to use it for
improper purposes, threatens to "chill" the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights, and is inimical to the privacy of citizens.
. (b) Destruction of Files.-The Committee was informed by NSA
that the files on American citizens were destroyed in 1974. At that
time, a centralized information storage system for foreign names was
set up in the intelligence community. This reorganization provided the
impetus for a re-evaluation of the files on American citizens. and a
consensus was reached that their usefulness did not justify the costs
in time, money, and storage space.
" For a detailed discussion see the Committee's report on Operation CHAOS.
Testimony of a CIA employee, 7/25/75, pp. 17, 25.
2. Failure to Purge "Suitability Files"
Like other Federal agencies, NSA maintains "suitability files" con-
cerning its employees. These files, which are held by the Office of
Civilian Personnel, constitute an interface between that Office and the
Office of Security. The latter provides information to these files and
has access to them. These files contain highly personal information
.which might show the kind of unreliability or vulnerability of an
employee which could lead to compromises of classified information.
According to NSA, the purpose of these files is t6 aid the Agency m
providing counseling and other forms of assistance to individuals with
personal problems, not to threaten or damage such employees. The
Committee has no reason to believe that the information in these files
has been misused. During its investigation, the Committee reviewed
50 of these files, selected on a random basis, with the names of all indi-
viduals deleted.
Since the information stored in these files is so personal, it seems
reasonable to expect that its retention would be kept to the minimum
necessary for the purposes of these files. Unfortunately, this policy
does not seem to have been observed in the past. Much of the informa-
tion is either many years old or simply irrelevant to the suitability of
an individual for employment.
If a systematic effort had been made periodically to review these
files and purge them of inappropriate or dated information, such nota-
tions would probably have been eliminated long ago. The establish-
ment of such a system has now been undertaken by NSA. Although
persons in sensitive positions at agencies such as NSA may be ex-
pected to sacrifice some degree of privacy to the need to protect na-
tional security, that sacrifice must be kept within reasonable bounds.
A related question is the access of employees to their own files. NSA
regulations provide: "In no instance will employees be given access to
their own Suitability File." 201 Nevertheless, with the recent imple-
mentation of the Privacy Act, employees may ask for, and be granted,
access to their files. Since the Committee found that these files some-
times contain unsolicited and unsubstantiated statements from neigh-
bors. spou'es. and others, the Privacy Act should result in much of
this information being purged.
3. Files on Nonaffliates of NSA Who Publish Writings Con-
cerning the Agency
The Office of Security maintained files on two individuals who have
published materials describing the work of the National Security
Agency. In one case, the relevant writine-s were published in the late
1960s; in the other case, much more recently.
By the time of the second case, NSA had gained some experience in
dealing with publicity. The file on this person consisted mainly of
checks with other Federal agencies to determine what information
they possessed concerning the author, and the results of various in-
ternal NSA inquiries as to where the author mipht have obtained
information. Nevertheless, the Office of Security did submit the au-
thor's name for inclusion on the NSA watch list. There is no evidence
that this submission resulted in the dissemination of any international
messages sent or received by the author.
mNSA Personnel Management Manual (NSAPMM), Section 2-7(c) (2).
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In the earlier case, the Agency appears to have overreacted. NSA
had learned of the author's forthcoming publication and spent in-
numerable hours attempting to find a strategy to prevent its release,
or at least lessen its impact. These discussions extended to the highest
levels of the Agency, including the Director, and resulted in the mat-
ter being brought to the attention of the United States Intelligence
Board.
In the course of these discussions, possible measures to be taken
against the author'were considered with varying degrees of serious-
ness. The Director suggested planting disparaging reviews of the
author's work in the press, and such a review was actually drafted.
Also discussed were: purchasing the copyright of the writing; hiring
the author into the Government so that certain criminal statutes would
apply if the work were published; undertaking "clandestine service
applications" against the author, which apparently meant anything
from physical surveillance to surreptitious entry; and more explicit
consideration of conducting a surreptitious entry at the home of the
author. To the credit of those involved, none of these measures were
carried out.
Other steps, however, were taken. The author's name was placed
on ,the NSA watch list and various approaches were made to his
publisher. The publisher submitted a manuscript of the work to the
Department of Defense, apparently without the author's permission.
Despite requests from NSA to halt publication or to make extensive
deletions, publication took place with only minor changes, to which
the author had agreed.
The most remarkable aspect of this entire episode is that the con-
clusion reached as a result of NSA's review of this manuscript was
that it had been written almost entirely on the basis of materials
already in the public domain. It is therefore accurate to describe the
measures considered by NSA and USIB as an "overreaction."
4. Other File8 Maintained by the Offece of Security
Although the Office of Security does not maintain files today on
persons not affiliated with the Agency, it has done so in the past.
The Agency describes these files in the following terms:
The maintenance of these files began in the late 1950s.
In early 1974, approximately 2800 files concerning nonaffili-
ated organizations and personnel were destroyed in accord-
ance with DOD Directive 5200.27. The files consisted of
reports from the FBI and other intelligence, security and
federal agencies as well as state and municipal agencies who
maintained such records. Information was also obtained from
the congressional records of the House Committee on Tn-
American Activities, and open source, commercial publica-
tins. These files were retained primarily as a reference source
for security education purposes, as an aid to our personnel
security process and to provide assessment regarding the
vulnerability of this Agency to foreign intelligence activities
and extremists activities which posed a threat to the NSA
mission, functions and property.
Of the 2800 files which were accumulated, the great major-
ity concerned foreign controlled and subversive organiza-
tions cited by the Attorney General of the United States.
These organizations were those advocating the overthrow of
the U.S. Government, and the violent disruption of the
orderly process of government, etc. The small percentage of
files maintained on individuals concerned suspected espionage
agents, extremists, anarchists, etc. These persons were both
U.S. and foreign citizens.202
DOD Directive 5200.27 was first issued in March 1971, and it greatly
restricted the discretion of Department of Defense units to retain
such files. The Directive stated, however, that it was "not applicable
to the acquisition of foreign intelligence information or to activities
involved in ensuring communications security." 203 NSA's General
Counsel interpreted this language as exempting NSA from the cov-
erage of the Directive, and was supported in this opinion by a Deputy
General Counsel in the Department of Defense.204 Only in 1973 was
NSA informed by the Defense Investigative Review Council
(DIRC) that some of its activities were subject to the Directive. Once
this was established, NSA took steps to comply, which included de-
struction of of the 2800 files.205
In April 1975, the DIRC conducted an unannounced inspection of
the NSA Office of Security to ascertain its compliance with DOD
Directive 5200.27. Although substantial compliance was found, the
DIRC did note that the Office still maintained three files with some
questionable entries. These files concerned "threats" to NSA functions
and property; characterizations of organizations; and unsolicited in-
quiries and "cranks." 206 Since the time of the DIRC report, NSA has
drastically reduced the amount of materials in these files.
The Committee did obtain from NSA copies of the files as they
existed at the time of the DIRC inspection. As the DIRC report noted,
the first two of these files contained some questionable entries. At the
time of the inspection, the "threat" file still contained extensive in-
formation on a peaceful demonstration of less than 40 persons near
NSA headquarters in 1974. Similarly, the "characterizations" file re-
flects the fact that in the past the Office of Security would prepare a
characterization of almost any organization that an NSA employee
wanted information about before joining it or otherwise becoming in-
volved. The characterizations were prepared largely on the basis of
NSA's own files and from information supplied by other agencies.
It appears that DOD Directive 5200.27 and its enforcement through
the DIRC mechanism are functioning effectively at this time to pre-
vent the excessive accumulation of files on American citizens.
5. Offce of Security Participation in Watch List Activity.
Inhis testimony before the Committee, NSA Director, General Lew
Allen, Jr., detailed the efforts made by the Agency to intercept com-
munications to and from certain American citizens from the late 1960s
until 1973.207 Not all of the names "watch listed" under this program
NSA Response, 8/25/75, p. 4.
lDO) Directive 5200.27, 3/1/71, section II.B. See the Committee's report:
"Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military," for a detailed dis-
cussion of this directive.
0 Ibid.
2 NSA Response, 8/25/75, p. 1.
2 Ibid., Tab 3, p. 6.
2"Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 1-46.
were submitted to NSA from the outside. The Office of Security also
submitted approximately 13 names for monitoring.
Of these names, 11 had some present or past affiliation with NSA.
Each of these 11 individuals had either defected to the Soviet Union,
been convicted of espionage, were suspected of some other connection
to an unfriendly power, or had made threats against NSA or its Di-
reotor. Two of the names were of American citizens not affiliated with
NSA. As described earlier, these two persons had published writings
in this country about the Agency's activities, causing the Office of
Security concern about the possible compromise of classified
information.
The Government does have a continuing legitimate interest in the
communications of defectors and suspected enemy agents, and should
be permitted to intercept such communications if the proper proce-
dures (e.g., a warrant or approval of the Attorney General) are es-
tablished. The danger in allowing the Office of Security to place names
on a watch list is that the decision as to whether the activities of a par-
ticular individual are sufficiently suspicious to justify intrusion into
the privacy of his communications is left in the hands of an interested
party: the Office of Security itself. The inclusion of the names of two
persons not affiliated with the Agency-neither of whom was seriously
suspected of any intent to aid a foreign power and each of whom was
directly exercising First Amendment freedoms-illustrates the tend-
ency of limited infringements of privacy to be extended to an ever-
widening scope. Only the involvement of a neutral third party can
help safeguard against such extensions.
6. Conventional Electronic Surveillance and Surreptitious
Entries
For many years, the Office of Security has scrupulously avoided
the use of conventional electronic surveillance off NSA premises. It
has neither tapped any telephones nor engaged in any bugging of
rooms outside the Agency since 1958.
In the late 1950s, four instances of electronic surveillance without
a court order did take place. Three of these incidents transpired at the
residences of present or former NSA employees. The fourth occurred
in a New York City hotel room occupied by one of those same persons.
The subjects of surveillance ranged from persons convicted of espio-
nage activities to persons friendly with diplomatic personnel of un-
friendly foreign powers and/or homosexuals. The duration of the
coverage varied from a few days to three months.
The technology of the bugging devices used -by the Office of Se-
curity in the late 1950s was such that they could only be installed by
trespassory means. Each of the above instances thus involved a sur-
reptitious entry at the place being bugged. Moreover, the devices were
battery operated; in the case of a surveillance lasting three months,
periodic re-entries were necessary to charge the batteries powering the
device.20s
In addition, the Office of Security conducted four surreptitious en-
tries in the early 1960s which were unrelated to electronic surveillance
and which did not involve warrants. The entries involved two defec-
tors to the Soviet Union (Martin and Mitchell), an employee suspected
s Staff summary of an interview with NSA Office of Security official, 8/8/75.
of taking classified documents out of NSA, and an employee who had
contact with an embassy of an unfriendly foreign power.
With the passage of many years since these relatively isolated mci-
dents, it is difficult to ascertain the levels at which they were approved.
Both past and present Directors of Security at NSA have stated that
they would not have taken place without the approval of the person
holding that position, and that at the time of these incidents the Di-
rector of Security enjoyed such a close working relationship with the
Director of NSA that the surveillance would not likely have occurred
without the Director's knowledge. 2 09
7. "External Collection Program"
In 1963, after a review of the Office of Security's counterintelligence
program by the Office and the Director of NSA, several steps were
taken to strengthen the program. Among these was the establishment
in October 1963 of an "External Collection Program." 210 It appears
that this "program" was, from its beginning, highly informal. Office
of Security personnel had only vague and conflicting recollections as
to what it had consisted of or how long it had lasted.
Most did recall that the program included brief periodic visits to
bars, restaurants, and other establishments in the vicinity of NSA
headquarters by Office of Security personnel. These visits were made
to determine where NSA employees gathered after hours, whether
they discussed classified information, and whether agents of hostile in-
telligence services also frequented these locations. The program also
involved an effort to encourage persons working in these establish-
ments to report any suspicious incident to NSA and to make the local
police aware of the sensitivity of NSA's mission.
Since the revelant documents were destroyed in 1973, the Committee
has been unable to establish whether the External Collection Program
was used to gather information on persons other than NSA employees
and foreign agents. The Office of Security, in fact, soon discovered that
it lacked the personnel to carry on such a program, and it died quietly
"in approximately 1966-1967." 211
2o' Staff summary of an interview with NSA Office of Security official, 8/22/75.
no NSA response of 9/30/75 to Senate Select Committee letter of 9/3/75.
Ibid.
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IMPROPER SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE CITIZENS
BY THE MILITARY
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Department of Defense maintains agents and investigators
abroad and within the United States to gather foreign intelligence and
to perform a variety of investigative tasks.' This report describes how
these agents and investigators have been used in the past to gather
information on the political beliefs and activities of "private citi-
zens" 2 in violation of their rights or in violation of the legal and tra-
ditional restraints which separate the military and civilian realms. It
does not cover the monitoring of international communications by the
National Security Agency.3
A. Traditional and Legal Re8traint8
The authors of the American Constitution sought to establish and
preserve a clear separation of the military. from the civilian realms.
An express provision of this effect was suggested by one of the dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention,' but it was not included in the
final version since the Founders considered separation assured by other
provisions, such as those which made the Armed Forces subordinate to
a popularly-elected President,' and left it to a popularly-elected legis-
lature to "raise and support" them.6 As James Madison later wrote:
"The Union itself, which [the proposed Constitution] cements and
secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which
could be dangerous." 7
'Within the United States, the Select Committee estimates that there are
approximately 5000 DOD personnel involved in the conduct of security clearance,
criminal, and counterintelligence investigations. For a discussion of the organi-
zation and activities of DOD foreign intelligence and investigative elements, see
the Select Committee's Foreign and Military Intelligence Report, Department of
Defense, pp. 355-359.
2 The term "private citizen," as used in this report, refers to persons and groups
of persons, who are neither military nor civilian employees of the Department of
Defense, nor employees of civilian contractors of the Department of Defense.
How the constitutional rights of this special group of citizens are infringed by
the intelligence activities of the Department is, however, a matter deserving of
congressional attention and the Select Committee, by this omission, does not in-
tend to discourage such an inquiry in the future.
a The use of military personnel to monitor international communications to
obtain information on civilians and civilian organizations is discussed in the
Select Committee's Report on National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting
Americans.
4 Recommendation of Charles Pickney, submitted August 20, 1787, printed in
The Record8 of the Federal Cowoention of 1787, ed. by Max Farrand (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 340.
'Article II, Section 2, Constitution of the United States.
' Article I, Section (12), Constitution of the United States.
' James Madison, No. 41, Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books, 1961),
p. 25&
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The Bill of Rights to the Constitution, adopted in 1791, established
additional restraints applicable to all government authority, including
the military, by forbidding any exercise of governmental power which
infringes upon certain rights of the people,8 among them, the right to
privacy and the rights to freedom of speech, of the press, of religion,
of association, and the right to petition the government.9
Despite the separation of the military and civilian realms secured
by the Constitution and the guarantee of personal liberties found in
the Bill of Rights, Congress has enacted no statute which expressly
provides how the military may be used in the civilian community,
or more specifically, whether it is prohibited from investigating pri-
vate citizens and private organizations. Congress did enact the Posse
Comitatus Act in 1878 10 which forbade using the Army to "execute the
law," but this was done to prevent federal marshals from commandeer-
ing military troops to help enforce the law, and not to prohibit investi-
gations of civilians by the military." Apart from the Posse Comitatus
Act, only the Privacy Act of 1974 12 appears to serve as a restraint upon
military investigators, but even the impact of this statute is uncertain."
It prohibits all federal agencies, including the military, from main-
taining records which reflect "how any individual exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment." ' 4 While the Act does not pro-
hibit investigations per se, its proscription against maintaining rec-
ords may, as a practical matter, inhibit them.
This report describes certain past investigative activities of the
military which may have exceeded these limitations. It also identifies
instances in which military investigators may have violated specific
statutes because of the tactics employed in investigations of civilians.
It does not attempt to evaluate the foreign intelligence and other in-
vestigative activities of the Department of Defense in terms of their
efficiency or usefulness.
B. Summary of Improper Surveillance Activities
After conducting an investigation of both the foreign and domestic
intelligence and investigative activities, of the Department of Defense,
the Committee identified four types of surveillance, or investigative
activity, which have involved the collection of information on the ac-
tivities of private citizens and private organizations and which may
have violated the traditional and legal restraints mentioned above:
(1) the collection of information on the political activities of private
citizens and private organizations in the late 1960s; (2) monitoring
of domestic radio transmissions; (3) investigations of private organi-
zations which the military considered "threats"; and (4) assistance to
other agencies engaged in surveillance of civilian political activities.
In each case, the Committee attempted to focus uponthose activities
which are improper in themselves, and those which are improper be-
cause it is the military which is engaging in them.
* Amendments I-X, Constitution of 'the United States.
* Amendment I, Constitution of the United States.
1018 U.S.C. 1385.
nFor a brief history of the Posse Comitatus Act, see Edward S. Corwin, The
President: Ofloe and Powers 1787-1957 (New York: New York University Press,
1957), pp. 130-138. See also the discussion at pp. 822-823.
Pub. L. 93-579.
"The application of the Privacy Act of 1974 Is discussed in detail at pp. 833-
834.
u5 U.S.C. 552a (e) (7).
1. Collecting Information about the Political Activities of Private
Citizens and Private Organizations in the Late 1960.-The President
is authorized by statute to use the militia (the National Guard), the
Armed Forces, or both, to "suppress" domestic violence. 1 Prior to
the 1960s, the President's exercise of this authority had been relatively
infrequent.
In the early 1960s, however, the Army and National Guard were
called upon with increasing frequency to control civil rights demon-
strations, prompting the Army to prepare for possible future
disturbances and to begin systematic collection of information con-
cerning civilians and organizations who might be involved.
Initially the Army relied, for the most part, on obtaining informa-
tion from local police authorities, the FBI, and the news media,
rather than assigning its own personnel to investigate. However, as
the frequency and severity of urban riots and antiwar demonstrations
grew in the late 1960s, the Justice Department and the White House
pressed the Army to obtain information on individuals and groups,
and the Army's response was to direct its investigators to report on
civilian political activities throughout the country.
Elaborate collection plans were issued, calling for the collection
of information on the most trivial of political dissent within the
United States. 1 As part of this collection program, massive
operations were undertaken by Army intelligence agents to penetrate
major protest demonstrations. In addition, political dissent was
routinely investigated and reported on in virtually every city within
the United States. These reports were circulated, moreover, to law
enforcement agencies at all levels of Government, and to other agencies
with internal security responsibility. In all, an estimated 100,000
individuals were the subjects of Army surveillance. The number of
organizations which were the subjects of an Army file was similarly
large, encompassing "virtually every group engaged in dissent in
the United States." 17
Techniques employed to carry out this surveillance included the
covert infiltration of private organizations by military agents at
demonstrations and meetings; Army agents posing as newsmen;
covert photography; and use of civilian informants.
. The Department of Defense ended the nationwide collection pro-
gram as a matter of policy in 1971, after the program had been
exposed in the press, and on the eve of a congressional investigation.
2. Monitoring Private Radio Transmissions in the United States.-
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1.934 prohibits anyone from
intercepting and publishing the content of a private radio trans-
mission. Despite this statutory prohibition the Army Security
Agency, primarily a foreign intelligence-gathering agency, moni-
10 U.S.C. 331-384.
'o One of these plans called for "the identification of all personalities involved.
or expected to become involved, in protest activities." It furthermore tasked
military investigators to provide "details concerning the transportation arrange-
ments" of such individuals as well as "details concerning (their) housing
facilities." United States Army Intelligence Command Collection Plan, April
23, 1969.
" Testimony of Ralnh Stein. formar Army intelligenee analyst. Senate .Tudiciary
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights Hearings, "Federal Data Banks, Com-
puters, and the Bill of Rights," p. 264. See footnote 21, p. 792.
tored and recorded domestic radio transmissions of U.S. citizens on
six occasions in the late 1960s.
Some of the radio monitoring was done during demonstrations or
urban riots where Army troops had been committed. On occasion,
it was undertaken in advance of, or in the absence of, any troop
commitment.
After its radio monitoring activity had begun, the Army sought
approval from the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC,
after receiving an opinion from the Attorney General, advised the
Army that such monitoring was illegal. Nevertheless, the Army con-
tinued its domestic radio monitoring without informing the FCC until
1970, when the Department of Defense ordered the Army to discon-
tinue such monitoring.
3. Investigations of Private Organizations Considered "Threats"
by the Military.-Although they are not expressly authorized by law,
each of the military services investigates civilian groups, both within
and without the United States, which it considers "threats" to its
personnel, installations, and operations.
In the late 1960s all of the services were engaged in monitoring
civilian antimilitary groups within the United States. This activity
was conducted concurrently with the civil disturbance collection effort
described above and continued after it stopped. Most of the informa-
tion gathered about these antimilitary groups was collected from law
enforcement agencies and the news media, but the services also quite
commonly inserted their own undercover agents and informants into
the groups. -
Penetrations of groups which are hostile, or might be hostile, to the
military continues today in the United States, although it has been
greatly reduced. Overseas, military intelligence is more active, largely
because it does not have civilian law enforcement agencies to rely upon.
In West Germany and West Berlin, the Army has actively con-
ducted surveillance of activities of American citizens and groups of
American citizens whom it considered "threats" since World War II.
Until 1968, the authority to target such individuals and grouns for
surveillance rested solely with the commanders of occupying Army
forces, and authorized techniques included opening mail, wiretaps,
and covert penetrations. In 1968, the West German Government placed
restrictions on the use of mail opening and wiretaps. and forbade the
Army from employing such techniques any longer. The use of covert
penetrations, however, was not affected by the new restrictions and
continued to be employed. Furthermore, the new restrictions did not
apply to West Berlin, where an Army commander governs the Ameri-
can sector of the city as part of a special tripartite agreement with the
British and French. Here, mail opening and wiretaps continued to be
employed after 1968 against Americans and groups of Americans con-
sidered to be "threats" to the military without the Army's having to
obtain the approval of the West German Government.
In Japan, the Navy has carried out similar operations in three cities
against groups of American civilians thought to pose "threats" to
the Navy, employing covert penetrations and informants, but not mail
opening or wiretapping.
"Threat" investigations are still conducted at present, but under
internal controls of the Department of Defense.
4. Assisting Law Enforcement Agencies in Surveilling Privatc Citi-
zens and Organizatione.-The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385)
prohibits the military from "executing the law." 18 Nevertheless, mili-
tary intelligence has frequently provided assistance to civilian law
enforcement agencies. In Chicago during the late 1960s, military
intelligence agents turned over their files on civilians and civilian
organizations to the Chicago police, were invited to participate in
police raids, and routinely exchanged intelligence reports with the
police. In Washington, D.C. Army intelligence participated in an
FBI raid in a civilian rooming house and provided funds for the
police department's intelligence division.
The military was also called upon by the Justice Department to
assist in analyzing intelligence information received during the 1972
national political conventions. Further, it joined other intelligence
agencies in drafting the so-called Huston Plan in 1970, and later
participated in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, an interde-
partmental committee established by the Justice Department to ana-
lyze domestic intelligence information. *'
C. Effect of 1971 Departmental Directive
In March 1971, during congressional hearings on the Army's civil
disturbance collection program, the Department of Defense announced
the issuance of a new directive to govern the collection and retention of
information by. the military on "unaffiliated" persons and organiza-
tions. 9
In general, the new directive prohibited, as a matter of policy, the
collection of any information whatsoever on "unaffiliated" persons and
organizations, except for limited: "military" purposes. It also estab-
lished the policy that any information which was collected by the mili-
tary would be obtained through liaison with law enforcement agencies
rather than through military operatives. Finally, it required the de-
struction of all current holdings of the department which were found
to violate the provisions of the directive.
This directive is discussed later in this report as it bears on issues
regarding possible legislative restraints upon future investigative ac-
tivities of the department.20 But an awareness of its existence and a
general understanding of its impact is crucial to the case studies which
follow.
D. leaues Presented
Each of the four types of activity summarized above involve investi-
gations by military intelligence of the political activities of private citi-
zens, and thus, to the extent they survive today, threaten to violate the
traditional and legal restraints which govern the use of military forces
in the civilian community. This situation. gives rise to two major ques-
1 The Posse Comitatus Act originally applied only to the "Army." It was later
amended to include the Air Force, and has been interpreted by the Department
of Defense as applying to all the military services.
' See the Committee Report, "National Security, Civil Liberties, and the
Collection of Intelligence: A Report on the Huston Plan."
"DOD Directive 5200.27.
* See pp. 825-833.
tions: First, should these activities in the civilian community be per-
mitted at all? If so, should they be restrained to prevent their over-
stepping traditional and legal bounds? Second, are the present DOD
directives sufficient for the task? Should Congress enact new
legislation?
Beyond these basic questions is the matter of what the restraints
which govern these activities should be:
(1) Should the military be prohibited from collecting or maintain-
ing any information regarding "private citizens?" If not, where
should the line between permissible and impermissible information be
drawn?
(2) Should the military be prohibited from using its own operatives
to collect information in the civilian community? Are there collection
techniques that might be authorized for some federal agencies (e.g.,
wiretaps) that should be denied to the military?
Finally, there are issues of oversight and control:
(1) Should there be a special mechanism established to control and
oversee activities by the military within the civilian community?
(2) How should congressional oversight of this area be achieved?
E. Conduct and Scope of Investigation
The Committee's inquiry, as summarized above, is divided into
four parts. One recognizes at the outset that the first of these-the
Army's domestic surveillance program of the late 1960s-has hereto-
fore been the subject of a congressional investigation. 21 The Select
Committee determined, however, that it could not ignore this largest
of military intelligence albuses, even though its inquiry must neces-
sarily overlap the previous investigation in some respects. The Army
program of the late 1960s, besides being the worst intrusion that mili-
tary intelligence has ever made into the civilian community, resulted
in new departmental restrictions being drawn, and other intelligence
activities against American citizens being curtailed or eliminated.
Thus, current use of military intelligence agents in the civilian com-
munity can not be fully understood without some knowledge of the
Army program and how it was curtailed.
The Select Committee inquiry does go well beyond the earlier
inquiries. In particular, it represents the first attempt to analyze the
origins and termination of the Army program. The Committee had
access to former Army intelligence officers, who were not permitted
to testify in the earlier investigations, and it had access to documents
not previously available to Congress.
' The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired
by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., held two series of hearings and published two
committee reports on the subject of military surveillance of civilians: 1) "Fed-
eral Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights," Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary. United States
Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (cited hereinafter as 1971 Hearings);
2) "Military Surveillance," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.. (1974)
(cited hereinafter as 1974 Hearings); 3) "Army Surveillance of Civilians: A
Documentary Analysis," A 'Staff Report of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1972) (cited hereinafter as 1972 Report) ; and 4) "Military Surveillance of
Civilian Politics," A Report of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., (1973)
(cited hereinafter as 1978 Report).
After initial briefings from pertinent elements within the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Committee staff interviewed 35 past and present
employees of the Department, and 13 other individuals regarding
some aspect of this inquiry.
The investigation generally covered the period from 1967 through
1975, although some events of prior years are described to provide
historical background.
F. Organization of Report
Parts II through V of the following Report describe in detail the
activities which have been summarized above. In Parts VI and VII,
the issues posed above are considered. The effect of recent Depart-
mental restrictions and the effect of the Privacy Act of 1974 are given
particular consideration.
II. THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF
PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS: 1963-1970
A. Legal Authoritie8
There is no statute which authorizes military intelligence to collect
information on the political activities of private citizens and private
organizations, but the Army claimed in 1971 that it needed such in-
formation in the late 1960s to enable it to prepare for situations in
which it was called upon to put down civil disturbances.22
Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution provides
that "the United States shall . . protect each [State] . . . against
domestic violence."
Congress first passed a statute to implement this constitutional
provision in 1795,23 and, although amended, its provisions remain vir-
tually intact today. 4 In essence, the President is authorized to use the
militia of any state, or the Armed Forces, or both, to "suppress
insurrection." 25
The President has occasionally exercised this authority and called
out the National Guard or the Armed Forces to put down unrest or
enforce the law where such enforcement proves to be beyond the ca-
pability of civil authorities. According to a 1922 study by the War
Department, the President exercised this authority thirty times be-
tween 1795 and 1922.- In recent times' while commitment of federal
troops in the civilian community has been more frequent, 28
an extraordinary exercise of executive authority.28
There is no explicit authority in sections 331-334 of title 10, United
States Code, for the National Guard, or the Armed Forces, to make
any "preparations" for future deployments upon order of the Presi-
dent. In 1971, however, the Department of Defense argued before
" Testimony of Robert F. Froehike, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Adminis-
tration), 1971 Hearings, p. 376.
I Stat. 424 (1795).
10 U.S.C. 331-334.
10 U.S.C. 331.
* Results of this study were quoted in the testimony of Robert F. Froehke,
1971 Hearings, pp. 376-377.
'7 Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, pp. 377-378.
n DOD General Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt told Senator Ervin that only "dras-
tic circumstances" necessitate the deployment of federal troops. See 1971 Hear-
ings, p. 412.
Cbngress that such authority could be implied, and would justify the
collection of information on persons and organizations in the civilian
community:
In order to carry out the President's order (under the stat-
ute) and protect the persons and property in an area of civil
disturbance with the greatest effectiveness, military com-
manders must know all that can be learned about the area
and its inhabitants. Such a task obviously cannot be per-
formed between the time the President issues his order and
the time the military is expected to be on the scene. Informa-
tion gathering on persons or incidents which may give rise
to a civil disturbance and thus commitment of Federal troops
must necessarily be on a continuing basis. Such is required
by sections 331, 332, and 333 of title 10 of the United States
Code, since Congress certainly did not intend that the Presi-
dent utilize an ineffective Federal force.29
The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights subsequently
rejected this assertion, however, stating that it was "unwilling to imply
the authority to conduct political surveillance of civilians from the
role assigned by statute to the military in the event of civil disturb-
ance." 30 It cited the traditional separation of the military and civilian
realms as a reason for refusing to imply such authority,' and it ques-
tioned the use of military rather than civilian authorities to gather
information about pending civil disturbances.32 Finally, it observed
that even if the military had implied authority to collect some infor-
mation on areas of potential civil disturbance, this authority did not
include the collection of information on how citizens exercise their
First Amendment rights.83
B. Origins and Development of the Army's Domestic Surveillance
Program
Army intelligence began collecting information on private citizens
and organizations in the early 1960s as part of furnishing information
to military commanders whose units were dispatched to control racial
situations in the South. In the late 1960s, however, as the volume of
civil disturbance and protest demonstrations grew, the Army came
under increasing pressure from civilian authorities to provide infor-
mation on persons and organizations involved in domestic dissent.
It responded by sending over 1200 of its investigators into civilian
communities to report on all vestiges of political activity.
(1) Limited Beginnings.-Despite the lack of clear legal authority
to "prepare" for deployments in civil disturbance situations, the Army
in the early 1960s initiated formal efforts to plan for its troops being
committed in future civil disturbances. Prompted by a rash of troop
commitments to control racial situations and enforce court orders in
" Froehlke, 1971 Hearing8, pp. 384-385.
m 1978 Report, p. 106.
0 Ibid.
*2 Ibid., p. 108.
"Ibid., p. 109.
the South,3 4 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1963 designated the Chief of
Staff of the Army as its "Executive Agent" for civil disturbance mat-
ters, and the Continental Army Command was made responsible for
the selection and deployment of Army troops in such situations.
5
Formal contingency plans were drawn.
It was at this time that Army intelligence began collecting infor-
mation on individuals and organizations, without any express au-
thorization, as part of its overall mission to support military com-
manders with information regarding possible deployments in civil
disturbances.36 The Army's collection, however, was ordinarily con-
fined during this period to those areas where civil disturbances were
likely or had already taken place, and information on civilians was
ordinarily obtained through liaison with law enforcement and use
of public media.3 7 Any covert use of military intelligence agents within
the civilian community still had to have the approval of the Depart-
ment of the Army.38
In the following three years, the number of riots and disorders with-
in the United States increased dramatically. In 1965, there were four
major riots, including Watts, California; in 1966, there were 21 major
riots and disorders; and in 1967, there were 83 .39These had necessi-
tated the deployment of National Guard forces 36 times during this
period.40
The Army, while being deployed only once during the period,4" was
nevertheless affected by events. Frequently, Army troops had been
alerted, and occasionally, they had been "pre-positioned" in the event
they were called upon.4 2 Army intelligence stepped up its own collec-
tion efforts in support of military commanders still relied, for the
most part, on their contacts with local police and the public media.
4 3
Army investigators in the United States were still spending most of
their time doing security clearance investigations for Army
employees.44
(2) The Army's Involvement Intensifies.-In 1967, the character
of the investigative program began to change. In July of that year, the
Army was placed on alert for riot duty in Newark, New Jersey, and
later in the month was actually deployed for eight days in Detroit,
Michigan.4 5 It was the most extensive use of Army troops since 1962.
* In 1957, federal forces were used in connection with the integration of Cen-
tral High School iu Little Rock, Arkansas. In 1962, 20,000 Army troops were
sent to Oxford, Mississippi, in connection with the integration of the University
of Mississippi. In 1963, federal troops were dispatched to Tuscaloosa and Hunts-
ville. Alabama, to enforce federal court orders. See 1971 Hearings, pp. 377, 1291.
Froeblke, 1971 Hearings, p. 377.
* Ibid., p. 381. This information was also confirmed by former Army Chief of
Staff, General Harold K. Johnson. Staff summaly of Gen. Harold K. Johnson
interview, 11/18/75.




4 1 Ibid., p. 378.
4In early 1965, the Army Intelligence Command was apparently preparing a
daily civil disturbance intelligence summary. The Secretary of the Army ordered
it discontinued in September 1965, however. Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, p. 832.
4 Ibid.
Ibid.
a Ibid., p. 378.
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In the post-mortems which followed the Detroit riots, the lack of
adequate intelligence prior to moving into the city was a sore point.
But the focus of the criticism was the lack of "physical intelligence"
about the area in which troops were being committed. Cyrus Vance,
sent by the President to make an after-action assessment, specifically
cited the need for this type of information:
In order to overcome the initial unfamiliarity of the Federal
troops with the area of operations, it would be desirable if
the several continental armies were tasked with reconnoitering
the major cities of the United States in which it appears pos-
sible that riots may occur. Folders could then be prepared for
those cities listing bivouac areas and possible headquarters
locations, and providing police data, and other information
needed to make an intelligence assessment of the optimum
employment of federal troops when committed.-
The Army reacted to Vance's recommendation by appointing a spe-
cial task force in the fall of 1967 to study the civil disturbance situa-
tion and make recommendations as to what its role should be.4 7
In the meantime, the Army was preparing for a unique sort of civil
disorder, one announced in advance and directed against the military
establishment. The so-called March on the Pentagon was scheduled
for late October 1967.
. For the first time in its history,4 8 the Army authorized a massive
covert intelligence operation to be undertaken in connection with a
civilian demonstration. In all, 130 Army intelligence agents were used
in connection with the demonstration.49 Some were used to penetrate
protest groups coming to Washington: some were used to penetrate
the groups in Washington who were planning the March; and still
others were used to penetrate and report on the line of march.
5 0 Army
agents, moreover, took still and motion pictures of the crowds, and
secretly monitored amateur radio bands to learn of the demonstrators'
plans.5'
Even after this large covert operation, the Army apparently was
still relying primarily on civilian authorities and the media for in-
formation on civilian "dissenters." 52 In a memorandum to the Under-
secretary of the Army from the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence in late 1967, the Under Secretary was told:
Army intelligence is not engaged in any concerted investi-
gative effort to determine the routes of domestic discontent or
"Final Report of Cyrus R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of De-
fense, Concerning the Detroit Riots, July 23 through August 2, 1967; Department
of Defense Press Release No. 85"47, 9/12/67, p. 51.
1 Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, p. 379.
" See Memorandum. Department of Army, "U.S. Army Intelligence Role in
Civil Disturbances," 1971 Hearings, p. 1292.
aFroehlke, 1971 Hearing8, p. 440.
* Ibid, p. 378.
"Ibid. See pp. 808-809.
2 It should be noted that Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Major
General William Yarborough. in October 1967 requested that the National Secur-
ity Agency provide the Army with any information it might have, or obtain,
regarding the foreign connections of domestic political groups. See Select Com-
mittee report "National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans."
the channels it will follow. The quantity and quality of third
agency reports is sufficient to allow proper and timely analysis
of the domestic situation so that commanders in the field will
be properly informed at all times.53
But if the Army had refrained from widespread use of its own
operatives, it was nonetheless increasingly relied on by the White
House and the Justice Department to provide information on civil
unrest. In a meeting at the White House on January 10, 1968, for
example, Attorney Geneial Ramsey Clark told those present " that
"every resource" must be used in the domestic intelligence effort and
he criticized the Army for not being more selective in the reports that
it was sending to the Justice Department.5 According to former Army
Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson, this was but one of several meetings
at the White House where the Army was urged to take a greater role in
the civil disturbance collection effort.5 6
The Army was looked to, first, because it had approximately 1200
agents scattered across the country who were young and could easily
mix with dissident young groups of all races.57 Second, the Army
was virtually the only agency apart from the FBI which had an inde-
pendent teletype network nationwide which could be used to transmit
data on civil unrest.8 The FBI had such a network but it was used for
other purposes, and could not handle the voluminous amount of data
generated by civilian political protests.
The pressure on the Army to produce information was rapidly
mounting in the winter of 1967, and it began to have its effect.
The Army task force, appointed to study the Army's role in civil
disturbances, recommended among other things, that "continuous
counterintelligence investigations are required to obtain factual infor-
mation on the participation of subversive personalities, groups or
organizations and their influence on urban populations to cause civil
disturbances." '9 It also recommended that the Army develop new
criteria to apply to the collection of domestic intelligence which would
"serve to indicate potential areas of civil disturbance." 60
Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson approved these recommenda-
tions in late November 1967, and directed that a plan be prepared
Quoted in Memorandum for Record from Army General Counsel Robert E:
Jordan III, for the Under Secretary of the Army, undated. 1974 Hearings, p. 288.
" Attending the meeting were White House aides Joseph Califano and Matthew
Nimitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Deputy Attorney General War-
ren Christopher, and Army General Counsel Robert Jordan.
' Memorandum for the Under Secretary of the Army, Subject: Civil Disturb-
ance Planning Meeting in Mr. Califano's Office, 1/10/68.
' .Tohnson (staff summary). 11/18/75.
6 See staff summary of General William Blakefield Interview, 7/11/75; staff
summary of General William Yarborough (ret.) interview, 7/18/75; staff sum-
mary of Col. Arthur Halligan (ret.) interview, 7/15/75; staff summary of Col.
Millard Daughtery interview, 11/20/75; staff summary of General Harold K.
Johnson interview, 11/18/75.
Ibid.
* Memorandum from Army General Counsel Robert E. Jordan 1II, for the
Secretary of the Army. Subject: Review of Civil Disturbance Intelligence His-
tory, undated, 1974 Hearings, p. 289. The term "subversive" was not defined.
5 Ibid.
formally directing the Army to collect civil disturbance information
on a nationwide scale. 61
C. The Army's Domestic Surveillance Program
The collection requirements were set out in an annex to the Depart-
ment of Army Civil Disturbance Plan, promulgated on February 1,
1968.62 The plan identified as "dissident elements" the "civil rights
movement" and the "anti-Vietnam/anti-draft movements," and stated
that they were "supporting the stated objectives of foreign elements
which are detrimental to the USA." 63 It furthermore directed Army
commands to provide information on the "cause of civil disturb-
ance and names of instigators and group participants," as well as
information on the "patterns, techniques, and capabilities of sub-
versive elements in cover and deception efforts in civil disturbance
situations." 64 The terms "civil disturbance," "instigators," "group
participants," and "subversive elements" were not defined.
While this new collection plan was being implemented across the
country, the Army was in the midst of planning its second concerted
domestic operation in preparation for a civilian demonstration-the
so-called Washington Spring Project. Martin Luther' King, Jr. had
announced his intention of bringing the nation's poor to Washington
in April 1968 in a massive protest demonstration. Antiwar groups had
also indicated their intent to use the occasion to protest the war.
The Washington Spring Project did not proceed as scheduled, how-
ever, because Dr. King was assassinated in Memphis on April 4th. Ex-
tensive rioting broke out in numerous cities across the country causing
simultaneous commitments of Army troops in Washington, D.C., Balti-
more, and Chicago. Other Army troops were placed on alert in Pitts-
burgh and Kansas City.65
This had never happened before, and it had a profound effect upon
the Pentagon. In a meeting with the Secretary of Defense on April 10,
1968, it was agreed that the Army would set up a permanent "task
force" to plan for civil disturbances, and that it would operate upon
the theory that the Army may have to deploy as many as 10,000
soldiers in 25 cities simultaneously.6
Three days later, the Under Secretary of the Army directed the
Chief of Staff to establish the Directorate of Civil Disturbance
Planning and Operations (DCDPO) which he instructed to "main-
tain an around-the-clock civil disturbance operations center to monitor
incipient and on-going disorders . .. and develop intelligence report-
ing procedures to provide information on civil disturbances occurring
or imminent." 67
a See Memorandum for Record from Milton B. Hyman. Office of the General
Counsel, to the Army General Counsel. Subject: Army Civil Disturbance Intelli-
gence Activities, 1/23/71, 1974 Hearings, p. 302.
" 1971 Hearings, pp. 1119-1122.
* Ibid., pp. 1120-1121.
" Ibid., pp. 1121-1122.
'New York Times, 4/9/68, p. 36.
6 Memorandum for Record from Secretary, General Staff, MG Elias C. Town-
send. Subject: Debrief of SECDEF Meeting, 1100 hrs., 4/10/68, 1971 Hearings,
pp. 1281-1282.
" Memorandum from David E. McGiffert, Under Secretary of the Army, for the
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Civil Disturbances, 4/13/68, 1971 Hearings,
pp. 1283-1284.
Two other changes were brought on by the King assassination riots.
The Secretary of the Army was formally designated Executive Agent
for the DOD on civil disturbance matters, 8 and it was decided that the
intelligence requirements of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan of
February 1 were inadequate for the Army's purposes.
A new, more detailed, collective plan, classified CONFIDENTIAL,
was thus issued on May 2, 1968.69 The new plan expanded the criteria
to be used for collecting information and directed that information on
political activities be gathered in cities where there was a "potential"
for civil disorder.70 Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Froehlke
told the Ervin subcommittee that demands of the collection plan for
information were sweeping:
The requirements of the plan were both comprehensive and
detailed, and, in the light of experience, substantially beyond
the capability of military intelligence to collect. They reflected
the all-encompassing and uninhibited demand for informa-
tion directed at the Department of Army.... So comprehen-
sive were the requirements levied in the civil disturbance
information collection plan that any category of information
related even remotely to people or organizations active in a
community in which the potential for a riot or disorder was
present, would fall within their scope. Information was sought
on orgahizations by name. or by general characterization.
Requirements for information were even levied which re-
quired collection on activities and potential activities of the
public media, including newspapers and television and radio
stations.?
The May 2nd Collection Plan was distributed to the White House,
the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Department of Defense, among others.7 2 While it is not clear
whether officials in any of these agencies actually read the plan, it is
clear that they had begun to press the Army by this time for informa-
tion on individuals and organizations involved in domestic dissent.7
While the Army was routinely disseminating its intelligence reports
to the FBI, it also frequently received verbal tasking from high-rank-
ing officials on the outside for information on particular incidents or
individuals.74 Their demands were insistent, and were conveyed down
the Army chain of command with a similar degree of intensity.75
According to former Army intelligence officials, this led to a situa-
tion where restraints on collection in the civilian community were ig-
nored.7 6 Lower-ranking intelligence officers considered the fact that
a DOD Directive 3025.12, 6/8/68, 1971 Hearings, p. 1272.
1971 Hearing8, pp. 1123-1138.
'0 1971 Hearings, pp. 1123-1138.
" Froeblke testimony. 1971 Hearings, p. 384.
71971 Hearings, p. 1137.
" Froehike testimony, 1971 Hearings, p. 388. This statement was also
confirmed in the staff interviews with General Harold K. Johnson; Gen. William
Blakefield; MG William Yarborough (ret.), Robert E. Jordan III; Col. Arthur
Halligan (ret.), and Col. Millard Daugherty (ret.)
7" Ibid.
7 Blakefield (staff summary), 7/11/75; Halligan (staff summary), 7/15/75;
Daigherty (staff summary), 11/20/75.
" Ibid.
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demands were coming from their superiors as sufficient authority to
obtain it by whatever means necessary. 7 Secondly, it led Army intelli-
gence agents in the field to collect as much information as possible so
they would not be caught short when demands for timely and compre-
hensive information came down through channels. 78
Thus, there developed, as former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Robert Froehike described it, "a practical inconsistency between the
level of demand for information imposed and the methods of collec-
tion authorized." "7
. Army agents were dispersed into civilian communities across the
country and tasked to report on any vestige of political dissent.
D. Questionable Activities on the Part of Army Agents
About 1500 Army intelligence agents were engaged in monitoring
civilian protests in 1968.80 These agents routinely monitored civilian
political activities in the communities to which they were assigned,
and occasionally were used as part of concerted intelligence operations
undertaken by the Army during the major political protests of the
late 1960s. The following discussion thus encompasses activities un-
dertaken both under "routine" circumstances and during major pro-
test demonstrations.
(1) The Covert Penetration of Civilian Groups.-Army agents cov-
ertly penetrated the organizational structure of civilian political
groups, attended their meetings, and participated in their private and
public activities. They also were inserted into public demonstrations of
all dimensions. A sampling of these activities follows:
-Army agents penetrated the Poor Peoples' March to Washington
in April, 1968, as well as the subsequent encampment which became
known as "Resurrection City;" 81
-Army agents were also inserted into groups coming from Seattle,
Washington to the Poor Peoples' Campaign; 82
-Army agents infiltrated the National Mobilization Committee; 83
-The Army monitored protests of a welfare mothers organization
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 84
-Army agents infiltrated a coalition of church youth groups in
Colorado Springs, Colorado; 85
-Army agents were routinely used to penetrate antiwar groups in
Chicago; 8l
1" Ibid. Retired intelligence Colonel Millard F. Daugherty pointed out that the
approval authority for operations in the civilian community was usually the same
authority making demands for information. Daugherty (staff summary),
11/20/75.
* Ibid.
*Froeblkp. 1971 Hearings, p. 388.
m See 1973 Report, p. 10.
s' Ralph M. Stein, former Army agent, testimony, 1971 Hearings, p. 253;
Christopher H. Pyle testimony. 1971 Hearings. p. 185.
"Department of Army Memorandum, "U.S. Army Intelligence Role in Civil
Disturbances," 1971 Hearings, p. 1293.
8 Pyle, 1971 Hearings, p. 201.
Stein. 1971 Hearings, p. 273.
" Oliver A. Pierce testimony, 1971 Hearings, p. 306.
" John O'Brien, former Army intelligence agent, testimony, 1971, Hearings,
p. 101.
-Army agents attended a Halloween party for elementary school
children in Washington, D.C., where they suspected a local "dissi-
dent" might be present; 87
-Army agents posed as students to monitor classes in "Black Stud-
ies" at New York University, where James Farmer, former head of
the Congress on Racial Equality, was teaching; 8
-58 Army agents were inserted into the demonstrations which took
place in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of
1968; 88
-Army agents attended the October 1969 and November 1969 Mora-
torium marches in various locations around the country; 9o
-Army agents attended a conference of priests in Washington, D.C.,
which had convened to discuss birth control measures; 1
-Army agents were routinely assigned to cover speeches made at
the major universities in New York City from 1968 to 1970; 92
-Army agents attended meetings of a sanitation workers' union in
Atlanta, Georgia, in 1968; 3
-An Army agent infiltrated the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference in 1968; 9
-Army agents infiltrated a Yippie commune in Washington, D.C.,
prior to the 1969 Inauguration; *
-Army agents attended an antiwar vigil at the Chapel of
Colorado State University; 96
-Army agents monitored the weekend activities of college fraterni-
ties in White, South Dakota, which allegedly had been responsible for,
previous damage to town property; "
-An Army agent attended an antiwar meeting at St. Thomas Epis-
copal Church in Washington, D.C.; 98 and
-107 Army agents monitored the protest activities surrounding the
Presidential inauguration in Washington, in January 1969."1
(2) Posing as Newsmen/Covert Photography.-Army intelligence
agents frequently posed as newsmen in order to photograph and inter-
view "dissident" personalities. Photographing participants in politi-
cal activities itself became a widely used intelligence technique.
During the Democratic National Convention of 1968, the Army, for
the first time, sent undercover agents, disguised as television news re-
porters from a nonexistent television news company, to videotape
interviews with leaders of the demonstrations. 00 This technique was
" Quentin L. Burgess, former Army intelligence agent, testimony, 1971
Hearings, p. 285.
" Joseph J. Levin, Jr., former Army intelligence agent, testimony, 1971
Hearings, p. 290.
* Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, p. 440.
9 Pyle, 1971 Hearings, pp. 204-205; Peirce, 1971 Hearings, p. 305.
* Burgess, 1971 Hearings, p. 286.
" Levin, 1971 Hearings, p. 293.
* Stein, 1971 Hearings, p. 274.
* Ibid.
* Pyle, 1971 Hearings, p. 201.
* Laurence F. Lane, former Army intelligence agent, testimony, 1971
Hearings, p. 314.
P" Stein, 1971 Hearings, p. 255.
m Burgess, 1971 Hcarings, p. 285.
* Froeblke, 1971 Hearings, p. 440.
'" Froeblke, 1971 Hearings, p. 387. See also, Pyle, 1971 Hearings, p. 154.
repeated during subsequent demonstrations in Atlanta, Washington,
D.C., San Francisco, and Baltimore.10
A representative of the Reporter's Committee on Freedom of the
Press also stated in congressional testimony that Army agents, posing
as newsmen, interviewed H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael in
New York in 1967; interviewed staff of the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference in 1968; and covered the 1969 Inaugural parade.102
The Army began using photographers to take still and motion pic-
tures of the participants in political demonstrations in 1967 during
the March on the Pentagon.203 This rapidly became an accepted collec-
tion technique for Army agents across the country.'o
(3) Hara8sment/Disruptive Condut.-Army agents generally re-
frained from aggressive activities against civilian protestors, but occa-
sionally they engaged in conduct designed to harass or confuse such
groups. Typically, this sort of activity was carried out at the "grass
roots" level by lower-level military intelligence agents, who neither
sought nor received authorization for such activity. The Committee
found no evidence of any concerted program of harassment, analogous
to the COINTELPRO operations of the FBI.'-o Nonetheless, some of
the techniques employed by Army agents were similar.
A former intelligence agent stated that he had posed as a bus driver
during a demonstration in Chicago, collected the bus tickets of depart-
ing demonstrators, and then sent them off to find a nonexistent bus.0
6
This same agent also recalled having posed as a parade marshal during
the 1969 Inaugural, and, as such, provided misinformation to demon-
strators.' 0o
Another recalled making harassing telephone calls and sending
orders of fried chicken to the offices of the Chicago 7 defense team.108
Another admitted having torn notices of rallies and demonstrations
from school bulletin boards,109 and still another recalled agents having
heckled speakers in order to cause a disruption. "o
Another former agent stated in a newspaper account that he was
given blank postcards which had been confiscated by the FBI from
the headquarters of a protest group in Washington, D.C. The cards
were to be sent in by Washington residents who were willing to house
demonstrators during the inaugural demonstrations. The agent stated
Lane, 1971 Hearings, p. 314.
m Fred P. Graham, testimony, "Freedom of the Press," Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), p. 260.
' Memorandum, Department of Army, "U.S. Army Intelligence Role in Civil
Disturbances." 1971 Hearings. p. 1292.
'" Pyle, 1971 Hearings, p. 155 (photographing demonstrations at the University
of Minnesota) ; O'Brien, 1971 Hearings, p. 113 (photographing dissidents in
Chicago) ; Stein, 1971 Hearings, p. 273 (photographing demonstrators in Seattle);
Peirce, 1971 Hearings, p. 807 (photographing demonstrators in Colorado Springs).
"5 For a full description of the FBI's COINTELPRO operations, see the Select
Committee report on this subject.
" Richard Norusis, former Army intelligence agent, testimony, 6/23/75.
'0rbid.
'"O'Brien testimony. 1971 Hearings, p. 114. Also. "Government Spied On
Chicngo 7; U.S. Attempts in '69. '70 Told," Chicaoo Tribune. 11/13/73.
109 Statement of Conner Henry, former Army intelligence a gent.
0 Statement of former Army intelligence agent, Casper, Wyoming, Field Office
of the 113th Military Intelligence Group (anonymous), in files of Select Com-
mittee.
that he filled out the cards with the names of fictitious persons and sent
them in."'
The Select Committee also investigated the relationship of military
intelligence with a right-wing terrorist group in Chicago known as
the Legion of Justice. Former members of the terrorist group told the
Committee that from 1968 until 1970 "military intelligence" had di-
rected and helped finance their activities against left-wing groups in
Chicago.' 12 They also alleged that the Army had supplied tear gas,
grenades, and bugging devices to be used against left-wing groups."13
Finally, they suggested that Army intelligence had received a film
and various documents stolen by the Legion from left-wing
organizations.11
4
The Committee's investigation did not substantiate any of these al-
legations.x"3 It did, however, show that Army intelligence agents had
been in contact with the leader of the Legion on several occasions in
regard to obtaining information on left-wing groups." Army agents
insisted, however, that they did not realize that their source was a
leader of the terrorist group, nor that the information he was offer-
ing the Army had been stolen." 7
(4) Maintenance of Files on Private Citizens and Private Orga-
nization.-All of the information collected by Army agents on civilian
political activity was stored in "scores" 118 of data banks throughout
the United States, some of which the Army had computerized."9 The
reports were routinely fed to the FBI, the Navy, and the Air Force,
and were occasionally circulated to the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Intelligence Agency.1 20
In all, the Army probably maintained files on at least 100,000
Americans from 1967 until 1970.121 Among them were: Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., Whitney Young, Julius Hobson, Julian Bond, Arlo
Guthrie, Joan Baez, Major General Edwin Walker, Jesse Jackson,
Walter Fauntroy, Dr. Benjamin Spock Rev William Sloane Coffin,
Congressman Abner Mikva, Senator Adlai Stevenson 111,122 as well as
m See "Break-In by FBI Alleged Before 1969 Inauguration," New York Times,
5/31/73, pp. 1, 6; "FBI Was Given Key for Search in 1969," New York Times,
6/1/73, p. 14.
The Select Committee was unable to locate the source of this news report;
however, FBI records made available to the Committee indicate that such searches
were made in the Washington D.C. area in advance of the presidential
inauguration.
m Staff summaries of Stephen Sedlacko and Tom Stewart interviews, 5/28/75.
aIbid.
n'Ibid.
m The allegations that Army intelligence furnished the Legion with bugging
devices and tear gas grenades appears improbable since these items were not
in the inventory of Army intelligence units. Approval of fund expenditures also
had to come from intelligence group headquarters, and there were no records
of such expenditures being approved. The remainder of the allegations were not
supported by testimony received from Army witnesses.
" Richard Norusis, 6/23/75; Thomas Filkins testimony, 10/21/75; and Robert
Liesik, 6/27/75, former members of the 113th Military Intelligence Group.
1 Norusis, 6/23/75, and Filkins, 10/21/75.
us 1973 Report, p. 4.
The Army maintained computerized files at Fort Holabird, Fort Monroe,
Fort Hood, and the Pentagon. See 1973 Report, pp. 59-53.
Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, p. 423.
121972 Report, p. 57.
Stein, 1971 Hearings, p. 266.
"clergymen, teachers, journalists, editors, attorneys, industrialists, a
laborer, a construction worker, railroad engineers, a postal clerk, a
taxi driver, a chiropractor, a doctor, a chemist, an economist, a his-
torian, a playwright, an accountant an entertainer, professors, a radio
announcer, business executives, and authors" 123 who became subjects
of Army files simply because of their participation in political protests
of one sort or another.
In addition, one witness told the Ervin subcommittee that "it was no
exaggeration to state that (the Army's files) covered virtually every
group engaged in dissent in the United States." 124 Cited as examples
were the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, the Ku Klux Klan, the Congress
on Racial Equality, the Urban League, the Women's Strike for Peace,
the American Friends Service Committee, the Citizen's Coordinating
Committee for Civil Liberties, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference Rampart8, The National Review, Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, the
John Birch Society, Young Americans for Freedom, Clergy and Lay-
men Concerned About the War, Business Executives Move to End the
War in Vietnam, and the National Organization for Women, among
others.125
E. Termination of the Army's Civil Disturbance Collection Program
The Army did not decide to terminate its domestic collection pro-
gram until the summer of 1970, after it had been exposed in the press
and Conge had announced its intentions to investigate. There had,
nevertheless, been reservations within the Army regarding the scope
of its domestic effort as early as the fall of 1968.
The first indication that anyone at the Department of Defense had
qualms about the Army's domestic program came in September 1968,
when Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze disapproved an Army
request for 167 additional spaces for Army intellhgence agents citing
"reservations regarding the extent of Army involvement in domestic
intelligence activities." 2 6
Three months later Arm Under Secretary David McGiffert also
expressed concern that the rmy's domestic collection program might
not be "worth the effort," and expressed his desire that the "civil dis-
turbance collection effort be more sharply focused on essential re-
quirements and the mission be more precisely delineated.127
This concern apparently led McGiffert in February 1969 to attempt
to curtail the Army's program. In a memorandum to the Vice Chief
of Staff, he expressed concern that the Army was, in furtherance of
the civil disturbance mission, collecting detailed information on per-
sons, organizations, and movements. Citing expediency rather than
principle, he stated that "our limited assets should not be expended in
developing such detailed information on these matters as part of the
m 1978 Report, p. 57.
Stein, 1971 Hearings, p. 264.
Imbid.
" Quoted in Memorandum from Army General Counsel Robert E. Jordan, for
the Secretary of the Army. Subject: Review of Civil Disturbance Intelligence
History, 1974 Hearings, p. 293. (Cited hereinafter as Jordan memo).
1 Froehmke, 1971 Hearings, p. 393.
process of assigning priorities to particular metropolitan areas." 12*
He expressed the opinion that such information, to the extent it was
necessary, could be gathered from civilian law enforcement agencies.
The memorandum also required that he be apprised on a quarterly
basis of all covert and overt collection activities.
The Under Secretary's memorandum met with stiff resistance from
the Army staff and was not fully implemented.129 The Under Secretary
did not press his demands, in part because he was about to leave, and
in part because the Army General Counsel had initiated negotiations
with the Department of Justice to reach an agreement which would
relieve the Army of its domestic intelligence-gathering role.1 30 How-
ever, the agreement which eventually resulted from these discussions-
the Interdepartmental Action Plan on Civil Disturbances-left the
domestic role of Army intelligence as ambiguous as before.131 Never-
theless, the initiative of the General Counsel had served to forestall
the implementation of McGiffert's memorandum until his successor
had taken office, and could be prevailed upon to continue the Army's
collection activities.
McGiffert's successor, Thaddeus R. Beal, did nonetheless retain
the requirement that the Army's collection activities be reported to
him on a quarterly basis. In the first of these renorts, filed on April 15,
1969, the Army indicated that 35 percent of its 3219 intelligence reports
were based on operations conducted by Army agents.182 This figure
caused some alarm at the Department of Army level,s'3 but did not
engender any formal attempts to limit such operations.
It was only in January 1970, when a former Army intelligence offi-
cer, Christopher H. Pyle, wrote an article for the Vaskington Monthly
exposing the extent of the Army's domestic program, that serious ef-
forts to curb the Army's domestic activities twere undertaken.'3 ' Pyle's
article drew substantial attention in the press, and two congressional
committees in the spring of 1970 announced their intentions to hold
hearings on the matter. 3 5
In response to the growing public pressure, the Army on June 9,
1970, rescinded its May 2, 1968 collection plan and issued an order
stating that:
Under no circumstances will the Army acquire, report,
process, or store civil disturbance information on civilian in-
dividuals or organizations whose activities cannot, in a rea-
Memorandum from David E. McGiffert, Under Secretary of the Army, for
the Vice Chief of Staff, Subject: Army Intelligence Mission and Requirements
Related to Civil Disturbances, 2/5/69. 1971 Hearings, p. 1139.
'm See Memorandum from the DCDPO to the Army General Counsel, Subject:
Army Intelligence Mission and Requirements Related to Civil Disturbances,
3/4/69, 1971 Hearings, pp. 1289-1292.
m Jordan memo, 1974 Hearings, p. 296.
'The final version of the plan stated that "raw Intelligence data pertaining
to civil disturbances will be acquired from such sources of the Government as
may be available." See 1974 Hearings, pp. 346-353.
Jordan memo, 1974 Hearings, p. 298.
SIbid.
Christopher H. Pyle, "CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian
Politics," Washington Monthly (January 1970), pp. 4-16.
0 Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee.
sonably direct manner, be related to a distinct threat of civil
disturbance exceeding the law enforcement capabilities of
local and State authorities. 36
The matter did not end there, however. Congressional hearings were
still in the offing, 37 and in December, NBC News reported that the
Army had had files on Illinois Senator Adlai Stevenson, III and Con-
gressman Abner Mikva. 38
These disclosures brought on renewed criticism which led Secretary
of Defense Melvin R. Laird on December 23, 1970, to direct that new
regulations be proposed which would ensure that "these [intelligence
activities] be conducted in a manner which recognizes and preserves
individual human rights." 139
On March 1, 1971, the day the Senate was to begin hearings on the
Army surveillance program, DOD formally issued the new regulation
called for by Secretary Laird.'o The new directive in general pro-
hibited military personnel from collecting information on "unaffili-
ated" persons and organizations, except where "essential" to the mili-
tary mission. It also required that all information which violated the
new directive, and was currently being held by the military, must be
destroyed. While as a practical matter implementation of the directive
did not occur immediately,' 4' the Army's nationwide collection effort
against civilians had officially come to an end.
III. MONITORING PRIVATE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS IN TIE UNITED STATES:
1967-1970
During the late 1960s, when the Army was being called upon to
control civil disturbances, an element of the Army, the Army Security
Agency (ASA), normally used to intercept international communica-
tions for foreign intelligence purposes, was used to monitor radio
transmissions in the United States. At times it was authorized not
only to monitor radio transmission, but to "jam" radio broadcasts
or transmit false information over the air, if such techniques were
thought necessary.
At first, ASA conducted its monitoring activity in support of Army
troops committed in civil disturbances. Later, however, ASA mom-
'"Letter from Robert E. Lynch, Acting Adjutant General of the Army, to
subordinate commands, Subject: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage
of Civil Disturbance Information, 6/9/70, 1971 Hearings, pp. 1099-1102.
'ff Although the House committee had conducted its own investigation, it had
decided against holding public hearings. The Senate subcommittee, while can-
celling hearings scheduled for October 1970, announced its intention of scheduling
them In early 1971.
NBC News, First Tuesday, 12/1/70.
1971 Hearinqs, p. 1299.
'DOD Directive 5200.27, dated March 1, 1971, Subject: The Acquisition of
Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the De-
partment of Defense. The provisions of this directive are discussed in detail at
pp. 825-833.
"' Several penetrations of civilian groups, begun before the directive, con-
tinued after it was issued, on the grounds that exceptions would later be sought
under the terms of the directive. Also, it required months for the Army and other
services to dispose of old files being held in violation of the directive.
tored radio communications in situations where Army troops had
not been deployed, and were not expected to be. Indeed, on two occa-
sions, ASA ordered its units, in violation of standing instructions, to
conduct general searches of the radio spectrum without regard to the
source or subject matter of the transmissions. ASA did not report
these incidents to the Army, even when specifically asked to do so as
part of the Army's preparations for the Ervin subcommittee hearings
in 1971.
In this report, the domestic use of the Army Security Agency is
treated separately from the Army's civil disturbance collection pro-
gram for several reasons. First, ASA is an agency whose primary mis-
sion is to gather foreign intelligence. In this respect, it differs from
the other Army collectors in the field in the late 1960s, who were there
primarily to conduct security clearance investigations. Second, ASA
has unique capabilities for surveillance that other Army investigators
do not possess. The fact that these capabilities were turned inward
upon private citizens is uniquely ominous. Finally, this type of sur-
veillance activity is bound by particular legal restraints which do not
apply to other types of investigative activity.
A. Legal Authorities and Restrictions
(1) Mission of the Army Security Agency.-ASA carries out com-
munications intercepts for both national and tactical intelligence pur-
poses.14 2 It also develops techniques of electronic warfar "jamming"
and "deceptive transmitting"-to support tactical Army operations."43
While it does maintain operational units within the United States-
in both mobile and fixed-station configurations-the domestic mission
of these units is limited primarily to support of Army training ex-
ercises and to determine the vulnerability of Army tactical communi-
cations to interception by hostile intelligence agents."'
(2) Section 605 of the 1934 Communications Act Prohibits Moni-
toring.-Section 605 of the 1934 Communications Act provides, in
pertinent part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any radio communication and divulge or publish the exist-
ence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person. 4 5
The statute thus makes the interception and publication of radio
transmissions a crime. While anyone with the appropriate radio
receiver may intercept the radio communication of another, Congress
has decided that the interceptor must not publish it. The law thus
assures persons using radios to communicate that their transmissions
will not be intercepted and divulged.
B. Origins of Domestic Radio Monitoring by ASA
Prior to 1963, there had been no explicit Army policy which had
either authorized or prohibited domestic use of the ASA. In 1963,
however, the Army was forced to decide the issue when it received





requests for ASA support from two Army task forces assigned to deal
with civil disturbances brewing in Alabama and Mississippi. The
commander of one of these task forces requested on June 7, 1963,
that ASA units be used to monitor police, taxi, amateur, and citizens
band radio, and that ASA be authorized to "jam" transmissions
emanating from a Ku Klux Klan net in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, if such
action were found desirable.1 4 6
But the Department of Army said "no." In a message to the task
force commander, it prohibited the domestic use of ASA resources:
United States Army Security Agency organizations or
elements thereof are prohibited from engaging in USASA-
type operational roles (e.g., monitoring or jamming of civil
and amateur telecommunications) in support of U.S. Army
forces committed to maintain or enforce law and order during
civil disturbances and disorders within the states and terri-
tories of the United States of America. 4 7
This policy remained in effect for the next four years, until the
pressure of events caused the Army to reverse its position.
C. Donetic Radio Monitoring by ASA: 1967-1970
(1) The March on the Pentagon.-In October 1967, preparations
were underway for the so-called March on the Pentagon, scheduled
for late in the month. As part of this planning, a "high level" decision
was made in the Army to allow ASA units to support Army units
which wofild be used to control the demonstration. 4 Accordingly, on
October 14, 1967, a message went from the Army to ASA expressly
rescinding the 1963 ban, and directing that ASA participate in "Task
Force Washington," the Army force created to handle the demonstra-
tion.149 The Army directed not only that ASA monitor civilian com-
munications during the March, but that it have the capability to
"jam" radio transmissions and to undertake "deceptive transmitting,"
in the event that either became necessary. 50
10 Message from Commanding General, Third Army, to the Commanding Gen-
eral, Continental Army Command, 6/7/63.
4 Message from the Department of Army to subordinate commands, 6/11/67,
Subject: Monitoring Civil and Amateur Telecommunications during Civil Dis-
turbances in U.S.
"a None of the documents examined by the staff Identified the particular in-
dividual who approved the ASA deployment in connection with the March on
the Pentagon. In a report made by the Army Inspector General to the Secretary
of the Army, 1/3/72, Subject: Report of Investigation into the Failure to Provide
Mr. Froehlke with Full and Accurate Information Prior to his Appearance
Before the Ervin Subcommittee, the Inspector General simply refers to this
decision as having been made "at a high level." (p. 25.)
This investigation of the Army Inspector General was undertaken because
ASA had failed to provide Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert F. Froehlke,
the DOD witness at the Ervin subcommittee hearings, with information re-
garding its orders, issued without Army approval, to conduct general searches
of the radio spectrum in connection with the Republican National Convention
of 1968 and the Huey Newton trial in September 1968. See pp. 812-813.
2'Message from the Department of Army to the Army Security Agency,
10/14/67, Subject: Use of ASA's Resources in Civil Disturbances.
According to an after-action report later filed by ASA after the
March, this was the first time that ASA resources had ever been used
in support of the Army domestically.' 5 '
During the weekend of the March, ASA units monitored citizens
band, police band, taxi band, and amateur radio bands from a total
of 36 listening posts. 52 Twenty-three of these were located at the
Pentagon; nine at ASA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and four
at an ASA fixed station facility near Warrenton, Virginia.15 3 The
after-action report of ASA also recites the fact that while it did have
the capability to "jam" and undertake "deceptive transmitting" during
the March, none was actually carried out. 5 4
* Despite its participation in the "March," ASA's potential usefulness
in civil disorders was not widely recognized, even in the Army. The
Army's Civil Disturbance Collection Plan of February 1, 1968, con-
tained no mention of ASA's role in such activities. Moreover, the mes-
sage of October 14, 1967, which had rescinded the 1963 ban, had been
sent only to ASA.15 5 Presumably, the rest of the Army was not on
official notice of ASA's potential support capability.
On March 31, 1968, official notice was provided in a classified mes-
sage sent to all domestic commands of the Army.5 8 The message stated
that ASA would participate in the Army's Civil Disturbance Collec-
tion Plan and could be used to monitor domestic communications and
conduct jamming and deception in support of Army forces committed
in civil disorders and disturbances. All such operations were required
to have the approval of the Army Chief of Staff. It also provided that
ASA personnel were to be "disguised" either in civilian clothes or as
members of other military units. None were permitted to be used as
liaison with civilian authorities. The 1963 ban was expressly rescinded.
(2) The King Assa8sination Riots.-Four days after the message
was sent authorizing use of ASA units in civil disturbances, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, and rioting erupted in
Washington, D.C. On April 5, even though Army forces had not
officially been brought on the scene, ASA units were directed by the
Army to begin monitoring civilian radio transmissions as part of the
riot control operation.'5 7 They were instructed to report directly to
the Army Operations Center until an Army Task Force had been
officially committed. On April 9, in anticipation of further demon-
strations in Atlanta, the site of the King funeral, ASA elements were
again requested to conduct radio monitoring operations, in advance
of any troop commitment.5s
m Annex A (Intelligence Summary) to USASA Task Force Washington After
Action Report, Army Security Agency, 1/5/68, p. 4.
'52 Letter from Col. Robert R. Brust, Chief of Staff, Army Security Agency, to
Robert E. Jordan, III, Army General Counsel, Subject: Radio Monitoring Activ-
ity, 12/15/70 (cited hereinafter as Brust Letter).
m Memorandum from John D. Kelley, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Se-
curity, to the Army Chief of Staff, Subject: ASA Radio Monitoring, 2/3/71, in
Select Committee files. (Cited hereinafter as Kelley memorandum).
' 47 U.S.C. 605.
u See footnote 149.
'r Department of Army message to subordinate commands, 3/31/68, Subject:
Use of USASA Resources in Civil Disturbances.
' Department of Army message to ASA, 4/5/68, Subject: Use of Resources.
10 Department of Army message to ASA, 4/9/68.
In all, the monitoring lasted from April 5 until April 17, 1968.
ASA units at the Arlington, Virginia, headquarters, at the Treasury
Building in Washington, and at a fixed station facility near Warren-
ton, Virginia, articipated in the Washington area monitoring.159
ASA units at Fort McPherson, Georgia, performed similar tasks for
the Atlanta area. Citizens band, police band, taxi band, military band,
and amateur bands were monitored.6 o On April 23, after the moni-
toring had ceased, ASA sent a message to the National Security
Agency, informing it that ASA had participated in the domestic
operations surrounding the King death. The message further advised:
"Similar tasking by DA expected in future whenever Federal troops
committed in civil disturbance operations." 161 This is the only indica-*
tion found by the Committee staff that NSA had ever been officially
apprised of the domestic activities of ASA.
After the King funeral, on April 29, 1968, persons from the Office
of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence met with rep-
resentatives of the FCC for the purpose of obtaining the FCC's
approval of future Army monitoring broadcasts during civil disturb-
ances.162
The FCC asked that the Army put its request in writing.s63
(3) The Poor People's Campaign in Washington, D.C.-Despite its
failure to achieve any immediate approval from the FCC, the Army
proceeded with plans to monitor civilian radio communications as part
of its surveillance of the Poor People's March and Campaign in Wash-
ington, D.C. ASA began radio monitoring on May 8, 1968, although
no formal authorization of these activities appears to have come from
the Army until May 21, 1968.164 In any case, some form of radio moni-
toring took place from May 8 until June 26, 1968.1e5 Two mobile vans
were located for this purpose at the 13th Police Precinct in Wash-
ington. 6* Other locations included ASA headquarters, the Treasury
Building, and (from June 6 until June 26) the ASA fixed station
facility near Warrenton, Virginia.167
It was not until after the Poor People's Campaign that the Army
renewed its initiative to the FCC in a June 25, 1968, letter from Acting
Assistant Chief of Staff MG Wesley Franklin to Rosel Hyde. the FCC
Chairman.168 The letter suggested, first of all, that the FCC itself
monitor civilian radio broadcasts in these situations to obtain informa-
tion useful to the Army. Alternatively, it was suggested that the Army
be allowed to monitor on its own.
I Kelley memorandum, 2/3/71.
m Brust letter, 12/15/70.
Army Security Agency message to the National Security Agency, 4/23/68,
Subject: Civil Disturbance Tasking.
M2 See Memorandum for Record, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli-
gence, 6/10/68, Subject: Possible Violations of Federal Communications Act in
Connection with Civil Disturbances.
1 Ibid.
' Department of Army message to ASA, 5/21/68, Subject: USASA Support to
DA OPLAN Washington Spring Project.
'xBrust letter, 12/15/70.
m Kelley memorandum, 2/3/71.
117 Ibid.
'8 Letter from MG Wesley C. Franklin, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of Army, to Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, Federal Com-
munications Commission, 6/25/68.
The FCC referred the Army's letter to the Department of Justice
for a legal opinion."" However, by August 6, when the Republican
National Convention opened in Miami Beach, the FCC had taken no
formal action.
(4) The National Political Conventions of 1968.-Senior officers at
ASA were unaware of the initiative to the FCC being taken by the
Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. 1o Thus, the fact that
the FCC was preparing a response to the Army's query with respect
to its domestic radio monitoring had no bearing on ASA deciding,
on its own, to resume radio monitoring in connection with the Repub-
lican National Convention in Miami Beach.
On August 6, 1968, without the required approval of the Army
Chief of Staff, ASA ordered its fixed stations in Virginia and Florida
to begin general searches of the amateur radio bands to determine if
there were dissident elements which were planning to disrupt the GOP
Convention.x"7 It ordered the monitoring to continue through Au-
gust 10.172
ASA had no reports from its fixed stations regarding the conven-
tion, and thus cannot state with certainty that such monitoring was, in
fact, carried out."5 The incident is significant, however, because (1) it
illustrates that such monitoring could be ordered, and was ordered,
without the required clearance of the Department of Army; 174 and
(2) it involved "general searches"-scanning of incoming radio sig-
nals without regard for their source or subject matter. .
In any case, while the Miami Beach convention had occasioned rela-
tively little disruption, Army intelligence predicted that the forth-
coming Democratic National Convention, scheduled to begin on
August 22 in Chicago, would occasion violent confrontations between
protestors and civilian authorities.
Prompted by fears that Army troops might have to be committed,
and that the Army Security Agency might once again be deployed,
representatives of the Army Assistant Chief of 'Staff for Intelligence
again pressed the FCC for a response to the earlier inquiry regarding
domestic radio monitoring. At a meeting held on August 15, 1968, the
FCC gave its reply: such monitoring would be illegal under section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934. 175 FCC representatives told
the Army that the matter had been brought up with the Attorney
General and that he had disapproved the Army request.1 76 The FCC
agreed, however, to submit a written reply to the Army stating that
' Staff summary of Hilburt Slosberg, former Deputy General Counsel, Fed-
eral Communications Commission, interview, 6/17/75.
"' Staff summary of MG Charles Denholm (ret.) interview, 6/16/75; and staff
summary of Col. John J. McFadden, ASA, interview 6/23/75.
nMessage from ASA to selected field stations, 8/6/68. Subject: Tasking in
Support of DA Civil Disturbance Operations.
7 Ibid.
u7 See footnote 148.
* The Department of the Almy did not learn of the incident until February
1971. (Kelley memorandum, 2/3/71.)
x" Memorandum for Record, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
8/16/68, Subject: Possible Violations of Federal Communications Act in Connec-
tion with Civil Disturbances. For provisions of section 605 see page 807.
'This was confirmed by Sol Lindenbaum, Executive Assistant to the Attorney
General. Staff summary of Sol Lindenbaum interview, p. 11.
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it could not "provide a positive answer" to the Army's proposal, rather
than a letter which branded the proposal as "illegal." 177
The FCC's formal reply to the Army was sent on August 19, 1968.171
By this time however, the pressures on the Department of Army to
authorize deployments of ASA in Chicago had grown. On Au-
gust 12, 1968, the ASA had itself requested Army approval to send
radio monitoring teams to Chicago.179 This was followed by a request
from the Army Commander at Fort Sheridan, on the outskirts of
Chicago, asking for ASA support.1 80 He anticipated his own troops
being called upon.
Thus, on August 21, in obvious disregard of the FCC's opinion
that civil disturbance radio monitoring by the Army would be illegal,
the Army ordered ASA to send moitoring teams to Chicago from
Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina.,,- These teams
were positioned at three locations in the downtown area and, while
no Army troops were actually called out during the demonstrations,
these teams did monitor citizens, police, and commercial bands from
August 22 to August 31.182
(5) The Huey Newton Trial.-Less than two weeks after the close
of the Democratic Convention in Chicago, Black Panther leader Huey
Newton was brought to trial in Alameda, California. Again ASA,
without the approval of the Army Chief of Staff, ordered as required
by the message of March 31, 1968 its fixed stations near Warrenton,
Virginia, and Monterrey, California, to monitor domestic radio com-
munications to determine if there were any groups around the country
which might be planning demonstrations in support of Newton.
8 s The
order, in this case, called for a "general search" of all amateur radio
bands from September 6 through September 10, 1968.1'* This meant
that ASA elements were given free reign to listen in on radio trans-
missions across the country, without regard to point of origin or sub-
ject matter.
m Army ACSI Memorandum for the Record, 8/16/68.
"Letter from Max D. Paglin, Executive Director, FCC, to Major General
Wesley C. Franklin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 8/19/68.
1 Message from ASA to Department of Army, 8/12/68, Subject: Force Genera-
tion and Closure Times.
* Message from Fifth Army to the Continental Army Command, 8/16/68, Sub-
ject: USASA Support.
181 Message from Department of Army to Army Security Agency, 8/21/68,
Subject: USASA Support.
1= Brust letter, 12/15/70.
Press allegations were made two years afterward that during this period
ASA agents had bugged the campaign headquarters of Democratic Presidential
candidate Eugene McCarthy. (See "Military Agents Had Secret Role at 1968
Conventions," Wa8hington Evening Star, 12/2/70.) An ASA after-action report of
the Chicago operation made no mention of the bugging, but it did mention that
the most productive of the radio nets being monitored was a radio net set up
between medical aid stations serving demonstrators in the Loop area. The net
control station, ASA learned, had been located in a room of the Conrad Hilton
Hotel, which was assigned to a member of the McCarthy campaign staff. (See
Army Security Agency Report. 7/29/69, Subject: TJSASA Support to DA Civil
Distrubance in Chicago, Illinois.) This may have been the source of the press
story.
" Message from ASA to subordinate field stations, 9/6/68, Subject: Operation
Rancher III.
I" rb~id.
ASA could produce no record which showed what monitoring, if
any, actually took place.'8 ' The order to monitor is, nevertheless, sig-
nificant since it was given without authorization, and in a situation
where the use of Army troops was not contemplated.
(6) Cafe Zipper.-There is no record of any further domestic
radio monitoring by ASA until March 1969. On March 17, 1969,
during a civil disturbance exercise at Fort Hood, Texas, ASA units,
who were monitoring radio transmissions of the participating forces
to determine their vulnerability, intercepted transmissions of un-
identified persons using citizens band radios who appeared to be
monitoring the conduct of the exercise. ASA requested Army per-
mission to continue monitoring the net-designated Cafe Zipper
Net 2-and permission was given.as
It was subsequently decided by ASA that the net was a nationwide
not probably comprised of members of the Citizens Band Radio
Operators of America. In a message from the Department of Army
to the Fort Hood commander, the net was cryptically described as
being "devoted to the illegal use of citizens band for hobby purposes.
It is not believed to represent a threat to the United States Army." 187
This conclusion was reached on April 21, 1969, over a month after the
monitoring had begun.
The significance of this incident is that the monitoring was not
undertaken for any authorized purpose. Although there was never
any indication that a civil disturbance would develop, requiring the
use of Army troops, the monitoring continued for more than a month.
D. The Termination of Domestic Radio Intercepts
While there were no further domestic intercepts actually under-
taken after "CAFE ZIPPER," the Army continued to debate ASA's
support role in civil disturbance operations. The Army's civil dis-
turbance office proposed in the fall of 1969 that the ASA role be
formalized in regulation."8 This prompted the Office of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) (which had been
told a year earlier that such activity was illegal) to ask for another
legal opinion from the Army Judge Advocate General.8 9 On Octo-
ber 2, 1969, Army JAG responded that such activity was probably
illegal.190 Relying on this opinion, the ACSI "nonconcurred" in the
proposal of the civil disturbance office.'
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"'The investigation of the Army Inspector General included searches of ASA
files and interviews with ASA operational personnel. The investigation did not
uncover any documentary evidence, however, showing the results of the "general
search" which had been ordered in connection with the Newton trial.
. Message from Department of Army to ASA, 4/10/69, Subject: Cafe Zipper.
m Message from Department of Army to Continental Army Command, 4/22/69,
Subject: Cafe Zipper.
m Memorandum for the Record, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
10/13/69, Subject: USASA Employment of Civil Disturbance Operations.
' Disposition Form, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to the Army
Judge Advocate General, 9/15/69, Subject: USASA Employment of Civil Disturb-
ance Operations.
'Letter from William M. Nichols. Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps,
to the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 10/2/67, Subject: USASA Employ-
ment in Civil Disturbance Operations.
9 Disposition Form, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the
Directorate of Civil Disturbance Plans and Operations, 10/15/69, Subject:
USASA Employment of Civil Disturbance Operations.
Shortly thereafter, Army ACSI sent a memorandum to the Army
General Counsel recommending that the Army seek legislative au-
thority to engage in future radio monitoring.192 In the same memo-
randum, however, it was stated that previous ASA operations had
been of little value:
No compromise of any covert operation has occurred to date.
However, it should be pointed out that the intelligence ob-
tained was of marginal value. Existing laws prohibit moni-
toring civilian radio transmissions and for the USASA to
continue covert monitoring could prove harmful to the United
States Army if compromised. Continued use of the USASA
in this effort does not appear justified considering the risks
involved.19 3
In spite of the Army ACSI's apparent decision in October 1969
that further domestic use of ASA was not justified, he took no formal
action to put an end to such use. ASA itself sought guidance
from ACSI regarding its domestic support role on two occasions in
1970,194 but ACSI responses were ambiguous. On December 1, 1970,
for example, the Army told ASA that while it would no longer have
a formal support role in civil disturbances, "in the event intelligence
estimates of civil disturbance threats change to indicate a requirement
for ASA support in civil disturbances operations, ASA will again
be -asked to provide support." 19*
In fact, as was the case with the Army's civil disturbance collection
program, ASA domestic intercepts were not formally terminated
until they were exposed in the press. On December 1, 1970, NBC News
reported that ASA units had been used to monitor civilian radio
broadcasts during the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 96 This
led the Army, on December 10, 1970, to rescind the March 31, 1968
message which had authorized the use of ASA resources in support
of civil disturbance operations. 97
No subsequent authorization has been issued.
IV. INVESTIGATING CIVILIAN GROUPS CONSIDERED (THREATS" TO THE MILI-
TARY: A CONTINUING PROGRAM
There is no express statutory authority for the military to investi-
gate persons or groups whom the military considers as "threats." The
services cite only the general authority of the National Security Act
of 1947 which authorizes each service secretary to undertake those
functions "necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, ad-
m2 Memorandum from Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the
Army General Counsel, Subject: United States Army Security Agency (USASA)
Covert Activities in Civil Disturbance Control Operations (undated).
'm Ibid.
' Message from ASA to Department of Army, 11/28/69, Subject: Status of
USASA Support to DA Civil Disturbance Control Operations. Message from
ASA to Department of Army, 11/30/70, Subject: USASA Support to DA Civil
Disturbance Control Operations.
" Message from Department of Army to ASA, 12/1/70, Subject: USASA
Sunport to DA Civil Disturbance Control Operations.
m NBC News, First Tuesday, 12/1/70.
" Memorandum for Record, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
12/11/70, Subject: Meeting with General Counsel.
ministration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, prepared-
ness, and effectiveness of (their particular service)." 198
Each of the military departments has traditionally maintained that.
the services required such authority in order to defend themselves. 199
Their argument has been that within the United States the FBI does
not provide sufficient information for this purpose, and, outside the
United States, there is no law enforcement agency upon which they
can rely at all for such information.2 00
The restrictions, imposed by the DOD in 1971 upon the collection of
information on "unaffiliated" persons and groups, expressly excepted
the collection of information on "threats" from its general prohibi-
tion.ox But the 1971 restrictions do not define what a "threat" is, apart
from listing examples such as "subversion of the loyalty, discipline, or
morale: of Department of Defense military or civilian personnel,"
which lend themselves to broad interpretations. 20 2
A. Investigations of Civilian Groups Within the United States
(1) Inve8tigation8 Undertaken Prior to the 1971 Directive.-In
the late 1960s and early 1970s military investigators from each of the
three services conducted investigations and maintained files on civil-
ian groups whose activities were directed against the military. The
Army reported to Congress that it "maintained files" on eleven such
civilian groups during 1969 and 1970.203 Furthermore fourteen mili-
tary groups (designated as "Resistance in the Army"-RITA) were
subjects of Army investigations. 204
Of particular interest to all the services were offpost coffeehouses,
operated by these civilian groups, and "underground" newspapers,
published by the same groups. Typically, both were designed to attract
military personnel. The primary means of obtaining information on
both the coffeehouses and the underground newspapers was to pene-
trate them with either a military intelligence agent or a military in-
formant, who would report back on the group's activities. These
reports were typically shared with the FBI and local law enforce-
ment agencies.
Again, Army representatives told Congress that the Army had con-
ducted "investigations" of 17 such coffeehouses,2' and "maintained
I' 10 U.S.C. 3012 (authority for the Secretary of the Army).
See 10 U.S.C. 5031 and 10 U.S.C. 8012 for comparable provisions for the Secre-
tary of the Navy and Secretary of the Air Force, respectively.
' Testimony of David 0. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller), 1974 Hearings, p. 108.
' Ibid., pp. 106, 122.
m DOD Directive 5200.27, paragraph IV (A).
m That part of the DOD Directive which permits the investigation of civilian
groups considered by the military as "threats" is discussed in detail at pp. 827-
828.
mo "Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 71," Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), Pt. III, p. 163.
The extent to which the Army was still maintaining files and conducting sur-
veillance activities against civilians came in the course of testimony regarding
Army expenditures for intelligence.
2 Ibid.
2w Ibid., p. 161. These included the Fun, Travel and Adventure Coffee House
near Ft. Knox, Ky.; Sergeant Brown's Memorial Necktie near Ft. Devens. Mass.;
Open Your Eyes near Ft. Eustis, Va.; Shelter Half near Ft. Lewis, Wash.; and
the Oleo Strut, near Ft. Hood, Texas.
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files" on 53 "underground" newspapers 206 during 1969 and 1970; but
that as of March 1970, the number of coffeehouses, as well as the
number of "underground" newspapers, was "drastically declining." 2"
(2) Inve8tigations of Civilian Groups After the 1971 Directive.-
As mentioned above, in March 1971, an internal directive was issued
which generally limited the military's collection of information about
private groups and individuals. It allowed for the collection of infor-
mation on "threats," however, and it permitted the military to pene-
trate covertly civilian groups so long as such penetrations were ap-
proved by a special DOD-level board-the Defense Investigative Re-
view Council (DIRC). 208 The directive set no standards, however,
upon which the DIRC would base its decision.
20
9
Since the date of the directive, nine requests have been made by the
military services (none of which were made by the Army) for DIRC
approval of covert penetrations directed against civilian groups.
Summaries of these requests follow.
2 1 0
(a) Antiwar Group in San Diego, California.-On March 25, 1971,
Navy Secretary John Warner requested DIRC approval for three
ongoing penetrations of civilian groups being carried out by agents
of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS). On May 24, 1971, he
amended the request by asking for permission to continue only one of
the three.
This entailed the penetration of an antiwar organization in San
Diego whose membership was predominantly comprised of military
personnel. NIS reported that it had several sources within the group,
including one in the "inner circle" of the group's headquarters. DIRC
was also informed that the FBI had declined to conduct its own pene-
tration, but had been informed of the NIS operation and its plans
to continue.
DIRC approved the request on May 24, 1971. In November 1971, it
revalidated the penetration at the request of the Navy.
On June 30, 1972, the Navy terminated the operation on its own
initiative. It reported to DIRC that it had succeeded in identifying
189 military personnel who were members or had some contact with
the group (NIS had obtained a copy of the membership list), and had
obtained extensive information on its financial and political connec-
tions. NIS -also indicated that it had filed a total of twenty-one reports
on the group, all of which had been distributed to the FBI, DIA, the
Air Force, and the Army. The operation terminated because the group
had disbanded.
(b) Peace Group to Hanoi.-The Air Force had recruited an anti-
war activist who was scheduled to go to Hanoi as part of a peace group
to report on the conditions of prisoners-of-war in North Vietnam.
DIRC approval was sought since the operation involved the penetra-
tion of a civilian group.
20 Ibid
2W Ibid., p. 163.
m DOD Directive 5200.27, para. V (E).
' The deficiency in the DOD Directive is discussed in detail at pp. 828-833. It
should be noted, however, that the DIRC has issued instructions to guide the in-
dividual services in submitting their requests for approval of covert penetrations.
Presumably, these same standards would govern the DIRC's decision.
20 All of the following summaries are the product of staff review of DIRC files.
DIRC gave its approval on September 24, 1971, but the Air Force
source did not make the contemplated trip to North Vietnam, and no
information was obtained.
(c) Underground Newspaper Near Travis Air Force Base.-On
October 1, 1971, Air Force Secretary John McLucas requested DIRC
permission to penetrate the staff of an underground newspaper which
was published near Travis Air Force Base in California. He stated
that the newspaper had encouraged insubordination by Air Force per-
sonnel, and that a penetration was necessary to determine whether
there was any conscious effort to disrupt Air Force activities or dam-
age Air Force property. DIRC approved the request on October 6,
1971.
The operation lasted until October 1972. DIRC was informed that
the Air Force Office of Special Investigations had not succeeded in
planting a source on the newspaper staff, but that it had identified
fifty Air Force personnel and fifteen civilians who were active in the
newspaper's operations. No evidence of any conscious effort to damage
Air Force property or disrupt Air Force activities was found.
(d) Peace Group in San Diego, California.-On May 30,1972, Navy
Under Secretary Frank Sanders requested DIRC approval for the
p enetration of a second antiwar group in San Diego, California. Mem-
bers of the group were thought to have been instrumental in protest-
ing the deployment of certain ships to South Vietnam. DIRC was in-
formed that both the FBI and local police had declined to place a
source in the group.
DIRC approved the operation on June 5, 1972. A year later, NIS
filed a progress report and requested revalidation of the operation. It
cited the fact that the operation had succeeded in identifying military
personnel who were members of the group, and had learned of "dis-
cussions" regarding plans to sabotage U.S. ships,21' to encourage in-
subordination within the Navy, and to reveal military secrets. NIS also
stated that it had received warnings of public demonstrations against
the war as a result of the penetration. The DIRC revalidated the pene-
tration. It continued until May 1974, when the group no longer focused
upon military problems.
(e) Antiwar Group in Charleston, South Carolina.-On October 20,
1972, the Navy requested DIRC approval to penetrate an antiwar
group in Charleston, South Carolina. It cited FBI reports which
showed the group planned to protest the departure of certain ships to
South Vietnam, and was contemplating acts of sabotage against a
Navy vessel. NIS reported that the FBI already had a source within
the group, but that the source did not provide sufficient information
regarding military personnel and military targets. DIRC approved
the penetration.
The operation lasted until May 1973, when it was determined that
the group no longer represented a significant threat to the Navy. NIS
reported that as a result of the penetration it had learned of one in-
cident in which Navy personnel had attempted to damage the boilers
on a U.S. vessel.
(f) White Racist Group in Charleston, South Carolina.-On
April 23, 1973, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations requested
a The "plans" referred to in the files apparently were never carried out.
DIRC approval of a penetration of a white racist group in Charles-
ton, South Carolina. Members of this group had apparently been re-
sponsible for encouraging racial unrest at Charleston Air Force Base.
Furthermore, the Air Force had information that the group had con-
tacted an Air Force sergeant for the purpose of obtaining ammunition
from the airbase. DIRC approved the penetration.
This penetration never took place because the military source was
transferred before his application for membership in the group was
approved.
(g) Dissident Group in Long Beach, California.-On March 15,
1973, the Navy requested DIRC approval for the penetration of a dis-
sident group with antimilitary objectives in Long Beach, California.
DIRC was informed that the FBI did not have a source within this
group.
DIRC disapproved the request on the grounds that the group did
not represent "a direct and palpable threat" to the Navy. It suggested,
however, that the Navy might provide a source which could be placed
under FBI control.
In fact, a Navy agent was "loaned" to the FBI in September 1973,
with DIRC approval. It lasted until July 1974, when the FBI decided
to terminate.
(h) Servicemen's Counseling Center in San Diego.-On June 7,
1974, the Navy requested DIRC approval for a penetration of a serv-
icemen's counseling center in San Diego, California. It stated that it
had reason to believe that the center was under communist influence
and encouraged insubordination among Navy personnel.
DIRC took no action on the request, and it was formally withdrawn
in August 1974.
(i) Antimilitary Group in Charleston, South Carolina.-On
March 14, 1975, the Navy requested DIRC approval to penetrate a
group that was offering advice to dissident sailors in Charleston, S.C.
It cited evidence it had obtained from the FBI that the group intended
to encourage a sit-down strike aboard a Navy vessel. NIS indicated that
it already had someone within the group that would cooperate.
DIRC approved this penetration to last for a period of 90 days only.
On May 1, 1975, the Navy reported that the penetration had been
terminated. NIS had learned of plans for a sit-down strike but it
never materialized because the ringleader had been administratively
discharged for drug-related reasons. Apparently, the Navy informant
had provided information which formed the basis for the discharge.
B. Investigations of Civilian Groups Overseas
Overseas, in the absence of the FBI, the military services have in
the past been more active in investigating civilian groups which they
consider "threats." In many cases, these groups have been composed
entirely or in part of American citizens living abroad.
Until August 1975, there were no departmental restrictions on
investigations of U.S. citizens living abroad. 2 1 2 DOD Directive 5200.27,
'"On August 20, 1975, the Defense Investigative Review Council voted to
extend DOD Directive 5200.27 overseas. This change has subsequently been in-
corporated in the directive.
In a case currently pending before the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (Berlin Denocratic Club et al. v. Sclesinger et al., Civil
which restricted such investigations in the United States, did not
apply overseas. Hence, the only restrictions which did apply
were the laws of the host country and the Status of Forces
treaties which normally govern the relationship between American
occupying forces and the host country. As a practical matter au-
thority to conduct operations against civilian groups has rested largely
with local military commanders.213
(1) Army Operations in We8t Germany and West Berlin.-The
Army has had troops stationed in West Germany and West Berlin
since the conclusion of World War II. As part of the occupation
agreements negotiated between the United States and West Germany,
the German Government agreed to provide security for American
forces stationed in West Germany.21 4 In satisfaction of this obligation,
the West German government has allowed the U.S. Army to conduct
counterintelligence operations within its boundaries. While such
operations were undertaken, for the most part, to detect the activities
of hostile intelligence agents or to recruit sources for foreign intelli-
gence purposes, they were occasionally undertaken to identify persons
or groups which sought to undermine the discipline or morale of U.S.
troops.
Until 1968, the decision to conduct such operations rested largely
with the commanders of intelligence units scattered throughout the
country.215 They were guided for the most part by operational neces-
sity. While no figures are available for this period, it is clear that
American citizens were occasionally targeted by these operations, and
that relationships between foreign groups and individuals, and Amer-
ican citizens were routinely scrutinized. 2 16
A variety of intelligence-gathering techniques were employed: wire-
taps, mail opening, covert penetrations, photography, and personal
surveillances. All were performed apparently with the knowledge of
the West German authorities, and, in the case of mail and telephone
intercepts, with their cooperation. 217
In 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) brought the
most sensitive surveillance activities-mail opening and wiretaps-
under its exclusive control. It created a parliamentary commission to
Action No. 310-74, filed 2/29/74), the government does not argue that U.S.
citizens who live or travel in foreign countries lose their constitutional rights
vis-a-vis the United States Government agencies, i.e., the Army, which might he
present in such countries. It does argue, however, that the Government has
additional security needs abroad against which the exercise of constitutional
rights must be balanced. The Government further argues that certain constitu-
tional safeguards, e.g., the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, are
not applicable in foreign contexts. See Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, filed 6/7/74,
pp. 46-48, 66-76, 105-107.
2m This authority has, of course, been subject to the direction of higher military
authority.
m4 Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 5/26/52, As Amended by (Schedule I of the Protocol on Termi-
nation of the Occupation Regime in Germany, Signed at Paris, 10/23/54, Article
5. Printed in "Documents on Germany: 1944--1970," Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, United States Senate (1971), p. 250.
m Staff summary of DOD Briefing, Army Counterintelligence Operations in
West Germany and West Berlin, 10/24/75.
211 Ibid. Also see staff summary of Col. John J. Coakley (ret.) interview, 8/14/75.
21 Ibid.
pass upon all requests for both mail and telephone intercepts, and
required that all such intercepts be performed by FRG authorities. 218
The requirements of this law were incorporated in a supplemental
agreement to the Status of Forces Agreement, referred to above.
Thus, the Army has been required to request mail opening and wire
surveillance from the West German commission in conformity with
the requirements of the new law since 1968. On one occasion, in fact,
a wiretap was requested on a foreign national who was working closely
with an American political group in Heidelberg. 219 It resulted in the
Army's obtaining considerable information regarding the personal
and political activities of American citizens who were living and
traveling in the Heidelberg area. 2 2 0
Insofar as other types of surveillance are concerned-penetrations,
photographic or covert observation-U.S. Army intelligence officers
continued to have approval authority.
In fact, Army intelligence has conducted surveillance operations
against civilian groups, comprised in part of American citizens, in
West Germany since 1968. In Heidelberg, for instance, the Army in
1973 attempted to penetrate the staff of an "underground" newspaper,
Fight Back, which was directed at military personnel in the area.2 2 1
It also penetrated a civilian legal counseling troup in Heidelberg
which was offering free counsel to servicemen. 2 2 2
In Mainz, another West German city, the principal target of Army
operations in 1973 was a meeting house jointly sponsored by the U.S.
National Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches, and
the German Evangelische Kirche, which attracted servicemen al-
legedly engaged in "dissident" activities within the military. 'The
Army photographed persons going into the meeting house, wrote down
license plate numbers, and sent their own agents inside to report back
on the group's activities. 224
Similar operations were carried out by the Army in West Berlin
where the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany did not apply.
Hence, the 1968 law, which placed strict restrictions on the Army's
ability to employ unilaterally mail openings and wiretaps, had no
effect there.
In West Berlin, under a special tripartite agreement with the
British and the French called the Allied Konunandatura, -the Army
commander is made the governing authority for the American sector
'" Federal Republic of Germany, Law Restricting the Privacy of Mails, Tele-
phone and Telegraphic Communications, 8/13/68, commonly referred to as the
"G-10" law.
1974 Hearings, pp. 382-389.
m Ibid. The summaries of wiretapped conversations indicate, in fact, that the
Army was more interested in the activities of American dissidents who were
working with the subject of the wiretap than it was with the subject himself.
' See "Germany Expelling U.S. Student for Work on Anti-Army Newspaper,"
New York Times, 9/13/73.
22' Affidavit of Carl E. Maze, Army intelligence agent, Defendants Submission
to the Court in camera, Ex Parte Berlin Democratic Club, et al. v. Schlesinger
Civil Action No. 310-74. United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
10/29/74.
"1974 Hearings, p. 394, and "U.S. Army Is Said To Spy on Its Critics in
Germany," New York Times, 7/28/73, p. 1.
"' 1974 Hearings, p. 394.
of West Berlin.2 2 5 The Komonandatwjra contains no restrictions on in-
telligence gathering of any kind: On the contrary, it requires each
of the three governments to provide information to the others regard-
ing security in their respective sectors of the city.
226 An active intel-
ligence operation thus appears to have been contemplated.
In fact, such an operation has been carried out by the Army since
World War II, not simply for its own purposes, but for the other Allied
commands as well. The Army has engaged in wiretapping and mail
openings as part of this program, as well as a variety of other surveil-
lance techniques.2 2 7 Further, in West Berlin, as in other cities in West
Germany, the Army has occasionally turned this intelligence apparatus
against civilian groups (composed largely of American citizens) who
were considered by the Army to be "threats." 
2 2 8
In August 1972, the Army focused its attention on a group called
"Americans in Berlin for McGovern," an organization which report-
edly had petitioned the National Democratic Party in the United
States for official affiliation. 229 After the election, the group changed its
name to Concerned Americans in Berlin, and attempted to interest
military men in joining. Members of the group were connected to an
"underground" newspaper called Forward, which made direct appeals
for support to military personnel in West Berlin.
As part of its surveillance of the group's activities, the Army opened
mail addressed to the newspaper, and penetrated its staff.
2 0 It also
sent informants or agents into Concerned Americans in Berlin'to re-
tort on its activities. 23 1 Surveillance of the group continued until 1974.
(2) Navy Operations in Japan."2-Beginning in 1973, the Naval
Investigative Service (NIS) conducted special counterintelligence
operations (covert penetrations) in three Japanese cities-Okinawa,
Iwakuni, and Yokosuka-against targets similar to those investigated
by the Army in West Germany. In each case, the targets were private
meeting places operated by a coalition of political groups, comprised
predominantly of Americans living in Japan. The groups attempted
to attract military personnel-often they provided legal counseling
and representation; and in some cases they published newspapers
designed to appeal to the military.
Mail opening and wiretaps were not used by the Navy against these
groups, as the Army had done in West Germany. The Navy's method
of operation in Japan was confined to using its own personnel as in-
formants. NIS records show that these informants made frequent-
in some cases, almost daily-reports to their case officers. Usually, the
reports described the activities of the members of each group, and
2 Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship Between the Allied Kom-
mandatura and Greater Berlin, Signed by the Three Western Commandants, Ber-
lin, 5/14/49. Also, Allied Kommandatura Letter, Subject: Declaration on Berlin,
to the Governing Mayor, Berlin. 5/5/55.
mIbid., para 2(e).
"
7 DOD Briefing (staff summary), 10/24/75.
2 Ibid.
1974 Hearings, pp. 370-379.
1974 Hearings, pp. 364-365.
2 Maze Affidavit, Berlin Democratic Club et al. v. Schlesinger, 10/29/74; and
1974 Hearings, pp. 373-379.
23 The description of these operations is based upon an examination of NIS
files by the Select Committee staff.
what had taken place in discussions and programs at the meeting
places. Any military personnel who frequented the meeting places
were reported, as were any "outsiders" who came as guests. NIS fre-
quently ran FBI and DOD checks on such "outsiders," and occasionally
requested copies of passport and visa applications from U.S. and
foreign authorities.
Navy informants also obtained copies of letters and envelopes found
at the meeting houses, and took copies of subscription lists, financial
records, and 'contact" lists maintained by the groups under surveil-
lance. In most cases, they also provided copies of photographs taken
of group members to NIS.
Information regarding the participation of Navy personnel was re-
ported by NIS to local Navy commanders, and on at least two occa-
sions, Navy personnel who became active participants in the groups
were transferred to other locations.
None of the three penetrations were coordinated with the FBI, CIA,
or DOD counterintelligence agencies as they would have been if the
agents of a hostile intelligence service had been involved. Nonetheless,
NIS did disseminate reports on the three groups to all of the agencies
mentioned.
In none of the three cases did NIS have information prior to con-
ducting the penetration that the groups were, in fact, engaged in, or
planning to engage in, illegal activities. The penetrations were under-
taken to determine if the groups posed any threat to the Navy, and, if
so, to enable the Navy to prepare for it.
All of these operations were instituted by the Director of the Naval
Investigative Service. Since they involved overseas operations, they
did not, at that time, require the approval of the Defense Investigative
Review Council.
V. ASSISTING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE
CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS
Military intelligence is rather frequently called upon, or undertakes
on its own initiative, to provide information or support to law enforce-
ment agencies at all levels of government, as well as the Secret Service.
A. Legal Authority
The extent to which the military can legally be used to "assist" law
enforcement agencies in the performance of their duties is not clear.
On the one hand, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the mili-
tary from "executing the law . . . except in cases and under circum-
stances expressly authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress." 2 "3
One such statutory exception, which Congress recognized in its de-
bates on the 1878 Act,23 4 was the power of the President to use the
armed forces to enforce the laws, in times of insurrection.2 3 5 Such use,
however, was conditioned upon the President's issuing a formal procla-
mation calling for the insurgents to disperse.2 36
18 U.S.C. 1385.
7 Cong. Rec. 3849 (1878).
010 U.S.C. 331-333.
m 10 U.S.C. 334.
In the years following the Civil War, federal marshals had relied
on Army troops to help them enforce federal election laws in the
South.37 By enacting the Pomse Comitatus Act .in 1878, Congress
sought to end the practice, or at least ensure that federal troops could
not be used without a formal proclamation from the President.2 3 8 This
suggests, therefore, that the Posse Comitatu Act was intended to
limit the ability of law enforcement agencies, in the absence of a
presidential proclamation, to task federal troops for support.
Insofar as military intelligence is concerned, it seems clear that the
Act would prevent its being tasked by civilian law enforcement to
perform criminal investigations of civilians. The extent to which the
military intelligence can otherwise be required to support such activity
is not so clear, but the Po88e Comitatws Act undoubtedly serves to
restrain such cooperation.
B. Nature of Assistance
(1) Collection and Exchange of Information.-In Chicago, Army
intelligence in the late 1960s received a copy of virtually all police
intelligence reports. 239 The military, in turn, provided the Chicago
police with their own reports, and in some cases, with military person-
nel records.24 0 In addition, Army intelligence frequently responded to
police and Secret Service requests for information.241
When the DOD restrictions came into effect in 1971 calling for the
destruction of all files on "unaffiliated" persons and organizations,
several Army intelligence units turned over their intelligence files on
dissident individuals and organizations to local police authorities
rather than having them destroyed: the Chicago Police Department
received the files of the 113th Military Intelligence Group; 24 the
Pennsylvania State Police obtained the files on "personalities" of the
109th Military Group; 243 the Cuyahoga County Sheriff's office received
the 109th's files on dissident organizations in the Cleveland, Ohio,
area; 244 and the Washington, D.C. Police Department reviewed and
retained certain files of the 116th Military Intelligence Group.242
In 1972, an Air Force counterintelligence unit in San Diego began
maintaining files on dissident individuals and groups in the San Diego
area. This activity was in anticipation of receiving tasking from the
Secret Service to collect such information in preparation for the 1972
Republican National Convention, which was scheduled for San Diego
at that time.246
" See Edward S. Corwin, The President: Ofece and Powers, 1787-1957, (New
York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 137-138.
' Ibid. See also, Rankin and Kailmayr, Freedom and Emergency Powers in the
Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964) p. 220.
m Norusis (staff summary), 6/23/75.
2
'
0 Ibid. Also, see "Lawyer Data Winds Up in Police Files," Chicago Daily News,
4/9/75, p. 1.
2.. O'Brien, 1971 Hearings, pp. 116-117.
" "Ex-FBI Aide Accused in Police Spy Hearings," Chicago Tribune, 6/21/75,
p. 3.
24 1971 Hearings, p. 1297.
" Ibid.
.4. Memorandum for ACSI Task Force, U.S. Army Intelligence Command, Sub-
ject: Possible Transfer of MI Files, 2/8/71.
2" See DIRO Inspection Report No. 4, 4/21/72, 1974 Hearings, p. 250.
(2) Transfer of Money and Equipment.-In 1968 after the riots
following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., a meeting was
held at the White House. At this meeting Mayor Walter Washington,
of Washington, D.C., expressed concern that the Intelligence Division
of the Metropolitan Police Department did not have sufficient resources
to predict future riots and disorders.
Shortly thereafter, at the order of the White House, the Army ar-
ranged for a transfer of $150,000 from its intelligence funds to the
D.C. Police Department to be used for intelligence purposes.24 8 In the
summer of 1968, the Army also agreed to furnish the Justice Depart-
ment with tear gas grenades for distribution to local police depart-
ments, but the plan was never implemented.2 4 9
(3) Participation in Law Enforcement Operationm.-On January
14, 1969, shortly before the inauguration of President Nixon, two
Army intelligence agents participated in an FBI search of the evac-
uated premises of an underground newspaper in Washington, D.C. 250
The FBI obtained a key from the landlord to gain entry, and sub-
sequently removed documents which they found on the premises. These
were turned over to the Army agents.2 5 1
In Chicago, two Army intelligence agents were invited to "observe"
a 1970 police raid on a meeting place of the Chicago 7 defense team.2 52
Another Army agent in Chicago stated that he had been invited to par-
ticipate in several raids by the Chicago police, including the raid on
the apartment of Black Panther leader Fred Hampton in November
1969.253 He denied having participated in any of the raids, however.
During the Democratic Convention of 1968, Army intelligence
agents in Chicago were also detailed to support the U.S. Secret Service.
One of the agents who was involved was assigned at various times to
monitor personally the activities and whereabouts of Ralph Aber-
nathy, Lester Maddox, and Jesse Jackson.2 54
In 1974, at the request of the FBI, Army investigators were used to
take down the license numbers of cars in a parking lot at West Point,
New York .2 5 5 The lot was being used to park the cars of demonstrators
in town for a protest demonstration.
Also in 1974, a special agent of the Defense Investigative Service
was asked to assist with an investigation of the U.S. Customs Bureau
by interviewing a friend suspected of having knowledge of the case.2 50
(4) Participation in Interagency Intelligence Projects.-Represent-
atives of the military were among those involved in drafting the so-
a See Testimony of Albert C. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intel-
ligence), Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of
Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), p. 219.
* Hyman Memorandum, 1974 Hearings, p. 307.
"Break-In by FBI Alleged Before 1969 Inauguration," New York Times,
3/31/73, p. 1; also "FBI Was Given Key for Search in 1969," New York
Times, 6/1/73, p. 14.
' Ibid.
2 Norusis (staff summary), 6/23/75.
' Staff summary of Jerry L. Borman interview, 6/13/75.
2 Statement of Richard G. Stahl, former intelligence agent, 6/18/75.
2 See Army Response to 2nd Select Committee inquiry, in Select Committee
files.
* Ibid.
called Huston plan in the summer of 1970.257 This plan was developed
for the President and proposed numerous alternatives for the expan-
sion of domestic intelligence capabilities. The military representatives,
however, succeeded in keeping the military out of further domestic
responsibilities. As White House aide Huston put it in his recom-
mendations to the President: "The intelligence community is agreed
that the risks of lifting these restraints (on military intelligence) are
greater than the value of any possible intelligence which could be ac-
quired by doing so." 258
In December 1970, however, six months after the Huston Plan had
been rescinded, the Department of Defense agreed to participate in an
interagency committee on domestic intelligence. Designated the In-
telligence Evaluation Committee, the group operated under the aegis
of the Justice Department.2 59 Its objectives were to prepare analyses
and reports on domestic unrest. The DOD furnished one representa-
tive to the Committee which lasted from January 1971 until June
1973.260 It also furnished a Navy ensign who was assigned to the IEC
working staff.261
In 1972, the Under Secretary of the Army approved a Justice
Department request to furnish three Army intelligence analysts to the
Justice Department's Information Evaluation Center in Miami
Beach.262 The purpose of these agents was to analyze intelligence com-
ing into a Justice Department communications center regarding pos-
sible demonstrations during the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions of 1972. These agents were on duty from July 15 to
July 25, 1972; and from August 15 to August 25, 1972.2683
VI. CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL RESTRAINTS UPON SURVEILLANCE OF
CIVILIANS
As discussed above, after the Army's civil disturbance collection pro-
gram had been exposed in the press, the Department of Defense in
March 1971 issued a new directive 264 which, in general:
-forbade the military from collecting and maintaining information
on "unaffiliated" persons and organizations, except for that "essential"
to the military mission;
-required that all information being held in violation of the direc-
tive be destroyed;
-permitted the military to continue investigating civilian groups
which it considered as "threats";
2 Representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, DIA and NSA took part.
For a detailed description of the Huston Plan and its evolution, see the Select
Committee staff report, "National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection
of Intelligence: A Report on the Huston Plan."
a Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H.R. Haldeman, 7/17/70, Sub-
ject: Domestic Intelligence Review, p. 4.
0 See Letter from D. 0. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Sena-





"' DOD Directive 5200.27.
-permitted the military to conduct both covert and overt surveil-
lance of civilian political activities if permitted by high-level DOD
officials;
-did not prevent military intelligence from continuing to supply
assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies.
The discussion now turns to a more detailed account of what the
directive requires and how it has worked. We begin by noting the im-
pact the directive has had on intelligence activities undertaken for the
purposes identified in Parts II-V above. The report then discusses the
remaining provisions of the directive as restraints upon military sur-
veillance in the future.
One must keep in mind throughout, however, that it is an admin-
istrative directive being considered. No matter how effective it may
have been in the past, the directive can be rescinded or changed at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense.
A. Curbing Pa8t Abuse8
Although the new directive places relatively strict restraints on
the collection and retention of information regarding "unaffiliated"'
persons and organizations, it leaves military intelligence free to engage
in collection activities for each of the purposes described in parts II-V.
(1) Preparing for Civil Disturbances.-The directive states that
the Attorney General of the United States is the chief civilian officer
for purposes of coordinating activities relating to civil disturbances.
Furthermore, it gives the Secretary of Defense or his designee-in this
case, the Secretary of the Army-the authority to order that informa-
tion be acquired to meet the Department's "operational reqcuirements,"
if "there is a distinct threat of a civil disturbance exceeding the law
enforcement capabilities of state and local authorities." 265
The directive does not state from whom the Department is author-
ized to obtain the information relating to its "operational require-
ments," or whether it may use its own personnel to collect such infor-
mation. Moreover, by reciting that the Attorney General is the chief
official responsible for coordinating civil disturbance operations, it
implies that if the Attorney General were to task the DOD for infor-
mation regarding civil disturbances, the Department would have no
choice but to comply. This is, of course, precisely what took place in
1967.
Thus, while the directive requires that any civil disturbance collec-
tion effort using military operatives or otherwise be "turned on" at a
high level of the Department, it does not forbid the military from
collecting information for this purpose.
As a matter of fact, the Secretary of the Army has exercised his
authority under the directive by designating a small element at the
Department of. Army level-the Division of Military Support-to
maintain contact with the Justice Department and acquire informa-
tion from it regarding "distinct threats of civil disturbances." None
of this information is currently disseminated within DOD but, presum-
ably, it would be in the event Army troops were deployed.
It would seem that while the directive appears to authorize the col-
lection of information on potential civil disturbances on a case-by-case
' DOD Directive 5200.27, Para. IV (c).
basis, in fact the Army has decided to authorize continuous, albeit
limited, collection.
The Committee's investigation also revealed that this portion of
the directive has been violated. As late as 1975, the National Security
Agency, a foreign intelligence collection agency of the Department
of Defense, was maintaining information on potential civil disturb-
ances on the grounds that it was helpful to NSA recruiters who may
be entering such "troublespots." 26 DOD put an end to the practice.
(2) Monitoring Donwstic Radio Transmission.-The directive con-
tains no direct reference to radio monitoring. Rather, it has a general
prohibition against the use of electronic surveillance "except as au-
thorized by law."
It is noted, in this regard, that the monitoring and publication of
radio transmissions are outlawed by section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, but that did not prevent the Army Security Agency
from engaging in such intercepts from 1967 to 1970.268 The Army, in
fact, continued such monitoring even after being told by the FCC that
it was illegal.
(3) Investigating "Threats" to the Military.-The directive express-
ly provides that "information may be acquired about activities threat-
ening defense military and civilian personnel and defense activities
and installations . . . ." One example of a "threatening" activity
cited in the directive is the subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale
of Department of Defense military or civilian personnel by actively
encouraging violation of law, disobedience of lawful orders or regula-
tions, or disruption of military activities."
This exception for "threats" is, on its face, ambiguous. The phrase
"subversion of the loyalty, discipline, or morale of DOD personnel,"
is not defined, nor is the phrase "encouraging .. . disobedience .. . or
disruption of military activities." Conceivably, these exceptions could
encompass any form of protest activity against the established order in
the civilian community.
The Committee has noted in the course of its investigation that
there are differing interpretations of what constitutes a "threat"
among the military services. For example, the Navy considered the
fact that its personnel were members of a "dissident" civilian group
sufficient grounds to treat the group as a "threat," and thereby justify
retaining information about the group. The Army and Air Force,
however, did not consider the membership of their personnel in such
a group sufficient grounds to collect information on the group. They
would retain information regarding such a group only if it could other-
wise be shown to be a "demonstrable threat" to their respective services.
These differences in interpretation are also reflected in the services'
requests to the DIRC for approval of covert penetrations. In the one
case where the DIRC turned down such a request, it did so on the basis
l)IRC Inspection Report, No. 19, 4/29/75. See Select Committee Report
"National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans".
" Neither the National Security Agency nor the service cryptologic agencies
which are under its operational control (the Army Security Agency is one of
these) regard section 605 of the 1934 Act or title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act as applying to them, since they collect foreign Intel-
ligence. See the Select CommUittee report "National Security Agency Surveillance
Affecting Americans". A different question is posed, however, when the National
Security Agency or one of its service components intercepts domestic communica-
tions for purposes other than foreign intelligence.
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that the civilian group against which a penetration was proposed, al-
though presumably antimilitary, did not represent a "direct and pal-
pable" threat. The directive, of course, makes no such distinction.
We have also seen in practice that what the military views as "threats"
are not always perceived as such by the FBI which, when approached
by the military, declines to initiate an investigation of the civilian
group in question.
(4) Assisting Law Enforcement Agencies.-The directive states that
DOD will place "maximum reliance" upon domestic law enforcement
agencies to satisfy its informational needs regarding civilians. It also
provides that the directive shall not be construed to prevent the Depart-
ment from reporting threats to life and property, or violations of the
law, to local law enforcement.
It makes no reference, however, to DOD's being tasked by law en-
forcement or other Federal agencies to perform intelligence duties in
the civilian community. In practice, DOD has taken the position that
all operations within the civilian community must be carried out in
accordance with the directive, whether they are done at the request of
other agencies or not.
Nevertheless there is a discernible tendency for DOD to agree when
asked by other agencies to undertake intelligence activities which it
would otherwise forbid to itself. For example, DOD participation in
the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its support to the Justice
Department at the 1972 political conventions are cases where DOD
undertook domestic intelligence activities at the request of other
agencies, which it presumably would not have undertaken on its own
initiative.
In short, the activities of the Department of Defense which have led
to abuses in the past are still within its jurisdiction, although the use
of military personnel to collect such information has been restricted.
The nature of these restrictions is the subject of the next section.
B. Preventing Surveillance in the Future
Although DOD Directive 5200.27 does seek to prohibit the "collect-
ing, reporting, processing, or storing information on individuals or
organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense," it al-
lows for exceptions and its terms are so ambiguous that future sur-
veillance activities in the civilian community might be undertaken con-
sistent with the directive.
(1) Scope.-Until August 20, 1975, DOD Directive 5200.27 applied
only to military personnel located in the 50 states, and the territories
and possessions of the United States.271 Furthermore, it did not apply
to the acguisition of "foreign intelligence information," even if such
information involved unaffiliated persons and organizations.
As noted previously, the Army undertook operations against civil-
ian groups in West Germany and West Berlin, and the Navy under-
took operations against similar groups in Japan, without seeking
exceptions to the DOD directive.
There has also been confusion over the meaning of the exclusion of
foreign intelligence information. Until August 1973, two years after
' On August 20, 1975, DIRC expanded the scope of the directive to include
military personnel in overseas locations.
the directive had been in effect, the National Security Agency, a for-
eign intelligence collection agency within the Department of Defense,
considered itself to 'be exempted by this clause from the provisions of
the directive.172
Moreover, NSA was found to have been violating the restrictions of
the directive. Its Office of Security was told in 1973 to destroy 40 cubic
feet of files on "unaffiliated" individuals and organizations being held
in violation of the directive.2 7 3
(2) Permitted Exceptions.-In addition to designating what in-
formation on unaffiliated individuals and groups may 'be collected and
retained, the directive also provides how such information shall be
collected. It begins by stating as a matter of "policy," that "maxi-
mum reliance" will be placed upon local law enforcement authorities.
It, nevertheless, allows military personnel to be used to collect "essen-
tial" information if authorized by various high-level persons within
the military.
(a) Covert surveillance.-The directive provides that "there shall be
no covert or otherwise deceptive surveillance or penetration of civilian
organizations unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of De-
fense or his designee." In this case, the "designee" is the Chairman of
the Defense Investigative Review Council, the special board, referred
to earlier, established to monitor the implementation of the directive.2 7 4
It should 'be noted, however, that the directive provides no criteria to
guide the judgment of those officials who must decide whether covert
surveillance should be employed. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Robert F. Froehlke, in an exchange with Senator Edward M. Kennedy
during the 1971 hearings, conceded that the directive may be deficient
in this respect:
KENNEDY. And you are not maintaining any information
then on any individual at the present time who is involved in
in protests?
FROEHLKE. Only under the policy that we have now. It
does allow it under certain circumstances, but in all cases a
civilian official would first have to give his approval. . . .
KENNEDY. And what criteria does he use?
FROEHLKE. Judgment, his judgment.
KENNEDY. Completely a subjective determination?
FROETLKE. As of this moment, yes. . . .
KENNEDY. Don't you think criteria ought to be set?
FROEHLKE. Yes. Short of having criteria, you are going
to be arbitrary. 275
As noted above, this authority has been exercised nine times since
1971 by the Chairman of the DIRC, all for the purpose of conducting
penetrations of civilian groups considered "threats." The Com-
" The DIRC informed NSA that the directive covered all elements of the De-
partment of Defense, including foreign intelligence collection agencies. It only
excludes from its general prohibition "foreign intelligence information." See
DIRC Inspection Report, No. 19, 3/29/75; and Staff Summary of Roland Morrow,
Defense Investigative Program Office, interview, 5/22/75.
* Ibid.
m The DIRC was established by DOD Directive 5200.26.
1971 Hearing8, p. 435.
mittee's investigation revealed only one minor "deceptive surveillance"
which appears not to have been authorized by the DIRC in accordance
with the directive. This occurred at Pawnee, Oklahoma, near Fort
Sill, where on two occasions in the spring of 1973 the Provost Marshal
of Fort Sill ordered Army personnel to conduct reconnaissance flights
to determine if members of the American Indian Movement were
marching on the Army post, or were building fortifications near
Fort Sill.277
(b) Overt Surveillance.-The directive also provides that "no DOD
personnel will be assigned to attend public or private meetings, de-
monstrations, or other similar activities for the purpose of acquiring
information the collection of which is authorized by this Directive
without specific prior approval by the Secretary of Defense or his
designee." The designees in this case are the Secretaries and Under
Secretaries of each military department. Local commanders may also
authorize such surveillance on their own initiative to collect informa-
tion on "direct and immediate threats," but this must subsequently be
reported to the Secretary of Defense or his designees.
Again, the Committee investigation revealed only one probable
violation of this provision. Army investigators attended a protest
rally in West Point, New York, in May, 1974, without the required
authorization of the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Army.
(c) Electronic Surveillance.-As mentioned previously, the direc-
tive provides only that the department will not conduct electronic
surveillance of any unaffiliated persons or organization "except as
authorized by law." This would seem to mean that insofar as non-
consensual wiretaps and eavesdrops are concerned, DOD must obtain
the approval of the Attorney General in accordance with section 2516
of title 18, United States Code. Consensual eavesdrops (one party
consents) must also have the approval of the Attorney General; 279
consensual wiretaps, however, may be approved within the Depart-
ment of Defense, but only for the investigation of crimes."so
It should also be noted that since electronic surveillance would also
be covert or deceptive, presumably its use would also require the
approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Defense
Investigative Review Council.
The Committee found no evidence that DOD had employed elec-
tronic surveillance against any unaffiliated person or organization
in the United States since 1971.
(d) Retention of Files.-The directive prohibits the "storage" of
information which violates its provisions. It further provides that
any information gathered under its provisions shall be destroyed
within 90 days, "unless its retention is specifically required by law, or
unless its retention is specifically authorized under criteria established
by the Secretary of Defense or his designee." The designee in this case
is the Chairman of the Defense Investigative Review Council.
m7 See DOD Response to Senate Select Committee's 2nd document request.
" See Memorandum from the Attorney General to the heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies; 6/16/67.
2' DOD Directive 5200.24.
The Chairman of the DIRC did exercise this authority soon after
the directive was issued to permit the military departments to main-
tain "dead storage" files, so long as procedures were employed to
screen any such files prior to disseminating information from them.2 81
This decision was made in order that the military departments
would not have to screen literally millions of files in "dead storage."
It did, nonetheless, result in a technical violation of the directive since
much of this information was not retainable.
A second violation of these provisions was the Army's retention
of microfilm files in a counterintelligence analysis unit in Washington,
D.C. Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway announced in
January, 1975, that the microfilm files contained substantial informa-
tion on the political activities of persons and organizations unaffiliated
with the Department of Defense and should have been destroyed.
Subsequent investigation by DOD disclosed that the microfilm con-
tained 160,000 documents, 24,000 of which were added since March 1,
1971, the date of the departmental directive. Of the 136,000 documents
dated prior to the directive, approximately 6,900 were found to be
held in violation of the directive's retention criteria. Of those 24,000
added after the date of the departmental directive, 175 were identified
in a preliminarily screening as being in possible violation of the direc-
tive. -Twenty-three were then determined by DOD to be in definite
violation of its directive.
The Army explained that the microfilm files had, in fact, been
screened in December 1970, in accordance with an Army order preced-
ing the promulgation of the DOD directive. At that time, those who
screened the files apparently considered the exception made for
"threats" to the Army to be broader than the current interpretation.
Due to the negligence of subsequent commanders of the Army unit
which maintained the files, the annual screening required by the
departmental directive did not occur.
A similar explanation was given for the accumulation of twenty-
three documents, obviously in violation of the directive. After the date
such directive was issued, the Army suggested that those who had
placed such documents in the files had a different interpretation of the
term "threat" than was currently acceptable.
The Select Committee also investigated news reports that the Army's
civil disturbance files, the retention of which was not authorized by
the directive, were transferred in 1972 from Fort Holabird, Maryland,
to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology via a Defense Depart-
ment computer network.2 8 3 The Committee investigation, however, did
not substantiate the news report.
(3) Implementation and Enforcement.-The task of implementing
and enforcing the departmental restrictions is delegated primarily
to the Defense Investigative Review Council (DIRC), the Chairman
of which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense on such matters.284
The DIRC carries out its work by issuing guidance to subordinate
elements of the department on how the basic directive should be imple-
a DIRC Study Report No. 1, 5/5/71. Subject: Retention Criteria for Investiga-
tive Information, Para VI.
m The Report was aired on the NBC Nightly News, 6/3/75.
2 See DOD Directive 5200.26.
mented. It also conducts unannounced inspections of DOD installations
to determine whether they are in compliance with the departmental
restrictions. As of May 29, 1975, the DIRC had conducted 19 such
inspections, covering a total of 82 DOD installations. 28 5
In general, the Committee investigation found that implementation
of the departmental restrictions has been vigorous and effective. The
Committee reached this judgment only after its staff inspected the
files and key operational personnel of every major domestic intelli-
gence headquarters of the Department. It found that the Department
of Defense now maintains little information on private citizens and
organizations in its current files. Of that which is maintained, all has
been carefully segregated and is systematically screened prior to dis-
closure outside the particular agency which holds them.
Moreover, as indicated above, violations of the directive have been
rare and relatively minor. They do not demonstrate widespread or
systematic misconduct. Furthermore, exceptions permitted by the
Department to the general prohibition of the directive do not appear,
in the Committee's view, to represent egregious abuses of discretion on
the part of authorizing officials.
(4) Prospects for the Future.- While the current departmental di-
rectives have succeeded in limiting military surveillance activities
against private citizens and organizations, these limitations remain
only in the form of an internal regulation, which can be rescinded or
amended by the Secretary of Defense. Although the Department as-
sures the Committee that it has no intention of doing either, it cannot
dispute the fact that such a possibility remains. Several former Army
officials told the Committee staff that if America returned to a period
of perceived crisis, such as the late 1960s, the new controls may be
scrapped. 28 6 Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert F. Froehlke con-
ceded as much in his testimony before the Ervin committee in 1971:
The Army, in such situations (civil disturbances), is really
the only unit of Government that has the resources today.
Whether or not it should be that way I think is very debat-
able, but that is now the fact, and when you get crisis situa-
tions, you need information. Responsible officials fear cities
are going to burn. Where do they look? They look to that
unit of Government that has the resources available, and it
is always the Army.28 7
Indeed, the current directives have such great flexibility that re-
newed surveillance activity could easily be undertaken if permitted
by high level officials of the Department. Again, one might consider
the following exchange between Senator Edward M. Kennedy and
Assistant Secretary Froehlke at the 1971 Ervin hearings:
KENNEDY. Are we going to assume now at the end of these
hearings that the Department of Army is going to continue
to involve itself (in collecting information on civilians) ?
2 At each installation visited by the DIRC inspection team, all units which
are likely to collect or maintain information on unaffiliated individuals and
organizations are normally inspected.
' Staff summary of Col. Arthur Halligan interview, 7/15/75; and staff sum-
mary of Gen. Millard Daugherty interview, 11/20/75.
m 1971 Hearings, p. 436.
FROEHLKE. The Army is out of it....
KENNEDY. Of course, they are out of it unless your council
[the DIRC] decides they are back in it.
FROEHLKE. Yes, sir ... 288
VII. CURRENT STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON MILITARY SURVEILLANCE
There is no statute which expressly prohibits the investigation of
private citizens by the military.
As noted above, the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) which
prohibits the military from being used to "execute the law," would
probably prevent the military from conducting criminal investiga-
tions of civilians, but that this would not bear upon other types of
investigations.'"9
Other than this, only the Privacy Act of 1974 290 appears to bear
indirectly upon the matter. The Privacy Act imposes general restric-
tions on all agencies of the Federal Government that "maintain sys-
tems of records" insofar as the maintenance and dissemination of
records on individuals are concerned.
One of these general restrictions, which applies to the Department
of Defense, as an agency which "maintains a system of records," is:
Each agency that maintains a system of records shall ...
maintain no record describing how any individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly
authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the
record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the
scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.2 91
Thus, the Act prohibits the maintenance of certain files, and not
investigations per se. Obviously, if an agency is prohibited from main-
taining records of investigations, it will ordinarily not be disposed
to conduct them.
Nevertheless, the impact of the Privacy Act, insofar as preventing
military investigations in the civilian community, is far from certain.
The Act itself has received no authoritative judicial interpretation, 2 2
and section 552a(e) (7), cited above, is, on its face, ambiguous. It is
unclear, for example, what a record "describing how any individual
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment" might consist of.
Would attendance at a protest demonstration, for example, be an ac-
tivity which could not be recorded under the Act? If the military
expected to be deployed during the demonstration, would taking note
of an individual's attendance be permissible under the Act? Whether
an individual act represents the exercise of Frst Amendment rights
or is conduct which justifies government investigation often depends
upon the facts of the case.
Further, section 552(e) (7) allows a government agency to main-
tain information on an individual's exercise of First Amendment
rights if (1) the agency is expressly authorized by statute to main-
a See pp. 822-823.
m P.L. 93-579.
I 5 U.S.C. 552a (e) (7).
2 The Privacy Act of 1974 became effective on 9/27/75.
tain such information; (2) if the maintenance of such record is au-
thorized by the individual concerned; or (3) if such information is
pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity." "3
These exceptions would appear to allow the military to maintain
records on private citizens and organizations for certain purposes of
its own, and to permit the use of these records by other federal agen-
cies which themselves fall within one of the excepted categories.
For example, the military is charged with enforcement of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, a law enforcement function. Thus,
criminal investigators would probably be able to maintain informa-
tion on the political activities of private citizens which was pertinent
to their investigations. Similarly, the military conducts security clear-
ance investigations to which subjects give their consent. Presumably,
this would enable military investigators to maintain information on
the political activities of such individuals.
Insofar as assisting other agencies is concerned, the reader has also
seen that the military intelligence has frequently been employed by
agencies with law enforcement purposes (the Justice Department and
FBI), and by an agency "expressly authorized by law" to maintain
such information (the Secret Service) .294 It woula appear, therefore,
that the military is not foreclosed by the Privacy Act from providing
intelligence assistance to other agencies.
In summary, the Privacy Act falls short of providing adequate
assurance that the military will not engage in surveillance of private
citizens in the future. The statute is written as applying generally to
all government agencies; its particular application to the military is
unclear. It is also sufficiently ambiguous and contains enough excep-
tions to raise doubts as to its effectiveness as a future restraint on
military investigative activity against private individuals and
organizations.
2OThis exception, insofar as the military is concerned, would have to be con-
sidered in light of the Pos8e Comitatus Act.
2 Section 2 of Pub. C. 90-331 (Note to section 305c. title 18, United States
Code).
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THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: AN INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCE AND COLLECTOR
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Internal Revenue Service functions as an intelligence agency
in two respects. First, through its Intelligence Division, it both col-
lects general intelligence about possible tax violators and investigates
specific allegations of tax fraud to secure evidence for criminal prose-
cution. Second, the IRS accumulates vast amounts of information
about the financial and personal affairs of American citizens from the
tax returns and supporting information which Americans voluntarily
submit each year. As a rich deposit of intelligence and an effective in-
telligence gatherer, the IRS is a powerful tool which other agencies of
government, including Congress and the executive branch, have peri-
odically sought to employ for purposes other than tax law enforce-
ment. This report is primarily an exploration of the reasons these uses
of the IRS have led to serious and illegal abuse of IRS investigative
powers and to a compromise of the privacy and integrity of the tax
return.
1. Intelligence Collection
The IRS Intelligence Division, with 2,800 special agents trained to
gather financial data, unlimited access to tax returns, and the power
to issue summonses requiring the production of financial information
without probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, repre-
sents a great investigative capability. Because of this capability, Con-
gress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and even the White House
have sought, sometimes successfully, to direct the efforts of IRS
against certain groups or individuals, many of whom would not have
been investigated under normal IRS criteria. In part because of the
absence of any statutes which meaningfully limit IRS authority to
gather general intelligence, IRS had little basis for resisting pressure
when it was applied. In any event, IRS did not always attempt to re-
sist. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many groups and persons were
selected for investigation by the Special Service Staff essentially be-
cause of their political activism rather than because specific facts indi-
cated tax violations were present. The evidence suggests the IRS read-
ily acceded to the congressional and White House pressure which led
to the formation of the Special Service Staff, and that the targets of
the Staff's activities were, in practice, largely determined by input
from the FBI for reasons unrelated to tax enforcement.
Special Service Staff is the principal instance of the use of the IRS
for a fundamentally improper non-tax purpose: selective enforcement
of the tax laws against dissenters. However, the use of IRS to achieve
even laudable non-tax objectives has also generally resulted in serious
abuse of IRS power.
(837)
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The use of IRS intelligence collection capability to achieve desir-
able non-tax objectives has resulted in loss of control over investiga-
tive techniques, and a loss of the capacity to limit the scope and nature
of information gathered to that which is related to tax enforcement.
Operation Leprechaun, for example, was an effort to employ IRS
investigative power to combat political corruption. The operation led
to the collection of details on the personal and sexual lives of certain
Florida political figures and to illegal acts on the part of IRS
informants.
Abuses such as Operation Leprechaun and others discussed in this
report have resulted from a combination of factors which have gen-
erally accompanied the use of the IRS for non-tax purposes. The IRS
system of organization and control over investigative activities has
not proved compatible with the pursuit of non-tax objectives. The
IRS was decentralized in 1952 in an effort to end widespread political
influence congressional investigators had discovered. Under this de-
centralized structure, the intelligence chief in each of the fifty-eight
IRS districts largely controls and supervises investigations. The
essence of decentralization is heavy reliance upon the professional, in-
dependent judgment of agents at the field level, subject to the setting
of general policy by the National Office. Under these general guide-
lines, agents and supervisors in the field apply tax related criteria in
,making decisions concerning the identification of targets of investiga-
tions, and the initiation and scope of investigations. The result has gen-
erally been that investigative resources are applied to particular tax-
payers or categories of taxpayers in proportion to the tax compliance
problems they present based upon the IRS experience of prior years.
This system is generally known as "balanced tax enforcement."
The use of the IRS for non-tax purposes requires "unbalanced en-
forcement," where the target group is selected for reasons other than
the significance of the tax compliance problem it presents. Unbalanced
tax enforcement has given rise to a combination of elements which
have produced abuse: (1) the subordination of tax criteria to achieve
a concentration of enforcement resources creates an atmosphere
within the IRS which encourages excessive zeal and departure from
other normal criteria of IRS operation; (2) the pursuit of non-tax
objectives through selective tax enforcement by the IRS Intelligence
Division has historically involved the use of techniques such as paid
informants, electronic surveillance, and undercover agents, all of
which are prone to abuse; (3) because the IRS decentralized or-
ganizational structure is designed to achieve tax objectives and is, by
design, resistant to pressure from above, in order to bring about the
desired imbalance in the enforcement program, the IRS has generally
found it necessary to bypass its normal organizational structure; (4)
in doing so, the IRS has bypassed the normal administrative mech-
anisms which check excess and abuse at the lower levels.
The loss of control over investigative techniques, over the scope and
nature of information gathered, and over the identification of proper
targets has not proved to be a function of whether the particular non-
tax objective the IRS has been called upon to pursue is right or
wrong. The Committee's investigation strongly suggests that more
effective oversight and new controls over IRS intelligence gathering
are necessary if the IRS is to be used for any non-tax purpose.
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2. IRS as an Intelligence Resource
Because the information submitted by taxpayers and gathered by
the Intelligence Division is so extensive, IRS has often been viewed by
other governmental intelligence and investigative agencies as a data
bank on which these agencies could draw for their own purposes un-
related to enforcement of tax laws. Both the FBI and the CIA have
had virtually unrestricted access to any tax information they sought
for any purpose.
The dissemination of tax returns and related information ("dis-
closure") is governed by statutes and regulations designed to limit
access to and use of the information. These restrictions, however, have
often failed to protect the information, in some cases because the laws
themselves were inadequate and in others because they were circum-
vented. Moreover, the uses to which the information was later put
were often questionable. In some cases, such as the FBI's
COINTELPRO, the uses were clearly illegal.
SUMMARY OF -RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION
The Committee's investigation of abuses of IRS intelligence was
divided into two parts: (1) a study of abuses of IRS because of the
uncontrolled access which other 'federal intelligence agencies have
had to tax returns and other tax information, and (2) a study of
alleged abuses in the IRS' own intelligence gathering.
Part I. Acce88 of Federal Intelligence Agencies to Tax Return
Information
The extent to which other federal agencies should have access to
tax information for non-tax purposes has been under study by several
congressional committees. This Committee, however, is the only com-
mittee studying the question of disclosure which was authorized and
directed to investigate all intelligence agencies and their interaction.
Senate Resolution 21 specifically directed this Committee to study:
'The nature and extent to which Federal agencies cooperate
and exchange intelligence information and the adequacy of
any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation
and exchange of intelligence information."
The committee staff reviewed every request 'by a federal intel-
ligence agency 'for a tax return of which there is a record either in
IRS or in the requesting 'agency. Most of these requests were from
the Department of Justice on behalf of the FBI. In selected cases,
the staff obtained the initiating documents from the requesting agency
to determine the purpose for which the information was desired,
compared this purpose with the reason or lack of reason given in the
request, then traced the tax 'information back into the requesting
'agency to determine what use was actually made of it. As a result
of its access to the records of other intelligence agencies, this Com-
mittee has had a unique opportunity to evaluate the problems of
disclosure of tax returns to intelligence agencies.
The most important facts the staff found were:
(1) The IRS has not required either the CIA or the FBI to state
the specific purpose -for which it needed tax return information.
"Senate Resolution 21, section 2(8).
(2) In the absence of such a specific statement, the IRS could not
judge whether the request met the regulatory criteria for release of
the information. In effect, IRS had delegated the determination of
the propriety of the request to the requesting agency.
(3) Further, in the absence of a statement of the specific reason
the tax return is needed, there is no basis upon which to limit the
subsequent use of the return to the purpose for which it was initially
released.
(4) As a result of these weaknesses in the disclosure mechanism,
the FBI has had free access to tax information for improper purposes.
The FBI obtained tax returns, for example, in an effort to disrupt
the lives of targets of its COINTELPRO operations, by causing tax
audits. The FBI used as a weapon against the taxpayer the very
information the taxpayer provided pursuant to his legal obligation
to assist in tax collection and, in many cases, on the assumption that
access to the information would be restricted to those concerned with
revenue collection and used only for tax purposes.
Because of the importance of the disclosure problem and its poten-
tial impact on all United States citizens, the Committee culminated
its investigation into the matter by holding a public hearing on
October 2, 1975, calling the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service, Donald C. Alexander, -as the witness.
Part II. Abuses in Intelligence Gathering
A. Areas of Inquiry.-The Committee's investigation of possible
abuses of IRS' own intelligence gathering required a selective ap-
proach. First, the Committee lacked both the time and resources neces-
sary to investigate the activities of the Intelligence Division in each
of the fifty-eight districts. Second, numerous allegations of abuse ap-
peared in the press in the early and middle portion of 1975, the very
period of this Committee's active investigation into IRS. Some of
these allegations were fully investigated by other congressional com-
mittees having specific oversight responsibilities over IRS, and this
Committee decided not to duplicate those investigations. Others were
investigated preliminarily by this Committee but determined to be
unfounded, in which case they are not discussed in detail in this
report.
The Committee focused most of its efforts on reviewing major
projects which represented systematic rather than isolated abuses and
which illustrated problems of control common to other IRS projects.
The Committee therefore examined:
(1) The causes of the breakdown of controls which permitted im-
proper electronic surveillance and other abuses of IRS intelligence
gathering in the drive against organized crime (1960-1964), as docu-
mented by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (the Long Committee).
(2) The origins and function of the Special Service Staff (SSS)
(1969-1973) and the Ideological Organizations Audit Project of the
early 1960s, whereby politically active groups were targeted for
investigation.
(3) The operation of the Information Gathering and Retrieval Sys-
tem (IGRS) used to collect and index general intelligence (1973-
1975) and, on occasion, personal information. .
(4) Operation Leprechaun in the Jacksonville, Florida, district
which involved improperly controlled informants who unjustifiably
collected personal and sexual information on some targets (1969-
1972), and committed a burglary.
(5) IRS actions, including use of undercover agents to monitor
meetings, against groups known as "tax protesters" which refused to
pay taxes as a form of protest against the tax system or against certain
government policies.
B. Metlwd of Investigation.-The Committee's investigation of
intelligence gathering abuses included: (1) reviewing reports of IRS
internal investigations; (2) corroborating the findings of those IRS
investigations on which the Committee relied, through independent
investigation; (3) intensively investigating intelligence operations in
six IRS district offices, including reviewing thousands of documents
relating to the Information Gathering and Retrieval System and the
Special Service Staff, as well as other special projects; interviewing
numerous special agents charged with -intelligence-gathering func-
tions, particularly those concerned with IGRS; interviewing most of
the principals and reviewing IRS Inspection Division summaries of
interviews as well as key documents in Operation Leprechaun;
interviewing Audit and Collection personnel who handled Special
Service Staff field referrals; reviewing tax protester intelligence files;
and interviewing special agents in charge of tax protester projects in
three districts.
Throughout its investigation, the Committee staff received full and
willing cooperation from all IRS officials in both the National Office
and the field. It had full access to all documents it requested and to
all employees it wished to interview.2
C. Sum'mary of Result.-As the criminal investigative arm of IRS,
the Intelligence Division normally investigates tax fraud allegations.
Because the scope of such an inquiry is self-defining, it has been practi-
cal for IRS to give the agent assigned to a case wide discretion in
selecting investigative techniques and the kinds of information col-
lected. The same inherent limitation upon the scope of the inquiry
made local supervision of such investigations practical. But, as the
following cases reveal, abuses inevitably arose when IRS intelligence
powers were employed to collect general intelligence rather than to
investigate specific tax fraud allegations, and to target groups for
purposes other than "balanced enforcement" under programs directed
from the National Office.
1. IRS Use of Electronic Eavesdropping Techniques-The Long
Committee Findings
In 1965, the Long Committee3 discovered a number of cases of
unlawful electronic surveillance by IRS agents, mostly in the course
of investigating organized crime figures under the aegis of the Nation-
wide Organized Crime Drive. The Long Committee hearings indi-
cated that the normal system of control over intelligence investiga-
tions was inadequate for those which, unlike ordinary tax fraud
2 During the course of the investigation the staff did not request or did it review
any individual's tax returns or tax related information.
a The Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, Hon. Edward
Long, Chairman.
investigations, involved the use of abuse-prone investigative tech-
niques, such as electronic surveillance.
The IRS had established a National Office Coordinator for the
Organized Crime Drive. In a number of the cases of improper elec-
tronic surveillance uncovered by the Long Committee, the testimony
established that the agents performing the surveillance were operat-
ing either under the authority or general guidance of the Coordinator,
with the knowledge of the Intelligence Division personnel in the dis-
trict in which the operation was taking place. The effect of creating
the Coordinator was to bypass normal administrative controls with-
out introduciig effective new controls.
2. Special Service Staff (SSS) : 1969-1973
The Special Service Staff was formed in 1969 in response to con-
gressional and White House criticism of inadequate IRS efforts
against "activism" and "ideological" organizations and individuals.
The critics believed IRS had a special responsibility to determine the
sources of funds of large activist groups and their leaders and to
assure their adherence to the tax laws.
The Special Service Staff was a special National Office organization
designed to concentrate IRS attention on "activists" and "ideologies"
in order to preclude criticism of the adequacy of IRS attention in that
area. In part because of the probable resistance of the decentralized
IRS structure to selective enforcement on a political basis, the National
Office deemed it necessary to act through a National Office organiza-
tion to achieve the desired imbalance in the enforcement program. The
Special Service Staff, using lists of political activists, including lists
supplied by the FBI and the Department of Justice, proceeded to "un-
balance" the enforcement program against "dissidents" and "extrem-
ists." By deciding what cases to bring to the field's attention, it
bypassed normal screening procedures and focused audit efforts on
groups and individuals selected for their political activities and beliefs.
In a few cases, SSS employed its position in the National Office to
bypass the district's normal structure and influence the handling of
individual cases.
The effect was that SSS reviewed the tax status of groups and
individuals in the absence of specific evidence of tax violations because
they exercised First Amendment rights. SSS targets included 8,000
individuals and 3,000 groups. Some of these groups historically had
not engaged in illegal activity of any kind, much less tax violations.
For example, targets included the Ford Foundation, the Head Start
Program, and fifty branches of the National Urban League.
The Special Service Staff, which had operated in secrecy, was
abolished by Commissioner Alexander when he learned of its existence
shortly after taking office in 1973.
Although the purpose of SSS differed fundamentally from that of
the Organized Crime Drive, both were efforts to employ tax weapons
for essentially non-tax purposes. Both required the creation of a special
National Office structure to achieve the desired emphasis in the enforce-
ment program. While IRS participation in the Organized Crime Drive
represented the pursuit of a laudable government objective, in both
cases, the special structure resulted in the bypassing of normal admin-
istrative controls and permitted abuse to occur.
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Ideological Organizations Audit Project
The Special Service Staff was not the first IRS effort directed at
groups and individuals because of their political ideologies and actions.
In 1961, the IRS initiated a test audit of right-wing organizations
which had drawn stern criticism from the President. The test audit
grew into a planned attempt by IRS to conduct intensive investiga-
tions of 10,000 tax-exempt organizations in order to determine
whether or not they engaged in political activities, which are impermis-
sible for tax-exempt organizations. The plan also called for investiga-
tion of non-exempt right-wing organizations through reviews of the
contributors' returns for improper deductions.
While IRS efforts directed at these political action -groups were
not as extensive as the coverage given organizations by the Special
Service Staff, the efforts did result in a significant departure by IRS
from a balanced enforcement program, and a concentration of tax
enforcement on certain individuals and groups because of their politi-
cal beliefs. The efforts IRS directed at these ideological organizations
established a foundation and precedent for the later Special Service
Staff.
The Committee did not find abuses of the normal IRS functions be-
yond the abuse which inheres in concentration of audits on organiza-
tions and individuals selected for political reasons (and in part by the
White House). The program illustrates responsiveness of the IRS to
the subtle pressures of other government agencies, and demonstrates
the need for close scrutiny of any IRS activities the primary purpose
of which is to achieve non-tax objectives.
3. Information Gathering and Retrieval System (LRS)
Partly as a result of its participation in the Organized Crime Drive,
the IRS Intelligence Division perceived a need to improve its ability
to gather and retrieve intelligence beyond the scope of investigations
of specific allegations of tax fraud. The Information Gathering and
Retrieval System, which IRS developed between 1963 and 1975, was
an effort to increase the collection of such "general" intelligence and
to index and store this intelligence efficiently. Ultimately, it included
information about 465,442 persons or groups.
The gathering of general intelligence differs from the investigation
of alleged tax violations in two fundamental respects: (1) there is
no inherent standard of relevancy by which to determine what kinds
of information to collect, and (2) there is no clear standard for decid-
ing who should be investigated. In the absence of such standards, nor-
mal IRS reliance upon agent discretion presents dangers. Neverthe-
less, the creators of IGRS failed to supply any meaningful criteria
for target selection or for the relevancy of the information to be
gathered. The results were tremendous overbreadth and a glut of
largely useless information gathered under IGRS. For example, the
system contained information not only about persons suspected of ties
with organized crime, but also individuals who had routine commer-
cial business transactions, such as selling a restaurant, with these per-
sons. In addition, in some districts, intelligence was collected about
political groups. IGRS became so encumbered by irrelevant data that
it was not effective for the purposes for which it was created. It was
terminated in 1975.
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4. Operation Leprechaun--Collection of Personal Inforrrmation: 1969-
1972.
The perceived need to gather general intelligence, and thus to estab-
lish IGRS, was largely a result of IRS participation in efforts against
organized crime and political corruption. Operation Leprechaun was
part of a drive against political corruption and involved the worst
examples of abuse of any project associated with IGRS. The evidence
indicates:
(a) that the special agent in charge of Operation Leprechaun, oper-
ating through informants, collected an excessive amount of informa-
tion on the sex and drinking habits of some of the targets of the
operation;
(b) that he engaged in electronic surveillance contrary to IRS
regulations;
(c) that two of his informants burglarized the office of a congres-
sional candidate, apparently without the special agent's knowledge
or consent, and stole a filing cabinet containing tax-related informa-
tion, some of which they then delivered to the special agent; and
(d) that the special agent's string of thirty-four informants were
not under effective control.
The agent's ability to gather highly personal information on the
targets which was not tax related, is a reflection of the absence of
meaningful written standards establishing criteria for relevancy of
information gathered under IGRS. The failure was less that of the
agent or of his superiors than of the creators of IGRS, who failed to
recognize that reliance upon agent discretion in general intelligence
gathering required more stringent, specific guidelines for relevancy
than ordinary tax investigations.
Similarly, the agent's inability to control his informants repre-
sented a failure of the IRS structure within which the agent's actions
took place rather than of the agent himself. IRS lacked a system
under which supervisors, rather than agents, could make key decisions
on recruitment and handling of informants. Instead, such decisions
were left to the agents, unassisted by clear guidelines.
In 1975, after analyzing the deficiencies of IGRS and investigating
the Leprechaun abuses, IRS management began to impose restrictions
upon intelligence gathering designed to assure that non-tax-related
information would not be gathered, that targets of information-
gathering operations would not be selected by the agent's personal
predilections, and that agents and management would have greater
control over informants. If fully implemented, they will reduce the
likelihood of recurrence of abuses such as those associated with Oper-
ation Leprechaun.
Many of the controls which are necessary to avoid a repetition of the
abuses of Operation Leprechaun and IGRS might not be necessary if
IRS confined its activities to a balanced tax enforcement program.
Many of these necessary controls may actually impede the special
agent in the performance of the normal IRS intelligence mission. The
price of the continued use of the IRS for purposes such as Operation
Leprechaun will either be continued abuse in the absence of stringent
controls or the imposition of controls which are necessary to prevent
abuse in the area of selective enforcement but may be excessive for
traditional tax collection activities.
INTRODUCTION AND DISCLOSURE
The data Americans voluntarily provide the IRS every year make
it the largest potential source of information about the personal lives
of Americans.4 The raw data which IRS holds and its special capa-
bility for obtaining financially related information in addition to that
which taxpayers voluntarily furnish, including the power to issue a
summons for records without a showing of probable cause, constitute
an intelligence resource which is of great potential usefulness to other
intelligence agencies pursuing non-tax objectives.
This Committee has studied the means by which federal intelligence
agencies have gained access to tax information, the stated purposes
for which they have obtained the information, and the uses they have
made of the information they obtained. The Committee has not at-
tempted to develop a comprehensive set of criteria for access to tax
returns, though its findings show that current regulations, as applied,
have permitted access for purposes which should be excluded. The
Committee has examined the current system of controls over access
in light of the uses intelligence agencies have made of the information
to which they have gained access under that system of controls. It has
found that the mechanism through which disclosure criteria are en-
forced has serious weaknesses. An effective mechanism for enforce-
ment of disclosure criteria is as crucial to protection against access
for improper purposes as the criteria themselves.
Under the current system, the FBI has obtained returns for pur-
poses for which they should not have been released even under exist-
ing, liberal standards for release of tax information.5 The FBI was
able to do so because the IRS failed to apply existing regulations to
require the requesting agency to state the reason for its request so that
the IRS could determine whether the purpose of the request fell
within the limits for permissible disclosure. The failure to require a
specific statement of purpose in the request for tax information has
also resulted in an absence of effective limitations upon the uses to
which the FBI could put the information it obtained.
Proposed legislation to narrow the purposes for which investigative
agencies can obtain tax information will not eliminate the potential
for repetition of the kinds of abuse the Committee has uncovered
unless the disclosure mechanism is also overhauled to assure that those
limitations are more effectively enforced than the broader limitations
have been enforced in the past. The purpose of this report is to analyze
those weaknesses in the present control mechanism which are respon-
sible for the abuses which have occurred.
' Testimony of Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner of the IRS, 10/2/75, hear-
ings, Vol. 3, pp. 25, 26.
' Shortly after the Senate Select Committee's hearing at which the abuses
which have arisen from weaknesses in the disclosure mechanism came to light,
the IRS changed its practice under the current regulations. Beginning in the
middle of October 1975, the IRS has required that all requests from United States
Attorneys and attorneys of the Department of Justice for tax return information
under 26 CFR 301.6103(a)-1(g) and (h) must include a sufficient explanation
which will permit the IRS to determine that there is an actual need for all the
requested information, and that it will be properly used by the requestor. This
change in practice is, however, not a result of any change in the regulations, and
is itself subject to change.
I. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SETTING
Under section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, "returns made
with respect to taxes . . ." are open to inspection "only upon order
of the President and under rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate and approved by the President." "Returns"
are not defined in the statute, but are defined by regulations [Treasury
Regulation Sec. 301. 6103 (a)-1(a) (3) (i)] to include both actual
returns and
Other records, reports, information received orally or in
writing, factual data, documents, papers, abstracts, memo-
randa, or evidence taken, or any portion thereof, relating to
[returns].
The present regulations provide that the Department of Justice
shall have access to "returns", stating:
. . [a] return in respect of any tax shall be open to inspec-
tion by a United States attorney or by an attorney of the
Department of Justice where necessary in the performance
of his offlca duties. The application for inspection shall be
in writing and shall show . . . (4) the reason wh inspection
is desired. 26 C.F.R. § 6103(g). [Emphasis added.]
This regulation differs from those applicable to other agencies (such
as the CIA), which are covered by the blanket provisions of section
6103(f ) :
if the head of an executive department . . or of any
other establishment of the Federal Government desires to
inspect a return in respect of any tax . . . in connection with
some matter officially before him, the inspection may, in the
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury or the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue . . . be permitted upon written
application. . . . The application shall . . . set forth . . .
(4) the reason why inspection is desired. . . .6 [Emphasis
added.]
Section 6103 (a)-1(a) (3) (i), supra, which, by defining "tax return"
broadly, has the effect of broadening the information the IRS is
obliged 7 to furnish to the Justice Department upon proper request to
include the results of IRS audits and intelligence investigations. In
the course of some of these audits and investigations, the IRS develops
information through the use of strong powers given it to determine
and collect the revenue (principally the power to obtain financial in-
formation by means of a summons without any showing of probable
cause) which neither the Justice Department nor the FBI could legal-
SExcept where indicated, the regulations have been substantially as sum-
marized above during all periods discussed in this report.
'On their face, the regulations seem to restrict access by the Department of
Justice to cases where returns are "necessary" in connection with its official
duties while heads of other agencies may obtain them when they "desire" them in
connection with their official duties. As a practical matter, however, IRS has not
applied the criterion of "necessity" to Department of Justice requests, so the
apparent distinction has had no practical consequence.
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ly obtain on its own without demonstrating probable cause. The regula-
tions contain no requirement that the Justice Department establish
probable cause to obtain this information from the IRS even where it
is to be used for criminal investigatory purposes unrelated to enforce-
ment of the tax laws.
n. IRS PRACTICE
A. Before 1968
Until 1968, the FBI obtained tax returns and other tax information
directly from the IRS Intelligence Division, under a procedure which
the Chief of the IRS Disclosure Branch termed "illegal" upon learn-
ing of it in 1968.8 Under that procedure the IRS failed to exercise
vigilance to determine the purposes for which the FBI obtained
returns.9
In one case, for example, in order to develop information "discre-
diting or embarrassing to the United Klans of America" "o or to a
Klansman who was the subject of FBI interest, the FBI field office
recommended obtaining the Klansman's returns in order to attempt
to determine whether he was reporting income from the Klan as income
from other sources. The recommendation was approved by FBI head-
quarters in November 1964. The returns were obtained from the IRS
through its Intelligence Division.
One of the express purposes of this operation was, in part, to "ex-
pose [the Klansman] within the Klan organization, publicly or by
furnishing information to the Internal Revenue Services." 1x Thus, the
planned operation envisaged the illegal public disclosure of tax
information.
On November 20, 1964, the FBI requested the returns of the Klans-
man for the years 1959 through 1963 and for the Klan organization for
1961 and 1963, and received the returns from IRS in January 1965.12
Although FBI documents do not indicate whether or not the planned
disruptive action was ever carried to fruition, the returns had left IRS,
to be used by the FBI for whatever purpose it deemed necessary.
Because of the lapse of time and the absence of records, the precise
nature of the procedure by which the FBI obtained returns before 1968
is not determinable. A review of FBI administrative files in the Bu-
reau's Liaison Section and the testimony of the FBI agent responsible
for liaison with IRS,13 however, indicates that the essential steps in
the process were as follows:
1. The FBI would decide to request a particular return or
set of returns on the basis of a memorandum setting forth the
reasons for the request in some detail;
'Memorandum from D. 0. Virdin for Harold E. Snyder, "Inspection of Returns
by FBI," 5/2/68.
* There is little documentary evidence of the pre-1968 procedures since, accord-
ing to Ms. Margaret Sampson of IRS Disclosure Branch, all IRS records of
pre-1968 disclosures to the FBI were destroyed in the Disclosure Branch in a
space-saving drive in about 1972 (the records having been transferred from Intel-
ligence to Disclosure in 1968). The only records which apparently ever existed
were the incoming request, in contrast to the practice in Disclosure of forwarding
material (or permission to review it) by letter to the requesting agency, signed by
an authorized IRS employee.
'0 Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/10/65.
Memorandum, Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/10/65.
" Memorandum, Midwest City Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, undated.
" Bernard Rachner testimony, 9/25/75 pp., 7-18.
2. The FBI would prepare a form letter for signature by
the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division,
Department of Justice, setting forth that the returns were
necessary in connection with an official investigation, but stat-
ing no specific reason;
3. The Assistant Attorney General was not given the de-
tailed memorandum stating the reasons for the request;
4. Liaison Section (the FBI Section responsible for liai-
son with other agencies and the White House) delivered the
signed form letter to someone in IRS Intelligence, who ob-
tained the requested information; 14
5. IRS Intelligence Division kept no record of the transmit-
tal of the information; 1
6. IRS Intelligence did not consult anyone outside the
Intelligence Division (including the Disclosure Branch--
which was theoretically charged with the responsibility for
disclosure of this kind of tax information) regarding action
on the request. 6
B. After 1968
In 1968, the Chief of the Disclosure Branch learned that the Intel-
ligence Division had been handling FBI requests for returns, branded
the practice "illegal" in a memorandum to his superior,'1 and effected
the transfer of all FBI requests to his jurisdiction.'
Though FBI requests for tax information were thereby regularized
after 1968, there is scant indication the IRS subjected them to more
meaningful scrutiny than it had while the Intelligence Division
handled the requests even though the regulations arguably required
such scrutiny. The regulation (26 C.F.R. § 6103(g)) requires that the
return be "necessary in connection with the official duties" of the re-
questing attorney, and also requires that the "reason" for the request
be given in writing.
After 1968, the Internal Security Division of the Department con-
tinued to obtain returns by means of a form letter which recited the
conclusion that the regulatory criteria were met. It stated that the
return was "necessary in connection with an official matter before this
office involving the internal security . . .," i.e., that it was "necessary
in connection with the official duties of the requesting attorney," but
contained no separate statement of a "reason" for the request.'9 On
the basis of these letters,2 0 the IRS could make no independent evalua-
tion of whether the reason for the request was in fact within the official
" See, e.g., memorandum, Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 11/18/64.
1 See Note **, p. 25.
* Memorandum from D. 0. Virdin for Harold Snyder, 5/2/68.
"Ibid.
During this same period, the CIA was apparently obtaining returns in a
manner similar to the FBI (though in much smaller numbers), yet no one in
the Intelligence Division or elsewhere in the Compliance Division thought to
examine that practice in light of the change being made in the practice with
respect to the FBI. See testimony of Donald 0. Virdin, 9/16/75, pp. 69-73.
" Since the request could not even be properly made unless the return was
necessary in connection with the requesting attorney's official duties, it is an
improbable interpretation that the statement of "reason" called for by the regula-
tions was to be simple recitation that the return was necessary in connection
with those duties. Further, in the absence of a statement of the specific reason,
the IRS could not meaningfully apply the regulatory criteria to the request.
2* A sample letter appears at note 44, p. 852.
duties of the requesting attorney, or of whether the return was "neces-
sary". In short, the IRS delegated to the Justice Department-and
in reality to the FBI-the administration of the disclosure regulations
with respect to the FBI's requests. Former Deputy Assistant Com-
missioner (Compliance) Leon Green advised the Committee: "I do
not think we ever questioned their need for a tax return." 21 Mr.
Green, whose duties included broad supervisory responsibility over the
Services disclosure activities testified as follows:
A. Any of the Assistant Attorney Generals could request
access to specific tax returns by name and generally they
were granted access without any questioning of the back-
ground or the need for them.
Q. You say without any questioning of the background?
A. I do not think we ever questioned their need for a tax
return. If an Assistant Attorney General signed a letter
saying in the course of their own operations they required
access to certain returns, they were given access . . .
Q. As a general rule, what kind of a reason would the In-
ternal Security Division give?
A. I do not think they would give any reason other than
to state in connection with a matter that they had under con-
sideration the Department of Justice required access to spe-
cific returns.
Q. So, in effect, the judgment as to whether the tax return
was necessary was left to the Justice Department?
A. The Assistant Attorney General who signed the letter,
right.
Q. In fact, the determination of whether the ... need for
the tax return was actually in connection with their official
duties was also left to the Justice Department?
A. Yes.22
The FBI requests and IRS responses invariably contained language
to the effect that the use of the return would be limited to the purpose
stated in the request. There is no specific regulation imposing such a
limitation in 26 CFR 6103(g) 2'but the limitation upon use is implicit
in the requirement that the "reason why inspection is desired" be
stated in the application. The release of the return is predicated upon
the reason given, and therefore made only for the stated purpose. This
limiting language is meaningless where the reason given is simply a
recitation that the regulatory criteria are met. The absence of any
meaningful limitation on use of returns has led to serious abuse.2"
nLeon Green deposition, 9/12/75, p. 6.
"Ibid., pp. 6-8.
The following subsection, 6103(h), dealing with the "use of returns in
Grand Jury proceedings and in litigation," does specifically provide that any
return furnished pursuant to that paragraph shall be "limited in use to the
purpose for which it is furnished . . . ," but 6103 (g) does not so provide.
" The IRS has freely disseminated tax returns to agencies of the government
with no intelligence function. In 1974, more than 29,000 tax returns of more than
8,200 individuals were requested by and disseminated to governmental agencies
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, Interstate Com-
merce Commission, Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation. (Alexander, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 31, 32.)
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III. FBI USE OF RETURNS IN COINTELPRO
Between 1966 and 1974, the FBI (either directly or through the
Internal Security Division of the Justice Department) made approxi-
mately 200 requests to the IRS for tax returns.25 Of the 200 requests.
approximately 40 (20%) involved foreign intelligence matters; 26 30
(15%) involved criminal matters; and 130 (65%) were for domestic
intelligence or "counterintelligence" (COINTELPRO) 27 purposes.
Although records are not complete, Mr. Green's belief that IRS "never
questioned their need for a return" indicates that virtually all re-
quests were honored.
The major portion of the 130 domestic intelligence requests were
part of two FBI "counterintelligence" programs, one directed at the
'New Left" (anti-Vietnam War) movement and the other at the so-
called "Black Nationalist" movement.2 8 Each of these two programs
had two components:
1. Targeting of individuals in either movement for intensive
intelligence-gathering activity.
2. Targeting of the same individuals for so-called COINTEL
PRO operations.29.
FBI COINTELPROs (counterintelligence programs) were designed
to:
ewpo8e, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of [the
target organizations and their leadership]. [Emphasis
added.]
A. Use of Tax Return in FBI Key Activist Program
1. Program Purpose8 and Tax Returm.-The "Key Activist" pro-
gram was established in January of 1968 for the purpose of "inten-
sive investigations" of the leaders of the New Left movement.31 Four
months later, on May 9, 1968, a COINTELPRO was recommended
against the New Left and the "Key Activists" of that movement on
the following basis:
The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurri-
lously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt
*A request normally sought several returns, often of several taxpayers.
2'Presumably, these returns would be those of individuals identified as being
agents of, or working in collaboration with, hostile foreign intelligence services.
See COINTELPRO Report.
* FBI Requests for tax returns, 1966-1975.
The following data is based on a staff review of materials in the FBI's ad-
ministrative file labeled "Income Tax Returns Requested."
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Total
Foreign intelligence.---------------- 4 7 4 6 3 3 9 1 1 1 39
Criminal investigation-------------- 0 1 6 4 6 10 4 0 0 31
Domestic intelligence, new left ac-
tivities ------------------------ 0 0 , 36 3 0 7 0 0 0 0 46
Black etremists ------------------ 0 0 24 3 0 30 10 6 1 0 74
Other ...------------------------- 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 11
Total.------------------.---. - 4 11 65 18 9 46 29 14 4 1 201
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Field Offilces, 1/30/6&
n See e.g., Memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/19/68 (New Left);
memorandum F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan 8/27/64.
to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the
college campuses. With this in mind, it is our recommenda-
tion that a new Counterintelligence Program be designed to
-neutralize the New Left and the Key Activists. The Key Ac-
tivists are those individuals who are the moving forces be-
hind the New Left and on whom we have intensified our in-
vestigations.32 [Emphasis added.]
The next day the Director established the program.3 4
Two weeks later, on May 24, 1968, the FBI requested tax returns
of 16 Key Activists for the years 1966 and 1967.35 These returns were
requested under the new procedure initiated in 1968 following IRS
Disclosure Branch's discovery that returns had previously been fur-
nished the FBI by the Intelligence Division. On October 24, 1968, the
Key Activist program was enlarged.36 On December 6, 1968, the FBI
requested returns on 19 additional Key Activists.3 7 According to the
authorizing memorandum:
As part of our overall intensive investigation designed to
neutralize these individuals in the New Left movement, in-
quiry into their financial status has proved productive.38
All of these returns were requested by form letters.39 In no case did
the IRS inquire further into why the returns were necessary or for
what precise purpose. The actual purpose of the requests is reflected in
a February 3, 1969, Headquarters memorandum in which the Bureau
reported upon the success of the return requesting effort:
We have caused a survey to be made by Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) concerning Key Activists. We have found a
number where no record exists for payment of taxes in 1966,
1967. Included in this group are [names deleted], IRS has ini-
tiated appropriate investigations as a result of our inquiries.
It is anticipated the IRS inquiry will cause these individuals
considerable consternation, possibly jail sentences eventually.
We now have sent requests on 35 Key Activists to IRS and
anticipated many will have filed no returns. This action is
consistent with our efforts to obtain prosecution of any kind
against Key Activists to remove them from the movement.4 0
The purpose of the requests was at least in part to develop ways of
using tax information as a COINTELPRO weapon."
The February 3 memorandum reflects a by-product of the disclosure
mechanism which enhanced its attractiveness to the Bureau. A simple
request for information was in and of itself a means of directing IRS
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Field Offices, 1/30/68.
" Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to various Field Offices, 5/10/68.
' Memornadum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/24/68.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to various Field Offices, 10/24/68.
* Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 12/6/68.
Ibid.
* The form letter is virtually identical to that set out in note at page 38.
Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 2/3/69, captioned "NEW
LEFT MOVEMENT, IS-MISCELLANEOUS."
" In addition, the returns were requested as part of an effort to determine
sources of funds. Ibid.
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attention at the COINTELPRO target, resulting in an IRS investi-
gation if no return was found for a particular year. The FBI docu-
ments suggest that the requests for Key Activists returns were not
selective, and were not predicated upon any specific information sug-
gesting the individual Key Activitists were delinquent in their tax
obligations. The IRS response was also all inclusive, and constituted
unknowing IRS cooperation in the COINTELPRO effort.4 2
2. An Ewample of the Use of Tax Information in a COINTELPRO
Operation.-One of the Key Activists who was the subject of a May 24,
1968, FBI request to IRS for 1966-1967 tax returns was a professor at
a midwestern university who the Bureau anticipated would be a
leader in demonstrations at the forthcoming Democratic National
Convention in Chicago. 43 A detailed analysis of the means by which
the FBI obtained his returns and the COINTELPRO use the FBI
was able to make of them demonstrates a key weakness of present dis-
closure statutes and regulations.
The FBI presented to J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in the Internal Security Division, a form letter addressed to
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service 44 listing six Key
Activists whose returns were "necessary in connection with an official
"According to a June 30, 1969, IRS memorandum, there were then in progress
21 investigations or other administrative action involving individuals connected
with "ideological organizations." Virtually all of these actions had resulted
from FBI-originated requests for tax returns. See June 30, 1969, memorandum
from Collection Division to Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) ; June 27,
1969, memo from Collection Division to Assistant Commissioner (Compliance);
June 25, 1969, memo from Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) to all IRS
Divisions; deposition of Donald Virdin at pp. 15-16; deposition of Leon Green,
pp. 16-17.
" The Committee is aware of the professor's identity but has withheld his name
for privacy reasons.
" Commissioner of Internal Revenue, MAY 31, 1968.
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. COMMISSIONER: In connection with an official matter before this
office involving the internal security of the United States it is necessary to
obtain the following described income tax returns and related data:
Name and address of taxpayer: Tax year
John Doe --------- ----------------------------- 1966 and 1967
John Doe ----------- ----------------------------- 1966 and 1967
Professor X ------------ ------------------------ 1966 and 1967
Jane Doe ------------------------------------------- 1966 and 1967
Jane Doe ---------- ---------------------------- 1966 and 1967
John Doe ----------------------------------------- 1966 and 1967
This request is made pursuant to section 301.6103(a), Title of CFR.
Documents furnished in response to this request will be limited in use to
the purpose for which they are requested and will under no condition be made
public except to the extent that publicity necessarily results if they are used
in litigation.
Access to these documents, on a need-to-know basis, will be limited to those
attorneys or employees who are actively engaged In the investigation or subse-
quent litigation. Persons having access to these documents will be cautioned
as to the confidentiality of the information contained therein and of the penalty
provisions of section 7213 of the Internal Revenue Code and section 1905, Title




matter before this office (i.e., the Internal Security Division) involv-
ing the internal security of the United States." Assistant Attorney
General Yeagley signed the letter. Yeagley has stated that the FBI
did not advise him that a purpose of the request was to use the tax
information as a tool for taking disruptive action against the subjects,
and that he was unaware that any COINTELPRO program existed.4 1
The FBI does not claim the contrary.46 Yeagley apparently did not
inquire into the purpose of obtaining the return, stating that he gen-
erally assumed the purpose of such a request was to develop investi-
gative leads.47
This letter was forwarded to the IRS, where it was determined that
the regulatory criteria were satisfied since the letter recited that the
returns were "necessary in connection with the official duties" of the
Assistant Attorney General. IRS inquired no further into the specific
purpose for which the returns were to be used, but relied upon the
Assistant Attorney General's statement that the purpose met the regu-
latory criteria.8 The Assistant Attorney General, in turn, relied upon
the FBI. The IRS furnished the returns.
Upon receiving the returns of Professor X, the FBI forwarded
them to its local office in the city where the professor taught, for ex-
amination for COINTELPRO potential." In examining the returns,
the local office was acting pursuant to the memorandum establishing
the Key Activist COINTELPRO program:
The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt, and other-
wise neutralize the activities of the various New Left orga-
nizations, their leadership and adherents. It is imperative that
the activities of these groups be followed on a continuous
basis so we may take advantage of all opportunities for coun-
terintelligence and also inspire action in instances where cir-
cumstances warrant. . . . In every instance, consideration
should be given to disrupting the organized activity of these
groups and no opportunity should be missed to capitalize
upon organizational and personal conflicts of their
leadership. 50
The local office examined Professor X's returns and found some
questionable deductions which "at the very least, provide a basis for
questioning by IRS," and requested the authority of the FBI Direc-
tor to call these questionable deductions to the attention of the local
office of the IRS. The express purposes of doing so, according to
the Airtel by which the request was made, were:
1. Due to the burden upon the taxpayer of proving deduc-
tions claimed, [Professor X] could be required to produce
documentary evidence supporting his claims. This could
prove to be both difficult and embarrassing particularly with
respect to validating the claim for home maintenance deduc-
a The signed statement of Judge Yeagley is in the Committee files.
* Robert Shackleford and Bernard Rachner testimony, 9/15/75, pp. 12-30.
' Statement of J. Walter Yeagley, September, 1975.
4 Donald 0. Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, pp. 88-91.
"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to a Midwest City Field Office, 7/18/68.
* Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to various Field Offices, 5/10/68.
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tions when, in fact, he doubtless has only the usual type of
study found in many homes rather than actual office space.
Validations of contributions to SNCC, SDS, and the [pri-
vacy deletion] Counseling Service may also be productive of
embarrassing consequences.
2: If [Professor X] is unable to substantiate his claims in
the face of detailed scrutiny by IRS, it could, of course, re-
sult in financial loss to him.
3. Most importantly, if IRS contact with [Professor X]
can be arranged within the next two weeks their demands
upon him may be a source of distraction during the critical
period when he is engaged in meetings and plans for disrup-
tion of the Democratic National Convention. Any drain upon
the time and concentration which [Professor X], a leading
figure in Demcon planning, can bring to bear upon this ac-
tivity can only accrue to the benefit of the Government and
general public. [Emphasis added.] 51
The recommendation was approved, and the local office supplied the
information to the local IRS office, but did not advise the IRS contact
that the information came from a tax return the FBI had previously
obtained from IRS.52 The FBI merely stated it "ha'd reason to believe
that Professor X had claimed deductions for contributions" to certain
organizations which would not normally be deductible.5 3 As a result
of the information the -FBI furnished, IRS initiated an audit of Pro-
fessor X's return.
Because of IRS liberality in granting delays in audits to suit tax-
payers' convenience, the audit of Professor X did not achieve the de-
sired purpose of disrupting his planning for demonstrations at the
Convention. The audit did result in the imposition of an additional
$500 in tax liability for the two years in question, as a result the local
FBI office deemed it a COINTELPRO success.5 4 While taxpayers
should pay taxes which are due, the fact that taxes are due does not
justify use of the tax laws to harrass demonstrators.
B. Use of Tax Returns in the FBI Key Black Extremist Program
The Key Black Extremist (K'BE) Program was established on
December 23, 1970, because of the perceived success of the Key Activist
Program. The documentary history of the establishment of the Key
Black Extremist Program and inclusion of requests for tax returns
as a standard technique are contained in the Committee files and de-
scribed briefly in the report on COINTELPRO.
" Memorandum from Midwest City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/1/68.
* A signed statement dated 8/13/75 of the IRS Inspector who received Bureau
information is in the Committee files.
0'Memoran'dun from FBI headquarters to Midwest City field office, 8/6/68.
One apparent reason for not disclosing the source of the information was
the injunction in the memorandum initiating the Key Activist COINTELPRO:
"you are cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no
circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the
Bureau. . . ."
" Memoranum from Midwest City Field Office to FBI headquarters undated.
According to the Committee staff's review of FBI files, the FBI
requested the returns of at least 72 of the 90 designated Key Black
Extremists. As in the case of the requests for Key Activists' returns,
one of the FBI's purposes in obtaining returns of Key Black Extrem-
ists was to use the returns as weapons in its campaign to "neutralize"
them. All the Key Black Extremist requests were made on the same
forms as the Key Activist requests. There is no evidence the IRS in-
quired into the specific purpose of any of the requests. All were
honored.@'
C. Disclosure of Identity of Contributor8 to Ideological Organisatione
The IRS routinely receives from tax exempt organizations lists of
their contributors either on tax returns or on exemption applications.
The information is given to IRS in order to enable it to enforce the
tax laws with respect to those organizations. The IRS also develops
contributor lists of non-exempt organizations during audits, especially
if there is reason to believe the contributors may be improperly deduct-
ing the contributions. These contributor lists are available to the FBI
and other federal investigative agencies by simple request to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, even in cases where those agencies could not
legally obtain the information directly.
1. Dr. Martin Luther Kinq and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference.-One of the organizations the FBI designated a "Black
Nationalist-Hate Type Organization" was the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference.6 As part of an earlier intensive investigation
of this organization and of its leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, the
FBI, in 1964, obtained from the Internal Revenue Service "all avail-
able information" concerning Dr. King and the SCLC.5 7 This infor-
mation included tax returns of both Dr. King and the SCLC as well
as certain IRS investigative files. The FBI studied IRS audits and
investigations of both Dr. King and the SCLC, and discussed with
certain IRS employees future IRS action to check on Dr. King's and
SCLC's compliance with the tax laws. The information received re-
garding Dr. King and SCLC was forwarded to the FBI Atlanta office
"for further review and coordination with the investigation relating to
Dr. King himself." 58 On April 14, 1964, the Atlanta office responded
with a suggestion for disruptive action against SCLC.59
After noting that SCLC was tax exempt in the sense that it was
not subject to income taxation (though contributions to it were not
deductible on the returns of the donors), and that its enjoyment of this
status required it to file a petition disclosing the names of contributors,
' Donald D. Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, p. 89.
' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to various Field Offices, 8/25/67.
r" The returns and other information were obtained during the period prior to
1968 when the FBI was obtaining information directly from the IRS Intelligence
Division. See memorandum from Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/64.
s Memorandum from Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 3/25/64; memorandum
from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 4/1/64.
' Memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64. Al-
though the suggestion (and other suggestions contained in the same letter) was
a COINTELPRO-type suggestion, it was not so denominated by the FBI.
the Atlanta office recommended that the following action be taken
with respect to the contributors so disclosed: so
It is believed that donors and creditors of SCLC present two
important areas for counterintelligence activities. In regard
to the donors it is suggested that official SCLC stationary
bearing King's signature, copies of which are available to the
Atlanta Office and will be furnished by separate communica-
tion to the Bureau Laboratory for reproduction purposes, be
utilized in advising the donors that Internal Revenue Service
is currently checking tax records of SCLC and that King
through this phony correspondence wants to advise the
donor insuring that he reported his gifts in accordance with
Internal Revenue requirements so that he will not become
involved in a tax investigation. It is believed such a letter of
this type from SCLC may cause considerable concern and
eliminate future contributions. From available information it
is apparent that many of these contributors to 'SCLC are
doing so in order to claim tax deductions and in order to be
eligible for such deductions, the contribution is being made
to the (privacy deletion-name of a church), which in turn is
forwarded to King or the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference."
The suggestion was considered by FBI Headquarters and was
categorized, along with some other suggestions
as not appearing desirable and/or feasible for direct action
by the Bureau at this time. . . .62
2. The Students for a Democratic Society.-In the course of audit-
ing would-be exempt organizations, the IRS will often seek to identify
contributors to the organization in order to determine whether the
contributors are deducting contributions. 3 Under current disclosure
regulations, the results of such audits, including the contributor lists
generated in the course of the audit, are available to other federal
agencies upon request. Thus, the potential use of IRS as a source
of contributor lists is not limited to exempt organizations, such as
SCLC. Moreover, such lists have in fact been obtained from the IRS.
In 1968, the IRS was conducting an audit of the Students for a
Democratic 'Society. The audit was initiated in New York, and was
subsequently referred to the Chicago District of 'IRS. An FBI letter
from Director, FBI, to SAC, Chicago, dated June 10, 1968, states:
It is noted IRS is presently conducting an audit of SDS
funds at the Bureau's request.
The IRS files do not reflect a specific request from the FBI for such
an audit, but do reflect considerable input from the FBI in the form
* It is not entirely clear from the Atlanta Office's letter whether it already
had the contributor list or was recommending that it be obtained. The point is
clarified by an internal memorandum of FBI Headquarters (Baumgardner to
W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/64) in response to the Atlanta suggestion which notes: "We
have already obtained all available information from IRS concerning King and
the 'SOLO."
6 Memorandmn from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64, p. 8.
* Memorandum from Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/64, p. 3.
" Contributions to non-exempt organizations are generally not deductible.
of reports suggesting that certain activists (including SDS mem-
bers) were probable tax violators." The FBI at least sought to direct
IRS attention to SDS.65
Since the SDS exemption application had been denied, it was appro-
priate for IRS in the course of the audit to identify contributors to
the organization, and it did so. The FBI obtained the list which IRS
had developed. Later, IRS passed the list on to the White House.
According to an April 8, 1970, internal IRS memordandum:
Paul Wright of AOC 66 and Joe Hengemuhle of the FBI
called to ask whether the FBI could furnish the White House
the list of SDS contributors which was furnished to the FBI
by IRS. The FBI has been requested by the White House to
furnish a report on the funding of various militant organi-
zations....
I advised that from a disclosure standpoint, if the White
House staff wanted this on behalf of the President-, there was
no disclosure problem; but in view of the sensitive nature of
the matter and of other investigations and problems, I wanted
to check this with Mr. Green to get his approval. 7
Permission was granted and the list was furnished to the White House.
IV. DISCLOSURES TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
With three possible exceptions, there is no evidence the CIA has
ever obtained tax return information through official disclosure chan-
nels. 68 Between 1957 and 1972, however, the CIA obtained tax return
information on at least thirteen occasions through unofficial channels.
A. Means of Obtaining Returns
The CIA obtained return information informally from IRS em-
ployees in the Compliance Branch who had other CIA liaison respon-
sibihties.6 9 It has been possible to identify taxpayers on whom the
CIA obtained return information, but since there are no records of
these disclosures, it has not always been possible to establish which em-
ployees released which information.70 That responsibility has been
established in at least two cases. In one case, an IRS employee stated
64Eg., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 6/10/68;
memorandum from Cleveland Field Office -to FBI Headquarters, 8/1/68; mem-
orandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 8/6/68.
" That the FBI sought to direct IRS attention at SDS is apparent from the
statement in the June 10, 1968, memorandum to Chicago Field Office, ". . . IRS is
presently conducting an audit of SDS funds at the Bureau's request." While this
statement does not conclusively demonstrate that the Bureau was the cause of
the audit, it does demonstrate that the Bureau sought to bring the audit about
and believed it was responsible for It.
" AOC is the Activist Organization Committee, later known as Special Service
Staff; Mr. Wright was its head.
' Memorandum for File by D. 0. Virdin, dated 4/8/70. Mr. Virdin was then
head of the IRS Disclosure Branch.
* The Committee staff reviewed IRS files of requests for tax returns and return
information from intelligence agencies.
' These included liaison concerning audits of CIA proprietaries, a subject
which will be discussed in the 'Committee's final report on the subject of CIA
proprietaries.
" Because of the informal nature of CIA access to returns, no records of the
disclosures' were maintained by IRS.
he was authorized to release returns by his superior, but his superior
can recall giving no such authority?1 In one other case, the IRS em-
ployee stated he had disclosed return information to a CIA agent who
carried the credentials of another U.S. Government agency as a cover.7 2
There was no written authority for the informal disclosure of tax
return information to the CIA, and, according to the IRS, there is
no basis upon which any of the disclosures could be considered legal.
B. Effect of Illegality
Although the purposes of the requests varied, it is clear that all
but one of the disclosures would have been legal had the CIA fol-
lowed legal procedures. The bulk of the requests arose in connection
with either CIA investigations of its own employees or other CIA in-
vestigations within its charter.73 Thus, with one possible exception,
the illegal practice did not result in the CIA's obtaining information it
could not have obtained legally. Like the practice of the FBI prior
to 1968 of obtaining returns from the Intelligence Division and by-
passing official channels, the CIA's informal, illegal access to return
information demonstrates not a weakness in disclosure regulations, but
a failure of IRS to apply those regulations.
The atmosphere of extra-legal cooperation between intelligence
agencies out of which the CIA's illegal access to returns arose did
lead to at least two serious breaches of IRS responsibility for impar-
tial, even-handed enforcement of the tax laws. In one case, the CIA
obtained information from the returns of Victor Marchetti, the author
of a book, publication of which the CIA sought to prevent. An uniden-
tified IRS source, referred to in a CIA memorandum 74 as "Confiden-
tial Informant," supplied the return information on April 5, 1972, and
advised the CIA that he:
was extremely interested in the fact that [Marchetti] had
authored and published a book but still only reported a
total income of [amount deleted] for 1970 and 1971. In this
regard, our source would be ready to conduct, at our request,
a routine audit of [Marchetti's] income tax for the past three
years. [Emphasis supplied.]
Either information the IRS possessed concerning Marchetti justi-
fied an audit or it did not. Since no formal relationship existed between
the two agencies, the CIA's interest in the matter should not have
affected IRS action.
The second case involved Ramparts magazine. A February 2, 1967,
internal CIA memorandum of a conversation between the Assistant
General Counsel of the CIA, the Assistant to the Commissioner, IRS,
and two other IRS executives, including the Deputy Assistant Com-
missioner for Compliance, indicates a basic willingness on the part
of the IRS participants to tailor their treatment of Ramparts to the
n' IRS Inspection Report, OIA access to tax related Information.
" Ibid. p. 1.
* Letter from CIA General Counsel to IRS Assistant Commissioner, Inspection,
8/4/75.
"A copy of the memo, which was captioned "Subject: Victor Marchetti," is in
the Committee's files.
desires and concerns of the Central Intelligence Agency. The memo-
randum " recites that the CIA Assistant General Counsel:
Told them of the information and rumors we have heard
about RAMPARTS' proposed exposes with particular ref-
erence to USNSA [U.S. National Student Association] and
[an organization]. I impressed upon them the Director's
concern and expressed our certainty that this is an attack
on CIA in particular, and the administration in general,
which is merely using USNSA and [an organization] as
tools.
One of the IRS executives advised the CIA of the status of the
USNSA application for tax exempt status. The CIA Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel then
suggested that the corporate tax returns of Ramparts, Inc.
be examined and that -any leads to possible financial sup-
porters be followed up by an examination of their individual
tax returns. It is unlikely that such an examination will de-
velop much worthwhile information as to the magazine's
source of financial support, but it is possible that some leads
will be evident. The returns can be called in for review by the
Assistant Commissioner for Compliance without causing
any particular notice in the respective IRS districts. The
proposed examination would be made by Mr. Green who
would advise if there appeared to be any information on the
returns worth following up. The political sensitivity of the
case is such that if we are to go further than this, it will be
necessary for the agency to make a formal request for the
returns under a procedure set forth in government regula-
tions. If such a request is made, the Commissioner will not be
in a position to deny our interest if questioned later by a mem-
ber of congress or other competent authority.
V. ANALYSIS
The cases described in this report reveal that more than privacy
is at stake in the disclosure of tax returns and tax return information
to federal agencies. It is apparently necessary to devise means to pre-
vent disclosure for improper purposes, and to prevent the subsequent
misuse of returns disclosed initially for proper purposes. The Justice
Department's failure to prevent FBI abuse of access to returns sug-
gests strongly that the control device must be in the hands of the IRS,
and not only in the hands of the requesting agency or of its parent
agency.
The case of Professor X, in which information supplied by IRS
was used in an FBI counterintelligence program, raises a fundamental
question concerning the use of IRS for non-tax purposes: whether the
selection of a taxpayer for audit or investigation for essentially politi-
cal criteria is justified by the subsequent discovery of some tax liability.
This question is fundamental, and applies whether the non-tax use
"The 2/2/67 CIA memorandum was captioned, "IRS Briefing on Ramparts."
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is through the unwitting manipulation of the IRS because of a weak-
ness in its disclosure ldws, or whether the political motivation
emanates from the IRS itself. If one underpays his taxes, one argu-
ment goes, one takes his chances. One's political opponent, dis-
gruntled neighbor, or disenchanted employee can report the under-
payment for the crassest of motives, and will be rewarded 7 for his
efforts; therefore, motive is irrelevant as a matter of policy-all
motives, however crass, enhance tax enforcement, and are therefore
desirable springboards for audits or investigations. If violation of
the tax laws inhibits one's freedom by increasing one's exposure to
audit or prosecution, the result is a salutary incentive to comply with
those laws.
There is an essential difference, however, between a government en-
forcement program along ideological lines and any individual effort
to bring the IRS down upon an enemy: the government is constitu-
tionally required to be neutral to politics; individuals are not. When
the IRS responds to an allegation it receives, the motive underlying
the transmission of the allegation is irrelevant. When the IRS selects
taxpayers for a tax compliance review because of their politics, the
government is employing its power for political purposes. Whether
the IRS performs the selection, as in the case of Special Service Staff,
or the FBI does, as in the case of Professor X, the fortuitous discovery
of a tax liability does not justify the repression inherent in the
practice.
Professor X was audited only because he was the target of a
COINTELPRO operation in which the FBI, through the use of the
disclosure regulations, sought to manipulate the IRS into "neutraliz-
ing" Professor X by means of a tax audit.7 Every IRS witness ques-
tioned regarding this case has agreed that Professor X's returns
would not have been knowingly disclosed for the purpose for which
they were used.7 8
The law and practice of disclosure of tax returns made this operation
possible. The law requires the IRS to turn over returns to the Justice
Department only where they are "necessary" in connection -with "offi-
cial duties." However, the IRS has not, in practice, administered
these two requirements, but has delegated their administration to the
requesting Assistant Attorney General, who in turn has delegated it
to the FBI. As a result, no one outside the FBI made any determina-
" Section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code permits the Internal Revenue
Service to pay a reward to anyone who provides it with information that leads to
the detection and punishment of anyone guilty of violating the Internal Revenue
laws.
" The Assistant Chief of Audit in the IRS District at the time has stated: "My
best recollection is that the return was a type which would not normally be identi-
fied by the computer as having audit potential. . . . There was no routine pro-
cedure in effect at that time for manual screening of returns for questionable
deductions. Therefore, without some impetus from outside the normal, routine
system, Professor X's return would in all probability not have been selected for
classification and audit." (Interview, 8/13/75.)
See deposition of Donald Bacon former Assistant Commissioner (Compliance)
with broad supervisory authority over disclosure pages 13, 14; deposition of
Donald Virdin, former Chief, Disclosure Branch, pp. 78, 79.
tion of the actual reason for the request for Professor X's return, or
of the compatibility of the reason with -the regulatory criteria.
Even if the FBI's initial reason for requesting Professor X's return
had been proper, the disclosure procedures provided no safeguard
against a subsequent misuse of the return in an operation unrelated
to the reason for the request. The letter requesting Professor X's return
recited:
Documents furnished in response to this request will be
limited in use to the purpose for which they are
requested. . . .79
But the "purpose" for which they were requested was stated so
generally as to permit any subsequent use. IRS failure to insist upon
Justice Department compliance with the requirements that the ap-
plication for the return state the reason why inspection is desired
permitted the FBI to legally obtain Professor X's return to later
improperly use the return as a COINTELPRO weapon.
Unrestricted FBI access to contributor lists the IRS compiles in
the course of enforcing the tax laws has threatened both the integrity
of the tax system and the constitutional rights of the contributors.
The identity of members of organizations such as SCLC and the
NAACP is privileged to protect members in thpir right to freedom
of association by forestalling the potentially chilling effect which
revelation of membership could have. The same reasons justify ap-
plication of this protection to the identity of contributors to such
organizations except to the extent that the act of contribution itself
is properly discoverable because of potential tax consequences. It is
for this latter purpose that the IRS is empowered to elicit contribu-
tors' identities. Presumably, if the FBI were investigating an allega-
gation of criminal tax fraud to which contributors' identities
were relevant, it would be entitled to the same information. There
is no suggestion in any of the relevant FBI documents that the FBI
sought to supplant the IRS in any investigation of the potential tax
liability of SCLC contributors.o Rather, the FBI contemplated using
the list as a means of disrupting SCLC and discouraging contribu-
tions, a purpose which constitutes a direct attack on the very interest
which the right to anonymity protects, and a purpose for which the
FBI could not have obtained a list of SCLC contributors from any
court.
That the FBI did not implement the suggestion does not affect
the basic point that FBI Headquarters furnished the tax information,
including the list of contributors, to the local office in order to enable
the local office to devise disruptive actions. COINTELPRO policy (as
evidenced in other cases which are discussed in the report on COIN-
TELPRO) makes it clear that the suggestion was not rejected because
of concern for the legality of so using the contributor list.
Letter from Walter J. Yeagley to Commissioner, IRS, 5/31/68.
* The OBI generally dbes not conduct such investigations. They are the basic
task of the IRS Audit Division.
In NAACP v. Alabama' the Supreme Court ruled that, even
though the specific purpose of a law empowering the government to
obtain the identities of members of a political group is legitimate, the
court will weigh against that purpose the probability that a conse-
quence of disclosure will be to interfere with the members' exercise
of their right of freedom to associate. If the reason for disclosure is
not "constitutionally sufficient" to outweigh the danger to freedom of
association, the law is unconstitutional. Given the existence of a
COINTELPRO policy of using all intelligence for disruptive pur-
poses whenever feasible, disclosure to the FBI of contributor lists of
target organizations violated the Constitution the moment the dis-
closure occurred even if, in the particular case, the FBI failed to
devise a feasible means of making disruptive use of the information,
and even if the FBI also had a legitimate purpose in obtaining
the information.
Obtaining contributor lists for purposes of "counterintelligence"
action to discourage contributions is unconstitutional under the
NAACP v. Alabama rule. In NAACP v. Alabama, the state was
denied access to contributors' lists because an incidental consequence
of publication would be non-governmental harassment of the mem-
bership. In the case of SCLC, where the FBI sought the list in part
for the purpose of dpveloping schemes for government-sponsored dis-
ruption, the illegality of obtaining the list is apparent. The case
demonstrates the importance of (1) requiring a statement of the pur-
pose of requests for returns; and (2) limiting their use to the stated
proper purpose.
The case of FBI access to an IRS list of contributors to SDS fur-
ther demonstrates that inadequate IRS controls have led to its becom-
ing an agent of a non-tax investigatory agency. It is not clear in this
case whether the SDS audit was initiated because of FBI interest.
It is clear that the FBI sought to direct the IRS intelligence gather-
ing capability at SDS and then, through the disclosure mechanism,
obtained information it could not legally have obtained on its own.
The case demonstrates how the disclosure procedures followed by
the IRS makes it possible for an intelligence-gathering power the
Congress has bestowed upon IRS for the purpose of tax collection-
the power to obtain the identity of contributors-to become an inves-
tigative power of a non-tax agency, bent upon non-tax purposes. The
SDS case also demonstrates that lax disclosure procedures provide
an incentive for other agencies to attempt to interfere in IRS selection
I NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163 (1957). The court held that
whether membership lists are constitutionally available to the state depends
upon whether the "reasons advanced" for the publication of the lists are "con-
stitutionally sufficient to justify its possible deterrent effect" upon the freedom
to asoclate. The Count found that the NAACP had made:
"An uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity
of its rank-andflle members has exposed those members to economic reprisal,
loss of employment, threat of physical coercion."
and that
"... compelled disclosure . . . is likely to affect adversely the ability of peti-
tioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs in that it
may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from
joining It because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their
associations 'and of the consequences of this exposure."
of taxpayers for audit. 2 An IRS audit is a financial vacuum cleaner.
Other governmental agencies have a powerful intelligence gathering
capability when they can exert influence over who the IRS selects
for an audit and then have uncontrolled access to information gath-
ered during the audit.
While it is clear that on occasion agencies performing intelligence
functions will have a legitimate need for tax returns and return-
related data, the need for a written record of the reasons supporting
an agency's request for the information is also clearly demonstrated
by the Ramparts and Marchetti cases in which the CIA informally
obtained tax-related information for questionable purposes. The CIA
was apparently unwilling to risk requesting tax return information
with respect to Ramparts and its supporters unless, through an in-
formal disclosure, it could first learn whether there was information
on the returns that would be of interest to them in their effort to
stifle Ramparts criticism of a CIA-sponsored organization.
The Ramparts and Marchetti cases demonstrate the dangers of in-
formal exchanges of information between the IRS and other intelli-
gence agencies. These informal exchanges both encourage illegal
disclosure and provide the other intelligence agency with a lever by
which to manipulate or persuade the IRS into action directed against
certain taxpayers for reasons having no bearing upon compliance with
the tax laws. In the Marchetti case, the unidentified IRS source offered
to conduct an audit of Marchetti at the CIA's request, an offer which
arose out of the atmosphere of extralegal cooperation which informal
access to tax return information creates.
The existence of informal disclosure channels is dangerous even if
the only tax return information that passes along those channels is
information that could have been properly disclosed under IRS regu-
lations. The existence of such channels fosters an atmosphere in which
those charged with liaison are tempted to place their desire to be co-
operative above their obligation to enforce the tax laws neutrally.
The unofficial character of the disclosure makes it possible to insulate
these acts of improper cooperation from outside scrutiny. It is far
to- important that taxpayers have confidence in the confidentiality of
the- returns they file and in the integrity of the tax system to permit
individuals within the IRS to exercise unreviewable judgment regard-
ing the propriety of disclosing tax return information to other Fed-
---. l agencies.
SELEcTIvE ENFORCEMENT FOR NON-TAX PURPOSES
Introduction
Because the investigation of the Internal Revenue Service encom-
rassed several abuses of the rights of American citizens of which some
8 A later case specifically shows FBI awareness of the advantages of directing
IRS attention at an intelligence target. In 1969, the Special Agent in Charge in a
Midwest City recommended furnishing certain information to the IRS in order
to effect an audit of a local Communist Party officer. (Memorandum from Midwest
City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/22/69.) Authority was granted in a
communication from the Director which also noted:
"After audits have been effected by the Internal Revenue Service, copies
of the audits can be obtained through liaison at the Bureau. Should you desire
copies, submit your request at the appropriate time." (,Memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Midwest City Field Office, 3/4/69.)
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details had previously been studied and revealed to the public by the
Congress (e.g., Special Service Staff, Ideological Organizations Proj-
ect), the staff was able to devote some of its investigation to an ana-
lytical evaluation of those abuses. This analysis revealed that many
abuses of the IRS intelligence functions occurred when enforcement
of the tax laws became an ancillary instead of the primary factor in
determining IRS actions.
The Internal Revenue Service, since it was reorganized in 1952, has
had a decentralized structure, with each of the 58 districts operating
autonomously and being generally responsible for its day-to-day
operations while the National Office is primarily responsible for policy
decisions. When the IRS participated in an activity in which targets
had been chosen on the basis of criteria which included factors in
addition to those involved in routine tax law enforcement, it was often
necessary for the IRS to impose centralized controls on its basic de-
centralized structure in order to accommodate the special requirements
created by the additional criteria. This has had the practical effect of
creating a new structure which has in the past been incompatible with
the original decentralized IRS structure and has often resulted in
abuse. The investigation revealed that this result occurred regardless
of the purpose of the IRS endeavor. For example, abuses attributable
to structural anomalies occurred in IRS participation in the Organized
Crime Drive, a valuable effort beneficial to the well-being of the coun-
try, as well as in the Special Service Staff, where IRS improperly
targeted individuals because of their political beliefs.
Part Two of this report, "Selective Enforcement for Non-Tax Pur-
poses," reports on the historical development of the intelligence opera-
tions of the Internal Revenue Service since its reorganization in 1952
and discusses the relationship between those abuses addressed and
their setting: the decentralized structure of IRS.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IRS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
A. Function and Structure of IRS Intelligence
1. Introduction.-The Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service performs those criminal investigative activities the IRS must
perform in order to collect the taxes, i.e., gathering that information
beyond what taxpayers normally provide IRS which is necessary to
determine the truth of allegations of criminal tax violations and, if
necessary, to prepare evidence for prosecution of such violations. These
activities are usually lumped under the IRS rubric, the "General
Enforcement Program" ("GEP").
In addition to this normal function, the IRS Intelligence Division
has engaged in "Special Enforcement Programs" ("SEP"), where
it targets major-criminal figures for general intelligence collection.
The element of targeting makes the SEP distinct in several im-
portant ways from GEP. In the General Enforcement Program, IRS
does not single out a taxpayer and seek to develop a case against him,
whereas the very purpose of the SEP is to develop tax cases against
persons who have been classified as participants in, for example,
organized crime. The purpose is a "nontax" purpose in the sense that
in most cases the motivation for selecting the investigative target
is not to achieve balanced tax enforcement but to seek to develop a
tax case against the target because he is believed to be a participant in
other criminal activities. The GEP target is investigated because there
is reason to believe he has committed a specific act of tax fraud. The
SEP target may be investigated in the hope such an allegation can
be developed.
This difference in targeting leads to differences in attitudes and
technique. Pursuit of SEP figures requires use of many of the tech-
niques of general law enforcement (paid, regular informants; elec-
tronic and other forms of surveillance; raids; nationally organized
and coordinated enforcement efforts) which the GEP does-not require
to the same degree. Further, the policy of the SEP is essentially one
of consciously "unbalanced" tax enforcement.8 3 Balanced tax enforce-
ment is an effort to allocate. enforcement resources to achieve the
highest degree of compliance with the tax laws." Balanced enforce-
ment does not imply that all classes of taxpayers will be equally sub-
ject to tax investigation, but that the criteria for resource allocation
will be designed to maximize tax law enforcement. In the SEP, these
criteria do not control. Resources may be allocated to SEP targets
because they are perceived to be dangers to society in many ways, even
though the tax compliance benefits of successful prosecution would
not alone have justified allocation of investigative resources. This
difference may lead to a different attitude on the part of the agents
tasked to "get" the SEP target from the attitude they bring to GEP
investigations, and aggravate the difficulties of controlling the agent's
exercise of discretion in the field.
The organization of the IRS Intelligence Division and its devices
for control of agents reflect the primacy of the "classical" IRS In-
telligence function: the investigation of specific allegations of tax
fraud in a balanced enforcement program. Unlike any other Federal
law enforcement agency, the Internal Revenue Service's Intelligence
Division is a decentralized organization. Local and regional offices
make virtually all operational. decisions. The National Office hierarchy
is designed to be a policy-setting organization which seldom inter-
feres with field activities-and, except in the case of major projects,
is unaware of specific activities. This arrangement contrasts strikingly
with the organization of the FBI, for example, which has closer con-
trol over day-to-day field operations because of its centralized struc-
ture with the chain of authority emanating from the center.
The IRS was decentralized to meet certain needs of tax collection
and tax law enforcement. The high degree of local autonomy and agent
discretion which accompanied decentralization have made the IRS
an effective tax enforcement agency. It has, however, proved to make
difficult the effective control of nontax law enforcement activities.
To the extent that a nontax emphasis may serve the national interest-
as with the drive against organized crime-it is apparent that effec-
tive control and oversight by the necessarily different organizations is
required.
2. Origins of Decentralizatio.-The organization of IRS Intelli-
gence parallels the organization of the rest of the IRS. Both are prod-
" See Manual Supplement 14R-17, November 6, 1959,* discussed at page 870,
infra.
" IRS Policy Statement p. 9-18.
ucts of an effort in the early 1950s to correct widespread abuses which
congressional investigators had uncovered in IRS operations. While
the reorganization of 1952 did not arise primarily from abuses by the
then functional equivalent of the Intelligence Division, the reasoning
which underlay the changes applied equally to all areas of IRS
activity.8"
Prior to the reorganization, the IRS collected the revenue through
64 "Collectors," who were Presidential appointees. Congressional in-
vestigators found that the Collectors had been susceptible to political
influence and to other forms of improper pressure. Commissioners
had found they were unable to control the independently-appointed
Collectors.6
The problem was perceived in part as one of excessive centralization,
which ma'de the IRS a powerful tool of political forces and threatened
public confidence in the tax system. 7 The solution was an effort to read-
just the perpetual tension between the need for central direction and
the dangers of central control.
The Treasury commissioned a management consulting firm to study
how to structure the IRS to insulate it from improper influence while
retaining the degree of central direction it needed to perform the mush-
rooming task of collecting the revenue. The consulting firm's recom-
mendations were ultimately embodied in Reorganization Plan No. 1
of 1952.88 In broad outline, the Plan called for two changes in IRS
structure which, on the surface, appear inconsistent but which were
designed to work in tandem to produce greater efficiency and inde-
pendence from political influence. Under the preexisting system, while
the National Office in theory directed field activities, in practice, since
the Collectors were Presidential appointees, the Commissioner's au-
thority over the 'field was in doubt. Further, the field was susceptible
to political pressure since the Collectors' job security depended upon
political favor. The Reorganization Plan sought to correct both defi-
ciencies by abolishing the Collectors' positions and creating not more
than 25 district commissioners who would be civil servants, promoted
according to merit, and answerable directly to the Commissioner. At
the same time, however, the plan called for a decentralization of most
IRS operations and a consequent reduction in National Office author-
ity over day-to-day field operations. The introduction of professional-
ism into -the highest levels of field organization would permit a high
degree of field autonomy; the elimination of patronage appointments
would create an environment in which field autonomy would not mean
field politics.89
" Statement of John B. Dunlop, Commissioner of IRS, "Meaning of Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 1 of 1952," 5/20/52.
" John W. Snyder, Secretary of Treasury, "The Reorganization of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue," Public Administration Review, 1952, p. 221 et seq.
'The House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments held
hearings on the Plan during January 1952. pursuant to the Reorganization Plan
of 1949, under which such reorganization plans were automatically ratified if not
di'sapproved by the Congress within 90 days. For the text of the plan, see Reorga-
nization Plan No. 1, !Submitted to the Congress by the President, 1/14/52.
' John W. ISnyder, "The Reorganization of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,"
p: 229.
"The Plan also called for the consolidation df field activities into administra-
tive groupings according to the function being performed (Investigative-includ-
ing Audit and Intelligence-Collection, ISettlement, etc.) rather than according to
the kind of tax being collected as a means df achieving clearer lines of responsi-
Un'der the plan, the primary function of the reduced National Office
staff would be to advise the Commissioner on questions of broad policy.
The Commissioner was to be the only political appointee in the IRS
and, as such, he was not to have the bureaucratic muscle necessary to
control field operations, but was to have the staff necessary to engage
in those activities for which a. political orientation was appropriate:
setting broad policy. Congressman Cecil R. King of California, Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue
Laws of the Ways and Means Committee, expressed the philosophy
underlying the Plan:
Political selection for positions which are primarily policy
forming has obvious justification. Where the job is primarily
a technical administrative post these are almost entirely
lacking.90
The reorganization of the Intelligence Division paralleled the pat-
tern for the Service.- The effect of the Plan was to increase the Com-
missioner's ability to exercise his general authority over intelligence
activities in the field by eliminating the politically independent Col-
lectors and streamlining the field organization while, at the same time,
minimizing direct National Office control over day-to-day operations
by bestowing greater autonomy upon the professional field staff.
With minor differences, the organization envisioned by the 1R52
Plan is that which exists today. Intelligence activities in each district
(of which there are 58) are run by a Chief, Intelligence, who reports
to the Regional Commissioner who reports to the Commissioner. The
Intelligence Division in the National Office is not in this chain of com-
mand and, therefore, generally has no line authority over the Chief,
Intelligence, in the district. It performs its function of assisting the
Commissioner in setting policy for all IRS Intelligence activities by
issuing rules and guidelines which are to be implemented by the Re-
gional Commissioners and the District Directors, in whom authority
to direct actual operations reposes."
hility and authority. Previously, for example, special agents engaged in intelli-
gence work had been divided into distinct administrative groups depending upon
whether they worked on excise, income, or other taxes.
" Testimony of the Hon. Cecil R. King before the Committee on Expenditures
in the Executive Departments, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Jan. 23, 1952, at p. 228.
"1 According to a June 23, 1961, IRS internal memorandum, at the time of the
reorganization there was much discussion of whether the District Directors (local
office administration) should have operational direction over intelligence opera-
tions or whether the contemplated District Commissioners (regional administra-
tors-now called Regional Commissioners) should. The plan adopted was the
former except for New York, where (presumably because of the presence of sev-
eral districts in a small geographic area with cases cutting across district lines)
the District Commissioner was to have operational control.
* See generally Internal Revenue Manual, § 9300; this discussion of IRS Orga-
nization is based in part upon interviews with many National Office and district
office intelligence executives. There are some exceptions to the rule of National
Office aloofness. Where problems of national scope require the application of In-
telligence resources, the National Office may initiate a National Office project and
coordinate it out of the National Office. Also, the Commissioner has the authority,
if he wishes, to seize control of any operation; however, he lacks the bureaucratic
capacity to do so on a large scaile, and further. for the National Office to inter-
fere in a case could and sometimes does, provoke objection and, thus, attention
from the IRS Inspection Service.
The Plan did not call for unqualified reliance upon the professional-
ism of the field organization to achieve in'dependence from influence
and high performance. It called for the transfer of responsibility for
investigating employee malfeasance from the Intelligence organization
to a newly created inspection service which would both police impro-
priety and continuously audit field performance.93 The current Inspec-
tion Service is the sole exception to the regionalized organization. It
was necessary to make Inspection independent of those it would in-
spect. Inspection personnel in the field therefore work out of the
Regional Offices and report to the Regional Inspector, who reports to
the Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) in the National Office, who
reports to the Commissioner. This structure makes Inspection inde-
pendent of the District Directors and the Regional Commissioners.4
The creation of Inspection amounted to the substitution of retro-
spective evaluation and investigation for direct supervision of field
activities. One of Inspection's key tasks is to determine the origins of
impropriety or inefficiency and to recommend new systems of organi-
zation or new guidelines to eliminate these causes." Its function is con-
sistent with the idea of a decentralized system in which the National
Office sets guidelines for performance and evaluates the field's ad-
herence to the guidelines, but does not control current operations.9 6
In 1952 the main job of IRS Intelligence was its classical task of
investigating allegations of tax fraud.97 The organization which was
created in 1952 promised effective and controlled intelligence opera-
tions as long as this classical intelligence function remained para-
mount.
Investigation of specific allegations of tax fraud inherently limits
the scope of an agent's discretion because of the narrow scope of the
inquiry. The inherent limitation makes it possible to rely to a high
degree upon agent initiative and spontaneous cooperation at the field
level with general guidance from the center when Special Agents in-
vestigate specific allegations of tax violations. The inherent controls
of the classical IRS intelligence task permitted the architects of 1952
to minimize central control, and thus minimize the chances of influ-
ence through the center without risking wholesale local abuse by
unrestrained special agents.
The story of abuse of the IRS Intelligence function since 1952 is
largely the story of the strains which the attempt to divert IRS re-
sources from its classical investigative function placed upon the or-
ganizational structure which had been designed for that classical
function-the investigation of specific allegations of tax fraud. Every
time the IRS has made a concerted effort to participate in tax law
Reorganization Plan of 1952.
* Interview, Warren Bates, Assistant Commissioner-Inspection, 9/75.
Ibid.
During its investigation the Committee found the Inspection Division to be
remarkably objective in its approach to investigation of allegations of IRS wrong-
doing. While the IRS system has its limitations, mainly in the mechanism for
identifying areas where investigation is necessary as contrasted with conduct-
ing an impartial investigation once it is begun, the ingredients of Inspection's
objectivity appear to merit study as an example of relatively successful self-
investigation.
*1 IRS Organization Study, Interim Report on Internal Revenue Service's
Intelligence Organization, September 1961.
enforcement activities with nontax objectives, it has found it necessary
to deviate in some way from its normal organization. The resulting
hybrid organizations created to participate in other than strict tax
enforcement activities have been responsible for many of the abuses of
which IRS Intelligence has been guilty during the last twenty-three
years.
The purpose of this report is to explore how changing objectives and
practices in IRS intelligence gathering have strained the Intelligence
organization the IRS established in 1952. Such an assessment is a
prerequisite to answering a major question facing those charged with
guiding IRS: whether the objectives which dictated the 1952 reorgani-
zation remain paramount, and, if so, whether there are means of avoid-
ing the abuses which have accompanied past efforts to reshape the IRS
tool for different purposes.9 8
B. IRS Intelligence 19592-1965: The Shift Toward Organized Crime
Between 1951 and 1960, IRS intelligence stepped into and out of the
fight against organized crime. In 1960, the government-wide Organized
Crime Drive began. IRS was drafted into the effort. The result was
the "unbalancing" of the tax enforcement effort: the key criterion for
the decision whether to investigate was no longer predicated on tax-
related criterion alone. In order to make certain the habits of bureau-
cracy would not negate this shift in emphasis, central "coordination"
of the effort was superimposed on the IRS's decentralized structure.
The resulting vagueness in- lines of authority, the increased use of the
abuse-prone intelligence gathering technique of electronic surveillance,
and the accompanying atmosphere of a crusade resulted in abuses in
the use of electronic surveillance between 1960 and 1965, which the
Long Committee 99 exposed. These abuses appear to be a direct result
of the structure created to handle the IRS activities and do not reflect
on the stated desirable purpose of the IRS action: to combat the nation-
wide growth of organized crime. 00
1. 1951-1960.-Before 1951, the classical function of IRS intel-
ligence was virtually its only function,101 but a change began at about
the same time reorganization plans were stirring. In February 1951,
the Kefauver Committee 102 criticized IRS failure to enforce the tax
" For a discussion of this issue see e.g., IRS Organizational Study Supplemental
Report, "A Contemporary View of the Criminal Law Enforcement Function in the
IRS," 1/12/70.
" Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 3, pp. 1126-27, Hon. Edward Long, Chairman.
100 IRS efforts directed at organized crime have resulted in the prosecution and
conviction of known criminals who successfully avoided conviction for other
crimes, the most notable being Al Capone. There are, however, differing views on
the question whether the concentration on organized crime figures can be justified
purely from a revenue enforcement viewpoint. See e.g., testimony of Louis Obder-
dorfer, p. 2, and Robert Blakey, p. 25, before the Subcommittee on Administration
of the Internal Revenue Code of the Senate Committee on Finance on "The Role
of the Internal Revenue Service in Law Enforcement," 1/22/76.
1' Interim Report on Internal Revenue -Service's Intelligence Organization,
September 9, 1961, pp. 1-3 (hereinafter referred to as "Interim Report"). In-
telligence also investigated employee malfeasance, job applicants, and similar
matters.
m Special Committee of the United States Senate to Investigate Organized
Crime in Interstate Commerce, established May 3, 1950.
laws with sufficient vigor against organized crime. This and other
criticism and encouragement by the Kefauver Committee led to the
creation in 1951 of a racketeer program in IRS. 103
In 1951 and 1952, the IRS assigned a large proportion of its intel-
ligence forces to racketeer work. The peak number of investigators
so assigned was 2,290 in January 1952.104 In that year 12,879 racketeer
cases were investigated.105 On November 1, 1951, a wagering tax be-
came effective, the purpose of which was to curb a primary source of
organized crime revenue. The Intelligence Division began to enforce
the tax through police-type intelligence gathering techniques. While
many in the IRS, including some of the accounting oriented personnel
of the Intelligence Division, resisted this work as an inappropriate
use of their training10 for a short time between the Kefauver hear-
ings and the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, this police
work represented an increasing part of IRS intelligence work.
The shift toward the Special (Organized Crime) Enforcement Pro-
gram reversed itself during the Eisenhower administration, which
consistently declined to provide special funds for racketeer work. 0
As a result, from 1952 on, Intelligence increasingly concentrated on
its "classical" function. In contrast to 10,041 racketeer cases investi-
gated in FY 1953, by FY 1955 total racketeer cases developed had
declined to 1,039; by FY 1960, to 125.10e
Following the 1957 Appalachian meeting of prominent organized
crime figures and the accession of Commissioner Latham in November
1958, however IRS once again began to emphasize enforcement efforts
against racketeers as part of a national program mounted by the fed-
eral government against major racketeers.o'0 A November 6, 1959,
Manual Supplement 14R-17 stated:
Achievement of the goal of balanced enforcement . . . does
not take precedence over the recognition of investigative re-
quirements arising from flagrant localized situations, includ-
ing racketeering or other illegal activity.110
- 2. Acceleration of IRS Intelligence Activities.-An April 1960
Manual Supplement established a renewed special enforcement effort
against racketeers."' The National Office was to maintain a file of all
m Then called the "Bureau". Reference throughout will be the Internal Rev-
enue Service.
1O See Interim Report, p. 12.
10 Ibid., Table 3. During the 15-month period, April 1951 through June 1952, 430
cases were recommended for prosecution. During the same period, convictions
were obtained in 133 cases involving 229 defendants. Interim Report p. 12.
" See Interim Report, pp. 13-14.
Ibid., p. 5.
x' Interim Report, Table 3.
"0 Statement of Robert K. Lund, former Director, Intelligence Division, before
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 7/29/75.
n MS 14R-17, November 6, 1959.
na MS 94G-4, The program partially centralized IRS intelligence activities,
calling for a special review of returns of major racketeers in each district and
requiring either an audit or an intelligence investigation of each major racketeer
at least every two years. It created a National Office Master File of racketeer
figures.
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information on major racketeers, even though, in theory, the National
Office did not direct investigation of such figures. The reemphasis
accelerated rapidly with the start of the Organized Crime Drive
(OCD) in February 1961. The Commissioner ordered that all necessary
manpower:
be made available to the extent necessary to promptly and
thoroughly conduct those investigations requested by the
Department of Justice. 1 2
The OCD was accompanied by a revamping of IRS intelligence or-
ganization which had not accompanied earlier racketeer programs. At-
torney General Kennedy had expressed the view that.the decentralized
structure of the Intelligence Division with its layers of non-law-en-
forcement personnel was not apt for the intensive, nationwide program
he envisioned against organized crime.'13 In response to this view, the
IRS carved out a new structure for OCD intelligence work which by-
passed the District Directors and created lines of authority strictly
within the law enforcement branch of IRS. The National Director of
the Intelligence Division assumed responsibility for "coordinating" the
OCD program. He established a "coordinator" in the National Office
who would work through similar "coordinators" in each region. The
system would bypass the main IRS organization. The District Di-
rectors lost effective operational authority over OCD investigations
(but retained administrative control over the personnel conducting
the investigations and operational control over them to the extent
their work fell within the GEP).
The transformed organization carried out transformed intelligence
activities. Use of general law enforcement techniques of all kinds, in-
cluding paid informants and electronic surveillance, increased sharply.
While no separate statistics are available for each technique, the table
set forth below reflects increases in the use of intelligence gathering
techniques which paralleled the increased participation of the IRS in
the OCD.
E.mpenses of 8eouring evidence
[In thousands]
Fiscal year: Fiscal year:
1960 (actual)--------------- $159 1969 ---------------------- 479
1961 ----------------------- 241 1970 (181)* ----------------- 490
1962 ----------------------- 432 1971 (127)* ----------------- 523
1963 --------------- ------- 653 1972 (211)* ---------------- 723
1964 ----------------------- 827 1973 ----------------------- 425
1965 ----------------------- 819 1974 ----------------------- 597
1966 ------------------------ 790 1975 ----------------------- 354
1967 ----------------------- 751 1976 (plan) ---------------- 327
1968 ----------------------- 459
The majority of funds expended for intelligence gathering in the years 1970-
1972 were spent by AT&F: $309,000 (1970), $396,000 (1971) and $512,000 (1972).
Figures through 1972 include expenses incurred by the Division of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms (AT&F) when it was a part of IRS. AT&F became a sep-
arate Bureau in 1972. The figures in parentheses for FYs 1970, 1971 and 1972
indicate the amounts expended by IRS in those years, exclusive of that allocated
to AT&F.
MS 14ROD-1, February 24, 1961.
no Statement of Robert K. Lund before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Con-
sumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations,
7/29/75.
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While no further breakdown of expenses for particular techniques is
available, testimony at the Long hearings supports the surmise that
the sharp increase in expenditures in FY 1961-1963 reflects changes
in intelligence techniques more frequently used during the period.
The reemphasis upon major crime figures also altered the personnel
profile of the Intelligence Division. In 1959, in partial response to this
reemphasis and the accompanying changes in the investigative skills
needed to perform the work, the IRS cut in half the accounting train-
ing required of prospective special agents, reducing it from 24 to 12
semester hours." 4 The impact of this change was multiplied by a
corresponding increase in hiring of Intelligence Division personnel.
According to its May 1961 Long-Range Plan, the IRS anticipated in-
creasing its intelligence field personnel from 1,998 in 1961 to 2,560 by
the end of 1964, with fifty percent of the total performing some form
of organized crime or racketeering work."a5
0. Abuses in IRS Intelligence 1960-1965: The Long Hearings
Unprecedented charges of the improper use of investigative tech-
niques resulting in the abuse of citizens' rights were made against IRS
Intelligence following the first five years of the Organized Crime
Drive."16
Senator Edward V. Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure uncovered widespread abuse of electronic surveil-
lance by IRS Intelligence-abuses the IRS had neither prevented
nor discovered on its own-in a series of hearings in July and August
of 1965.117 In response to the Committee's allegations of IRS abuse of
wiretap capabilities, Commissioner Cohen acknowledged the various
forms of surveillance and explained their origin as follows:
A valid starting point is the 1957 Appalachian meeting of
the crime overlords which focused national concern on the
cancer of organized crime. February 1961 saw the onset of a
drive on organized crime unprecedented in terms of resources,
intensity, and-thankfully-results. The success of this pro-
gram. has been reflected in a tenfold increase of convictions
secured in organized crime cases.
Briefly, we have completed 3,130 full scale investigations
in the rackets area from February 1961 through March 31,
1965. Prosecution has been recommended in 2,452 of these.
So far from these cases 1,214 convictions have resulted. A
number of others are still pending . We presently have 664
cases under investigation. From the Internal Revenue stand-
point, taxes and penalties of more than $219 million have
been recommended for assessment against OCD subjects. It is
noteworthy that where criminal prosecution has been recom-
n'Interim Report, pp. 79-83.
m Interim Report, p. 80.
U Not all of the abuses the Long hearings uncovered were products of the
OCD. However, the vast majority of the abuses discussed in testimony before
the Long Committee occurred in the course of OCD investigations.
1 Long Committee hearings, pp. 126-27; Letter, Commissioner, IRS to Senator
Long, 7/11/67.
mended, we have still been properly able to assess civil taxes
and penalties. It seems fair to say that without the whole-
hearted efforts of the Internal Revenue Service there could
have been no organized crime drive nearly resembling that
sponsored and endorsed by the Administration and the Con-
gress since February of 1961. Over 60 percent of the cases
prosecuted in the organized crime field during this eriod
have been developed by Internal Revenue Service
investigation.
In order to effectively combat organized crime the Service
recognized that the furtive, underground activities which go
hand in hand with organized crime could often be uncovered
only through resort to special techniques and equipment. The
extraordinary nature of organized crime compelled extra-
ordinary effort by the Service.
The Service early tooled up appropriately for its efforts.
Under the impetus of the organized crime drive, the Service
expended allotted funds-representing still but a minute
fraction of its investigative expenditures-for the purchase
of modern, miniaturized electronic transmitting and receiv-
ing equipment.
With respect to the difficulty of controlling special agents once they
had been furnished the investigation tools, Commissioner Cohen
testified:
Insuring adherence (to restrictions on use of the electornic
devices) is not a simple matter. The Service has approxi-
mately 3,000 criminal investigators working throughout the
country. They constitute an elite group. While we must tem-
per their zeal with controlled judgment, we cannot categori-
cally deprive them of tools and training with legitimate,
exemplary uses.
For many of the abuses the Long Committee uncovered the immedi-
ate cause of the breakdown in controls may have been the confusion of
lines of authority which resulted from a hybrid organizational struc-
ture, the changed structure merely reflected the underlying and un-
anticipated problems which accompany subordinating tax enforce-
ment, with its inherent restraints, to a non-tax goal.
The Long hearings resulted in no change in IRS structure. The IRS
did, however, issue directives expressly forbidding all wiretaps, includ-
ing those considered legal. It required very high level approval of any
electronic surveillance and imposed strict controls upon access to the
tools of the eavesdropping trade.
D. TUlndercover Agent Abuse8 and IRS Organizational Veaknessee
The same administrative weaknesses which led to abuses of the elec-
tronic surveillance capability have also led to abuse of a second major
IRS investigative tool; the undercover agent.
The Special Agent Undercover Program, which has existed in vary-
ing forms since the IRS began investigating tax fraud, intensified
with the beginning of the OCD. In 1963, in a pattern which paralleled
that for the entire OCD, the Undercover Agent Program.
was centralized under the direct control of the National Office
Intelligence Division. This action was taken as the result of an
Intelligence Division task force study that found a centralized
program would be more effective and economical than the sep-
arate undercover projects that were then operated by indi-
vidual regions or district offices.""8
The result of this action paralleled the results of the centralization
of other OCD efforts; neither the Districts nor the National Office
exercised control over the undercover agents.
In a major study in 1975,"9 IRS Inspection found widespread abuse
in the undercover agent program, and traced the abuse to administra-
tive anomalies remarkably similar to those which underlay the elec-
tronic surveillance abuses which the Long Committee had unearthed.
An undercover agent in New York, -who was to develop intelligence
regarding organized crime figures, had engaged in extortion, sale of
stolen property and fraudulent business schemes; an agent in Birming-
ham had been arrested for violations of Alabama gambling and pro-
hibition laws; other undercover agents who had not committed any
illegal acts had been largely unsupervised in their undercover careers.
In the case of the New York agent, the study found that:
National Office advised that field managers were responsible
to ensure that the Manhattan Strike Force's objectives were
achieved by the undercover agent. However, the Manhattan
Strike Force representative (i.e., a "field manager") advised
that only the National Office had authority to approve and
direct the undercover agent's activities.12 0
In the case of the Birmingham agent, the study found:
National Office and district responsibilities for direction and
control of the undercover project were not clearly defined.
2 1
The Committee staff also discovered instances of improper and ex-
cessive use of undercover agents. In its efforts directed at organized
groups which refuse to file returns and pay taxes as a means of pro-
testing the constitutionality of the internal revenue laws, the IRS
often uses local and national office-supervised undercover agents, as
well as informants, to infiltrate the groups. The undercover agents,
often posing as husband and wife, attend open meetings of these
protesters, identifying all individuals in attendance,1
22 and in some
cases become trusted members of the protest organization. One such
instance was described as follows:
After several months of getting acquainted with the move-
ment, we decided we would attempt to infiltrate one of our
m IRS Internal Audit Report of the Review of the National Office Intelligence
Division Special Agent Program and Investigative Imprest Fund, 4/21/75,
Attachment 2, p. 1.
1" Ibid. The report covered the period 1971-1975. Because the same administra-
tive system for undercover operations had existed since 1963, however, there
is every reason to believe this period is representative of the 12-year span.
A copy of the report is in the Committee files.
m Ibid, Attachment 3, p. 4.
SIbid., Attachment 5, p. 1.
m Memorandum of telephone converation between Richard B. Worker, IRS
Special Agent, Chicago, and Brian Wellesley, IRS Group Supervisor, Intelligence
Division, Los Angeles, 4/3/73.
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agents into the inner circle of the [protest group]. Despite
foreboding warnings from other districts that infiltration
was extremely difficult, by November 1973 one of our agents
had gained the trust, confidence and money of the [protest
group] by being selected as treasurer. This coup also gained
us the entire mailihg list of the [organization] .123
The staff also learned of instances in which the undercover opera-
tives, because of their positions of trust within the organizations, were
privy to legal strategy sessions of tax protesters who had been indicted
for violations of the tax code and had legal actions pending against
them in court.
In one case, a National office undercover agent who had infiltrated
a tax protest organization gained access to a draft of a legal brief of
a protester which had been prepared by his attorney and was to be
used in the protester's defense in his trial for willful failure to file
tax returns. The agent turned the brief over to his contact in the Los
Angeles office, who then gave it to the U.S. Attorneys prosecuting
the case.124
The two projects in the IRS study which were found to be the
most effective and the most free of abuse were projects in which the
districts simply moved into the control vacuum and assumed control
of the project, directing it in the manner in which the IRS' decen-
tralized intelligence system was designed to function. In most cases,
however, the districts failed to exercise this initiative in the face of
theoretical National Office responsibility for the project; loss of con-
trol and overuse resulted.
The IRS was unwilling to change its entire organization to meet
the special needs of the OCD because the decentralized structure was
best adapted to its classical function. A decentralized structure yielded
effective audit and collection action. Since the classical intelligence
function depended upon close coordination with Audit and Collection,
a balanced enforcement program at the district level required that
the intelligence function be similarly organized. The requirements
of the intensive effort apparently necessitated a different, more cen-
tralized structure. The "coordinator" system and the centralization
of the undercover program reflected these requirements. The result
of these attempts to change an organizational structure designed only
to control classical IRS intelligence activities into a hybrid capable
of performing both classical and police-type work was loss of
control.125
m Memorandum, IRS Special Agent Neuhauser, Chicago to Assistant Regional
Commissioner-Intelligence, Midwest Region, undated, p. 2.
" All personnel in the Los Angeles district interviewed by the staff denied
turning over results of undercover work to U.S. Attorneys on any occasion. An
unsigned district memorandum, however, discovered by IRS Inspection Service
during its investigation of the intelligence functions of the district, praises the
work of the undercover agent in gaining access to the legal brief.
m Senator Long also concluded there was a close connection between IRS
organization and abuse. On October 5, 1966, Senator Long wrote to Commissioner
Cohen:
"If control could be once again centered in the National Director of Intelli-
gence in Washington (as is the case with IRS' Inspection Service) and if
the Division could return to Its normal job of checking on large tax evaders
rather than bookies and numbers operators, things would be greatly imoroved
at IRS."
69-984 0 - 76 - 56 .
II. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST POLITICAL ACTIVISTS: SPECIAL
SERVICE STAFF
A. Introduction
The Special Service Staff was a centralized effort to gather intelli-
gence on a category of taxpayers defined by essentially political cri-
teria for the purpose of developing tax cases against them. While
perceptions of the program's purpose varied, many in IRS and the
few outside IRS who knew (e.g., FBI, White House) of the program
regard it as an attempt to suppress a group which threatened the
country's security. A centralized effort was deemed necessary because
the balanced enforcement programs of the districts had not led to
sufficient efforts against "activists" to satisfy IRS' critics, and because
the threat was nationwide and involved some national organizations.
The Special Service Staff was not an Intelligence Division project116
but it was an information-gathering project in which some of the in-
formation gathered was transmitted to the field for appropriate action.
The creators of SSS have uniformly testified that they did not intend
that it would result in enforcement of the tax laws along ideological
lines; that SSS was simply to gather information and disseminate it
to the field where the normal decentralized controls of the tax system
would assure that the information would result in no disproportionate
enforcement effort.127 Districts, it was presumed, would resist re-
ferrals which did not meet normal IRS criteria for tax investigations.
In fact, focusing intelligence collection on ideologically-selected
groups inevitably resulted in disproportionate enforcement efforts
against them. Even had the decision whether to refer a particular
case to the field been wholly objective, SSS targets would have
shouldered a concentrated burden of tax enforcement because of the
disproportionate increase in the gathering of information on them.
Additionally, the structure created to accomplish the purposes of
SSS were the controls normally present in district operations.
A detailed documentary and transactional history of the origins
of SSS is contained in two prior Congressional reports 12 on the
subject.
Its origins will merely be summarized here.12 9
"o Until February, 1972 SSS was under the Assistant commissioner (Com-
pliance), who also supervises the Intelligence and Audit Divisions.
'"Leon Green testimony, 9/12/75, pp. 65, 66.
""'Investigation of the Special Service Staff of the IRS," by the Staff of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, June 5, 1975, hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Joint Committee Report;" "Political Intelligence in the IRS: The
Special Service Staff. A Documentary Analysis Prepared by the Staff of the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Ninety Third Congress, Second Session, December, 1974.
" The Committee has relied heavily upon the work of the Joint Committee
in its inquiry into SSS. The Senate Select Committee's contribution to the prob-
lem of the origins of the Special Service Staff has been limited to that new
material which came to light in depositions. In general, this Committee's investi-
gation has corroborated the Joint Committee's findings regarding SSS origins.
This Committee plowed new ground in two principal areas: (1) investigation
of the criteria for referral of subjects to the intelligence agents to the Special
Service Staff; (2)interviews of field personnel who handled SSS cases to deter-
mine if SSS influenced action on cases after the referral. Except where indi-
cated, all statements regarding the origins of SSS are based upon pp. 33-44 of
the Joint Committee's Report.
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B. Congressional Influence
During the six months prior to the formation of SSS, staff mem-
bers of the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations (Permanent Subcommittee)
had been reviewing IRS files on activist organizations, both in the
field and in Washington.130 As a result of this review, the Permanent
Subcommittee became aware of the extent of IRS activity in its area
of interest, and expressed criticism that the IRS had not been more
active. At a hearing on June 25, 1969, the Permanent Subcommittee
"raked over the coals-organizationally, not individually" 131
Mr. Leon C. Green, Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) for
the lack of IRS activity in the area of ideological or activist organiza-
tions. As Mr. Green interpreted the Committee's criticism, it related
purely to the likelihood that the organizations and individuals asso-
ciated with them were escaping tax liabilities.
C. White House Influence
There is evidence of a direct White House interest in SSS, as con-
trasted with the more generalized interest of the Permanent Sub-
committee, in IRS policy toward activists.1as
1. White House General Criticism and Encouragement.-Tom
Charles Huston in early 1969 recommended to President Nixon
that the IRS examine left-wing tax exempt organizations to be sure
they were complying with the tax laws.13 3 President Nixon reportedly
concurred, and Dr. Arthur Burns was asked to speak with the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue about the President's concern.13 4
According to Commissioner Thrower's memorandum of the subse-
quent (June 16, 1969) conversation with Dr. Burns, the latter ex-
pressed the President's concern.
According to Commissioner Thrower, he may have expressed the
President's general concern to Assistant Commissioner (Compliance)
Bacon, who had responsibility for the Audit, and Intelligence Divi-
sions, but did not recommend or discuss the establishment of an
organization such as SSS.
about enforcement in the area of exempt organizations. The
President had expressed . . . great concern over the fact that
tax-exempt funds may be supporting activist groups engaged
in stimulating riots both on the campus and within our inner
cities.'"
The Subcommittee's authority to do so was by virtue of an Executive Order
pursuant to 26 USC 6103(a).
131 Leon AD. Green Testimony, 9/12/75, p. 36.
'"On the other hand, following the formation of SSS, the staff of the Perma-
nent Subcommittee was quite directly involved in its work in contrast to the
White House, which exhibited little interest for over eighteen months after its
formation.
m1 Joint Committee Report, pp. 16, 17.
... For the detailed account of these transactions, including Dr. Burns' inability
to recall most of what others claim occurred, see the Joint Committee Report at
pp. 17-18.
-mMemorandum [to file] from Commissioner Thrower, 6/16/69.
Four days after the meeting between Messrs. Burns and Thrower,
Mr. Huston advised Roger Barth (Assistant to the Commissioner)
by memorandum that the
President is anxious to see some positive action taken against
those organizations which are violating existing regulations,
and I have assured him that I will keep him advised of the
efforts that are presently underway.""'
On July 1, 1969, Eddie D. Hughes, a special agent in the Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (AT&F) Division of IRS 1" and an expert in
militant organizations, gave a briefing on militant organizations to
the staff of the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Hughes had been summoned to Washington, D.C., by the head
of AT&F, who, according to Mr. Hughes, advised him he was to help
prepare a report for the White House. 1 38 Following the briefing,
Mr. Hughes helped Bernard Meehan, the Chief of Staff of the Assist-
ant Commissioner (Compliance) prepare a report 139 on ideological
organizations to Mr. Barth.14 0 The report begins:
In furtherance of the recent high level interest shown in the
activities of ideological organizations .
and discusses current IRS activity in the area of ideological organiza-
tions. Mr. Huston has stated he believes he saw the memorandum and
that Mr. Barth had sent it to him.
2. Evidence of Early White House Interest in SSS.-An early meet-
ing of the organizers of SSS occurred on July 24, 1969. Mr. Meehan
of the Compliance Division attended the meeting at the direction of
Mr. Bacon, the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance), and, accord-
ing to Donald Virdin (who took the minutes) ran the meeting.
Mr. Virdin stated that he received a call during the afternoon of
July 24 from someone in the Compliance Division directing him to
hasten his preparation of the minutes, and that as a result, he had
no time to correct several typing errors in the draft.14 ' Mr. Virdin
wrote the following memorandum regarding an early morning tele-
m3 Memorandum from T. C. Huston to Roger Barth, 6/20/69.
According to the Joint Committee Report, Mr. Barth may have shown this
memo to the Commissioner and to Mr. Bacon, but Mr. Barth cannot recall doing
either for certain. (Joint Committee Report, p. 20.)
' Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was a division of IRS until 1972 when it
became a separate branch of the Treasury Department.
' Mr. Hughes' recollection is corroborated by his expense voucher, which
recites: "My presence in Washington, D.C. is necessary to assist the National
Office with a report on militant organizations and the financial funding thereof,
as it relates to violations of the Internal Revenue Code. The report was requested
by and will be submitted to the White House." (Joint Committee Report, p. 20.)
' Memorandum, Assistant Commissioner, Compliance, to Roger Barth, July 1,
1969.
5 Career IRS people questioned unanimously named Mr. Barth as a conduit
to the White House of information about the inner workings of the IRS.
Mr. Hughes stated he never prepared a report addressed to the White House. See
Donald 0. Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, pp. 31, 32. The pressure to complete the
minutes is significant in view of later events indicating the minutes went to the
White House. This raises the possibility someone in the Compliance Division was
aware of specific White House interest in Special Service Staff.
m.. Joint Committee Report, p. 22, e.g. Leon Green testimony, pp. 20, 21.
phone conversation with Mr. Meehan (who had run the July 24 meet-
ing for the Compliance Division) in which Mr. Meehan complained
of being bypassed by the newly-appointed head of the SSS (initially
called the Activist Organization Committee) :





Subject: Activist Organizations Committee.
Mr. Meehan called. We were very upset because Mr. Wright
[head of SSS] had discussed this matter with Mr. Green
[deputy to Mr. Bacon] yesterday. Mr. Meehan said he won-
dered what was going on and why it was necessary for Mr.
Wright to discuss this with Mr. Green.
Mr. Meehan said that the creation of this organization had
been discussed with Mr. Bacon [Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance) and Mr. Green's and Mr. Meehan's superior]
that Mr. Meehan represented Mr. Bacon at the meetings creat-
ing this organization; and that the instructions given by Mr.
Meehan were those of Mr. Bacon. The reason why Mr. Meehan
sat in the meetings is because Mr. Green was absent.
Mr. Meehan's concern is that there may be conflicting in-
structions; thus, even though Mr. Green is thoroughly fami-
liar with the matter, the original instructions were those of
Mr. Bacon. A copy of the minutes of the meeting which he had
prepared were forwarded to Mr. Barth in the Commissioner's
office, and Mr. Meehan says now they are over at the White
House. Thus, he is most distressed that we might be taking
some action contrary to our original commitments. [Emphasis
added.]
-D. 0. VIRDIN.143
Mr. Huston has stated he had no discussion with Mr. Barth regard-
ing establishing SSS.144 There is no evidence that the White House
ordered or specifically suggested its establishment. The evidence does
suggest, however, that because SSS was in part a response to White
House interest in the IRS' acting against ideological oragnizations,
the White House was kept advised of the specific action IRS was tak-
ing and that there was some feeling within IRS that the Service
had made a "commitment" to the White House to proceed with SSS. 14
D. Establishment of 888
Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) Leon C. Green ree-
ommended establishing the organization which became SSS on June
" Mr. Bacon, Mr. Green and Mr. Meehan have all testified they were unaware
of any White House interest in the Special Service Staff as such. Mr. Virdin has
testified :
By that time [July 31, 1969], Mr. Meehan had told me that the White House
had the minutes, and the White House was interested. And he was upset, maybe
because there was at that time, he knew, such a high level interest in it [i.e. SSS].
Virdin Deposition p. 62.
'"Joint Committee Report, p. 23.
'" D. 0. Virdin, Memorandum for the File, "Activist Organizations Committee,"
July 31, 1969; D. 0. Virdin, Memorandum to Mr. [Harold E.] Snyder, "Activist
Organizations Committee," May 2. 1968.
25, 1969, immediately following his testimony before the Permanent
Subcommittee, and apparently as a direct consequence of his "raking
over the coals." Mr. Green's thought, shared by his superior, Mr.
Bacon, was that the SSS would gather information on activist and
ideological groups, analyze the information to determine if tax ques-
tions or violations were present and refer the information to the field
for whatever action the field deemed appropriate.146 The organization
was to have no authority to initiate investigations or audits, but was
merely to gather and disseminate information. One of the main rea-
sons for not giving the organization line authority was the concern that
the members of the organzation would develop a non-tax orientation
as a result of the considerable contact it was anticipated it would have
with the FBI, the Internal Security Division of the Justice Depart-
ment, and other intelligence organizations concerned with subversives.
E. Administration of 888
- SSS was originally a committee [the "Activist Organizations Com-
mittee"] composed of representatives of the three IRS Compliance
Divisions, Audit, Collection and Intelligence, and of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (AT&F).147 It was directly under the Assistant Com-
missioner (Compliance); its work was to be supervised by the staff
of the Assistant Commissioner, in particular, the Deputy Assistant
Commissioner (Compliance), Mr. Leon Green. In this respect, SSS
administrative position was analogous to that of the OCD National
Office coordinator with the exception that the National Office Coordi-
nator was under the Director, Intelligence Division, and was thus one
step further removed from the Assistant Commissioner.
F. Secrecy of SS
The IRS decided very early to keep the existence of SSS a secret
from those inside and outside of IRS who had no "need to know" of
SSS. In a "talking paper" written before a meeting during the forma-
tive stages of SSS, the author commented:
In another area we must be particularly careful. At least one
or more of these organizations apparently consider them-
selves to 'be political organizations. This is an extremely deli-
cate and sensitive area and the Chief Counsel will have to
provide guidance. We certainly must not open the door to
widespread notoriety that would embarrass the Administra-
tion or any elected officials. This is one of the reasons why we
are not publicizing this Committee except as such publicity
may be necessary within the Service.4s
Because of the classified documents SSS handled, all its members had
to have top secret clearances. While the existence of SSS was disclosed
in the Internal Revenue Manual in 1972 when word regarding its opera-
tions appeared in the press, 1 49 the entry did not disclose its functions.
The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation did not learn of
SSS functions until sometime in 1973 following press stories regarding
the activities.o5 0
" Green testimony, 9/12/75, p. 65.
"' Memorandum for File by D. 0. Virdin 7/29/69.
'r Unsigned memorandum composed by D. 0. Virdin 7/24/69. See also Memo-
randum of meeting by D. 0. Virdin 7/24/69.
1 "Deposition of former Commissioner Walters, p. 51, 9/19/75.
" Interview with Joint Committee staff representative, June, 1975.
G. Operation of 888
The Special Service Staff did not function in accordance with the
limited, tax-oriented purpose for which Mr. Green and Mr. Bacon
established it. In practice, Special Service Staff: (1) believed its mis-
sion included saving the country from subversives, extremists, and
anti-establishment organizations and individuals; (2) reviewed for
audit or collection potential organizations and individuals selected by
other agencies, such as the Internal Security Division of the Justice
Department and the FBI, on bases having no relation to the likelihood
that such organizations or individuals had violated the tax laws; (3)
after reviewing information regarding such organizations and indi-
viduals, referred cases to the field for action, some of which did not
meet IRS criteria for audit or collection action; (4) at times used its
status as a National Office organization in a partially successful effort
to pressure the field into proceeding further with audits and collection
action than the field would have done in the absence of pressure from
the National Office.
Both Mr. Bacon and Mr. Green testified they recognized the danger
that SSS would 'develop a mentality similar to that of the intelligence
organizations with which it dealt on a daily basis. Mr. Green testified
that he perceived that Mr. Wright soon felt he was "participating in
an effort to save the country from dissidents and extremists" 151 and
that Mr. Wright had a tendency to inflate the importance of the SSS
function through identifying with the larger fight against extremists.152
Mr. Green usually read Mr. Wright's bi-weekly reports, several of
which contained clear indications that tax considerations were not al-
ways paramount in SSS decisions to refer cases to the field. In one
such report,153 Mr. Wright complained of one of the "very few" SSS
referrals the field had rejected.
The Detroit District has submitted a memorandum report
stating they have reviewed the information submitted to them
in our proposal for possible Audit action, but have concluded
that enforcement action will not result in additional tax liabil-
ity of "Material compliance consequence." This is one of the
ver)y few declinations we have received on [SSS] cases.
We are not questioning the District decision or its right
to make the decision, as our referral letters (see copy
attached) leave broad options. However, the information
available indicates the individuals involved may be under-
reporting their income and they are notorious campus and
anti-draft activists having arrest records under anti-riot
laws. They are the principal officers in the Radical Education
Project, an offshoot of the Students for Democratic Society,
and have been identified as members of certain Communist
front organizations.
This matter is cited in this report only for the purpose of
suggesting that while revenue potential might not be large
in some cases, there are instances where enforcement against
a Leon Green testimony, p. 68, 9/12/75.
mlIbid., p. 66. Mr. Green said one of the few serious disagreements he and
Mr. Bacon ever had was over the appointment of Mr. Wright to head SSS.
' SSS Bi-weekly Report, 11/2/70.
flagrant law violators would have some salutary effect in this
overall battle against persons bent on destruction of this gov-
ernent." [Emphasis added.]
Both Mr. Bacon and Mr. Green also testified that, while they made
some efforts to check this tendency on the part of SSS, they relied
largely upon the independence of the decentralized field organization
to prevent any abuses from actually occurring." The evidence is that
this reliance was misplaced. On the basis of interviews of field per-
sonnel who handled some SSS referrals, the staff believes that, in
practice, except in the "very few" cases referred to by Mr. Wright in
his memorandum, the field onored the National Office referrals even
where it believed the recommended action was not justified by the tax
merits of the case. 55
The attitude reflected in the bi-weekly report quoted above resembles
the attitude of the OOD. This time, however, the targets were not
major criminals. The position. of the SSS in the IRS structure was
as anomolous as that of the OOD Coordinator and rendered ineffective
existing mechanisms for checking abuse-in this case the abuse of
ideologically-motivated tax enforcement. These analogies of motive
and organization were apparent to the creators of SSS. A July 2, 1969,
memorandum of an SSS organizational meeting alluded to the admin-
istrative resemblance:
The Chairman of the task force [SSS] will establish liaison
with the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, and will coordinate matters with
that Division in the same fashion that the Intelligence Divi-
sion now coordinates OCD matters with the Criminal Divi-
sion of Justice.
A July 22, 1969 memorandum alluded to the analogy of purpose:
In effect, what we will attempt to do is to gather intelligence
data on the organizations in which we are interested and to
use a strike force concept whereby all Compliance Divisions
and all other service functions will participate in a joint effort
in our common objective.
While it is contended by those who established SSS that it was not
intended that activists receive any more attention than normal tax
compliance criteria would dictate, the creation of a special National
Office bureaucracy to focus on activists is inconsistent with this view.
SSS was created because the application of normal enforcement cri-
teria by the field was not yielding enough results to satisfy congres-
sional and White House critics. What began as a bureaucratic effort
to still criticism by focusing special attention on the problem became,
in the minds of the SSS group, a crusade against alleged threats to the
national security.
1. Special Service Staff Target Selection Criteria.-The basic modus
operandi of SSS was; 1) to establish files on individuals and organiza-
tions falling within its purview; 2) to engage in a routine examina-
tion of a variety of sources of information to determine the likelihood
* Leon Green testimony, p. 65; Donald Bacon testimony, pp. 98-102.
See, e.g., Discussion of Meikeljohn Civil Liberties Library, pp. 887-889.
that any of the organizations or individuals were not in compliance
with the tax laws.156 In a very general sense, this procedure parallels
"compliance" programs the IRS engaged in regularly. An IRS district
will often identify an area of probable non-compliance and engage in
an intensive investigations of taxpayers falling within the category.
On occasion, the IRS initiates random compliance programs, such as
conducting mass interviews of all employees in a certain business dis-
trict to see whether employers are complying with withholding laws,
or checking whether all attorneys in a particular area are filing tax re-
turns. The element which distinguishes all these programs from the
SSS program is that the criteria for selecting the targets in normal
compliance programs are related to enforcement of the tax laws. Even
in the cases of random checks, the taxpayers selected are generally
those with high incomes where nonfiling of returns can lead to a sig-
nificant revenue loss.'"5 The Selection criteria of SSS were neither
random nor directly tax related.'58
Most individuals and organizations that became targets of SSS
did so by virtue of becoming targets of one of the agencies from which
SSS obtained information.159 The reason for this selection of tax
enforcement targets by non-tax agencies was set forth in the following
passage from the minutes of an early SSS organizational meeting.
Since the Department of Justice Internal Security Division
has a primary responsibility of determining what organiza-
tions might fall in this category '(ideological organizations),
it will be necessary to determine from that Department addi-
tional information as needed.160
It is apparent that the IRS had doubts about its competence to deter-
mine what an ideological organization was, and would largely leave
that determination and thus the determination of the targets of its
enforcement program to agencies with greater expertise. This feeling
of inadequacy on the part of IRS is a direct reflection of the absence
of a relationship between the selection criteria and tax issues.16 1
The FBI was the largest source of SSS targets. While still in its
formative days, SSS was placed on the FBI's distribution list in re-
.. See Joint Committee Report, p. 7.
Leon Green testimony 9/12/75, pp. 58, 59.
m Some SSS selections were directly tax-related. To the extent SSS examined
exempt organizations which were engaging in political action; or inquired into
the deductibility of contributions to non-exempt organizations; or reviewed the
possible unreported siphoning of funds of activist organizations by their leaders,
Its activities were tax-oriented and reflected the legitimate concerns the White
House and the Congress had expressed. However, SSS Activities went far beyond
these inquiries, as the discussion below will demonstrate.
"' "Q: Was the identity of the organizations and individuals that came to the
attention of the Special Service Staff for review pretty much determined by the
nature of the input that they received from the FBI and the Justice Department?
Mr. Green: No question. (Deposition of Leon C. Green, p. 56.)
' D. 0. Virdin, Memorandum for Files, "Ideological Organizations," 7/2/69.
... The IRS did not wholly rely upon other agencies, but it did so to an un-
precedented degree in comparison to other IRS compliance programs in which
target selection is based solely upon tax compliance criteria in which the IRS is
expert. SSS reviewed the tax compliance of persons and organizations about
which its critical Information was simply that their names appeared on material
supplied by other agencies in response to an IRS request for help on identifying
"dissidents" or "extremists". See note 166.
sponse to a request from Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) Bacon
for information regarding
various organizations of predominantly dissident or extremist
nature and/or people prominently identified with those
organizations.162
The FBI, perceiving that SSS would "deal a blow to dissident ele-
ments" 163 decided to supply reports relating to the category of indi-
viduals and organizations identified by Mr. Bacon.




nowhere to keep them except in files, so it established files on the sub-
jects of the FBI reports. Once a file was established routine SSS pro-
cedures swung into effect and, except for those which were not checked
because of shortage of manpower, the files were reviewed; IRS master
files were checked to determine if the subjects had filed returns; if
they had not, investigations were initiated in the field; if they had,
the returns were reviewed for audit potential.165 The FBI did not
select the reports it forwarded on the basis of the presence of a prob-
able tax violation, but on the basis of the criteria Mr. Bacon had sup-
plied; yet the furnishing of the report resulted in establishment of an
SSS file and, subject to resource limitations, to a review of possible
tax liability.
Among the other lists of "extremists," "subversives" and dissidents
SSS received was a list of 2,300 organizations the FBI categorized as
"Old Left," "New Left," and "Right Wing". The bi-weekly report for
the week of June15,-1970-,describes-SSS plans for this list:
Through the cooperation of the FBI we have received a list-
ing of 2300 organizations categorized as "Old. Left," "New
Left," and "Right Wing." Many .of these have tax exempt
status. We propose to screen the entire list against the Exempt
Organization Master File and the Business Master File and
establish files on these organizations where non-compliance
with filing requirements is indicated.
The SSS also received the printouts of the Inter-Divisional Infor-
mation Unit (IDIU) of the Department of Justice, which varied be-
tween 10,000 and 16,000 names.1 6 6 In the August 29, 1969 bi-weekly
report acknowledging receipt of the printout, Paul Wright stated:
As a major assist in this Committee's effort, we received on
August 26, 1969, subject data sheets (hard copy computer
printout) containing about ten thousand names of officers,
members and affiliates of activist, extremist and revolu-
tionary organizations.
By the time SSS was disbanded in 1973, it had reviewed more than
half the lists and established files on those persons on whom it did not
yet have a file. In addition to containing the names of known activists,
the IDIU printouts also contained the names of many prominent
Memorandum from D. W. Bacon to Director, FBI 8/8/69.
Memorandum from D. J. Brennan, Jr., to W. C. Sullivan 8/15/69.
1" Joint Committee Report, p. 58.
166 SSS Bi-weekly Reports, 6/15/70; Donald Bacon testimony, pp. 91-95, 9/16/
75.
" SSS Bi-weekly Report, August 29, 1969.
citizens whom the Justice Department thought could be of assistance
in quelling a civil disturbance in a particular locality should one
occur. 16 7 SSS personnel were unaware that the IDIU printout con-
tained the names of these persons and indiscriminately established
files on them.
Under the above procedures, even if SSS had adhered strictly to
established IRS criteria for determining whether audit or collection
action was justified, SSS subjected its targets to a systematic, dis-
proportionate degree of tax enforcement. The criteria which deter-
mined the targets of this special enforcement effort were not tax-re-
lated IRS criteria, but the criteria of the FBI and the Internal Se-
curity Division of the Department of Justice. The special enforce-
ment effort was applied to the "dissidents" on whom Assistant Com-
missioner (Compliance) Bacon had requested FBI reports, on the
"Old Left", "New Left" and "Right Wing" organizations the ISD
chose to list, and to the subjects of the IDIU printout. The criteria the
FBI applied in selecting reports for dissemination to SSS are indi-
cated by the reason for which the FBI decided to comply with As-
sistant Commissioner Bacon's request: that SSS would "deal a blow
to dissident elements"; the criteria were not related to probable non-
compliance with tax laws. They were selected because of their political
and ideological beliefs and activities. Since SSS routinely reviewed the
names on the lists for tax compliance, politics became the criteria for
an IRS tax review.
The routine procedures of SSS thus focused a unique enforcement
effort on a category of organizations and individuals defined by
political criteria. Whether the criteria were blind to the particular
political stripe of the organization or individual is not as important
as the concentration of tax enforcement efforts against dissidents as
a group.
The result was to employ the enormous power of IRS attention to
dissent on both sides of center. That SSS knew what it was doing and
intended to accomplish non-tax goals through the application of the
tax laws is apparent from the writings of its Chief, Mr. Wright:
There appears to be high acclaim that the charter of this
committee will lead to enforcement actions needed to help
control an insidious threat to the internal security of this
country. Obviously, we will receive excellent field coopera-
tion and assistance now that our mission is understood.'"8
- Review is underway on this organization [It] . . . pro-
duces and distributed motion pictures relevant to individuals
engaged in movements advocating radical change in Ameri-
can Society. Organizations with which they do business in-
clude the Black Panther Party and the Students for Demo-
cratic Society.**
We assisted Inspection (Internal Security Division) by
providing information about war tax resistance organiza-
tions and Federal employee peace action groups. 70
" Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Assistant Attorneys General
John Doar, Fred Vinson, Roger W. Wilkins, and J. Walter Yeagley, 12/28/67.
" Biweekly report of August 22, 1969.
16 Biweekly report of December 15, 1969.
7 Biweekly report of April 19, 1971.
We have received from the FBI a listing of all known
underground newspapers in the United States and also a list
of known editors. We are currently checking these lists
against (Business Master File and Individual Master File)
registers for possible tax violations. The first case checked out
(Free Press of Louisville) will become a field collection re-
ferral for delinquent employment taxes. We anticipate the
total list will develop a substantial number of similar
referrals."7
Last week we noticed that on an "official only" bulletin
board in this building a notice appeared from the Institute
for Policy Studies inviting individuals to apply for a new
PhD program . . . Since IPS has been described by the
media as a "Radical New-Left Think Tank" and the Balti-
more District will soon propose revocation of its exempt
status, we brought the matter of this notice appearing on an.
official IRS bulletin board to the attention of Internal
Security.172
2. SSS Field Referral.-SSS activity went beyond gathering in-
formation on subjects selected for reasons not strictly related to tax
enforcement. SSS referred some cases to the field for action which
did not qualify for referral according to normal IRS criteria, and
used its National Office position to effect field action in these cases.
Messrs. Green and Bacon believed the decentralized, independent
field organization would check any such tendency on the part of SSS.
Mr. Green testified that some cases referred to the field "would not
have qualified for a referral but for the ideological category in which
they fell,"1 73 that he was relying on the field to reject the file referrals
which were not justified on tax merits and to use the same criteria
for determining its course of action in the referred cases as it would
in determining whether to investigate any other case. 74 Green also
stated that while the field closed out many cases referred to it because
of the lack of tax grounds upon which action could be initiated, the
fact that cases were referred from the National Office sanctioned
by the Special Service Staff probably did result in some cases being
examined despite the lack of adequate grounds.' 5
Interviews with field employees who handled SSS referrals indicate
that SSS' position, as an adjunct of the Assistant Commissioner's
office, sometimes effectively negated the built-in check of decentralized
field operations. As in the case of the OCD, the IRS had established
an extraordinary National Office entity with sufficient authority to
short-circuit normal organizational controls without establishing ex-
traordinary controls to replace the normal ones.
The case discussed below is an example of an SSS field referral
which appeared to lack an adequate tax basis upon which any IRS
action could be based. This judgment was confirmed by the field agent
" Biweekly report of June 28, 1971.
x' Biweekly report of November 15, 1971.
n Leon Green testimony, p. 65.
" Ibid., pp. 65, 66.
" Ibid., pp. 73-75.
who was asked to handle the case. Yet the field took the action SSS
sought to achieve. 7 1
- a. Meikeljohln Civil Liberties Library
The Meikeljohn Civil Liberties Library was a San Francisco based
organization which provided legal materials to attorneys involved
in civil liberties cases. It was a tax exempt organization. SSS received
FBI reports 177 indicating that the Library was to sponsor the "Thomas
Paine Summer Law School", which in 1970 had given instruction to
leftist lawyers. The FBI documents also indicated that three of the
instructors at the school would be individuals formerly associated
with the National Lawyers Guild and the Communist Party. On the
basis of these reports, SSS referred the case to the field on March 16,
1971, 178recommending that an audit be conducted:
It appears that this organization may be supporting various
causes not related to tax exempt purposes. It may be advocat-
ing an action which is not allowable, or engaging in paid
services to specific lawyers rather than acting as a library.179
The referral also stated with respect to the instructors at the Thomas
Paine Law School which MCLL was allegedly to sponsor:
[One instructor] was on May 3 1967, a member of the Na-
tional Lawyers Guild. [The SSS referral to the field was
dated March 16, 1971.] The House Committee on Un-Amer-
ican Activities . . . cites the National Lawyers Guild as a
Communist front which . . . has failed to rally to the legal
defense of the CP and individual members thereof....
During April 1969 the President of the NLG spoke at
an NLG banquet held in New York City stating that the NLG
has organized young people to work in a radical movement
which is seeking to destroy a corrupt violent society and re-
place it with one which will benefit all. He also stated that the
purpose of the NLG is to advance the "social revolution" tak-
ing place in this country....
[Name deleted] is listed as President of MCLL. She was
issued "Daily Worker" Press Club subscription 2825 on Jan-
uary 2, 1948.
Press Club subscriptions . . . were only issued to CP mem-
bers at that time.
Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code governs the ex-
empt status of organizations. An organization can lose its exempt
status by engaging in political activity, or advocating one side of an
issue. It cannot lose exempt status by reason of the political leanings
of its members if those leanings are not reflected in political action
by the organization. In the case of MCLL, the SSS referral stated
"a The Committee was unable to determine the number or percentage of all
SSS referrals which resulted in investigation even though the facts referred did
not establish a tax related basis for investigation.
'" The FBI documents were discovered in the Meikeljohn Civil Liberties Library
file in the Special Service Staff vault at IRS.
sLetter, Paul Wright, Director of SSS, to Chief, Audit Division, March 16,
1971.
" The latter statement appears to be without any basis in the file.
that certain MCLL personnel had had communist affiliations in the
past; that MCLL was sponsoring a school some of whose instructors
were also affiliated with the National Lawyers Guild, which engaged
in political activities. None of these statements established that MOLL
was involved in any political activity.
An interview with the auditor who handled the MCLL referral
indicates that he conducted the audit even though he believed the
information provided by SSS was not an adequate basis for an audit:
The purpose of the Meikeljohn Civil Liberties Library was
to make an index of legal materials on civil liberties cases.
Some but not all of the information provided by Special
Service Staff in its referral was that one or more of the prin-
cipals of the organization was a Communist. That allegation
standing alone would not be sufficient to trigger an audit.8 0
The auditor also said:
In this case, however, even if the referral had contained no
allegations, an audit might nonetheless have been conducted
because no one in the exempt organization branch had ever
heard of MCLL.'as
This reaction demonstrates that dissident groups which attracted the
attention of SSS were subject to being audited merely because of that
attention, notwithstanding the lack of tax-related criteria upon which
an audit is normally based.
In this case, the field conducted the audit of MCLL despite the
failure of the allegations in the referral to establish or suggest non-
compliance. The result of the audit was a determination that there was
no evidence MCLL had had any relationship with the Thomas Paine
Summer Law School or engaged in any other activity which would
jeopardize its exemption.182
b. Collection Referrals
In the face of collection referrals, the field reaction was completely
submissive. Collection personnel often treated SSS referrals as orders.
A revenue officer in Los Angeles described his reaction to an SSS
collection referral on a taxpayer who had filed no returns for several
years but had earned only a small income subject to a withholding
more than adequate to meet his tax obligation: 183
The SSS had a report from an unidentified organization that
[taxpayer] had been employed in 1969 and 1970, and had
earned from $2,000 to $3,000 in both years subject to with-
holding, and the individual master file showed no returns
from him in those years. A compliance check was requested.
[I] . . . found that in 1968 [taxpayer] was a student and had
no income, in 1969 and 1970, he had income, but filed no re-
m Statement of Auditor, San Francisco District, 7/30/75, p. 1.
181 Ibid.
.2 Ibid.
' Statement of Revenue Agent, Collection Division, Los Angeles District,
8/75.
turns, but had he filed returns, he would have been entitled
to a refund. [Emphasis added.]
There is no element of discretion on the part of the Rev-
enue Officer on whether to conduct a compliance check once
one is requested by the proper Form 2990. There is discre-
tion in closing the file without effecting compliance under
the de minimus rule.18 4
A second case corroborates the view that Collection did not ques-
tion SSS referrals. A revenue officer signed the following summary
of his interview: 185
This was a case of mistaken identity. SSS was interested
in the wife of an activist, and the lady to whom the referral
related happened to have the same name. The referral con,-
tained no information indicating the basis to believe the tax-
payer was not in compliance with the tax law, but was merely
a request for a "compliance check", which is an investigation
of whether the individual filed tax returns and, if not, whether
they are required to do so.
... A revenue of)icer would not normally question the rea-
son for a compliance check.... In this case, it was determined
there *was full compliance, and, as a result of the investiga-
tion it was also determined that the taxpayer being investi-
gated was not actually the one ih which SSS was interested.
3. 888 Pressure on Field Personnel.-SSS file material does not
tell the whole story of SSS influence over the subsequent handling
of referrals.8 6 Much of this influence was by telephone and was not
reduced to writing, at least not in detail. ' In a few cases the field
personnel were able to recall the impact which SSS contact had on
the handling of the case. In a case in St. Louis involving an orga-
nization which advocated resistance to the "war tax", the revenue
agent who was the "case reviewer" (whose job is to determine whether
to accept the recommendation of the field agent who actually con-
ducted the investigation) recalled how a telephone conversation with
an SSS member influenced his review of the case. The field agent had
filed three reports, each recommending that the case be closed and
giving reasons. Under normal procedures, according to the revenu.
agent, he would simply have closed out the cases in accordance with
the field agent's recommendations. However, because of the "special
' The revenue officer need not actually obtain the delinquent return if the.
result will be a refund.
' Statement of Cardone. Collection Division, Los Angeles District, 8/3/75, p.
2. Mr. Cardone also stated: "It is true that the [person requesting a compliance
check] does not have to provide reasons for the check, but this is the exception
and not the rule. Generally the originator will give reasons and also supply any
information and/or material which would be of assistance. . . . (Ibid., p. 2.)
SSS was apparently an exception in this case, but the absence of any stated basis
for the check did not lead to the field's questioning the propriety of proceedihg.
"OThe Select Committee staff interviewed IRS representatives who handled
SSS field referrals in several of the districts investigated.
1 SSS bi-weekly reports refer to telephone conversations with the field on
many occasions. See e.g. Bi-Weekly Report 10/5/70.
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procedures" applicable in this Special Service Staff case," "" he first.
called the National Office, SSS, to discuss the matter. SSS criticized
the field agent's recommendations, saying, inter alia: 189
Although it's the District's decision on type of closing he
[SSS member] hates to see this happen since they want to
get [the organization] and [individuals] on filing records
(for comparisons, etc.). At any rate, they will review and
return to District with suggestions if applicable. Viet Nam
being over is not a valid reason for closing as the [organi-
zation] will (and is) redirecting their attention to other prob-
lems.
As a result of this conversation, the reviewing revenue agent re-
turned the case to the field agent for further work.190 Thus, the orga-
nization received more prolonged attention than the field would have
accorded it on its own.
4. Tax ReSults of 88S Actions.-The perception which resulted in
the establishment of Special Service Staff, that activists and dissidents
posed a significant problem of noncompliance with the tax laws, was
not validated by the results of SSS compliance checks. The number of
cases SSS referred to the field was small in comparison to the number
of files it established and reviewed.19' Only 225 cases were referred-
after SSS had made a compliance check on about 5,000 of the 10,000
taxpayers on its list.
As of the date of publication of the Joint Committee Report, June 5,
1975, the four-year SSS project had resulted in assessment of a total
of $622,000 ($82,000 against organizations, $580,000 against individ-
uals), $501,000 of which was attributable to four cases. Thus, SSS
success in focusing greater than normal IRS attention upon its target
group did not have a widespread tax impact on dissidents and activists.
III. THE IDEOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS PROJECT
The IRS reaction to Congressional and White House pressure in
establishing the Special Service Staff was not unique. In 1961, the
IRS, in direct response to statements made by President Kennedy at
'x In a memorandum dated March 30, 1972, the Assistant Commissioner (Com-
pliance) directed District Directors to investigate individuals designated as
"War Tax Resisters" and:
"Whatever action is taken, or deemed appropriate, in these cases should be
documented sufficiently to provide a memorandum of actions taken and results
obtained to the following address:
Mr. Paul H. Wright
P. 0. Box 14197
Benjamin Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044."
The address is that of the Special Service Staff.
1. Statement of Chief, Review Staff, Audit Division, St. Louis District, 8/7/75.
See also Memorandum, Chief, Review Staff, Audit Division, to Revenue Agent
Ross Howard, 7/12/73.
1" Memorandum. Chief Review Staff, St. Louis. 7/12/73.
"' According to the Joint Committee Report, SSS referred a total of 225 cases to
the field for Audit, Collection, or Intelligence action out of a total of 11,458 files.
Of the 11,458 files, SSS had reviewed the IRS Individual Master File for 3,658
and the Business Master File for 832, and thus had made some assessment of
the taxpayer's compliance with the tax laws In a total of 4,490 cases, and in
addition, checked the Exempt Organization Master Files for 437 organizations
a news conference, selected 18 organizations for concentrated tax en-
forcement activity. The "Ideological Organizations Project", although
smaller in scope than the Special Service Staff, reflected as clearly IRS
a response to pressures to enforce the tax laws against targets selected
for it by others according to political criteria.
A. Origins of the Ideological Organizations Project 192
On November 16 and 18, 1961, President John F. Kennedy made two
speeches critical of right-wing extremists. At a news conference on
November 29, 1961, in response to a question concerning reportedly
"sizable financial contributions to the sort of right-wing extremists
groups you criticized last week," the President stated:
As long as they meet the requirements of the tax laws, I don't
think that the Federal Government can interfere with the
right of any individual to take any position it wants. The
only thing we should be concerned about is that it does not
represent a diversion which might be taxable-for nontaxable
purposes. But that is another question and Im sure the In-
ternal Revenue System examines that. [Emphasis added.]
The next day, the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance), William
Loeb, sent a memorandum to Dean J. Barron, Director of the Audit
Division, calling his attention to the President's news conference and
directing that the Audit Division secure from the Attorney Advisor
to the Commissioner, Mitchell Rogovin, a list of organizations to be
examined for possible tax liability by the IRS.193 On December 20, 1961.
Rogovin forwarded to Barron a list of 18 organizations partially com-
piled from the December 4 and 8 issues of New8week and Time maga-
zines, respectively, for the sample checks.14
During the next month a single left-wing organization was added
to the list, bringing the total of targeted groups to 19.195 Apparently,
none of the organizations were chosen on the basis of any information
that they were not in compliance with tax laws.
' The history and operations of the Ideological Organization Project are de-
tailed in the June 5, 1975, report prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation, entitled, "Investigation of the Special Service Staff
of the Internal Revenue Service." Documents examined and interviews conducted
by the Select Committee corroborated and expanded the findings of the Joint
Committee's staff. See pp. 101-110 of the Joint Committee's report for its
discussion.
'm The November 30, 1961, memorandum from Loeb to Barron, with a copy to
Rogovin, read as follows:
"The attached clipping reporting on the President's meeting with the press
contains comments regarding financial contributions to so-called "right-wing
extremist groups". You will note the President's reference to the fact that "As
long as they meet the requirements of the laws," etc. I think It behooves us to
be certain that we know whether the organizations are complying with the tax
law as a matter of fact.
"I have asked Mr. Rogovin to ascertain the names of some of the oragnizations
which we might use for a sample check. Please have someone contact him to
secure the same in order that appropriate audits may be made."
"4 Memorandum from Mr. Rogovin, Attorney Assistant to Commissioner, to
D. J. Barron, Director, Audit Division, 12/20/61.
.mMemorandum from Commissioner, IRS, to Surrey, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury, 1/18/62. The left wing organization added to the list was the
Fair Play For Cuba Committee.
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B. IRS Initial Inve8tigative Action
After the organizations which were to be the subject of the sample
compliance checks had been designated to the Audit Division, normal
IRS machinery became operational, with the sample checks being
conducted as a National Office project. The Director of the Audit
Division, in a March 9, 1962, memorandum to the Assistant Commis-
sioner (Compliance), stated that the Audit Division had requested
examinations of six large corporate taxpayers who were alleged to be
financial backers of extremist groups in New York and San Fran-
cisco.19* It had also requested examinations of the activities of three
large extremist groups in New York and San Francisco and was soon
to send memoranda to the Assistant Regional Commissioners (Audit)
supervising audit- activities-n-regions-in-which seven of the other 19
organizations were based.9 1
While the Audit Division was looking at the activities of the organi..
zations for possible tax consequences, it is apparent that its concen-
trated efforts were related to the criteria that initially caused the or-
ganizations to become IRS targets: their public political activities. In
the March 9, 1962, memo, the Audit Director stated:
We think it advisable to examine the organizations listed in
the memorandum to the Assistant Regional Commissioner
(Audit), San Francisco, since these organizations appear to
be among the largest and most publicized groups.
Although the IRS was aware that the activities, and not possible
tax liabilities, of the target organizations were the reasons they were
selected, it attempted to place its actions within the proper scope of
IRS enforcement activities, stating:
[W]e have used the term "political action organizations"
rather than "right-wing organizations" throughout this dis-
cussion. This has been done to avoid giving the impression
that the Service is giving special attention to returns filed by
taxpayers or organizations with a particular political
ideology." 198
Indeed, on April 2, 1962, almost five months after -the initial effort was
begun, the Commissioner's Office forwarded to the Audit Division a
list of 19 organizations considered by the Assistant to the Commis-
sioner to be "left of center." 199 In an interview with committee staff,20 0
Mr. Rogovin could not recall the sources he used to compile the list of
left-wing organizations, but stated he may have gotten some of them
from the FBI.
'Memorandum, D. J. Barron, Director, Audit Division, to Assistant Commis-
sioner (Compliance), "Examination of Returns Filed by Certain Political Action
Organizations", March 9, 1962.
' The memo stated: "We intend to send similar memorandum [sic] to Assist-
ant Regional Commissioners (Audit) requiring that examination be made of the
following organizations. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
He Memorandum, Director, Audit Division, to Assistant Commissioner (Com-
pliance), March 9, 1963.
* Memorandum, Attorney Assistant to the Commissioner, to Director, Audit,
April 2, 1962.
" Interview with Mitchell Rogovin, former Attorney Assistant to Commis-
sioner, IRS.
Rogovin's memorandum adding the left-wing organizations, while
attempting to make IRS activities balanced in that organizations on
both sides of center were to be checked, did not in fact accomplish that
purpose. In a memorandum from the Commissioner to the Under Sec-
retary of -the Treasury, the Commissioner acknowledged IRS' primary
interest in right-wing organizations, stating: 201
The activities of so-called extremist right-wing political
action organizations have recently been given a great amount
of publicity by magazines, newspapers and television pro-
grams. This publicity, however has made little mention of
the tax status of these organizations or their supporters.
Nevertheless, the alleged activities of these groups are such
that we plan to determine the extent of their compliance with
Federal tax laws. In addition, we propose to ascertain whether
contributors to these organizations are deducting their con-
tributions from taxable income. [Emphasis added.
The following is a list of the largest and most publicized
extremist groups whose activities we have directed our field
offices to examine: . . .
Inasmuch as we are not certain any of these organizations
or their benefactors are failing to comply with the tax laws,
we believe it prudent to avoid any possible charges that the
Service is giving special attention to a group with a particu-
lar ideology. In furtherance of this goal, we are planning to
examine the returns of a reprsentative group of alleged left-
wing organizations.
On the next day, the Commissioner informed Attorney General
Robert Kennedy of the new program, noting that previous interest
had been expressed in the tax status of right-wing groups by John
Seigenthaler, Special Assistant to the Attorney General. 202
On February 8, 1963, the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance)
provided the Commissioner of IRS with a status report 203 of the "Test
Audit Program of Political Action Organizations" in which he
summed up IRS efforts directed at 12 allegedly right-wing organiza-
tions and 11 allegedly left-wing organizations. At that time,
. . . nine allegedly right-wing organizations have been
audited, including four exempt organizations. Revocation of
exempt status was recommended in two of these cases. . . .
No changes in tax liabilities were recommended upon exami-
nation of the five taxable organizations. . . .
Only four of the allegedly left-wing groups have been ex-
amined, including two exempt organizations. No changes were
recommended as a result of these examinations . . .
Memorandum to the Under Secretary from Commissioner, IRS, 5/14/62.
2 Letter, Commissioner of IRS to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, May 15,
1962. This letter places Seigenthaler's initial expression of concern in November
of 1961, at about the same time the President made his open attaeks on right-wing
extremist organizations.
. Memorandum, Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) to Commissioner, IRIS,
2/8/68.
Additionally, the Assistant Commissioner stated that no evidence had
been found -that individual taxpayers were claiming deductions for
contributions to non-exempt political action organizations. The memo
also contained a summary of the results of IRS actions which had been
undertaken at that point and noted that IRS would concentrate on
exempt political action organizations in the future.204 In July of 1963,
the White House was brought up-to-date on IRS activities directed at
ideological organizations and expressed renewed interest in the
project.215
C. The Planned Expansion of Project to Audit of 10,000 Organizations
A status report from the IRS Commissioner to the Deputy Special
Counsel to the President detailed IRS' findings with respect to seven
of the right-wing organizations, and stated that it had completed nine
audits of left-wing organizations with one requiring further study.206
The report also announced IRS' plans for "10,000 examinations of
exempt organizations of all types including the extremist groups" in
1964. White House pressure intensified upon receipt of this report. On
July 23, and in response to the report, President Kennedy called the
Commissioner, urging IRS to proceed with an aggressive program on
both sides of center and mentioning that Congressional hearings were
scheduled for January 19, 1964.207 Within the next month, IRS officials
met twice with White House representatives and once with the At-
torney General. 2 08
The IRS response to the interest of the White House and Attorney
General again intensified 209 and plans to initiate the new surveys were
drawn up.210 A list of right- and left-wing organizations was to be pre-
pared with the survey to first concentrate on the examination of right-
wing groups exempt under the provisions of section 501 (c) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. All cases which had been begun as a result of
President's initial remarks were to be absorbed into and completed
' The Committee attempted to ascertain why non-exempt organizations were
included in the initial phases of the project. The following exchange took place
during the Committee's deposition of former IRS Commissioner Caplin:
Q. Do you know why non-exempt organizations were included in the test
audit?
A. Well, I would 'think then because they went into ideological organizations.
And there were all kinds of ideological organization....
Q. What would [be] the purpose df doing a test on It in order to study exemp-
tions, and selecting non-exempt organizations?
A. Well, I think that they were looking for a standard that could be applied
in separating what was an educational organization from an ideological or politi-
cal action organization. And the regulations were inadequate. . . .
'See testimony of Commissioner Caplin, 9/22/75, pp. 40, 41.
' Memorandum, Assistant Commissioner (Compliance), to Commissioner, IRS,
2/8/63.
m' Memorandum, Commissioner, IRS, to Myer Feldman, Deputy 'Special Counsel
to the President, 7/11/63.
2" Handwritten notes on 7/11/63 memorandum from Commissioner to Feldman.
Testimony of Caplin, Commissioner, IRS, 9/22/75, p. 44. The hearings were to be
before the Senate Committee, chaired by Senator Yarborough.
"Handwritten ndtes on 7/11/63 memorandum from Commissioner to Feldman.
2 There is also evidence that Congressional interest also served as a catalyst
to the IRS response. IRS documents note that two Congressional committees had
held hearings on political activities of exempt organizations. Memorandum, Com-
missioner to Feldman, 7/11/63.
n Conference report, Political Action Organizations, July 26, 1963.
during this second operational phase.2" Files of all target organiza-
tions were to be checked to see if prior allegations had been made
against them and if they affected the exempt status of the organiza-
tions. A procedural outline for field action in examining the organiza-
tions was adopted. 2 12 On August 2, 1963, the task force responsible for
conducting the examinations met again and decided to begin the survey
of well-known organizations already identified and adopted proce-
dures to ensure meeting the October 1, 1963, deadline which had been
established at the last meeting. 213
Mitchell Rogovin, Attorney Assistant to the Commissioner, con-
tinued to act as IRS liaison with the White House and Justice De-
partment during this period of intensive IRS activity. On August 20,
1963, at the Attorney General's request, he briefed the Attorney Gen-
eral on the progress of the program. 214 On August 21, Rogovin was
requested to and met with Myer Feldman at the White House, where
he briefed Feldman on the expanded audit program and went over the
names of the 24 organizations then included in the program. Feldman
expressed his desire that the program be completed by the October 1
deadline and suggested that two organizations on Rogovin's list be
deleted.215 Feldman also stated he would make available to Rogovin an
"extensive confidential memorandum he had prepared for the Presi-
dent touching on both exempt and non-exempt organizations." 216 On
August 29, 1963, Rogovin, in a letter to a member of the task force,
suggested the deletion from the current list of the two organizations
mentioned by Feldman, suggested the addition of two organizations
which were associated with an organization already on the list, and
recommended the addition of three other organizations. 217
The IRS plan to audit 10,000 exempt organizations never material-
ized. Pursuant to the plan devised at the meeting, IRS employees
began to draw up a list of target organizations. A list of 24 organi-
zations was eventually prepared, with 19 of them being categorized
as "right-wing". During this phase of the program, field personnel
were responsible for compiling information in the field and trans-
mitting it to the National Office, where the task force which had been
handling the Ideological Organizations Project analyzed the infor-
mation and informed the field as to what action should be taken.
Procedures were later adopted which required review by the Chief
Counsel of all revocation recommendations by the task force. Of the
15 cases in which the task force recommended revocation (14 right-
' The IRS referred to the examinations of the first 22 organizations as a "test
audit program" of political action organizations.
ns Under the contemplated procedure, a task force was set up to coordinate
field response to the program. The field was to check its files for allegations con-
cerning the organizations to see if they affected the organizations exempt status,
the field was to report the results of its investigation back to the National Office
task force which would take appropriate action (revocation, no change, etc.)
through the Assistant Regional Commissioner (Audit) for the region in which
the organization was located.
a Conference Report, Political Action Organization, 8/2/63.
"Rogovin memorandum, Political Action Organization File, 8/21/63.
Rogovin memorandum, Political Action Organization File, 8/21/63.
no Ibid.
"' Letter, Rogovin to Chapper entitled, "Ideological Organizations Proposed
for First Phase of Audit Program," 8/29/63.
wing), only 4 were approved (3 right- and one left-wing)."* The
remaining recommendations were either rejected or sent back to the
field for further study.219
IRS efforts directed at the ideological organizations apparently
waned as White House interest decreased. The last status report to
the White House was sent on March 23, 1964.220 Later status reports
to the Treasury. Under Secretary indicate that in 1966 three organi-
zations lost their exempt status and four exemptions were revoked
in 1967 (of these seven, six were right-wing) .221 The program was
apparently completed and surveys of organizations labeled as ideo-
logical were integrated into normal IRS enforcement procedures after
1967.
D. Analysis of Ideological Organizations Project
The Ideological Organizations Project resembled the Special Serv-
ice Staff in ways other than the selection of targets based on their
ideological beliefs. Although IRS justified the project as an effort to
strengthen its exempt organization laws, the IRS perceived the need
to initiate the tax enforcement methods only after, and in direct re-
sponse to, statements of the President. As in the case of the Special
gervice Staff, the IRS was not totally unaware of the possibility that
an area of potential revenue existed in the exempt organizations area
and had considered the tax exempt status of political action groups
prior to the President's remarks. It had, however, based on its previous
experience, decided that the area was one which bore little potential
for revenue. In his July 11, 1963 memorandum to the President's
Deputy Counsel, the Commissioner of IRS stated:
In the past, examinations of exempt organizations were held
to a minimum since these difficult and time-consuming audits
were rarely productive of revenue. Also, for every man year
,spent on such examinations there is a potential loss of ap-
proximately $175,000 otherwise produced from income tax
audits.
Despite this reasoning and these statistics, the IRS response to the
President's expressed interest was an attempt, although never carried
out, to increase the examination to 10,000 during fiscal year 1964.
Just as the Organized Crime Drive had brought about a reduction
in the accounting training required of special agents, the Ideological
Organization Project necessitated a similar change in the areas of
concentration of audit personnel assigned these cases: the analyses
of contents of literature and activities of the target organizations.
The Commissioner stated:
The examination and administrative processing involved in
revoking exempt status of ideological organizations is com-
plex. An "educational" organization may advocate a particu-
lar point of view, but, under our regulations, the agent must
analyze all publications, speeches, and seminars to determine
Memoranda, Commissioner, IRS, to Under Secretary of Treasury, 12/4/64,
2/8/65, 3/8/65.
Ibid.
mJoint Committee Report, p. 112.
m Memoranda to IRS Commissioner, 4/66, 11/67.
that there has been a full and fair exposition of pertinent
facts to allow formation of independent opinion by the
public. The same detailed analyses is required on whether
more than an insubstantial, part of a charitable organiza-
tion's activities are the carrying on of propaganda to in-
fluence legislation.
IRS INFORMATION GATHERING PROCEDURES
I. THE INFORMATION GATHERING AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM
A. Introduction
In May, 1973, the IRS established the Information Gathering and
Retrieval System. The IGRS was a new approach to intelligence
gathering, and to the storage and retrieval of so-called "general"
intelligence, as contrasted with intelligence developed in the course
of ai investigation of a specific tax case. Under the system, significant
intelligence resources were to be diverted from investigation of spe-
cific tax cases and allocated to gathering general intelligence. The pur-
pose of this allocation of manpower was to develop tax cases which
the existing IRS procedures missed. A crucial element in the system
was computerization of the storage and retrieval of general intelli-
gence. The computer, it was thought, would make it possible to re-
trieve masses of data by category--e.g., by subject name, by illegal
activity category-and would thus make gathering vast quantities
of general intelligence fruitful.
Within a year of the formal establishment of IGRS, the system
came under fire in the press as an alleged secret IRS "hit list" and
an index of dossiers on the personal lives of Americans containing
data unrelated to tax law enforcement. Allegations linked the system
to the so-called Nixon Enemies List. It was alleged IGRS was part
of a vast Federal data bank to which other agencies, such as the FBI,
had unlimited access. The Committee has investigated these allega-
tions in the course of studying the origins, purpose and operation of
IGRS.
IGRS fell short of its goals of enhanced case development and
improved intelligence retrievability. In general, more "intelligence,"
most of it of little or no value, was input into IGRS than the
computer could effectively retrieve. In a number of districts, IGRS
fostered unrestrained, unfocused intelligence gathering and permitted
targeting of groups for intelligence collection on bases having little
relationship to enforcement of the tax laws. While there were no
"dossiers" of personal information (with the possible exception of
Operation Leprechaun) in the districts the Committee investigated,
there were the beginnings of politically motivated intelligence col-
lection in at least one district; and evidence that the fruits of similar
investigative efforts in two districts had been destroyed. The lack of
adequate -control on the system resulted in the ultimate inclusion of
465,442 names on the IGRS index. IRS traditional reliance on agent
discretion combined with this new, broad intelligence collection effort
to produce a dangerous machine which, had it continued unchecked
for a long period, could in some districts have approached the monster
some newspaper accounts described.
B. Origin of IMRS
Before IRS implemented the Information Gathering and Retrieval
System during the early 1970's, its devices for the storage and re-
trieval of general intelligence in a typical district consisted of two
basic filing systems: (1) an "information item" system, and (2) in-
vestigative files. 2 2 2 The information item system was in theory a file
of information the IRS received (e.g., through an agent's investiga-
tive efforts, an unsolicited informant's letter, a referral from another
law enforcement agency) amounting to an allegation of tax fraud.
2 2
1
Some information items would lead to intelligence investigations;
some would result in audit or collection action; those of questionable
value would simply repose in the files.
2 24 These files were indexed ac-
cording to subject and were not cross-indexed to related files and
subjects.
An investigative file 225 consisted of all the information collected
in determining the validity of a specific allegation of tax fraud. The
IRS indexed these files only by the name of the subject of the investi-
gation. There was no formal system of cross-indexing information
between agents; informal systems for information exchange were at
best intra-district systems. Intelligence of potential value in several
investigations would normally simply repose in the file in which it
was basically developed.
A third, informal information storage system existed: the "squirrel"
file.2 2 7 Since there was no designated repository for information which
did not amount to an allegation of tax fraud, but was of poten-
tial future value, treatment of such information varied widely be-
tween districts and between agents.228 Some districts had local filing
systems which made the information available to some extent to all
agents in the district. Some districts improperly used Information
Item Files. In most districts the information reposed in the agents'
" Internal Revenue Manual, Sec. 9300, et 8eq.
2 Sec. 9311.1 of the Internal Revenue Service Manual defines information
item as: ". . . any communication or Information received by Intelligence alleg-
ing or indicating a violation within the investigative jurisdiction of Intelli-
gence...
g The staff obtained much of the information about the practical operation
of IRS district intelligence systems through personal observation of six districts
(Los Angeles, San Francisco, Baltimore, St. Louis, Chicago, and Jacksonville)
and interviews of many special agents in those districts. To assure the accuracy
of the staff's observations, the Committee requested that IRS intelligence specif-
ically review the IGRS section of this report for accuracy. Footnotes to support
statements herein which are based upon staff observations and upon review
by IRS Intelligence will state: "Staff observations of District Intelligence
operations."
m Investigative files, or numbered case files. are generally established after
the Intelligence Division has received and evaluated a referral from the Audit
or Collection Division or after information items relating to a specific taxpayer
have been evaluated and the evaluation support the opening of an Intelligence
investigation. See IRS Manual, Sec. 932D et seq.
""Squirrel" files is not the official IRS name given to these files, but a name
the files had come to be called in one district investigation. Generally, they con-
sisted of information which was not a part of a particular Investigation and




drawers, as they were primarily considered an individual special
agent's private files. In no case was the information readily available
outside the district in which it was collected, and no means existed for
determining its potential value to other districts. 2 2 9
Before IGRS and the information item system, intelligence gather-
ing (as contrasted with the passive receipt of unsolicited information)
was generally restricted to active investigations of specific allegations.
The collection of "general" intelligence-information of potential
value but not needed for a specific case occurred only incidentally to
specific investigations, and, because of the absence of any filing system
for such information, was largely not retrievable except by the agent
who ran across it.
In September, 1963, the National Office Intelligence Division ex-
pressed a need to improve the retrievability of the information the
district Intelligence Division collected. 2 30 While decentralized intelli-
gence operations meant fragmented information, organized crime was
both widespread and monolithic. The flagrant tax violator was becom-
ing more sophisticated in his efforts to avoid payment of taxes. The
Intelligence Division wanted to devise means to aggregate the infor-
imation each of 58 districts had gathered on organized crime. National
Office Intelligence Division planners proposed a mechanized cross-
indexing system which would make the intelligence retrievable na-
tionwide without altering the scope of intelligence gathering.
The result was the Central Index of Racketeer and Wagering Inves-
tigations (CIRWI), which would contain all intelligence on organized
crime figures, cross-indexed so that information from one district
would be available to other districts concerned with related investiga-
tive targets.2 31
The CIRWI was to be a prototype system restricted to the "limited
and identifiable universe" of organized crime, a pilot project to gauge
the usefulness of a nationwide retrieval capacity.232 However, al-
though improvements in the system were under constant study, the
thought of extending the system beyond the organized crime area was
not pressed for several years.233
In March 1968, the Planning and Procedures Branch reported the
interim results of a study of the CIRWI and of possible improvements
in it.23 It found the system had been a "valuable and effective tool in
'-The above description of the filing systems maintained in the IRS Intelli-
gence Division is drawn from IRS documents, as noted above, and from the
actual methods used to file information observed by the Committee staff dur-
ing its Investigation of IRS districts.
'"Memo from Intelligence Division to Assistant Commissioner (Compliance),
dated September 27, 1963.
'Manual Supplement 94G-19, April 9, 1964; Manual Supplement 94G-20,
September 18, 1964.
2 Memo from Intelligence Division to Assistant Commissioner (Compliance),
September 27, 1963.
m Memo for file, INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, Visit to Detroit District
Intelligence Office by M. J. House, April 15, 1966.
m'Memorandum, 3/28/68, Acting Chief, Planning and Procedures Branch, to
Acting Director, Intelligence Division. The report contained no hint of exten-
sion of the system beyond organized crime, but did hint at an expansion of Intel-
ligence gathering (as contrasted with mere improved retrieval) in its sugges-
tion that the question of what sources of information to explore and the nature
and volume of information to be gathered should be part of the recommended
study.
identifying racketeer subjects and their interrelationships." The re-
port recommended further study of the operation of the system and
exploration of possible improvements with those districts with most
experience in its use.
As the National Office reconsidered its approach to intelligence
gathering and retrieval, several districts were experimenting on their
own with new systems of retrieval and new approaches to collection.
In 1968, the Los Angeles District created a special intelligence-gather-
ing unit,2 35 denominated a "Case Development Unit", comprising two
special agents who were to devote their time to systematically gather-
ing intelligence calculated to lead to the initiation of actual "num-
bered" investigations. 23 6 The unit was expected to concentrate on or-
ganized crime figures.237 This unit was the earliest forerunner of the
case development units which would be created under the Information
Gathering and Retrieval System. Its function was distinct from any
previous IRS intelligence operation in that the gathering of general
intelligence was its sole objective, whereas under prior practice the
IRS gathered general intelligence only incidentally to specific
investigations.
The unit was created at a time when improved data processing and
information retrieval systems were becoming available, suggesting a
possible combination between gathering general intelligence and stor-
ing it in a computerized retrieval system. General intelligence is by
definition intelligence the relevancy of which is unclear; it is poten-
tially relevant to as yet unconceived investigations of as yet unidenti-
fied taxpayers. For general intelligence to be of value, a system must
exist which permits its to be cross-indexed to every category of poten-
tial usefulness.
At the same time the Los Angeles District created this unit whose
function was to gather intelligence of potential, but undetermined,
value, it evaluated and eventually implemented a mechanized micro-
film retrieval system called Miracode, which, to some extent, enabled
the case development unit to cross-index information to those intelli-
gence gathering targets of potential interest, and to retrieve that in-
formation more rapidly than a manual system permitted. 238 The Chi-
cago District established a somewhat similar system with individual
agents becoming responsible for case development. The indexing sys-
tem in Chicago was not as advanced as that in Los Angeles.2 3 9
The remainder of the history of the development of IGRS is a story
of the interaction of district experimenters and National Office policy
Staff interview with Chief, Los Angeles Intelligence Division, 7/24/75.
Section 9570-400 of the Internal Revenue Service Manual provides: "When
the Chief, Intelligence Division, determines that an information item has intelli-
gence potential, he will assign it the next case number in the District sequence."
'"The Committee staff's review of the files of this unit indicates it did gen-
erally concentrate on organized crime-with at least one important exception.
... Staff Observations of District Intelligence Operations, Los Angeles, 7/75.
. The St. Louis District had a case development unit whose function was in
theory akin to that in the Los Angeles District. However, in St. Louis no mecha-
nized retrieval system existed. In fact, St. Louis is one of the few districts which
never adopted the IGRS. Its case development unit is, therefore, not really a
precursor of IGRS. A pilot program was also initiated in the Jacksonville District.
makers. The study group which the Planning and Procedures Branch
had recommended studied existing information gathering and retrieval
systems and reported on June 25, 1969: 240
We considered the various systems now in use in different
districts and the Central Index in operation in the National
Office. It is our opinion that the Central Index has not been
effective because it has failed to provide the special agent
with current useful information. The districts' systems have
not been effective due to lack of uniformity, lack of a pre-
scribed formal system and lack of sufficient resources.
We conclude, therefore, that a serious need exists for a
formal uniform system, operated by the district offices, that
will provide current and useful information.
As in the case of the Central Index, the need for the proposed new
system was said to emanate from the threat of organized crime. The
report explained:
In recent years the growing menace of organized crime,
racketeering and corruption has been recognized as a critical
national problem. . . . The techniques being used by syn-
dicated crime to infiltrate legitimate businesses and to corrupt
public officials have reached new heights of sophistication.
Some of these same techniques are a so being adopted by
various major subversive and radical elements to further
breakdown [sic] the basic fibres of our society.2 4'
The Intelligence Division has reached the point where it
can no longer rely on haphazard, outdated methods to identify
those of the criminal element who are evading taxes. Nor can
it continue to allow files to be almost irretrievable. Instead,
it must meet the demands of the President and the Service
and devise a uniform effective system of information gather-
ing, evaluation, dissemination and retrieval to allow it to
fulfill this essential element of its mission.242
The success of the [proposed] program will depend almost
entirely upon the full cooperation of every District Director,
Chief, Intelligence Division [District Intelligence Division
heads], and Special Agent to assure its full implementation
and acceptance since the system is basically a district
operation.
2 Letter, John J. Olzewski, Chairman, Task Force on Intelligence Gathering
and Retrieval System, to William A. Kolar, Director, Intelligence Division,
6/25/69.
m' Report of Task Force on Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, June
25, 1969, Internal Revenue Service Intelligence Division.
2" The reference to "subversive and radical elements" is an early indication that
these groups were regarded as suitable targets for IRS intelligence. The reference
foreshadows a fundamental problem of the "general" intelligence gathering ap-
proach IGRS represented: the lack of objective criteria for target selection, and
the resulting tendency to select targets on the basis of the personal predilection
of the agent or someone in the National Office.
The proposed system included the following key elements: (1) case
development units similar to the Los Angeles model; (2) a uniform
system for encoding entries into the system for flexible retrieval; (3)
a non-automated retrieval system; (4) limitation to organized crime
figures.
The IRS did not establish the formal, nationwide system until May,
1973. In the meantime, the districts experimented with a variety of
systems. Because of the high degree of local autonomy in IRS intel-
ligence, the variations covered the spectrum from a continuation of
the former practice of gathering general intelligence only as part of
specific investigations or on a sporadic individual basis to the forward-
looking Los Angeles system.'4 3 Districts tried various methods of
automated retrieval of information. Los Angeles experimented with
"weighting" data for its potential tax consequences so that when data
about a particular subject reached a given weight, his file would auto-
matically be reviewed.2M
Los Angeles also gained practical experience with the collection ef
forts of its "case development" unit. The district found that two spe-
cial agents who devoted full time to gathering intelligence outside the
scope of specific investigation gathered an enormous mass of material.
By the time IGRS supplanted it, the Miracode retrieval system con-
tained 40,000 documents. 245 This practical lesson in volume in Los
Angeles apparently strongly influenced the decision to computerize the
IGRS retrieval system.
In May 1973, the National Office issued a directive creating the for-
mal Information Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS).'" The
system as modified in March, 1974,'247 had two key features not included
in the June 25, 1969, recommendations of the study group: (1) the
storage and retrieval system was to be computerized; (2) the targets of
general intelligence gathering were not to be limited to the organized
crime figures whose "sophisticated" methods and nationwide operations
had been the basis for the study group's recommendations, but were
to include all subjects of the General Enforcement Program, i.e., all
taxpayers who came to the attention of the case development units.24 8
The reason for the computerization of the general intelligence input
is clear. By the time IGRS was formally implemented, the Los An-
geles lesson had been learned: case development units amassed tens
of thousands of pieces of information. This practical experience in
intelligence gathering since the issuance of the June 25, 1969, study
had made it apparent that the computer was the only means of re-
trieving that data which turned out to be of use in a subsequent inves-
tigation, or which, when related to other information, justified opening
an investigation.249 To establish case development units nationwide
would result in the collection of so much data that the relatively
'"Staff observations of district intelligence operations, Los Angeles, 7/75.
"Memorandum, Assistant Regional Commissioners-Intelligence (Western Re-
gion) to all District Intelligence Chiefs (Western Region), 4/29/71.
' Staff interview with special agent in charge of pre-IGRS system, Los Angeles,
7/75.
m Manual Transmittal 9300-40, May 4, 1973.
Manual Transmittal 9300-47, March 4, 1974.
"Ibid.
'"Memorandum, Assistant Regional Commissioner Intelligence, Western Re-
gion, 4/29/71.
unsophisticated automated retrieval systems available to the indi-
vidual districts would be insufficient. All indexing of all general
intelligence would have to be performed at the IRS' national com-
puter center in Detroit.
The origin of the decision to extend general intelligence gathering
to the General Enforcement Program is less clear than the reasons
for computerization, but may be related. Businesses and sophisticated
taxpayers employed devices similar to those employed by organized
crime to escape IRS detection of tax evasion, so the same logic which
justified the new approach to general intelligence gathering for or-
ganized crime figures justified it in the General Enforcement Program.
A manual system could not handle the mass of additional data that
would result from extension of the program to the GEP. The Data
Center's computer could handle this information. The decision to
extend general intelligence gathering to the GEP, therefore,. rein-
forced the choice to computerize general intelligence.250
Under the new system, the information-collection functions of a
"typical" district Intelligence Division were to be divided into three
categories: (1) the former Information Item system; (2) specifically
assigned intelligence-investigations and projects; (3) the Information
Gathering and Retrieval Unit (IGRU). The first category was the
classic Intellitrence Division activity: investigation of an allegation
of tax fraud involving a specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers. In
this classical function the allegation had to have sufficient probability
of truth to justify opening an investigation and allocating manpower
to corroborating or disproving the allegation. The second category
was the long-standing system for handling any information which
amounted to an allegation of tax fraud.
The function of the IGRU was to gather information which did not
qualify as information items (i.e., which did not amount to allegations
of tax fraud) and which was not relevant to any pending case to
evaluate this data for its potential future value,2"' and to "input" the
valuable information into IGRS.
The new system called for the creation of IGRU's (case develop-
ment units) in large districts, and for the allocation of manpower to
the case development function in others. In general, during the exist-
ence of IGRS, approximately 10 percent of total Intelligence man-
power was to be allocated to the general intelligence gathering and
retrieval effort. A new Manual section spelled out the duties of the
IGRU in a district:
(a) Evaluation of newly received information.
(b) Preparation and submission of input documents for in-
formation entering the background files to determine if any
Memorandum to Chief, Intelligence (Manhatten), Information Retrieval
System in the Manhatten District, 10/29/71.
" For example, if a special agent in the TGRU read in the newspaper that a
known organized crime figure had invested $40,000 in a restaurant, that news-
paper article would be filed and indexed in IORS for two basic reasons: (1) so
that any agent working on an investigation of that individual would have that
information available, and (2) so that, at some future time, someone in the IGRU
could pull all information on that individual to determine whether a basis existed
for opening an investigation-a basis which, conceivably, would never have been
detected but for the gathering of many pieces of information none of which
alone would have triggered an investigation.
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investigative action should be taken, and to ensure that sub-
jects and documents no longer of interest to the Intelligence
Division are purged from the files.
(c) Establishment, development and coordination of liai-
son contacts with other law enforcement agencies and other
organization8 and information sources as directed by the
Chief, Intelligence Division.252 [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the IGRU was not to be a passive recipient of information. Its
function was to actively seek information which would lead to a tax
investigation.253 This tasking encouraged cultivation of regular in-
formants.
However, IGRS altered the informant pattern in one important
way. IGRS was not restricted to organized crime figures. While the
OCD was not known for clarity of targeting, IGRS had virtually no
targeting criteria. The districts were instructed to cultivate sources,
but were left largely free to select their own targets within. the follow-
ing general guidelines: 254
9393.1 Criteria for Inclusion in District Background Files-
(1) Documents entering the district background files must
relate to specific subjects or entities. They must involve fi-
nancial transactions with potential tax consequences; illegal
activities with tax potential; or other illegal activities which
fall within our investigative jurisdiction.
The guidelines thus gave their blessing to intelligence gathering re-
garding illegal activities without potential tax consequences ("other
illegal activities"), subject only to a limitation that the illegal activity
had to fall within "our investigative jurisdiction."
The heart of IGRS was to be the retrieval system. The system con-
templated using the Data Center computer to generate an index to
documents physically filed in the districts.255 When the IGRU eval-
uator 2 5 6 decided that a particular document merited inclusion in
IGRS, a clerk was to fill out an input card containing all the refer-
ences under which that document would be indexed for retrieval,
including the persons mentioned in it in relationship to the informa-
tion which had caused the document's selection, the area of business
activity involved, the area of illegal activity, the source of the infor-
mation, and a forty-character description of the content of the docu-
ment. The computer would then turn these cards into a print-out
listing alphabetically all the persons listed for each document in
IGRS, and identifying every document (by number) in which that
person's name appeared. The computer would also produce an index
' May 5,1973, MT 9300-40, Section 9392 (5).
'For example, in discussing the establishment of an Intelligence Gathering
and Retrieval Unit in Birmingham, the Chief, Intelligence Division, stated, "All
special agents are encouraged to develop, for the purpose of receiving useful
information in relation to tax violations in all walks of life, confidential in-
formants who can provide meaningful information in this regard." Memo from
Chief, Birmingham Intelligence Division, to Special Agents, dated February 20,
1974.
m Sec. 9393.1, IRS Manual, 3/4/74.
2 IRS manual Transmittal 9300-40, May 4,1978.
' Evaluators were part of the case development team. Their function was to
evaluate material gathered by the special agents assigned to case development
and to decide whether it should be included in IGRS.
by document number showing the same of each person listed in con-
nection with that document. Both indexes would also show, as to
each document, the source, the illegal activity, the business, and the
40-character document description.257
The computer stored and updated the index to the documents, but
was not to be a repository of data about the subjects. If, for example,
a 30-page report of the debriefing of an informant contained state-
ments the informant had spontaneously made about the sex life of
the subject, that information would not be "in" the computer unless
the agent chose to include it in the forty-character document de-
scription. The document would be referenced in the index, as would
the subject's name, business, illegal activity coding, and a code in-
dicating the document source was an informant. But the detailed in-
formation would remain in the district's files, retrievable only by
reading the report. As envisioned, the system would ultimately permit
nationwide identification of every document in any district's IGRS
pertaining to a particular individual, a particular illegal activity, or
a particular business. Districts had available optional local codings
which they could use to categorize their information by geographical
area or in any other way they choose. New input was to be provided
to the Data Center monthly so that the indices the Data Center re-
turned to the districts would be current.2 58
C. IGRS in Practice
1. Introduction.-A principal deficiency of IGRS was the mis-
placed reliance upon the computer's retrieval capability. This was a
natural result of the lack of controls over input. The districts' normal
discretion in 8electing target8 is inherently limited by the general
requirement that there exist a probability of a specific tax violation;
the discretion is in selecting the most fruitful of such allegations to
investigate. The agents' discretion in how to investigate is inherently
limited by the narrow scope of the information which is relevant to
the suspected violation.
However, the IGRS granted the districts total discretion in deter-
mining whom to investigate. It was not intended that a specific al-
legation would precede intelligence gathering; rather, it would follow.
For. the same reason, agents were given total discretion to collect
whatever information they chose, as long as it related in some way
to IRS' "investigative jurisdiction". The only control which IGRS
left intact was the judgment of the agents, the chiefs, intelligence, and
the district directors.259
See IRS Manual Transmittal 9300-40, May 4, 1973.
* IRS Manual Transmittal 9300-40, May 4, 1973.
2' In one district, the problem of what information was to be input in the sys-
tem was clearly stated in a memo from a District Director to all Division Chiefs
in the division. The District Director stated:
"I request that each agent or officer under your supervision be alert to such
unusual items and submit them to our Information Gathering and Retrieval
Unit. While it is difficult to establish criteria concerning what to submit, each
agent can at least ask himself whether a particular item would be of value to
him now or In the future if he were assigned a case on an entity named in a
given item of information." Memorandum, District Director. Greensboro Dis-
trict, to All Division Chiefs, Branch Chiefs, and Managers, March 4, 1974.
IGRS was an intelligence collection system. It did not bypass the
decentralized control system for initiation of actual criminal investi-
gations. Therefore, no actual investigation could result from the
intelligence-gathering in the absence of a basis for believing a tax
violation was present.
IGRU "case development" agents gathered massive quantities of
information having no bearing on tax enforcement. In at least one
district an agent amassed huge quantities of intelligence on militant
groups without adequate tax justification; in other, militants were
also targeted without good reason, but to a lesser degree.
IGRS became an information catch-all from which useful informa-
tion retrieval was almost impossible even with the computer's aid.
However, the abuses of IGRS were largely potential in the sense that
they consisted only of the gathering of intelligence. Because of the
basic requirement of probable cause to believe a tax violation had
occurred before a criminal investigation could begin remained intact,
IGRS did not result in criminal tax investigations of improperly
selected targets. However, had the system worked more effectively, it
would have resulted in selective enforcement against groups chosen for
investigation by agent predilection rather than by tax enforcement
criteria. Concentration of information gathering will ultimately re-
sult in concentration of enforcement since information is the key
to commencing an investigation. The overbroadness of IGRS led to
the glut of data which made IGRS ineffective. Overbreadth was thus
the cure for the very evils it created.
2. The Los Angeles Example.-The uniform, nationwide IGRS
the Internal Revenue Manual prescribed never came into existence.
The Committee staff studied the systems in six districts: Los Angeles,
San Francisco, Jacksonville, Chicago, St. Louis, and Baltimore. By
January, 1975, the Los Angeles IGRS has amassed 80,000 documents;
Baltimore had 39 files filling two small file drawers containing ap-
proximately 3,000 documents. These statistics reflect the two poles.
They indicate that at the time of its termination on June 23, 1975, the
IGRS described in the Internal Revenue Manual was not a reflection
of a uniform reality.
Since Los Angeles had the longest experience with an IGRS-type
intelligence gathering system, its experience epitomizes the problems
the system entailed: 1) lack of controls over targeting; 2) inadequate
screening of information gathered for its relationship to tax enforce-
ment; 3) as a corollary of the first two, ineffectiveness in producing
the anticipated crop of high quality cases for investigation.
The Los Angeles information gathering experiences predated the
formal establishment of IGRS by four years. However, the guidelines
set forth in the Manual were essentially the informal guidelines under
which the Los Angeles general intelligence gathering operation had
functioned since its inception: any target was an appropriate subiect
for general intelligence gathering as long as it was within the IRS
investigative jurisdiction. 2 60 The largest single category of targets
' In a January 18, 1971, memorandum discussing consolidation of various fea-
tures of the Los Angeles IGRS with similar systems in San Francisco and Reno,
it was stated that "Los Angeles [IRS Intelligence Division] is Interested in
anything and everything. . . ." Memorandum, Special Agent David D. Gehrt to
Chief, Intelligence Division, Reno, 1/18/71.
was organized crime,2 61 a concentration which reflects the rationale
for devising an improved information-gathering system. However,
Los- Angeles also focused its intelligence gathering on activists and
militants, particularly black militants.
During July, 1975, the Committee staff searched the last IGRS
print-out for Los Angeles and found many references to documents in
the IGRS files relating to militants and activists. The "illegal activ-
ity" code for these groups was code. 509, which has carried both the
designation "subversives" and the designation "sabotage." The Staff
was able to learn very little about the contents of these files, however,
as the Los Angeles Intelligence Division had destroyed them (not in
keeping with any routine document destruction schedule) in approxi-
mately December 1974.262
The initial decision to target militants for intelligence gathering in
Los Angeles was made by the Chief, Intelligence Division, in early
1969.263 An employee in the Audit Division had a personal interest
in militant groups and felt since they "violated the Constitution they
were likely to be violating other laws as well, including the Internal
Revenue Code .264 He also felt that the IRS should be checking on
their tax compliance because of the large sums of money which passed
through their hands. The auditor recommended to his Chief that he be
permitted to transfer to Intelligence to work on this problem. Follow-
ing a meeting with the Chief, Intelligence, the auditor joined the new
"case development" unit in Los Angeles and began to gather intelli-
gence on militants from public sources, other law enforcement agencies
and informants.211 The auditor stated that the information he had
gathered was strictly limited to tax-related financial information about
the groups.266
There is no way of knowing how extensive the Los Angeles project
would have been had the National Office not developed a similar inter-
est in activists a short time after the Los Angeles project began. This
National Office interest, which had its origin in criticism of IRS by
congressional committees and ultimately led to the establishment of
SSS, initially found expression in a request to all the districts on
a Staff statistical review of contents of Los Angeles IGRS files.
The story of their destruction is set forth later in this section, as is a
description of the destruction of a similar file in the St. Louis Intelligence
Division in January 1975.
m Staff interview of Robert Handley, Audit Division, Los Angeles, 8/1/75.
m Ibid.
The informants were, according to the auditor, not members of the groups,
but people in positions to learn of their activities through their own informants,
including one person alleged to be an investigator in the employ of the Office of
the Governor of the State of California. Ibid.
'The destruction of the material this agent gathered was not quite complete.
The few remaining documents dealing with militants the staff located in the
IGRS files, were, for the most part, not related to financial transactions and
of no apparent value in tax enforcement. They related to such subjects as changes
in leadership in the groups, arrests for violence, meetings, and surveillance re-
ports by other law enforcement agencies as well as minutes of meetings of law
enforcement associations concerned with militants. In the absence of the com-
plete files the auditor created, there is no means of verifying the means of in-
formation gathering employed or the kind of information gathered.
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March 25, 1969 and again on July 18, 1969, for all existing file infor-
mation on certain activist organizations. 0 7
Los Angeles chose to read this request as a reason to redouble their
efforts. The auditor spent the ensuing nine months preparing a com-
prehensive report for what was to be the Special Service Staff.268 In
preparing the report, he gathered large amounts of material on various
groups including militants and activists, but the material was
destroyed.
The auditor amassed roughly one file drawer of documents concern-
ing militants. When the Los Angeles District created an automated
retrieval system for microfilmed intelligence documents he selected
some of this material for inclusion in that system. The material was
not actually microfilmed, however, but, unlike all the other intelligence
documents, was merely referenced in the microfilm system, while the
auditor retained personal control over the documents themselves. When
he was transferred in 1972 he destroyed the documents which were not
referenced in the automated system but retained the ones which
were.269 With the establishment in 1973 of the IRS-wide intelligence
retrieval system known as IGRS, the Los Angeles microfilm system
was entered on the IGRS computerized index, including the references
to the auditor's documents. As of that date (May 1973), under IRS
document destruction rules, the documents acquired a new filing date,
and destruction was not permitted for seven years thereafter.2 70
In approximately December 1974, at a time when it was common
knowledge that the Congress was preparing to examine intelligence
agencies, the auditor's documents were apparently destroyed. The
Chief (Intelligence), Los Angeles, ordered a subordinate to retrieve
the documents from the auditor and to provide them to a second
subordinate whose function was to review incoming documents to de-
termine whether they should be retained or destroyed. The latter indi-
vidual does not specifically recall whether he destroyed the documents,
but believes he may have done so.271 A thorough search of the Intelli-
gence Division, Los Angeles District, hs failed to produce the
documents.
The Chief (Intelligence) has stated that the retrieval of the docu-
ments was pursuant to a short-lived. directive from the Western Re-
gion to clean out intelligence files. However, the Chief also stated
that no general review was made of intelligence files, and that the
only specific action he can recall taking pursuant to the directive was
to order the retrieval of the auditor's file materials on militants and
activists.272
9"Memorandum, Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) to All Regional Com-
missioners, March 25, 1969. Memorandum, Assistant Commissioner (Compliance)
to Assistant Commissioners (Data Processing, Technical), Chief Counsel, and
All Compliance Division Directors, July 18, 1969.
m For a discussion of Special Service Staff, see p. 876.
2 Staff interview of Robert Handley, 8/1/75.
" Internal Revenue Manual Transmittal 1(15)59-101 (8/12/69) (Records
Control Schedules).
" Statement of Jerry Baker, Intelligence Division, Los Angleles District,
8/1/75.
2m Statement of Chief, Intelligence Division, Los Angeles District, 8/1/75.
That the staff detected the destruction of the Los Angeles material demonstrates
a benefit which results from computerization of intelligence: a record of the
material gathered exists outside the control of the gatherers. Such a record is
of particular importance where control of intelligence-gathering depends upon
In St. Louis, the staff discovered a folder denominated "Militants"
and a second folder denominated "Subversives" in the intelligence
files. The "Militants" file had been checked out to the Chief (Intel-
ligence) in January 22, 1975. The Chief stated that at some time
during December or January he ordered the file destroyed because he
believed it was inappropriate for it to be in the intelligence files as
it had no bearing on tax matters.2 7 3 The "Subversives" file contained
only material on the Church of Scientology. No employee of the Intel-
ligence Division could recall that it had ever contained any other
material.27 4
3. Overbreadth.-Reports on the IGRS have suggested that the
presence on the subject index in certain districts of many names of
reputable citizens indicates that the IRS was unjustifiably spying on
such people and seeking to develop tax cases against them or other
discrediting information about them. However, a thorough review of
the IGRS files in six districts disclosed no evidence that any of the
Intelligence Divisions employed their Intelligence Gathering Unit for
this purpose.
Few IGR Units adequately screened the documents which they
placed on the index. Virtually none of the Units screened those docu-
ments it selected to eliminate insignificant names. The result can best
be demonstrated by an example. If the Special Agent screening docu-
ments selected for inclusion a newspaper article which mentioned that
a known racketeer was investing money in a restaurant, alluded to
the former owners, and contained interviews with several patrons, the
IGRS index would contain a numbered reference to that document
under the name of each of the persons mentioned in the article, includ-
ing the randomly interviewed patrons and the former owners. This
collection of useless data resulted from the use of clerks to prepare
the input cards who were not permitted to exercise any judgment
about which names in a document were important, and therefore
included them all. In effect, the function of evaluators was being by-
passed. The name J. Edgar Hoover appears in many IGRS indices
because he often made statements on subjects dealing with organized
crime. Newspaper articles reporting his statements were often filed
in IGRS. The name Internal Revenue Service often appeared on the
indices, as did the names of the present and most former Commis-
sioners of Internal Revenue.
The presence of a name on the IGRS index therefore did not mean
that individual had been selected by the IRS as a subject of intel-
ligence gathering. It meant the individual was mentioned in some
document which an agent had selected for filing in IGRS. Further,
none of the districts investigated had complied with manual provi-
sion providing for the review and purging of unnecessary names and
information from IGRS. 275 The wholesale inclusion of names in the
system, coupled with the failure to screen material adequately at the
inception of IGRS and the failure to purge the files pursuant to stand-
ing instructions explains why the nationwide total of IGRS "subjects"
is 465,442.
retrospective review and revision of guidelines rather than upon day-to-day
direction of operations.
' Statement of Chief, Intelligence Division, St. Louis District, 8/6/75.
"' Staff observations of district intelligence operations.
"' Staff observations of district intelligence operations.
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The presence of thousands of names of prominent, reputable people,
and of tens of thousands of names of less well-known but apparently
reputable people on the IGRS index does not demonstrate that IGRS
was targeting innocents but that it was choking on its own data.
4. IGRS Ineffectivenes.-Statistical evidence suggests that IGRS
did not succeed in producing a large number of high quality cases
for investigation. In Los Angeles, by January 1975, the system con-
tained 85,387 subjects. Between July 1, 1973, and October 31, 1974
Los Angeles attributed the initiation of 45 intelligence investigations
to IGRS. Chicago had 89,417 subjects and attributed four investi-
gations to IGRS.276 Nationwide, investigations were started against
only 350 of the 465,108 "subjects".
The table shows comparable results in 45 districts.
Because Operation Leprechaun is the focal point of the most serious
claims of abuse connected with IGRS, the staff's conclusions regard-
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I The information in this table was furnished the Director Intelligence Division in response to directive issued by IRS
Commissioner suspending the operation of IGRS in January 1975.
2 The relatively large quantity of material in some districts' IGRS is the
result of their having intelligence gathering systems prior to the formal estab-
lishment of IGRS. In the case of Los Angeles, the numbers are particularly high
because of an apparent error by the regional data center in following the dis-
trict's instructions regarding the input of the material the difstrict had gathered
under the Miracode system. The district apparently screened the material and
asked to have a program written which would result in the automatic selection
of that material from the Miracode data most likely to be of continuing value.
Through an oversight the program was not used, and all of the Miracode data
was included in IGRS. The result of this mass inclusion of the Miracode data
is that the IGRS in Los Angeles gives a picture of intelligence gathering prac-
tices in the district over a period of six years, and of the results of this long
experience with an IGRS-type system in relation to the amount of data
accumulated.
I. OPERATION LEPRECHAUN
"Operation Leprechaun" was an intelligence gathering project di-
rected at political corruption and participated in by both the Internal
Revenue Service and the Justice Department. Because of the sensitive
character of the intelligence gathering effort, it occurred outside the
framework of the normal intelligence administrative structure. The
staff's investigation revealed that most of the allegations which com-
prised Operation Leprechaun were unfounded. Those of the alleged
acts of wrongdoing which actually occurred are attributable to a com-
bination of circumvention of normal supervision over intelligence
gathering and informant control, and the inadequacy of IRS guide-
lines for control and payment of nformants. 277
A. Background of Operation Leprechaun
In late 1971, a local investigation by the Miami Police Department
and the Dade County Department of Public Safety uncovered certain
information concerning political corruption and bribes of political
figures in Miami-Dade County. This -investigation came to be known
as the "Market Connection". The attorney in charge of the Justice
Department's Organized Crime Strike Force located in Miami, Mr.
Dougald McMillan, cooperated with the local authorities and received
information from them concerning allegations about those political
figures. McMillan became interested in initiating a federal strike force
investigation and in securing the aid of the IRS and other law en-
forcement agencies in such an effort. In several conferences with the
Justice Department and IRS officials, he vigorously solicited their
support."" At about the same time, the IRS chose the Jacksonville
District, of which Miami is a part, to be one of the pilot districts in an
intelligence gathering and retrieval experiment.279 The Miami Intel-
ligence Division chose Special Agent John T. Harrison as the prin-
cipal IRS agent to work on the Market Connection intelligence-gather-
ing effort, and later assigned him to feed the resulting intelligence into
the new information gathering and retrieval system.
The purpose of a Justice Department Strike Force Program is to
achieve a coordinated effort by all federal law enforcement agencies
against organized crime in a particular locality. A Justice Department
attorney headed the Strike Force effort in Miami as elsewhere. The
" Two members of the Committee staff spent ten days in Miami investigating
the allegations. For much of its information about the allegations, however, the
Committee relied upon the work of the 91 investigators IRS Inspection Division
assigned to investigate the allegations of Operation Leprechaun. The Commit-
tee's independent investigation of cases which Inspection also investigated has
convinced the Committee of the thoroughness and independence of Inspection
Division inquiries into alleged IRS wrongdoing. The Committee staff has also
read or attended the hearings of the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Ways
and Means Committee and the Government Operations Subcommittee on Com-
merce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs on the subject of Operation Leprechaun.
The Committee also devoted a portion of its public hearing on IRS intelligence to
Operation Leprechaun.
' See, e.g., Memorandum of Meeting of IRS Target Selection Committee at-
tended by Strike Force Attorney prepared by Thomas Eaton, June 28, 1972.
m See discussion of the development of the Information Gathering and Re-
trieval System at p. 900.
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Audit and Intelligence Divisions of the Miami IRS District each as-
signed a representative to the Strike Force whose function was to (1)
concentrate tax enforcement efforts on Strike Force targets; (2) ex-
change information with other agencies represented on the Strike
Force to the extent disclosure regulations permitted; (3) participate
in identifying new targets. These Strike Force representatives were
to remain under both the operational and administrative control of
the District.2 so The Strike Force concept did not call for the bypassing
of normal administrative controls.
Agent Harrison, though not the Miami Intelligence Division's
Strike Force representative, was assigned to work closely with the
Strike Force attorney.-8, His assignment was to seek to develop tax
cases against public figures suspected of accepting bribes or otherwise
participating in corruption through the use of informants and other
intelligence-gathering method.28 2 On the basis of memoranda of meet-
ings between the Strike Force attorney and members of the Intel-
ligence Division in Miami, it appears that the Strike Force attorney
contributed names of individuals and other information to IRS, some
of which was subsequently used by the Target Selection Committee, an
IRS group charged with final approval of targets for information
gathering. 83 In any event Harrison generally did not select his own
targets. The Chief, Intelligence Division, ordered that Harrison be
removed from the normal chain of command.2
84 Harrison's nominal
superior, his Group Manager, was to be advised of Harrison's activities
only on a "need-to-know" basis.2
8 5 As a result, Harrison's IRS superior
lost effective control of his activities.
Agent Harrison chose the name "Operation Leprechaun" to de-
scribe his efforts. He picked that name because he used green ink for
his informant files and green ink caused him to think of leprechauns.
I looked up the definition of a leprechaun and found,
in essence, the meaning to refer to the "wee mysterious
people" who could reveal many secrets.2
86
B. Allegations About Opemtion Leprechaw%
Allegations of improprieties within the IRS Intelligence Division
in Miami first appeared in a series of articles in the Miami News
a Memorandum of IRS Inspection Interview with Dougald D. McMillan,
4/5/75, p. 22.
SAffidavit of John McRae to IRS Inspection, 3/19/75, p. 3. McRae, in a later
affidavit, modified some of the statements contained in the affidavit of 3/19/75.
His later statements indicate that there was some misunderstanding within IRS
concerning the exact status of Special Agent Harrison.
' Ibid, pp. 3-5.
253 See memorandum dated June 28, 1972, summarizing a meeting with the
Strike Force attorney; memorandum dated September 6, 1972; minutes of Target
Selection Committee meeting, dated May 15, 1973.
2 McRae affidavit, 3/19/75. McRae, In his affidavit, states, "At a subsequent
meeting a short time later Chief Register directed that Special Agent John T.
Harrison be relieved of his present assignment and given the task of perfecting the
case development files on the individuals identified on Dougald McMillan's 
list.
It was Chief Register's further direction that S/A Harrison would consult di-
rectly and closely with Dougald McMillan about the corruption in Dade County.
Chief Register advised me that I would learn of S/A Harrison's activities on a
need-to-know basis. Mr. Register asked me if I could work with S/A Harrison
under such an arrangement and I told him I saw no problem." See also, Transcript
of IRS Miami meeting, 3/25/75. Register, in subsequent statements, has denied
ever removing Harrison from the effective control of his supervisors. The staff
concluded that his later statements, as was McRae's statement, are indicative 
of
the misunderstanding within IRS as to Harrison's exact status.
McRae affidavit to IRS Inspector, 3/19/75, p. 3.
Affidavit, John T. Harrison, 3/18/75, p. 2.
beginning in March 1975 alleging serious abuses by IRS intelligence
in Operation Leprechaun. The source of most of the allegations was
an informant used by Harrison, Elsa Gutierrez.287 Among the princi-
pal allegations concerning Operation Leprechaun were the following:
-that the IRS recruited Gutierrez and other informants for the
purpose of gathering information on the sex lives and drinking
habits of thirty public officials in the Miami area;
-that two IRS operatives burglarized the Miami campaign office
of a congressional candidate;
-that the IRS made improper use of electronic listening devices;
-that Special Agent Harrison threatened Gutierrez with fatal acci-
dents and imprisonment if she revealed her IRS activities;
-that personal information gathered in the course of Operation
Leprechaun about enemies of the White House was funneled to
the White House by the IRS;
-that following publication of the newspaper articles on Opera-
tion Leprechaun, IRS audited the tax returns for each of eleven
years of a reporter who was the principal author of the Lepre-
chaun stories; and I
-that IRS agents promised Gutierrez $20,000 per year for life and
eventually a home outside the country in return for her spying on
public officials.
C. Operation Leprechaun Improprieties
While evidence gathered by IRS Inspection and corroborated by
the staff indicates that many of the allegations of Elsa Guiterrez about
Operation Leprechaun were unfounded, several improprieties were
discovered. 288 Of these, some apparently are directly related to the
environment in which special agent Harrison conducted the project
and these further illustrate the increased potential for abuse of
individual rights when the normal IRS structure and its inherent con-
trols on IRS activities are circumscribed to meet the needs of a special
program which has, as its objective, a set goal in addition to enforce-
ment of the tax laws. The principal improprieties occurring in Opera-
tion Leprechaun include improper special agent supervision, improper
informant usage, including unauthorized electronic surveillance, and
useless and improper material being gathered and stored by the IRS.
These areas are discussed below.
1. Improper Special Agent Supervision.-From its inception, the
project which became Operation Leprechaun placed Special Agent
Harrison in a position inconsistent with normal IRS operating pro-
cedures. The then Chief of the Jacksonville District Intelligence Divi-
sion has stated that in response to the request of the Miami Strike
Force Chief, Dougald McMillan, information gathered concerning
political corruption in the Miami area was sensitive and should be
disseminated on a "need-to-know" basis only.2 9
John McRae, Harrison's Intelligence Division Group Manager,
has stated that he, upon receiving a listing of targets from the Intelli-
gence. Chief, instructed Harrison to first develop initial files on the
targets. McRae further stated that Harrison was to consult directly
and closely with Mr. McMillan regarding this investigation and that
2 The staff, in its investigation by Operation Leprechaun, did not attempt
to determine Gutierrez' motives for exposing Operation Leprechaun. As previ-
ously noted, many of her allegations appear now to have been unfounded.
m Operation Leprechaun always had as its goal the enforcement of the tax
laws.
I IRS Report on Relationship between Miami Strike Force and IRS Miami
Strike Force Personnel, p. 4; Affidavit, McRae to IRS Inspection, 3/19/75.
he (McRae) was to learn of Harrison's intelligence gathering ac-
tivities on a "need-to-know" basis only. 2 9
McMillan, in an affidavit to IRS Inspection, stated that Harrison
was at no time the official IRS representative to the Miami Strike
Force, and at no time did he in any way supervise Harrison.2 91 Me-
Millan stated, however, that in response to a request by Harrison,
and because Harrison was always in a hurry, he (McMillan) told
Harrison that he could stop dealing with the IRS Intelligence Divi-
sion Representatives to the Miami Strike Force and deal directly with
McMillan on Strike Force related matters.292
While the evidence cited above does not conclusively define the
exact nature of the relationship between the IRS and the Strike Force
during Operation Leprechaun, it does indicate lines of communica-
tion were unclear and that the normal IRS organizational structure
had been changed to meet the needs of the specialized, sensitive proj-
ect. This hybrid structure necessarily diminished the effectiveness of
built-in controls over special agent investigation activity and ap-
parently was a primary contributing factor to other improprieties in
Operation Leprechaun.
2. Informant Recruitment and Development In Operation Lepre-
ohaun.-Special Agent Harrison had for several years advocated the
need for a network of confidential informants to obtain information
on organized crime, corruption and racketeering. 293 This view ap-
parently was a major factor in the decision to place him in charge of
the Operation Leprechaun intelligence gathering activities, which
were targeted at political corruption.
Harrison began to recruit informants to develop intelligence for
the project. Since Harrison would have to purchase the information,
the Chief, Intelligence, applied to the National Office to establish an
"imprest fund" of $30,000 to finance the project. In his application,
he stated it was understood that:
Expenditures from these funds will not be made unless the
information received warrants compensation. The inform-
ants who will be utilized as the opportunity arises will be
guaranteed no compensation or operating expenses but will
be paid for value received only.2 9 4
The Director, National Office Intelligence Division, approved the
fund.2 9 5
Harrison 296 developed his informants through fellow agents, other
law enforcement agencies, state agencies, and through his own per-
m Affidavit of John McRae to IRS Inspection, 3/19/75, p. 3.
" McMillan, statement to IRS Inspection, 4/5/75. p. 3.
22Ibid.
"' Harrison affidavit, 3/18/75.
Letter from G. T. Register, Jr., to Assistant Regional Commissioner, Intelli-
gence, 3/30/72. This limitation on informant payments is set forth in Internal
Revenue Manual section 9372.1(3), as follows: "When practicable, direct pay-
ments to informants should be made only after the information or evidence has
been obtained, evaluated, and determined to be worthy of compensation." 'Other
regulations govern accountability for imprest funds, including the requirement
that advances from the funds be made only by "class A cashiers". As administered,
Operation Leprechaun violated all these. regulations.
' He later (April 22, 1973) approved a $17,000 addition to the fund.
" Harrison affidavit, 3/15/75, p. 1.
sonal contacts. 29 7 He also instructed some informants to develop other
confidential sources.2 9 8 According to Harrison's statement, a total of
42 confidential informants were involved in some aspect of Operation
Leprechaun. 29 9
Of twenty informants used by Harrison during the project and
interviewed by IRS Inspection during its investigation, five advised
that they had been requested to gather sexual information, two ad-
vised they had been requested to research public records or develop
background files; five advised they had been requested to gather
political information, one advised she had been instructed to gather
drinking habit information and 4 advised they had been involved
in electronic surveillance.30 0
D. Informant Activities During Operation Leprechaun
1. Breaking and Entering.-The conduct of informants during the
course of Operation Leprechaun ranged from the performance of
activities which were clearly illegal to those which were at least
questionable. Although they do not necessarily reflect on the wisdom
or integrity of Special Agent Harrison, they do indicate an inade-
quacy in the system of informant control utilized during Operation
Leprechaun.
Two Leprechaun informants, Nelson Vega and Roberto Novoa,
according to Vega's admission, burglarized the office of Evelio Estrella,
a candidate for Congress on November 14, 1972.301 Vega (Novoa is
deceased) stated in an affidavit to IRS Inspector that he was hired to
work on "Operation Leprechaun" for $100 per week and was given the
assignment of getting information on people who were running for
office to determine where they were getting their money for parties
and other activities.302 Vega stated that he and Novoa burglarized the
office of Estrella and took from it a filing cabinet which they thought
contained certain information which would be useful to the Internal
Revenue Service.30o Vega, emphasized that Harrison was unaware of
the burglary at the time it was committed, and that, although he and
Novoa later turned over some of the stolen material to Harrison, they
advised him someone had given them the material.3o4
Harrison stated he was unaware of the burglary at the time it was
committed and became aware of it only when he read Vega's news-
paper statement.305 Harrison also stated that he emphatically told
"' Harrison affidavit, 3/15/75, p. 1.
m Ibid, p. 2.
'Ibid. The IRS Inspection Report on Operation Leprechaun states that
. . during the time Harrison was identifying his expenditures to informants
with the code name "Operation Leprechaun," Harrison was obtaining informa-
tion from 41 informants; 29 of whom were paid and 12 unpaid." See IRS Inspec-
tion Report Sec. 2.
IRS Inspection Report, Operation Leprechaun, Sec. 2.
3o1 The police report on the Estrella burglary indicates that a "heavy instru-
ment was used to smash and completely remove glass from front door;" that an
employee of Estrella's campaign office discovered the breakin on the morning
of November 13, 1972, and found that a beige filing cabinet about 48" high con-
taining all their campaign records had been stolen.
'" Affidavit, Nelson Vega to IRS Inspector, 4/16/75.
"'Ibid.
' Vega affidavit, 4/16/75.
" Harrison affidavit, 4/8/75.
each informant that they were not IRS employees and that their
relationship with him was not a license to violate the law.306
Harrison's informants' files contained a manila envelope with the
name Evelio S. Estrella written on the outside containing originals
and copies of State Campaign Treasury Pre-Election Reports, includ-
ing itemized receipts and expenditures, invoices and similar items
relating to Estrella. Roberto Novoa's wife, who confirmed that her
husband and Vega had brought the filing cabinet to the Novoa home,
stated that about three days following the theft Harrison asked
Novoa and Vega if they knew who had broken into Esterella's office
and, upon being advised Novoa and Vega did not know, told them
that whoever had done it would go to jail regardless of the motive
for the burglary.307
2. Unauthorized Electronic Earvedropping.-Although consensual
non-telephone electronic surveillance (i.e., where one party to the
conversation consents to eavesdropping) is not illegal, the IRS has
established regulations to safeguard against abuse of the technique.
Internal Revenue Manual section 9389.3, entitled Consenaual Monitor-
ing of Non-Telephone C(onersations, requires prior Justice Depart-
ment approval of all such monitoring providing that:
Consensual monitoring is to be approved in writing by the
Attorney General of the United States or any designated
Assistant Attorney General as follows: a) all requests for
approval must be submitted through channels and may only
be signed by the Director Intelligence Division or Acting
Director; when time is a iactor a telephone request may be
made to the Director. If an emergency exists approval may
be granted -by the Director, or Assistant Director, Intelligence
Division. Additionally, as soon as practicable, after moni-
toring the non-telephone conversation, a report will be filed
with the Chief showing how the equipment was used and
summarizing the intelligence or evidence obtained by such
use; this report should complement the information set forth
in the original request.
Elsa Gutierrez stated '0 that on August 23, 1972, she was present
when a Leprechaun informant (9th-28) outfitted with a radio trans-
mitter, entered the home of a former judge, Harrison, Novoa and
another special agent sat in Harrison's car which was equipped with
receiving equipment, and listened to the ensuing conversation. Harri-
son, in an affidavit,300 has stated that Elsa Gutierrez was present
when another agency, either the Miami Police Department or the
Dade County Sheriffs' Department, placed a concealed transmitter on
one of Harrison's confidential informants, but that the investigation
was not 'an IRS investigation. Harrison stated that the Miami Strike
Force Attorney had become interested in a possible state charge
against the judge and had solicited the aid of the Miami Police De-
partment and Dade County Public Safety Department, and arranged
Ibid.
W Affidavit, Marina Novoa to IRS Inspection.
E. Gutierrez Affidavit to IRS Inspection.
Harrison Affidavit, 4/10/75.
for the Miami Police to use the equipment. He further stated that he
was asked only to supply an informant to be wired for the surveillance,
that he had provided the other agency with the confidential inform-
ant, and that Elsa Gutierrez was there because she had recruited the
informant and might have been able to lend moral support."'o
Harrison's confidential informant files contain two documents signed
by 9th-28 authorizing police officers to place electronic eavesdropping
devices on his person; both forms are signed by Harrison as a witness.
The files also contained an affidavit by 9th-28, regarding a conversa-
tion he had with the judge in question while wearing the transmitter,
in which 9th-28 stated that he had permitted an associate of Harri-
son to wire him for sound and that he had obtained bad checks from
the judge which the judge wished him to collect for him and that
9th-28 had given the checks to Harrison.au
Major Herbert Breslow of the Miami Police Department has fur-
nished an affidavit 3 stating that on August 9, 1972, the Chief At-
torney for the Miami Strike Force requested that he furnish tech-
nical assistance to Harrison and that a state case could result from
the investigation in which the technical assistance was needed. Bres-
low stated that he accompanied Harrison to a location near the judge's
home where Breslow equipped 9th-28 with a transmitter and that 9th-
28 then entered the judge's home. While 9th-28 was in the judge's
home, Harrison, Breslow and certain other persons unknown to Bres-
low, listened to the conversation in Harrison's car at a distance of 300
yards from the judge's house. In addition, Breslow's affidavit states
that the monitoring had nothing to do with any Miami Police De-
partment investigation. Breslow recalled that he either kept the tape
of the conversation or received it from Harrison shortly after the
event and kept it until Harrison advised him it was no longer needed
and that Harrison supervised and coordinated the activity. Finally,
Breslow stated that he assumed that the eavesdropping was in aid of
an IRS investigation. Other affidavits of members of the Dade County
Department of Public Safety indicate that similar requests for tech-
nical assistance from Harrison were honored on two other occasions. 13
"o 9th-28 Affidavit to IRS Inspection.
al 9th-28 Affidavit to IRS Inspection. The files also contained memoranda to
the file from Harrison dated August 22, 1974, and August 24, 1974, respectively,
in which Harrison states that 9th-28 had given him information regarding the
judge; and that Harrison (or 9th-28?) had paid informants Novoa and Vega
for the information they had supplied concerning the judge. Neither memoran-
dum alludes to any electronic surveillance.
... Affidavit, Major Breslow to IRS Inspection.
3 The Miami Intelligence Division files contained handwritten and typewrit-
ten versions of memoranda regarding informants which differed in significant
respects. The typewritten version of one memorandum did not contain a section
from the handwritten version of the same memorandum describing a meeting
between 9th-28 and the judge during which a "microphone was taped to 9th-
28's body." A second handwritten memorandum described a second recorded
meeting between 9th-28 and the judge and indicated the informant and 9th-28
dealt with a "voice recording technical." The typed version of this memorandum
omitted the references to these events. In his affidavit, Harrison stated the first
omission was a typing error. As to the second, he said, "It appears from check-
ing back the dates that had erroneously Included that material on August 22,
1972, which could have been on Tuesday, whereas the written material as-
suming it to be correct should have been referred to on Wednesday which was
(Continued)
Both Harrison and the police assign a key role in the initiation of
the surveillance on the former judge to the Miami Strike Force At-
torney, who has stated in substance that although he could not recall
his exact conversations with Major Breslow and Captain Bertucelli,
he felt sure they were aware that the sole purpose of wiring the in-
formant was to determine if state law was being violated since ob-
viously there was no tax violation.3 14 He advised that Major Breslow
and Captain Bertucelli may have assumed the incident was part of a
Federal investigation. He emphasized, however, the whole purpose was
a possible state charge.
Whether Harrison was assisting state or local police or vice versa,
his participation in the electronic surveillance appears to have violated
the IRS regulations requiring Attorney General authorization for
consensual electronic surveillance, since the regulation does not require
that the surveillance have a Federal purpose before Attorney General
permission is required.
E. Results of Operation Leprechaun
The intelligence gathering efforts of Operation Leprechaun, by tax
enforcement standards, were successful. Full-fledged Intelligence Di-
vision investigations, which can be initiated only upon the probability
that criminal tax fraud has occurred, as well as IRS Audit Division
investigations, which indicate the probability that a substantial de-
linquent tax liability exists, were opened as a result of the project.
Out of 42 joint Intelligence and Audit Division investigations of tax-
payers who were the subject of Leprechaun documents, 22 were opened
directly as a result of allegations furnished by either the Strike Force
or information gathered during Operation Leprechaun, or both. Fur-
ther, five of eight separate Audit Division investigations of Lepre-
chaun subjects were opened as a result of information obtained from
the Strike Force, Leprechaun informants, or both. Much of the in-
formation gathered, however, bore little or no relationship to tax law
enforcement and some of the information was concerned with the sex
and drinking habits of Operation Leprechaun targets.
Examination of 594 debriefing documents of Harrison's confidential
informants indicate 135 (23o) contained references to the sexual
(Continued)
August 23, 1972." A four page memorandum in the Miami Intelligence office
files, dated August 15, 1972, prepared by Harrison, contained the following state-
ment:
"On August 9, I met with (informants) together with Capt. Herb Breslow ...
(Informant) consented for an electronic transmitter to be placed on his person.
He had made an appointment to see (judge) at his home . .. At approximately
5:55 p.m., (informant) commenced his conversation with (judge) inside (judge's)
home. The conversation was monitored and taped by use of a KEL KIT sup-
plied and operated by Capt. Breslow in my presence. Upon completion of the
conversation . . ., Capt. Breslow presented me with the tape. A transcript of
the tape will be forwarded once it has been typed."
The same memorandum appeared in 9th-28's file, but it lacked the above para-
graph. Harrison, in his April 10, 1975, affidavit, stated that he could only spec-
ulate that he received instructions to omit the paragraph from the second mem-
orandum and that such instruction could only come from the Chief, Intelligence.
The apparent reason for the omission, according to Harrison, was to prevent a
casual reader from being misled into thinking that the IRS had engaged in
electronic surveillance. The Chief, Intelligence, has no recollection of giving
such instructions. (Affidavit, Chief, Intelligence, Jacksonville District.)
"' IRS Inspection Interview with Dougald McMillan, 7/29/75.
and/or derogatory drinking activities of the subjects. Of these 135
documents, 70 also contained tax related information, but 65 did not.315
By comparison, out of 3,719 confidential informant debriefing docu-
ments prepared by all other Special Agents in the Jacksonville Dis-
trict, only 255 (7%) contained references to sexual or derogatory
drinking activities of the subjects.lo
The above evidence, in addition to statements of some of his inform-
ants, suggests that Harrison encouraged his informants to collect per-
sonel, non-tax-related information about the subjects of Operation
Leprechaun, either through specific instruction to the informants or
through displaying particular interest in the information upon de-
briefing the informants. Since the informants' continued employment
depended upon their providing information which interested Harri-
son, they would naturally be alert for information which interested
him, despite the lack of specific instructions to gather it.
It does not appear, however, that the targets of Operation Lepre-
chaun were selected because of -any interest Harrison may have had in
their personal lives. The responsibility for target selection lay with
the Target Selection Committee. Harrison's influence was primarily
over the nature of the information gathered about the targets, rather
than the selection of the targets. And, as indicated by the positive tax
enforcenent results of Operation cited above, Harrison's apparent
interest in personal information did not cause the collection of such
information to become the main focus of the intelligence gathering
operation. The statistics cited indicate that a substantial amount of
the information gathered was tax-related, and that collection of per-
sonal information, while excessive in relation to other tax investiga-
tions, remained subsidiary to the main purpose of the operation, the
effort to develop tax cases against the targets.
F. Cause8 of Leprechaun Abuse8
The system of controls over intelligence gathering activities failed
in the case of Operation Leprechaun. Special Agent Harrison's collec-
tion of personal information was not detected and arrested. He re-
cruited some informants of extreme unreliability and poor judgment
without his superiors' realizing it. He allowed informants to recruit
and to pay other informants whom, in some cases, Harrison never
met.31" Harrison engaged in unauthorized electronic surveillance with-
out its being detected by his superiors. Harrison paid many of his
informants on a regular salary-like basis instead of paying them
according to the value of the information received. Even though his
superiors knew of the practice none prevented it.318
Ibid., p. 18. Copies of some of these documents are in the Committee files.
Ibid. It is possible to quibble with the criteria applied to determine whether
a given document contains sex or drinking related information. A subsequent re-
evaluation of the documents by IRS using different criteria resulted in a smaller
percentage classified as being related to the sex and drinking habits of the targets.
However, since the criteria applied to Havrison's debriefing documents and those
applied to those of other agents were uniform, the comparison is valid. The Com-
mittee files contain some of Harrison's debriefing documents. They clearly contain
sex and drinking related information with no relevance to tax enforcement.
m In his March 18, 1975, statement, Harrison said he had one informant who
... did recruit one individual from the Cuban community who, in turn, re-
cruited three or four other confidential informants."
' Memorandum, Harrison to Chief, Intelligence Division, Jacksonville,
9/13/72.
Each of the abuses of Operation Leprechaun can be traced to fail-
ure of Harrison or his superiors to meet responsibilities. The evidence
suggests that Harrison conducted the unauthorized electronic sur-
veillance, without his superiors' approval, and was able to do so
because, as in the case of the electronic surveillance abuses the Long
Committee studied, he was outside the normal chain of command. Har-
rison's superiors had an opportunity, however, to curb potential abuse
in Harrison's employment of informants. In a September 13, 1972,
memorandum from Harrison to the Chief, Intelligence Division,
Harrison advised that he had 34 paid informants, many of whom he
had never met; that these unknown informants had been developed by
other informants; and that some of his informants were paying others.
Harrison expressly acknowledged in this memorandum that the
arrangement was unusual and risky. The memorandum also advised
the Chief that Harrison had learned that Elsa Gutierrez was a "double
agent" and had plans to expose his activities and dispose of him.
While the Leprechaun abuses can, therefore, be explained as indi-
vidual failures to detect potential abuse, there is a pattern to the
failures which indicates that the abuses have a general cause. The IRS
failed to prevent, or to curtail, the serious misdeeds of Operation
Leprechaun for three principal reasons:
1. IRS guidelines for the recruitment and use of informpnts were
not sufficiently stringent;
2. IRS reliance upon retrospective detection of abuse followed by
corrective action is inadequate to achieve control of intelligence gather-
ing of the type necessitated by projects such as Operation Leprechaun
activities;
3. Agent Harrison's anomalous position outside the normal admin-
istrative structure seriously aggravated the existing deficiencies in the
system of controls. In particular, the limited controls the IRS had over
the use of informants were largely deactivated by the decision to place
Harrison out of the effective reach of the IRS chain of command.
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NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE: A REPORT ON THE
HUSTON PLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Scope of the Investigation
On January 27, 1975, the United States Senate, meeting early in the
1st Session of the 94th Congress, established through Senate Res-
olution 21 a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Select Committee on In-
telligence was given a broad mandate to investigate the extent, if any,
to which "illegal, improper, or unethical" activities were engaged in
by the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government.
Falling within this mandate was the specific charge in Section
2(3) of the Resolution to reveal "the full facts" with respect to "the
origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan to apply United
States intelligence agency capabilities against individuals or organiza-
tions within the Umted States." I This report presents the results of
the Select Committee inquiry into this controversial intelligence plan.
In June 1970 President Nixon requested a review of those intel-
ligence collection practices which might lead to better information on
domestic dissenters. In response, the intelligence community produced
a 43 page Special Report on the subject. The Huston Plan, written
soon thereafter by presidential assistant Tom Charles Huston, was a
set of recommendations-for-action derived from the options presented
in this Special Report.
The following commentary on the Special Report and the Huston
Plan is organized, first, to reveal the background events which led
to the presidential request for an intelligence review. It then explores
in detail the views and activities of the men who wrote the Special
Report, as well as the reaction of the President to its controversial
spin-off, the Huston Plan. The effect of this episode upon the ongoing
activities of the intelligence agencies is examined next. Pursuant to
Senate Resolution 21, special attention was devoted throughout the
inquiry to the question of whether illegal, improper, or unethical acts
had been carried out by the President or those preparing the intel-
ligence report for him.
The Committee investigation into the Huston Plan began in April
1975. During the course of the inquiry over 40 interviews were con-
ducted. These included all major-and most minor-participants in
the intelligence agencies who helped draft the intelligence report for
'Senate Resolution 21, January 27, 1975, See. 2(3).
(923)
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the President. The documents relevant to an understanding of the case
were obtained by the Committee, including those from the papers of
President Nixon.
Plans were made early in the investigation to interview the former
President regarding his views on the Huston Plan episode; but, after
lengthy negotiations, the conditions set for the interview by his lawyer
proved to be unacceptable to the Committee Members, who favored
an examination before the full Committee and on the record. The
Select Committee did decide, however, to send the former President
a set of written interrogatories on the Huston Plan. His responses are
included in this report.
Supplemented by this presidential retrospect, the extensive docu-
mentation now available-as well as the existence of views from vir-
tually every other major participant still living-provides a reasonably
full understanding of the events which transpired in the summer of
1970, now encapsulated in the phrase, "The Huston Plan." These
events are summarized briefly in the following pr6cis.2
B. A Pricis
Richard M. Nixon won his first Presidential election in 1968 by
less than one percent of the total popular vote. The Presidential cam-
paign that year had been accompanied by some of the most violent
street demonstrations in the history of American elections.
His first year in office provided the President with ample further
evidence of the mood of revolt in the country. In March and April
1969, student riots erupted in San Francisco, Cambridge, and Ithaca;
and in Chicago, ghetto blacks battled the police in the streets. By
October and November, the anti-war movement was sufficiently well
organized to bring to the nation's capital the largest mass demonstra-
tions ever witnessed in the United States. The magnitude of the unrest
was immense and, just as the nation was obsessed by Vietnam, so, too,
the White House grew increasingly preoccupied with' the wave of
domestic protest sweeping the countryside.
Presidential assistant Tom Huston and others in the White House
believed that better intelligence on the plans of domestic protesters
would enable the President to take more decisive action against
violence-prone dissenters. In their view, serious deficiencies in intelli-
gence collection had resulted from the decision in the mid-1960s by
J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, to curtail certain collection techniques (particularly surrepti-
tious entry and electronic surveillance). This view was shared widely
by intelligence officers throughout the Government. Hoover went so
far as to sever formal liaison ties between the FBI and the CIA in
March 1970 and later with the other intelligence agencies, adding
further to the widespread disenchantment with his leadership in the
intelligence area.
Tom Huston grew more frustrated by the inability of the White
House to anticipate the plans of domestic dissenters. He was also
encouraged by William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director for Domestic
2 See the main text for documentation of facts presented in the pr~cis.
Intelligence, FBI, to help remove Hoover's restraints on intelli-
gence collection. By the spring of 1970, Huston decided to urge senior
White House personnel to have the President request a thorough
review of intelligence collection methods. The President, himself
greatly concerned about domestic unrest, agreed to the proposal.
On June 5, 1970, President Nixon held a meeting in the White
House with the leaders of the intelligence community. The purpose of
the meeting was to establish a special committee which would review
methods for improving the quality of intelligence particularly on the
New Left and its foreign connections. Specifically this Interagency
Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was charged with the prepara-
tion of a report for. the President on existing intelligence gaps, how
to close them, and how to enhance coordination among the intelligence
agencies.
Assigned a tight deadline, the Ad Hoc Committee staff prepared
the study in a fortnight. The final report was entitled "Special Report
Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) " and, on June 25,
1970, it received the signatures of the four top intelligence directors:
Hoover (FBI), Helms (CIA), Bennett (DIA) and Gayler (NSA).-
The enterprise was unique. It pooled the resources of the foreign--
oriented CIA, DIA, and NSA with those of the domestic-oriented
FBI. Many of the participants endorsed the enterprise enthusins-
tically, not because of an interest in better data on the New Left but
because they sensed an opportunity to remove various restrictions on.
the collection of strictly foreign intelligence. Others participated only
hesitantly and briefly, fearful of breaking through the membranes
of law and propriety.
Drawing upon the Special Report, Tom Huston prepared a memo-
randum in early July for Presidential advisor H. R. (Bob) Haldeman
under the heading "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection."
In this. memorandum Huston, who had been the White House rep-
resentative at the Ad Hoc Committee meetings, recommended that the
President select for implementation those options in the Special Report
which would have relaxed dramatically the current restrictions on in-
telligence collection. The set of options recommended by Huston is
defined in this particular report known as the Huston Plan, although
the phrase has been generally applied to the Special Report from
which Huston selected his options.3a
8J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee; Ridhard Helms, Director Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) ; Lt. General Donald V. Bennett, USA, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) ; Vice Admiral Noel Gayler (pronounced GUY-ler),
USN, Director, National Security Agency (NSA).
" Since the Senate Watergate Committee revealed Nixon White House rela-
tions with the intelligence community, the term "Huston Plan" has been generally
used in reference to recommendations and options described in both the Special
Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970,
and in the memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, July
1970. In this report, "Special Report" refers only to the Special Report of the
Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), and "Huston Plan" refers to
the recommendations outlined in the memorandum from Huston to Haldeman,
July 1970.
Presidential approval of the options recommended by Huston would
have given intelligence and counterintelligence specialists within the
intelligence community authority to:
(1) monitor the international communications of U.S.
citizens;
(2) intensify the electronic surveillance of domestic dis-
senters and selected establishments;
(3) read the international mail of American citizens;
(4) break into specified establishments and into homes of
domestic dissenters; and,
(5) intensify the surveillance of American college students.
Thus, in the summer of 1970, Tom Charles Huston believed the law
had to be set aside in order to combat forces which seemed to be
threatening the fabric of society. Apparently the President agreed, for
on July 14, 1970, Haldeman wrote a memorandum back to Huston
to inform him the President had approved his options to relax collec-
tion restraints. This decision later formed the core of Article II in
the Impeachment Articles framed by the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives in 1974.
To implement the presidential decision, Huston next wrote a memo-
randum to each of the intelligence agency directors, dated July 23rd,
informing them that certain restraints on intelligence collection were
being removed. Writing under the heading "Domestic Intelligence,"
Huston invoked the authority of the President and outlined exactly
which restrictions were to be lifted. This document is the second ver-
sion of the Huston Plan and is similar to the first sent to the President
for his approval via Haldeman in early July.
Four days later on July 27th, the Huston Plan sent to the intelli-
gence directors was recalled by the White House "for reconsideration."
Most of these bare facts have been in the public domain since 1973,
when the Senate Watergate investigation first brought to light the
history of the Huston Plan. What is new as a result of this inquiry
conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is the dis-
covery of a much more extensive degree of impropriety in the intel-
ligence community than was initially revealed in 1973. Moreover, the
Committee found instances of duplicity between the intelligence agen-
cies and the President, and among agencies themselves.
Despite the request of the President for a complete report on intel-
ligence problems, the Special Report of June 1970 failed to mention
an ongoing CIA program that involved opening the international
mail of American citizens or an on-going NSA program to select from
intercepted international communications of American citizens con-
tained on "watch lists" submitted by other agencies. The CIA mail
program was clearly illegal, and the NSA program was of question-
able lawfulness. Not only were laws violated, but the President was
asked to consider approving the CIA mail-opening program appar-
ently without ever being told of its existence.
Furthermore, despite the ultimate decision by the President to re-
voke the Huston Plan, several of its provisions were implemented
anyway. The intelligence agencies contributed an increasing number
of names of American citizens to the NSA "watch list" so that NSA
would provide the contents of any intercepted international commu-
nications of those citizens to the other intelligence agencies.
The number of Americans on this watch list expanded to a high
point in 1973. The CIA continued its illegal program of mail opening.
After the Huston Plan, the FBI lowered the age of campus inform-
ants, thereby expanding surveillance of American college students as
sought through the Plan. In 1971, the FBI reinstated its use of mail
covers Sb and continued to submit names to the CIA mail program. In
December 1970, the intelligence community established-at the request
of the White House-a permanent interagency committee for intelli-
gence evaluation called the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC),
an entity highly comparable to one outlined in the Special Report.
Finally, several of the principals involved in the Huston Plan episode
continued to seek the full implementation of its provisions. Admiral
Gayler and Richard Helms, for instance, urged Attorney General
Mitchell on March 22, 1971, to relax the restrictions on key intelligence
collection operations previously barred by the President in his ulti-
mate rejection of the Huston Plan.
Placed in perspective, the Huston Plan must be viewed as but a
single example of a continuous effort by counterintelligence specialists
to expand collection capabilities at home and. abroad often without the
knowledge or approval of the President or the Attorney General, and
certainly without the knowledge of Congress or the people. As a com-
mentary on accountability, the lesson of the Huston Plan is obvious:
often there was no accountability at all, beyond the intelligence agen-
cies themselves. The result was a neglect of civil liberties by the intelli-
gence collectors.
C. l88Ue8
The case of the Huston Plan has been of particular significance
because it raises a host of central issues about the American intelli-
gence community that reappear throughout the broad range of the
Committee investigation. Among these are the issues of accountability,
authority, lawlessness, the quality of intelligence, and the problem
of intelligence coordination.
. Accountability and Authority.-Did the intelligence agencies con-
ceal operations from the President in June 1970? From the representa-
tive of the President, Tom Huston? From the Attorney General?
From the Congress? From each other? What review procedures ex-
isted to evaluate and approve the various collection techniques dis-
cussed in the Special Report? Were these procedures used?
Lawles8ne8s.-Has the White House or the intelligence service acted
in disregard for the law? Why did the intelligence community list
for the President in the Special Report options which were illegal?
Why did the President approve for implementation in the Huston
Plan recommendations which were, in some cases, plainly illegal and,
in other cases, of dubious legality ? Did the intelligence professionals
or Tom Huston seek legal consultation with the Justice Department,
Congress, the courts, or their own legal counsel in drafting the intelli-
gence plan?
' A "mail cover" Involves a request to the Postal Service to examine the ex-
terior of mail addressed to or from a particular individual or organization.
Quality and Coordination of Intelligence.-How justified was the
dissatisfaction expressed by the Nixon Administration with the quality
and coordination of intelligence on domestic dissenters in 1969 and
1970? Did the raising of barriers to intelligence collection by Hoover
in the mid-1960's significantly reduce the quality of counterintelligence
information? How badly were intelligence functions impaired by the
severance of formal liaison ties between the FBI and the other intelli-
gence entities in 1970?
An inquiry into the Huston Plan permits an analysis of answers to
such issues found in the writings of the intelligence specialists who
prepared the Special Report for the President in June 1970. Their
views, reflected in the Report and subsequent memoranda, 'are provoca-
tive stimuli for thought, debate, and reform on the scope and method
of intelligence activities within the United States.
II. BACKGROUND: A TIME OF TURBULENCE
A. Frustrations in the White House
The antiwar protests and the incidents of violence and civil dis-
obedience which occurred throughout the country in 1969 and 1970
greatly concerned the Nixon Administration, much as it had the John-
son Administration before it. Among the responses of both adminis-
trations was the belief that hostile foreign powers must somehow be
responsible for, or at least influencing, the domestic unrest. President
Johnson often asked the intelligence agencies to probe the possibility
of linkages between the antiwar movement and foreign influence.4
Not long after entering the White House, President Nixon took up
the refrain.
In April 1969 the President asked his aide, John Ehrlichman, to
have the intelligence community help him prepare a report on foreign
Communist support of campus disorders. Evidence of a foreign con-
nection was insubstantial; but the President and Ehrlichman were
dissatisfied with the intelligence provided by the agencies, believing
it to be inconclusive.5
Two months later, Ehrlichman assigned a young White House
Counsel on Pat Buchanan's Research and Speech-Writing staff to pre-
pare a second and more thorough report on foreign support of campus
disturbances. Tom Charles Huston, lawyer and recently discharged
Army intelligence officer, drew the assignment chiefly because he was
interested in the subject and seemed to know more about New Left
politics than anyone else on the White House staff.6
On June 19, 1969, Huston paid his first visit to William C. Sullivan
of the FBI.? Sullivan had served as the FBI's Assistant Director for
Domestic Intelligence since 1961. In this position, he was responsible
for counterintelligence, that aspect of intelligence activity designed
to discover and destroy the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence
services. Huston related to Sullivan the substance of a recent meeting
'C. D. Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 104, 107, 135.
'Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 4.
o Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 4.
'Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 6/20/69. (Hear-
ings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 5)
he had with the President. Concerned about revolutionary activities
by the New Left, the President wanted to know the details on the
radical movement-"especially," Sullivan remembers Huston em-
phasizing, "all information possible relating to foreign influences and
the financing of the New Left." S (To at least one intelligence official
the line seemed extremely thin between the interest of President Nixon
in this kind of information for the purposes of national security,
on the one hand, and his interest for strictly political purposes, on the
other hand.) 9
Sullivan, replying to the White House inquiry for assistance from
the FBI, told Huston that his request would have to be put in writing
to Mr. Hoover, the FBI Director.1o On the next day, June 20, 1969,
Huston prepared the request to be sent to Hoover. With the earlier re-
port which the FBI had prepared for Ehrlichman in mind, Huston
told the Director that the available intelligence data on Communist
influence over radicals was "inadequate." - On behalf of the Presi-
dent, Huston wanted to know what gaps existed in intelligence on
radicals and what steps could be taken to provide maximum possible
coverage of their activities. Unwilling to accept earlier intelligence
results which did not fit their preconceptions, the White House policy-
makers began to apply increased pressure on the FBI to try additional
collection techniques.
Huston also gave this same -assignment to the CIA, NSA, and DIA.
Each of the agencies submitted its report to Huston on a June 30th
deadline, with the NSA feeding its contribution through the DIA
presentation. The FBI report showed a "strong reliance upon the use
of electronic coverage", according to C. D. Brennan, an assistant to
William Sullivan who helped prepare the response to the White House
request.12 Brennan concluded that increased coverage would be neces-
sary "as it appears there will be increasingly closer links between [the
New Left and black extremist movements] and foreign communists
in the future."
The quality of the intelligence supporting these reports apparently
failed to satisfy Ehrlichman and others in the White House, especially
the FBI data, and the disenchantment with the intelligence agencies
continued.13
B. The Hu8ton-Sullivan Alliance
Throughout the rest of 1969, Huston was assigned to receive and
disseminate FBI intelligence estimates sent to the White House. Con-
tempt for these estimates was voiced by Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and
Huston's colleague, Egil Krough.14 Huston himself adopted more
moderate views on the quality of Bureau intelligence reports, espe-
cially after he became more acquainted with Sullivan. Listening to the
'Sullivan memorandum, 6/20/69.
* Staff summary of [CIA intelligence officer] Interview, 6/27/75.
1o Sullivan memorandum, 6/20/69.
n Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/20/69. (Hear-
ings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 6).
2 Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 6/30/69. (Hear-
ings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 7).
"Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 19.
"Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 19,21.
counterintelligence specialists made Huston sympathetic to the diffi-
culties of intelligence collection under the restraints imposed upon the
FBI by its Director. Sullivan often complained to Huston about the
"question of coordination, the lack of manpower, the inability to get
the necessary resources, the problems of the various restraints that
were existing." 15
From June 1969 to June 1970, the important relationship between
Huston and Sullivan deepened into a working alliance devoted to the
lowering of intelligence collection barriers. As a Central Intelligence
Agency officer wrote in a memorandum for the record, "By way of
background, it should be noted that Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Huston had
been in frequent contact on these matters before [June 1970], because
Mr. Sullivan was extremely displeased by the number of restrictions
which had been placed on the FBI by Mr. Hoover." 16 The two had
numerous meetings and telephone conversations during this period,
beginning with dialogues on the report prepared for the President in
June 1969 and followed by preparations to deal with protest activity in
the Washington, D.C., area.
As Huston recalls, it was during this period that he became close to
Sullivan and his assistant, Brennan. "I think I had their confidence,
in that I think they thought I understood a little bit about who the
players were and what was going on in the country in internal security
matters," Huston has testified. "And they certainly had my confidence.
In fact, I do not think there was anyone in the government who I
respected more than Mr. Sullivan." 17
Though far different in temperament, age, and experience, Huston
and Sullivan found themselves' in agreement on several points. Both
viewed the spiraling unrest in the country with alarm; both believed
in the need for greater interagency coordination among the intelligence
agencies; both thought the quality of data on domestic radicals could
be vastly improved; and both agreed that most of the intelligence de-
ficiencies could be remedied if the intelligence agencies-and partic-
ularly the FBI-would reinstate collection methods common "in the
good old days," such as the use of electronic surveillance to obtain in-
telligence data. 8
C. The "New" Hoover
Counterintelligence specialists throughout the government were dis-
mayed when undercover FBI operations important to them, and car-
ried out for several years, were suddenly suspended by Hoover in the
1960s.19 The new emphasis in the Kennedy Administration on investi-
15 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 28; see also Tom Charles Huston testimony,
9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 16-18.
"Memorandum for the Record, James Angleton, 5/18/73, p. 2. (Hearings, Vol. 2,
Exhibit 61) ; see also Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 23 and staff summary of
William Sullivan interview, 6/10/75.
" Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 16.
1 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 33; Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75. See
Sullivan's endorsement in March 1970 of a proposal advanced by Richard Helm%,
the CIA Director, that the FBI consider installing electronic surveillance upon
CIA request, with the prior approval of the Attorney General and "on a highly re-
lative basis." In a handwritten note, Hoover vetoed the idea. (Memorandum from
William C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 3/30/70.)
"Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
gations into organized crime and civil rights had already drained man-
power from security and intelligence operations, according to an ex-
perienced FBI counterintelligence specialist. 20
Then by the mid-1960s, Hoover began to terminate specific security
programs. In July 1966, for example, Hoover wrote on a memorandum
that henceforth all FBI break-ins--or "black-bag" jobs-were to be
cut off. 2 1 By its refusal to use rigorously a full array of intelligence
collection methods, Huston strongly believed the FBI was failing to
do its job. This belief was shared widely among intelligence profes-
sionals. Helms, Bennett, and Gayler all expressed this view, as did-
privately-key intelligence officers within the FBI itself.22
Intelligence professionals were dismayed by Hoover's reluctance
now to order what he had allowed before on a regular basis. Some sug-
gested that the wiretap hearings held by Senator Edward V. Long in
1965 had turned public opinion against the use of certain intelligence-
gathering techniques,23 and that the Director was merely reading the
writing on the wall. One seasoned CIA intelligence officer recalls:
Mr. Hoover's real concern was that during the Johnson Ad-
ministration, where the Congress was delving into matters
pertaining to FBI activities, Mr. Hoover looked to the Presi-
dent to give him support in terms of conducting those opera-
tions. And when that support was lacking, Mr. Hoover had
no recourse but to gradually eliminate activities which were
unfavorable to the Bureau and which in turn risked public
confidence in the number one law enforcement agency.24
Others pointed to the increased risks involved in break-ins because
of new and sophisticated security precautions taken by various Bureau
targets. Hoover, according to this theory, was unwilling to engage in
past practices when faced with the new dangers of being caught. 25
The fact that Hoover reached age 70 in 1965 was also significant
in the view of still others, since he then came within the law which
required mandatory retirement. Henceforth, he served each year in a
somewhat vulnerable position, as his Directorship was now reviewed
for renewal on an annual basis. So he became, according to an FBI
official, "very conscious of the fact that any incident which, within his
Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, p. 101.
n See also J. Edgar Hoover's handwritten notes on memorandum from William
C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 7/19/66, p. 3. As early as 1963, Hoover began to
oppose the broad use of domestic wiretaps. (Memorandum from William C.
Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 3/7/70.)
" Richard Helms deposition, 9/10/75, p. 3; General Donald V. Bennett dep-
osition, 8/5/75, p. 12; Admiral Noel Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, pp. 6-7; Sul-
livan (staff summary), 6/10/75; Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 36 In the latter
part of 1969, Hoover was advising the CIA to see the Attorney General-not
him-if it wanted to expand its intelligence collection on foreigners within the
United States. (Sullivan memorandum, 3/30/70.)
* Staff summary of (FBI intelligence officer), 8/20/75.
" James Angleton testimony, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 69-70. In April 1970,
Sullivan noted that "we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result of
the lack of support [from 'responsible quarters']...." (Memorandum from Wil-
liam C. Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 4/14/70. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit
52).]
' Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
understanding might prove an embarrassment to the Bureau, could
reflect questionably on his leadership of the Bureau." 26
Several highly-placed observers in the intelligence community also
believed the Director was simply growing old and more wary about
preserving his established reputation-a wariness nurtured by the pro-
tective instincts of his close friend and professional colleague, Clyde
Tolson, who held the second highest position in the FBI. Dr. Louis
Tordella, the long-time top civilian at NSA, speculated in conversa-
tions with William C. Sullivan in 1969 that Tolson probably had told
Hoover something to the effect: "If these techniques ever backfire,
your image and the reputation of the Bureau will be badly dam-
aged." 27
Tordella, Sullivan, and others in the intelligence world grew in-
creasingly impatient with the "new" Hoover and with what they con-
sidered to be his obstinance on the question of intelligence collection.
If they were to expand their collection capabilities, as they and the
White House wished, the new restrictions would have to be eased.
Yet no one was willing to challenge Hoover's policy directly.
Tordella and General Marshall Carter, when he was Director of
NSA, tried in 1967 and failed.28 Their 15-minute appointment with
Mr. Hoover in the spring of that year stretched into two-and-a-half
hours. The communications experts first heard more than they wanted
to about John Dillinger, "Ma" Barker, and the "Communist Threat."
Finally, they were able to explain to Hoover their arguments for rein-
stating certain collection practices valuable to the National Security
Agency. Hoover seemed to yield, telling the NSA spokesmen their
reasoning was persuasive and he would consider reestablishing the
earlier policies.
The news came a few days later that Hoover would allow FBI
agents to resume the collection methods desired by NSA. Tordella
and Carter were surprised, and gratified. Then three more days passed
and the FBI liaison to NSA brought the word that Hoover had
changed his mind; his new stringency would be maintained after all.
William Sullivan called to tell Tordella that "someone got to the
old man. It's dead." That someone, Sullivan surmised, was Tolson.
Hoover added a note to his message for Carter and Tordella, in-
dicating that he would assist the National Security Agency in its
collection requirements only if so ordered by the President or the
Attorney General. Tordella, however, was reluctant to approach
either. "I couldn't go to the chief law enforcement figure in the country
and ask him to approve something that was illegal," he recently ex-
plained (despite the fact that he and General Carter had already
asked the Director of the FBI to approve an identical policy). As
for the President, this was "not a topic with which he should soil his
hands." For the time being, Tordella would let the NSA case rest.
Nor was Richard Helms going to be the man to urge Hoover to relax
the newly imposed restrictions. He and Hoover had little pa-
tience for one another for several years. Hoover distrusted the
" Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, p. 97.
' Staff summary of Louis Tordella interview, 6/16/75.
2 Tordella (staff summary), 6/16/75.
"Ivy League" style of CIA personnel in general; according to Sul-
livan, "Ph.D. intelligence" was a term of derision Hoover liked to use
against the Agency."9 Gayler and Bennett, newcomers to the intel-
ligence community, were warned immediately by their assistants not
to challenge the Director of the Bureau directly on matters relating
to domestic intelligence.-"
It would take the pressure of events, skillful maneuvering by a
group of FBI counterintelligence specialists, and Huston's strategic
position on the White House staff to focus the attention of the Presi-
dent on the problem of intelligence collection.
D. The Presure of Event8
Events encouraged action. Riots and bombings escalated through-
out the country in the spring of 1970. In his official statement on the
Huston Plan, issued while he was still in the White House, President
Nixon recalled that "in March a wave of bombings and explosions
struck college campuses and cities. There were 400 bomb threats. in
one 24-hour period in New York City." " The explosion of a Weather-
man "bomb factory" in a Greenwich Village townhouse in March
particularly shocked Tom Huston and other White House staffers.32
The response of the President was to send anti-bombing legislation
to the Congress.
Moreover, in the spring of 1970 the FBI severed its formal liaison
to the CIA in reaction to a CIA-FBI dispute over confidential sources
in Colorado." Though hostility between the two agencies had sur-
faced before with some- frequency over matters such as disagreement
regarding the bona fide8 of communist defectors, this particular dis-
pute was "the one straw that broke the camel's back." 3 The incident
in Colorado, now known as the Riha- Case, involved a CIA officer
who received information concerning the disappearance of a foreign
national on the faculty of the University of Colorado, a Czechoslo-
vak by the name of Thomas Rih.
The information apparently came from an unnamed FBI officer
stationed in Denver. Hoover demanded to know the identity of the
FBI agent; but, as a matter of personal integrity, the CIA officer re-
fused to divulge the name of his source. Hoover was furious with
Helms for not providing the FBI with this information and, "in a
fit of pique," 3 he broke formal Bureau ties with the Agency." To
" Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, p. 28; staff summary of General Donald Bennett
interview, 6/5/75.
' President Nixon statement, 5/22/73, Presidential Documents, Vol. 9, No. 21,
May 28, 1973, p. 694.
a Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 21.
" Hoover issued an order that "direct liaison" with OIA Headquarters "be
terminated" and that "any contact with CIA in the future" be "by letter only."
Henceforth, the position of FBI "liaison agent" to the CIA was eliminated.
See also Hoover's handwritten notes on a letter from Richard Helms to J. Edgar
Hoover, 2/26/70 and Sam Papich deposition, 9/22/75, p. 3.
Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, pp. 83-84.
a Staff summary of [CIA intelligence officer], 2/9/76.
By midsummer, formal Bureau liaison ties with all- other intelligence agen-
cies had been terminated as well, leaving only a staff linkage between Sullivan
in the Bureau and Huston in the White House.
many observers, including Huston and Sullivan, the severance of these
ties contributed to the perceived inability of the Bureau's intelligence
division to perform their task adequately.
In this context, a special meeting was called on April 22, 1970, in
Haldeman's office. In attendance were Haldeman, Krogh, Histon,
Alexander Butterfield (who had responsibility for White House liaison
with the Secret Service), and Ehrlichman. The purpose of this gather-
ing was to improve coordination among the White House staff for
contact with intelligence agencies in the government and, more im-
portantly, as Huston remembers, to decide "whether-because of the
escalating level of the violence-something within the government
further needed to be done." 3 7
A decision was made. The President would be asked to meet with
the directors of the four intelligence agencies to take some action that
might curb the growing violence. The intelligence agencies would be
asked by the President to write a report on what could be done. The
meeting was planned for May. In addition, Tom Huston was given a
high staff position in the White House; henceforth, he would have
responsibilities for internal security affairs.38 He was now in a strategic
position to help Sullivan reverse existing Bureau policies.
The meeting between President Nixon and the intelligence directors
was not held in May, because plans for, and the reaction to, the April
29 invasion of Cambodia in Southeast Asia disrupted the entire White
House schedule. In the aftermath of this event, the meeting "became
even more important," recalls Huston.39 The expansion of the Indo-
china war into Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State and Jack-
son State had focused the actions on antiwar movement and civil rights
activists.
As soon as the reaction to the Cambodian incursion had stabilized
somewhat, the meeting between President Nixon and the intelligence
directors was rescheduled for June 5th. It was to start a chain of events
that would culminate in the Huston Plan.
III. THE MEETINGS: THE WRITING OF THE SPECIAL REPORT
A. Who, What, When and Where
Throughout June 1970 a series of seven important meetings on in-
telligence were held in Washington. They began on June 5th in the
Oval Office with a conference between the Chief Executive and the
intelligence directors, at which President Nixon requested the prep-
aration of an intelligence report; and they ended twenty days later
in Hoover's office where the directors gathered to officially sign the re-
port for the President. In between these two meetings came a pre-
lininary planning session in Hoover's office on June 8, and four sub-
sequent staff meetings held at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
It was at these staff meetings that the intelligence report was formu-
lated. (See Table 1.)
* Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 22. H. R. Haldeman's appointment calendar
for April 22, 1970, includes a list of participants at this meeting.
" Memorandum from John R. Brown III to H. R. Haldeman, 4/30/70.
Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 29.
TABLE 1.-SUMMARY OF THE MEETINGS FOR THE PREPARATION OF AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 1970
Meeting No.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Date of meeting---------- June 51----------- June 8.------------ June 92 -----------.. June 12 k ---------- June 17 2...----.... June 23 2 .---------- . June 25.Location----------------- White House ---- FBI --------------- CIA --------------- CIA --------------- CIA --------------- CIA --------------- FBI.
Principal participants ---- President Nixon, Hoover, Helms, Helms Angleton (CIA). Cregar (FBI, Lieu- Colonel. Koller (AF), Stilwell (DIA), Hoover, Helms,
Hoover (FBI), Gayler, Bennett, 'Bufff am. tenant Colonel D. Moore (F 1), Sullivan, G. Moore Gayler Bennett,
Helms (CIA) Buffham (NSA), Downie (Army), Captain Rifenburgh (FBI). Sullivan, Huston,
Admiral Gaer Sullivan (FBI)Huston. (Navy). Brennan.




Purpose of meeting.-.-.....- Request for intel- Planning session.-. Agenda setting.-....-. Review of working 1st draft.----------- 2d draft------------ Signing ceremony.
Igence plan papers.
I Robert Finch, an advisor to the President, also attended this meeting, but just as a holdover from Note: Helms, D. Moore, and Koller attended only the Ist CIA meeting. A few other "observers"
a previous meeting invited to stay on by the President. not listed above attended I or more of the last 3 sessions at the CIA, including C. D. Brennan and' Each of these individuals listed attended I or more of the 4 staff meetings held at the Central Fred J. Cassidy of the FBI.
Intelligence Agency.
B. At the White House, June 5th: The President Requests an In-
telligence Report
Huston was responsible for arranging the conference between Presi-
dent Nixon and the intelligence leaders, and had briefed the President
in advance. The briefing was based on a two-page working paper that
Huston prepared, relying on his conversations with the considerably
more experienced Sullivan. As Sullivan's assistant, C. D. Brennan,
recalls: "Mr. Huston did not have that sufficient in-depth background
concerning intelligence matters to be able to give that strong direction
and guidance," and therefore Sullivan was the "principal figure" be-
hind the preparations leading to the Huston Plan.40 Sullivan's role
seemed to be to tell Huston what were desirable changes in the intelli-
gence services; Huston was to try to make what was desirable possible,
through his position as the White House man charged with respon-
sibility for domestic intelligence.
The two-page working paper outlined for the President items he
might discuss with the intelligence directors: the increase in domestic
violence; the need for better intelligence collection; a report to be pre-
pared for the President on radical threats to the national security and
gaps in current intelligence on radicals; and the use of an interagency
staff to write the report.4 1
Before the meeting, the President telephoned Huston to say he
wanted Hoover to be the chairman of the committee responsible for
the intelligence report. (The President had met privately with the
FBI Director the day before.4 2 ) Huston took the opportunity to urge
the President to appoint Sullivan as the chairman of the staff
subcommittee.-
The June 5th meeting in the Oval Office lasted less than an hour.
Reading from a talking-paper prepared for the session by Huston,
the President first emphasized the magnitude of the internal security
problem facing the United States. The paper read:
We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our
country-one which we know too little about. Certainly hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans-mostly under 30-
are determined to destroy our society. They find in many of
the legitimate grievances of our citizenry opportunities for
exploitation which never escape the attention of demagogues.
They are reaching out for the support-ideological and
otherwise-of foreign powers and they are developing their
own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as
dangerous as anything which they could import from Cuba,
China, or the Soviet Union.
4 4
a Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, pp. 105-106.
Huston stated that the paper for the President "clearly reflected Bill's [Sul-
livan's] views." (Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.)
nHuston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.
"Attachment to memorandum from J. Bruce Whelihan to Ron Ziegler, 1/29/74,
p. 2, from the Nixon Papers.
aHuston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 33.
"Talking Paper prepared for President Nixon, 6/5/70.
Among the chief factors complicating the internal security prob-
lem, according to the paper, were the people of the United States:
"Our people-perhaps as a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy
era-are unwilling to admit the possibility that 'their children' could
wish to destroy their country.... This is particularly true of the media
and the academic community." The solution to the problem of domestic
instability could be found in better intelligence: "The Government
must know more about the activities of these groups, and we must
develop a plan which will enable us to curtail the illegal activities of
those who are determined to destroy our society."
The President then expressed -his dissatisfaction with the quality
of intelligence he had been receiving on the protest movement. 5 ' "Based
on my review of the information which we have been receiving at the
White House," read his prepared notes, "I am convinced that we are
not currently allocating sufficient resources within the intelligence
community to the collection of intelligence data on the activities of
these revolutionary groups." 46 To obtain the "hard information" he
wanted, the President told the directors they were to serve on a special
committee to review the collection efforts of the intelligence agencies
in the internal security area. Based on this review, they were expected
to recommend steps which would strengthen the capabilities of the
government to collect intelligence on radicals.4 7
Departing from his prepared notes, the President next mentioned
a meeting he had had with President Calder of Venezuela earlier that
morning.48 President Calder had complained to him about the high
degree of violence and unrest in the Caribbean, noting that some
Latin American nation believes U.S. nationals-specifically black
radicals-were fomenting this unrest. President Nixon asked Helms
if he had any information on the relationship between-black militancy
in the United States and unrest in the Caribbean. Helms said he did
not, but that he would investigate the matter for the President. (The
CIA gave the President a report on this subject, via Huston, on
July 6, 1970.49)
The President paused at this point in the meeting to ask Hoover and
Helms if there were any problems in coordination between their
respective agencies. Both assured him there were not.5 0 Neither,
apparently, wished to discuss the Riha Case with other disagreements.
'0 General Bennett recalls that "the President chewed our butts." [Bennett
(staff summary), 6/5/75.] The Director of DIA took notes on the meeting, and
thought he remembered President Nixon turning on a taperecorder sitting on
his desk at the beginning of the session. No other participant recalls this taping,
and no such tape was found in the search through the papers of President Nixon
by his lawyers, at the request of the Select Committee.
r Talking Paper prepared for President Nixon, 6/5/70. In fact, however, this
matter had received considerable attention from the intelligence agencies. See,
for instance, the testimony of FBI intelligence officer Brennan, 9/25/75. Hearings,
Vol. 2, pp. 104, 107, 135; and the -Select Committee Report on CIA Project
CHAOS.
Talking Paper prepared for President Nixon, 6/5/70.
Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 35-36.
49 Ieport to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the
United States, June 1975, p. 122, note.
0 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 36.
President Nixon concluded the meeting by directing the intelligence
directors to work with Tom Huston on the report they were to prepare.
Huston would "provide the subcommittee with detailed information
on the scope of the review which I have in mind," said the President."
He also asked Hoover to serve as chairman of the committee, which was
to be known as the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc).
Finally, he recommended that Hoover name his Assistant Director for
Domestic Intelligence, William Sullivan, to be responsible for the staff
workgroup for the actual drafting of the Special Report. Hoover
agreed to be chairman and to place Sullivan in charge of the inter-
agency committee staff. 52
The meeting in the Oval Office took place on a Friday. Sullivan's first
assignment from Hoover was to set up a preliminary planning session
to be held in Hoover's office the following Monday.
C. In Hoover'8 Office, June 8th: A Premonitory Disagrement
At the Monday meeting, Hoover reminded the other intelligence
directors that the President was dissatisfied with the current state of
intelligence on domestic radicals, and stressed his own alarm at links
between protestors in this country and Cuba, China, and the Iron
Curtain countries.53 He said that President Nixon wanted an his-
torical summary of unrest in the country up to the present, and he
spoke of the establishment of an interagency staff committee to meet
the President's objectives. Sullivan would be chairman of the staff
group, and its first meeting would occur the next afternoon, Tuesday,
June 9th, at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Hoover asked Richard Helms first, and then the others, if they had
anything to add; none of the intelligence directors did. Then came
Tom Huston's turn to respond. The Director had misunderstood the
intent of the President, said the White House aide. The report was
not to be an historical summary at all. It was to be a current and future
threat assessment, a review of intelligence gaps, and a summary of
options for operational changes.5"
Admiral Gayler of NSA then spoke up: it was his understanding,
too, that the committee was to concentrate on the shortcomings of
current intelligence collection. General Bennett, Gaylor, Helms, and
Huston proceeded to discuss their impressions of what the President
really meant.-5 President Nixon wanted the pros and cons of various
collection methods spelled out clearly in the form of an options paper,
emphasized the young White House staffer. The President preferred
reports presented in this form to assure that decisions were not made
at a lower level, with the President merely the recipient of a fait ac-
compli. All the intelligence directors, except Hoover, supported the
objectives articulated by Huston.
Hoover-who was apparently irritated by this turn of events "
finally agreed and the meeting ended abruptly. He asked the other
directors to give this matter the highest priority and to assign their
top experts to the project. After the meeting, Hoover confided to Wil-
51Talking Paper prepared for President Nixon, 6/5/70.
Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 34.
* Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 4.
* Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
William C. Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 121.
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liam Sullivan that he believed Huston was a "hippie intellectual." 7
Sullivan's own views on the importance of this undertaking were re-
flected in a statement which he prepared for Hoover as background
information for this meeting. "Individually, those of us in the intelli-
gence community are relatively small and limited," he wrote. "Unified
our own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It is through
unity of action that we can tremendously increase our intelligence
gathering potential, and, I am certain, obtain the answers the President
wants." 58
D. The Langley Meeting8: Drafting the Intelligence Report
The Ad Hoc Committee staff met the next day at CIA Headquarters
in Langley, Virginia, for the first of four drafting discussions."9
The Fir8t Langley Meeting: Setting the Agenda
At the first staff meeting Huston summed up for the participants
the objectives of the President, using a "Top Secret" outline he had
prepared.- Under "Purposes," the outline noted that the Committee
was to prepare an analysis on the internal security threat; -identify
gaps in the present collection efforts; recommend steps to close these
gaps; and review the status of interagency coordination. Under
"Procedures," Huston had written: "Operational details will be the
responsibility of the chairman. However, the scope and direction of
the review will be determined by the White House member." In other
words, Sullivan would provide the guiding expertise to lay out what
collection barriers the counterintelligence experts wanted removed;
Huston would make sure the Committee did not stray from the goal
of suggesting options to remove these barriers. The "Objectives" of
the Committee included "maximum use of all special investigative
techniques.. .. "
After the staff members had read the outline, Huston stressed to the
group the President's deep concern about New Left anarchism and
whether the intelligence agencies were 'doing all they could to cope
with the problem. He said, as he had in Hoover's office the day before,
the President wanted to see the pros and cons of any restraints so that
he could decide what action to take.
Following the presentation by Huston on the President's require-
ments for the Committee, Sullivan asked for comments regarding the
level of classification for papers or reports prepared by the Committee.
The classification "Top Secret" was adopted. Helms also recommended
the maintenance of a "Bigot List" reflecting the names of all persons
who would have knowledge of the work of the Committee.
' Sullivan (staff summary), 9/23/75.
" Attachment to William Sullivan memorandum to Cartha DeLoach, 6/6/70.
(Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 9.)
m The FBI served as secretariat for these meetings, with William Creegar
keeping the minutes. Summaries of the sessions are found in a series of FBI
memoranda: Memorandum from William 'Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 6/10/70
(Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 11) ; Memorandum from William Sullivan to Cartha
DeLoach, 6/15/70 I(Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 13); Memorandum from William
Sullivan to Oh'arles Tolson, 6/29/70 (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 17); Memorandum
from William Sullivan to Charles Tolson, 6/26/70 (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 18) ;
and Interagency Committee on Intelligence '(ICI) minutes, 6/19/70 '(Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 14).
6 Memorandum, "USIB Subcommittee on Domestic Intelligence," undated. A
summary of the first session is found in Sullivan memorandum, 6/10/70.
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The Committee turned next to the heart of the matter: the meth-
odology of intelligence collection. Going around the table, the variouis
representatives discussed restraints upon the ability of their agencies
to develop the intelligence necessary to satisfy the concern of the Presi-
lent over "New Left" dissent and its possible foreign support. It was
agreed that members would bring to the next session a list of those
- estrictions which hampered their intelligence-collection activities.
Again Huston urged them to remember the President's interest in
the pros and cons of each restriction.
Buffham of NSA called attention to the outline circulated by Huston.
In its first paragraph the outline called upon the Committee "to define
and assess the existing internal security threat." The NSA representa-
tive said that such a study would require immediate attention from
the counterintelligence specialists from each member organization.
Huston suggested the FBI prepare a threat assessment from the do-
mestic point of view and CIA from the foreign point of view. All mem-
bers concurred, and Sullivan asked the FBI and CIA to have the pa-
pers ready for distribution at the next meeting to allow consideration
by the full committee as soon as possible.
Thus, the agenda was set. The work-group would begin by exam-
ining restraints on intelligence collection and preparing a threat
assessment. Members were cautioned to maintain tight security to
conceal the existence and activities of the Committee. To assist this
objective, the group agreed to continue meeting at CIA Headquarters.
The Committee adjourned until the following Thursday, June 12th.
(See the Chronology in the Appendix.)
The Second Langley Meeting: Early Discussions
At the next gathering of the work-group at CIA Headquarters on
Friday of the same week, agreement was reached to follow an outline
prepared by Huston and the FBI to guide the writing of the report
for the President.6 ' The report would cover three specific areas: (1) an
assessment of the current internal security threat and the likelihood
of future violence; (2) a listing of the current restraints on intelli-
gence collection; and (3) an evaluation of interagency coordination
within the intelligence community.
Just as he had reminded Hoover that Monday in the Director's
office, Huston again made the point that the threat assessment was
not to be merely an exercise in history writing. The President wanted
an up-to-date analysis of the "New Left" threat and an estimate on
future problems posed by the radicals.
For the meeting each agency had prepared a paper on intelligence
collection restraints. Huston found the preliminary drafts "totally
unacceptable," according to CIA representative James Angleton, and
said that the group "was n t being responsive to the President's
needs." 6 2 As exemplified by the FBI submission, Huston wanted the
restraints clearly identified, the pros and cons listed, and a format pro-
vided whereby the President could indicate whether he wished the
restraints to be maintained, relaxed, or that he required more informa-
tion to make a decision. The entire ranae of collection options were
to be listed, whether the Committee thought they were preposterous or
e The second. Langley meeting is summarized in Sullivan memorandum,
6/15/70.
2 Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 57.
desirable. The representatives were asked by Huston to follow the FBI
model for their subsequent drafts.
As for the third portion of the report, opinion among the partici-
pants was generally in favor of the establishment of a permanent in-
teragency committee on intelligence. It would evaluate intelligence,
coordinate operations, prepare ongoing threat assessments on domes-
tic protest, and develop new policies.
The idea of a permanent committee was strongly endorsed by Hus-
ton, who said the President would probably favor its creation.
Privately, Huston thought this was "the most important recom-
mendation." 3 Among the participating agencies only the CIA ques-
tioned the need for a permanent committee, recommending instead the
establishment of a temporary group first to see if it would work.6 4 The
Agency's hesitancy may have reflected a reluctance to confront Hoover
with such a blatant entry into the domestic intelligence area, largely
the private preserve of the FBI in the past.
The FBI threat-assessment paper, entitled "Defining and Assess-
ing the Existing Internal Security Threat-Domestic," was circulated
at this second meeting and, at Huston's suggestion, was tabled to
allow each member time to review its contents carefully for discussion
at the third session. The CIA paper, captioned exactly like the Bu-
reau's except for the substitution of "Foreign" for "Domestic," was
not yet ready; but Richard Ober, the primary CIA drafter, said it
would be circulated in time for review by everyone before the third
meeting.65
The Committee agreed to have the FBI prepare a first draft of the
entire report to be circulated on June 16th. T. J. Smith and Richard
Cotter of the Bureau Research Division were assigned by Sullivan to
write the drafts; 66 everyone Twas to provide the Bureau with inputs on
or before June 15th. The third meeting of the Committee was set for
Wednesday, June 17th.
The Third Langley Meeting.: Reviewing the First Draft
This third session of the Ad Hoc Committee staff was the most im-
portant. From it emerged the specific options which the group would
lay before the President. The first two sessions had been preparatory;
now the Committee was ready to examine thoroughly a first draft
of the report.6" The members dissected the draft in minute detail, spen-
ing all afternoon and part of the evening going over it. The FBI and
CIA reports on "Defining and Assessing the Existing Internal Secur-
ity Threat" had been incorporated into the draft, as had the pros and
cons of various restraints inhibiting intelligence collection.
Starting at the beginning of the draft, the Committee first went
step-by-step through the section on the internal security threat facing
the United States. The military representatives criticized the CIA and
FBI data and interpretations'on militant "New Left" groups, black
"3 Huston (staff summary), 9/22/75.e Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, pp. 18-19; staff summary of James Angleton in-terview, 9/12/75.
" Ober was also in charge of the controversial CIA "Operation CHAOS" to in-vestigate foreign contracts with American dissidents. See the Select CommitteeReport on Operation Chaos.
" Staff summary of Richard Cotter interview, 9/15/75; Sullivan (staff sum-mary), 6/10/75.
"For a review of the third ICI meeting, see the Interagency Committee onIntelligence minutes, 6/19/70.
extremists, the intelligence services of Communist countries, and other
revolutionary groups (like the Puerto Rican nationalist extremists).
Eventually, however, virtually unanimous agreement was reached on
this threat assessment section.
The next section of the report on restraints was much more complex
and open to controversy. Huston made it clear early in the review of
this "Restraints" section that no individual agency would be allowed
to make a separate recommendation, conclusion, opinion, or observa-
tion. The report had to be a joint effort, and only options were to be
listed for the President. The sole exception would be the possibility of
recommending to the President the establishment of a permanent
interagency group or committee to evaluate intelligence problems re-
lated to internal security. While the discussion on the options was
lengthy and punctuated by disagreements, the end result was a first
draft of the intelligence report which had the support of all the par-
ticipating agencies.
The Fourth Langley Meeting: The Final Draft
The fourth and final meeting of the ICI staff was held on June 23rd
and was devoted to improving the first draft and polishing it into a
final report."" Between the third and fourth sessions, Sullivan and the
other representatives from the various agencies showed the first draft
to their superiors. While the other directors saw no significant prob-
lems with the draft, Hoover balked. He would not sign the report, he
informed Sullivan. It would have to be completely rewritten to elimi-
nate the extreme options in the "Restraints" section and the recom-
mendation for the permanent interagency committee would have to be
removed also. 69
Hoover explained his objections, as Sullivan recalls, in this way:
For years and years and years I have approved opening
mail and other similar operations, but no. It is becoming more
and more dangerous and we are apt to get caught. I am not
opposed to doing this. I'm not opposed to continuing the bur-
glaries and the opening of mail and other similar activities,
providing somebody higher than myself approves of it. . . .
I no longer want to accept the sole responsibility-the Attor-
ney General or some high ranking person in the White
House-then I will carry out their decision. But I'm not
going to accept the responsibility myself anymore, even
though I've done it for many years.
. Number two, I cannot look to the Attorney General to ap-
prove these because the Attorney General was not asked to be
a member of the ad hoc committee. I cannot turn to the ad hoc
committee to approve of these burglaries and opening mail as
recommended here. The ad hoc committee, by its very nature,
will go out of business when this report has been approved.
That leaves me alone as the man who made the decision.
I am not going to do that any more . . . I want you to pre-
pare a detailed memorandum and set forth these views. . . . o
" The last meeting of the ICI staff is summarized in the Sullivan memorandum,
6/24/70.
* Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 122-24.
Sullivan pointed out to Hoover that it would not be entirely fair or
reasonable to rewrite completely a report which had been approved
already by everyone else. Instead the Director might wish to note
his objections in the form of footnotes to the report, if he felt he
,needed to as was commonly done on interagency intelligence papers.
Hoover finally agreed. Sullivan personally added the footnotes to the
draft, as requested by Hoover, and had his secretary type up the new
version to be presented at the fourth Langley meeting.71
Sullivan distributed this second draft of the report at the final
Langley meeting. It bore Hoover's footnotes conspicuously, and the
participants realized that Hoover had intervened. 72 (The first draft
had been written in the Bureau Research Section and brought to the
third Langley meeting without being shown to Hoover. 3 ) Col. Downie,
the Army representative, remembers smiling as he read the second
draft; he found it amusing that Sullivan had "eaten humble pie."
Hoover had "put the brakes on," Downie figured, and now the Com-
mittee was "back to square one." "
Only one day separated the last meeting at Langley from the of-
ficial signing of the Special Report, which was to take place in Hoover's
office on June 25th. It left little time for the directors of CIA, DIA,
and NSA to react to the footnotes."T Certainly, Hoover did not call to
.71 Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 124-125.
'" Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75. Sullivan also remembers the presence
of an Intelligence Review Board in the draft, which was designed to monitor
problems within the intelligence side of government. He remembers Hoover
demanding its removal at this stage, and Sullivan complied. No one else remem-
bered this Review Board concept.
"Cotter (staff summary), 9/15/75.
" Staff summary of Col. John Downie interview, 5/13/75.
"The footnote aspect of the Special Report remains a mystery. A Sullivan
memorandum dated June 24, 1970, discussing the results of the final ICI staff
meeting, notes that the Hoover footnotes were included in the final draft
distributed on June 23rd to all the participants. (Sullivan memorandum,
6/24/70.) Yet, Adm. Gayler now denies knowing about these notes until the
actual signing ceremony in Hoover's office on June 25th. [Gayler (staff sum-
mary) 6/19/75.] Gen. Bennett goes so far as to claim the footnotes were added
after the signing ceremony. [Bennett (staff summary) 6/5/75.] Going still
further, Col. Downie, the Army representative, believes the directors signed an
innocuous report, then the signature page was attached later-without the
knowledge of the other directors-to a report which included all the extreme
options appearing in the Special Report as we know it today. [Downie (staff
summary) 5/13/75.] This extreme version was then sent to the President via
Tom Huston.
What seems most likely to have happened regarding the footnotes is as
follows: Sullivan had told Huston early in the sessions at CIA Headquarters
that it would be a major error to show Hoover the final draft of the report at
the same time the other directors saw it. He would just "whack it away, and
will have no chance," -Sullivan said. (Houston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 65.)
Instead, Sullivan decided to have the Ad Hoc staff first approve a draft (which
they did at their third meeting), The members were then to get their respective
agency hierarchies to approve it, also. This was accomplished directly after the
third meeting. Helms, Bennett, and Gayler reviewed this first draft and found
it generally acceptable. Bennett had it approved by his and Gayler's superiors
at the Defense Department. Finally, once the representatives of the various
agencies had reported back that their directors had given their approvals
(around June 20th) Sullivan approached Hoover, saying: "Here is the report
that has been approved by all the other agencies, and we need your approval."
[Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.]
Sullivan hoped that, faced with this united front, Hoover would go along.
[Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/76; Huston deposition, 5/23/75.1
forewarn them of his action. When their representatives brought news
of what the FBI Director had done, Gayler and Bennett were furious.
Both called Huston immediately.7"
They were "mad as the dickens," Huston recalls. The White House
aide tried to calm them and urged them to "live with" Director
Hoover's additions to the Report.
The military intelligence director persisted. Hoover had no righb
to add his own personal observations; and if he could do it, so could
they. Bennett and Gayler were particularly annoyed that Hoover
had objected to specific operations, when what was listed were options
for the President, not recommendations. Hoover's critical footnotes
made the options appear to be recommendations which the other
directors automatically supported. "They either wanted another meet-
ing among the Directors [to] demand that the footnotes be with-
drawn, or else they wanted to insert their own footnotes saying they
favored certain things," recalls Huston." The White House staffer
was:
. . very much interested in not creating any difficulties with
Mr. Hoover that could, at all, be avoided, and I told both
General Bennett and Admiral Gayler that I thought it was
unnecessary for them to take such action; that in my cover
memorandum to the President, I would set forth their views
as they had expressed them to me, and that I would appreci-
ate it if they would not raise the question with the Director.78
Helms has testified that he does recall the episode.79
At the time, Huston appeared unconcerned about Hoover's nota-
tions. One participant at the final session thought Huston would
achieve his ends anyway. "He seemed to exude the attitude that 'What
the White House wanted, the White House would get,' "recalls a Navy
observer. "If Hoover didn't want to play, it would be played some
other way." 80
Tordella of NSA, too, remembers that Sullivan was not particularly
upset by Hoover's move. With Helms, Bennett, and Gayler still in sup-
port of the Special Report, Sullivan believed President Nixon would
accept the options on relaxing restraints anyway."'
The final meeting at Langley was thus spent in the review of this
second draft. In -addition to the footnotes, some changes were made.
Diction which Hoover had found perjorative was removed ("pro-
cedures" replaced "restrictions" in one segment, for instance); and
references to CIA-FBI liaison difficulties was excised, as was the con-
cept of a full-time working staff for the recommended permanent
interagency committee. The essential alteration, however, was the
addition of Hoover's footnotes.82 The next step was to have the intelli-
gence directors sign the report.
Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 67.
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 7.
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 7.
Helms deposition, 9/10/75, p. 40.
Staff summary of B. Willard interview, 5/16/75.81Tordella (staff sihmmary), 6/16/75.
* Sullivan memoandum, 6/24/70.
E. The Signing Cerenwny
The meeting to review and sign the Special Report began at 3:00
promptly on the afternoon of June 25th. 83 The Director of the FBI
opened the meeting by commending the members for their outstanding
effort and cooperative spirit displayed in preparing the Special Re-
port. Hoover went through his normal routine on such occasions. He
started with page one of the Report and said "Does anyone have any
comment on Page 1?" He then proceeded to go through the 43-page
document, page by page, in this fashion.
For each page, Hoover addressed his question to each Director and
to Tom Huston. Hoover displayed his contempt for Huston by
addressing him with different names: "Any comments, Mr. Hoffman?
Any comments, Mr. Hutchinson?" and so on, getting the name wrong
six or seven different ways.8 4
Huston hoped the meeting would end before Gayler or Bennett
raised the subject of the footnotes. "We got down to about 'X' number
of pages and, finally, it was just too much for Admiral Gayler," Hus-
ton recalls, "and so, sure enough, there he goes. He started in about a
footnote, I think." 85 Bennett joined Gayler in querying the Director
about the footnotes.6
Hoover was surprised. It was not customary to respond critically
during the FBI Director's pro forma readings. Huston looked toward
Helms, who spoke up and managed to smooth the waters to some
degree."8 However, Hoover was clearly upset,"" and hurried through
the rest of the Report. The four directors then signed the document.
Hoover reminded them to have all working copies of the Report
destroyed, thanked them for their participation, and dismissed the
Committee. The Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)
had completed its assignment.
IV. AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT: THE OPTIONS
The next day, June 26th, the Special Report was delivered to Huston
at the White House for the President. For each of the intelligence
collection methods, the President was presented the option of (1)
continuing the present restrictions, (2) asking for more information,
or (3) accepting one of the relaxations listed below.89 Hoover's notes
were typed in beneath the options for each collection technique.
The first category of options written into the report dealt with com-
munications intelligence.
A. Category One: Comnunications Intelligence 90
-Present interpretation should be broadened to permit
and program for coverage by NSA of the communications
of U.S. citizens using international facilities.
" Sullivan memorandum, 6/24/70.
" Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 70.
"Bennett (staff summary), 6/5/75.
Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 70.
* Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
Special Report, Interagency Coimittee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), 6/70 cited
in this report as Special Report. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 1). See note 3a.
" The "and" in the following two paragraphs is probably an original error and
should read "a".
-Present interpretation should be broadened to permit and
program for coverage by NSA at the request of the FBI of
the communications of U.S. citizens using international fa-
cilities. [Original emphasis. No footnotes were added to this
section.]
The National Security Agency pressed for the inclusion of these
options in an effort to obtain a clarification of their role in targeting
against communications traffic involving U.S. revolutionary leaders
and organizations.91 At the time, NSA believed that its authority pre-
cluded production and dissemination of intelligence from international
communications between U.S. citizens and barred specific targeting
against the communications of U.S. nationals.9 2
At the heart of this option lay the NSA "Watch List." In 1967, the
NSA began to receive from the FBI, the CIA, and the Secret Service
the names of individuals whom these agencies viewed as threats to
American security. The NSA was supposed to select, from interna-
tional communications, messages which were sent to or from these in-
dividuals-approximately 1,650 of whom were U.S. citizens.93 (The
present director of the NSA does not know whether or not the Presi-
dent knew about the NSA Watch List.9 4 ) Unsure about the legality of
the practice, the June meetings were viewed by NSA as a chance to
obtain more explicit approval to do what, in fact, they were already
doing; that is, selecting the international messages of specified U.S.
nationals for transcription and dissemination to other intelligence
agencies. Explicit approval from the President for this practice would
have permitted an expansion of the American names on the Watch
List.
B. Category Two: Electronic Surveillances and Penetration
-Present procedures should be changed to permit intensi-
fication of coverage of individuals and groups in the United
States who pose a major threat to the internal security.
-Present procedures should be changed to permit intensi-
fication of coverage of foreign nationals [classified] of in-
terest to the intelligence community.
Note: The FBI does not wish to change its present proce-
dure of selective coverage on major internal security threats
as it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The FBI
would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of the At-
torney General for coverage required by them and thereafter
instituting such coverage themselves.
As the Special Report stated: "NSA has been particularly hard-hit
by this limitation." 95
The CIA had a strong interest in this option, too. In the mid-1960s,
Helms had approached Hoover to increase the number of telephone
' Special Report, p. 23.
02 Special Report, p. 23.
' General Lew Allen testimony, 10/28/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 12. See also
NSA Report, Sec. II: "NSA's Monitoring of International Communications."
" Allen, 10/28/75, hearings, p. 28.
4 Special Report, p. 26.
taps to assist the CIA in its missions.9 6 For similar reasons, the CIA
now joined the NSA in its quest for increased electronic coverage. As a
former high-level CIA counterintelligence officer has noted, "Thou-
sands of man-hours would have been saved if the Bureau had been will-
ing to place taps on [selected] telephones." 97
Among the arguments presented in the Special Report in favor of
the increased use of this technique was that "every major intelligence
service in the world, including those of the Communist bloc, use such
techniques as an essential part of their operations; and it is believed
the general public would support their use by the United States for the
same purpose." 9 8 Yet, five years earlier, Hoover had cut back on these
forms of surveillance in large part for the very reason that he believed
the American public would no longer tolerate their broad use.99
C. Category Three: Mail Coverage
-Restrictions on legal coverage should 'be removed.
-Present restrictions on covert coverage should be relaxed
on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal
security interest.
*Note: The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail
coverage because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if
done, information would leak out of the Post Office to the press
and serious damage would be done to the intelligence com-
munity. The FBI has no objection to legal mail coverage pro-
viding it is done on a carefully controlled and selective basis
in both criminal and security matters.00
As the draft explained, two types of mail coverage exist: routine cover-
age, which involves recording information from the face of envelopes,
and covert (or "sophisticated') coverage which entails the examination
of contents within a sealed envelope. The former is legal, the latter is
not. "Covert coverage has been discontinued," the President was told
in the Report, and one option placed before him read: "Present restric-
tions on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of prior-
ity foreign intelligence and internal security interest." [Emphasis
added.] 101
In fact, "covert coverage" had not been discontinued. The CIA had
used covert mail programs to examine mail sent between the United
States and Communist countries since 1953. It was the judgment of
some Agency officials that, although warrantless mail opening was
illegal, the good that flowed from them in terms of anticipating threats
to the United States made it worthwhile.' 0 ' The objective was "to try
to uncover foreign involvement in this country," 103 .but, in the retro-
" Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
* Staff summary of James Angleton interview, 7/10/75.
9 Special Report, p. 27.
Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.o This represented a change in Hoover's position, though the Bureau would
not actually engage in this legal coverage again until 1971. Earlier in the history
of the Bureau (prior to 1964), it had been a common technique.
101 Special Report, p. 31.
" See, for example, Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 61. See also Mail Report.
'Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 76.
spective view of the CIA officer in charge of the program, the covert
mail programs were "very much an error." 104 Since 1958, the FBI had
also known of these programs and, in fact, had contributed names to
the CIA's "Watch List".es
D. Category Four: Surreptitious Entry
-Present restrictions should be modified to permit pro-
curement of vitally needed foreign [classified] material.
-Present restrictions should also be modified to permit
selective use of this technique against other urgent and high
priority internal security targets.
Note: The FBI is opposed to surreptitious entry ...
[classified].
This option reflected the use of breaking and entering, and burglary,
by Government agents. Of all the agencies involved in these meetings,
NSA was the most interested in removing the restraints on surrepti-
tious entries.10 Millions of dollars could be saved by such operations,
Buffham argued at the Langley meetings. 0 8
One option for the President proposed that "present restrictions
should also be modified to permit selective use of this technique against
other urgent and high-priority internal security targets." 109 In short,
entries were to be made against the "New Left" subversives discussed
in the Special Report-if the President gave his approval to this
option.
E. Category Five: Development of Campus Sources
-Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded
coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related
groups.
-CIA coverage of American students (and others) travel-
ing abroad or living abroad should be increased.
Note: The FBI is opposed to removing any present con-
trols and restrictions relating to the development of campus
sources. To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations
and could result in charges that investigative agencies are
interfering with academic freedom." 0 .
The intelligence professionals complained at the drafting sessions that
it was difficult to gather data on student subversives when no secondary
school students and no one below the legal age in colleges and univer-
sities were allowed to work for the intelligence agencies as sources."'
Among other reasons for relaxing these restraints was the argument
that campus violence occurs quickly and with little planning. To
anticipate this kind of disorder, the intelligence community had to
have youthful informants. Hoover had taken the position, however,
'" Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 64.
Angleton, 9/24/75, pp. 77-78; Mail Report.
x Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75; see also memorandum from William
Sullivan to Cartha DeLoach, 6/19/70. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 15).
'. Staff summary of Benson Buffham interview, 5/19/75.
' Special Report, p. 33.
no In the fall of 1970, the FBI reduced the age limits on campus informants
from 21 to 18.
"n Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
that using informants below age twenty-one was too risky; they were
less reliable, and legal complications could arise with their parents
and the school 'administration.112
According to Huston, the FBI members of the ICI ad hoc staff
hoped to reduce the age level of informants to eighteen through the
Special Report; but, if they said so directly and explicitly, "it would
make Mr. Hoover mad." Therefore, they "couched this recommenda-
tions in terms that 'campus informant coverage shall be expanded"' a113
The Special Report noted that, in this area, "the military services
have capabilities which could be of value to the FBI." 114
F. Category Sie: U8e of Military Undercover Agenfu
-The counterintelligence mission of the military services
should be expanded to include the active collection of intelli-
gence concerning student-related dissident activities, with
provisions for a close coordination with the FBI.
-No change should be made in the current mission of the
military counterintelligence services; however, present re-
strictions should be relaxed to permit the use of trusted mili-
tary personnel as FBI assets in the collection of intelligence
regarding student-related activities.
Note: The FBI is opposed to the use of any. military under-
cover agents to develop domestic intelligence information be-
cause this would be in violation of the Delimitations Agree-
ment. The military services, joined by the FBI, oppose any
modification of the Delimitations Agreement which would
extend their jurisdiction beyond matters of interest to the
Department of Defense.
The only specific views on intelligence operations which Huston's
superiors at the White House discussed with him before the June
meetings had to do with the military. Haldeman expressed to Huston
the President's belief that "we should use the military services in col-
lection of domestic intelligence." 115 The vast resources of the military,
it was felt, could effectively supplement the intelligence gathering
capabilities of the other agencies.
At the third Langley meeting, Huston therefore told the group that
the President wanted a list of options on the use of the military for
domestic intelligence collection. The military voiced its opposition to
the idea, however, and the FBI was also against it.11 The Committee
wanted to eliminate the option from the report. Huston himself
thought the proposal was inappropriate, but he insisted the option be
moluded, since Haldeman and the President had explicitly requested
The response of the Committee, in Huston's opinion, was to write a
set of options in favor of using the military which were "very flimsy
Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
m Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 23-24.
n'Special Report, p. 35.
"'Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/22/75, pp. 39-40; see also Huston, 9/23/75,Hearings, pp. 17, 35.
no Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 35.
n' Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 35.
and they would not convince anyone." In the Report, six "Advantages
of Maintaining Restrictions" were listed, compared to just three "Ad-
vantages of Relaxing Restrictions." 118 The military representatives
stressed, in their discussion of these options, that disclosure of military
involvement in this kind of counterintelligence work "would certainly
result in considerable adverse publicity." 11
In fact, at that time Army officials were preparing for their appear-
ance before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,120
which was then investigating the question of military surveillance of
civilians in the United States. This investigation serves as an im-
portant backdrop for understanding the marked caution of the mili-
tary intelligence representatives during the sessions at Langley.
The Special Report included two more sets of options for the Presi-
dent's consideration:
G. Category Seven: Budget and Manpower
-Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to
projected manpower needs and other costs in the event the
various investigative restraints herein are lifted.
-Each agency must operate within its current budgetary
or manpower limitations, irrespective of action required as
result of this report.
H. Category Eight: Permanent Interagency Committee
-An ad hoc group consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should
be appointed and should serve as long as the President deems
necessary, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry
out the other objectives indicated above.
-A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA,
NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies
should be appointed to provide evaluations of domestic in-
telligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates,
and carry out the other objectives indicated above.
Note: The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent
committee for the purpose of providing evaluations of do-
mestic intelligence, however the FBI would approve of pre-
paring periodic domestic intelligence estimates.
In the first draft of the Report, the following options were also
included, though both were removed in the writing of the final
draft: 121
Special Report, pp. 37-38.
Special Report, p. 38.
"Federal Data Banks, Computers, knd the Bill of Rights," Part II, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Constitutiona Rights, 2/31/71 through 3/17/71.
' Sullivan memorandum, 6/24/70. Another option-to permit the use of truth
serum-went into an early rough draft in the Bureau. It was devised by Bureau
staffers In hopes that Hoover would remove it from the final report but, as a
compromise, keep in all the other options. Sullivan, however, decided to remove
this option before the first draft ever left the Bureau to be read by the 101
staff at Langley. [Cotter (staff summary), 9/15/75.]
I. Category Nine (Removed): Surreptitious Optical Surveillance
According to intelligence specialists, this phrase simply refers to
taking photographs of people without their knowledge. The discussion
of options under this heading was finally discarded from the report,
evidently because the members knew it was already being done and
saw no point in asking the President for his views on the subject.'2 2
J. Category Ten (Removed) : Investigations of Diplomatic Personnel
When conducting "investigations" of foreign diplomats (often a
euphemism for recruiting an agent) within the United States, the FBI
traditionally clears the probe with the State Department before pro-
ceeding. This is done to make sure the Bureau is not entering into a
case that, for some reason, might be peculiarly sensitive, and disclosure
could have international repercussions detrimental to U.S. interests.
On occasion, some members of the Bureau have had investigations
blocked or delayed by the State Department for reasons which they
viewed as unsatisfactory. The question was consequently raised at the
Langley meetings as to whether these clearances from State were really
useful, or merely represented a further obstacle to intelligence work.
This was a subject of great interest to many of the counterintelligence
specialists who viewed the State Department skeptically. As one re-
marked candidly, "Our roles are often conflictual: they're always try-
ing to 'build bridges'-detente and all that stuff-while we're trying
to catch spies." 122 On balance, though, opinion within the group fa-
vored keeping the clearance procedure and avoiding a dispute with
State.
These first eight categories of options, then, constituted the vital
core of the special intelligence report for the President, from which
the Huston Plan would be extracted. Behind them lay a variety of
forces and pressures which had preceded and shaped the Report, but
which were nowhere revealed in its formal language. (These hidden
dimensions are explored in Section VII below.)
In the weeks that followed the official signing of the Special Report,
Tom Charles Huston recommended to the President those options
from the Report which promised to eliminate most thoroughly the
existing restrictions on intelligence collection. These recommendations
became known as the Huston Plan.
V. THE HUSTON PLAN
A. Huston Plan, Phase One: Advice for the President
For several weeks after the signing of the Special Report on
June 25th, it appeared to the intelligence agencies that their efforts
had come to nothing. No response had come from the White House,
and Sullivan began to believe the whole idea had "died aborning." 1-4
Yet, in the White House, Huston was working toward the next step.
He had succeeded in obtaining the four signatures from the chiefs of
the intelligence community, even Hoover's. Now he wanted to get the
Staff summary of [FBI counterintelligence expert], 8/20/75.
m [FBI counterintelligence expert] (staff summary), 8/20/75.
Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
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President to approve the strongest options in the Special Report de-
signed to remove the existing restrictions on intelligence collection. If
he were successful here, the intelligence collectors would then have all
the authority they desired.
Soon after the June 26th delivery of the Special Report to the White
House, Huston began to prepare carefully a memorandum addressed
to Haldeman on what the President ought to do with the Report. The
memo, dated simply "July 1970" but written in the early days of
July, was entitled "Domestic Intelligence Review." It was a synopsis
of the Ad Hoc meetings held during the month of June. Huston began
with a sharp diatribe against Hoover, the "only stumbling block" in
the proceedings (in contrast, Helms had been "most cooperative and
helpful") .125 The FBI Director "refused to go along with a single
conclusion drawn or support a single recommendation made," until
Huston successfully opposed Hoover's attempt to rewrite the Report.
(In this description of the confrontation with Hoover, Sullivan was
never mentioned.)
Hoover then "entered his objections as footnotes to the report,"
Huston wrote further. These objections were "generally inconsistent
and frivolous." 126 To avoid "a nasty scene" between the military direc-
tors and Hoover over the footnotes, Huston assured Admiral Gayler
and General Bennett that their objections "would be brought to the
attention of the President." Turning to the substantive work of the
Ad Hoc group, Huston emphasized to Haldeman that everyone who
participated was dissatisfied with current intelligence collection proce-
dures-except Hoover. Even the FBI participants, according to
Huston, "believe that it is imperative that changes in operating proce-
dures be initiated at once." Furthermore, all members felt it "impera-
tive" to establish a permanent interagency committee for intelligence
evaluation-again with the exception of the FBI Director.
Should the President decide to lift the current restrictions, Huston
recommended a face-to-face "stroking session" with Hoover in which
the President explained his decision and indicated "he-is counting on
Edgar's cooperation.. . ." In this way, Huston continued, "We can get
what we want without putting Edgar's nose out of joint." Though
the Director was "bullheaded as hell" and "getting old and worried
about his legend," he would "not hesitate to accede to any decision the.
President makes," predicted Huston. Attached to this optimistic ap-
praisal were Huston's specific recommendations on the decisions Nixon
should make concerning the lifting of operational restraints.
The Recommendations
The recommendations in this first version of the so-called Huston
Plan were written under the heading "Operational Restraints on In-
telligence Collection." 127 Huston offered advice on each operational
section of the Report, and each recommendation was buttressed by a
one-to-several paragraph rationale. The recommendations comprising
'Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7/70. (Hear-
ings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 2). See footnote 3a.
" By "inconsistent," Huston is apparently referring to Hoover's willingness to
permit the exercise of collection techniques in the past which he would not permit
in 1970.
" Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70.
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Huston's plan, as presented to the President, are outlined below with
the exception of the rationales which concluded chiefly that (1) cover-
age was inadequate, and (2) all the methods had been used before
with great productivity.
Communications Intelligence. Recommendation: 1
Present interpretation should be broadened to permit and
program for coverage by NSA of the communications of
U.S. citizens using international facilities.
Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations. Recommendation:
Present procedures should be changed to permit intensifi-
cation of coverage of individuals and groups in the United
States who pose a major threat to the internal security.
ALSO, present procedures should be changed to permit in-
-tensification of coverage of foreign nationals [classified].
Mail Coverage. Recommendation:
Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.
ALSO, present restrictions on covert coverage should be
relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence
and internal security interest.
Surreptitious Entry. Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be modified to permit procure-
ment of vitally needed foreign [classified] material.
ALSO, present restrictions should be modified to permit
selective use of this technique against other urgent and high
priority internal security targets.
Development of Campus Sources. Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded
coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related
groups.
ALSO, CIA coverage of American students (and others)
traveling or living abroad should be increased.
Use of Military Undercover Agents. Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be retained.
Beyond the lowering of specific operational restraints,
Huston made two further recommendations.
Manpower and Budget. Recommendation:
Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to pro-
jected manpower needs and other costs in the event the
various investigative restraints herein are lifted.
Measures to Improve Domestic Intelligence Operations.
Recommendation:
A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be
appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,
- The "and" instead of "a" error from the Special Report is repeated in
Huston's recommendation.
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry
out the other objectives specified in the report.
In his discussion of these methods, Huston raised-and quickly dis-
missed-questions about the legality of two collection techniques
in particular: covert mail cover and surreptitious entry. "Covert
[mail] coverage is illegal, and there are serious risks involved," he
wrote. "However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh
the risks." 129
As for surreptitious entry, Huston advised: "Use of this technique is
clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could
result in great embarrassment if exposed. However," he concluded, "it
is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence
which cannot be obtained in any other fashion." 1o
In brief, the President's aid was asking the highest political figure
in the nation to sanction lawlessness within the intelligence commun-
ity. This attitude toward the law was not his alone; it was shared by
certain representatives of the intelligence community as well. The
recommendations made to the President, says Huston, "reflected what
I understood to be the consensus of the working group."
1
3' Huston
agreed with this consensus.
Sullivan has explained his view-not necessarily shared by others-
that he and the rest of the intelligence officers attending the Langley
meetings "had grown up 'topsy-turvy' during the War-a time when
legal aspects were far less important than getting a job done against
the enemy." Moreover, they shared the belief that intelligence work is
"something different," somehow falling outside the normal realm of
the law. The business required one to engage sometimes in activities
that would not always be acceptable to others. That many of the men
had served in the agencies operating overseas, unfettered by the legal
system of the United States, may have contributed to a disregard for
the "niceties of the law" in discussions of intelligence collection against
alleged subversives. Besides, the KGB did not play by a legal rule-
book.13 2
For Huston, the only Ad Hoc Committee member too young to have
grown up "topsy-turvy" during the War, the reasons for government
lawlessness were different. Viewed as a conservative intellectual of
sorts among his colleagues in the White House, he had spun a theory
on the New Left which led him inexorably toward helping to un-
bridle the intelligence collectors. Huston believed that the real threat
to internal security was repression. The New Left was capable of pro-
ducing a climate of fear that would bring forth every repressive dem-
agogue in the United States. These demagogues were not in the govern-
ment, but out in the country; the intelligence professionals, if given
2 Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70, p. 
2.
mw Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70, p. 3. In using the word "burglary."
Huston sought to "escalate the rhetoric . . . to make it as bold as possible." He
thought, that as a staff man, he should give the President "the worst possible
interpretation of what the recommendation would result in." (Huston deposi-
tion, 5/22/75, p. 69.)
m' Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 8.
m' Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75,
the chance, could protect the American people from these latent forces
of repression by monitoring the New Left and providing information
to stop the violence before it began. The Huston Plan would halt re-
pression on the Right by stopping violence on the Left.
Huston saw his own role as the Administration's coordinator of all
internal security matters. After writing his recommendations for the
President, he sent a memorandum to Richard Helms, dated July 9.
All future matters relating to domestic intelligence or internal se-
curity were to be sent to the 'exclusive attention" of Tom-Huston, since
"the President is anxious to centralize the coordination at the White
House of all information of this type.. . ." Huston ended: "Dr. Kiss-
inger is aware of this new procedure." 134
Huston then waited expectantly for the decision of the President.
It came via Haldeman on July 14: The President had approved the
recommendations1 3 5 Former President Nixon has since stated, "My
approval was based largely on the fact that the procedures were con-
sistent with those employed by prior administrations and had been
found to be effective by the intelligence agencies." 136
Huston was pleased. There was only one problem: President Nixon
had told Haldeman he was too busy to meet again with Hoover and
the other intelligence directors on this subject, as Huston had rec-
ommended. He preferred "that the thing simply be put into motion
on the basis of this approval." Huston felt a certain uneasiness. He
particularly wanted the President to invite Hoover in to give him
the decision directly, "because it seemed to me it would be easier
maybe to get him to accept it." 1' Nevertheless, Huston proceeded to
draw up the official memorandum which would carry the news to the
intelligence directors. The "Huston Plan" was now presidential policy.
B. Huston Plan, Phase Two: The President's Policy
Just over a week later, on July 23, 1970, Huston finished the official
version of this presidentially-ratified plan and sent it on its way via
courier to Hoover, Helms, Bennett and Gayler.s38 With only minor
changes, this official intelligence plan repeated the recommendations
made by Huston to the President earlier in the month. Now it began
with the preface: "The President has carefully studied the special
report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence . . . and made
the following decisions." Huston had selected the most extreme op-
tions posed by the counterintelligence experts and the President of
the United States had agreed with those recommendations.
Henceforth, with presidential authority, the intelligence commu-
nity could at will intercept and transcribe the communications of
Americans using international communications facilities; eavesdrop
'2 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms, 7/9/70. (Hear-
ings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 19).
'Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Charles Huston, 7/14/70.
(Hearings Vol. 2, Exhibit 3.) See also H. R. Haldeman testimony, Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Hearings, 7/31/73, Vol. 8,
p. 3030.
" Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 19,
3/19/76, p. 13.
m Huston, 9/23/75, pp. 23-24.
1 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Intelligence Directors, 7/23/70.
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from near or afar on anyone deemed to be a "threat to the internal
security;" read the mail of American citizens; break into the homes
of anyone tagged as a security threat; and monitor in various ways
the activities of suspicious student groups. Only the restraints on
military intelligence collection were preserved, no doubt because the
military was dead set against further involvement in the face of pend-
ing Congressional hearings on military surveillance of civilians.
The official memorandum to the intelligence directors further noted
that on August 1, 1970, the permanent inter-agency committee on
intelligence evaluation would be established, with the FBI Director
as chairman (a palliative, according to Huston, to the defeated
Hoover, meaning little, since he could easily be outvoted in the Com-
mittee). Huston would be the "personal representative to the Presi-
dent," with complete White House staff responsibility for domestic
intelligence and internal security affairs. By September 1, 1970, just
before the reconvening of students on campuses across the country,
the agencies were expected to report on the steps they had taken to
implement these decisions.
Reaction to the Huston Plan was mixed among the intelligence di-
rectors, ranging from surprise to shock and rage. Admiral Gayler was
"surprised" that the President had selected the most extreme op-
tions.139 General Bennett was pleased to hear about approval of a
permanent committee for intelligence evaluation (he thought the FBI
needed help in this area), but thought everything else in the memoran-
dum was largely irrelevant to the mission of the Defense Intelligence
Agency.4 0 According to his assistant, James Stilwell, the two joked
about Huston's signature on the plan. "They passed that one down
about as low as it could go," they agreed, concluding that Pre 4nt
Nixon and Haldeman "didn't have the guts" to sign it themselves. To
them, the use of Huston as a possible scapegoat indicated "what a hot
potato it was." 141
The Director of the FBI "went through the ceiling," Sullivan re-
calls.142 Hoover and his assistant, Cartha DeLoach, walked immedi-
ately to Attorney General Mitchell's office nearby. Mitchell was totally
surprised. It was the first time he had heard of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee, let alone the Special Report or Huston's memorandum. His
immediate reaction was to agree with Hoover: the illegalities spelled
out in the memorandum could not be presidential policy. As Mitchell
noted in Select Committee public hearings, individual items in the
Huston Plan had been suggested to him before July 1970, and had
been turned down. With the Huston Plan, "the aggregate was worse
than the individual parts that had been suggested." 143 Moreover, he
was "very much opposed to the thought of surreptitious entry, the
mail covers, and all of the other aspects of it that were involved at
the particular time." 144 Hoover later told Sullivan that the Attorney
Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, p. 42.
"0 Bennett (staff summary), 6/5/75.
' Staff summary of James Stilwell interview, 5/21/75.
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'o John Mitchell testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 123.
" John Mitchell testimony, 'Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, Hearings, 7/10/73, Vol. 4, pp. 1603-1604.
General was angry he had been by-passed by Huston and others in the
White House on this whole affair.'"
Mitchell told the Director to "sit tight" until President Nixon re-
turned from San Clemente, the Attorney General would then discuss
the whole affair with the President.1" Hoover returned to his office
and wrote a memorandum to Mitchell, re-emphasizing his strong op-
position to the recommendations in this Huston Plan. In the memo.
the FBI Director said he would implement the Plan but only with
the explicit approval of the Attorney General or the President.
Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of
the various investigative restraints referred to above and to
the creation of a permanent interagency committee on domes-
tic intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement the instruc-
tions of the White House at your direction. Of course, we
would continue to seek your specific authorization, where
appropriate, to utilize the various sensitive investigative tech-
niques involved in individual cases.
Richard Helms eventually went to see the Attorney General about the
matter on July 27, 1970. The Director of Central Intelligence was
greatly surprised to discover the Attorney General had heard of the
Special Report and the Huston Plan only in the last couple of days
from Hoover. "We had put our backs into this exercise," Helms told
Mitchell, "because we had thought [the Attorney General] knew all
about it and was behind it," 14 As Mitchell had advised Hoover, so too
he told Helms to sit tight. 4 9
VI. RECISION OF THE HUSTON PLAN: A TIME FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. The President Takes a Second Look
When President Nixon returned from the Western White House,
one of his first conversations on July 27 was with the Attorney Gen-
eral. The message Mitchell delivered was, according to his testimony,
that "the proposals contained in the [Huston] Plan, in toto, were
inimical to the best interests of the country and certainly should not
be something that the President of the United States should be
approving." 150
As former President Nixon now recalls, "Mr. Mitchell informed me
that Mr. Hoover, Director of the FBI and Chairman of the Inter-
agency Committee on Intelligence, disagreed with my approval of
the Committee's special report." '51 President Nixon was surprised by
Hoover's objections because he had not voiced any reservations to
"5Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
n Memorandum for the record from Richard Helms, 7/28/70. (Hearings, Vol.
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that he "made known to the President any disagreement with the concept of the
plan and recommended that it be turned down."
" Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to John Mitchell, 7/25/70.
"'Helms memorandum, 7/28/70.
Richard Helms testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 89.
Mitchell. 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 123.
m Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17,
3/9/76, p. 11.
the President when the Committee met "a few days earlier." 152 The
Attorney General told the President that Hoover believed "initiating
a program which would permit several government intelligence agen-
cies to utilize the investigative techniques outlined in the Committee's
report would significantly increase the possibility of their public dis-
closure," former President Nixon recalls. "Mr. Mitchell explained to
me that Mr. Hoover believed that although each of the intelligence
gathering methods outlined in the Committee's recommendations had
been utilized by one or more previous administrations, their sensitivity
would likely generate media criticism if they were employed." 153
Mitchell also indicated, according to the former President, it was his
opinion that "the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions,
such as unauthorized entry into foreign embassies to install a micro-
phone transmitter, was greater than the possible benefit to be
derived." 154 Based on his conversation with Mitchell, President Nixon
decided to revoke his approval originally extended to the Committee's
recommendations.
Warned by Sullivan of the chain of events between Hoover and
Mitchell and the impending visit to the President by the Attorney
General, Huston was expecting a call from Haldeman, which came
later that day.155 The Attorney General had come to the White House
to talk about Huston's decision memorandum, Haldeman said. The
President had decided to revoke the memorandum immediately, so that
he, Haldeman, Mitchell, and Hoover could "reconsider" the recom-
mendations.
The Attorney General did not take it upon himself to investigate the
past illegalities referred to in the Huston Plan memorandum brought
to his attention by Hoover. The following excnange ensued on this
point during public hearings:
Q. You do agree, do you not, that looking at the document,
dated June 1970, it does reveal that in the past, at least, mail
had been opened, does it not?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that is the implication, yes.
Q. And it does state in the document that the opening of
mail is illegal, does it not?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that with reference to a number of
subjects were illegal and I think opening of mail was one of
them.
Q. All right. Then based upon your knowledge from an
examination of the document, that in the past at least illegal
actions involving the opening of mail that had taken place, did
n' Apparently the former President is referring to the June 5, 1970 meeting
with the intelligence directors in the White House; if so, his statement is puzzl-
ing, since the recommendation had not been drafted at the time. If he is referring
to another meeting with Hoover, no other record of such a meeting after June 5
has been found. Most likely the former President had the June 5 meeting in mind
where Hoover indeed made no objections, for there were no recommendations
to object to at that time.
m Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17,
3/9/76, p. 11.
15. Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17,
3/9/76. p. 12.
' Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 24.
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you convene a grand jury to look into the admitted acts of
illegality on behalf of some intelligence services?
Mr. Mitchell. I did not.
Q. And why not?
Mr. Mitchell. I had no consideration of that subject matter
at the time. I did not focus on it and I was very happy that the
plan was thrown out the window, without pursuing any of its
provisions further.
Q. Are you now of the opinion that if you had had time to
focus on the matter then it would have been wise to convene
some investigation within the Department to determine what
had happened in the past?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that that would be one of the normal
processes where you would give it in ial consideration and see
where it led to, what the statute of limitations might have been
and all of the other factors you consider before you jump into
a grand jury investigation.
Q. Excepting those point, do you agree that you should
have at least considered the matter?
Mr. Mitchell. I think if I had focused on it I might have
considered it more than I did.'15
Upset, angered, and embarrassed about having to recall his memo-
randum, Tom Huston walked to the White House Situation Room. 157
The Sit Room, "mailbox" of the White House, was the location where,
among other things, couriers came and went. Huston went directly
to the Chief of the White House Situation Room with the presidential
order to rescind the decision memorandum of July 23, which had gone
through there on its way to the intelligence directors. Huston was
intense and agitated, the manager of the Sit Room recalls, and men-
tioned something about Hoover having "pulled the rug out" from
under him.'" The Sit Room Chief contacted the CIA, NSA, DIA, and
the FBI to have the memoranda returned. By the close of business on
the next day, July 28, each agency had complied. From markings on
the memoranda, it was clear the agencies had removed the staples and
photocopied the document for their records.'59
Though Huston had suffered a major setback, he was not going
to yield easily. On August 3, he went to Haldeman's office and tried to
persuade him to convince the President that the objections raised by
Hoover had to be overridden. He urged a meeting between Haldeman,
Mitchell, and Hoover. 60 Two days later in anticipation of this meet-
ing, Huston put his views down on paper for Haldeman.
The memorandum, written under the title "Domestic Intelligence,"
ran five pages and was extremely critical of the FBI Director.'"'
Huston first reminded Haldeman that all the agencies and all of
Hoover's own staff on the ICI (Ad Hoc) supported the options
0 Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p; 145.
'Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 56.
'" Staff summary of Interview with the 1970 Ohief of the White House Situa-
tion Room, 7/1/75.
m 1970 Chief of Situation Room (staff summary), 7/1/75.
"'Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 62.
m Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 8/5/70.
selected by the President. Only Hoover dissented. "At some point,
Hoover has to be told who is President," Huston wrote. "He has
become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental to our
domestic intelligence operations. . .. If he gets his way it is going to
look like he is more powerful than the President."
Huston further warned that "all of us are going to look damn silly
in the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Bennett, and the military chiefs if
Hoover can unilaterally reverse a presidential decision based on a
report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and which,
on its merits, was a first-rate, objective job." Tom Charles Huston was
"fighting mad," for "what Hoover is doing here is putting himself
above the President."
Two more days elapsed and, on August 7, 1970, Huston sent a
second, terser note to Haldeman. 62 The FBI Director had left for
the West Coast on vacation just as the new school year was about
to open; across the country student violence loomed as a real possi-
bility. Huston again urged Haldeman to act: "I recommend that you
meet with the Attorney General and secure his support for the Presi-
dent's decision that the Director be informed that the decisions will
stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement
them at once." However, by this time, Huston recalls, "I was, for all
intents and purposes, writing memos to myself."' - Haldeman took
no action. Hoover had won the battle.
The reasons for Hoover's victory were many but, Huston believes,
having the support of the Attorney General was a large plus.164 The
President had a high regard for John Mitchell. When both Mitchell
and Hoover agreed in their strong objections to the Plan, Nixon no
doubt saw little point in continuing the effort.
Looking back, Sullivan sees other factors which worked in Hoover's
favor as well. He believes the Chief Executive buckled under the pres-
sure of the FBI Director partly because President Nixon and Hoover
went back a long way, considered themselves old friends, and still
socialized together frequently; and partly because the President owed
his 1950s reputation as a staunch anti-Communist to Hoover. "Of
course," Sullivan adds, "Hoover had his files, too." - The Director
had another ace in the hole: he could always have had the Huston
recommendations leaked, bringing the enterprise to a sudden halt.
Moreover, Huston notes that the opinions of Helms, Gayler, and
Bennett were far less weighty than Hoover's.1 6 6 Neither President
Nixon nor Haldeman were well acquainted with Gayler or Bennett;
and Helm's relationship with the White House tended to be precar-
ious, Huston believes, "in view of the problems that he had with Mr.
Kissinger on foreign intelligence estimates." Finally, Huston recalls,
"neither the President nor Mr. Haldeman had, in my judgment, any
sensitivity to the operational aspects of intelligence collection." 167
' Huston memorandum, 8/5/70.
10 Huston (staff summary), 5/22/75.
'"Huston (staff summary). 5/22/75.
" Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
'"Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 78.
m Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 77.
B. Huston Leave8 the White Houme
The memoranda written by Huston went unanswered throughout
the month of August. Shortly after writing his August 7th memo-
randum, Huston was informed by Haldeman that John Dean was
taking over his responsibilities at the White House for domestic in-
telligence. Huston would be on Dean's staff. As Dean recalls, "Huston
was livid." 'a
John Dean had come to the White House on July 27th from the
Justice Department, where he had worked with and impressed Mitch-
ell for his skillful handling of negotiations with demonstrators for
parade permits and other matters. He had no intelligence experience.
Dean realized that Huston was in an awkward situation. He asked
Huston on August 10, 1970, what he wished to do while on Dean's
staff. "Well, I'm a speechwriter," Huston replied.1 69 In the following
months, Huston would do practically whatever he felt like doing: 1o
sending an occasional memo to the President or Haldeman on intel-
ligence matters; 17 writing speeches for Pat Buchanan; continuing to
circulate the daily FBI intelligence reports in the White House; re-
viewing conflict-of-interest clearances; prodding the Internal Revenue
Service to investigate New Left organizations and their supporters; 171
and writing a lengthy history of Vietnam bombing negotiations.
Huston often spoke to his counterintelligence associates on a special
scrambler phone which he kept hidden in his office in a safe.17 3 Not
until February 2, 1971, did Dean inform the CIA that, henceforth, he
would be the White House contact on domestic intelligence matters,
rather than Huston. 7 4
Huston occasionally sent further memoranda to Haldeman, again
urging him to encourage the President to relax intelligence collection
restraints. On August 17, 1970, for example, Huston complained that
Hoover "has made no effort to remove the restrictions on development
of informant coverage which currently exist," despite the President's
oral request to Hoover on August 16 1 to intensify the investigation of
extremist organizations. "We need changes at the operating level, not
merely at the FBI," concluded Huston, "but throughout the intelli-
gence community." ' 76 Finally, Huston found time to relate briefly to
his new supervisor the saga of the Huston Plan. Dean had the distinct
impression that Huston wanted to become the domestic equivalent of
Henry Kissinger. 7 7
Growing ever more disenchanted with his position and with Nixon's
policies, Huston resigned from the White House staff on June 13, 1971,
Staff summary of John Dean interview, 8/7/75.
"Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
"' On Huston's activities during this period, see Huston deposition, 5/23/75.
". For example, on Arab terrorism, see memorandum from Tom Charles Huston
to President Richard Nixon, 8/12/70.
". Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 9/21/70.
(Hearings, vol. 2, Exhibit 62).
.' Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75. See also John Dean testimony, Senate
Watergate Hearings, June 28, 1973, Vol. 4, pp. 1446-1456.
.' Richard Ober handwritten notes on Huston memorandum, 7/9/70.
' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to President Richard Nixon, 8/17/70.
"Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 8/17/70.
x" Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
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and returned to Indiana to practice law.*17 He continued to serve as a
consultant to the White House, finishing his study of Vietnam negotia-
tions. On October 7, 1972, he was named a member of a Census Bureau
Advisory Committee on privacy and confidentiality.
Huston's original ally, William Sullivan, managed to remain on
good terms with J. Edgar Hoover, at least for a few months-he was
reprimanded by the Director for letting the Ad Hoc staff get out of
hand,'179 but nonetheless was promoted to Number 3 man in the FBI.
Sullivan's fall from power began several months after the Huston
Plan, with his October 12, 1970 speech at Williamsburg, Virginia,
where his answers to questions were critical of Hoover's ability to
understand the changing nature of the U.S. internal security threat.
Sullivan told his audience that the race riots and student upheaval
had nothing to do with the Communist Party. Rather, they were at-
tributable to problems within the American social order and to the
Vietnam War. When he returned to Washington, Sullivan remembers,
"all hell broke loose." o10 Hoover told him he had given "the wrong
answers... . How do you expect me to get my appropriations," said
the Director of the FBI, "if you keep downgrading the [Communist]
Party." The breached widened, and finally, a year later on October 1,
1971, Hoover had Sullivan literally locked out of his office for good.
VII. THE HIDDEN DIMENSIONS OF THE HUSTON PLAN
A. Duplicity
Looking back on the summer of 1970, Tom Huston observes that the
atmosphere of duplicity was the most astonishing aspect of the meet-
ings at Langley. On June 5, the President had sat across the table from
the directors of the major intelligence agencies and asked them for a
comprehensive report on intelligence collection methods against do-
mestic radicals. Instead, President Nixon and his representative were
victims of deception. "I didn't know about the CIA mail openings,
I didn't know about the COINTELPRO Program [an FBI internal
security operation]," Huston says. "These people were conducting all
of these things on their own that the President of the United States
didn't know about. ... In retrospect, we look like damned fools." 181 In
interrogatory answers, the former President stated that he had no
knowledge the CIA mail-opening program was already in existence
before June 1970; he was aware, however, that the intelligence com-
munity read the outside of envelopes of selected mail.x12
Huston believes that part of the problem was bureaucratic game-
playing: ". . . the Bureau had its own game going over there. They
didn't want us to know; they didn't 'ant the [Justice] Department to
know; they didn't want the CIA to know." And, across the Potomac,
"the CIA had its own game going. They didn't want the Bureau to
know." 183
178 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 83-84.
m Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
1w Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 35-36.
281 Huston deposition 5/22/75, p. 50.
m Answers of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories,
3/9/76, pp. 1, 4, 5 and 14.
m Huston deposition, 5/22/75, pp. 50-51.
Agencies concealed programs from one another partly out of "in-
teragency jealousies and rivalries," Huston speculated18" They did not
want to have revealed the fact that they were working on each other's
"turf." For example, "Mr. Hoover would have had an absolute stroke
if he had known that the CIA had an Operations CHAOS going on." 185
Huston has suggested another possible motivation for concealment:
I think the second thing is that if you have got a program
going and you are perfectly happy with its results, why take
the risks that it might be turned off if the President of the
United States decides he does not want to do it; because they
had no way of knowing in advance what decision the Presi-
dent might make. So, why should the CIA ... the President
may say hell no, I don't want you guys opening any mail.
Then if they had admitted it, they would have had to close
the thing down.s'
The unfortunate end result of these concealments between agencies
was the fact that the President did not know what his intelligence
services were doing either.
The language in the Special Report concerning the CIA covert mail
project is a clear example of the concealment of an illegal intelligence
collection operation from the President. The section of the Report
dealing with mail plainly stated that "covert coverage has been dis-
continued." 187 In truth, however, the CIA program to read the inter-
national mail of selected American citizens and foreigners was con-
tinuing to operate at the time of the Langley meetings.
Director Helms thinks he told Attorney General Mitchell about the
CIA mail program; and he is uncertain whether President Nixon knew
about it-he personally never informed the President.188 Mitchell has
denied that Helms told him of a CIA mail-opening program,1 89 and
has testified further that the President had no knowledge of the pro-
gram either, "at least not as of the time we discussed the Huston
plan." 190
Helms' suggested that Huston may not have been told about the
mail-opening program at any of the working group meetings because
he was the White House contact man for "domestic intelligence. We
thought we were in the foreign intelligence field." Whatever the ex-
planation, however, it is clear that the President was given a mislead-
ing document.
James Angleton, who served as Chief of the CIA Counterintelligence
Staff from 1954 to 1974 and was in charge of the CIA covert mail pro-
gram from 1955 to its termination in 1973, had other explanations for
the misleading language on the mail program in the Special Report.
Angleton testified: "It is still my impression . . . that this activity
that is referred to as having been discontinued refers to the Bureau's
activities in this field . .. it is certainly my impression that this was
Huston 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 33.
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 33.
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings p. 33-34.
mSpecial Report, p. 29.
Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, pp. 89. 96.
Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 137. See also pp. 120, 122.
-Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 138.
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the gap which the Bureau was seeking to cure." 193 The language of the
Report itself, however, does not reflect such a distinction.
Angleton also stated that the CIA would never discuss such a sensi-
tive topic as their mail program in large meetings like the ICI Ad Hoc
sessions at Langley, "The possibilities for leaks were too great for one
thing," he observes.194 One of Angleton's assistants has referred to the
Langley meetings as "a fish bowl." 195 Delicate matters, if they required
Presidential approval, "would have been raised either by the Director
of the FBI or the Director of Central Intelligence," Angleton
stressed.196 Yet, insofar as the record indicates, neither of the Directors
did raise this topic with the President.
During public hearings, Angleton stated that the concealment from
the President was not deliberate:
Mr. Angleton: Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would
have hesitated to inform the President if he had at any
moment asked for a review of intelligence operations.
Senator Church: That is what he did do. That is the very
thing he asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that
these agencies got together to make recommendations to him,
and when they made their recommendations, they misrepre-
sented the facts.
Mr. Angleton: I was referring, sir, to a much more re-
stricted forum.
Senator Church: I am referring to the mail, and what I
have said is solidly based upon the evidence. The President
wanted to be informed. He wanted recommendations. He
wanted to decide what should be done, and he was mis-
informed.
Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered
authorizing the opening of the mail five days later and re-
voked it, the CIA did not pay the slightest bit of attention
to him, did it, the Commander-in-Chief, as you say ?
Mr. Angleton: I have no satisfactory answer or that.
Senator Church: You have no satisfactory answer?
Mr. Angleton: No, I do not.
Senator Church: I do not think there is a satisfactory
answer because having revoked the authority the CIA went
ahead with the program. So that the Commander-in-Chief is
not the Commander-in-Chief at all. He is just a problem. You
do not want to inform him in the first place because he might
say no. That is the truth of it. And when he did say no you
disregard it, and then you call him the Commander-in-
Chief. 1 9 7
Questioning Tom Huston on the subject of mail openings, the Chair-
man of the Select Committee summarized the Huston Plan exercise
as follows:
'. Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 54.
1n'Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 56.
Staff summary of [CIA counterintelligence specialist], 2/8/76.
' Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 56.
" Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 37.
Senator Church: So we have a case where the President
is asked to authorize mail openings, even though they are
illegal. And quite apart from whether he should have done
it, and quite apart from whether or not the advice of the
Attorney General should have been asked, he acceded to that
request, thinking that he was authorizing these openings-
not knowing that his authority was an idle gesture, since
these practices had been going on for a long time prior to the
request for his authority. And after he revoked that author-
ity, the practices continued, even though he had revoked it.
That is the state of the record, based on your testimony?
Mr. Huston: Yes, I think it is.19*
In retrospect, Huston reasons that if he and others in the White
House had known these intelligence options were being exercised al-
ready and had not produced results significant enough to curb domes-
tic unrest, "it conceivably would have changed our entire attitude
toward the confidence we were willing to place in the hands of the
intelligence community in dealing with this problem." 199
Huston now points to the irony in the fact that intelligence is sup-
possed to provide policymakers with information upon which to make
decisions, but in June 1970 the top policymaker in the government
was kept unaware that certain sources of information were even avail-
able. 200 Part of the problem seemed to be excessive compartmentation
in the intelligence agencies.
The failure of the CIA participants to tell Tom Huston of their
mail-opening program was not the only example of dissimulation
during this episode. Sullivan attempted to give Hoover the impression
that he was not a part of the efforts to relax the restraints on intelli-
gence collection. He wrote in a memorandum to Cartha DeLoach-
his immediate supervisor and the Number 3 man in the FBI in June
1970-that Benson Buffham (the NSA representative at the Langley
meetings) was takin*g a particularly active role in the review of the
"restraints" section of the draft. "Admiral Noel Gaylor (sic) of the
National Security Agency," wrote Sullivan, "may have been a moving
force behind the creation of this committe9." [Emphasis added.] 202
Sullivan was indeed in a good position to know. He and Tordella of
NSA (Gaylor's deputy) had viewed these meetings since the begin-
nine as, in Tordello's words. "nothing less than a heaven-sent oppor-
tunity for NSA. ... .o203 Yet, Sullivan ended his memo for the FBI
leadership with the admonition: "Contingent upon what the Presi-
dent decides, it is clear that there could be problems involved for the
Bureau." 204
This was the first written example of Sullivan's aDparent strategy to
impress upon Hoover. Tolson. and DeLoach his disassociation with
attempts to relax restraints which Hoover wanted maintained. Two
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 16.
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 17.
"Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 34.
m Sullivan memorandum, @/19/70.
Tordella (staff summary), 6/16/75.
Sullivan memorandum, 6/19/70.
days later on June 20, Sullivan took a definitely pro-Hoover position
in a memorandum for the Director. He recommended that the FBI
oppose "the relaxation of investigative restraints which affect the
Bureau" 205 Everything he had been working for with Huston,
Tordella, and the others was denied. For the Director's consumption,
he portrayed himself as the arch-defender of the Bureau's image, pro-
tecting Hoover and the FBI against the excesses of Huston's commit-
tee. The memorandum was written on the same day Sullivan's rival,
Cartha DeLoach, made a decision to leave the FBI to become a business
executive, thereby clearing the pathway to higher office in the Bureau
for Sullivan.
As for the proposed interagency committee-an idea for which both
he and Huston had expressed strong commitment and -lively inter-
est 20-Sullivan concluded on the eve of his promotion to the Num-
ber 3 spot in the FBI: "I do not agree with the scope of this proposed
committee nor do I feel that an effort should be made at this time to
engage in any combined preparations of intelligence estimates." 207
Huston suspected that the opposition of the FBI's representatives
was ambivalent. "I am sure that, tactically, the people in the Bureau
probably were telling Hoover that 'the other fellows are pushing this
stuff,'" Huston has testified. "If I had to gamble, that would be my
bet. Probably 'Huston over there with a black snake whip,' or Helms
or somebody else-which didn't bother me, I mean tactically, if that
is the way the people figured that they had to push the Director to get
done what they wanted to do. 208
There is little doubt, however, that Huston and the Sullivan group
of the FBI set the agenda and shaped the format of the Special Report.
Huston, Sullivan, and Brennan had discussed the direction the Com-
mittee ought to take many times over.20 9 They worked closely together
during the June meetings; and before formal meetings, Huston, Sul-
livan and the Bureau representatives were in frequent contact over the
telephone or talking together directly. Members of the FBI contingent
would pick up Huston at the White House on the way to Langley and
bring him back after the ICI meetings. Often they lunched together.
Huston saw himself acting, in part, in the capacity of a sympathetic
White House staffer passing on to the President what the professionals
wanted. "And I agreed with them," he emphasizes. "I say 'agreed.'
After you work with somebody and you are convinced that what they
want to do is right, you agree with them." 210 There was no doubt in
Huston's mind that FBI, CIA, and NSA professionals were pushing
hard for expanded intelligence collection operations. They "clearly
wanted me to recommend to the President that these operations be
adopted," he remembers.2 11 To conclude that Huston dominated and
Memorandum from William Sullivan to Olyde Tolson, 6/20/70. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 16).
Huston deposition, 5/23/75; Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
* Sullivan memorandum, 6/20/70.
Huston deposition, 5/28/75, pp. 64-65.
* Huston deposition, 5/23/75, pp. 62-63; Sullivan (staff summary), 6/20/70;
FBI counterintelligence specialist (staff summary), 8/20/75.
2 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 63.
2 Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 63.
manipulated the.intelligence community is an error..The relationship
-was symbiotic. As.Hluston-has explained,
... the entire intelligence community, in the summer of 1970,
thought we had a serious crisis in this country. I though we
had a serious crisis in this country. My attitude was that we
have got to do something about it. Who knows what to do
about it. The professional intelligence community? The pro-
fessional intelligence community tells me, "you give us these
tools; we can solve the problem." I recommended those
tools.212
The duplicity went beyond the CIA mail program and Sullivan's
dissembling. A subsequent section of this commentary reveals that
the intelligence agencies greatly expanded their collection programs
after President Nixon revoked his authority for the Huston plan,
without obtaining presidential approval for their actions.
B. Laulesnes8
Several of the techniques discussed in the drafting of the Special
Report were of questionable legality. For example, covert mail cover
and surreptitious entry were, in Huston's words, "clearly illegal." 213
And, the legitimacy of other intelligence collection methods, such as
placement of American names on the NSA watch list, was highly ques-
tionable.214 Yet, former President Nixon does not recall "any dis-
cussion concerning the possible illegality of any of the intellhgence
gathering techniques described in the report during my meeting with
the [ICI] Committee [on June 5,1970]." 215
During public hearings, Senator Walter Mondale asked Huston
whether any one of the ICI staff members had objected "during the
course of making up these options to these recommendations which
involved illegal acts": -
Mr. Huston: At the working group level, I do not recall
any objection.
Senator Mondale: Do you recall any of them ever saying we
cannot do this because it is illegal?
Mr. Huston: No.
Senator Mondale: Can you recall any discussion whatso-
ever concerning the illegality of these recommendations?
Mr. Huston: No.
Senator Mondale: Does that strike you as peculiar that
top public officers in the most high level and sensitive posi-
tions of government would discuss recommending to the
President actions which are clearly illegal and possibly un-
constitutional without ever asking themselves whether that
was a proper thing for them to be doing?
Mr. Huston: Yes, I think it is, except for the fact that I
think that for many of those people we were talking about
2 Huston, 9/23/75, Hestrings, p. 17.
2 Attachment to Huston memorandum, 7/70, pp. 2, 3.
" See NSA Report, Sec. II B 2.
'Answer of Richard M. Nixon to !Senate 1Select Committee Interrogatory 23,
3/9/76, p. 13.
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something that they had been aware of, had been under-
taking for a long period of time.
Senator Mondale: Is that an adequate justification?
Mr. Huston: Sir, I am not trying to justify, I am just try-
ing to tell you what my impression is of what happened at
the time.
Senator Mondale: Because if criminals could be excused
on the grounds that someone had done it before, there would




Legal advice was not sought, several important legal matters were in-
volved in preparing the report for the President. The CIA General
Counsel was not included or consulted, since, as Angleton had test-
ified, "the custom and usage was not to deal with General Counsel, as
a rule, until there were some troubles. He was not a part of the proc-
ess of project approval." 217
Avoidance of legal and constitutional matters was, apparently, not
uncommon throughout the intelligence community. William Sullivan
has testified:
During the ten years that I was on the U.S. Intelligence
Board, a Board that receives the cream of intelligence for this
country from all over the world and inside the United States,
never once did I hear any body, including myself, raise the
question: "Is this course of action which we have agreed upon
lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral?" We never gave any
thought to this realm of reasoning, because we were just nat-
urally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned about
was this: will this course of action work, will it get us what
we want, will we reach the objective that we desire to reach ?218
Sullivan attributes much of this attitude concerning the law to the
molding influence of World War II upon young FBI agents who have
since risen to high position. In a deposition, Sullivan noted that during
the 1940s there was "a war psychology. Legality was not questioned.
Lawfulness was not a question; it was not an issue."
Senator Mondale: That carried on, unfortunately, after the
war.
Mr. Sullivan: Senator, you are right. We could not seem to
free ourselves either at the top or bottom, could not free
ourselves from that psychology with which we had been
imbued as young men, in particular, most all young men when
we went into the Bureau.
Along came the Cold War. We pursued the same course
in the Korean War, and the Cold War continued, then the
Vietnam War. We never freed ourselves from that psy-
chology that we were indoctrinated with, right after Pearl
Harbor, you see. I think this accounts for the fact that no-
body seemed to be concerned about raising the question, is this
oHuston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 21.
2' Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 77.
2 Sullvan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 92-93.
lawful, is this legal, is this ethical. It. was just lik a. soldier
in the battlefield. When he shot down an enemy he did not
ask himself is this legal or lawful, is it ethical? It is what he
was expected to do as a soldier.
We did what we were expected to do. It became a part of
our thinking, a part of our personality.219
Neither the Attorney General nor anyone in his office was invited to
the sessions at Langley, or consulted during the proceedings. During
public hearings on the Huston Plan, Huston was asked about the
absence of consultations with the Attorney General.
Senator Church: And it never occurred to you, as the Presi-
dent's representative, in making recommendations to him
that violated the law, that you or the White House should
confer with-the Attorney General before making those recom-
mendations?
Mr. Huston: No, it didn't. I should have, but it didn't.220
The Attorney General knew nothing of the preparation of an in-
telligence report for the President 'until so informed by Hoover on
July 27, 1970, several weeks after Hoover had signed the June "Special
Report." 22 One reason for the absence of Attorney General John
Mitchell, Huston explains, is that -this was an intelligence matter to
be handled by the intelligence agency directors.222 Mitchell, the head
of Justice, was not included, just as Laird, the head of Defense, was
not included. Huston now claims, though, that he naturally thought
Hoover would check with Mitchell or his Deputy before signing the
Special Report, just as General Bennett cleared with his superior,
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, and informed the Sec-
retary of Defense, Melvin Laird.223
Another reason for the exclusion of Mitchell might have been the
institutional animosity which- existed between the professional in-
telligence establishment and the Office of the Attorney General. The
former was primarily interested in the collection of intelligence and
the protection of sources; the latter suffered, in Huston's view, from"prosecutor's mentality"-an interest in the collection of evidence for
its use in securing prosecution. Huston -states that there are "two
approaches" to handling the problem of violence-prone demonstrators:
One is the intelligence-collection approach where you try
to keep tabs on what is going on and stop it before it happens.
The other approach, which is perhaps the only tolerable one
in a free society, from a perfectly legitimate point of view,
is you have to pay the price of letting a thing happen, and
then follow the law and hope you can apprehend the person
responsible and prosecute him according to the law.224
" Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, pp. 95--96.
mHuston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 15. In the summer of 1970, Huston held the
belief that "the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the President in the exercise
of matters relating to internal security or national security." (Huston, 9/23/75,
Hearings, p. 20.) ISee also lluston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 14.m Helms memorandum for the record, 7/28/70; Sullivan (staff summary),6/10/75; Mitchell testimony, Senate Watergate Hearings, July 10, 1973, Vol. 4,pp. 1603-04.
Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 35.
Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 15; Bennett (staff summary), 6/5/75.
Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 167.
Considerable tension existed between these two approaches in 1970.
The enmity between some members of the White House staff (no-
tably Huston) and the Justice Department stretched back to prepa-
rations for the antiwar demonstrations in Washington in 1969. The
Justice Department, Huston believes, saw the violence which occurred
as premeditated and leaned toward seeking indictments under the
Federal Anti-riot Act. In contrast, Huston and Sullivan saw the prob-
lem from the perspective of an intelligence officer. The answer rested
in mobilizing the intelligence agencies, not the law enforcement com-
munity.2 2 5 As Huston has testified: "I frankly did not have a whole
lot of confidence in the Justice Department sensitivity with respect
to distinguishing between types of protest activity." 226 So the Justice
Department continued to seek more stringent criminal sanctions to
deal with the problem of subversives, and the intelligence collectors
pursued the expansion of their methodology as a better solution.
In his March 1976 interrogatory answers, former President Nixon
took the position that "there have been-and will be in the future-
circumstances in which presidents may lawfully authorize actions in
the interests of the security of this country, which if undertaken by
other persons, or even by the president under different circumstances,
would be illegal." 227 As an example, the former President drew upon
the example of mail opening. "The opening of mail sent to related
priority targets of foreign intelligence, although impinging upon
the individual," said the former President, "may nevertheless serve a
salutory purpose when-as it has in the past-it results in preventing
the disclosure of sensitive military and state secrets to the enemies
of this country." 228
The White House staffer who recommended the use of illegal and
highly questionable intelligence gathering techniques in 1970 had de-
cided five years later that, in the end, the growth and preservation
of a free society depended upon a reliance on the law.229 For Huston,
the sanctions of criminal law had replaced his earlier faith in un-
restricted intelligence collection as the more appropriate response to
the threat of violence in our society. 2 0 The risk inherent in the latter
approach was too great. In Huston's words:
The risk was that you would get people who would be sus-
ceptible to political considerations as opposed to national
security considerations, or would construe political consid-
erations to be national security considerations, to move from
the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from
the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper
sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just keep going
down the line.22 '
'Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 24, Sullivan (staff summary), 6/10/75.
m Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 15.
22 Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate ISelect Committee Interrogatory 34,
3/9/76, p. 17.
22 Iist
m Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 45.
1 Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, p. 47.
01 Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, P. 45.
C. Mixed Motives
Also hidden behind the events of June 1970 were the reasons for
ardent participation-or lack thereof-in the writing of the intelli-
gence report. Reaction to the first gathering of the ICI (Ad Hoc)
work-group was mixed. Some participants were delighted by the
turn of events. For years, a group of counterintelligence specialists
within the FBI had favored reinstatement of collection procedures
taken away from them by the Director and viewed the request from
the White House for a Special Report as a unique opportunity. The
CIA, NSA, and most of the FBI representatives shared an enthusi-
asm for the project, with varying degrees of optimism that the
planning would actually be approved by Hoover.
'Not everyone, however, was sanguine aibout the proceedings. "What
a bucket of worms!" observed Richard Ober, Angleton's backup man
from the CIA, to Col. Koller of the Air Force after the meeting.23 4
Koller thought it was worse than that. "I wouldn't have touched what
they were talking about with a 10-foot pole," he noted recently. "The
things they were talking about were illegal, and certainly beyond our
interest and capability." 235 Koller dropped out after the first meeting,
warning his boss, General Triantafeller, not to get the Air Force in-
volved. The Air Force kept a representative at the meeting, Col.
Demelt "Gene" Walker, but only as an observer who had been cau-
tioned to keep a safe distance from the planning and to protect the Air
Force.236
This reaction was typical of all the military representatives. The
Army member, Col. John Downie, was the most outspoken. At the
first gathering he made it clear that "the Army would keep the hell
out" of domestic intelligence collection, since it was already in deep
trouble over the recent exposure of Army surveillance of civilians.23 7
Downie and others were at that moment preparing for hearings before
the Senate's Constitutional Rights Subcommittee on that very subject.
Downie now states that the Army would have been far less resistant
to Sullivan's efforts to draw them in had they not been on the "hot
seat" at the time.238
Stilwell of DIA was also told by Gen. Bennett to proceed with ex-
treme caution; he was supposed to help out where he could, but
Bennett felt the DIA had little to contribute to the effort. Huston
recalls the DIA role as being minimal.239 "B." Willard, the Navy
civilian observer, remembers that the dominant feeling of the military
representatives was: "Don't try to draw us into this." 240 The attitude
2' Staff summary of Ool. Rudolph Koller interview, 8/11/75.
' Koller (staff summary), 8/11/75. Col. Koller's protestations about "illegalf-ties" to the contrary ndtwithstanding, no witness recalls 'anyone-including
Koller-who discussed the legal aspects of intelligence collections during theLangley meetings.
' Staff summary of Col. Demelt Walker interview, 7/23/75; Koller (staff
summary), 8/11/75.
* Downie (staff summary), 5/13/75.
Downie .(staff summary), 5/13/75.
* Stilwell (staff summary), 5/21/75; Bennett (staff summary), 6/5/75; Hus-ton deposition, 5/23/75, p. 40.
w Willard (staff summary), 5/16/75.
of the Air Force and the Navy, was, in Stilwell's opinion: "We
haven't been involved in domestic intelligence collection, and we're
not going to start now." And for the Army the attitude seemed to be:
"We may have been stupid enough to stick our nose in once, but we're
not going to get burned twice." 
24
1
Among the FBI participants at Langley, Donald E. Moore was an
exception. After Sullivan, he was the senior Bureau representative
on the ICI staff. He had been involved in intelligence work for the
Bureau since 1956, and in June 1970 was the Inspector-in-Charget
Espionage Research Branch. He was greatly troubled by the opening
meeting at Langley. "I felt very uneasy about the direction the work
group was taking," he remembers. "Their views were contrary to what
Mr. Hoover would have liked. I wanted out." 242
A Hoover "loyalist," Moore went to Sullivan after the meeting and
asked to be excused from subsequent sessions. "Suit yourself," Sullivan
replied, and Donald Moore faded from the scene, except for desultory
comments made on the threat portions of a draft Sullivan asked him
to review a week later. 2 3
. Even among the ICI enthusiasts, not all were pursuing the same
goal. Ostensibly, the Ad Hoc Committee was established to provide
better intelligence to the President, primarily, on New Left activities,
and, secondarily, on foreign influence over the New Left. The radical
protesters were clearly Tom Huston's main interest. Data collection
on the New Left and black militancy was of great interest to others
as well, such as George Moore, who was the Bureau Section Chief with
responsibilities in this area. However, several of the participants saw
the concern of the President over domestic intelligence chiefly as a
way to ride piggyback through the White House approval process
their own primary goal of knocking down obstacles to foreign intelli-
gence collection. As one FBI observer at the Langley meetings has
commented:
-Hoover put us out of business in 1966 and 1967 when he placed
sharp restrictions on intelligence collection. I was a Soviet
specialist and I wanted a better coverage of the Soviets. I
felt-and still feel-that we need technical coverage on every
Soviet in the country. I didn't give a damn about the Black
Panthers myself, but I did about the Russians. I saw these
meetings as a perfect opportunity to get back the methods we
needed . . . and so did Sullivan.2 44
Huston was aware that Gayler and others were in the venture for
reasons other than strictly to improve domestic intelligence. "The
whole question of surreptitious entry . . . was an issue going into this
thing I didn't know anything about, and didn't understand really
what it had to do with the subject underhand," Huston recalls. "It
was really clear to me that it was a foreign intelligence matter. . . . It
just seemed to me that if these people felt so strongly about it, why
u. Downie (staff summary), 5/13/75.
" Staff summary of Donald E. Moore interview, 7/28/75.
2" Donald Moore (staff summary), 7/28/75.
244 [FBI counterintelligence expert] (staff summary), 8/20/75.
shouldsay no? And so it went. in [to the report for the
President]." 245
Hustorrremembers another example of the approach used by NSA:
the modification of its authority for the collection of communications
intelligence. "For all I know that [directive] could have authorized
people to have free lunch in the White House mess," he says. "In other
words, Admiral Gayler said, 'This is what needs to be done' and that's
what I did." 246
Those focusing on domestic intelligence objectives and those on
foreign intelligence, those committed to relaxing collection restraints
and those reluctant to be involved-these were the central cleavages in
the staff of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc).
D. "Credit Card Revolutionarie8"
Just as hidden from the President and Tom Huston as the CIA
mail program--though more from reasons of their own selective per-
ception than from duplicity-was the reality of the antiwar movement
which helped spur the writing of the intelligence report in the first
place. The threat assessment section of the Special Report was not
too different from earlier assessment prepared for Ehrlichman and
Huston in April and June of 1969. Though more thorough, it also
failed to produce much concrete evidence of foreign influence over
domestic unrest. During the public hearings on the Huston Plan,
C. D. Brennan, the FBI witness, said that the Bureau was never able
to find evidence indicating the antiwar protesters in the United States
were financed by external sources. "I felt that the extremist groups
land the others who were involved in antiwar activities and the like
at that time were of the middle- and upper-level income," stated Bren-
nan, "and we characterized them generally as credit-card revolution-
aries." 247
Despite the lack of any substantial evidence of foreign involvement,
the White House under both Johnson and Nixon had persistently
tasked the Bureau to discover evidence of foreign funding.
24 8 As in
earlier reports, however, the assessment section of the Special Report
pointed to the danger of foreign connections developing in the future.
Consensus here was high. Like those in the White House, the intel-
ligence officers writing the Report walked a slippery slope when they
began to speak of the need to expand intelligence collection more
because of potential rather than 'actual findings.
These were among the main forces, not immediately visible, which
were particularly important in shaping the Special Report and the
Huston Plan. Those who had sought to obtain presidential authority
to broaden intelligence collection methods had ultimately failed;
but they remained committed to their objective of expansion nonethe-
less. The intelligence collectors were not to be dissuaded by the simple
absence of presidential or congressional authority.
'Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 41.
"'Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 46. Tordella has also alluded to an additional
reason for high NSA interest in these proceedings. Intelligence budgets were
sagging in 1970 and some saw chances here for expanded intelligence activities
and increased funding. Tordella (staff summary), 6/16/75.
' Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, p. 134.
'Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, pp. 104, 107, 135.
VIII. AFTERMATH: THE EMD-OR THE BEGINNING?
Two events of particular significance followed in the close wake of
the Huston Plan. One was the creation of the Interagency Evaluation
Committee (IEC), and the other was a secret meeting involving
Hoover, Helms, Gayler, and Mitchell.
The IEC has become controversial, since it was similar in some
respects to the permanent interagency group recommended in the Hus-
ton Plan. Questions have thus been raised concerning whether the
IEC became the instrument for carrying out the provisions of the Hus-
ton Plan, possibly even serving as the precursor of the "Plumbers"
group which broke into the Democratic National Headquarters in the
Watergate building in 1972.
A review of the IEC history by the Committee, summarized below,
suggests that the Committee did resemble the interagency committee
outlined in the Huston Plan; however, the IEC amounted to little
more than a research -group, with no operational dimension and no ties
to the "Plumbers" unit. The IEC, however, did 'bring to fruition the
Huston Plan concept of an interagency intelligence committee.
A. The Intelligence Evaluation Committee
Within a month of John Dean's arrival in the White House, he had
learned-chiefly through conversations with Huston-the basic details
about the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Intelligence and the col-
lision with Hoover. By late August, Haldeman had approached Dean
on the Huston Plan, instructing him "to see what I could do to get the
plan implemented." 251 Dean his testified that he had found the plan
"totally uncalled for and unjustified." 2 52
Eventually, on September 17, 1970, Dean went to see John Mitchell
about the Huston Plan and Haldeman's request for its implementa-
tion. Mitchell explained to him some of the details of the Plan. As
Dean now recalls, his reaction was to think: "You've got to be kidding.
This sounds like something the people on Mission Impossible would
dream up." 23
The Attorney General reiterated his position against the Plan-
with one exception. Unlike Hoover, Mitchell now thought that a
permanent interagency committee for intelligence evaluation might be
useful. As Dean testified in 1973: "After my conversations with Mit-
chell, I wrote a memorandum requesting that the evaluation commit-
tee be established, and the restraints could be removed later. I told Mr.
Haldeman that the only way to proceed was one step at a time and this
could be an important first step. He agreed." [Emphasis added.] 254
This memo of September 18th from Dean to Mitchell read in
part: "A key to the entire operation will be the creation of a (sic)
interagency intelligence unit for both operational and. evaluation pur-
poses ... and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to
obtain such intelligence." [Emphasis added.] 255 Echoing Huston's
' Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
Dean, Senate Watergate Hearings, 6/25/73, p. 916.
'Dean (siaff summary), 8/7/75.
O Dean, Senate Watergate Hearings, 6/25/73, p. 916.
m Memorandum from John Dean to John Mitchell, 9/18/70. (Hearings, VoL
2, Exhibit 24.)
recommendation to Haldeman ofamonth before, the mem ore the
postscript: "Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like
him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so."
Looking back on this memorandum, Dean pointed out that, although
he was against the intelligence collection methods in the Huston Plan,
he knew Haldeman supported them and would be reading the memo,
too. Dean recalls that to keep his rapport with Haldeman-and his
job-he included the operational language in the memorandum, ac-
tually believing, he claims, that the permanent evaluation committee
would be as far as the undertaking would ever go. He and Mitchell
were in agreement that "the enthusiasts" in the White House would
require some kind of pacifier and this memorandum would give them
at least a sense of action and commitment. 256
Whatever the truth may. be about the later intentions of Dean,
Mitchell, or Haldeman, an interagency Intelligence Evaluation Com-
mittee was planned and set up by Dean and Robert Mardian (As-
sistant Attorney General in charge of Internal Security) during the
waning weeks of 1970. The IEC held its first meeting in Dean's EOB
office on December 3rd, with Mardian in charge. 257 The meeting repre-
sented the fulfillment of one Huston Plan objective: the creation of a
permanent interagency intelligence committee.
At this opening session of the IEC were several old hands from the
earlier ICI Ad Hoe Committee: Angleton of CIA, George Moore of
FBI, Bffman of NSA, and John Downie of DOD. At the subsequent
meetings the group would be supplemented by staff aides, many of
whom (like Richard Ober of CIA) had also seen duty at the Langley
meetings in June. The focus of the IEC, it was decided at the meeting,
would be on-
intelligence in the possession of the United States Govern-
ment respecting revolutionary terrorist activities in the
United States and to evaluate this intelligence to determine
(a) the severity of the problem and (b) what form the Fed-
eral response to the problem identified should take.2 59
Though Dean had received a special security clearance at CIA on
September 30th and had immersed himself, at Haldeman's request,
into the details of the Special Report and the Huston Plan, his partici-
pation in IEC meetings soon came to an end. The IEC began meet-
ng in the Justice Department under Mardian's tutelage, and by
January of the new year Dean had stopped attending the sessions.260
Thereafter, the IEC was chiefly operated by Mardian and Bernard A.
Wells, his deputy.
One of the military stafftmen assigned to the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee was Army counterintelligence specialist Col. Werner E.
Michel. His views on the IEC are shared by virtually everyone familiar
with its activities. Michel observes that (1) the IEC did very little-
and nothing of an operational character; (2) what little it did do
2 Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
2 Memorandum from Robert Mardian to John Mitchell, 12/4/70. (Hearings,
Vol. 2, Exhibit 25.)
Mardian memorandum, 12/4/70.
Dean (staff summary), 8/7/75.
chiefly, prepare intelligence reports) was not done very well; and
3) its leadership-specifically, Mardian-was inexperienced when
it came to intelligence work.2 61
The principal representatives to the IEC, experts like Angleton,
Buffham, Downie, and George Moore, dropped out of the proceedings
by July 20, 1971, leaving behind subalterns to observe and participate.
General Bennett has said, for example, that an enlisted man was as-
signed to the IEC staff "to make sure Mardian wasn't trying to drag
the military into something unwarranted." 262
The IEC prepared about thirty staff reports and fifty-five "intelli-
gence calendars" on radical events which were distributed to Dean
in the White House and to the heads of participating agencies (includ-
ing Treasury and the Secret Service). These reports were considered
to be of low quality by experienced intelligence specialists. 2 6 3 The
singularly most questionable document to emerge from the IEC
files was a memorandum appearing on January 19, 1971. Typed on
Justice Department stationery and addressed to Mitchell, Ehrlichman,
and Haldeman, the unsigned memorandum purported to speak unam-
mously for the IEC participants. It asked for the implementation of
the Special Report of June 1970; obviously, from the text, the memo-
randum actually sought the adoption of Tom Huston's recommenda-
tions. "All those who have been involved in the project firmly believe,"
read the memorandum, "that the starting point for an effective domes-
tic intelligence operation should be the implementation of the Special
Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence." The anonymous
author, or authors, added that "there is considerable doubt as to how
significant a contribution the proposed committee [the IEC] would
make to existing domestic intelligence operations without implementa-
tion of the Ad Hoc Committee Report. . . ." [Emphasis added.] 264
Dean has stated that Mardian was responsible for this memoran-
dum.265 Mardian, however, denies he made any attempt or suggestion
to implement provisions of the Huston Plan or the Special Report of
June 1970. In his view, the IEC was strictly an effort "to increase
formal liaison among the intelligence agencies, since Hoover had
broken it off the previous summer.. . . The IEC was only for
analysis." 266
The Committee does not appear to have done anything more than
try to evaluate raw intelligence data, over 90 per cent of which was
generated by the FBI.6 7 Like the Huston Plan itself , this interagency
effort also failed in large part because of Hoover's truculence toward
it. At one point, Hoover wrote to Mardian concerning a proposed
2n Staff summary of Col. Werner E. Michel interview, 5/12/75. See also memo-
randum for the record, by Col. Werner E. Michel May 21, 1973.
mBennett (staff summary). 6/5/75.
* Michel (staff summary). 5/12/75; Stilwell (staff summary), 5/21/75;
Downie (staff summary), 3/13/75; Buffham (staff summary), 7/19/75; Angle-
ton (staff summary), 11/5/75.
m Memorandum (unsigned) on Justice Department stationery to John Mit-
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Staff summary of Robert Mardian telephone Interview, 1/13/76.
* Michel (staff summary), 5/12/75. The FBI did have, however, the benefit of
NSA data, the CIA mail opening product, and information from the CIA/CHAOS
project.
charter for the IEC: ". . . it is reauested that an appropriate change
be made in the wording of paragraph IV entitled Staiff' to clearly
show that the FBI will not provide personnel for the proposed perma-
nent intelligence estimation staff." 26
8
Mardian later complained to the Attorney General on February 12,
1971 that the content of the intelligence estimates would be of in-
sufficient quality "to warrant continuing without [FBI] coopera-
tion." 269 Eventually, Hoover did send over two analysts; but they
were considered to be less than satisfactory by most other partici-
pants. 270 The Director of the FBI clearly was not interested in the
success of the IEC, no more than he had cared for the concept of an
interagency committee as outlined in the Huston Plan.
According to various sources. the secrecy of the IEC stemmed from
its handling of secret documents; its desire to avoid publicity and
criticism which might come to an interagency intelligence group,
regardless of how innocuous its works; and, Mardian's abtempt to
make the IEC appear to be more important than it really was.271
In early June 1973, the IEC was finally abolished by Assistant
Attorney General Henry E. Petersen. He concluded in a memorandum
to participating agencies: "Now that the war in Vietnam has ended,
demonstrations carrying a potential for violence have virtually ended;
therefore, I feel that the IEC function is no longer necessary.'" 272 Be-
hind this smoke screen lay the real reason, according to IEC staff mem-
ber, James Stilwell: IEC leaders feared the mounting criticism of the
recently revealed Huston Plan (a copy of which appeared in the New
York Times) would lead the "jackals of the press ' to their door.27 3 It
was time to close shop. Some members of the IEC staff argued that
it would be a mistake to abolish the IEC at this time because people
would conclude wrongly that it was in some way an extension of the
Huston scheme. This viewpoint was overridden.274
B. Secret Meeting with Hoover
On March 25, 1971, an FBI counterintelligence officer wrote a memo-
randum for Hoover's information regarding a request from Attorney
General Mitchell which asked the Director to meet with him, Helms,
and Gayler on March 31. The officer did not know the agenda for the
meeting, but speculated that it would cover the subject of foreign intel-
ligence as it related to domestic subversives. 271
m Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Mardian, 1/3/71.
2 Memorandum from Robert Mardian to John Mitchell, 2/12/71. (Hearings,
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m Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, 3/23/75. (Though W. R.
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a subordinate in the FBI Intelligence Division.) In January 1971 the NSA Di-
rector had written a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney
General on how his Agency could assist with "intelligence bearing on domestic
problems." See memorandum from Noel Gayler to Melvin Laird and John Mitchell,
1/26/71. Benson Buffham of NSA personally showed the memorandum to John
Mitchell. (Memorandum for the record by Benson K. Buffham, 2/3/71).
The NSA, noted the memorandum, was already sending intelligence
to the CIA and the FBI "on an extremely confidential basis" on the
international communications of American citizens, but only as by-
product from NSA's communications monitoring responsibilities. This
information was not developed in any systematic way. The memoran-
dum suggested that Helms and Gayler might have an interest in in-
creasing intelligence output of this type.
The memorandum stated that the principal source of Bureau data
on subversive activities was electronic surveillance and live informants.
To supplement these collection techniques, Hoover was advised to "take
advantage of any resources of NSA and CIA which can be tapped for
the purpose of contributing to the solution of the problem." The memo-
randum sounded like a fragment of conversation from the Langley
meetings the previous June.
The meeting in Mitchell's office actually occurred on March 29. Later,
Hoover prepared a memorandum for the files which indicated that
Helms was primarily responsible for the gathering. The purpose of the
meeting was to discuss "a broadening of operations, particularly of
the very confidential type in covering intelligence both domestic and
foreign." Gayler was "most desirous" of having the Bureau reinstate
certain intelligence collection programs; and Helms spoke of "further
coverage of mail."
These approaches were rebuffed by Hoover, who told Helms and
Gayler (according to his memorandum) that he "was not at all enthu-
siastic about such an extension of operations insofar as the FBI was
concerned in view of the hazards involved." Mitchell then intervened,
according to Hoover's memorandum, and asked Helms and Gayler to
prepare an in-depth examination" of exactly what collection methods
they desired. After reading the report, Mitchell said he would convene
the group again "and make the decision as to what could or could not
be done." According to the Hoover memo, Helms agreed and said he
would have the report prepared "very promptly." 276
The Huston Plan battle had been fought again, this time with the
inclusion of the major missing participant: Attorney General Mitchell.
The results were similar to the earlier outcome: a victory for Hoover.
Yet, clearly, the war was not over. While neither Helms nor Gayler
nor Mitchell recall this meeting, or the outcome of the Helms-Gayler
report, and while it is unclear whether such a report was ever actually
prepared, one thing is certain: efforts to implement provisions of the
Huston Plan persisted. The unlawful CIA mail-opening program con-
tinued; the list of names of American citizens on the NSA Watch List
expanded during the years 1970 to 1973; the ag e limit on FBI campus
informant8 was lowered from 21 to 18; and the Bureau intensified its
inve8tigations in the internal security field.277
w' Memorandum for the files by J. Edgar Hoover, 4/12/71. (Hearings, Vol. 2,
Exhibit 31). Subsequent to the meeting with Mitchell, "the Attorney General
reversed the FBI decision" against a proposed CIA electronic surveillance, accord-
ing to Angleton, and in May 1971 "all the devices which bad been installed . . .
were tested and all were working." See Memorandum for the record by James
Angleton, 5/18/73, p. 5. (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit 61).
m For the detailed documented evidence on these points, see the Select Commit-
tee Reports on the CIA mail program, the NSA, and the FBI internal security
programs. Information on the incidents of surreptitious entry remains classified
but the cases are limited to foreign targets. See also Brennan testimony, 9/25/75,
Hearings, p. 100, on the extent of the FBI internal security investigation.
The intensified intelligence activities of the FBI included surveil-
lance of "& eery Black tdn no n iia ~or eadeso~ ~ ~, ~ JLuLekit, %J JIv aII.. ZiI"iari groJup, reW wvvoo V1
their pa8t or present involvement in disordere." [Emphasis added.] 278
This involved the opening of 4/000 new cases. Also, members of the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) were placed under investi-
gation accounting for an additional 6,500 new cases. 2 7 9
The FBI witness during the Huston Plan public hearings did not
believe the President was ever told about this increased Bureau
activity.280 Nor, according to other witnesses, was he told about the
instances of expanded intelligence collection by other agencies, Speak-
ing of the CIA mail program, former Attorney General John Mitchell
suggested that "the old-school-tie boys, who had been doing it for 20
years, just decided they were going to continue to do it." 281
Looking back on the Huston Plan, President Nixon said in an official
statement in 1973: "Because the approval was withdrawn before it had
been implemented, the net result was that the plan for expanded intel-
ligence activities never went into effect." 282 It was not that simple,
however. As a former CIA Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angle-
ton, noted:
The Huston Plan, in effect, as far as we were concerned, was
dead in five days and therefore all of the other matters of en-
larging procurement within the intelligence community were
the same concerns that existed prior to the Huston Plan, and
subsequent to the Huston Plan. The Huston Plan had no im-
pact whatsoever on the priorities within the intelligence com-
munity.283
"People are reading a lot into the Huston Plan," Angleton continued,
"and, at the same time, are unaware that on several levels in the com-
munity identical bilateral discussions were going on." 284 Angleton
stated that, since the creation of the CIA in 1947, 'there has been con-
stant discussion of operations and improvement of collection, so there
is nothing unusual in time. . . . There were a number of ongoing bi-
lateral discussions every day with other elements within the intelli-
gence community which may or may not have duplicated the broad,
general plan that Huston brought about." 
28
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The fact that the President approved the Huston Plan-if only
briefly-is deeply troubling in itself, as some of its provisions con-
travened the law. That some of the intelligence agencies could continue
these programs after the President revoked his authority--and, in
fact, expand them-is cause for great alarm. These facts raise serious
questions about the sensitivity of the White House and the intelligence
agencies to the law and the Constitution.
Memorandum from Executives Conference to Clyde Tolson, 10/29/70. (Hear-
ings, Vol. 2, 10/29/70). The Executives Conference was an occasional gathering
of senior officials in the FBI.
Executives Conference memorandum, 10/29/70.
Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, pp. 138-139.
Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, p. 141. On the apparent lack of presidential
awareness of the NSA watch list expansion, see Allen, 10/29/75. Hearings,
pp. 28-29. and Nixon's answers to interrogatories, 3/9/76. p. 1.
' President Richard Nixon, Presidential Documents, 5/22/73, pp. 693-M4.
" Angleton, 9/24/75. Hearings, pp. 70-71.
" Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 82.
' Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, p. 83.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Huston Plan episode is a story of lawlessness and impropriety
at the highest levels of government. It is also a story of high-level de-
ception, for some of the intelligence agencies concealed illegal pro-
grams from the President and his representatives, from the Congress,
and from one another. The findings in this investigation are similar to
those disclosed in other phases of the Select Committee inquiry into the
American intelligence community, namely: a lack of accountability.
unclear lines of authority, and frequent disregard for the law.
A. Accountability, Authority, and the Law
On June 5, 1970, the President ordered the intelligence community
to provide the White House with a complete and factual review of se-
lected intelligence collection procedures, restraints upon these proce-
dures, and options for relaxing the restraints. Instead, his representa-
tive, Tom Charles Huston, was deceived. The intelligence report for the
President failed to disclose an ongoing illegal mail-opening program
conducted by the CIA (with the cooperation and knowledge of the
FBI). It also failed to mention the improper domestic intelligence
activities of the CIA and the FBI, now known respectively as "Oper-
ation CHAOS" and "COINTELPRO." 2 9 0 In short, the authority of
the President's order for a candid report carried little weight.
Later, on July 23, 1970, when the President revoked his authority
to implement the Huston Plan provisions, his action again had little
effect upon the intelligence services. The CIA mail-opening con-
tinued; Operation CHAOS and COINTELPRO went on; NSA se-
lection of international communications involving Americans was
expanded (apparently, largely as a result of names contributed to
the NSA "Watch List" by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, BNDD); the FBI opened thousands of new cases on do-
mestic dissenters and intensified its campus surveillance by lowering
the age of informants to 18; the intelligence agencies formed a perma-
nent interagency committee for intelligence, as envisaged in the
Huston Plan; and, the intelligence directors from the CIA and the
NSA continued to seek the full implementation of certain Huston
Plan provisions.
The intelligence officers conducted illegal and questionable collec-
tion programs apparently partly because they concluded the good that
flowed from them in terms of anticipating threats to the United States
made the programs worthwhile, and partly because of the pressure for
results from the White House. In addition, the threats of civil strife
faced by the nation in 1970 seemed to justify to the intelligence col-
lectors the use of extraordinary methods. Few of the counterintelli-
gence experts who prepared the report leading to the Huston Plan
objected to the inclusion of illegal options for the President. They did
not consult the Attorney General; they did not consult the Congress;
and they did not consult their own legal counsels.
m Although these two programs were not strictly within the intelligence collec-
tion mandate of the ICI Ad Hoc Committee, they did deal with matters of in-
ternal security and, in the case of CHAOS, with the connection between domestic
dissent and foreign powers; therefore, the CIA and FBI were being far from
candid with one another-and with the President's representative-by conceal-
ing these programs at the Langley meetings.
B. The Quality and Coordination of Intelligence
The Huston Plan is a story not only of impropriety and duplicity in
the nation's intelligence community, but also of frustration over the
quality and coordination of intelligence. The frustration came from
several sources and took many forms. The White House was dissatis-
fied with the information available on domestic dissenters and their
foreign supporters, and was concerned about the disintegration of
liaison ties between the FBI and the other intelligence agencies.
Within the intelligence agencies themselves various degrees of dis-
satisfaction over the quality and coordination of intelligence were also
expressed. In particular, J. Edgar Hoover was viewed widely as an
obstacle to the expansion of intelligence collection methods, especially
for the acquisition of foreign intelligence.
Most of the counterintelligence experts involved in the Huston Plan
episode did not share the White House view that domestic dissenters
were receiving substantial foreign funding. Despite considerable at-
tention to this matter, at the request of the White House, the intelli-
gence agencies were unable to discover evidence of such a link. None-
theless, the President's men insisted upon still further investigation of
possible foreign ties and complained about the poor quality of intelli-
gence data in this area.
Reactions to the break-down of formal liaison coordination between
the FBI and the other intelligence agencies was also viewed from
different perspectives by various participants in 1970. William C.
Sullivan of the FBI and Tom Huston saw the severing of formal
ties by Hoover as another manifestation of paralysis in the conduct
of Bureau intelligence affairs. Others viewed the development as an
unfortunate inconvenience, but one that was soon surmounted by
sundry informal methods of communication. Severing formal liaison,
in other words, did not terminate cooperation between the intelligence
agencies and the FBI; rather, it forced the establishment of different
channels of communication, chiefly through increased telephone con-
versation and the exchange of memoranda. No one, however, thought
the situation was as good as before formal ties were broken; and
everyone looked upon the general lack of communication between
Hoover and the other directors-especially Helms-as unfortunate.
C. Public Policy Implicationm
The case of the Huston Plan provides a tragic commentary on the
state of American democracy in the summer of 1970. Tom Charles
Huston, the top White House adviser for internal security affairs,
advised the President of the United States, in effect, authorize the
violation of to the Constitution and specific federal statutes protect-
ing the rights of American citizens. The President, Richard M. Nixon,
accepted the advice and gave his brief approval to the unlawful in-
telligence plan which now bears the name of his adviser. Throughout
the episode, some of the intelligence agencies concealed projects from
the White House and from one another; and, after the President took
back his authority from the intelligence plan, certain agencies con-
tinued to implement the provisions anyway.
The conclusion to be drawn from this case is that: no longer can
the intelligence agencies be exempted from the law or from lines of
higher authority. The final report of the Senate Select Committee on
982
Intelligence sets forth a series of recommendations to help prevent
this from happening again. Central to each of the issues of accounta-
bility, authority, lawlessness, and the quality and coordination of in-
telligence is the question of control. The provisions in the Final Report
would tighten control over the intelligence community.
Yet to avoid the dangers of tyranny inherent in greater control
in the government, the authority and responsibility for this increased
supervision must be shared among the intelligence agencies themselves,
the President, the Justice Department, the Congress, and the courts.
If shared and closer control is one answer emerging from this investi-
gation into the Huston Plan, another is the need for more frequent
dialogue on intelligence problems among responsible individuals in
each branch of the Government. The Huston Plan arose because well-
meaning and intelligent people wanted solutions to pressing questions
of intelligence quality and coordination. The solutions arrived at in
June 1970 were inappropriate and have been rightly criticized, but
the original problems have not been completely unresolved. And they
will not be until leaders in the Congress and the Executive Branch
face them, discuss them, and decide upon appropriate courses of action.
The objective of the Select Committee has been to contribute to this
vital process.
APPENDIX
"CHRONOLOGY OF HUSTON PLAN AND INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE" PREPARED BY SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE STAFF
Date Central event Related developments
1965-------------------------------------------------- As a result of Senator Long's wiretap bearings,
December 1966.---..... FBI terminates break-ins.
1967-68--. ...---------- Capt. Thomas Charles Huston, U.S. Army
works at DIA in the area of covert aerial
reconnaissance.
1968---------.......... Huston works part time in the Nixon cam-
paign.
April 1968 ------------------------------------- Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., is murdered;
student riots at Colambia University.May 1, 1968 ------------------------------------ Poor People's march heads for Washington
from Memphis.
June 5 1968 ------------------------------------ Robert F. Kennedy is murdered in Los Angeles.
Aug. 2h, 1968 ----------------------------------- Chicago police and sme 3,000 demonstrators
cofron usd h hcg itnJanuary 1969-------- Huston begins employment at the White
House on the Speechwriting and Research
staff.
March 1969 ------------------------------------ Student riots at San FranclsE State College.
April 1969 ------------------------------------- Rioting In Black neighborhoods of Chicago,
student riots at Harvard and CornelL.,April 1969 ------------------------------------- Ehrlichman prepares a report for Nixon on
foreign Communist support of campreisde
is ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ uu dipeseishqu o-aa-set
orders; the White House conclu s that
- present Intelligence collection capabilities
were Inadequate.
May 1969 ------------------------------------- Nixon places first of 17 tops on government
officials.
June 1969 ---------- Huston is unsigned by Ehrlichman (through
Krogh) to Investigate possible foreign sup-
port of campus disorders; receives briefings
and reports from CIA and FBI; obtains ltete
evidence to support the hypothesis, though
is displeased with quality of data-Rpeci-
ally from the Bureau; has first contact with
the intelligence community oince entering
the White House.
July 1,1969- ------------------------------------ Huston advises IRS to move against leftist
organizations.
July 22, 1969 ------------------------------------ Mitchell establishes the "Civil Disturbance
Group" (CDG) to coordinate intelligence,
policy'and action within Justice concerning
domestic civil disturbances--apparently be-
cause he doubted the adequacy of FBI
efforts in this area.October-November 1969s During the demonstrations, Huston wonitoro
FBI intelligence estimates for the White
House;, Krogh, Haldemun, and Ehrlicliman
complain aboutquality of FBI data.
December 1969- Huston asks Sullivan to have the Bureau pre-
pare a reporton the November mortonum
showing that the Weathermc i were to
blame for the violence not the New Mobiliza-
tion (a conclusion agreed upon by Huston
and Sullivan and contrary to the position of
the Department of Justice).
January 1970- ----------------------------------- Army domestic surveillance program is
revealed; Ervin begins investigation; Huston
continues responsibilities for monitoring and
disseminating FBI intelligence to the White
House; student riots at UC Santa Barbara.March 1970 ------------------------------------ Explosion of Greenwich Village townhouse
'bomb factory;" Weathermen bombings of
corporation offices in New York; increase in
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.COMMITTEE STAFF--Continued
Date Central event Related developments
March 19, 1970.------------.-....-------------------------Executive Protection Service establinhed,
placing a heavier guard around embassies.
Apr. 4,1970 ----------------------------------------- 40 000 march down Pennsylvania Ave. in
Apr.22, 1970--------- Meeting in Haldeman's office: Huston is told
to meet regularly with intelligence agencies
on questions of domestic violence and
report to the White House; decision that
Nixon should meet with intelligence com-
munity principals regarding intelligence
gaps; Cambodian incursion prevents meet-
ing from being held in May.
May 1970----...--..-----------------------------------------Kent State and Jackson State shootings; anti-war demonstrations; Hoover terminates FBI
liasion to CIA; Army phases oat domestic
June 4, 1970--------- Huston recommends to Nixon that Sullivan be
named chairman of work group for Special
Report; earlier, Huston and ullivan had
met together to outline the restraints on
intelligence collection which Huston could
show to Nixon in order to persuade him to
establish the Interagency Committee on
Intelligence (ICI) (ad hoc).
June 5, 1970 ---------.. Nixon holds meeting in White House to create
ICI (ad hoc); Hoover named chairman;
present at the meeting with Nixon are:
Hoover, Helms Bennett Gayler, Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Finch, and Huston.
June8, 1970 .....----.--- Hoover convenes meeting of intelligence
principals to plan the writing of a Special
Report for the President; names Sullivan
work group chairman; meeting attended by
Helms, Hoover, Gayler, Bennett, Huston,
Sullivan, and G. Moore.
June 9, 1970.--------- First meeting of ICl (ad hoc) work group at
Langley; discussion on the purpose of the
assembled group; each agency assigned
task of preparing a list of restraints hamper-
ing intelligence collection.
June 10, 1970----e-------------------------------------Sullivan is promoted to No. 3 man is theBureau, succeeding De Launch as Assistant
to the Director; De Lunch retires on July 20.
1970.
June 12, 1970--------- Second meeting of work group -------
June 17, 1970---------Third meeting of wark groap
June: 23, 1970---------Fourth and final meeting of the work groupS
June 23, 1970- ----------------------------------------- Hoover terminates all FBI formal inaison with
NSA, DIA, Secret Service, and the military
services.
June 25, 1970 -------- . ..Principals meet in Hoover's office tN sign the
June 26, 1970--------- A coyo h pca Report delivered to
HuBton at the White House.
July 1970 ------------------------------------------------- John Dean transfers to tbe White House from
Justice, where he had often represented the
Government in discussions with protest
leaders about demonstration permits for the
Early July 1970- In a memo to 
Haldeman entited "Operational
Restraints on fintelligence Collection,"
Hustos recommends that Nixon select most
of the options relaxing restraints on intel-
ligence collection; his recommendation
he says, reflects the coesenss of the IC
(ad hoc), not just his own viewpoint. Huston
writes a separate memo encouraging Nixon
to implement tbe Special Report options
in a face-to-face meeting with the Agency
chiefs; otherwise, thought Huston, Hoover
might not accept the relaxations.
July 9, 1970.- ---- -In a memo, Husto proclaims himself the
"exclusive contact point at the White
House on matters of domestic intelligence
or internal security.
July 14, 1970--------- Haldeman writes memo to Hsanton saying that
Nixon had approned Hustons plan, though
he did not agree to the face-to-face an-
nouncement of the decision. Nixon tells
Haldeman, who tells Huston, that he did
not want to take the time to call the Agency
Directors in.
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July 23, 1970--------- Huston prepares a memo on Nixon's approval
of the extreme options, has the memo ap-
proved by Haldeman, and sends itto Helms,
Hoover, Gayler, and Bennett. Sullivan calls
Huston soon thereafter to say that Hoover
was furious about the memo and intended
to see Mitchell Hoover calls and writes
Mitchell to comp)ain (the firsttime Mitchell
hears about the Special Report). Hoover
goes to Mitchell's office to object to the
removal of restraints on intelligence col-
lection methods; Mitchell supports Hoover's
obectives.
July 27, 1970.--------- Mitcheli confers with the President. Haldeman
calls Huston to say that Mitchell has talked
to Nixon about the Huston Plan, and the
July 23, decision memo was being recalled
so that Nixon, Hoover, Mitchell, and Halde-
man could reconsider the plan. David Mc-
Manus of the White House Situation Room
telephones each agency to request the re-
turn of the decision memo and the Special
Report.
July 28, 1970---------The agencies return the decision memoran-
dums to the White House Situation Room.
Aug. 3, 1970--------- Huston and Haldeman "hassle" verbally
about whether Nixon should let Hoover's
objections to the Huston Plan prevail.
Aug. 5, 1970--------- Huston writes a memo to Haldeman urging
implementation of the Presidential decision
reflected in the July 23, memo.
Aug. 7, 1970----------In a memo to Haldeman, Huston advises.(1)
that Haldeman meet with Mitchellto secure
his support for the President's decision; (2)
that the FBI Director be informed the deci-
sion will stand; and (3)that all intelligence
agencies are to proceed to implement them
at once.
Aug. 10, 1970--------- Huston is shifted to a subordinate position
under John Dean, who is charged with
assuming Huston's intelligence responsi-
bilities in the White House. Henceforth,
Huston's main responsibilities related to
conflict of interest clearances and the re-
view of Executive orders, though he occa-
sionally prepared intelligence reports for
Haldeman and continued to be the liaison
in the White House for FBI information.
Huston also worked on a White House his-
tory of Vietnam negotiations.
Aug. 14, 1970 ---------------------------------------- Huston ask IRS for a progress report on it
review of the operations of ideological
Late August.---------- Haldeman shows Dean the Huston Plan and
asks him to implement it.
Aug. 25, 1970 ---------------------------------------- In a memo to Haldeman, Huston urges White
House expansion of Subversive Activities
Control Board via an Executive order.
Sept. 10, 1970 ---------------------------------------- Huston writes a memo to Haldman on the
subject of air hijacking in which he states
the seed for improved intelligence commu-
nity coordination, referring to Hoover as the
chief obstacle.
Sept. 17, 1970.-------- Mitchell has lunch at CIA to discuss possi-
bility of improved interagency coordination;
meets with Dean in the afternoon and says
that he opposes Huston Plan but (unlike
Hoover), approves of an interagency evalua-
ation committee to improve intelligence co-
ordination. In a memo to Haldeman, Dean
recommends the establishment of such a
committee as a first step toward imple-
menting the Huston Plan. Haldeman concurs.
Sept. 18, 1970.-------- In a memo to Mitchell, Dean recommends the
creation of an Intelligence Evaluation Com-
mittee (IEC) for the improved coordination
and evaluation of domestic intelligence. The
Interdivisional Information Unit in the De-
partment of Justice would provide cover for
IEC. (The IDIU monitored information on
ci disturbances for ttHe AG.)
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Sept. 21, 1970 ---------------------------------------- In a memo to Haldeman, Huston complains
thJt the IRS has failed to take any notable
actions againnt ideological organizatin.
In a memo to IRS, HuHton recommends that
the Agency put together a small group of
agents to uoe information gleaned from ta
records "to harass or embarrass" certain
individuals.
Dec. 3 1970------IEC holds first meeting in Dean's office ---
Jan. 14, 197i ---------An unsigned memo an Department of Justice
stationer goes to Mitchell, Ehrlichman,
and Haldeman, recommending implemen-
tation of the Hasten Plan and supposedly
reflecting unanimous IEC opinion.
Feb. 3, 1971.---------- Hoover refuses to provide FBI staff for IEC...
Mar. 29, 31, 1971.---.-.- Hoover, Helms, Gayler meet in Mitchell's
office to discuss relaxation of restraints on
intelligence collection.
June 13,1971--------- Pentagon Papers are published; Huston re-
turns to law practice in Indiana soon there-
after, but continues to serve as a consultant
to the White House throughout the year.
July 2, 1971. ------------------------------------------ Erlichman forms "Plumbers" grp at
Nixon's request.
Oct. 6,1971.------------------------------------------Sullivan resigns from the Bureau.
May 2, 1972 ------------------------------------------ Hoover dies.
May I-June 1972 ------------------------------------------- Watergate break-ins.
Oct. 7, 1972 ------------------------------------------ Huston is named a member of a Census
Bureau Advisory Committee on privacy and
confidentiality.
Apr30 1973- -- John Dean is fired as White House Counsel.
June ei3g ro-m te Beiasheud................
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